J Rat-Emo Cognitive-Behav Ther (2011) 29:248256

DOI 10.1007/s10942-011-0146-0
ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy: A Positive

Perspective
James Collard Monica OKelly

Published online: 11 November 2011

 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Abstract Through his development of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy

(REBT), Albert Ellis was a major contributor to the development of cognitive behaviour
therapy. This article reviews key aspects of REBT, the distinction between unhealthy
and healthy emotions, and the role irrational and rational beliefs play in relation to these
emotions. As with other areas of psychology, the focus of REBT over the years has been
dominated by negative emotional experiences. In an attempt to address this and further
develop REBT, the present article reviews recent claims from the realm of social
psychology that positive illusions promote mental health. Consequently, it is proposed
that a similar dichotomy of healthy and unhealthy positive emotions also exists, and a
basic framework for working with this positive dichotomy is introduced.
Keywords

REBT
Positive illusions
Positive emotions
Mental health

Traditional REBT
Albert Ellis is acknowledged as the father of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy
(REBT) and is undoubtedly the GRAND father of the more general school of
therapy, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy. Having commenced writing on the topic in
J. Collard
Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
J. Collard
M. OKelly
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy Australia, Narre Warren North, VIC, Australia
M. OKelly
Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
M. OKelly (&)
Australian Institute for RET, 33 Balcombe Road, Mentone, VIC 3804, Australia
e-mail: mokc@starnet.com.au

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1955 with the article New approaches to psychotherapy techniques (Ellis 1955), he
predated many of the fathers of this school of therapy such as Beck (1963, 1976),
Mahoney (1974), and Meichenbaum (1977). He was at the forefront of the movement
in psychology that has come to be called the cognitive revolution (Dember 1974,
p. 161), a movement that was motivated not only by a dissatisfaction with traditional
psychoanalysis but also a dissatisfaction with the behaviourist stimulusresponse
model that had dominated American psychology for many decades.
Since 1955 Ellis refined his theory and wrote extensively. His major work,
Reason and emotion in psychotherapy (1962, 1994), which he wrote in 1962 and
then revised in 1994, has remained a significant text for rational-emotive behaviour
therapy practitioners. Although the name has changed from the original rational
psychotherapy (Ellis 1958), to rational-emotive therapy or RET, and more
recently to rational-emotive behaviour therapy or REBT (Ellis 1994), the
underlying cognitive tenets of the therapy remain the same.
Ellis (1962, 1994) postulated that the most important cause of distress or
neurosis was not the environmental trigger or activating events (As) but our
dysfunctional or irrational beliefs (iBs) about these events. Thus, undesirable
environmental events could lead either to what was considered appropriate or
healthy emotional consequences (Cs) such as feelings of regret, annoyance, or
sadness, or unhealthy negative consequences (Cs) such feelings of guilt, anger, or
depression. It was when the feelings were mediated by dysfunctional irrational
beliefs that disturbance occurred. Ellis asserted that people created their emotional
reactions, when he wrote:
I stated and implied that when people have the goals and values (Gs) of
remaining alive and making themselves happy, and when Activating Events or
Activating Experiences (As) block and thwart these goals, they have a choice
of making themselves feel healthily or self-helpingly sorry, regretful,
frustrated, or disappointed at point C, their emotional Consequence; or they
can (consciously or unconsciously) choose to make themselves feel unhealthily or neurotically panicked, depressed, horrified, enraged, self-hating, or selfpitying at C. (1994, p. 17)
He further pointed out that healthy feelings were created by functional or rational
beliefs (rBs), such as I dont like this situation but I can cope with it and do my
best to change it. On the other hand unhealthy feelings were created by
dysfunctional or irrational beliefs (iBs), such as This situation shouldnt be like
this. Its horrible and awful and I cant stand it.
This distinction between healthy and unhealthy emotions is one of the
characteristics of REBT that Ellis pointed out differentiates it from other Cognitive
Behaviour Therapy approaches. In clarifying this difference, Ellis stated:
Many followers of CBT think of depression as extreme sadness, and view both
intense sadness and depression as harmful symptoms. But REBT sees
depressed people as commanding that their extreme sadness (which may be
based on a real loss, and therefore quite legitimate) must not exist and as
thereby unhealthily making themselves depressed. It consequently tries to help

