Pepsi Colar v Gal-Ang

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/sep1991/gr_89621_1991.html
Facts
Private respondents were employees of petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the
irregular disposition of empty bottles.
A complain for theft was filed but was withdrawn and instead a complaint for falsification
of private documents was filed. These were later dismissed.
Respondents filed a case of illegal dismissal and petitioner was ordered to reinstate them.
Respondents likewise filed separate civil suit for damages.
The petitioners moved to dismiss contending that the labor arbiter cannot try the civil suit.
Respondent judge on MR reinstated the complaint.
Respondents cited article 217 to support their claim that a claim for damages is under the
jurisdiction of the LA.
Issue: Does the labor arbiter have jurisdiction of the case?
Ruling No.
It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can
be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal
connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the
case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be
cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal
jurisdiction.
In San Miguel Corporation v NLRC - It is the character of the principal relief sought that
appears essential, in this connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under
labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might
be asserted as an incident to such claim.
Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the
Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but
by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts
of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
As it is in this case, the complaint arose when petitioner filed a complaint, with bad faith
for theft which was later dismissed by the prosecutor. There was no relationship or ULP
asserted. Hence, the matter is not with the labor arbiter but with the regular courts
since the law applicable is the revised penal code.

San Miguel Corporation V Etcuban Et al

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/dec99/127639.htm
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC to declare the retrenchment program
executed by petitioner a nullity. They alleged that they, former employees of SMC, where
deceived in severing their employment with SMC who concocted a financial distress
story to effectuate a retrenchment program.
Respondents pray for reinstatement, back wages and damages

 The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case based on Article 291, their cause of action having
prescribed. Even if it was under Article 1146 as in the New Civil Code, the dismissal
was an injury upon the rights of the person, the same cannot stand because the cause
of action has prescribed.
Respondents appealed before the NLRC but was dismissed after SMC filed a motion to
dismiss.
The respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the NLRC decision. The court said
that the controversy is not exactly based on an ER-EE relationship. IT is a civil dispute
arising from the contract of termination of their services which is inexistent for being null
and void.
The CA added citing Article 1410 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 1409 as herein
before quoted, specifically provides that the action for the declaration of the inexistence of
a contract on ground (3) above does not prescribe.
The CA denied the MR of SMC hence this petition.
Issue: Is the cause of action of respondents actually based on an ER-EE relationship?
Ruling: Yes
If there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the
employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor
courts.[9] In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
Article 217 paragraph 4 provides Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations; to be cognizable by the Labor
Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided
for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim
for the damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
In the present case, while respondents insist that their action is for the declaration of nullity
of their contract of termination, what is inescapable is the fact that it is, in reality, an
action for damages emanating from employer employee relations.
First, it is clear that their claim is grounded on their illegal dismissal, the prayer and
allegations it submitted originally to the LA is almost identical with those submitted
before the court.
Even the term used for designating the contract, i.e. contract of termination, was
formulated in a shrewd manner so as to avoid a semblance of employer-employee
relations. This observation is bolstered by the fact that if respondents designation for the
contract were to be made complete and reflective of its nature, its proper designation would
be a contract of termination of employment
The Court is aware that the Civil Code provisions on contracts and damages may be used
as bases for addressing the claim of respondents. However, the fact remains that the
present action primarily involves an employer-employee relationship. The damages
incurred by respondents as a result of the alleged fraudulent retrenchment program
and the allegedly defective contract of termination are merely the civil aspect of the
injury brought about by their illegal dismissal.[14] The civil ramifications of their actual
claim cannot alter the reality that it is primordially a labor matter and, as such, is cognizable
by labor courts.

Banez v Valdevilla
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2000maydecisions.php?id=567

Facts
Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent who was indefinitely
suspended due to a certain installment scheme he allegedly has been doing.
Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC who found him illegally
dismissed.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. Petitioner
respondent contending that the action is based on an ER EE relationship the court
doesnt have the jurisdiction. But the judge ruled contending that the complaint for
damages is grounded on the nefarious activities of defendant that caused damage and
prejudice to the plaintiff (private respondent).
The court believes that it was a breach of contractual duty, a civil dispute.
Issue: Did the judge err in taking cognizance of the complaint for damages filed before the
court? Is the complaint filed before the judge one arising from ER-EE?
Ruling Yes.
There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondents claim against
petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the
first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioners "doing
business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee.
Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first, those amounting to lost profits
and earnings due to petitioners abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager,
having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and
second, those equivalent to the value of private respondents property and supplies which
petitioner used in conducting his "business" .
Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant
action for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioners
installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private
respondents property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal
dismissal case,
To distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different
source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the
damages, claimed for were based on tort 14 , malicious prosecution 15 , or breach of
contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee 16 or seeks
liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.
Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the resolution of
the issues presented by the complaint does not entail application of the Labor Code
or other labor laws, the dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code,
as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in
other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

Eduardo Eviota v CA
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/152121.htm
Facts:

 Respondent bank engaged petitioner as its compensation and benefits manager.

However, he abruptly resigned from his position to rejoin his former employer which is
the basis for the complaint for damages filed by respondent before the RTC.
Petitioner showed promise as an employee that private respondent bank was eager to
supplement him with all the benefits he needed so he can discharge his duties properly.
His sudden resignation however caused disruption in respondent banks operations
which is the basis of the claim for damages.
According to Private respondent, he (petitioner) violated Article 19, 200, 21 of the new
Civil code. His manner in terminating his employment was abusive and did not take
into account the 30 day notice in employee termination.
He also had the bank incur considerable expenses for his supposed projects.
It is also alleged that petitioner left respondent bank with a diskette containing confidential
information.
The private respondent bank also contend that petitioner made derogatory remarks against
the bank and has besmirched the banks reputation, affecting its capacity to recruit the best
personnel.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. He contends that the controversy is in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter as it has arisen from an ER-EE relationship.
The court ruled in favor of respondent and on MR, the CA ruled in affirmed, hence, this
petition
Issue: Does the Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction of the case?
Ruling: No.
A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a reasonable causal connection
between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the
complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice.
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship
is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of
obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.
The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is
limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their
collective bargaining agreements.
The claims were the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation,
intrinsically civil in nature. regular courts.
In this case, the private respondents first cause of action for damages is anchored on
the petitioners employment of deceit and of making the private respondent believe
that he would fulfill his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness
and earnestness. The petitioner volte face (complete turn around) when, without the
requisite thirty-day notice under the contract and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, he abandoned his office and rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the
private respondent to hire a replacement.
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner
do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and other labor
laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There
is no causal relationship between the causes of action of the private respondents causes of
action against the petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the

