Republic Vs.

Tagle
Facts: Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square meters
more or less.
The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team
on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project
in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III
(Construction Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC). PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez,
signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to
lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no
less than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of
twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site.
The Philippine Womens University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy
and use the land in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network
installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the
CMDC took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject matter hereof based on defendants 1990 tax declaration, was made.
In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented by
then Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own capacity
did not sign the deed of absolute sale.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the
Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for
Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it
subsequently.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that
the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be
expropriated.

Held: No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The
expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land.
Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable
taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute
ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power,
petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and
ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the
property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
ANTONINO POBRE, respondents.

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

FACTS
Antonio Pobre owns 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano,
Municipality of Tiwi, Albay which he developed into a resort-subdivision, Tiwi Hot Spring
Resorts Subdivision. When the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water
and steam, which were suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use,
were present beneath the Property, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), began initiating
two expropriation complaints on the said Property. The first expropriation complaint was granted
by the court. During its pendency however, NPC began drilling operations and construction of
steam wells. Said procedures produced waste materials which NPC dumped beyond the site
agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of
some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with
its dumping.
In the meantime, the second appropriation proceedings was filed by NPC to acquire an additional
5,554 square meters of the Property. Disturbed by what NPC did with his propery, Pobre filed a
complaint for damages. Surprisingly, Napocor withdrew its complaint for expropriation by filing
a motion to dismiss, five years after filing the second expropriation complaint, on the ground that
NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project
within the Property due to Pobre's opposition.
The trial court granted NPCs motion dismiss but allowed Pobre to proceed with his complaint
for damages. Despite the opposition of NPC, the trial court ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered
NPC to pay P3,448,450.00 as damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence
the present appeal.

NPC argued that the complaint for damages filed by Pobre should be dismissed because of the
dismissal of the second expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE:
WON the motion to dismiss filed by Napocor in order to withdraw its complaint for
expropriation has rendered the complaint for damages filed against it by Pobre, nugatory.
HELD:
NO.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been
subject to court approval and to certain conditions. The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17
of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to
other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his
right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court.30 The court must then
see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due
process of law.
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial
scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights
may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the
expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is
not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.33 However,
when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his damages ascertained
either in the same case or in a separate action.
Thus, NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre's
claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that
provided for the dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the
expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the
claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages
occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint can be
made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's right to recover
damages either in the same or in another action. The trial court in this case reserved Pobre's right
to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC's own fault.

We must correct NPC's claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just "shortly" after it had filed
the complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated several times to the trial court its
desire to dismiss the expropriation case it filed on 5 September 1979, it was only on 2 January
1985 that NPC filed its notice of dismissal. It took NPC more than five years to actually file the
notice of dismissal. Five years is definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously dillydallied in filing its notice of dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobre's property rights.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY

(NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
FACTS
: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent municipality (now
city) as having the right to expropriate petitioners property for the construction of an access
road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for
eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the
previous owners and the same was not accepted.

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to
expropriate.

HELD:
No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer
will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for
public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820

Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels

of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of
the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously
made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property
upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA
7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On
private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court
dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by
its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the
former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer
in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the
latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

MIAA vs RODRIGUEZ
FACTS

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), a GOCC operating the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway in the 70s. So it
bought and occupied some of the properties surrounding the area through expropriation. In 1996,
respondent lot owner proposed to sell to MIAA at P2,350.00 per square meter one of the lots
already occupied by the expanded runway. No deal was made. So respondent Rodriguez bought
the bigger lot, a portion of which was occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to claim
reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its owner then, Buck Estate, Inc., for P4
million.

Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for the property and back rentals for 27 years,
amounting to P468.8 million. Failing to reach an agreement with MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case
for accion reinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA had illegally taken possession
of the property, the trial court ruled respondents favor. The Court of Appeals modified the trial
courts decision, holding that Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from the time he became
the registered owner of the property in 1996.

ISSUES

1.) Was Rodriguez a buyer in bad faith for having bought the subject lot in a highly speculative
and scheming manner, and in anticipation of a grossly disproportionate amount of profit at the
expense of the Government?

2.) Is Rodriguez entitled to exemplary damages and attorneys fees?

RULING

The petition is partly meritorious.

There is taking when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period
but for a more permanent duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in
such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In this
context, there was taking when the MIAA occupied a portion thereof for its expanded runway.

Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner
sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings,
the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling for purposes of compensation.

Thus, in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, wherein it took the owner of a parcel of
land thirty-five (35) years before she filed a case for recovery of possession taken by the local
government unit for a road-right-of-way purpose, this Court held:

there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that
just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking
thereof in expropriation by the Government, not the increased value resulting from the passage
of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true
value to be paid as just compensation for the property taken.

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that

". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural
increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses.

The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. Thus, the value of the
lot in 1972 should serve as the basis for the award of compensation to the owner.

On actual damages for the occupation of the subject lot, undeniably, the MIAAs illegal
occupation for more than 20 years has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his
predecessors-in-interest. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form
of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the
value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is
based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the

landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking.
Case laws ruled that the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owners right to be
paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the compensation
due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of such
compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property, and hence, there is no
basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking.

On buyer in bad faith, the point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in
bad faith, all that he will be entitled to is the value of the property at the time of the taking, with
legal interest thereon from that point until full payment of the compensation by the MIAA. There
is nothing wrongful or dishonest in expecting to profit from ones investment. However,
Rodriguez can fault but only himself for taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already
being used for a public purpose. To our mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts which
should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees
is in order.

Municipality of Meycauayanvs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Facts:
Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land.
The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondents heavy
equipment and various finished products.
The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution manifesting the intention to
expropriate the respondents parcel of land. It was opposed by the respondent Philippine Pipes
and Merchandising Corporation with the office of the Provincial Governor.
Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or
annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of
Meycauyan to expropriate the respondents property for use as a public road. Then Provincial
Board of Bulacan passed Resolution disapproving and annulling the Resolution passed by the
Municipal Council of Meycauayan.
However, Petitioner (Municipality of Meycauayan) filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan a special civil action for expropriation, and upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00,
which is the market value of the land, with the PNB, the trial court issued a writ of possession in
favor of the Petitioner.

The respondent went to IAC, on petition for review, which the appellate court affirmed
the trial courts decision. But upon MR, the decision was reversed and held that there is no
genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as public road as there were several other roads
for the same purpose and another more expropriate lot for the proposed public road.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has the right to expropriate?
Held:
The Petitioners purpose in expropriating the respondents property is to convert the same
into a public road for the purposes to ease the traffic in the area of vehicles. However, it reveals
that there are other connecting links or several roads for the same purpose and another lot for
proposed public road. The Petitioner itself admits that there are four (4) such cross roads in
existence.
The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only
if it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the
courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor.
It is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will
not allow.
There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the
proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioners attempt to
expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.
Petition DISMISSED.

Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28,
1961
FACTS
The Power of Eminent DomainTo ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street,
the Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up
to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.The petitioner in this case is the Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General; and the respondent is La Orden de PP.
Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda

College.Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government
drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to the
Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of
approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situated on
Mendiola St. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the
Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the
property in question at P270,000.00 and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon
depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the
trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in
possession of the property aforesaid.In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already
dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for
the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different
site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the
expropriation of a property dedicated to education.The trial court granted the motion, holding
that the expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent
Domain
Held:
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and
upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it
is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether ornot there is a genuine necessity therefor.It does not
need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga
extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a
question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took
judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be
established by means of evidence. The parties should have been given an opportunity to present
their respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or indirect help in
determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the extension of
Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street