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Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis

Author(s): Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen


Reviewed work(s):
Source: Representations, No. 27 (Summer, 1989), pp. 92-110
Published by: University of California Press
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MIKKEL

BORCH-JACOBSEN

Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis
BY FREUD
constitutea usefulpointof departure
Two STATEMENTS
for discussing hypnosisin psychoanalysis.The firstone is taken fromthe nine-

Lecturesto Psychoanalysis:
teenth of the Introductory
began when
I have been able to say thatpsychoanalysisproper [dieeigentliche
Psychoanalyse]
I dispensed withthe help of hypnosis.'

TreatThe second statementis in Freud's "Adviceto Physicianson Psychoanalytic


ment" (1912):
In practice . . . there is nothingto be said against a psychotherapistcombininga certain
amount of analysiswithsome suggestiveinfluencein order to achieve a perceptibleresult
in a shortertime.But one has a rightto insistthathe himselfshould be in no doubt about
what he is doing and should knowthathis methodis not thatof true psychoanalysis.2

These two statementscategoricallydefine Freud's break with hypnosis: in the


rejectionof hypnosis-but also, and more generally,of all "suggestive"practices,
even those limitedto advice or exhortation-psychoanalysisas such,psychoanalysis"proper,""true" psychoanalysisis supposed to have been born. What was at
stake around 1895, when Freud decided to abandon all hypnosuggestivepracticesin favorof the method knownas "freeassociation,"was thus nothingother
and nothingless than the veryidentityof psychoanalysis,in its supposedly total
differencefromall psychotherapyand indeed fromall thaumaturgy.As a result,
thisdecision involvesall of psychoanalysis,applies to psychoanalysisas a whole;
and, in fact,thatis how thisdecision is ordinarilyunderstood.The institutionalization of psychoanalysishas finallyeven lent thisdecision the featuresof actual
Conpsychoanalyticdogma. Jacques Lacan, forexample, in TheFourFundamental
ceptsofPsychoanalysis,says:
As everyone knows, it was by distinguishingitselffrom hypnosisthat analysis became
established.3

Thus "everyoneknows,"especiallybecause itis finallyon this"knowing"that(give


or take a few differenceson thispoint) the communityof analystsis based. But
does everyone know it well?As Hegel said, what is well known is badly known.
And when we come across such phrases as "itis knownthat"or "quite obviously"
or "clearly,"the odds are that the evidence requires furtherinvestigation.We
if we
and suggestion
should be asking what is encompassed by the termshypnosis

92

REPRESENTATIONS

27

Summer1989(C

THE REGENTS

OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

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want to know fromwhat,exactly,psychoanalysishas freed itself-if it has ever


reallydone so.
Simply reading Freud is enough to show thaton thispoint thingsare much
more complex than theyare ordinarilysaid to be. In the firstplace, when we
consider Freud's statementsthat deal withthe hypnoticunconscious (or unconwe must note thatFreud never reallydreamed of denyinghis indebtsciousness),
edness to research into the hypnoticunconscious-or, as people before Freud
preferredto call it,hypnotic"automatism,"the hypnotic"subconscious,"or hypnotic "dual consciousness." Hypnosis, that slumberingof consciousnessduring
which a subject paradoxicallyremains"awake,"alwaysseemed to Freud particunot subject to the monitoring
larlyrevealing of an unconscious psychicactivity,
and controlof the ego. How to explain, forexample, thata subjectcarriesout a
posthypnoticsuggestion-of whichhe no longer knowsanythingfromany other
source-if not byconceding the agencyof nonconsciousthought(thatis,of ideas
which the I does not "accompany,"to use Kant's expression)? Thus we read in
Freud's Autobiographical
Study:"I received the profoundestimpression of the
possibilitythat there could be powerful mental processes which nevertheless
remained hidden fromthe consciousnessof men."4Moreover-whether in the
sixthIntroductory
Lecture,in the "Note on the Unconscious,"or in the articleon
"The Unconscious"-Freud invariablyinvokes hypnosis,as often as dreams,
when he wantsto "prove" or "illustrate"the factof the unconscious:
andespecially
Evenbeforethetimeofpsychoanalysis,
hypnotic
experiments,
posthypnotic
had tangibly
demonstrated
theexistence
and modeofoperationofthemental
suggestion,

unconscious.5

Again, in TheEgo and theId, hypnosisis elevated to the rank of paradigm of the
unconscious,exactlyon a par withdreams,and thereforealso as a kindof second
"royalroad" of analysis:
To mostpeople who have been educatedin philosophy
theidea of anything
psychical
whichis not also consciousis inconceivable.... I believethisis onlybecausetheyhave
neverstudiedtherelevantphenomenaofhypnosis
and dreams,which-quiteapartfrom
thisview.Theirpsychology
pathologicalmanifestations-necessitate
of consciousness
is
incapableofsolvingtheproblemsofdreamsand hypnosis.6
These citations,of course, are farfromexhaustive,but theyare alreadysufficient
to establishthat,for Freud, thefactof hypnosisis certainlyequivalentto thefact
of the unconscious (the unique "object"of psychoanalysis).
This factof hypnosis,thistypicalexample of theunconscious,simultaneously
representsa formidable"riddle"forpsychoanalysis.This is "theriddle [Rdtsel]of
suggestiveinfluence,"the riddle of suggestion.Afterall, whyis one susceptible,
under hypnosis,to "an influencein theabsence of all logicalreason"?What is this
strangeemotionalmalleabilityof thehypnotizedperson,whichcauses himto feel,
perceive, and sometimeseven experience in his body everythingthat the hypHypnosisin Psychoanalysis