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J. Collard, M. OKelly

them remain sad or grieving but surrender their unconstructive, self-defeating

feeling of depression. (1994, p. 257)
This delineation between the healthy and unhealthy emotions is an extremely
constructive concept clinically as it enhances the practitioners ability to work with
clients to enable them to accept helpful emotions, that is those that do not block the
achievement of goals, as part of being human and develop the skills of emotional
coping and management. We humans are not unfeeling robots. Emotions are part of
the human condition. Others agree that the differentiation between disturbed and
non disturbed emotions is, in our view one of the most helpful aspects of RET
theory (Walen et al. 1992, p. 92).
Dryden and DiGiuseppe (1990) in their Primer on Rational-Emotive Therapy
outline the difference between beliefs that are flexible and rational, in the form of
desires, wishes, wants and preferences, leading to appropriate negative emotions,
and those that are rigid and irrational in the form of shoulds, musts and, oughts,
leading to inappropriate negative emotions. They develop the concept with a table
giving examples differentiating the two, a copy of which is shown in Table 1.
Elsewhere, it is reiterated that emotions of concern, sadness, annoyance, remorse,
regret and disappointment are seen as appropriate and healthy, with anxiety,
depression, clinical anger, guilt, shame and hurt seen as disturbed and unhealthy
(Walen et al. 1992).
To date the focus in REBT has been on these negative emotions, both in
identifying and discussing them theoretically, and in developing techniques through
cognitive intervention to change these unhealthy negative emotions to healthy
negative emotions. A number of these unhealthy negative emotions are mentioned
in A Dictionary of Rational-Emotive Feelings and Behaviour (Crawford and Ellis
Table 1 Inappropriate and appropriate negative emotions and their cognitive correlates
Inferences related to personal domain

Threat or danger
Loss (with implications for future): failure
Breaking of personal rule (other or self);
other threatens self; frustration
Breaking of own moral code

Type of
belief

Emotion

Appropriateness
of emotion
Inappropriate

Irrational

Anxiety

Rational

Concern

Appropriate

Irrational

Depression

Inappropriate

Rational

Sadness

Appropriate

Irrational

Damning anger

Inappropriate

Rational

Non damning anger

(or annoyance)

Appropriate
Inappropriate

Irrational

Guilt

Rational

Remorse

Appropriate

Other betrays self (self non-deserving)

Irrational

Hurt

Inappropriate

Rational

Disappointment

Appropriate

Threat to desires exclusive relationship

Irrational

Morbid jealousy

Inappropriate

Rational

Nonmorbid jealousy

Appropriate

Personal weakness revealed publicly

Irrational

Shame

Inappropriate

Rational

Regret

Appropriate

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1989). There has been little if any discussion regarding positive emotions or the
implications that such discussion has for the clinician. As with negative emotions, it
cannot be assumed that all positive cognitions or emotions are necessarily healthy. It
is likely that both healthy and unhealthy positive emotions exist.

