Rule 37: New Trial or Reconsiderations

Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which
such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration
upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order
is contrary to law. (1a)
Section 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice
thereof. The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse
party.
A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motion.
A motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph (a) of the preceding section shall
be supported by affidavits of merits which may be rebutted by affidavits. A motion
for the cause mentioned in paragraph (b) shall be supported by affidavits of the
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly
authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.
A motion for reconsideration shall point out a specifically the findings or
conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or conclusions.
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary
period of appeal. (2a)
Section 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration. The trial court
may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms
as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly. (3a)
Section 4. Resolution of motion. A motion for new trial or reconsideration shall
be resolved within thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted for resolution. (n)
Section 5. Second motion for new trial. A motion for new trial shall include all
grounds then available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A
second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when
the first motion was made, may be filed within the time herein provided excluding
the time during which the first motion had been pending.

Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or

reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
not appealed, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order. (n)

Samson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654 (1986)

Facts: Feliciano Talens was Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of
Caloocan. The newly-elected mayor, Marcial Samson, released an
Administrative Order qualifying the services of Talens as noncompetetive and terminating his employment on the
ground of lack and loss of confidence.
He appointed Liwas as replacement.
Petitioner justifies that as Assistant Secretary, li
k e t h e S e c r e t a r y , r e n d e r s n o n - competitive service
which is primarily confidential and highly technical in nature
where termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence.
However, respondent contends that he is not a non-competitive
employee and thus, can only be removed for cause and after due
process has been observed. Thus, he filed with the Court of First
Instance of Caloocan to annul the disputed administrative
order, to enjoin the petitioner mayor, treasurer, and auditor
from enforcing the same, and
toc o m p e l a l l t h e s a i d p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s t o p a y
p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t t h e s a l a r i e s a n d emoluments
due to him. The CFI, as well as the CA, ruled in favor of Talens.
Issue:
Is the termination without cause or due process of Talens
services as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor legal on the ground of
lack or loss of confidence?
Ruling: NO. The position of Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor cannot be classified as non-competitive.
Since the position is n o t e n u m e r a t e d n o r d o e s i t
q u a l i f y a s Secretary or Head of Departments
under Section 5 of the Civil Service Law, then the
position is classified
as competitive. Employees of competitive classificatio
n cannot be terminated on the ground of lack or loss of
confidence, rather only for cause and after due process.

NAPOCOR vs CA,GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993

No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final order (4a, 4, IRG)
Section 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. If a new trial is granted in
accordance with the provisions of this Rules the original judgment or final order
shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded
evidence taken upon the former trial, insofar as the same is material and
competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking
the same. (5a)
Section 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration. If the grounds for a motion
under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less
than an of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to
it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (6a)
Section 8. Effect of order for partial new trial. When less than all of the issues
are ordered retried, the court may either enter a judgment or final order as to the
rest, or stay the enforcement of such judgment or final order until after the new
trial. (7a)

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate
complaints., filed against NPC and a particular Chavez.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of
lives and destruction of properties due to the negligence of the
latter in releasing water from Angat dam during the typhoon
Kading
Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multipurpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in
monitoring the water level at the dam.
NPCs allegations were as follows:

1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the

operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant;
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the
selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the
different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents
therein about the impending release of a large volume of water
with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the
necessary precautions;
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to
people and property;
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence
exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that
resulted and;
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were
caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the
nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of
special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the
NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely
governmental function.
The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on
the ground that the provision of its charter allowing it to sue
and be sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its
decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of
sufficient and credible evidence."
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded
damages in favor of the private respondents. Based on the
findings that From the mass of evidence extant in the record,
We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October
27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored
waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the
Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight
of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27,
1978.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is negligent?
Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?
Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM
ABSQUE INJURIA?

HELD:
We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein who were
similarly situated as the private respondents herein was the
negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978
"early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected
municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was
insufficient.
The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of
foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and
operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of
the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all
but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness,
slovenliness, and carelessness."
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the
Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God,"
the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the
event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must
be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to
the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553;

Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of

Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil.
657).
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of
God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage
sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners,
were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned
exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor
negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect
then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have,
even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus,
the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.

