Cooke, "Beyond Dignity and Difference"

European Journal of Political
Theory
http://ept.sagepub.com
Beyond Dignity and Difference: Revisiting the Politics of Recognition

Maeve Cooke
European Journal of Political Theory 2009; 8; 76
DOI: 10.1177/1474885108096961
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article
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Beyond Dignity and Difference

Revisiting the Politics of Recognition
Maeve Cooke
University College Dublin, Ireland
European Journal
of Political Theory
SAGE Publications Ltd,
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
issn 1474-8851, 8(1) 7695
[DOI: 10.1177/1474885108096961]
ABSTRACT:
Revisiting Taylors 1992 account of the politics of recognition, I argue that

he is right to discern a strand in contemporary politics that goes beyond the demand for
recognition of dignity. Against Taylor I contend that this is best understood as a concern
not for recognition of difference but for the value of something that is not universally
shared, such as a particular ethical conception, cultural tradition or religious belief and
practice. Using the examples of three social movements I show the relevance of this for
contemporary politics. My empirically based argument is supported normatively by a
discussion of Hegels critique of morality as conscience in his Phenomenology. Referring
to Axel Honneths theory of recognition I highlight the lack of attention to this kind of
concern for recognition in contemporary political and social theory. I conclude by
specifying the key features of the concept of recognition most appropriate for
responding to it publicly under conditions of value-pluralism.
KEY WORDS:
difference, Hegel, Honneth, politics of recognition, Taylor
What is the point of the politics of recognition? What does the concept of recognition add to our thinking about justice or freedom or any other normative aim of
political association and action? This question is not easy to answer. Certainly,
Charles Taylors seminal essay The Politics of Recognition seemed to capture
the mood of the times when it first appeared in 1992.1 His essay sparked off a
variety of theoretical attempts to conceptualize demands for political justice as
demands for recognition and may well have contributed towards the new idiom of
recognition in political claims-making that emerged in the 1990s. However, from
the beginning it was subjected to vigorous criticism and, rereading it some 15
years later, it is hard to see why the essay was quite so influential. Nonetheless, I
will suggest in the following that Taylors discussion is guided by an important
intuition that has continued relevance for political theory and practice. In my
view, he is right to suggest that there is a strand in contemporary politics that goes
beyond the demand for recognition of universal capacities or qualities; moreover,
that this should be seen as a demand for recognition of the worth of something
76
Contact address: Professor Maeve Cooke, School of Philosophy, University College

Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.
Email: Maeve.Cooke@ucd.ie
Cooke: Beyond Dignity and Difference

that is not universally shared. However, Taylors efforts to address this kind of
concern for recognition are hindered by his interpretation of specificity as difference and, in particular, his correlation of the politics of difference with the norm
of authenticity. In order to understand what is at stake and to respond to it appropriately, therefore, we shall have to move beyond the framework of Taylors
politics of recognition. Three contemporary social movements will be used to
illustrate my point and to provide empirical support for my thesis that this kind
of concern for recognition calls for an appropriate public response. In the following section, drawing on Hegels critique of morality as conscience in his
Phenomenology of Spirit, I reinforce this empirically based argument with a normative one. Then, focusing on the work of Axel Honneth, I discuss the lack of
attention paid to this kind of concern for recognition by contemporary political
and social theorists. In conclusion, I identify the key features of the concept of
recognition most appropriate for responding to this kind of concern.
Revisiting Taylor
Taylor famously distinguishes between two meanings of the politics of recognition. The first is what he calls the politics of equal dignity. This focuses on what
all human beings have in common and is governed by the norm of autonomy. The
second is what he calls the politics of difference. This focuses on each groups or
each persons distinctness from all others and is governed by the norm of authenticity. Taylor connects these two versions of the politics of recognition with two
types of social movements. The politics of equal dignity is held to correspond to
a type of social movement in which a concern for legal issues is paramount: examples might be current campaigns for human rights in the detention centre in
Guntanamo Bay or for religious freedom in Tibet. By contrast, the politics of
difference is connected with social movements in which the principal issues are
identity-related: examples might be campaigns to protect and celebrate the distinct ethnic identity of the Roma or Taylors own example of the Qubcois. He
suggests, furthermore, that these two types of social movement form a historical
sequence: the politics of equal dignity is presented as historically prior to the
politics of difference which is not to dispute its persistence in contemporary
politics and, accordingly, the shift to a politics of difference is seen as something
historically new. On his account, the politics of difference grows organically out
of the politics of universal dignity through one of those shifts whereby a new
understanding of the human social condition imparts a radically new meaning to
an old principle.2
Taylors account of the politics of recognition has been subjected to various
criticisms. One objection is that he postulates a sequence of types of social movement that is historically inaccurate and misleading. Some critics argue that
Taylors account obscures the ways in which, historically, issues of legal rights and
issues of identity and, correspondingly, the politics of equal dignity and the poli-
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European Journal of Political Theory 8(1)
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tics of difference, have always been intermeshed; moreover, that presenting the
politics of difference as a historically new development disregards the ways in
which identity-related issues were central to the resistance movements of the 19th
and early 20th centuries, such as womens campaigns for the right to vote or the
black revolt against slavery.3A second objection is that his account of the politics of
difference is tied to an interpretation of difference as authenticity that seems to
preclude the kind of discriminating recognition this kind of politics demands. This
was one of the objections I raised against Taylor in a critical discussion of his essay
some years ago.4 I argued that the politics of difference runs up against serious
problems when it calls for recognition of authenticity, understood by Taylor as
inwardly generated uniqueness. The main problem is one of critical evaluation.
We can see this by recalling the point of Taylors distinction between the politics
of equal dignity and the politics of difference. If the two are to be distinguished
along the lines he suggests, the kind of recognition called for by the politics of
difference cannot be an undiscriminating recognition of authenticity. A politics
that recognizes everyone equally for their authenticity fits the model of the politics
of equal dignity: it simply interprets the concept of human dignity in terms of
uniqueness. Taylor is aware of the need to discriminate evaluatively between
manifestations of authenticity, drawing attention to the distinction between
regarding the creative activity of individuals or groups as worthwhile and declaring oneself on their side, even if their creations are not at all impressive.5 As he sees
it, failure to critically assess the validity of particular claims to authenticity leads
easily to subjectivism, which, for him, is shot through with confusion.6 He concludes that we should make only a presumption of worth, which serves as a starting
point for critical evaluation. However, critical evaluation runs up against two
serious difficulties. First, in contexts in which there is a plurality of conceptions of
ethical value and no generally acceptable overarching framework for
distinguishing between them, ethical judgements will be contested. Second, in the
case of claims to authenticity there is a further complication. Since this is an
inwardly generated form of uniqueness, no external court of judgement is
available: only the individuals and groups concerned can pass judgement on the
validity of such claims. In the closing pages of his essay Taylor grapples with these
difficulties but does not resolve them satisfactorily. In my critical discussion of the
essay, my response was threefold. I first argued that he distinguishes too sharply
between two versions of the politics of recognition and, furthermore, proposes a
problematic correlation of the norm of autonomy with the politics of equal dignity
and the norm of authenticity with the politics of difference. If we take autonomy
to mean the capacity to form and develop an identity-specific conception of the
good7 and, if as Taylor suggests, the deep concern of the politics of difference is
singularity, then the norm of autonomy is also central to this version of the politics of recognition. I then proposed a more differentiated account of the politics of
difference. Whereas Taylor interprets the demand for recognition of difference
solely as a demand for recognition of authenticity, I identified four other interpre-