Positive Illusions in Mental Health

Traditionally, concepts of mental health have held a central role for accurate
perceptions of reality, which is consistent with REBT theory. This has been
questioned in recent years with some authors (Taylor and Brown 1988) proposing a
Social Psychological Model, which suggests that well-being is basically synonymous to mental health. Furthermore, it is claimed that such positive mental health is
generally based upon positive illusions. Such a controversy generates a number of
questions when considering positive beliefs and emotional experiences, some of
which the REBT framework appears well suited to answer.
The term mental health has historically been used in a negative, paradoxical
manner, referring instead to psychopathological conditions. However, when
considered for its positive connotations, Western philosophy and psychology,
especially clinical psychology, have traditionally held a central role for the accurate
perceptions of oneself and the world in defining what is good mental health. In line
with this, the traditional view has also maintained that departure from reality into
illusions and distortions are maladaptive and interfere with the individuals potential
for self-actualisation (Colvin and Block 1994; Ryff and Singer 1998). For example,
in a review of the various theoretical structures of mental health approximately
50 years ago, Jahoda (1958) concluded that healthy perception is a process of
viewing the world so that one is able to take in matters one wishes were different,
without distorting them to fit these wishes (p. 51).
Recently, this view of mental health has been challenged by findings from the field
of social psychology, with Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) championing the idea that
positive illusions contribute to an individuals mental health and well-being. While it
is relatively undisputed that high levels of positive illusions are problematic and can
lead to psychopathology, either directly, by creating issues such as delusions, or
indirectly, whereby the constant challenges provided by reality results in emotional
distress, it is maintained that there is still an optimal, adaptive level (Baumeister
1989; Kinney 2000; Taylor and Brown 1994). Specifically, illusions relating to selfevaluations, control and optimism were argued to have a beneficial and adaptive
value. These claims were based on two types of research findings. Firstly, that such
positive illusions were common within the normal population, and that they
tended to be pervasive, enduring and systematic (Taylor and Brown 1988, p. 194).
Secondly, they maintain that people experiencing depression, or in some cases
depressed mood, were more realistic and balanced in reporting on the areas of selfregard, control and optimism (Taylor and Brown 1988). Furthermore, Taylor and
Brown (1988, 1994) proposed that positive illusions enhance other aspects of mental
health which they considered to be of importance, such as the ability to be happy, the
ability to care for others and the capacity for creative and productive work. While

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there were a number of methodological issues with these claims (for a review see
Colvin and Block 1994), we intend to address the theoretical issues this argument
holds for REBT and the use of evidence based techniques.
One of the assumptions of the Social Psychological Model is that due to the high
prevalence of positive illusions within the normal population, who are generally
considered to be mentally healthy, accuracy is not essential for mental health. This
assumption is problematic in two major ways. Firstly, it presupposes a simplistic view
of mental health where people who are diagnosed as having some form of
psychopathology are classed as unhealthy and those avoiding such a label are
considered healthy. The reality of the situation is not so black and white, as indicated
by several prominent authors, with mental health being more a matter of degrees
(Allport 1960; Jahoda 1958; Maslow 1962). For example, depressive illnesses are
graded as mild, moderate and severe, with the more severe cases demonstrating a
greater degree of irrational cognitions. Hence, it would appear intuitively logical that
such degrees would also exist for positive mental health. Furthermore, descriptions of
what is good mental health tend to describe the ultimate condition. To place an
expectation that members of the normal population attain such a standard would be
unrealistic, and the presence of illusions and irrational thoughts would still be
expected. Just as allowances are made in regard to physical health, where issues such
as high blood pressure, high cholesterol and weight are common to the normal
population, these criteria would not be used in a definition of what good physical health
actually is. Instead a definition of physical health would describe the elite, in terms of
strength, endurance and immune functioning, amongst other physical attributes. Thus,
as recommended by Diener and Seligman (2002) it is the study of the supranormal
individuals that can best reveal the processes that lead to happiness and good mental
health. This leads us to our second issue with the assumption upon which the model is
based, the use of statistical normality as a criterion for mental health. This concept was
challenged by Jahoda (1958), as it presumes that common behaviours of the so-called
healthy population are adaptive. If this were true, then society would not have been
plagued by a history of behavioural health issues, such as smoking, and problematic
cultures around alcohol consumption and obesity. Moreover, anger, and the irrational
demands that tend to underlie it, are also regularly found within the common
experience of the normal population, yet while these are manageable for the normal
person, these are still not considered helpful, or as a sign of good mental health.
Taylor and Browns (1988) claim that, positive illusions promote better moods, is
not unreasonable, and it would seem quite obvious that positive illusions would
foster improved moods, for the short term. For example, someone who thinks they
have performed a task to a high standard would feel a greater amount of satisfaction
than if they believed their performance was of an average standard. However, to
label such processes as healthy would be premature, as by such criteria substance
abuse to relieve emotional distress could also be labelled adaptive. It is the longer
term implications, and accumulative effect of these cognitions that is of greater
importance. While Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) argued that the longer term
outcome of positive illusions were in fact adaptive, such as through the creation of
self-fulfilling prophecies and heightened motivation, more recent findings call this
into question. Even in regard to potential effect upon subjective well-being, the use