private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an existing
employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is merely incidental.
Perpetual Help Credit Coop V Faburada
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/oct2001/121948.htm
Facts
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PHCCI.
PHCCI moved to have the complaint dismissed on the ground that no ER-EE contending
that private respondents are also members and co-owners of the cooperative. PHCCI also
contend that remedies provided under its bylaws were never exhausted. Likewise the
Cooperative dev authority law, its laws require conciliation and mediation before a judicial
action is pursued.
The LA denied the motion to dismiss and ruled they were illegally dismissed. The NLRC
affirmed hence the petition.
Petitioner PHCCI contends that the respondents were working as volunteers. But the court
find the presence of ER EE hence the court upheld the finding of illegal dismissal. As to
the basis of the dismissal, it is not within the ones enumerated under just and authorized
cause of the labor code. Petitioner also failed to observe procedural due process.
Petitioners also contend that the LA has no jurisdiction of the complaint considering that
PD 175 mandates that disputes must first be submitted to the grievance machinery and its
implementing rules and regulations applied .
Issue: Does the LA have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Ruling: Yes
The main contention of Petitioner is anchored on Article 121 of Republic Act No. 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines) which provides
o the procedure how cooperative disputes are to be resolved, thus:
o ART. 121. Settlement of Disputes.- Disputes among members, officers, directors,
and committee members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable,
be settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms
embodied in the bylaws of the cooperative, and in applicable laws.
o Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939 (Cooperative Development
Authority Law) which reads:
o SEC. 8 Mediation and Conciliation.- Upon request of either or both parties, the
Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes within a cooperative or between
cooperatives: Provided, That if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three
(3) months from request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the
Commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts.
The above provisions apply to members, officers and directors of the cooperative
involved in disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives.
There is no evidence that private respondents are members of petitioner PHCCI and
even if they are, the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and
termination of employment. Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Austria V NLRC
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/124382.htm
Facts
Petitioner was a pastor of the SDA (Seventh Day Adventists) who was terminated by
reason of misappropriation of funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross
and habitual neglect of duties and a commission of a crime against the person of the
employers of duly authorized representatives. He worked with SDA for 28 years.
Reacting to the decision, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal praying for reinstatement plus back wages and benefits, who ruled in his favor.
On Appeal, the NLRC ruled in private respondents favor but later on reversed its decision
upon petitioners MR.
SDA filed another MR contending that the LA did not have jurisdiction to try the case
originally. The court ruled in their favor without ruling on the merits of the case hence, the
petition.
Respondents claim that the Labor Arbiters doesnt have jurisdiction since the matter
involves the discipline of a religious minister, and is purely an ecclesiastical affair
which the state has not right to interfere.
Issue: Does the labor arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case?
Ruling: Yes.

The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The
idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions
and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of
the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. While the State is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in
purely secular matters
an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members
and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the above cited
examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does
not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here
is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is
purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines of the church.
There is no question that the grounds invoked by respondent for the dismissal of petitioner
are grounds found in Article 282 of the labor code. This alone is reason to believe that the
nature of his dismissal is not religious. (why cite the labor code as groundsfor temrination
whenyouwould later say that its purely an ecclesiastical affair?)
The fact that the private respondent furnished the NLRC of copy of his termination
and submitting as evidence the SSS registration of petitioner by respondent and the
ultimate fact that it participated in the case without raising an objection regarding
the jurisdiction of the court is tantamount ot the invocation of that jurisdiction and
the willingness to abide by the resolution of the case.
Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-employment states that the provisions of this Title
shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not. Obviously,

the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is
made more evident by the fact that the Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the Termination of Employment and
Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage of the law, to
wit:
o Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings,
whether operated for profit or not, including educational, medical, charitable
and religious institutions and organizations, in cases of regular employment with
the exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

G Holdings Inc. v National mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_160236_2009.html
Facts
NAMAWU was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a copper mine and
mill complex.
MMC was incorporated by the DBP and PNB on account of their foreclosure of MMCs
assets.
Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or
privatization because it had become an on-performing asset.
On October 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) executed
between petitioner and APT, petitioner brought 90% of MMCs shares and
financial claims.
Upon signing of PSA and full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment,
petitioner immediately took physical possession of the mine and its facilities
and took full control of the management and operation of MMC.
Four years after, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU with the
latter filing with the NCMB of a notice of strike.
LA ruled in favor of NAMAWU. It ruled that the lay-off implement by MMC
is illegal and it committed ULP.
On petition with this Court, we sustained the decision of LA. A partial writ
of execution was issued. The writ was not fully satisfied because of MMCs resisted its
enforcement.
On October 2002, GHI filed with RTC a Special Civil Action for Contempt with issuance
of TRO.
GHI contented that the property were subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage executed MMC in favor of petitioner.
RTC issued a TRO. On appeal to CA, CA set aside the RTC
issuance of writ. Hence, this petition.
Issue:Whether RTC can validly issue TRO to prevent the execution issued by labor tribunal.
Ruling:
It is settled that a RTC can validly issue a TRO and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution raised by a labor tribunal on the
basis of a third-partysclaim of ownership over the properties levied upon.

 While, as a rule, no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any

case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court where the
writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon the property of
a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere
prima facie showing of ownership of such claimant a separate action for injunctive
relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since said action neither involves nor
grows out of labor disputes insofar as the third party is concerned.
Petition is granted.
Alberto Silva v NLRC
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jun1997/110226.htm
Facts:
Petitioners in this case filed a complaint before the NLRC for ULP and damages. The
complaint stemmed from a previous understanding involving a retrenchment program that
Philtread effected with the promise those who were terminated will be given priority
employment when conditions get better, financially.
When financial conditions of respondent got better, petitioners submitted their
employment applications but they were refused employment. Respondent asserts that
they will be considered for future vacancies.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending the NLRC did not have
jurisdiction since no ER-EE existed and the issue is about the interpretation of the CBA
cognizable before the regular courts. Jurisdiction lies with the voluntary arbitrator.
The petitioners stressed the complaint is one of ULP, with respondents refusal to reemploy them as mandated by their CBA.
The LA dismissed the complaint, not ruling on the jurisdictional matter but mandated that
respondent prioritize the employees for employment.
The NLRC reversed the decision but stated nonetheless to re-employ petitioners subject to
available vacancies.
Acting on an MR, the NLRC reversed again its decision and specified that the complaint
should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor
Code since the issue is one of implementation of the CBA.
Petitioners also challenged the fact NLRC issued a new resolution after the preceding one
attained finality when Philtread did not interpose a motion for reconsideration. Since
Philtread indisputably failed to file any such motion within said period, petitioners deemed
it highly irregular and capricious for the NLRC to still allow reconsideration of its April
15, 1992 resolution.
Issue: Did the NLRC err in issuing the resolution when the preceding one already attained
finality?
Ruling: Yes.
In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Philtreads counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration of the April 15, 1992 resolution only on June 5, 1992, [8] or 31 days after
receipt of said resolution.[9] It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed
outright Philtreads late motion for reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite, its
actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its utter
disregard for its very own rules. Certiorari, therefore, lies.
Issue: Does the LA or the NLRC have jurisdiction ?

Ruling: Yes.
When the issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA, one cannot
immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. There
is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the
union and the employer; otherwise, the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume
jurisdiction.
It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the
company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred
to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
Since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread, then
pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine, it is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take
cognizance of the complaint, notwithstanding Philtreads claim that the real issue is
the interpretation of the CBA provision on re-employment.

Corazon Sim v NLRC

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_157376_2007.html
Facts
Petitioner worked for private respondent Equitable Bank as its Italian remittance
marketing consultant to the Frankfurt Representative office. She was promoted to a
managerial position up until her termination.
She was terminated by respondent for loss of trust and confidence based on the alleged
mismanagement and misappropriation. Respondent denies an ER-EE relationship
existed.
The LA dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The LA said that the court of
labor relations do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction and is limited only to labor
disputes within the Philippines.
The NLRC affirmed. Instead of filing an MR, petitioner appealed to the CA but was
dismissed hence this recourse under rule 45 of the RoC before the SC
Issue: Is the Labor Arbiter correct in dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction?
Ruling: No.
A palpable error in the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, which was affirmed by the
NLRC, with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It was wrong for the Labor Arbiter to
rule that "labor relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial
jurisdiction."
o ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,18 provides:
o SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 804219 provides
that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the
rules and procedures of the NLRC.
Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including
termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers.