tations of this demand, one of which was a demand for recognition of autonomy,
understood in the sense already mentioned. Arguing that some of the other interpretations, too, run up against the problem of critical evaluation encountered by
Taylor, I concluded that only versions of the politics of difference that appeal to
the norm of autonomy are able to avoid the subjectivism he deplores.
At first glance this may seem merely to call for a more fluid boundary-line
between Taylors two versions of the politics of recognition. Closer consideration
reveals, however, that it undermines the very concept of a politics of difference as
Taylor understands it. This is because the versions of the politics of recognition I
ended up endorsing were ones that fit Taylors description of the politics of equal
dignity: they focus on what all human beings have in common, in this case a capacity to form and develop identity-related conceptions of the good. Since, for
Taylor, the politics of difference is the latest stage in a historical progression (we
will recall his contention that it grows organically out of the politics of equal dignity as part of a shift in the western modern social imaginary), it also raises a question as to the contemporary relevance of the concept of the politics of recognition.
In hindsight I think my conclusion was too hasty. I still hold that Taylors
correlation of the politics of difference with the norm of authenticity is problematic. Moreover, I continue to be suspicious of the demand for recognition of any
kind of difference. At the same time, I think Taylors account of the politics of
recognition is guided by an important intuition. This is the intuition that contemporary politics must take seriously a concern for recognition that goes beyond
a demand for recognition of universal qualities or capacities; moreover, that it is a
concern for recognition of the worth or value of things that are not universally
shared.8 To be sure, Taylors gaze is rather narrow: he focuses on the worth of
particular cultural identities, specifically, the Francophone culture of Quebec.
Since this is coupled with an interpretation of identity as difference, understood
as authenticity in the sense of inwardly generated distinctiveness, it leads him into
the difficulties I have outlined. It is easier to retain hold of Taylors intuition if we
give up his focus on demands for recognition of particular cultural identities and
expand his gaze to include claims for recognition of the value of particular substantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and
practices. As the following examples show, Taylor is right to identify a concern for
recognition that does not fit the category of the politics of equal dignity. But he is
wrong to suggest that it is captured by the idea of a politics of difference. It is not
a demand for recognition of authenticity, or indeed of difference in any sense, but
a demand for recognition of a substantive value, be it the value of a concrete conception of the good, cultural tradition or religious belief and practice. I will argue
that there are good reasons to take seriously this kind of concern for recognition.
This calls on us to consider what it would mean to respond to it appropriately
under contemporary conditions of value-pluralism.
Let me start with three examples of contemporary social movements that are
motivated, at least in part, by a concern for public recognition of the worth of
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something that is not a universal capacity or quality. Despite some significant
differences between these movements, they all seek recognition for something
that cannot be captured within the framework of the politics of equal dignity.
The Slow Food Movement
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Constituted in 1989, its manifesto signed in Paris by delegates from 15 different

countries, the international Slow Food movement is founded upon the concept of
eco-gastronomy, which emphasizes the strong connections between plate and
planet.9 The movement describes itself as working to defend biodiversity in our
food supply, spread taste education and connect producers of excellent foods with
co-producers through events and initiatives. Its philosophy is that everyone has a
fundamental right to pleasure and consequently the responsibility to protect the
heritage of food, tradition and culture that make this pleasure possible. Let us
assume as seems clear from its self-description that this movement seeks public recognition for its philosophy and mission. What kind of recognition does it
seek? To describe it as a demand for recognition of what we share in common
seems to miss the point. Despite the movements use of the term right to pleasure, it appears that its main purpose is not to unite all human beings through
appeal to some universal human quality or capacity (for example, dignity or
uniqueness or even pleasure) but to educate people to an appreciation of the benefits of biodiversity, of the value of local food traditions and of the importance of
taking an interest in the food we eat, how it tastes, where it comes from and how it
affects the rest of the world. Correspondingly, it seems less concerned to establish
that right legally than to win public recognition for the value of eco-gastronomy.
It might be objected that there is no difference in principle between the Slow
Food movements campaign for eco-gastronomy and human rights movements
since, like these, it seeks recognition for something that is held to be of universal
value. The difference is merely that the good in question is not yet recognized as
such by everyone. Nowadays, human rights movements can normally take for
granted that the value of, for example, the dignity of the person is universally
recognized and are concerned instead with inclusion: with expanding the category
of those who count as persons. However, the dignity of the person was not always
recognized as a universal value. The Slow Food movement, so the objection runs,
can be described as a human rights movement in an early stage, when the principal task is not inclusion, but to establish the universal value of the good in
question.
It is true that the Slow Food movement has a universalizing impulse (I shall
come back to this). Nonetheless, the objection is unconvincing. To categorize it
as a human rights movement is to disregard a central difference between its aims
and those of such movements. Since they are held to be universal, the qualities or
capacities for which human rights movements seek recognition have to be construed sufficiently abstractly to accommodate the multiplicity of particular ends

motivating human beings. In this sense, the recognition they seek is formal: it
abstracts from the concrete content of particular conceptions of the good, traditions, beliefs and practices. By contrast, the Slow Food movement is concerned to
win recognition not for an abstract right to pleasure, but for a right to pleasure
that has a determinate content: it seeks recognition for the value of a substantive
end. Eco-gastronomy is a concrete good: it commits those who value it to specific
beliefs and specific ways of life. It is the value of this concrete good that is at stake
in its campaign. This is why it does not fit the category of the politics of equal
dignity. It is also what connects it to my other examples.
The Welsh-Language Initiatives: Mentrau Iaith