Section 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. The judgment and orders
of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable to
the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner
as in ordinary actions:
ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS S. YUJUICO vs. Republic of the
Philippines
Facts:
1. In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration
and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land with an area of
17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in
Paraaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance
(CFI).The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Trial court ruled in favor of
Castro.
2. The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from
the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for
the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and a
Decree was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC).
An Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Fermina
Castro by the Register of Deeds.
3. Land was then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of Castro was
cancelled and a TCT was issued in Yujuicos name over Lot1 while
another TCT was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner Augusto
Carpio.
4. Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and asserts that Land
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
became the properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a
government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or
the acquisition of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in
favor of PEA. The PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels
of land along the Manila Bay coast which were subsequently sold
to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC).
5. The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal
Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered
that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road
directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of
the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC.
6. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Paraaque City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and
Annulment of Title with Damages.
7. Respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land
was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of
Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision
adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was

void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from
a void title, were likewise void.
8. Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and states that after 28
years without being contested, the case had already become final
and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had
participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the
validity of the decision but did not.
9. On appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court asserting
that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public
use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of
private ownership or confer title upon the registrant. Further,
according to the appellate court res judicata does not apply to
lands of public domain, nor does possession of the land
automatically divest the land of its public character. HTP.
Issues: Whether CAs decision was correct.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED.
While it may be true that estoppel does not operate against the
state or its agents, however, Equitable estoppel may be invoked
against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already
alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not
undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of
time.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent
purchaser for value who relied on the clean certificates of the title
was sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to
the Government, we ruled that it is only fair and reasonable to
apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the
government to avoid an injustice to innocent purchasers for value
Republic v. Court of Appeals is reinforced by our ruling in Republic
v. Umali, where, in a reversion case, we held that even if the
original grantee of a patent and title has obtained the same
through fraud, reversion will no longer prosper as the land had
become private land and the fraudulent acquisition cannot affect
the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the
lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action
for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches.
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public
domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or
estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an
innocent purchaser for value over and above the interests of the
government. Section 32 provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value.The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised
by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent
purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree,
it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrances for value.

In this petition, the LRA, issued Decree No. N-150912 in favor of

Fermina Castro and OCT No. 10215 was issued by the Rizal Registrar

of Deeds. OCT No. 10215 does not show any annotation, lien, or
encumbrance on its face. Relying on the clean title, Yujuico bought
the same in good faith and for value from her. There is no
allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire
the land fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens
System that every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same
free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate
and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting. The same
legal shield redounds to his successors-in-interest, the Yujuicos and
Carpio, more particularly the latter since Carpio bought the lot from
Jesus Y. Yujuico for value and in good faith.
Likewise protected are the rights of innocent mortgagees for value,
the PISO, Citibank, N.A., PDC, RCBC, PCIB, and DBP. Even if the
mortgagors title was proved fraudulent and the title declared null
and void, such declaration cannot nullify the mortgage rights of a
mortgagee in good faith.
Another contention of the respondent Republic:
The plain import of Municipality of Antipolo vs Zapanta is that a land
registration court, the RTC at present, has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the application which respondent Republic claims
is public land.
Firmly entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. Consequently, the proper CFI (now the
RTC) under Section 14 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
has jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land.
The applicant in a land registration case usually claims the land
subject matter of the application as his/her private property, as in
the case of the application of Castro. Thus, the conclusion of the CA
that the Pasig-Rizal CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the application of Castro has no legal mooring. The land
registration court initially has jurisdiction over the land applied for
at the time of the filing of the application. After trial, the court, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, can determine whether the title to
the land applied for is registrable and can be confirmed. In the
event that the subject matter of the application turns out to be
inalienable public land, then it has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of the land and perforce must dismiss the application.
Fil-Estate Management v. Trono
An application for registration of a parcel of land already covered
by a Torrens Title is actually a collateral attack against the Title not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
A Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the
validity of title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for the purpose.
It is too late to question petitioners titles considering that the
Certificates of Title issued have become incontrovertible after the
lapse of one year from the decree of registration.
Section 96. Against whom action filed. If such action is brought to
recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any
estate or interest therein arising wholly through fraud, negligence,
omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court personnel, Register
of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties, the action shall be brought
against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land is situated and the National Treasurer as defendants. But if