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93

notistdirects?How to explain this"paralysis"of the will,thisradical disengagementof self,whichis at the same timea radicalengagementbyanother?In short,
where do the extraordinarypowerof thehypnotistand theextraordinarydocility
of the hypnotizedperson come from?
This enigma, it mustbe stressed,is both the enigma of the unconscious and
thatof a certainrelationshipto others,perhaps even thatof the unconsciousas a
relationshipto others.It arises in GroupPsychology
and theAnalysisoftheEgo when
Freud's investigationinto the essence of the social tie-and, more generally,of
what he calls the "emotionaltie" (Gefiihlsbindung)
to others-provides the opportunityfora protracteddebate withGabrielTarde, GustaveLe Bon, and Hyppolite
Bernheim, all advocates of the theoryof suggestion.Freud heartilyrejects this
theoryin chapter 4: the notion of suggestion,supposed to explain everything,
cannot explain itself,he says; it is onlya "magic word" (Zauberwort)
employed to
explain, tautologically,"the magic of words."Freud thereforedeclines to explain
hypnoticsuggestion and related phenomena (such as "mental contagion" in a
crowd,the "sympatheticinducementof emotions,"Einfdhlung,
and so on) by the
theory
of suggestion-a theorybased on thehypothesisof a kindof physicalreflex
(and, in thissense, unconscious) mimesisof others.But thisrefusalcertainlydoes
not remove the mysterythatthe veryfactof suggestionstillrepresentsfor him.
For Freud himselfhas no alternativetheoryto propose: the one he attemptsto
put forward-the theoryof thelibido-ultimatelyfailswhen confrontedwiththe
phenomenon to be explained.
It is impossibleto retracehere the extraordinarily
complex route thatleads,
in GroupPsychology
and theAnalysisoftheEgo, to the admission(or half-admission)
of thisfailure.Here I shall onlysay,on thebasis of previousanalyses,7thatFreud
does attemptthroughoutthisworkto interpretthe social or (and it comes to the
same thing,in thiscontext)"emotional"tie to othersas a libidinalor erotic phenomenon, a phenomenon of love. Thus it is for love that someone would surrender to a hypnotist,forlove thatmembersof a crowdor a societywould identify
withone another,and again forlove thattheywould submitthemselvespolitically
to the crowd's Father-Head-Ringleader.In otherwords,the libido,and not suggestion, is what would constitutethe basis of the relationship to others (to
and the
"objects") in general. Nevertheless,a close reading of GroupPsychology
Analysisof theEgo establishes that Freud himself was not satisfiedwith this
answer-first of all because thewhole problemof the"social"and "emotional"tie
confrontedhim in manywayswiththe paradox of a "rapportsans rapport"with
others, an identificatory
relationship:ambivalent,preceding the ob-positionof
the Ego and the object, and thereforealso precedingany libidinalobject or any
eroticrelationship.In short,just as the libidinalhypothesiswas based on the idea
of a monadic and substantialsubject (desiring,instinctual,and so on) whom the
relationshipto otherswould affectonlysecondarily,so too did thewhole problem
of the social-emotionaltie make it necessaryto envisage a kind of originalaltera94

REPRESENTATIONS

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of an "ego" and wellbefore


byothers,wellbeforeanyconstitution
tion(or affection)
any Oedipal triangle. Thus Freud, having attempted at firstto exploit the
ends by makinghypresources of the psychoanalyticalconcept of identification,
nosis,in a strikingreversal,the paradigm of the relationshipto others.Hypnosis,
he says,much more than love, mostclearlyshowsthe unfathomable"nature" or
to others.
"essence" of the Gefiihlsbindung
withrare exceptions
giventhatpsychoanalysts,
attention,
This pointwarrants
(such as Sandor Ferenczi and, more recently,Leon Chertokand Francois Roustang),have remained strangelydeaf and blindto thequestionthusinheritedfrom
to hypnosiswas not merelyto challenge the
Freud. To assimilateGefdhlsbindung
it was also to rediscoverthe
libidinal presuppositionof the analyticalTrieblehre;
of
excellence
psychoanalyticalinvestiga"emotional tie" to others,the object par
and theAnalysisoftheEgo,
tion,as a pure enigma. In chapter 8 of GroupPsychology
shortlyaftersaying,"It would be more to the point to explain being in love by
means of hypnosisratherthan the other way round," Freud goes on to remark:
of groupsforus rightaway,
Hypnosiswouldsolvetheriddleof thelibidinalconstitution
whichare notmetbytherationalexplaifitwerenotthatititselfexhibitssomefeatures
sexualtrends
givenofitas a stateofbeinginlove,withthedirectly
nationwehavehitherto
excluded.There is stilla greatdeal in it whichwe mustrecognizeas unexplainedand
[ormysterious;
mystisch].8
mystical
behind whichhide the
he continues,is a "mysteriousword" (Rdtselwort),
Hypnosis,
the "posithe "enigmatic"(Geheimnisvolle),
"uncomprehended" (Unverstandene),
And thisenigma is the "riddle of sugtivelyuncanny" (etwasdirektUnheimliches).
the "riddle of suggestiveinfluence"(das Rdtsel
gestion"(das RdtselderSuggestion),
dersuggestiven
Einflusses).
This impressiveseries of admissionsof defeat is evidence thatrejectingthe
theory of suggestion never eliminated the enigma of hypnoticsuggestion for
Freud. Moreover, this enigma managed to reappear in psychoanalysisas the
enigma of its own foundation:withhypnosis-that is, withthe unconscious and
the "emotional tie"-psychoanalysis itselffinallybecame the enigma for Freud.
To put it another way,withhypnosis,taken as paradigm of the relationshipto
beyond the
others,psychoanalysisstumbledintothe enigma of relationshipitself,
presupposed subject(desiring,in love, instinctual)of the relationship.But what
does psychoanalysisdeal with,then,if not withthe that[(a; the Id], which overwhelms and affectsthe subject beyond himself?What, if not withthose archaic
relationsto others,whichare variouslycalled "love,""hate,""anxiety,""guilt"?
at least,to maintainthe thesis(authorizedbyFreud himIt becomes difficult,
and
simple break between psychoanalysis,on the one hand, and
self) of a pure
hypnosisand suggestion,on the other.Psychoanalysisno doubt did found itself
on the abandonment of hypnosis-but only,it must be recognized, to see hypnosis reappear, sometimesunder othernames or in otherforms,at thecrossroads
Hypnosisin Psychoanalysis

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95

of all questions; hence, the importanceof reconsideringthisso-called abandonment,not so much to initiatea "returnto hypnosis"as to examine, in lightof the
questions Freud was asking himselfin his last phase, the reasons whyin his first
phase he had believed, rathertoo quickly,thatthese issues were settled.In other
words, what is importantis to reconsiderwhat Freud called the "prehistory"of
psychoanalysis,to returnto itwiththe suspicionthatthis"prehistory"belongs to
a certainfutureof psychoanalysisratherthan to a long-dead past.
It is certainlywithrespectto everythingtouchingon the transferencethatthe
"resurgence of hypnosis"(to quote the titleof Leon Chertok'srecent book) is
most spectacular in Freud. And this is hardlysurprising,if we reflectthat the
transference-that strange "rapport sans rapport" set up between patient and
analyst-always representedforFreud a kind of blueprintor,betteryet,a repetitionof the "emotionaltie"to others.Thereforeitis onlynaturalthattheproblems,
gave rise should have
both theoreticaland practical,to whichthisGeffihlsbindung
with the crucial
reappear,
to
of
"rapport"
caused the whole problem hypnotic
question now being to know how the transferencerelationshipcan finallybe distinguishedfrom the hypnotictie,which analysisinitiallyrefused to mobilize in
the cure.
It is thisquestion thatI would like to examine, byattemptingto "repeat" (in
Heidegger's but also Freud's possible meaning of thisword) thatpart of history
which runs fromthe discardingof hypnosisup to the definitiveisolationof the
transferenceas a distinctproblem,and hoping thatthisjourney willfinallyproto others.
vide some insightinto the "riddle" of the Gefithlsbindung
To recall some historicalfact,in December 1887 Freud told Wilhelm Fliess
thathe had immersed himselfin "hypnotism"and thathe had already obtained
"all sorts of small but peculiar successes" (letter2).9 "Hypnotism"at that time
meant "psychotherapyby suggestion,"as practicedby Bernheim and the Nancy
School. Briefly,here is what hypnosisconsistedof. A verbalsuggestionwas given
("You are now in a deep sleep," and so on), followedbya furthersuggestion,still
verbal,thatthe symptomor itsimmediatecause should disappear. This method,
of the subjectsand at the same
based on the deliberateuse of the "suggestibility"
timeon what Freud was alreadycallingthe"magicalpowerof words,"is described
favorablyand at length in a series of articleswrittenby Freud around 1890,
in the article "Hypnosis" in
mainly in his review of August Forel's Hypnotism,
Anton Bum's dictionary,and in "PsychicalTreatment."
In May 1889, Freud began the treatmentof Emmyvon N., in whichhe first
used the "catharticmethod" developed byJosefBreuer. This method stillused
hypnosis, but no longer for direct suggestion. Instead, hypnosiswas used to
reimmersethe patientintothat"hypnoid"stateduringwhicha "traumatic"event
supposedly had become embedded like an "internalforeignbody" in the psychic mechanism,and thus to facilitatethe recollectionor reexperiencingof that
event. According to thishypothesis,derived fromJean-MarieCharcot,hysterics
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-that is, from nonabreacted ideas-and the