HSBC v Broqueza

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/nov2010/gr_178610_2010.html
Facts:
Respondents in this case were employees of HSBC. Respondent acquired loans from the
bank which were deductible from their payroll.
A labor dispute arose between HSBC and employees wherein most of its employees
including respondents were dismissed. They then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Because of their termination, and unable to pay their loans petitioner filed a civil case
against them, a separate suit with no connection to the ongoing labor dispute.
The MeTC ruled in HSBCs favor and when respondents appealed, the RTC likewise
affirmed. Citing the applicability of Article 1179
The court of appeals disagreed however. Saying that the loan obligations have not matured
yet.
Issue: did the court of appeals commit grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling: Yes.
Art. 1179. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain
event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once.
No date of payment indicated in the Promissory Notes. Hence the contention that obligation
has not ripened cannot stand. The RTC is correct in ruling that since the Promissory Notes
do not contain a period, HSBCL-SRP has the right to demand immediate payment. Article
1179 of the Civil Code applies.
The payroll deduction is merely a convenient mode of payment and not the sole source of
payment for the loans. HSBCL-SRP never agreed that the loans will be paid only through
salary deductions. Neither did HSBCL-SRP agree that if Editha Broqueza ceases to be an
employee of HSBC, her obligation to pay the loans will be suspended.
Halaguea v PAL
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/172013.htm
Facts

 Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent PAL and are
governed by the Pal FASAP CBA.
The petitioners assail section 144 part A of the CBA as being discriminatory to their
female cabin crews. The section provides the compulsory age of retirement for
employees for females at 55 years of age and 60 for males.
Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for declaratory relief with TRO and Writ of
preliminary injunction with the RTC of Makati for the invalidity of the PAL FASAP
CBA section in question. The court granted the order upholding its jurisdiction stating
that no ER-EE question is present in the current controversy nor does it involve a claim
against respondent.
The CA however ruled in favor of PAL stating that the court (RTC) doesnt have
jurisdiction of the case. Hence the petition.
Petitioners submit that the RTC has jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and in all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.
Accordingly, it has the power to decide issues of constitutionality or legality of the
provisions of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. As the issue involved is
constitutional in character, the labor arbiter or the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) has no jurisdiction over the case and, thus, the petitioners pray
that judgment be rendered on the merits declaring Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP
CBA null and void.
Respondent, on the other hand, alleges that the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over
the present case, as the controversy partakes of a labor dispute. The dispute concerns
the terms and conditions of petitioners' employment in PAL, specifically their retirement
age.
Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction of the case?
Ruling: Yes.
The allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners'
cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
It is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA
is unlawful and unconstitutional.
The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by
the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.[15] Being an
ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
The employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the
cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution
and CEDAW.
Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code
or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the
general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of
justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
Leslie Okol v World International
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/160146.htm
Facts

 Petitioner worked for respondent as its head office manager but she rose through the
ranks and became the Vice president until her dismissal.
She was preventively suspended initially. The cause was due to certain machines that
were seized by the customs office for being undervalued.
She received a memo asking her to explain but management proved her answer was
unsatisfactory, hence her termination.
Okol filed a complaint with the arbitration branch of the NLRC citing illegal suspension,
dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages, etc.
Respondent contends that the NLRC doesnt have jurisdiction of the complaint. Which the
LA granted. Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an intra-corporate
controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch.
The CA likewise ruled the same being an intra-corporate dispute, falls within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799.
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she was a corporate officer
and that the case is an intra-corporate dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Petitioner asserts that even as vice-president, the work that she performed conforms
to that of an employee rather than a corporate officer. The four fold test applies. Petitioner
likewise enumerated the acts of respondent that is indicating of control (salary payment),
deduction in medicare, ss, etc.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that petitioner was a corporate officer at the time
of her dismissal from Slimmers World as supported by the General Information Sheet and
Directors Affidavit attesting that petitioner was an officer.
Issue: does the NLRC have jurisdiction of the case?
Ruling: No.
The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner
was a member of the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital
stock, and an elected corporate officer.
Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president,
secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws
Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and
officer of Slimmers World. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid
commissions, reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall
squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes.
We have held that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intracorporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question
of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple
labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation
Code.
The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his
employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intracorporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
EDI STAFF builders v. NLRC
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_145587_2007.html
Facts

 Petitioner corporation is engaged in the recruitment and placement of OFWS. Gran was
one of those OFWs who was placed in Riyadh as a Computer specialist. Petitioner
received a faxed letter that if he accepts he would be paid a salary of 600USD but the
employment contract of gran suggested 850USD. He questioned the discrepancy when he
arrived in Riyadh and the employer agreed to pay him 850USD.
He was terminated 5 months later for non-compliance of contract requirements and
non compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency and for
insubordination or disobedience.
He instituted a complaint before the NLRC when he arrived in the Philippines. Prior to
that, he received his final pay and signed a declaration releasing the employer from any
financial obligation towards him.
The LA ruled that he doesnt have a claim nor was there illegal dismissal or he was
underpaid. Regarding his qualifications, the LA ruled that indeed he was not qualified and
he did not follow company rule, his dismissal valid.
Gran appealed to the NLRC without furnishing a copy of the appeal memo to EDI
The NLRC ruled that the act of EDI to transfer to ESI his contract is actually reprocessing,
a prohibited act under the labor code. He was not afforded due process as well regarding
his termination.
Gran filed a motion for execution but EDI opposed contending that they were not
notified of the appellate proceedings. Which it assailed before the CA.
The CA said that it was only a formal lapse and not a jurisdictional defect that would
justify the dismissal of the appeal.
Hence this petition.
Issue: failure to file a notice of appeal fatal? Should it be given due course?
Ruling: No. No.
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the appeal
to the adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal lapse, an
excusable neglect. Time and again we have acted on petitions to review decisions of the
Court of Appeals even in the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals as required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the petitions and
simply require the petitioners to comply with the rule.
But nonetheless, the observance of the proper service of notices under Section 13, Rule
13 of the Rules of court must be observed.
ATCI Oversease Corporation v Josefa Echin
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/178551.htm
Facts
Respondent was hired by petitioner in behalf of its co-principal, the ministry of public
health in Kuwait for the position of medical technologist. Newly hired, she was under a
probationary period of 1 year. She was terminated for failing the probationary period.
When she returned home, she filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal
against her local recruitment agency and the foreign principal.
The LA ruled that her dismissal was illegal since there was not just cause to justify it.
On appeal, petitioner contends that the ministry (employer principal) a govt agency is
immune from suit. The NLRC affirmed the LAs decision.

 In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry
and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court
noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas
worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment
contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court
to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the
present case.
Issue: Is the principal immune from being sued?
Ruling: No.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their
foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and
assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.
Issue: are Philippine labor laws controlling as in this case?
Ruling: Yes

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can
establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in
this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
Processual Presumption - Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is
not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only
be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court which reads
Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners
submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of
the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service
laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated.