such action is brought to recover for loss or damage or for

deprivation of land or of any interest therein arising through fraud,
negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of person other than
court personnel, the Register of Deeds, his deputy or other
employees of the Registry, such action shall be brought against
the Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer and other person or
persons, as co-defendants. It shall be the duty of the Solicitor
General in person or by representative to appear and to defend all
such suits with the aid of the fiscal of the province or city where the
land lies: Provided, however, that nothing in this Decree shall be
construed to deprive the plaintiff of any right of action which he
may have against any person for such loss or damage or
deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party
defendant. In every action filed against the Assurance Fund, the
court shall consider the report of the Commissioner of Land
Registration.
Art. 1465. Things subject to a resolutory condition may be the
object of the contract of sale. (n)

Hrs. of Zoilo Espiritu vs. Landrito (520 SCRA 383)

Reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes 10 years
after date of registration
An action for reconveyance prescribes 10 years from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale if the action is based on
implied trust arising from a wrongful foreclosure with iniquitous
interest. The principal obligation still stands however the interest is
set at 12% per annum which should be paid.
CRESENCIA ALMARZA, petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION ARGUELLES, GILDA ARGUELLES, GIL PANCRUDO,
BALBINA PANCRUDO and HON. JUDGE MIDPANTAO L.
ADIL, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
From the decision dated June 2, 1978 rendered by the then Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II in Civil Case No. 11051 entitled,
"Asuncion Arguelles, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Cresencia Almarza,
Defendant", petitioner came directly to this Court on a lone question of
law:
May the possessor en concepto de dueno of a
parcel of land, after the lapse of more than ten
years from the issuance of a Torrens Certificate of
Title to another person ask the latter to reconvey
the land?
It was established that Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre,
situated in the Barrio of Sulanga Municipality of Cabatuan, Iloilo,
originally belonged to private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Romualdo Grana. In 1929, he sold a portion thereof consisting of 7,300
square meters, more or less, to petitioner and her husband, the late
Leon Almarza. After the sale, said portion was physically segregated
from the whole lot and was taken possession of by petitioner and her
husband, who since then had been in continuous, peaceful, open and
adverse possession thereof, cultivating and gathering the produce
thereof and declaring the same in their names for taxation purposes.
The document evidencing the sale in favor of petitioner and her
husband was lost during the war, but sometime thereafter, the late
Laura Pancrudo, mother of private respondents Asuncion and Gilda
Arguelles, executed an affidavit acknowledging the sale of said portion
to petitioner and her husband. On the basis of said affidavit and after
actual inspection of the lot, the Provincial Assessor issued a new tax
declaration, Tax Declaration No. 456 beginning in the year 1945 to
Leon Almarza, annotating at the back thereof the aforementioned
affidavit of the late Laura Pancrudo. The tax declaration, covering the
7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 sold to petitioner and her husband
was designated as Lot No. 5815-B. On the other hand, a new tax