"suffer[ed]from reminiscences"
symptomswould disappear when the patientswere able to recount these "traumatic scenes" (the model of this "purgativenarration"was still,of course, the
"talkingcure" inventedby the hystericalprincepsof analysis,Anna 0.). What was
emphasized was the patient'stellingof his or her own story.Breuer and Freud
called thisnarration"cathartic"because of the emotional purge it was supposed
to bringabout, and because theywere no doubt thinkingof the medical interpretationof Aristoteliancatharsisprovidedby the uncle of Freud's wife,the philologistJakob Bernays. Be thatas it may,we mustnote the strangenessof the process
that led Breuer and Freud to call such narration"cathartic,"since in true Aristoteliandoctrinecatharsisrefersto dramaticratherthan narrativeimitation-or,
in whichthe speaker enacts a role, rather
as we mightsay withPlato, to mimesis,
than to diegesis,in which the speaker recounts events.'0 If Freud and Breuer
described the storiesof theirpatientsas cathartic,it is because these storieswere
in fact dramas that were played out, acted, mimed. To realize the truthof this
proposition,one need onlyread the descriptionof the catharticprocedure in the
"PreliminaryCommunication"to Studiesin Hysteria:
almostinvariably
affect[affektloses
producesno result.The
without
Erinnern]
Recollection
as possible[lebhaft
tookplacemustbe repeatedas vividly
psychical
processwhichoriginally
... wiederholt];
it must be broughtback to itsstatusnascendiand given verbal utterance."

Study,the catharticcure is similarly


Thirty-twoyears later,in An Autobiographical
characterizedas "thetracingback of hystericalsymptomsto eventsin the patient's
life, and their removal by means of hypnoticreproductionin statunascendi."'12
Now, repetitionin statunascendi,in the stateof being born,is clearlynot remembering; it is neithertellinga storynor representinga past event as past. It is, as
the event, with all the
Freud and Breuer also write,reliving(wiederdurchleben)
intensityof the firsttime,by repeatingit in thepresent.If we add thatthe events
thus enacted ("tragedized,"saysBreuer) were highlydoubtful(as Freud realized
later), and if we go on to say that these reexperienced events and theircorresponding emotions occurred under hypnosis(thatis, in a stateof absence from
self), then we can understand that Freud's and Breuer's hystericsremembered
nothing,had nothingto tell; theywere playing,living,and acting roles, not so
much bymeans of fantasyrepresentation(Vorstellung)
as by"actingout" (Agieren).
To be more precise, theywere mimingthe affects,body and soul-perhaps the
only way to feel or "experience" an emotionif,as Freud later suggestsin several
withothers.But thisaffecways,thereis no emotionexceptthroughidentification
tive mimesis,which Freud and Breuer describe perfectly,theysimultaneously
theorize as a diegesis, as the "verbalization"of a recollection.And here arises
constant ambiguity,seen clearly in the confusion maintained throughoutthe
Studiesbetween the reexperiencingof a traumaticevent under hypnosis and
insight [prisede conscience]into the event. This ambiguitywas pointed out by
Hypnosisin Psychoanalysis

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97

Lacan, in a passage of "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psy-

choanalysis"worthquoting here:
If thisevent [whichis "the pathogenicevent dubbed the traumaticexperience"] was recognized as being the cause of the symptom,it was because the puttinginto words of the
event (in the patient's"stories")determinedthe liftingof the symptoms.Here the term
"prisede conscience,"
borrowed fromthe psychologicaltheorywhichwas at once attributed
to this fact,retains a prestigethat deserves what we consider to be a healthydistrustof
explanations thatdo officeas self-evidenttruths.The psychologicalprejudices of the day
were opposed to acknowledgingin verbalizationas such anyrealityotherthanitsownflatus
vocis.The factremainsthatin the hypnoticstateverbalizationis dissociatedfromtheprise
de conscience,
and this factalone is enough to require a revisionof the conception of its

effects.
13

How, then, Lacan wonders,could Breuer and Freud have attributedthe dispelling of hystericalsymptomsto a prisede conscience,
to insight,to conscious recollectionof the traumaticevent,sincein hypnosistherecollectionoperates farmore
in a state of absence, of unconsciousness,of forgetfulnessof self? This point is
far fromincidental,for in cuttingthroughthisambiguity-in maintainingonly
the one aspect, that of conscious recollection-Freud founded psychoanalysis
proper, die eigentlichePsychoanalyse.

In the fall of 1892 Freud began to use the method called "freeassociation,"
fromwhich all suggestiveor hypnoticelementswere graduallypurged, untilthe
definitiveabandonment of hypnosisaround 1896. But whywas hypnosisabandoned? Why was there thisshifttowarda purelynarrative,demimeticized,deemotionalized therapeuticmethod? We know that the reasons Freud gave later
on were quite diverse: hypnosis would provide only temporaryremission of
symptoms,it was apparentlypowerlessto overcomethe "resistance"(Freud also
saysthe "autocratism")of certainsubjects,or (and here is an apparent contradiction) it would preventanalysisof this"resistance"bysuppressingit artificially.
On closerexamination,however,we observethatthedivorcebetweenanalysis
and hypnosisoccurredessentiallyovertheissue of remembering.The initialidea,
in fact,was that one could just as well obtain the patient'srecollectionswithout
hypnosis.This idea had been supplied bycertainexperimentsof Bernheim,who
showed that it was possible to dispel posthypnoticamnesia merelyby applying
lightpressure on the patient'sforehead once the patientwas awake. It was this
Druckmethode,
significantly
qualifiedas "lighthypnosis,"thatFreud began to use,
although finallyhe trustedthe patient'sspeech alone, speech freeto sayanything
was said). Thus, ifhypnosiswas abandoned, itwas firstof all
(so long as everything
in its capacityas a simple technical
procedure
designed to bringabout the recollectionof "scenes,"whetherreal or,lateron, in fantasy.Fromthisremembering,this
recollectionof "forgotten"ideas, Freud continued to expect the reliefof symptoms,and thisis whyhypnosiswas rejectedin favorof a therapyusing language