MonteDeramos v Tri-Union International Corp

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/176700.htm

Facts
Petitioner was hired as stockman by Respondent Corporation in its outlet in Metro
Ayala Dept. Store, Cebu. The company is engaged in marketing and distributing company
b products.
Petitioner was suspended which is the basis for his complaint herein. He contends that he
was asked to sign a 5 month control but he refused because he knew he was a regular
employee
Respondent countered that he was served memoranda warning him of is tardiness
and after failing to answer the memo filed to him. Following his 3 rd memo, he did not
report to work anymore.
The LA ruled in favor of his reinstatement since there was no dismissal nor abandonment.
On appeal the NLRC ruled the was illegally dismissed but did not award reinstatement but
favored separation pay instead.
The CA reversed the NLRCs decision. It went on to hold that petitioners infractions
resulting in his suspension tardiness and refusal to attend company meetings
because he was not allegedly paid remuneration were of his own wrongdoings.
He particularly highlights the fact that his one month suspension ended on July 31, 2003
but he was given a chance to report on August 9(sic), 2003 as amounting to constructive
dismissal.
Issue: Was petitioner illegally dismissed?
Ruling: No.
This petitioner failed to discharge. He, in fact, failed to refute respondents claim that it sent
him a Violation Memorandum, which was duly received by him on April 15, 2003, and a
subsequent Memorandum via registered mail,[20] requiring him to explain his habitual
tardiness on the therein indicated dates but that he failed to comply therewith.
That respondent advised petitioner on July 31, 2003 that he was supposed to report . . . [the
following day], August 1, 2003 but that he was given a chance to report on August 11,
2003 does not, in itself, amount to constructive dismissal. Bare allegations
of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given
credence.[21]
Constructive dismissal contemplates, among other things, quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or a demotion in rank or a
diminution of pay. It clearly exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee, leaving him with no option
but to forego his continued employment.[22] Not any of these circumstances exists to call
for a ruling that petitioner was constructively dismissed.

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries V NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/179402.htm
Facts
Petitioner NUWHRAIN is a legitimate labor organization composed of rank-andfile employees of the Hotel,[3] while respondent Acesite Philippines Hotel
Corporation is the owner and operator of said Hotel.
The Hotel entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with HI-MANILA

PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (), the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees of the Hotel.
NUWHRAIN was accorded by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) the status of a legitimate labor organization.[7] Thereafter,
NUWHRAIN exercised the right to challenge the majority status of the incumbent union,
HIMPHLU, by filing a Petition for Certification Election on 28 June 2005.
HIMPHLU then demanded the hotel to dismiss 36 of its employees for alleged
disloyalty and violation of its CBA. The union contends that they left HIMPHLU to
join NUWHRAIN, a violiation of the CBA union security clause.
The hotel issued notices to the 36 members imploring them to explain their side. The hotel
also effected reconciliatory efforts to prevent the dismissal of the employees.
NUWHRAIN filed a notice to strike before the NCMB for ULP against the hotel. The Sec
of labor intervened and certified the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC.
The NLRC and the CA ruled that the hotel did not commit any ULP. That it was prudent
for the hotel to carry out any reconciliatory measures that lead to the non-dismissal of the
employees.

Issue: Did the hotel commit ULP?

Ruling: No.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement includes a union security provision.[28] To avoid the
clear possibility of liability for breaching the union security clause of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and to protect its own interests, the only sensible option left to the
Hotel, upon its receipt of the demand of HIMPHLU for the dismissal of the 36 employees,
was to conduct its own inquiry so as to make its own findings on whether there was
sufficient ground to dismiss the said employees who defected from HIMPHLU.
The issuance by the respondent of the Notices requiring the 36 employees to submit their
explanations to the charges against them was the reasonable and logical first step in a fair
investigation. It is important to note that the Hotel did not take further steps to terminate
the 36 employees. Instead, it arranged for reconciliatory conferences between the
contending unions in order to avert the possibility of dismissing the 36 employees for
violation of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Had the Hotel totally ignored this demand, as NUWHRAIN suggests it should have
done, the Hotel would have been subjected to a suit for its failure to comply with the
terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In the case at bar, there is even less possibility of sustaining a finding of guilt for unfair
labor practice where respondent did not dismiss the 36 employees, despite the insistence
of HIMPHLU, the sole bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of the Hotel, on
the basis of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The only
act attributed to the respondent is its issuance of the Notices which, contrary to being an
unfair labor practice, even afforded the employees involved a chance to be heard.
Pentagon Steel Corp v CA and NLRC
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/174141.htm
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing G.I. wire and nails wherein
respondent worked in its wire department. Respondent was declared AWOL after he
failed to report to work for a few days. Petitioner made sure to have sent notices to him
by registered mail demanding him to explain why.

 Respondent filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries

and wages, OP, HP, SIL, 13th money pay, sep pay and ecola. He contends that is absence
was due to infection resulting in diarrhea and loose bowel movement and said illness
prevented him from work.
He contends that petitioner wont admit him back even with a medical certificate.
Because of petitioner not letting him work, hence the complaint. He later amended his
complaint to include illegal dismissal
The LA dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint. The LA contends that no Illegal
dismissal took place and that his (respondent) allegations lack corroborating
evidence.
The NLRC reversed. The court reason that the defense of abandonment of work cannot
be accepted since there was no intention of respondent to sever the er-ee relationshiop.
Separation pay was awarded.
The
CA
affirmed
the
NLRCs
finding
but
favored
reinstatement.
The CA held that the respondent was constructively dismissed when the petitioner
repeatedly refused to accept the respondent back to work despite the valid medical
reason that justified his absence from work.
The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove a clear and deliberate intent
on the respondents part to discontinue working with no intention of returning. The
CA took note of the respondents eagerness to return to work when he obtained a note from
his doctor about his fitness to return to work.
Issue: was respondent constructively dismissed?
Ruling: Yes.
We significantly note that by reporting for work repeatedly, the respondent
manifested his willingness to comply with the petitioners rules and regulations and
his desire to continue working for the latter. The petitioner, however, barred him from
resuming his work under the pretext that he had violated a company directive. This is a
clear manifestation of the petitioners lack of respect and consideration for the respondent
who had long served the company without blemish, but who had to absent himself because
of illness. The petitioners actions, under these circumstances, constitute constructive
dismissal.
the illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Plantation Bay Resort and Spa & Belarmino v Dubrico
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/182216.htm
Facts
Respondents are former employees of Plantation Bay located in Cebu, of which Belarmino
is the Manager. On several dates in September 2004, after Plantation Bay issued a series
of memoranda and conducted seminars[5] relative to its drug-free workplace policy.
The carried out the random drug test with the assistance of SOCO and the Philipping druge
screening lab inc.
Respondent failed to TAKE the drug test. A memorandum was sent to him asking him
to explain why. He averred he was not informed about his selection .

 Dubrico was later tested and found positive for use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Twenty other employees were found positive for use
of shabu including herein respondents Godfrey Ngujo (Ngujo) and Julius Villaflor
(Villaflor).
The employees then were dismissed after the hotel found their reasons unsatisfactory. The
basis the hotel raised was serious misconduct. Hence the complaint for illegal dismissal,
questioning the conduct of the drug test without the presences of the DOLE regional
director or rep.
The LA dismissed the complaint. He discredited the drug test results seeing that it was
conducted AFTER the random drug tests schedule. The NLRC affirmed but on MR, the
NLRC reversed its decision ruling that they were illegally dismissed.
In finding for respondents, the NLRC held that the results of the confirmatory drug
tests cannot be given credence since they were conducted prior to the conduct by the
employer of the drug tests.
The veracity of the confirmatory tests was raised by respondents only when they filed a
belated Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, hence, the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it reversed its findings based on such new issue.
They maintain that in terminating the services of respondents, they relied on the results of
the random drug tests undertaken by an accredited and licensed drug testing facility, and if
the results turned out to be questionable or erroneous, they should not be made liable
therefor.
Issue: did the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling: No.
The NLRC did not err in considering the issue of the veracity of the confirmatory
tests even if the same was raised only in respondents Motion for Reconsideration of
its Decision, it being crucial in determining the validity of respondents dismissal from
their employment.
In the interest of substantial justice, new or additional evidence may be introduced on
appeal before the NLRC.
The Constitution no less directs the State to afford full protection to labor. To achieve this
goal, technical rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in favor of the working class
in accordance with the demands of substantial justice.
Issue: Is the drug testing credible? Were the employees ILLEGALLY Dismissed?
Ruling: No and Yes.
The confirmatory test results were released earlier than those of the drug test, thereby
casting doubts on the veracity of the confirmatory results.
Indeed, how can the presence of shabu be confirmed when the results of the initial
screening were not yet out? Plantation Bays arguments that it should not be made liable
thereof and that the doubt arising from the time of the conduct of the drug and confirmatory
tests was the result of the big volume of printouts being handled by Martell do not thus
lie. It was Plantation Bays responsibility to ensure that the tests would be properly
administered, the results thereof being the bases in terminating the employees
services.
In fine, as petitioners failed to indubitably prove that respondents were guilty of drug
use in contravention of its drug-free workplace policy amounting to serious
misconduct, respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed.

