CASE # 2

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals,

249 SCRA 538
FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel
industry.
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISAs original term
expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation
which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing,
among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of
the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing
from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and
immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and
related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, dated November 16, 1982,
was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term.
RULING: Yes
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There
is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a nonincorporated agency or instrumentality. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct
from the personality of the Republic.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body
corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as legal personality.
In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the
latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal,
G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989
FACTS:
Payawal, a buyer of a certain subdivision lot, sued Solid Homes for failure to deliver the
certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that
jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by
PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages
HELD:
SC held that NHA has jurisdiction. On the competence of the Board to award damages, SC
held that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide
claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to
create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth
department of the government.
Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to
enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC. v. IGNACIO

G.R. No. 164789 | August 27, 2009
FACTS
Christian General Assembly entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot4 with Villa Priscilla Subdivision located
in Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would pay P2,373,000.00 for the subject property on installment
basis; they were to pay a down payment of P1,186,500, with the balance payable within three years. Subsequently,
the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to Sell to extend the payment period from three to five years.
According to CGA, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered
that the title covering the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots that the respondents had
acquired from Nicanor Adriano and Ceferino Sison, respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenantbeneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial whose subject property had been placed under Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27s Operation Land Transfer. According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land
under Republic Act No. 6657,which the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted. The DAR Order authorized
Imperial to retain the farm lots previously awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries, including Lot 2-F previously awarded
to Adriano, and Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 awarded to Sison.

Understandably aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA filed a complaint against the
respondents before the RTC. CGA claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the
subject property was part of a property under litigation.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. The respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action
is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HLURB.
ISSUE
Whether or not the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGAs action for rescission and damages.
HELD
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGAs action for rescission and
Damages. The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an increasing number of cases between
subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURBs exclusive jurisdiction.
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC,
G.R. No. L-23004, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
The Securities and Exchange Commission in its resolution denied the Makati Stock Exchange
Incs permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its
board securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and
that it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commissions order or resolution would make
impossible, for all practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its
permission amounted to prohibition.
Issue:
Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?
Held:
None. The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double
listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it.
It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Head before the war and it is not in
conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself,
adds no weight in judicial litigation.
The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in
discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an administrative
officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute, and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is
approved without such condition against double listing.

CASE # 13
Taule v. Santos,
G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991
Facts: On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of

Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six
members, including Taule, in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its
officers. The group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
members. The Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent the Secretary of Local
Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification
due to flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. The Secretary nullified the
election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a new one to be conducted to be presided by
the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Taule, contested
the decision contending that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC
and that the Constitution provides that it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective barangay officials.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;
Held: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is
limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn
petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal
or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of
the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as
prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority
of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the
election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular
level conducted by their own respective organization.

CASE # 15
Cario v. Commission on Human Rights,
G.R. No. 96681, December 02, 1991
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend
work and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. Sec. Isidro Carino issued return to

work order in 24 hours to striking teachers or face dismissed for failure to heed the order. For failure to
heed the order, the teachers were charged, preventively suspended for 90 days and temporarily replaced.
The Teachers complained to CHR that they were replaced without notice and for no reason. Carino moved
for dismissed for lack of jurisdictions. CHR denied the motion and ruled that there had been violation of
the teachers civil and political rights which CHR was empowered to investigate Carino elevated the case
to Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. The most that

may be conceded to CHR is that it may investigate i.e receive evidence and make findings of facts as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights
The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

CASE # 16

Villaluz v. Zaldivar,
G.R. No. L-22754, December 31, 1965
FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in
1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader
and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a
committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz
be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his
post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. THE President as the

administrative head of Villaluz, is empowered to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio,

without need of any previous complaint.
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the
executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified
service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the
classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with
the provision of our Constitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department.

Case # 19
Pefianco v. Moral,
G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000
FACTS: Maria Luisa Moral ,Chief Librarian of National Library, was charged with dishonesty, grave

misconduct and conduct prejudiced to the best interest of the service for pilferaging of historical
documents.
DECS Investigating Committee conducted hearings. Thereafter DECS Sec Ricardo Gloria ordered Moral
dismissed from government service
Moral filed Petition for Production of Investigating Committee Report purportedly to guide her on
whatever action to take. Her petition was denied. She filed for mandamus. RTC denied motion to dismiss
filed by Gloria. On appeal CA, sustained RC. Gloria went to SC
HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings
and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity
to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation
committee. Respondent had been accorded these rights.