Institution of Heirs

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA

DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON
June 30, 1970 G.R. No. L-24561
Teehankee, J.:
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named
Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee),
Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is
the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are
the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs,
together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture
valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above- named heirs. The lower court,
after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles
906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in
order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the
New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for
reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the
law
Issue:
Whether use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real
properties to the respective heirs are in the nature of devises of real property
Ruling:
For the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the
will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of
little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition
her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary

dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken
solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent
that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and
not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective
legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament
any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death
shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory
heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the
second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "One who has
compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of
this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of
bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the
executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate
in providing that "The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,
provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to
him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament;
otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions
by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and
testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Adjudication:
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.

Preterition / Pretermission
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D.
SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy
and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified
to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of
the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, was
filed by petitioners before the RTC.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is entitled as:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Issue:
Whether or not there is preterition in the case at bar
Ruling:
The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to
the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
Adjudication:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

Preterition / Pretermission
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, JULIAN L. TEVES VS.
ANTONIO BALANSAG AND HILARIA CADAYDAY
G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena, and after her
death, with Milagros Donio Teves. Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa
Teves Escao and Emilio Teves. He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely:
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves, Jose Catalino Donio Teves, Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes
Teves. The present controversy involves a parcel of land. When Antonia died, the land was
among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages, the second wife of Don
Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the
effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated
to Josefa Teves EscaHo and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as
including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half
belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves.
In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the
wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio
Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and
his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Don Julian died intestate.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject
lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from
the second marriage
Ruling:
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the

heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by
not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It
consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the
legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don
Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other
properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his
death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire
along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Adjudication:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

Preterition / Pretermission
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
PARAS, J.:
Facts:
Constantino Acain filed on the RTC, a petition for the probate of the will of the late
Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, on the premise
that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and
Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty.
Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: THIRD: All my shares that
I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife
Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of
legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother
Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and
here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita,
Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner. The oppositors filed a motion to dismiss
on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents have been preterated
Ruling:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854
of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although
she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
(Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were

deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Adjudication:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit

Preterition / Pretermission
ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL, vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
MORAN, J.:
Facts:
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage six
children named Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second
marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and
Emma. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, that is, a little less than
eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven children
named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's
testament, which was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his children by the
first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had already received
their corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial
court found, contrary to what the testator had declared in his will, that all his children by the first
and second marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the
improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership,
which should belong to Ignacia Akutin.
Issue:
Whether, upon the foregoing facts, the omission of the children of the first marriage
annuls the institution of the children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator
Ruling:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will,
they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited.
It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced
heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to
disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest. Except as to "legacies and
betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious, preterition avoids the
institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession.
In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator.
"Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the
Civil Code, and where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume
that the testator had no intention to that effect. In the will here in question, no express betterment
is made in favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly
made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is
accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first
marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention,
as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally among
all his children.

Adjudication:
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed, without
prejudice to the widow's legal usufruct, with costs against respondents.

Preterition / Pretermission
REMEDIOS NUGUID vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
SANCHEZ, J.:
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,
and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her demise. On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly
the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios
Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the
institution is void.
Issue:
Whether or not the omission of parents of the deceased in the will constitute preterition
Ruling:
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la
institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of
Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the
sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It
is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
The word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the
nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in
the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Adjudication:
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed.

Preterition / Pretermission
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., and BERNARDO S. ASENETA
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at
age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and
Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L.
Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra.
Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness
with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am
now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as
Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.
Respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of
decedent Clemencia Aseneta
Issue:
Whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance
Ruling:
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized
by law." Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntary". The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of
heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial
issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court
that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however,
that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
Adjudication:
The Decision in question is set aside.

Preterition / Pretermission
ADOLFO C. AZNAR vs. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died
leaving a will. The will was admitted to probate. In that same decision the court declared that
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was
appealed to this Court, and was affirmed.
In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the trial court
approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will,
which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the
order of approval, and this Court reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the
provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law.
CFI issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein
the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan
(named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy
Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based
on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy
Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased
had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies
have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
Issue:
Whether or not Helen Garcia was preterited or she has only the right for the completion
of her legitime
Ruling:
In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to the completion of his
legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been
left to him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is,
a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir?
This question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen
Garcia is not mentioned as an heir indeed her status as such is denied but is given a legacy
of P3,600.00.
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. In each one of
those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime,
but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the
estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the
institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. The foregoing
solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator in the present

case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge
Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00.
The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason
to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude
towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally
to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
Adjudication:
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project of
partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside.