Hilario Ramirez V CA
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/182626.htm
Facts
Respondent worked for petitioner as one of its emergency/rescuer mechanic. He was
initially hired as construction worker, then promoted to mechanic. They were said to
have been paid in a packyao basis.
Respondent contends that he was not allowed to work because he refused to be paid on
a pakyaw basis, hence the complaint for illegal dismissal.
For petitioner, respondent abandoned his job. He did not follow a lawful order it
(petitioner) made. He also failed to report to work the next day when the order was given
hence abandonment of work. HE did not in any way presented an answer for not
answering an emergency call and or filing a leave of absence.
The LA ruled that neither was there illegal dismissal nor abandonment in the case since
the allegations lack supporting evidence. Nevertheless it ordered petitioner to pay
respondent his money claims amounting to over 45,000.00
Petitioner filed an MR with urgent motion to reduce the appeal bond on the 9th day of the
reglementary period before the NLRC. the NLRC ruled that the ground to reduce the
bond was not sufficient (bond posted was 10,000). The court added that petitioner failed
to substantially comply with the rules hence he failed to perfect his appeal.
The order of the LA became final and executory hence the petitioner before the SC.
Issue: Did petitioner substantially comply with the requirements in Article 223 regarding the
appeal bond?
Ruling: No.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decision of the labor arbiter. The word only in Articles 223
of the Labor Code makes it unmistakably plain that the lawmakers intended the posting of
a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and exclusive means by which an
employer's appeal may be perfected.
Clearly, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the
NLRC.
In this case, although Ramirez posted an appeal bond, the same was insufficient, as it was
not equivalent to the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, when Ramirez
sought a reduction of the bond, he merely said that the bond was excessive and
baseless without amplifying why he considered it as such.
It is daylight-clear from the foregoing that while the bond may be reduced upon motion by
the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall
be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant; otherwise, the filing of the motion to reduce
bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification
effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the
10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety
bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.

 We have always stressed that Article 223, which prescribes the appeal bond requirement,
is a rule of jurisdiction and not of procedure.
Jarvin Davies V NLRC
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_106915_1993.html
Facts:
Respondent salutin worked for petitioner Jardine Davies as its agronomist, a job that
involves the promotion and use of JDI (petitioner) pesticides and products.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal plus money claims; the Labor arbiter
ruled in favor of his reinstatement and payment of his claims.
Petitioner appealed posting a supersedeas bond to answer the money claims. But the
cases was dismissed by NLRC and likewise Its MR was denied for the order has become
final and executory.
During the events narrated above, certain material facts occurred involving the
reinstatement of Salutin. He was directed to work in its Bacolod branch but did not last
long and since have left his work. This prompted petitioner to stop paying his salary.
Hence petitioner filed a manifestation and motion that saluting has abandoned his work
for being absent for 3 weeks without explanation; the award of reinstatement have been
waived. Salutin opposed the motion. He contends he was suffering a serious ailment. He
presented a med certificate to corroborate his claim.
Petitioner claims he was employed elsewhere.
The motion and subsequent MR denied, hence the certiorari petition. Petitioner also filed
a writ of Prelim injunction and or TRO to prevent the enforcement of Salutins
reinstatement.
Issue: Did the Commission (NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
respondent did not abandon his work?
Ruling: No.
Abandonment of position is a matter of intention expressed in clearly certain and
unequivocal acts. In this instance, however, certain uncontroverted facts show just
exactly the opposite. Hence, Salutin did report, as directed, on 24 September 1991, but
that he could not stay long because he was ailing at that time; he, although perhaps
belatedly made, did seek medical consultation on 7 November 1991, at the Corazon
Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional Hospital, for "peptic ulcer"; and on 11
December 1991, he did, in fact, manifest his desire to assume his work with the
petitioner.
This Court's resolution of 26 February 1992, denying the petition in G.R. No. 103720,
became final and executory on 19 June 1992. Respondent Salutin's interim employment,
stressed by the petitioner, did not stain the picture at all. Here, we second the wellconsidered view of NLRC, thus
The order of immediate reinstatement pending appeal, in cases of illegal dismissal
is an ancillary relief under R.A. 6715 granted to a dismissed employee to cushion
him and his family against the impact of economic dislocation or abrupt loss of
earnings. If the employee chooses not to report for work pending resolution of the
case appeal, he foregoes such a temporary relief and is not paid of his salary. The
final determination of the rights and obligations respectively of the parties is the
ultimate and final resolution of this Commission.

Pioneering Texturing Corp v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/oct1997/118651.htm
Facts
Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners reviser/trimmer since 1980 (12
years worked).
She was dismissed for allegedly dishonesty and tampering official records with the
intention of cheating. In her defense, respondent contends that she may have been
negligent for trimming the ribs of PO No. 3853 since they look like the ones in PO no
3824. She was not dishonest nor did she tampered any documents.
The LA ruled that her dismissal was not justified and ordered reinstatement. On appeal,
the NLRC ruled that she was negligent but nevertheless ruled to have her reinstatement
without backwages.
Also Petitioners theory is that an order for reinstatement is not self-executory. They
stress that there must be a writ of execution which may be issued by the NLRC or
by the Labor Arbiter motu proprio or on motion of an interested party. They further
maintain that even if a writ of execution was issued, a timely appeal coupled by the
posting of appropriate supersedeas bond, which they did in this case, effectively
forestalled and stayed execution of the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Was she illegally dismissed?
Ruling: Yes.
Gleaned either from the Labor Arbiters observations or from the NLRCs assessment, it
distinctly appears that petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering of official
records and documents with intention of cheating against de Jesus was not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners simply failed, both before
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, to discharge the burden of proof and to validly justify
de Jesus dismissal from service.
We also find the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal against de Jesus as
certainly harsh and grossly disproportionate to the negligence committed, especially
where said employee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelve-year service
record.
Equally unmeritorious is petitioners assertion that the dismissal is justified on the basis
of loss of confidence. In this case, petitioners were unsuccessful in establishing their
accusations of dishonesty and tampering of records with intention of cheating. Indeed,
even if petitioners allegations against de Jesus were true, they just the same failed to
prove that her position needs the continued and unceasing trust of her employees
functions.
Issue: Is reinstatement immediately executory, even pending appeal?
Ruling: Yes
Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years
from the date a decision, an order or awards becomes final and executory. It cannot
relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which
Article 223 contemplates.
The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately
executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay

the execution for reinstatement. The legislative content is quite obvious, i.e., to make an
award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal.
Buenviaje v NLRC
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/nov2002/147806.htm
Facts
Petitioners worked for respondent Cotton way as their promo girls for their garment
products. Their services were terminated for respondent was allegedly suffering business
losses.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and the LA ruled that petitioners
retrenchment program was valid.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LAs decision and ordered their reinstatement.
The respondent made a manifestation before the NLRC that it complied with the orders
of reinstatement but the petitioners did not return to work and due to such, they have lost
their employment.
Petitioners filed a motion for execution of the decision on the ground that it was already
final and executory. Respondent also filed a manifestation reiterating that the petitioners
already found employment somewhere.
Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protasio issued an Order declaring that the award of
backwages and proportionate thirteenth month pay to petitioners should be limited from
the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time they received the notice of termination
sent by the company upon their refusal to report for work despite the order of
reinstatement. He cited the fact that petitioners failed to report to their posts without
justifiable reason despite respondent's order requiring them to return to work
immediately.
The CA favored respondent. Reinstatement not possible because of the deliberate refusal
of petitioners to go back to work . The Court of Appeals thus held that the amount of
backwages due them should be computed only up to the time they received their notice of
termination.
Issue: WON back wages should be limited from the time they were illegally dismissed until
they received their notice of termination?
Ruling:
Under R.A. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from
the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed
from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to "full
backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings
derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal.
Issue: did petitioner abandon their work? Was their dismissal valid then?
Ruling: No.
Petitioners' alleged failure to return to work cannot be made the basis for their
termination.Such failure does not amount to abandonment which would justify the
severance of their employment.