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alone-specifically, narration.Indeed, ratherthan being invitedto reexperience


or mime the pathogenic "scene,"withits accompanyingaffects,the patientnow
had to narrate,recounta storypassed on to a physicianwho was not supposed to
intervenein the storyat all. The analyst,as we know,is not a true interlocutor.
He does not answer,he listens;and if he does speak, it is only to fillin the gaps
and construcin the autobiographicalaccount of the patientwithinterpretations
tions. One could even say (referringto whatwould have been the "ideal" analytical method of the 1900s) that the analystis simplyan auxiliaryof the patient's
autobiographyand self-analysis.In the more modernversionof the same "ideal,"
the analystis the Addressee, the silentrespondentwho inverselyreflectsthe subject's own message or history.
This shifttoward narration raises a number of problems, if only from a
strictlytherapeutic standpoint. Indeed, we may wonder whether Freud, by
rejectinghypnosisin favorof a method more suitableforevokingrecollections,
did not actuallyrejecttheverysource of thosespectacularhysterical"recoveries."
Afterall, what caused the reliefof symptomsin the firsthystericalpatients?Was
itrecollection,insight?We have alreadyseen, withLacan, thatthiscould not have
occurred in a state of hypnotic
been true, since the so-called prisede conscience
in a hypnoticstate,of thetraumatic
unconsciousness.Then was ittheverbalization,
event? At firstsight,this solution is seductive,to the extentthat it refutesthe
opposition that is often observed between a hypnoticmethod considered to be
entirely nonverbal and a psychoanalyticalmethod supposed to have finally
enabled the patientto speak. Yet thisdogmaticrepresentationof hypnosisas an
a far more
infralinguisticand thereforesimplyirrationalprocess oversimplifies
complex situation:therewas in factno less "verbalization"(or,as Lacan also says,
"full speech" [parolepleine])in the catharticmethod than in the method of free
association.Of course,itis stillnecessaryto knowwhatis meantby"verbalization"
and parolepleine.As we know,Lacan definedthe latteras "the assumptionby the
subject of his own story,insofaras it is constitutedby speech addressed to the
other."'4Withrespectto the alleged "hypnoticrecall,"Lacan asks:
do notuse thisas their
Aufhebung
Whyis it thatthestaunchadvocatesofthebehaviorist
exampleto showthattheydo not have to knowwhetherthe subjecthas remembered
fromthepast?He hassimplyrecounted
theevent.ButI wouldsaythat
whatever
anything

he has verbalized it ... thathe has made it pass into the verbeor more precisely,into the
eposbywhichhe bringsback into presenttimethe originsof his own person. And he does
this in a language that allows his discourse to be understood by his contemporaries,and
which furthermorepresupposes theirpresentdiscourse.Thus it happens thatthe recitation of the eposmay include a discourse of earlier days in its own archaic, even foreign
tensewithall theanimationoftheactor;but
language, ormayevenpursueitscoursein thepresent
it is like an indirectdiscourse,isolated betweenquotation markswithinthe thread of the
narration,and, ifthe discourseis playedout,itis on a stageimplyingthe presencenot only
of the chorus,but also of spectators.

Hypnosisin Psychoanalysis

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99

Hypnotic recollectionis, no doubt, a reproductionof the past, but it is above all a


spoken representation-and as such impliesall sortsof presences [emphasisadded].'5

It is notable that"verbalization,"supposed to bringabout the reliefof symptoms,is defined here bytwotraits:1) itis speech-thatis, a discourseaddressed to
an otherand throughwhichthe subjectis supposed to recognizehimself
in his own
truth;and 2) itis a story
(Lacan also callsitan epos,no doubt thinkingof the"mixed
diegesis"of Plato), since even when thesubjectpresentshis "story""in the present
tense withall the animationof the actor,"thismimesisis held to constitutea kind
of quotation "in the thread of the story"addressed to the physician.
Yet thisidea of hysterical"verbalization,"no doubt valid forthe classicalanalyticalsituation,causes major problemsif,withLacan, we transpose it onto the
hypnoticsituation.Indeed, the least we can say is thatin thiscase thereis not an
I facingtheyouand thereforeno parolepleine,either,no symbolicmediation,no
"intersubjectivity,"
no dialecticof recognitionwhereinthesubjectreceiveshis own
message in invertedform.The other,in hypnosis,does not appear as other,and
if the subject does recognize himselfin the other,it is ratherby totallyidentifying
withhim.
To grasp this,we have onlyto thinkof hypnosisbyverbalsuggestion,as Freud
described it,forexample, in "PsychicalTreatment."The hypnotistsays,"You are
fallingasleep," and voild,I fallasleep. He says,"You are smellinga flower,"and I
smell the fragrance.He says,"You see a snake,"and I see the reptile,I am afraid,
and I cryout. It would be totallyfalse to claim thatan I is submittingor responding to another here. In reality,"I" am spokenbythe other,I come into the place
of the other-who, by the same token,is no longer an otherbut rather"myself"
in my undecidable identityof somnambulisticego. Thus, the other disappears
fromthe awareness of the hypnotizedsubjectat theverymomentwhen the other
provides the subject'sconsciousnesswithideas, perceptions,volitions,and so on.
We could even say,as Freud did in the "Note on the Unconscious,"thatthe other
remains"unconscious,"so long as we understandthatthiswithdrawalof theother
person fromconsciousnessprecedes anyideaof theotherperson and likewiseany
rememberingand repression. In this sense, hypnoticsuggestion may well be
defined, in the termsFreud used in the preface to his translationof Bernheim,
as "a conscious idea which has been introducedinto the brain of the hypnotized
subject byan externalinfluence,and whichhas been accepted bythe subjectas if
it had arisen spontaneously."'6 This verysingularhypnotic"spontaneity"is here
the effectof a radical forgetting
oftheother-a forgettinginaccessibleto any recollection(and veryclose, by the way,to the "forgetting"
of whichHeidegger and
Blanchot speak, each in his own fashion).
The preceding description,which applies to direct hypnoticsuggestion,
applies equally to the kind of somnambulismexperienced by Anna 0., wherein
the hypnotizedperson seems to enjoy a somewhatgreaterautonomytowardthe
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hypnotist,since the latter'sinterventionis limitedto the suggestionof hypnotic