These are local organizations in Wales that offer support to communities to
increase and develop their use of the Welsh language.10 Their self-professed aims
are to offer helpful information to parents seeking to raise their children bilingually and/or to educate them through the medium of Welsh; they also counsel
public and voluntary organizations on how to increase their use of Welsh and
advise businesses eager to offer a bilingual service to their customers. In addition
they seek to provide social and leisure opportunities for children and young people
to use Welsh, as well as opportunities for Welsh learners to use their Welsh outside the classroom. In this case, too, there is an evident concern for public recognition. And, once again, describing this as a demand for recognition of what we
share in common seems to miss the point. As I read the movements mission statement, its concern is less to unite human beings through appeal to some allegedly
universal norm or quality than to bring to public attention the value of the Welsh
language and the cultural traditions of which this is part. As in the case of the Slow
Food movement, recognition is sought in the first instance not for an abstract
right, but for the value of a concrete good. This is not to say that legal or public
recognition of an abstract universal right for example, a right to linguistic selfdetermination is not also at stake: it is to suggest that this movements demand
for recognition would not be fully satisfied by recognition of such a right.
The Assembly for the Protection of Hijab

This is a campaign to allow Muslim girls to wear the hijab in schools.11 Launched
in London in 2004 by the Muslim Womens Group and the Muslim Association
of Britain, this international movement describes itself as seeking the protection
of Muslim womens right to wear the hijab in accordance with their beliefs and of
every womans right to dress as modestly and as comfortably as she pleases. Its
self-professed aims are to bring an end to the hijab ban wherever it has already
been imposed and to prevent any further spreading of the ban. It seeks, in addition, to provide a platform for Muslim women to express their views, to expose
and discourage any false stereotypes that present Muslim women as being
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oppressed and to liberate Muslim women from any form of race, religious or sex
discrimination. In this case, the appeal to universal rights is particularly striking.
Those involved in the campaign appear to seek recognition for something all
humans share in common, for example, a conception of dignity that is independent of race, religion and sex or a capacity for self-determination that extends to
matters of dress. Certainly, for many people actively involved in or sympathetic to
the campaign, its purpose may best be captured in these terms. However, two
comments are relevant here. First, despite the rhetoric of its mission statement,
the Assembly clearly sees wearing the hijab as the public expression of a deeply
held religious conviction. It does not consider it simply a matter of personal
preference on a par with a penchant for bright-coloured clothing or the fashions
of the 1950s. To express something publicly is to seek public recognition for the
importance or value of what is expressed. Insofar as the Assembly is also concerned with public expression, therefore, it seeks public recognition not just for a
conception of human dignity, or for the right to dress as one pleases, but for the
importance of particular religious beliefs and practices. In this case too, therefore,
recognition is sought for the value of a concrete good. Second, its employment of
the language of universal rights could be due to its adoption of an assimilation
model of social integration. Among contemporary sociologists it is generally
accepted that assimilation is the first ideal-typical mode of incorporation of outsider groups into the civil societies of western modernity.12 Incorporation as
assimilation requires outsider groups Jews, blacks, women or, in this case,
Muslims to shed their outsider identities completely upon entering the public
domain. However, assimilative incorporation is usually considered normatively
unsatisfactory. This is because a stigma remains attached to the cast-aside outsider
qualities, infringing against the egalitarian requirements of justice. Some also
consider it empirically unstable, since it is premised on the vilification and exclusion of the identities of those who belong to the formerly outsider groups.13 For
these reasons, it can be expected to give way to a hyphenated mode of incorporation: here, outsider groups partially give up their outsider identities in favour of a
new form of identity that goes beyond all existing insider or outsider identities.
However, some sociologists regard this mode of social integration, too, as normatively unsatisfactory. This is because outsider qualities are not redefined and
there is no valuing of otherness; rather, the new identities adopted by outsider
groups reflect the norms and values of the already dominant social groups. This
suggests the need for a third mode of incorporation. Following this line of argument, Jeffrey Alexander argues that only the multicultural mode of social
integration leads to the requisite reconfiguration of outsider and insider qualities;
on the multicultural model, outsider qualities are no longer seen as stigmatizing
but as valuable in themselves.14 Following Alexander we could surmise that, on a
multicultural model of incorporation, wearing the hijab would no longer be seen
as irrelevant from the point of view, for example, of equal respect for the dignity
of all women; rather it would be seen in a positive way as a public expression of a

deeply held religious conviction on the part of a formerly outsider group.15 To be
sure, the empirical and normative arguments underpinning this sociological
account are a matter of debate; nonetheless, insofar as they have some initial plausibility, they may help to explain the campaigns focus on what all human beings
share in common and its use of the language of rights, despite its evident belief
that wearing the hijab is not a normatively irrelevant aspect of personal identity
for many human beings and that it is the public expression of an important conviction.
From Empirical to Normative Arguments