 The facts of this case do not support the claim of Cottonway that petitioners have
abandoned their desire to return to their previous work at said company. It appears that
three months after the NLRC had rendered its decision ordering petitioners reinstatement
to their former positions, Cottonway sent individual notices to petitioners mandating
them to immediately report to work.
We note that Cottonway, before finally deciding to dispense with their services, did not
give the petitioners the opportunity to explain why they were not able to report to work.
The records also do not bear any proof that all the petitioners received a copy of the
letters.
It appears that the supposed notice sent by Cottonway to the petitioners demanding that
they report back to work immediately was only a scheme to remove the petitioners for
good. Petitioners failure to instantaneously abide by the directive gave them a convenient
reason to dispense with their services.
Roquero v PAL
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/152329.htm
Facts
Roquero and Rene Pabayo were employees (mechanics) respondent PAL. They were
caught possessing shabu n a raid conducted by PAL security.
They alleged that they were instigated by a certain Alipato wo was introdocued to them by
the Airport division manager of PAL. Alipato bragged about being able to smuggle the
drugs in the airport. They were bought to the security office of PAL where written
confessions were taken from them without the benefit of a counsel.
They then received a notice for administrative charge for violating the PALcode of
discipline and subsequently put in preventive suspension.
In their reply agains the admin charge against them, they alleged that Alipato instigated
them to commit the crime. No record of employment was found regarding Alipato inside
PAL.
The LA ruled that the illegal dismissal was valid. But ruled in favor of giving them
separation pay. Whiel the case was on appeal before the NLRC, they were acquitted by the
RTC for the crime.
The NLRC ruled to have them reinstated and petitioners subsequently asked the court to
issue a writ of execution which PAL refused contending that it has a petition for review
before the CA.
The CA ruled to have them reinstated but without the award of separation pay on the ground
that they were not deserving of the said benefits.
There is no question that petitioner Roquero is guilty of serious misconduct for possessing
and using shabu. He violated Chapter 2, Article VII, section 4 of the PAL Code of
Discipline which states:
Any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is under the
influence of prohibited or controlled drugs, or hallucinogenic substances or narcotics
shall be dismissed.
Issue: Is reinstatement immediately executory?
Ruling: Yes.
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the
employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective

from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of
execution.[24] Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor
Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was
granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in
the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as
if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the
decision of this Court.

Juanito Garcia v PAL

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/jan2009/164856.htm
Facts
The case stemmed from the admin charge filed by PAL against herein petitioners when they are
allegedly caught sniffing shabu.
They were dismissed by PAL for violation of the PAL Code of Discipline after due notice that
led to the filing of herein complaint.
The LA ruled infavor of their immediatereinstatement. Prior to the decision, PAL was suffering
from losses that it was put under an Interim Rehab receiver by the SEC and later on, on
permanent rehab receiver.
PAL appealed to the NLRC but it dismissed the complain.
INCOMPLETE INCOMPLETE INCOMPLETE INCMPLETE INCOMPLETE
King Integrated Security Inc v Gatan
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/143813.htm
Facts
Galo S. Gatan, respondent, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal deduction
and underpayment of wages against King Integrated Security Services, Inc. and/or Mina
King
The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the wage
differential. On appeal, te NLRC deleted the wage differential between nov 2 1990 and
feb 10 1992 contending that it is in accord with Article 291 of the Labor Code which
provides that all money claims arising from an ER-EE relations shall be filed with 3 years
from the time the cause of action accrued.
The NLRC resolution became final and executory; the LA ordered for the execution of
the order. The CA affirmed the NLRC order on appeal hence, this petition.
According to petitioner a) in disregarding their documentary evidence showing that
respondent received in full his monthly salary; and, b) in failing to consider his admission
that his monthly salary rates effective December 16, 1993 and April 1, 1994 were
P5,029.16 and P5,397.97, respectively.
Issue: Is a decision that becomes final and executory appealable?
Ruling: No.
We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is not
appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to a case.
Settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made
thereto, and nothing can be done therewith except its execution; otherwise, there would

be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught the main role of courts of justice, which is
to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order, by
setting justiceable controversies with finality.
Issue: did the CA erred in giving attention to the MR petitioner filed?
Ruling: Yes
Yet, despite the fact that what is being assailed is the NLRC Resolution ordering the
issuance of a writ of execution, still the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition
for certiorari and evaluated the parties evidence. Clearly, the Court of Appeals
overstepped its jurisdiction.
Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty
of the court or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not
appealable.

St. Martin Funeral Home v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sep1998/130866.htm
Facts

PCI Travel Corp v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/154379.htm
Facts
NUBE-AMEXPEA/PCI travel Employees union filed a complaint for ULP against
petitioner. They contend that petitioner were filling up regular positions with
contractual employees who were performing necessary and desirable work in the
usual business of petitioner.
They prayed that the contractual be paid their differentials and their (union
employees) actual wages and benefits to them plus damages.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. It averred that the contractuals were
sourced legitimately from an independent contractor.
The LA ruled contending that the motion to dismiss was a PROHIBITED PLEADING.
Hence it rendered the judgement in favor of the union.
The NLRC affirmed and likewise the CA outright dismissed the complaint for lack of
necessary documents, and lack of a verification and certification of non- forum
shopping. The CA also ruled that the president of PCI travel has no authority to sign
the papers submitted and cannot bind petitioner to the proceedings.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Rules of Court does not
require the submission of proof of due authorization to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for a petition to prosper. Nonetheless, petitioner
subsequently filed a manifestation stating that earnest efforts and diligence have been
exerted in searching for said board resolution, but to no avail.
The MR was denied hence petition.
Issue: WON President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping, without need of a board resolution.

Ruling: Yes.
In the recent case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the
General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of
the authority was done on a case-to-case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation
to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being in a position to verify
the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.