"sleep." Here, the somnambulistallows herselfto be permeated, or entranced,
anotherrole,or even (to borrowone
not bythe hypnotistbut byanotheridentity,
of Anna O.'s expressions,whichcondenses thewhole question) "anotherme." We
of the hystericstreatedbyBreuer and
should recall thatone of the characteristics
Freud was theiroscillation,under hypnosis,among several"personalities"("I am
a woman from the last century,"Emmy von N. said). Therefore, in everycase,
the basic phenomenon of hypnotic"verbalization"was that the "subjects,"far
fromspeakingto another,let themselvesbe spokenbyanother,while mimingthe
"withall
other. If we add that thishypnotic"miming"was enacted in thepresent,
the animation of the actor" and in a kind of identificationwithor mimesisof
another person, we see thatcharacterizinghypnotic"verbalization"as narrative
isjust as inadequate as describingit as speech addressed to another.
And so we are confrontedonce again with the question of knowingwhat
could have brought about the relief of symptomsin these hystericalpatients.
Once we are dealing withneithera question of recollection(as Freud thought)
nor one of narrativespeech (as Lacan would have it),should we not attributethe
healing process, if not to hypnosisproper,at least to the mimesisthatcharacterized it? Wasn't it this trance, this forcefulinvasion of the "subject" by another
identity,thatwas decisive?If so, thiswould mean thatfromthe outsetFreud led
analyticaltherapydown thewrongpathbybasingiton recollectionand narration.
This idea is actuallynot so surprisingif we bear in mind thatthe "psychotherapies" (or, better yet, the "sociotherapies")that preceded psychoanalysis-from
shamanistictechniques to "animal magnetism,"not to mentionexorcismof the
possessed-have alwaysincluded, in one formor another,an element of trance
or disappearance of self. From thisstandpoint,isn'tOctave Mannoni correctto
say that the transference,as it is handled in analysis,"is what is leftto us of possession"? "Eliminate the devil," Mannoni says, "and people with convulsions
remain. Eliminate relics,and Mesmer's 'magnetizedsubjects'remain. Eliminate
hypnosis,and what remains?The transference.Thus the question of the transference touches on basic issues, whichwe mightcall 'anthropological,'given the
special meaning thisadjectivemayhave foran analyst."'7But ratherthan go into
thisvast and fascinatingprehistoryof psychoanalysis,or consider the enormous
question of knowingwhetherthe kindsof therapiesjust mentionedmaystillhave
any effectivenessin our symbolicsystem,'8it would be more useful to examine
the resurgence of this prehistoryin analysis itself,under the name-the new
name, among so manyothers-of "transference."
Almost immediately,transferencecame to disturb the ideally narrative
method of analysis.Veryearly,in fact,Freud realized thatthe person of the analystregularlyintervenedin the associationsof patients.This development had
not been foreseen. It meant that the purely autobiographical "story"of the
patienttended to transformitselfyetagain into a currentrelationship,one that
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was acted out (not to say mimed) with the analyst.This phenomenon, which
he firstexplained as one more
Freud noticed as early as the Studiesin Hysteria,
and
resistance among others, simplyas a displacement(the termsVerschiebung
were at thattimealmostsynonymous).In thisregard,itis instructive
Ubertragung
to consider the passage of the Studieswhere the concept of transferencefirst
appears. In that passage, Freud proposes a theorythat consistsof interpreting
as Emile Benvenistemightsay) as a
the patient'spresent demand (his discourse,
"story"in disguise-that is, as a resistanceto the rememberingrequired by the
analyst.Thus, referringto a hystericalpatientwho threwher arms around his
neck in the middle of a session, Freud immediatelyexplains that the patient's
desire was not addressed to him but to another,a "thirdperson." Behind theyou
stated in the currentsituation,one should hear a he narratedin the past:
The contentof the wishhad appeared firstof all in the patient'sconsciousnesswithoutany
memoriesof the surroundingcircumstanceswhichwould have assigned it to a past time.
The wish which was present was then, owing to the compulsion to associate which was
dominant in the consciousness,linked to my person.... Since I have discovered this,I
have been able, whenever I have been similarlyinvolved personally,to presume that a
and a false connection [falscheVerkniipfung]
have once more
transference[Ubertragung]
taken place.'9

Hence there appeared (Freud continues)a resistanceto the treatment,since the


patientsbroke offtheirassociationsat the pointwherecertainpersonal relations
seemed to come into play,and where a thirdperson (dritte
Person)blended with
the person of the physician.20Freud offersthe same explanation a bit later,in
Dora, and he also calls on it to explain hypnoticphenomena. Transferences(the
plural is used) are new editions or facsimilesof the impulses and fantasiesthat
are to be aroused and made conscious during the analysis,but theircharacteristic peculiarityis to replace some earlier person withthe person of the physician.
In other words, a whole series of psychologicalexperiences is revived "notas
belongingto thepast, butas applyingtothepersonofthephysicianat thepresentmoment.'

Furtheron, Freud says:


Hysteriamay be said to be cured not by the methodbut bythe physician,and . .. thereis
usually a sortof blind dependence and a permanentbond betweena patientand the physician who has removed his symptomsby hypnoticsuggestion[what is meant here is, in
PierreJanet'sbeautifulphrase, "somnambulisticpassion"],but the scientificexplanation
such as are regularlydirected
of all these factsis to be found in theexistenceof transferences
by patientsonto theirphysicians.22

Thus we find 1) that the phenomenon of transferenceis, as Freud himself


admitted,nothingother than the reemergence,withinanalysis,of the characteristicrelationship("rapport") of hypnosis(dependence, submission,and even, as
"PsychicalTreatment"says,Alleinschdtzung,theattachingof exclusiveimportance
to the person of the physician);and 2) thatthissingular"rapport"withanother
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in
person, as soon as it is recognized,is immediatelyinterpretedin analyticalterms
that the patient'scurrentrelationshipwiththe analystis understood (and at the
same timederealized) as the displaced representationor reproductionof an earPerson.The emotionalscene that
lier "emotionaltie" to a loved and/orhated dritte
the patientplays out to the analystsupposedlyconceals a storyand makes a past
memorypresent("withall the animationof the actor,"to repeat Lacan's phrase).
in the The Questionof Lay
The patient, Freud said later and very significantly
Analysis,is "obliged to stage a revival"of an old play; he reproduces it "tangibly,
as if it were actuallyhappening, insteadof rememberingit."23
This hypothesisis decisive,since itestablishesthe supposedlyirreducibledifference between the analystand the hypnotist.Indeed, to respond to the somnambulisticaffectof the patient,as Freud untiringlyexplains,would be to swing
into the orbitof hypnoticsuggestion.It would confuse the ostensibleyouof the
Person,and thus would lock the patient
emotional impulse withthe he,the dritte
into the "perpetual attachment"thatbinds the subjectto thatthirdperson,when
the point is preciselyto expose thisbond forwhatit is and freethe patientfrom
it. In thissense, an analystis an analystonlyif he does not respond to the affects
and demands of the patient,thusforcinghimto movefromactingto telling,from
repeating to remembering,fromthe presentto the past. In fact,the abstinence
and impassibility(or, perhaps more accurately,the apathyand disaffection)that
Freud demands of theanalystcorrespondto thisstrategyor policyof enunciation.
The analystmustnot open himselfto the actionsor affectsof the patient,which
bytheirverynature are alwaysin the present,active,acted out (mimed,we might
say), and therefore"resistant"to the narrationrequired byanalysis.
thingsdid get complicatedwhen
This definitivehypothesisnotwithstanding,
Freud realized that the transference,far frombeing only one resistanceamong
others,reallyconstitutedthemajor resistanceto analysis.The harder the analyst
tried to obtain the patient'srecollection,the more the patienttended to forget
himself,as it were, in the analyst'sarms, so thatall the otherresistancesseemed
to revolve around that particular"amnesia." As a result,analysisof resistances
increasinglybecame analysis of the transferenceor, in other words, analysisof
the analyticalrelationshipitself,as if the transferencewere both the obstacle to
and the mainspringof the cure. Freud made thispoint in 1912, in the articleon
"The Dynamicsof the Transference,"and itmeans among otherthingsthatitwas
even impossible,to distinguishbetween the
becoming more and more difficult,
of
mechanicsof analysisand those hypnosis,even thoughhypnosiswas supposed
to have been discarded once and for all. If the transferencetends to dominate
the whole analyticalsituation,and ifthe analyst'ssilence,ratherthan keeping the
transferenceat bay,actuallyprovokesit,thenone can no longeroppose, as Freud
had done earlier, the pure interpretativelisteningof the analystto the direct
of the hypnotistto the abstensuggestionof the hypnotist,or the interventionism
tionismof the analyst.This is what FrancoisRoustang has pointed out: whether
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the analystspeaks or not,uses suggestionor not,is relativelyunimportantbecause