One implication of the foregoing is that the formulation demand for recognition
may be misleading. What I have hitherto referred to as demands are sometimes
better described as needs, desires or expectations of recognition, since those to
whom such needs, desires or expectations are attributed may not be conscious of
them, may not articulate them explicitly or may misconstrue the kind of recognition that is required. This implies, in turn, that empirical arguments relating to
actually formulated demands for recognition are insufficient to justify the politics
of recognition: the reasons for responding politically to needs, desires or expectations for recognition are always also normative in character.
I have suggested that Taylor is correct to discern a concern for recognition that
cannot be accommodated within the framework of the politics of equal dignity,
which, as we have seen, focuses on qualities or capacities that are shared in common. Using the examples of three contemporary social movements, I identified,
respectively, a concern for recognition of the value of a specific substantive
conception of the good, a specific linguistic and cultural tradition and a specific
religious belief and practice. In each case, I perceived a concern for recognition of
something that is not universally shared; indeed, in the case of the Welsh language
and wearing the hijab, it is not clear that the movements in question even aim at
universalization. But the examples also make clear that the issue is not recognition
of difference. The Slow Food movement does not claim that eco-gastronomy is
valuable because it is different, but because it is the right approach to life for
human beings. The Welsh-language initiatives do not claim that speaking Welsh
is valuable because it is different, but because it is an intrinsic part of a cultural
tradition that is conducive to human flourishing. The Assembly for the Protection
of Hijab does not claim that wearing the hijab is valuable because it is different,
but because it is the public expression of religious belief in the one true God.
Evidently, therefore, in order to take account of this kind of concern for recognition, we need to move beyond the two categories proposed by Taylor. However,
before moving onwards, we should recall one further element of our discussion of
his essay. This is the problem of critical evaluation that arises when recognition is
required for something that is not universally shared. As we have seen, this gives
rise to the following difficulty. On the one hand, there is a need for discriminat-
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ing recognition; if subjectivism is to be avoided, uncritical approbation of the
value of a particular substantive conception of the good, cultural tradition or
religious belief and practice is not an option. On the other hand, in contexts in
which there is a plurality of conceptions of value and no generally acceptable overarching framework for distinguishing between them, critical evaluation does not
appear to be an option either. As we have also seen, in my earlier discussion of
Taylor this problem of critical evaluation led me to reject the project of a politics
of difference and to endorse only those versions of the politics of recognition that
are guided by the norm of autonomy. I no longer consider the problem of critical
evaluation quite so intractable; in the next sections, I propose a processual conception of ethical value and corresponding processual conception of recognition
that are initial steps in response to it.16 But responding to the problem of critical
evaluation presupposes that there are good normative arguments for doing so.
For, even if, empirically, I am correct to identify a concern for recognition of the
value of particular substantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and
religious beliefs and practices, its empirical reality is not sufficient reason to take
it seriously. Just as a normative theory of recognition cannot dispense with evaluative distinctions, a normative political theory has to distinguish evaluatively
between the kinds of claims to recognition it deems worthy of response.
Moreover, as indicated, the fact that a claim to recognition is articulated publicly
is not sufficient reason for regarding it as such. Indeed, we should beware of taking
as our point of orientation those normative claims that have already gained public notice in social movements. For one thing, as Axel Honneth points out, there
is a danger here of reducing social suffering and moral discontent to just that part
of it that has already been made visible in the political public sphere by publicitysavvy organizations.17 For another, in every society there are structural and
political reasons why some groups are more visible than others. Drawing attention to everyday, embryonic forms of social misery and moral injustice that are no
less pressing for not yet being in the public eye, Honneth makes the case for
thematizing socially unjust states of affairs that so far have been deprived of public
attention, and for speaking on behalf of those who suffer from them.18 Honneths
words of caution are well-taken. Thus, if contemporary political theory is to
respond to a need, expectation or demand for recognition of the kind I have
attributed to the Slow Food movement, Welsh-language initiatives and Assembly
for the Protection of Hijab, it should have good normative reasons for doing so.
In the next section I provide one such reason.
The Relevance of Hegel
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Why is public recognition of the value of particular substantive conceptions of the

good, cultural traditions or religious beliefs and practices important from the
point of view of normative political theory? One good reason is to avoid what we
might call the privatization of ethical concerns.19 It is noteworthy that a trench-