Laguna Metts Corporation v CA

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/185220.htm
Facts
A labor case was file by respondents against petitioner. The LA and the NLRC ruled
for respondent.
Petitioner filed before the CA a motion for extension of the prescribed period for filing a
petitioner for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RoC. A 15 day extension was prayed. Said
extension was granted by the court.
Respondent moved to have the extension reconsidered since according to A.M. No. 07-712-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of the RoC, the extension is not allowed.
The MR was denied. The CA opined that although the amendment calls for the stricter
observance of the periods, it did not strip the CA of power to grant the motion for
exceptional cases
Hence this petitioner for certiorari before the SC contending that the CA gravely abused
its discretion when it granted the extension
Issue: Did the CA err in granting the 15 day extension?
Ruling: Yes
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to
prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case
or even defeat the ends of justice.
Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did
away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari
must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.
While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition
for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,[11] the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion
of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant extensions of
time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by
private respondents counsel did not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative

and often self-serving.[15] Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from
the 60-day rule.
Agustillo v CA and SMC
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/142875.htm
Facts
Petitioner is an employee of respondent SMC who worked initially as a temporary
employee but later on was regularized as a safety clerk. His position was later
abolished wherein he was transferred to a different position.
SMC carried out a retrenchment program in favor of modernizing its facilities.
Petitioner was dismissed from the service.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for ULP, illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims.
He alleged that he was a regular employee and he was terminated because of his union
activities; he wanted to create a union and or join later on BMP (buklod mangagagawang
Pilipino)
He averred that he was deceived by SMC about its program of modernizing its
production when after 3 years, the machineries pursuant to its labor cutting
program hasnt been operational.
The LA ruled that his dismissal was valid as is the retrenchment program. Likewise
it found the receipt and release signed by petitioner to be valid and technically he
was barred from contesting since his ULP complaint was prescribed (article 290 Par
2).
The NLRC vacated the ruling however. It declared his dismissal illegal and ordered SMC
to pay.
MR denied, respondent filed a petitioner for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO. At the same time petitioner sough a writ of execution of the order. The TRO was
granted. After the TRO expired (60 days) the LA refused to enforce the writ .
The CA then ruled reversing the NLRC and favored the view of the LA hence this
petition.
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to dismiss the original special civil action of certiorari filed by private
respondents before it. Petitioner argues that whatever error of judgment the NLRC may
have committed in this case is not correctible through an original special civil action for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON a SCA for certiorari is the correct mode in assailing the judgements of the NLRC
Ruling: In St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[14] it was held that the special civil action of
certiorari is the mode of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC either by this Court and
the Court of Appeals, although the latter court is the appropriate forum for seeking the relief
desired in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and that, in the exercise of
its power, the Court of Appeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the
NLRC.
Issue: Was the LA in error when it refused the writ of execution after the lapse of the TROs 60
days?
Ruling : Yes

 In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need
of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or
renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
IT was thus error for the labor arbiter to deny petitioners motion for execution
unless the Court of Appeals clearly mandate[d] otherwise. However, petitioner should
have filed an action for mandamus to compel the labor arbiter to enforce the writ of
execution he had issued. As he did not do so and the Court of Appeals has already
decided the case, this matter is now moot and academic.
Issue: Was he illegally dismissed?
Ruling: No
Petitioners employment was terminated on the ground of the installation of labor
saving devices by SMC. Art. 283 of the Labor Code
(VALID)While quitclaims and releases are generally held contrary to public policy, there
are nevertheless voluntary agreements which represent reasonable settlements and are
considered binding on the parties. Such is the Receipt and Release involved in this case.
Petitioner is not an illiterate person who needs special protection. As the labor arbiter
found, petitioner holds a masters degree in library science and is an instructor in
political science at the University of San Carlos. He was also at that time a law
student in the said university.
Limketkai Sons v LLamera
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/152514.htm
Facts:
Petitioner Limketkai was engaged in the manufacturing and processing of corn and
coconut oil whom respondent was one of their laboratory analyst. Petitioner received
reports that some of its products contained impurities and were rancid in taste.
It conducted an investigation and had the employees including respondent to explain).
They were placed in preventive suspension.
Respondent was on maternity leave then but denied the claim that she was responsible to
the adulteration of the products.
Their employments were terminated that led to respondent to file a claim of illegal
dismissal, ULP, illegal suspension and payment for benefits.
The LA ruled in respondents favor. But the NLRC disagreed. There was no basis that there
was ULP and no basis for the claims her dismissal was valid.
Its MR denied, the respondent filed a SCA for certiorari before the CA. the court modified
the ruling. Contending that she was dismissed illegally and ordered petitioner to pay.
Hence the petition.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not according the NLRCs evaluation
of evidence due respect and finality.
Petitioners further point out that respondents position as laboratory analyst is
imbued with trust and confidence, which was breached when the oil products under
her control were returned due to its rancid taste and visible impurities. Thus,
petitioners argue, respondents termination for loss of trust and confidence was legal.
Issue: Was respondent illegally dismissed?

Ruling: Yes.
The Court of Appeals accorded more weight to respondents detailed and technical
discussion of the cause of the reported adulteration. The CA found unsubstantiated the
petitioners sweeping statement that respondent conspired in the sabotage of petitioners oil
products. In the mind of the appellate court, petitioners simply failed to prove that
respondents dismissal was for a valid cause.
In the case at hand, we find untenable petitioners claim of breach of trust and confidence
committed by the employee.
o ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
o (c) willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
o The willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer must
be founded on facts established by the employer.
Petitioners simply allege that respondents failure to report to the quality control head the
batch that did not meet the minimum standard showed connivance to sabotage petitioners
business. Not only is petitioners logic flawed, it is an instance of arguing non sequitur.
Said allegation alone, without proven facts to back it up, could not and did not suffice as a
basis for a finding of willful breach of trust.
We are thus constrained to hold that petitioners failed to prove the existence of a valid
cause for the dismissal of respondent.
Maralit v PNB
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/163788.htm
Facts
Petitioner maralit worked for PNB as its casual clerk initially, up until she became the
branch manager. PNB offer its early retirement plan under Board resolution no. 1
which approved its special separation incentive plan (SSIP)
Under the Circular, personnel with pending administrative cases or who are under
preliminary investigation may avail of the SSIP. However, payment of their
benefits shall be made only after the resolution of their cases and only if they are
not disqualified from receiving such benefits.
Maralit then received a memo from PNBs audit group that she violated bank policies
which resulted in the return of 54,950,000 million pesos.
She was made to answer the allegations against her. At thoroughly the same time,
Maralit applied for te retirement plan.
In her answer she stated that the accommodations where granted to a certain Amado
Sanao in good faith for the interests of the Bank. She did not deny that these
transactions were against bank policies.
Hence she was terminated and her retirement benefits amounting to over 1.3 million
were forfeited.
The LA ruled she was illegally dismissed and ordered that she be paid her claims. It
ruled that there was no preliminary investigation held before she filed her early
retirement, that if she have known she wouldnt have filed her retirement benefit. That
she was amply given time to answer her claims *due process*
The NLRC likewise agreed but the CA did not and reverse the resolution of the NLRC
contending it abused its discretion. Hence, the petitioner before the court.

 Maralit claims that Articles 217[15] and 223[16] of the Labor Code grant the NLRC
the power to review decisions of labor arbiters. Since the law expressly grants the
NLRC the power to review decisions of labor arbiters, the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiters
22 January 2001 Decision.
Maralit claims that, in a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals
cannot make its own factual determination.
Maralit claims that, in a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals
cannot receive new evidence.
Issue: Did the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the LAs ruling?
Ruling: Yes.
The law grants the NLRC the power to review decisions of labor arbiters. However, the
fact that the law grants the NLRC the power to review decisions of labor
arbiters does not automatically rule out the possibility of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion may arise if the NLRC exercises such power in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner.
Issue: Was she afforded due process?
Ruling: Yes
The evidence shows that Maralit was afforded due process. The essence of due process is
an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side. A formal or trial-type hearing is not essential.
Maralit submitted her answer dated 11 January 1999. In her answer, Maralit
admitted that she violated PNBs policy against drawings against uncollected
deposits. She stated that, The accommodations though admittedly a deviation from
Banks policies, were all aboveboard and well-motivated.
Issue: di the CA err in arriving in its own factual determination?
Ruling: No
In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to
make its own factual determination. In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court held:
[I]t has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice
in certiorari proceedings.