suggestibility(or passivity)appears in the patient anyway,taking the form of
what Freud calls "positive"transference.24
Instead of talkingabout his past loves,
the patient "loves" his analyst,thinksonly of him, submitscompliantlyto his
advice, accepts all his interpretationsand constructions,believes blindlyin psychoanalyticaltheory,and so on. We mightgo so faras to say thatthe whole analyticalprocess moves once again towardthe establishmentof a hypnotictypeof
"rapport,"in which the subject speaks and thinkslike another,and even toward
an actual state of trance (as Ferenczi was forced to acknowledge, calling it
"neocatharsis").
It is futileto object thatthis"transferencelove" is stillverydifferentfromthe
intense mimetic-emotionalrelationshipseen in hypnotictrance. Bernheim had
which he also called credivite',
is found at least as
already said that suggestibility,
much in the waking state as in deep hypnosis,the latterbeing on the whole an
Freud certainlyknew this,
especially spectacular manifestationof suggestibility.
whichhe uses constantlyto describe positive
especiallysince the termGldubigkeit,
creduloustransference),is the same termhe used
transference(that is, believing,
in German. Positive
in "PsychicalTreatment"to render Bernheim'stermcredivite'
the "credulous"
transference,in thissense, is none otherthangldubigeErwartung,
or "confidentexpectancy"that Freud at the time considered to be the basis of
effectivetherapeuticsuggestion.Thus, in almost all the "technicalwritings"he
Freud
produced fromthattimeon, and withremarkablehonestyand consistency,
on
recognized thatwhat analysisrediscoversin the transferenceis suggestibility
the patient's side, and suggestion (even if unintentional)on the analyst's.For
example, we read in the AutobiographicalStudy:
In everyanalyticaltreatmenttherearises withoutthe physician'sagency,an intenseemobetween the patient and the analyst
tional relationship [eine intensiveGefihlsbeziehung]
which is not to be accounted for by the actual situation.... We can easilyrecognize it as
which is the
the same dynamic factor which the hypnotistshave called "suggestibility,"
agent of hypnotic"rapport" [deshypnotischen
Rapports]and whose incalculable behaviour
led to difficulties
withthe catharticmethod as well.25

We also findthe followingstatementat the beginningof chapter 3 in Beyondthe


Pleasure Principle:
Psychoanalysiswas then firstand foremostan art of interpreting.Since thisdid not solve
the therapeutic problem, a furtheraim quicklycame into view: to oblige the patient to
confirmthe analyst'sconstructionfrom his own memory.In that endeavour the chief
emphasis lay upon the patient'sresistances:the art consistednow in uncoveringthese as
quickly as possible, in pointingthem out to the patientand in inducing him by human
as "transference"
influence-thiswas wheresuggestion
operating
playeditspart-to abandon his
resistances[emphasis added].26

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We immediatelyperceive the problemthatstatementslike these cannot help


how can analysis
raising:if"transference"is onlya new name for"suggestibility,"
be distinguishedfromsuggestionand even fromhypnosis?For example, how is
it possible to guarantee that the analyst'sinterpretationsand constructionsare
correct,if the patient'sconvictionis extortedby "suggestionoperating as transference"?How can we knowthatthepatient'smemoriesare notpseudomemories,
memories
forthesake oflove,somewhatlike the fantastic"reminiscences"of Anna
0. and Emmy von N.? In other words,how can we ensure thatthe resultsof an
"rapport"thanto interpretation
analysisdo not owe more to hypnotransferential
All
these
questions, which periodically
material?
into
repressed
of and insight
came up in his works, Freud generallyanswered by invokingthe "dissolving"
(Auflisung) of the transference.Analysis,in provoking"transferenceneurosis,"
also revived hypnotic"rapport"; but, for Freud, this rapport was revived the
betterto be destroyedin being consignedto thepatient'spast. In theAutobiographical Study,we read:
methods,employs
likeotherpsycho-therapeutic
truethatpsycho-analysis,
It is perfectly
is this:thatin analysis
Butthedifference
of suggestion
(or transference).
theinstrument
results.The transthetherapeutic
itis notallowedtoplaythedecisivepartindetermining
and itis resolvedbyconvincing
ferenceis made consciousto thepatientbytheanalyst,
emotionalrelations
he is re-experiencing
[wiedererleben]
attitude
himthatin histransference
duringtherepressedperiodof
whichhad theiroriginin hisearliestobjectattachments
hischildhood.27
Lecture,where all these issues are discussed at
Introductory
In the twenty-eighth
length,Freud saysagain thatin analysisthe transferenceis dissolved:
betweenanalyticand
distinction
whichis the fundamental
It is thislast characteristic
therapyand whichfreestheresultsof analysisfromthesuspicionof
purelysuggestive
thetranstreatment
In everyotherkindofsuggestive
beingsuccessesdue to suggestion.
ferenceis carefully
preservedand leftuntouched;in analysisitis itselfsubjectedto treatmentand is dissectedin all the shapesin whichit appears.At the end of an analytic
itselfmustbe cleanedaway;and ifsuccessis thenobtainedor
thetransference
treatment
buton theachievement
byitsmeansofan overcoming
itrests,noton suggestion
continues,
ofinternalresistances.28
Thus, thedifferencebetweenanalyticaltreatmentand hypnosuggestivetreatment lies uniquely in the dissolutionof the transference,alias "suggestibility,"
alias hypnotic"rapport."This should notbe surprising,since itis onlyto sayonce
more thatthe practiceof analysisdiffersfromthatof itspredecessoron the basis
of the enunciation (or, as Lacan writes,the "verbalization")required in analysis.
And what, indeed, is "dissolving"the transference,if not gettingthe patientto
tell his storyand remember,whereas hypnosiskeeps him stuckin the repetitive
enactmentof an "I love/I hate you" addressed to the physician?But we also see
that the differencebetween analysisand hypnosis,or between analysisand sug-