declaration, Tax Declaration No. 3909 was issued by the Provincial

Assessor in the name of Romualdo Grana for the remaining portion of
Lot No. 5815, described therein as Lot No. 5815-A.
Sometime prior to July, 1950, Josefa Malote, mother of private
respondents Gil and Balbina Pancrudo, filed for and in behalf of her
children and the late Laura Pancrudo an answer in Cadastral Case No.
78, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1321. In support of her claim over Lot No.
5815, she presented in evidence Tax Declaration No. 3909 covering
only a portion thereof designated therein as Lot No. 5815-A and a land
tax receipt dated March 30, 1950 showing payment of the real estate
tax for a portion only of Lot No. 5815 known and described in the Tax
Declaration as Lot No. 5815-A.
On July 25, 1950, the cadastral court declared Gil and Balbina
Pancrudo owner of one-half undivided share of Lot No. 5815 and the
late Laura Pancrudo as owner of the other undivided half share.
Pursuant to a decree of title, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-134,
covering the entire Lot 5815 was issued in the name of said
adjudicatees on May 29, 1951.
On November 1, 1951, Laura Pancrudo died, leaving private
respondents Asuncion Arguelles and Gilda Arguelles as her only
children and legal successors-in-interest.
On April 20, 1977, private respondents Asuncion and Gilda Arguelles
and Gil and Balbina Pancrudo instituted before the then Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Civil Case No. 11051 against petitioner for recovery of
the 7,300 sq.m. portion of Lot No. 5815 in her possession and for
damages. Basis of the action was OCT No. 0-134 issued on May 29,
1951. Petitioner, in turn, interposed a counterclaim for reconveyance of
the disputed portion of Lot No. 5815 in her favor.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment on June 2, 1978 in favor
of private respondents, ordering petitioner to vacate the portion of Lot
No. 5815 subject of the controversy and to deliver the same to private
respondents, as well as to pay the costs of suit. Petitioner's
counterclaim was dismissed for the reason that although a constructive
or implied trust was constituted in favor of petitioner when the disputed
portion was included in the certificate of title issued to private
respondents, petitioner's action for reconveyance had prescribed more
than ten years having elapsed from the issuance of said certificate of
title.
We reverse. As between the conclusion reached by the trial court that
petitioner's action for reconveyance has prescribed and petitioner's
own contention that it has not, We find that the factual backdrop of the
case at bar provides tenable reasons for sustaining the latter's position.
First. It is not disputed that petitioner has been in possession as owner
of the disputed portion of Lot No. 5815 since 1929 by reason of a sale
in her and her husband's favor by the original owner thereof, Romualdo
Grana, predecessor-in-interest of private respondents. Said sale was
even acknowledged by Laura Pancrudo, mother of private respondents
Asuncion and Gilda Arguelles, in an affidavit annotated at the back of
Tax Declaration No. 456. From that time on, petitioner and/or her
husband cultivated the land, gathered the produce thereof, declared
the same in her and/or her husband's name for taxation purposes and
accordingly paid the realty taxes due thereon. In Caragay-Layno v.
Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718, citing Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana, 103
Phil. 683 and Faja v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, cases with
similar factual backgrounds as the instant case, We held that
prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, which is,
in effect, an action to quiet title against the plaintiff therein who is in
possession of the land in question. The reason, We explained, is "that
as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of
action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property
in one's possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession
over a period of fifty-two [52] years (48 years in this case) gave her a
continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her title."
We further stated that if ever prescription may be invoked, it may be
said to have commenced to run only from the time the possessor was

made aware of a claim adverse to his own. In the case at bar,

petitioner was made aware of such adverse claim only upon service on
her of the summons in Civil Case No. 11051. As her action for
reconveyance, or to quiet title was contained in her counterclaim, the
same cannot be said to have already prescribed.

Iloilo is hereby ordered to cancel OCT No. 0-134 in the names of

Balbina, Gil and Laura, all surnamed Pancrudo, and thereafter to issue
a new certificate of title covering said 7,300 square meter portion in
favor of petitioner and another certificate of title in favor of private
respondents covering the remaining portion of Lot No. 5815. No costs.

Second. The evidence submitted by Josefa Malote during the

Cadastral hearing consisted of tax declaration No. 3909 covering only
a portion of Lot No. 5815 designated as Lot No. 5815-A and land tax
receipt dated March 30, 1950 showing payment of real estate tax for a
portion only of Lot No. 5815, designated as Lot No. 5815-A in said tax
declaration No. 3909. In so doing, she laid claim only to said portion of
Lot No. 5815 and did not assert ownership over the disputed portion,
known as Lot No. 5815-B. This being the case, the inclusion of the
disputed portion in OCT No. 0-134 is "void and of no effect for a land
registration court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who
have put no claim in it and who never asserted any right of ownership
over it." 1 "The remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one
year from date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages." 2 Petitioner availed herself
of this remedy seasonably.

SO ORDERED.

Third. Private respondents obtained OCT No. 0-134 on May 29,1951.