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of positive illusions appears limited. In a study by Boyd-Wilson et al. (2004) it was

found that positive illusions were associated with moderate levels of well-being, but
not with high levels of well-being. Although the implications of this research are
reduced due to the strictly student population utilised, the results indicated that those
with the highest levels of well-being did not rely on positive illusions. Similarly
Colvin et al. (1995) also found that individuals who engaged in self-enhancement
were viewed less favourably by friends and independent assessors, presenting with a
range of anti-social behaviours. These results were consistent for both the short term
and over a 5 year period (Colvin et al. 1995).
Next, we turn to the use of depressive realism as support for the need for optimistic
illusions in mental health. As noted above, findings have shown that depressed
individuals view the world in a more realistically and balanced manner than the normal
population. From this, it has been suggested that accurate perception causes depression
(Taylor and Brown 1988). However, while the depressed individuals may indeed view
the world more accurately than the normal population, who tend to rely on positive
illusions, to claim that such accurate perceptions cause depression is a leap of faith. A
view consistent with REBT, on the other hand, is that rather than the accurate perceptions
themselves contributing to the depression these individuals experience, it is instead the
personalised meaning they derive from their perceptions (Kinney 2000). Thus, it is not
the recognition that one has failed at a task that contributes to depression, but rather the
irrational evaluation that is made from the event, such as Im worthless, which results
in the depression. Thus, in a mentally healthy individual who is not prone to making
these irrational conclusions, accurate perceptions would not endanger their well-being.
What then is the role of positive illusions? Taylor and Brown (1994) claim that
positive illusions can be differentiated from defence mechanisms both conceptually
and operationally. This is based upon the relationship between positive illusions and
threatening circumstances. They report that while defence strategies are inversely
related to threatening information, positive illusions are instead directly responsive
to threatening circumstances (Taylor and Brown 1994). For instance, a defence
mechanism would deny or repress challenging information, whereas with positive
illusions the individual would acknowledge the same information but put an
unwarranted positive spin on it. This argument appears spurious, however, as both
strategies still have ultimately the same outcome of distorting reality. As such,
positive illusions can be said to be based upon a maladaptive and irrational basis (Ellis
1987; Kinney 2000; Robins and Beer 2001). It has been argued that self-enhancing
positive illusions regulate unrealistically high levels of self-esteem and well-being,
which have a fragile nature, and are therefore rigidly defended against thoughts of
failure (Robins and Beer 2001). In addition, Kinney (2000) states that self-enhancing
illusions may also arise from irrational beliefs that one must have the approval of
significant others and that ones worth is based on their achievements or competencies. Furthermore, illusions of control are thought to be derived from irrational beliefs
that it is awful to have ambiguity, to have circumstances that are not as one would like,
or to not have control over events. Use of such illusions are therefore superficial and
prevent the individual from engaging in deeper, more curative solutions (Ellis 1987).
Similarly, optimistic illusions are based on a range of irrational beliefs, including
expectations that life is fair and just, that there are perfect solutions to all problems and

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that any adversity will be intolerable (Kinney 2000). Hence, regardless of how
manageable or adaptive positive illusions may appear in the short term, they are still
based on an irrational belief system. In one sense they can be seen as merely a
mechanism for avoiding other irrational thoughts that create emotional distress, and
are therefore indicative of an impoverished tolerance to discomfort.
Further consequences to the use of positive illusions have also been demonstrated. In
a study of the longer term impacts of positive illusions, Brookings and Serratelli (2006)
assessed the influence positive illusions have on another aspect of positive mental
health, namely the individuals ability for personal growth. This was operationalised via
a test of moral reasoning. Emerging from the study was a negative correlation between
positive illusions and moral reasoning (Brookings and Serratelli 2006). Unfortunately
the study was limited via its reliance on a small, largely homogenous sample of
female college students, and also due to a low reliability of the test of moral reasoning.
Adding to these findings, a series of studies conducted by Robins and Beer (2001),
demonstrated that individual differences in self-enhancement bias were positively
related to individual differences in narcissism, as measured by the Narcissistic
Personality Inventory. The first of these studies showed that self enhancement was
associated with short-term affect following a laboratory task (Robins and Beer 2001).
However, in the second study presented, Robins and Beer (2001) utilised a longitudinal,
real-world sample. For this they assessed college students self-enhancing beliefs
regarding their academic performance, their well-being and self-esteem on six
occasions over a 4 year period, beginning with university entry. They found that over
this period the well-being and self-esteem of the self-enhancers tended to decline,
compared to those with accurate perceptions, and furthermore, the self-enhancers did
not achieve higher levels of performance or graduation, instead demonstrating a greater
propensity for disengaging from the academic arena. While the study used strong
measures of illusion, the results were still only correlations, prohibiting causal
attributions. Finally, in relation to optimistic bias, it has been suggested that such a
positive illusion can increase complacency and inhibit precautionary behaviour for a
range of health risks, including smoking and unprotected sex (Glanz and Yang 1996).
Thus positive illusions, even amongst normal populations, have been demonstrated in
the longer term to negatively impact on the ability to engage in challenging tasks, on
personal growth, on well-being, and on helpful health behaviours.
From the evidence above, it is suggested that unhealthy positive cognitions and
emotions exist in addition to the negative unhealthy cognitions and emotions
suggested by Ellis (1994). This distinction has not only been neglected by REBT,
but also by psychology in general. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that emotional
well-being is synonymous with mental health, as many mood enhancing activities
can ultimately be detrimental to health.