The Court of Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari when, as in the
present case, it finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by
disregarding evidence material to the controversy. To make this finding, the
Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own factual
determination.

Issue: Can the CA receive new evidence through a SCA for certiorari?
Ruling: Yes
The Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence and perform any
act necessary to resolve factual issues. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended, states that, The Court of Appeals shall have the power tot ry cases and conduct

hearings,receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issuesraised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Panuncillo v CAP
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/161305.htm
Facts
Petitioner worked as the office senior clerk of respondent. She secured a plan for the
education of his Son but later on said plan was sold to Josefina for 37,000.00 before
actually transferring the plan to josefina, she pledged (pawned) to John Chua for 50,000
whom in turn sold it to Bonghanoy. Bonghanoy sold the same to Gaudioso Uy for 60,000.
(pastilan)
She contends that she needed the money badly and because of the delayed transfer to
Josefina, she was constrained to have it pawned to John Chua. She admitted in her
explanation that she defrauded josefina but did not do it intentionally.
She was also sent a disciplinary show cause memo ordering her to explain and why she
should be sanctioned. She admits that she has violated the company code and she was open
to any disciplinary action, hoping it would not be her termination. That she was constrained
to do the acts she did to pay her debts.
Nevertheless, respondent terminated her services. A letter was sent to respondent
wherein it was discussed that she was paying her dues through petitioner but none
was remitted to respondent. During this time, she was asking for reconsideration but
management ultimately ruled to terminate her services.
Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
The LA ruled her dismissal was for valid cause but the penalty was too harsh. The
NLRC ruled her dismissal illegal and ordered reinstatement. The NLRC said that the
respondent did not suffer any damage.
But the CA disagreed contending that the dismissal was valid. Is she guilty for violations
of section 8.4 of respondents coade of discipline?
Issue: Was the dismissal Valid?
Ruling: Yes
Issue: WON respondent did not suffer any damage resulting from the transaction.
Ruling: Immaterial. Yes.
The transaction with Josefina aside, there was this case of misappropriation by petitioner
of the amounts given to her by Evelia representing payment for the lapsed plan of Corazon
Lintag. While a settlement of the case between the two may have eventually been forged,
that did not obliterate the misappropriation committed by petitioner against a client
of respondent.(valid dismissal cause)
Additionally, there was still another complaint lodged before respondent by Gwendolyn
against petitioner for failure to remit the cash payments she had made to her, a complaint
she was apprised of but on which she was silent.
In fine, by petitioners repeated violation of Section 8.4 of respondents Code of
Discipline, she violated the trust and confidence of respondent and its customers.

Issue: IS the order of the NLRC immediately executory?

Ruling: No.
The NLRC decision became final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the
decision by the parties for reinstatement.
o ART. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or
med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any
interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5)
years from the date it becomes final and executory,
There was still a need for the issuance of a writ of execution of the NLRC decision.
o Unlike then the order for reinstatement of a Labor Arbiter which is selfexecutory, that of the NLRC is not. There is still a need for the issuance of a
writ of execution.
o If a Labor Arbiter does not issue a writ of execution of the NLRC order for the
reinstatement of an employee even if there is no restraining order, he could probably
be merely observing judicial courtesy, which is advisable if there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.
Hanjin Heavy Industries v CA
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/feb2009/167938.htm
Facts
Private respondent Multiline Resources Corporation (Multiline) is a recruitment
agency engaged in the deployment of workers to Saudi Arabia. Hanjin is the Saudibased principal of Multiline which also holds office in the Philippines.
Ramos applied with Multiline for overseas employment as a barber. After passing the
examination and interview conducted by Multiline and submitting the necessary travel
documents, he signed his contract and job order.
The contract specified that Ramos was to work as a barber for twelve months for a monthly
salary of US$ 265.
Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, Ramos proceeded to the office of Hanjin. However, he was
informed that the position he applied for had already been filled up and there was no
more vacancy. Ramos was thus forced to beg for food and to share sleeping quarters with
other Filipinos in Saudi Arabia. After five days, he returned to the Philippines.
Then serving as the basis for the complaint for illegal/dismissal against hanjin and
multiline.
The POEA admin ruled that they were severally and jointly liable to pay respondent.
On appeal before the NLRC, it originally dismissed the case but on a second order it set
aside the order of the POEA admin, the same has lost jurisdiction.
The case was reassigned to another LA who dismissed the case.
Ramos filed a motion to reopen the case. The LA ruled he was legally dismissed. The
NLRC reversed the decision and entitled Ramos to 3 months worth of salry.
Ramos appealed contending that he is entitled to the 1 years worth of salary. The NLRC
agreed.

 Hence the petition by Hanjin

Respondents aver that the petition must be dismissed since Hanjin elevated the case via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65[14] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, instead of
under Rule 45.
Issue: Is respondent correct?
Ruling: Yes.
The special civil action for certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for the lost
remedy of an appeal under Rule 45.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Hanjin failed to prove that it had no appeal
or any other efficacious remedy against the decision of the Court of Appeals and the proper
remedy of a party aggrieved is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent civil action based on the specific
grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal.
Likewise, by availing of a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the petition merits an
outright dismissal pursuant to Circular No. 2-90[21] which provides that, an appeal taken to
either Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.[22]
J.K. Mercado v Secretary of Labor
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/august2008/158084.htm
Facts
In 1993 the RTWBP region XI issued a wage order that granted a COLA for the covered
workers.
Petitioner applied for exception but it was denied. Nonetheless petitioner did not comply
with the wage order. Respondent filed a motion for writ of execution and garnishment
seeking the enforcement of the wage order. The regional director issued the writ.
The petitioner moved to have the writ quashed on the basis that their failure to move the
execution has already prescribed. The regional director denied the motion to quash
however.
A notice of appeal was filed by Petitioner contending that the RD was not a party of the
case. That the RD have no authority to issue the writ without a prior motion from
respondent.
The case reached the CA wherein the court where the court held. Being a final order,
the same may be the subject of execution motu proprio or upon motion by any of the
parties concerned.
The law is equivocal that a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. Hence, we see no basis for petitioners insistence on the applicability of
Article 291 of the Labor Code in the instant case.

 Arguing that a money claim must be filed by herein private respondents

to avail of the wage differential or COLA granted under Wage Order
No. 3, petitioner avers:
The crux of the controversy in the case at bar is not when
the writ of execution issued by the Regional Director of
Region XI can be enforced, but rather, whether a money
claim must be filed first by private respondents against
petitioner for the latters refusal to pay the COLA granted
under WO 03.
Clearly, petitioners contention is premised on the mistaken belief that the right of
private respondents to recover their wage differential or COLA under Wage Order
No. 03 is still a contestable issue.
Before the SC petitioner presents the issues:
Issue: Did the CA erred in holding that article 291 is not applicable to the recovery
of benefits subject to the wage order?
Is there a need to submit a case so that the benefits in a wage order be enforced ?
Is the claim of respondent for the COLA subject to article 291 of the labor code?
Ruling: No.
Art. 291 of the Labor Code applies to money claims in general and provides for a 3year prescriptive period to file them.
On the other hand, respondent employees money claims in this case had been
reduced to a judgment, in the form of a Wage Order, which has become final and
executory. The prescription applicable, therefore, is not the general one that applies
to money claims, but the specific one applying to judgments. Thus, the right to
enforce the judgment, having been exercised within five years, has not yet
prescribed.
Stated otherwise, a claimant has three years to press a money claim. Once judgment
is rendered in her favor, she has five years to ask for execution of the judgment,
counted from its finality. This is consistent with the rule on statutory construction
that a general provision should yield to a specific one and with the mandate of social
justice that doubts should be resolved in favor of labor.