ant critique of ethical privatization can be found in Hegels Phenomenology of
Spirit, to whose account of recognition Taylor is, of course, indebted.20 Towards
the end of that book, Hegel presents the Romantic understanding of morality as
conscience as a step forward in the development of Spirit and, specifically, of the
concept of moral freedom.21 In line with his dialectical view of history, he shows
how morality as conscience overcomes some of the limitations of the Kantian
interpretation of moral freedom as duty. At the same time, he shows how it has
weaknesses of its own that give rise to new problems.
Hegel regards the Romantic view of morality as conscience as overcoming the
incoherence and duplicity of the Kantian conception of moral freedom. One
of Hegels criticisms of Kant is that he locates moral dignity in a capacity for selfdetermination, while at the same time conceiving of self-determination as subjection to a moral law whose authority derives from a source external to the self. The
objection, if I understand it correctly, is that we cannot at one and the same time
take seriously the component of self-prescription in the idea of moral freedom and
attribute to some other consciousness the authority of the moral law the individual
prescribes to herself. For Hegel, the Romantic view of morality as conscience
addresses this objection by moving moral authority inwards. Rather than appealing to an external moral authority (for example, the Kantian moral law), the
Romantic self determines from its own self what is true or right: In the strength of
its own self-assurance it possesses the majesty of absolute autarky.22 By seeing its
own inner voice its conscience as the sole moral authority, it is able to do justice
to the idea of moral freedom as moral self-determination and overcomes the
shortcomings of the Kantian conception. However, its strength in this regard is
also its weakness. As we have seen, the Romantic self possesses absolute autarky.
Since it itself is the sole arbiter of the validity of its judgements and actions, no
other self can judge their morality. Given that the self is always an empirical self,
with a particular physical and psychic constitution, and particular experiences
gained in real historical situations, this means, concretely, that we have no way of
distinguishing between judgements and actions that meet the demands of objective moral authority judgements and actions in conformity with the morally
binding law and the caprice of the individual and the contingency of her natural
impulses and inclinations. As Hegel puts it: Conscience . . . in the majesty of its
elevation above specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it
pleases into its knowing and willing. It is the moral genius which knows the inner
voice of what it immediately knows to be a divine voice . . .23
There is a second reason why Hegel regards the Romantic view as a step forward in the development of the concept of moral freedom. Unlike the Kantian
conception, in which the validity of the moral law is given prior to all experience
and in which, as a consequence, moral freedom is essentially independent of
recognition by others, the Romantic view ties the freedom of the individual to the
recognition by others of the moral validity of her judgements and actions. But
here, too, the weakness of the Romantic position is apparent. Since conscience is
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the sole arbiter of moral validity, recognition of the morally judging and acting
individual is purely formal. The Romantic self declares itself to be the truth,24 and
in so doing, recognizes every other self as a self who, in acting from conscience,
always speaks the truth; in turn, it is acknowledged by every other self as such a
self.25 What is recognized, however, is not the moral quality of the selfs actions,
but its formal capacity for self-determination. Since conscience possesses absolute
autarky, no one individual can judge the moral quality of anothers judgements
and actions; they can merely acknowledge them from the outside, as it were, as the
expression of a self-contained source of moral validity. Using Taylors terminology we might say that this is the politics (or ethics) of equal dignity: Romantic
selves focus on what we share in common, recognizing the universal human
capacity for radical and absolute moral self-determination. However, Hegel holds
purely formal recognition to have at least two unwelcome consequences. He sees
it as leading, first, to feelings of emptiness and a pathological inability to act and,
second, to social relations of mistrust and hostility.
One unwelcome consequence of purely formal recognition is that it produces a
hollow self that suffers from feelings of emptiness and incapacity for action;
accordingly, for Hegel, the Romantic self is yet another form of unhappy consciousness.26 Since no external recognition of its substance is available, the self
becomes a hollow object filled with a sense of emptiness. Moreover, in order to
preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world; thus,
its self is reduced to extreme abstraction.27 It becomes disordered to the point of
madness, wastes itself in yearning and pines away in consumption.28 As Hegel puts
it: In this transparent purity of its moments, an unhappy, so-called beautiful soul,
its light dies away within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapour that dissolves
into thin air.29
Another unwelcome consequence of purely formal recognition is that it leads
to relations of mistrust and hostility towards others that seriously threaten social
and political cohesion. As we have seen, the Romantic self exists within purely
formal relations of intersubjective recognition, in which each self is recognized as
its own source of moral authority; since there can be no external acknowledgement of the value or worth of its moral judgements and actions, these become a
purely private matter. As Hegel points out, since only each self can assess the
moral validity of its judgements and action, each self can regard only its judgements and actions as morally good. The implication of this is that each self must
regard the judgements and actions of others as evil. As he puts it: Others . . . do
not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil, or rather they not only
cannot know, but they must also take it to be evil.30 His point seems to be that, in
the moral domain, everything that is not judged to be good is judged to be not
good and what is morally not good is evil. At first glance this looks like an implausibly strong claim. On closer examination, however, it is hard to dispute. I take
Hegel to mean that we cannot in the long run abstain from passing judgement on
actions and beliefs we regard as morally relevant. If we do pass judgement on such

actions and beliefs, our options are simple: they must either be judged to be
morally good or morally not good (evil). If each self regards the others actions
and judgments as evil, because only its own can be judged to be morally good, the
inevitable result is reciprocal feelings of mistrust and hostility, radically undermining the possibility of social and political cohesion.
If Hegels argument is convincing, we have good reasons to seek to establish
forms of social and political association that avoid ethical privatization. Moreover,
it suggests that avoiding such privatization is a matter of establishing the right
kind of relations of intersubjective recognition. In this regard Hegels critique of
morality as conscience enhances Taylors account of the politics of recognition in
at least two respects. First, whereas Taylor could be read as simply charting two
steps in the movement of the western modern social imaginary, neither which is
normatively better or worse than the other,31 Hegels approach is unequivocally
normative: he not only insists that purely formal recognition is insufficient for
the purposes of realizing human freedom; he leaves no doubt that it hinders its
realization.32 Second, Hegel suggests a way forward for the politics of recognition
that is blocked by Taylors interpretation of particularity as difference, and difference as inwardly generated uniqueness. As we have seen, Taylors account
of the politics of difference ends in an impasse: he presents the politics of difference as the historical successor to the politics of equal dignity, but interprets
difference in a way that prevents the discriminating recognition the politics of
difference requires in order to be coherent. By contrast Hegel indicates a solution
to the problem he identifies. We have seen the problem to be the Romantic selfs
absolute autarky in the domain of moral judgement; in other words, its claim to
exclusive ownership of its ethical judgements and actions. In the final pages of the
relevant section of the Phenomenology, Hegel offers an account of Spirits progression beyond morality as conscience, which can be read as the eventual resolution
of the problem.
Although his account of the progression is not well developed, it contains some
useful pointers. In this account, morality as conscience undergoes a number of
unstable transitions before finally reaching a mode of consciousness in which the
previous tensions between self and others are reconciled.33 For our present purposes, the most significant feature of this progression is that Hegel describes it as
a movement outwards.34 Instead of keeping its knowledge of itself to itself,35 refusing to let its own inner being come forth into the outer existence of speech,36 the
self now brings its formerly completely inner being into outer existence.37 He
refers to a reconciling Yea in which each self lets go of its formerly antithetical
relation to the other, expanding its existence as a self-contained I into an intersubjective one.38
What I take from Hegels story is the claim that each self, if it is to progress
towards the realization of moral freedom, must give up its claims to own its ethical judgements and actions and release them into the public domain, where they
will face the criticisms and challenges of other selves. In other words, if it is to
87