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gestion, is far frombeing as clear as it was in the early days of psychoanalysis,


since now psychoanalysisalso appears to be a kindof internalexit fromhypnosis.
The eigentliche
Psychoanalyse,
just as before,is supposed to begin where hypnosis
leaves off-but now it is throughhypnosis,through
the transference.Thus one
issue-the beginningof "true"analysis-now becomes another,distressingone:
the end of analysis.Is therean end to analysis,afterall? Is analysis"terminable"?
Can hypnotictransferencebe "dissolved"?Or is itinsteadthe partof analysisthat
cannot be analyzed, of which the patient cannot be cured, no more than of
repetition?
This question-absolutely crucial forpsychoanalysis,since what is at stake is
its "identity"and its "singularity"-has reallynever been settled.In the end, is
psychoanalysis,to use Francois Roustang'sexpression,"long-drawn-outsuggestion"?There is certainlyno way to decide on the basis of the facts.Indeed, can
we ever determinewhetheran analysisis reallyover,whetherthe transferenceis
reallygone? It is more useful to ask what the transferenceis-that is, to ask (as
is-if we wantto knowwhetherthe transferencecan
we know now) whathypnosis
trulybe eliminated. This last question rapidly brings us back to the original
the "emotionaltie,"the "rapportsans rap"enigma,"that of the GeftihIsbindung,
port" with another. For it is this rapport that Freud found in the transference,
and perhaps it was simplypointlessto tryto dissolve it. It is constituentof the
"subject"and, as such,unrecollectible,untellable,unrepresentable-indissoluble.
What,then,is the transference-or hypnosis?Freud answersthatitis a resistance. But to what?To remembering.To rememberingwhat?It is a resistanceto
remembering"some portionof infantilelife,"sayschapter3 ofBeyondthePleasure
Therefore, the
Principle,"of the Oedipus complex, thatis, and itsderivatives."29
transferenceis a resistanceto rememberinga libidinalobject-tiethat,because of
a conflict,has succumbed to repression.
Yet how does the transferencerapport resistremembering?By concealing
the "emotionaltie"itis supposed to reproduce?Quite thecontrary."These reproductions,"we find in the same passage of BeyondthePleasurePrinciple,"emerge
with . . . unwished-forexactitude."30 But why,then, speak of "resistance"if the
unconscious is, as it were, nakedlyexhibitedin the transference?The answer is
in a kindof absence
thatthe unconscious is, paradoxically,exhibitedunconsciously,
from self that excludes all rememberingand all representation.This is what
Freud explains at the end of "The Dynamicsof the Transference,"using terms
that cannot help recallingthe hypnoid "reliving"of experiences,as reported in
the firsthystericalpatients:
In the process of seekingout the libido whichhas escaped fromthe patient'sconscious we
have penetratedinto the realm of the unconscious.... The unconsciousimpulsesdo not
want to be remembered in the way the treatmentdesires them to be, but endeavour to
of the unconscious
reproduce themselvesin accordance withthe timelessness[Zeitlosigkeit]
and itscapacityforhallucination.Justas happens in dreams,the patientregardsthe prod-

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ucts of the awakening of his unconscious impulses as contemporaneous [Gegenwdrtig]and


real; he seeks to act out his passions [seineLeidenschaftenagieren] without taking any account
of the real situation.

Three points are worthnotinghere. First,it is "passions"or "impulses"-in


other words, affects-thatelude recollection.If the transference"resists"being
and affect,as Freud says
remembered,thisis because itis "transferenceof affect,"
perceived in the present,unlike ideas. In other
elsewhere, is characteristically
words,the affectin transferenceis experiencedinstatunascendi,withall theintensityof the firsttime.This firstpoint,of course, accords withwhat Freud says in
the Studiesin Hysteriaabout the "abreaction"of affectsunder hypnosis.
Second, and at the same time,the transferenceis "timeless.""Timelessness"
means here, as it always does in Freud, complete disregard of the past and the
futurein sole favorof the present.The transferencemakespresentthe "fragment
of infantilelife,"and thisactualizationFreud designatesbytwoterms,equivalent
(Freud uses these
for him: "actingout" (Agieren)and "repeating"(Wiederholung).
Repeating,Working
two terms from 1914 on; they firstappear in Recollecting,
Through.)What is decisive about the notionof Agierenis not so much actingout,
or nonverbal enactment,as actualization.Affect,in transferentialrepetition,is
acted out in the present; it is unrememberedand unrepresented; thus, in the
transference,gesturesaccompanyspeech, and thoughtimmediatelybecomes act,
ratherthan the reverse.
The thirdpointis doubtlessthe mostenigmatic:the transferenceis governed
by primaryunconscious processes. As Lacan says,althoughwithcompletelydifferentintentions,the transferenceis "the enactmentof the realityof the unconscious."32This idea hardlyaccords withthe conceptof transferenceas resistance,
nor can it be reconciledwithan unconscious theorizedas made up of repressed
ideas. The unconscious does manifestitselfin the transferenceas affect,as an
"emotionaltie,"but it is scarcelyconceivablethatthe transferencewould resistits
own dis-covery,since it is thisverydis-covery.That is whyFreud was obliged to
repetitionis
in BeyondthePleasurePrinciple,thattransferential
say more explicitly,
not so much resistancetothe unconsciousas resistanceofthe unconscious (or of
and Anxiety).
Repetitionin the transSymptom,
the Id, as he also says in Inhibition,
ference is finallyless a resistanceto the recollectionof the unconscious thanthe
to recollection,
as "devilish"persistencein amnesia. Thus
unconsciousas resistance
one is ultimatelyreduced to asking whetherthe wish to obtain a recollectionof
the unconscious makes any sense at all. Chapter 3 of BeyondthePleasurePrinciple
makes thispoint:
We can say that the patient's
It is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious....
resistances arise from his ego, and we then at once perceive that the compulsion to repeat
mustbe ascribed to the unconscious repressed.It seems probable that the compulsion can only
express itself after the work of treatment has gone half way to meet it and has loosened
the repression [emphasis added].
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107

Freud's footnoteto thispassage, added in 1923, notonlycompletesthe fusion


of these three notions-"transference, "repetition,"and "the unconscious"but also links this group of terms to suggestion (in other words, to hypnotic
''rapport"):
I have argued elsewhere thatwhat thus comes to the help of the compulsion to repeat is
the factorof "suggestion"in the treatment-that is, the patient'ssubmissivenessto the
physicianwhichhas itsrootsdeep in his unconsciousparentalcomplex.34