Introducing Positive Emotions to REBT

As with negative emotions, it is proposed that healthy positive emotions are also
associated with rational beliefs, while unhealthy positive emotions are associated
with irrational beliefs. These unhealthy positive beliefs are characterised by

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excessively positive inferences and illusions, as if looking through rose coloured

glasses. In addition, individuals with such a bias may have delusions that demands
are always met, and may also have beliefs that they are able to stand anything, that
everything in life is magnificent, or suffer grandiosity of self.
In proposing a framework for working with these unhealthy emotions, it is useful
to conceptualise a continuum from the unhelpful negative emotions through to the
corresponding unhelpful positive emotions. Examples of these emotional continuums are demonstrated in Table 2. Table 3 provides examples of the types of
irrational positive beliefs that correspond to negative irrational beliefs.
In practice, those relying on such positive illusions, or irrational beliefs, whilst
experiencing a high level of well-being, may demonstrate a number of unhealthy
behaviours which have an excessive or manic quality. In addition, these individuals
also face a higher risk of experiencing emotional distress. In the short term, this
threat arises from the constant challenges provided by life to the irrational beliefs,
with an ensuing risk for those same beliefs to be disconfirmed. The occurrence of
such disconfirmation is proposed to cause serious emotional distress (Baumeister
1989). In the long term the constant effort to maintain these illusions is likely to take
a toll on the individual, which may result in physical and emotional burnout. It is
also possible that some individuals fluctuate between the two extremes of unhealthy
positive emotions and unhealthy negative emotions, such as is the case in those
suffering bi-polar disorder.

Summary
Ellis in his early writing differentiated between healthy negative emotions, which
are associated with rational beliefs, and unhealthy negative emotions, which are
associated with irrational beliefs. This view has proven to have major clinical value.
Table 2 Emotional continuums
Unhealthy negative
emotion

Healthy negative
emotion

Neutral
point

Healthy positive
emotion

Unhealthy positive
emotion

Depressed

Sad

Anxiety

Concern

Content

Happy

Euphoric

Calm

Excited

Anger

Annoyance

At peace

Ecstatic

Caring/affection

Limerence

Table 3 Positive and negative evaluations

Negative irrational beliefs

Positive irrational belief

I cant stand it

I can stand anything

Catastrophising (e.g. This is the worst thing that

could happen to me/its awful/I have no control)

Utopianising (e.g. This is the best thing that can

happen to me/its perfect/I control everything)

Self-downing (Im useless)

Self-aggrandisement (e.g. Im the greatest)

Downing of others (e.g. They do everything wrong)

Aggrandisement of others (e.g. They cant do

wrong)

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However to date the focus in REBT has been on negative emotions. It is likely,
however, that a similar dichotomy exists for positive emotions with there existing
healthy and unhealthy positive emotions again associated with rational and
irrational beliefs. It is suggested that well-being and emotional health are not
synonymous, as individuals with high well-being may hold irrational beliefs that
lead to unhealthy positive emotions which have long term costs to the individual.

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