Their action was instituted only on April 20, 1977, or after a lapse of
twenty-six [26] years. The neglect or failure of private respondents to
assert their alleged right under the certificate of title for such
unreasonable length of time makes them guilty of laches.' They should
now be held either to have abandoned or waived whatever right they
may have under said certificate of title.
Fourth. As correctly analyzed by the trial court:
Apparently, the plaintiff [private respondents] are
seeking to recover the 7,300 square meters land
in question because it is included in their title.
They have not rebutted the [defendant's petitioner]
evidence to the effect that they bought the area in
dispute from its primitive owner, Romualdo Grana,
in 1929 and the said sale was confirmed by the
late Laura Pancrudo after World War II. Plaintiffs
likewise have not disputed that the defendant and
her late husband have been in continuous, public,
and peaceful possession of the premises since
1929 until the filing of this case.
It seems that the plaintiffs solely anchor their right
over the disputed premises on the strength of their
title over Lot 5815 which includes the area in
dispute and the fact that they acquired said title in
a cadastral proceedings in 1950 which was a pro g
in rem. 3
On this premise, to adjudge private respondents owner of the disputed
portion of Lot No. 5815 on the basis merely of its having been
erroneously included in their certificate of title would indeed be "a sad
day for the law" for then. We shall be 4 attaching full faith and credence
to a Torrens certificate of title" "oblivious to the demands of justice" and
anchoring our decision "solely on a narrow and literal reading of a
statutory prescription, devoid of any shadow of moral
right. 5 Furthermore, We shall be putting a premium on land-grabbing
and transgressing the broader principle in human relations that no
person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering private respondents to
cause the segregation of the disputed portion of 7,300 square meters
forming part of Lot No. 5815 of the Cabatuan Cadastre, Cadastral
Case No. 78, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1321, presently occupied by
petitioner and to reconvey the same to said petitioner. After the
segregation shall have been accomplished, the Register of Deeds of

Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Manuel Quijano (449

SCRA 15)
Facts: On August 29, 1988, Free Patent No. VII-4-2974 was
issued to Alan P. Quijano over a parcel of land identified as Lot
374, Cadastre 374-D wherein Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. OP-38221 was issued in his name. Meanwhile, on
November 11, 1988, Free Patent No. VII-4-3088 was issued in
favor of Gwendolyn Q. Enriquez for Lot 379, Cadastre 374-D in
which OCT No. OP-39847 was also issued in her name. Alan
Quijano and Gwendolyn Enriquez are among the heirs of
Manuel Quijnao who are the private respondents in this case.
Enriquez filed an application for a free patent over Lot 376 of
Cadastre 374-D with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). She also filed an application for a
free patent over Lot 378. However, the heirs of Guillermo
Sanjorjo, filed a protest/complaint with the DENR praying for
the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. VII-4-2974 and VII-43088, and for the dismissal of the free patent applications over
Lots 376 and 378. The protestants/claimants alleged that the
said parcels of land were originally owned by Ananias Ursal
but were exchanged for a parcel of land, owned by their
predecessor, Guillermo Sanjorjo, and from whom they
inherited the property. However, the protestants/claimants
withdrew their protest/complaint. Thus, on April 14, 1992, the
Regional Executive Director rendered a decision giving due
course to the applications. However, he ruled that the free
patents over Lots 374 and 379 could no longer be disturbed
since the complaint for the cancellation was filed more than
one year from their issuance. On September 13, 1993,
petitioners Vicente Sanjorjo, the heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo, and
Spouses Inot, filed a complaint for cancellation of titles under
tax declarations and reconveyance of possession of real
property covering the Lots 374, 376, 378 and 379, against the
private respondents, the heirs of Manuel Quijano and Vicente
Gulbe. Petitioners allege that they are the owners of several
parcels of land covering Lots 374, 376, 378 and 379 which
they inherited from their grandfather the late Maximo Sanjorjo.
According to the petitioners, sometime in 1983, the parcels of
land in question were leased to Manuel Quijano for a two (2)
year period. However, the lease was never paid for nor was
possession of the said properties ever returned to the
petitioners, despite repeated demands on Quijano to return the
same. When Manuel Quijano died, his heirs divided among
themselves the land belonging to the petitioners. Plaintiffs
averred that they nor their ascendants have never sold,
donated, or mortgaged any of these lots in question to the
defendants or their ascendants. On the other hand, private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata based on the decision of the Regional
Executive Director on April 14, 1992. They maintained that the
decision of the Regional Executive Director had become final
and executory and, as such, barred the petitioners action.
They also invoked that the petitioners action was barred by the
issuance of OCT No. OP-38221 covering Lot 374, and OCT
No. OP-39847 covering Lot 379. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. On
appeal, petitioners limited the issue to Lots 374 and 379 only.
The appellate court affirmed the order of the trial court
although for a different reason, i.e., prescription.