Preterition / Pretermission
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA,
and EMETERIA S. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:
Facts:
Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia, claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr.
Meliton Solano, filed an action for recognition against him. In his Answer, Solano denied
paternity. On February 3, 1970, during the pendency of the suit, Solano died.
Petitioner Zonia Ana Solano was ordered substituted for the decedent as the only
surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to
his death. Zonia entered her formal appearance as a "substitute defendant" on March 4, 1970
claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of her father, Solano, and asking that she be
allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from
the Garcias who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of Solano".
Issue:
Whether or not the Garcias were preterited in the will
Ruling:
Upon the facts, the Garcias and Zonia were in the same category as illegitimate children;
that Zonia's acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a notarial document executed by Solano and
Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941,
Solano was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and,
therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of Zonia's conception,
that being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were, in fact, pretended from Solano's Last' Will and
Testament; and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano
is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code.
Adjudication:
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the hereditary
share in the estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2
+ (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while that of private respondents, Bienvenido S. Garcia and
Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate.

Substitution of Heirs
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO vs. ZOILO S. SANTIAGO,
FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts:
Basilio Santiago contracted three marriages the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene
Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene
and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and
Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano,
Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde,
all surnamed Santiago.
One of the provision of the will state that e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi
bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang
sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may
tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will, the probate court approved the will by Order of August
14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of
title indicated therein. The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for
completion of legitime against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain
undisturbed
Ruling:
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house and
lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and that the
property be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition set by the decedent on the
propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the appellate court: For this Court to sustain without qualification, petitionerss
contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the
Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only
last for twenty (20) years. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a
property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction coownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code
Adjudication:
The petition is DENIED

Substitution of Heirs
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN vs.
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 168660 June 30, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
The decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last will and
testament. The will was admitted to probate. The CFI Manila approved the project of partition
presented by the executor of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs will. At the time of her death, the
decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of
her properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doa Margarita
Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income
from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries.
As regards Clause 10 of the will which explicitly prohibits the alienation or mortgage of
the properties specified therein, we had occasion to hold, in Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., that the clause, insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned, does not
violate Article 870 of the Civil Code.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of
Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve
the trust on the decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty
years, in violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code, and inconsistent with our ruling in
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the trusteeship over the properties left by Doa Margarita Rodriguez can be
dissolved applying articles 867 and 870 of the civil code
Ruling:
The court held in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals that the perpetual prohibition was valid
only for twenty (20) years. We affirmed the CAs holding that the trust stipulated in the decedents
will prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of the properties violated Articles 867 and 870
of the Civil Code.
However, we reversed and set aside the CAs decision which declared that that portion of
the decedents estate, the properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, ought to be distributed based
on intestate succession, there being no institution of heirs to the properties covered by the
perpetual trust. Thus, at present, there appears to be no more argument that the trust created over
the properties of the decedent should be dissolved as the twenty-year period has, quite palpably,
lapsed.
Adjudication:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

Substitution of Heirs
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ vs. MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution of heirs
made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose legal
force and effect is not in dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth,
tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of
age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and
universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after
probate of this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will
receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my
own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by
accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally
possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their minority,
I order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and
in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack of
confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I
recognize that his character is not adapted to management and administration.

Issue:
Whether or not the substitution is simple or fideicommissary substitution
Ruling:
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution,
are present in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was
instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the
whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the
"whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving
the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in
case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such
second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added, that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the
estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a

necessary consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in which the
second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.
Adjudication:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

Substitution of Heirs
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., vs. DR. MANUEL
SINGSON
G.R. No. L-13876
February 28, 1962
DIZON, J.:
Facts:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco
Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located a Plaridel St.,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements
existing thereon. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said
property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the
duly probated last will of Da. Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition
submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding;
that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to
accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not
owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not
entitled to demand partition thereof.
It is admitted that Da. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the
owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last
will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding of the lower court whose decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living
relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia
and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
Issue:
Whether the testamentary disposition provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for
a sustitucion fideicomisaria
Ruling:
The testator may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death, but
also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept or are in no position to
accept the inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him. The testator may also bequeath his
properties to a particular person with the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same
to another person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event.
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a
substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion
Florentino whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix the property bequeathed
to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers,
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of
Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary
result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of
one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would

have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she
would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be
clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the
estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this
reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no
effect unless it is made expressly.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor
does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy
usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in
the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death
whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix her share shall belong to the brothers
of the testatrix.
Adjudication:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.