progress towards the realization of moral freedom, the individual self may no
longer see itself as the sole authority determining the value of its ethical judgements and actions; rather, the value of ethical judgements and actions becomes
something to be worked out cooperatively by a plurality of selves in processes of
public challenge and response. On such a view, ethical value is not something
fixed and given, but rather a property that emerges processually by way of public
contestation. I see this as a valuable intuition. In my concluding remarks I contend
that a processual model of recognition fits best with a processual conception of
ethical value.
Beyond Honneths Formal Conception of Sittlichkeit
88
Hegels critique of ethical privatization shows the importance of public recognition of the value of ethical conceptions. It can be expanded to include related
forms of privatization, such as the privatization of cultural traditions and the
privatization of religious beliefs and practices. Thus, his critique of privatization
calls on us to respond to the kind of concern for public recognition I attributed to
the Slow Food movement, the Welsh-language initiatives and the Assembly for
the Protection of Hijab. It is striking, however, that there has been little attention
to a concern of this kind among contemporary theorists of recognition. Our discussion in the foregoing helps to explain why it slips from view in Taylors
account. But why is it disregarded by the other major contributors to current
debates? Even Honneths critical social theory, which offers one of the most
developed and differentiated contemporary accounts of the relation between
human flourishing and recognition, has no room for the kind of concern for
recognition I have attributed to the social movements mentioned. In the case of
some other theorists, this could be traced back to their understanding of substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and practices as
inherently private or local. Jrgen Habermas holds this view. This leads him, in
the case of conceptions of the good and cultural traditions, to confine public discussion to hermeneutic explication39 and, in the case of religious beliefs and
practices, to a salvaging operation in which the parties involved in discussion seek
to rescue potentially valuable contents for the secular imagination by translating
them into a secular vocabulary.40 Honneth rejects what he sees as Habermass
overly deontological, Kantian approach. In his view, Kantian approaches make
the mistake of splitting off questions of the selfs duties to others from questions
relating to self-realization.41 Against this, Honneth seeks to reintegrate the questions What ought I to do? and What is the best life for me as a human being?
At the same time, he is wary of communitarian approaches, which construe the
good for human beings in terms of the substantive values that constitute the ethos
of a particular community. Instead, he seeks to steer a middle path between
Kantian and communitarian approaches by proposing a formal conception of
ethical life (Sittlichkeit); this specifies only the conditions necessary for self-

realization, leaving open the question of which substantive values are the right
ones. Since Honneth sees recognition by others in a number of dimensions as a
necessary condition of self-realization, this has consequences for his theory of
recognition. It explains his endeavour to specify the relations of recognition
required for self-realization in terms that make no commitment to substantive
ethical values. Thus, the three principal relations of recognition he identifies are
designed to be sufficiently abstract to avoid raising the suspicion that they reflect
a particular vision of the good life. These are, first, recognition of the other as a
particular object of love or affection; second, recognition of the other as the bearer
of legal rights; and third, recognition of the other for her individual achievements
or contributions to society (Leistung).42 The kind of concern for recognition under
discussion in the foregoing cannot be accommodated in this schema. It is obviously not a form of recognition of the other as a particular object of love and
affection and it is hard to see how it could be construed as a form of recognition
of individual achievements or contributions. The category into which it most
easily fits is that of recognition of the other as a bearer of legal rights. However,
as our examples of certain social movements showed, while recognition of rights
is often also an issue, granting the rights in question would not fully satisfy their
concern for recognition.43
I have suggested that the inability of Honneths schema to accommodate recognition of the value of specific substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions
and religious beliefs and practices is due to his concern to avoid making selfrealization dependent on particular substantive values. This concern is laudable.
Were his theory to specify in advance the ethical ingredients of a good life, it
would undermine the individuals capacity to form and develop her own conceptions of the good in other words, her autonomy. Nonetheless, Honneth seems
to have missed the middle path he seeks and to have taken instead the Kantian
turning. In his efforts to avoid the danger he associates with communitarianism,
he adopts a Kantian position on ethical value: one that abstracts from the particular ends of individual and groups. He needs to set his theory back onto the
middle path. This requires him to find a way of recognizing the value of particular substantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and religious beliefs
and practices without pre-empting the question of which values are the right ones.
In my discussion of Hegel, I hinted at a solution. As I read Hegels account of
Spirits progression beyond morality as conscience, this is to be understood as a
movement outwards, whereby moral authority is released from its confinement in
inner being and discharged into processes of contestation in the public domain.
This means that ethical value is no longer something each individual determines
for herself by looking inwards, but a matter to be worked out with other individuals in cooperative processes of challenge and response. Such a processual
conception of ethical value has the advantage that it does not specify in advance
which judgements and actions are the right ones; rather, it takes seriously individual autonomy by making it a task for the individuals concerned. Honneth could
89
90
find the middle path he seeks by understanding ethical value in this way. To be
sure, he would have to modify his theory of recognition accordingly and expand
his schema of relations of recognition to include a concern for recognition of
particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs
and practices. This is not a problem in principle. Since the schema in its present
form depends on a combination of empirical and normative arguments, it can
easily be expanded if there are good empirical and normative reasons for doing so.
My discussion in the foregoing provides such reasons. In order to see this, a few
words on the status of Honneths theory of recognition may be helpful.
As indicated, Honneth justifies his schema of three relations of recognition by
way of a combination of empirical and normative arguments. To begin with, his
argument has a strong empirical component.44 The three relations of recognition
he identifies are held to be normative expectations that have emerged in the
historical passage towards bourgeois modernity.45 He claims that they build on
certain anthropologically rooted conditions of intact personality formation, but
have taken on their specific shape as expectations of love or affection, of equal
respect and of recognition of achievements or contributions only in the course of
the last few hundred years. The claim that these are the salient relations of recognition in contemporary capitalist societies relies on the support of convincing
empirical arguments. However, on their own, empirical arguments are insufficient. As we have seen, the actual articulation of a demand for recognition, or even
the empirically verifiable existence of a need or desire for recognition, is not yet
reason to satisfy it. This is why empirical arguments must go hand in hand with
normative arguments, which are always guided by a particular vision of human
flourishing.46 In Honneths case, the vision guiding his theory is one of human
freedom in three dimensions corresponding to the three spheres of recognition
mentioned.47 It is against the background of this idea of freedom that we can
understand one of his central theses: the claim that failure to meet the specified
expectations of recognition results in social pathologies.48
Since Honneths schema of relations of recognition relies on a combination of
empirical and normative arguments, it is open to challenge by convincing arguments of these kinds. My discussion in the foregoing has supplied such arguments.
Empirically, it has identified in contemporary social reality a concern for recognition of the value of particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions
and religious beliefs and practices, which cannot be accommodated within his
schema as it stands. Normatively, it has suggested that lack of public recognition
of the value of particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and
religious beliefs and practices may lead to social pathologies, specifically to feelings of emptiness and an incapacity for action and to mistrust of, and hostility
towards, others.
Thus, my argument challenges Honneths schema in a productive manner by
supplying good empirical and normative reasons for why he should expand it.
Furthermore, the processual conception of value I have proposed fits well with his