Issue: WON petitioners action for the reconveyance of Lots

374 and 379, covered by OCT No. OP-38221 and OCT No.
OP-39847 respectively is barred by prescription.
Held: No, the action for reconveyance of the lots in question
has not yet prescribed. A Torrens title issued on the basis of
the free patents became as indefeasible as one which was
judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of
issuance of the patent. However, an aggrieved party may still
file an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust, which prescribes in ten years from the date
of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the property
provided that the property has not been acquired by an
innocent purchaser for value. The presence of fraud or mistake
creates an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful and legal
owner giving him the right to seek reconveyance of the
property. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two acts:
(1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the
defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same. In their
complaint, the petitioners clearly asserted that their
predecessors-in-interest have long been the absolute and
exclusive owners of the lots in question and that they were
fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof when the private
respondents obtained free patents and certificates of title in
their names. Article 1456 of the New Civil Code provides that a
person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation
of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. The presence of fraud in this case
created an implied trust in favor of the petitioners, giving them
the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the private
respondents. However, because of the trial courts dismissal
order, the petitioners have been unable to prove their charges
of fraud and misrepresentation. The petitioners action for
reconveyance may not be said to have prescribed, for, basing
the present action on implied trust, the prescriptive period is
ten years. The questioned titles were obtained on August 29,
1988 and November 11, 1988, in OCT Nos. OP-38221 and
OP-39847, respectively. The petitioners commenced their
action for reconveyance on September 13, 1993. Since the
petitioners cause of action is based on fraud, deemed to have
taken place when the certificates of title were issued, the
complaint filed on September 13, 1993 is, therefore, well within
the prescriptive period.
Pino vs. CA G.R. No. 94114 June 19, 1991
FACTS: The decision of the CA affirming in toto the decision of the
RTC of Echague, Isabela is now being assailed in the instant petition
for certiorari.
Lot 6 was acquired by the spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato.
Juan Gaffud died in 1936. On Jan. 11, 1938, Lot 6 was originally
registered (OTC No. 4340) in the Registration Book of the Office of the
RD in the names of Rafaela, Raymundo and Cicero Gaffud (sons of
spouses) as co-owners, . The said lot was sold to Rafaela Donato
through a Deed of Transfer which cancelled OTC NO. 4340 and in lieu
thereof a TCT was issued in the name of Rafaela alone.
On Feb. 1967, Rafaela sold a portion of Lot 6 in favor in Fortunato
Pascua. The aforesaid sale caused the subdivision of the said lot into
Lot-6-A and Lot-6-B. Upon registration of said sale in favor of
Pascua, TCT No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato
on March 2, 1967 covering the land designated as Lot 6-B.
On Jun. 10, 1970, Rafaela Donato sold to petitioner Felicisima Pino
said Lot-6-B as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which was
duly notarized. Rafaela undertook to register said Deed with the RD of
Isabela and on July 13, 1970, the sale was inscribed therein and
a TCT was issued in the name of Felicisima Pino.

On Sept. 1980, Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife Demetrian and
sons Romulo and Adolfo, private respondents herein.
On March 9, 1982, private respondents filed a complaint for nullity of
sale andreconveyance against petitioner Felicisima Pino. (During
the pendency of the case before the trial court, Rafaela Donato, who
was not a party to the case, died on November her 26, 1982.)
The RTC ruled and this was sustained by respondent CA that
petitioner Pino is not a purchaser in good faith, so (a) the Deed of
Absolute Sale made by Rafaela in favor of Pino null and void insofar as
the shares of Cicero and Raymundo are concerned, (b) cancellation of
TCT No. 49380 in the name of Pino and (c) reconvey one-half of Lot-6B to plaintiffs withing 10 days.
ISSUE:
1. WON Felicisima Pino is a purchaser in good faith
2. WON the filing of an action for reconveyance has already prescribed
HELD: 1. The rule applicable to this controversy is well-settled. Where
the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold,
the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the
certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse
suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of said certificate.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record discloses that when
petitioner purchased the subject property on June 10, 1970, the title
was in the name of her vendor Rafaela Donato alone.
There was no allegation, and much less any evidence, that the transfer
of the subject property from the original owners (Rafaela, Cicero and
Raymundo) to Rafaela Donato was fraudulent.
3. TCT No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato
on March 2, 1967. The present action for reconveyance was filed only
on March 9, 1982. Clearly then, the action has already prescribed
because it was filed fifteen (15) years after the issuance of TCT No. T32683
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach
an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is
to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud or
were instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now wellsettled that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of
the Torrens Title over the property. (Armerol v. Bagumbaran, 154
SCRA 396, 407; Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407;
Walstron v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431, 442).