But all this information,enigmatic in itself,does not tell us whether the


tie to another person can rightlybe "dissolved,"untied. Is it
hypno-transferential
possible to dispel the amnesia that belongs to the unconscious? Or (really the
in the narrativemode?
fundamentalquestion) can affectbe narrated,abreagiert
These questions are meaningfulonly in relationto an at least possible recollection. It is because Freud continues to thinkthatthe unconscious is made up of
ideas (and not of affects),of repressed memoriesor fantasies(and not of enactments), that he can state his objectiveas the undoing of the transference,conceived as blind repetitionof an earlier"emotionaltie" to an object of love and/or
reallybe remembered?For such remembering
hate. But can thisGefihlsbindung
to be possible, this "emotional tie" would have to be presentedto the subject (to
his conscious or unconscious,it reallydoes not matter)as an idea (a perceptionor
a fantasy;again, it does not matter),so thatitcould be keptpresentin a memory
and possiblybe recollectedas a memory.This hypothesispresentsno problems
so long as we hold to the idea thatthe transferencerepeats "some portionof the
Oedipus complex," as Freud says. With the Oedipus complex, in fact,we are
dealing withan already formed subject or "Ego," whichmaintainsdiverse emoothers(love forthe maternalobject;admitional relationshipswithdifferentiated
ration of and hatefulrivalrywiththe paternal model);therefore,the hypothesis
of repressed ideas, transferredaffects,and so on, stillseems quite plausible.
The hypothesisof recollectionneverthelessdoes grow problematicwhen
but also in TheEgo and theId,
Freud informsus-essentially in GroupPsychology,
Oedipal tiesin
and, more generally,in all the textsof the second topography-that
more
archaic
"emotional
a
turn reflect,because theyrepeat it,
tie,"which Freud
or "incorporation,"and which he continvariouslycalls "primaryidentification"
Yetthis"emouallydescribesas a deep emotionalambivalence(Gefihlsambivalenz).
tional tie,"whichcertainlyremainsveryclose to the hypnotic"tie,"stillcannot be
representedor remembered,if onlybecause it precedes the Ego, the subject-of"is the origthe-representation."Identification,"Freud says in GroupPsychology,
inal formof emotional tie withan object,"35and thismeans that the Ego forms
itselfor is bornin this devouring identificationwiththe other.Thus there is no
model,
Ego, no subject to forman idea of the object and/orof the identificatory
of
the
this
in
the
"event"
since it is precisely
Ereignis,
appropriation(of
singular
we could say withHeidegger) thatthe Ego as such emerges. The "other"whose
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identityis thus incorporated sinks into an oblivion that precedes memoryand


idea, never havingpresenteditselfto any subject-and itis "myself,"the unutterable affectof my birth.As Freud suggested in connectionwithanxiety,birthis
the primordialaffect,and we mightadd thatthisis so because it is identification,
Because "I am the breast" (in Freud's famous phrase),
mimeticGefihlsbindung.
because I am nothingbefore this earliestidentificationand because such is my
byan othbirth,affectcomes about-in otherwords,mybeing affected[affection]
thatis myidentityor my"selfness"itself.
erness [alterite]
This first"emotionaltie" to another,whichis also the unrepresentableevent
of my"own" birth,can neverbe remembered,neverbe recalled to memory.This
is also why it can never be "dissolved,"as Freud would have it. But (and this is
what happens all the time,if it happens) it can be repeated-forexample, in hypnotictrance,or in the oblivionof the transference.In the end, in thisstrangerite
of passage that today we call "psychoanalysis,"perhaps the only stake is this:
repeating, repeating the other in oneself,dyingto oneself-to be reborn,perhaps, other.
TranslatedbyAngela Brewer

Notes
This paper was originallypresentedas a lectureon 24 January 1985 at the invitation
of the Societ6 franpaisede medecine psychosomatique,and was subsequentlypublished in Mikkel Borch-Jacobsenand Leon Chertok,Hypnoseet psychanalyse
(Paris,
1988).
1. StandardEditionoftheComplete
Works
Psychological
ofSigmundFreud(hereafterSE), ed.
Werke
James Strachey,24 vols. (London, 1953-74), 16:292; Gesammelte
(hereafterGW),
ed. Anna Freud et al., 17 vols. (London, 1940-52), 11:302.
2. SE 12:118; GW 8:384.
3. Jacques Lacan, TheFourFundamental
Concepts
trans.Alan Sheridan
ofPsycho-Analysis,
(London, 1977), 273.
4. SE 20:17; GW 14:41.
5. SE 14:168; GW 10:267.
6. SE 19:13; GW 13:239.
7. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen,Le Sujetfreudien(Paris, 1982); The FreudianSubject,trans.
Catherine Porter(Stanford,Calif., 1988).
8. SE 18:114-15; GW 13:126-27.
9. Sigmund Freud, TheOriginsofPsycho-Analysis
(New York, 1977), 53.
10. Plato Republic392c-398b. Insofar as I shall be making use, in what follows,of the
Platonic terminology,I should recall that Plato distinguishesthree modes of poetic
enunciation,depending on whetherthepoet "speaksin hisown name withoutseeking
to make us believe that it is someone other than he who is speaking" (this is "pure
narrative,"hapMdiegesis),
or,on thecontrary,"makesa speech in someone else's name"
(this is dramaticmimesis),
or, finally,uses a combinationof both registers(and this is
the "mixed narrative"characteristicof the epic).
11. SE 2:6; GW 1:85.
12. SE 20:21; GW 14:46.
13. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits:A Selection,
trans.Alan Sheridan (London, 1982), 46.
Hypnosisin Psychoanalysis

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109

15. Ibid. (slightly modified translation).


14. Ibid., 46-47.
16. Sigmund Freud, "Vorrede des Ubersetzers zu H. Bernheim: Die Suggestion und ihre
Heilwirkung," in Hyppolyte Bernheim, Die Suggestion(Leipzig-Wien, 1888-89), x; SE
1:77.
qui nenfinitpas (Paris, 1980), 49-50.
17. Octave Mannoni, Un Commencement
18. Roger Gentis, unpublished lecture on the "New Therapies," Strasbourg, April 1984.
21. SE 7:116;GW5:279-80.
20. SE 2:304;GW1:310.
19. SE 2:303;GW1:309.
23. SE 20:226-27; GW 14:258.
22. SE 7:117; GW5:281.
24. Franois Roustang, "Elle ne le ldcheplus" (Paris, 1980), chap. 4.
26. SE 18:18; GW 13:18.
25. SE 20:42; GW 14:67-68.
28. SE 16:453; GW 11:471.
27. SE 20:42-43; GW 14:68.
30. SE 18:18; GW 13:16.
29. SE 18:18; GW 13:17.
32. Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts,146.
31. SE 12:107-8; GW 8:373-74.
35. SE 18:107;GW13:118.
34. Ibid.
33. SE 18:19-20;GW13:18.

110

REPRESENTATIONS

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