processual conception of recognition. For, as the word struggle in the title of his
first major work on recognition makes clear,49 recognition for him is not a static
concept, but a dynamic relation that is fought for in processes of social contestation and, once obtained, always open to new challenges.
Concluding Remarks
This way of understanding the concept of recognition helps us to answer the question of what it would mean to respond to the concern for public recognition of the
value of particular ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and
practices. Drawing together the strands of our discussion, we can now say that
taking seriously this kind of concern for recognition calls for open-ended public
processes of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to convince others
of the value of particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and
religious beliefs and practices.50 For reasons I have elaborated elsewhere, such
public processes of contestation should always involve the exchange of powerful
arguments and counter-arguments, although non-argumentative forms of public
contestation may play a significant, if subsidiary, role.51 I have also argued that
such public processes of contestation should take place at the formal level of political decision-making and law-making, as well as in the informal public sphere.52
Four further observations are important here.
First, in many cases, the projected goal is not general agreement that a particular
substantive conception of the good, tradition, belief or practice should be
embraced by everyone. For example, while the aim of the Slow Food movement
does seem to be that everyone should adopt eco-gastronomy as a way of life, the
other two movements mentioned do not share this universalizing aspiration. The
aim of the Welsh-language initiatives is not that everyone should speak the Welsh
language, but that everyone should acknowledge that speaking the Welsh language is a vital element in maintaining a particular valuable cultural tradition.
Similarly, the aim of the Assembly for the Protection of Hijab is not that everyone should wear the hijab, but that everyone should acknowledge that wearing the
hijab is the expression of a particular deeply held, valuable religious belief. In such
cases, the projected general agreement does not universalize the value in question:
it is not a matter of everyone agreeing that it is valuable for everyone, but of everyone agreeing that it as a valuable way of life for some individuals or groups.53 To be
sure, in order to avoid subjectivism, the argument that something is valuable
for particular individuals and groups must attribute some degree of subjectindependent value to the good in question. Thus, the argument would be, for
example, that speaking Welsh is valuable for particular individuals and groups
because that language offers possibilities for expression that would not otherwise
be available; further, that expressivity is good. Or, that wearing the hijab is
valuable for particular individuals and groups because the power of God can be
experienced only by those who live their lives in certain ways and that wearing the
hijab is one of these ways; further, that experiencing the power of God is good. In
91

allowing for public discussion of the value of something particular, this position is
similar to Taylors presumption of worth: his view that the prerequisite for dialogue is a presumption that a particular cultural identity is valuable. However,
Taylor then blocks the path towards testing this presumption in dialogue by
interpreting particularity as difference and difference as inwardly generated
uniqueness. I unblock the path by focusing, instead, on claims to recognition
raised on behalf of particular substantive conceptions of the good, cultural traditions and religious beliefs and practices.
Second, even in cases where the projected goal is general agreement that the
value in question is valuable for everyone, this should not be understood as a deontological prescription. It should be understood, instead, as an invitation: the individuals and groups who seek recognition that the value in question is valuable for
everyone invite us to see the world in a new way. In such cases, accordingly, universalization involves a change in perceptions. If autonomy is to be respected, such
changes may not be imposed; they can only be encouraged by opening our eyes to
new possibilities and perspectives. Typically, such processes of disclosure and
cognitive transformation involve changes in behaviour as well as powerful arguments. Thus, the Slow Food movement does not insist that eco-gastronomy is
mandatory for all human beings, but hopes that we will all come to recognize it as
a way of life conducive to human flourishing by hearing the movements message
of plate and planet and by taking steps to live our lives in a corresponding way.
Third, the idea of general agreement whether it is agreement by everyone that
something is valuable for some people or agreement by everyone that something
is valuable for everyone is an imaginative projection. It conjures the idea of a
harmonious condition of perfect understanding and insight. Such a condition is
not an attainable goal of human action; nonetheless, its projection serves to orient such action. In other words, general agreement is not an achievable state of
affairs, but a regulative idea that orients practices of contestation.54
Finally, as indicated, recognition in practice is a dynamic relation. Individuals
and groups seek to win recognition from others in never-ending struggles for
recognition (Honneth), for recognition, even if obtained and institutionalized
politically, is always subject to new contestation.
Taken together these observations provide the basis for the account of recognition most appropriate for responding publicly to claims for the value of
particular substantive ethical conceptions, cultural traditions and religious beliefs
and practices under conditions of value-pluralism. In the spirit of Honneth, such
an account of recognition allows for a public response to claims of this kind without pre-empting the question of which values are the right ones. In the spirit of
Taylor, it allows for a politics that is hospitable to particularity though indifferent to difference without endorsing it in an uncritical way.55
92