Fuguracion V. Libi, GR No.155688 (2007)

Facts: In 1948, the Cebu City government expropriated a parcel of
land of Galileo Figuracion to be turned into a portion of N. Escario
Street.In 1989, the Sangguniang Panglungsod approved the
reconveyance of the unused portionof the lot to the successor-ininterest, Isagani Figuracion. A new TCT was issued to
IsaganiFiguracion.The Spouses Libi were owners of an adjacent lot
and has been using the said lot as accessto the road. They refused to
vacate the lot despite demand. The lower court ordered that
theSpouses Libi remove the fence they have erected on the said
lot.The Spouses Libi filed for easement, then amended their complaint
and shifted cause ofaction to one for the annulment of sale to
Figuracion with damages.
Issue: WON the action by the Spouses Libi to annul the reconveyance
of the lot to Figuracion is proper.

Ruling: The Court ruled that the Spouses Libi were not the realparties-in-interest to annul the TCT of Figuracion, since they are not
themselves claiming title to or possession of the lot. Libi alleged that
they bought the adjacent lot in the belief that they had an outlet to N.
Escario Street through the lot owned by the Cebu City
government. Clearly, they have no interest in the title ofthe lot.
Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands
of the public domain through the cancellation of private title
erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The action should be in the
name of the State. Thus, Spouses Libi cannot be considered the
proper parties therein.

Section 7. Effect of judgment. A judgment of annulment shall set aside the

questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and
void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.
However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. (n)

The Spouses sole interest is the use of the property as access to N.

Escaro Street. Such interest is tangential to any issue regarding
ownership or possession of the property. Hence, it Is not sufficient to
vest in them the legal standing to sue for reversion of the property.
They shouldhave maintained the action for easement. The wisdom and
intent of the City Council to recognize the right of Isagani Figuracion to
repurchase the lot cannot be gainsaid. The City of Cebu has the power
and authority to sell the expropriated property that is no longer
needed for that purpose for which it was intended. The Spouses Libi
not only lacked the legal personality but also have no legal basis to
challenge the reconveyance.

Section 9. Relief available. The judgment of annulment may include the

award of damages, attorney's fees and other relief.

Section 8. Suspension prescriptive period. The prescriptive period for the

refiling of the aforesaid original action shall be deemed suspended from the filing
of such original action until the finality of the judgment of annulment. However,
the prescriptive period shall not be suspended where the extrinsic-fraud is
attributable to the plaintiff in the original action. (n)

If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been executed
the court may issue such orders of restitution or other relief as justice and equity
may warrant under the circumstances. (n)
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts.
An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be
treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule
shall be applicable thereto. (n)

RULE 47

QUIETING OF TITLE (n)

Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and Resolutions
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. (n)

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or

any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast

upon title to real property or any interest therein.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)

Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.

Section 3. Period for filing action. If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must
be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (n)
Section 4. Filing and contents of petition. The action shall be commenced by
filing a verified petition alleging therein with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with
sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents. A certified true
copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses
or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn certification
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n)
Section 5. Action by the court. Should the court find no substantial merit in the
petition, the same may be dismissed outright with specific reasons for such
dismissal.
Should prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be given due
course and summons shall be served on the respondent. (n)
Section 6. Procedure. The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be
observed. Should trial be necessary, the reception of the evidence may be
referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. (n)

Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a

cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation
has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by
extinctive prescription.
Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he
may have received from the latter, or reimburse him for expenses
that may have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.
Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title
are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with this
Code.
Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of
a cloud therefrom shall be governed by such rules of court as the
Supreme Court shall promulgated.
RULE 63: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17
February 1998)
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the
Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (1a, R64)

Section 2. Parties. All persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration shall be made parties; and no declaration shall,
except as otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the action. (2a, R64)

final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration

Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.

Section 3. Notice on Solicitor General. In any action which involves the

validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental
regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same
and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. (3a, R64)

What is quieting of title?

Section 4. Local government ordinances. In any action involving the validity of

a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the
local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be
heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General
shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. (4a, R64)

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal

of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. (Oo vs Lim, G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010)

Section 5. Court action discretionary. Except in actions falling under the

second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon
motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe
instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or
construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances. (5a, R64)

What is the purpose of an action to quiet title?

Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to
secure "...an adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is
invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under
him may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim. (Baricuatro vs CA, G.R. No. 105902,
February 9, 2000)

Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. If before the final termination of

the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation should take place,
the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action, and the parties
shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper. (6a, R64)

In such action, the competent court is tasked to

determine the respective rights of the complainant and
the other claimants, not only to place things in their
proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no
rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one
so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that
whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly
introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as
use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit. (Oo
vs Lim, ibid.)

JOSE GOMEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

168 SCRA 503 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds
Judgment Confirms Title Sec 30 & 32 PD 1529
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12
parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez.
Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were
inherited by Jose Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to
divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to
the application, the trial court issued an order of general
default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The
decision became final and executory hence the court directed
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) to
issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots
adjudicated.

What is the nature of the action?

Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi
in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in
personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is
named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem,
a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the
parties. (Portic vs. Cristobal G.R. 156171, April 22, 2005,
456 SCRA 577)

GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and

petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12
parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was
already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law,
land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be
the subject of another registration. The lower court granted
Silverios recommendation.

What are the two kinds of actions referred to in the

law?
1. REMEDIAL an action to remove the cloud or to quiet
title
2. PREVENTIVE an action to prevent a future cloud or
doubt

Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land

Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the
issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title.
That once the judgment becomes final and executory under
Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of
course.

What are the two requisites in order that an action

for quieting of title may prosper?

ISSUE: Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial

ruling on approving the adjudication even after it had became
final and executory.
HELD: Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of
land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. The Supreme Court has held that as long as a

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper,

two requisites must concur:
1.
2.

The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in

the real property subject of the action; and
The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. (Phil-

 The period would be either 10 or 30 years depending on

ordinary or extraordinary prescription. It may also be
barred by laches.

ville Dev't and Housing Corp. vs Bonifacio, et al., G.R. No. 167391,
June 8, 2011)
What does the cloud on title consist of?
The cloud on title consists of:
1. any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding;
2. which is apparently valid or effective;
3. but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable; and
4. may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted. (Phil-ville Dev't
and Housing Corp. vs Bonifacio, et al., ibid)
Can this action be filed by a person other than
the registered owner?
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper
party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has
been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a
person other than the registered owner because, in the
Article reproduced above, title does not necessarily refer
to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of
an actual certificate of title to a property does not
necessarily bar an action to quiet title. (Portic vs.
Cristobal, ibid.)
"Title" to property does not necessarily mean the original
transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive
prescription by possession in the concept of an owner
thereof. Indeed, one who has an equitable right or
interest in the property may also file an action to quiet
title under the law. (Mamadsual vs Moson, G.R. No. 92557
September 27, 1990)
Does an action for quieting of title prescribe?
It depends.
1. If the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the
action does not prescribe.
Reason: There is settled jurisprudence that one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be
owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by one who is in possession. No better situation can
be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on
equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother,
Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for
no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a
claim that the land she had been occupying and
cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a
third person. We hold that in such situation the right to
quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance
and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only
from the time in possession was made aware of a claim
adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory
period of prescription commences to run against
possessor. (Faja vs CA, G.R. No. L-45045, February 28,
1977)
2. If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, the
action may prescribe.

When will the action to quiet title not prosper?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

If it is merely an action to settle a dispute concerning boundaries

If the case merely involves the proper interpretation and meaning of a
contract or document
If the plaintiff has not title, legal or equitable
If the action has prescribed and the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property
If the contract, instrument, etc. is void on its face
If it is a mere claim or assertion (whether oral or written) unless such
claim has been made in a court action or the claim asserts that an
instrument or entry in behalf of the plaintiff is not really what it
appears to be (Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Book II, Property)
MAMADSUAL V. MOSON
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if plaintiffs are in
possession of the property.
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title. It is not necessary that the plaintiff be the
registered owner of the property in question. One who has
an equitable right or interest in the property may also file
an action to quiet title under the law. Thus title can
connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the
concept of an owner.
Previously, the Court considered the action to be one for
quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and
actual possession since time immemorial of the property
in question by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, while defendants secured a
certificate of title through fraud, misrepresentation, and
deceit.