Notes
1. C. Taylor, The Politics of Recognition in A. Gutmann (ed.) (1994) Multiculturalism:
Examining the Politics of Recognition, pp. 2572. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. Ibid. p. 39.
3. See C. Calhoun (1995) Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of
Difference, pp. 21516. Oxford: Blackwell. Citing Calhoun approvingly, Axel Honneth,
too, finds Taylors thesis of a shift from a concern with legal equality to a concern with
cultural identity and difference historically misleading and accuses him, in addition, of
over-dramatizing the differences between the politics of equal dignity and the politics of
difference. See A. Honneth, Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy
Fraser, in N. Fraser and A. Honneth (2005) Redistribution or Recognition? A PoliticalPhilosophical Exchange, pp. 1224. London: Verso.
4. M. Cooke (1997) Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of
Recognition, Political Theory 25(2): 26090.
5. Taylor (n. 1), p. 69.
6. Ibid. p. 69.
7. I propose a conception of autonomy along these lines in M. Cooke (2006) Re-Presenting
the Good Society, pp. 133145. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Taylor (n. 1), pp. 6373.
9. http://www.slowfood.com
10. http://www.mentrau-iaith.com
11. http://www.prohijab.net
12. See e.g. J. Alexander (2006) The Civil Sphere, pp. 42557. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
13. Alexander (n. 12) holds this view.
14. Ibid. pp. 4507.
15. Alexander argues that in the multicultural mode of incorporation rigid distinctions
between insider and outsider groups break down and difference and particularity
become sources of cross-group identification. In his view, accordingly, multicultural
integration not only reconfigures the categories of outsider and insider in more
universalistic and egalitarian ways; it also extends the range of imagined life-experiences
for members of the insider group.
16. I address the problem of critical evaluation in more detail in Cooke (n. 7), where I
outline the key features of a model of practical reasoning appropriate for contexts of
value pluralism.
17. Honneth (n. 3), p. 115.
18. Ibid. pp. 11316.
19. I use the term ethical in a loose sense to refer to conceptions of the good. What I say
about ethical conceptions can, I suggest, be extended to religious beliefs and cultural
traditions.
20. G. W. F. Hegel (1977) The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. Cf. Taylor (n. 1), p. 36.
21. Following Hegel I use the terms ethical and moral interchangeably in the following.
22. Hegel (n. 20), p. 393, 646.
23. Ibid. p. 397, 655.
24. Hegel underscores the linguistic component of this kind of recognition, seeing it as
crucial to its claim to universality. I cannot explore this further in the present context.
25. Ibid. p. 397, 654.
26. Ibid. pp. 399400, 658. It may be noted that Axel Honneth sees feelings of emptiness
of the Hegelian kind as one of the pathologies of contemporary capitalism. See A.
93
94
Honneth (2002) Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung: Paradoxien der

Selbstverwirklichung, in A. Honneth (ed.) Befreiung aus der Mndigkeit: Paradoxien des
gegenwrtigen Kapitalismus, pp. 1427 (here p. 146), Frankfurt and New York: Campus
Verlag. See also A. Honneth (2001) Suffering from Indeterminacy. An Attempt at the
Reactualization of Hegels Philosophy of Right. Amsterdam: Spinoza Lectures.
27. Hegel (n. 20), p. 400, 658.
28. Ibid. p. 407, 668.
29. Ibid. p. 400, 658.
30. Ibid.
31. Taylor does not argue explicitly that the historical progression from the politics of equal
dignity to the politics of difference constitutes a normative gain.
32. By contrast, it is not clear whether or not Taylor regards all versions of the politics of
equal dignity as to some degree harmful; certainly, he holds the view that not all versions
are equally homogenizing: see Taylor (n. 1), pp. 5173.
33. Hegel (n. 20), pp. 398409, 65770. The key transitions described by Hegel are from
morality as conscience to the beautiful soul and, from there, to the confessing,
hardhearted and, ultimately, forgiving consciousness.
34. Ibid, esp. pp. 4078, 66971.
35. Ibid. p. 406, 668.
36. Ibidp. 405, 667.
37. Ibid. p. 408, 670.
38. Ibid. p. 409, 671.
39. J. Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms, tr. W. Rehg, pp. 15768. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
40. J. Habermas (2008) Between Naturalism and Religion, tr. C. Cronin. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
41. A. Honneth (1995) The Struggle for Recognition, tr. J. Anderson, pp. 1729. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
42. Ibid., esp. pp. 92130. In this book, Honneth described the third sphere of recognition as
that of solidarity. In his more recent work, he no longer refers to it as such, speaking
instead of recognition of achievements or contributions (Leistung): see e. g. Honneth
(n. 3), pp. 14550.
43. In his exchange with Nancy Fraser, Honneth does consider the possibility of the
emergence of a fourth principle of recognition within the normative infrastructure of
capitalist societies: a principle that calls for social recognition of members of a cultural
group: see Honneth (n. 3), pp. 16170. Indeed, he even acknowledges that one of the
multiple ways of interpreting this demand is as a demand to recognize the culture in
question as valuable in itself. However, he sees no possibility of dealing with the problem
of critical evaluation to which this gives rise. In the end, he remains sceptical as to
whether this kind of demand represents a legitimate fourth principle of recognition.
44. A. Honneth (2002) Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions, Inquiry
45(4): 500.
45. Honneth (n. 3), pp. 1367 and (n. 44), p. 501.
46. See Cooke (n. 7).
47. In his exchange with Nancy Fraser, Honneth presents his work as a recognitive theory of
justice: see Honneth (n. 3). It is important to grasp, however, that in this context he uses
the term justice in a broad sense: as more or less equivalent to the normative goal of his
critical social theory, which he variously describes as freedom or autonomy or selfrealization. He makes this particularly clear in Honneth (n. 44), pp. 51617.
48. A. Honneth (1994) The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical
Theory Today, Constellations 1(2): 25569.

49. Honneth (n. 41).
50. My call for public deliberation concerning substantive values, esp. ones that are particular
to certain individuals and groups, raises a number of epistemological issues, such as
whether we must presuppose a common concern with a shared conception of truth. I
discuss the issue of truth in M. Cooke (2008) Religion in the Democratic Public
Sphere: Does Truth Matter? Paper delivered at Reset Dialogues on Civilization
Istanbul Seminars, 26 June.
51. Cooke (n. 7), esp. ch. 6.
52. See M. Cooke (2007) A Secular State for a Secular Society? Postmetaphysical Political
Theory and the Place of Religion, Constellations 14(2): 22438.
53. I make a distinction between (a) conceptions whose validity is accepted by everyone and
are also deemed to be valid for everyone and (b) conceptions whose validity is merely
accepted by everyone. See M. Cooke (1994) Recognizing the Post-Conventional Self,
Philosophy and Social Criticism 20(12): 87101.
54. I discuss ideas of the good society as imaginative projections and make a case for the
place of regulative ideas in critical social thinking in Cooke (n. 7), esp. chs 5 and 6.
55. I am grateful to Jonathan Seglow for helpful comments.
95

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European Journal of Political

Beyond Dignity and Difference: Revisiting the Politics of Recognition

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Beyond Dignity and Difference

University College Dublin, Ireland

Revisiting Taylors 1992 account of the politics of recognition, I argue that

difference, Hegel, Honneth, politics of recognition, Taylor

Contact address: Professor Maeve Cooke, School of Philosophy, University College

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