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Knowledge andAction
hat foilows r,vili draw inspiration fronl Aristotie's virtue theory for
an accrount of how human knowledge and action are related.
A. Aristotle
r. We begin r.vith a passage that illurninates Aristotle's ethics, frorn Book
ll, Clrapter 4, of the lrlicomachean [:thics;
It is possible to do sonrething that is in accorciance witir the laws ofgrarnnrar,
cither by chance or at the suggestion of another. A uran will be a gramnur*
ian, then, only when he has both done something grammatical and donc it
grammaticaliy; and this means doin; it in accordance with the gramuratical
krrowiedge in hirnself. (ENII a, no5azz-(>)
'l'his provides a key to Aristotle's view of hurnan flourishing as the funtlrrnrental ethical value. Please note that the second o'in accordance with"
(.ilnnot mean simply "coinciding with the content of." After all, what
orrc cloes nright coincide with the content of one's knowledge entirely by
,'llance. But Aristotle means to rule out such accidental coincidence, as is
t lcar in the first sentencre of the passage. There nlust be a tighter connection
tlrln jr-rst coinciclence letween one's knowledge that a certain sentence is
rtlrulrnratic:al ancl thc bcing granrnlatical clf one's utterance, in order for the
uttcr;Il)c:c to trc "in ccorcianc:cr with" the knowledge. The sentence may
lrc knowll to bc gnrnrnltic'a1, firr onc thinil, blrt its grarunratical utterance
rrr;ry bc clrrc orrly to tlrc ussrrr:rrrt'c of rr liar (to tlrc "suggestion ofanother"),
u,llilc tllc klrowlctlu('rr.'nlrtins irrrplicit rlrrl ill,rt tivc.
r34
True virtue resides tn the perfection of one's rational nature, and it is tllc
exercse of such virtue and only this that makes a life good.'
Thrs paints
z. Beyond his own nlain statenrents, Aristotle's vierv stands otlt lnorc
clearly by contrast with the Stoic alternative, which seenls diametrically
opposed. Aristotelian flourishing involves the exercisc of one's virtuc's'
ntoral and intellectual. However, sonle virtues require external aids ftrr
their exercise, as when liberality reqrlires itlollcy. Ily contfast, all that thc
Stoics require for a full nteasure ofhappiness (f;rring wcll) and virtue is that
one properly order one's preferenc:es and clhoose raticltrally ()n th:rt basis.
r. It riht be tgrrght tht cxtcrnrl qoorls firrtlrcr hrppirrcss tltc_rv:ry :t gootl stotclr tirrthcls 'r
pl..riirrblc i,rt".ii.l strc, irs r,rr"r.i,'',".,,, to rcrl hlprirrcss, rvhith is irrtcrrrrlly (-()lrstittltc(l'
ilrrt this clrrtr.rt frc riglrt, givcn tllrt Iir Alistotlc lrl'irrrr rvcll is r'rrrs/lllrlr'rl by tttllrlc t titlll. sttt l
Nol ir
rs thc libcllrl h;rn,lirrg ovt'l ,r{'.1 lili. .rrrrl rrot .irrst tltc situttl.tt tllll ilt .t M.rtrix sr't'rlritl.
sillt r'
gotltls'
of
tt'lll
cx
p,rsst'ssiott
ivil
t
I
ol
vrr
t
rrorrr
\'
,,rrsist.
lr,rt
lr;rpprrrcss
t
tllrr
it plrLrsiIlc
Itttttt.ttt11,,,,,11(\'lll1l()ll\.l(tiVll\'..lltlcrltltt'tltl0tlt
rrt'rtls rsr',1 irl solttt rtlr lt .tr I tvtt 1'.
stark contrast.
'Who
B. Aristotle
Chapter 8 adds:
Yet evidetly, as we said, it leeds the cxternal goods as well; for it is ipossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper ecluipment. Irr many
actions lve usc friends and riches and political power as itrstruurcnts . . ' (EN
I 8, ro99a3r-bti)'
ll(',llilIvllIll{rtl\'l(Il\lt\"l)lllll)\tltl
l.t5
is right?r
r. Take a culture where sheep are sacred and wolves evil. Shccp urc t() [)('
protected, wolves to be killed. Suppose you shoot and kill a shccp in woll 's
clothing. Your action is "in accordance" with virtue. Nevertllclcss, it l,rlls
short. We are focused on your doing in killing that shcep-that vcry tloiui.
not things done whereby you do that doing. This doing is clistint t fiorrr
any action ofyours, strictly speaking. An action of oing nrust illlplcurcr)l ,ur
irrtention to o, as such, and you do not intend to kill a.s/lccp, as sur'lr. Yor rl,'
intend to kiil that animal (clothed as a wo10, and that aninral i.r :r .r/rcr7r, lrrrt
you do not intend to ki1l it under rlris description.
Suppose next you shoot and kill a wolf in wolf's clothing. Nolv you tlo
intend to kill this arrinal, and this alrinlal is a wolf, and you tlo intcnrl ro
kill it under this dcscription. Now your full endeavor is in act:ortlrurt t' rvit lr
your virtue, as is its succcss. You do intend to kill that anintal bcfirrc v()u, ,rs
it happens a wolf, and you do intend to kill it as a rvolf. In a wrry tlris srrt t't'ss
i-s "in accordance with" your relevant conlpetences, practical rultl t ounitivr'.
You endeavor to kill that rvoif by shooting it, when you spot it, r ntl bclit'r,t'
it correctly to be a wolf. You thr.rs bring to bcar a colllplcx c:ornlrint'tl r'onr
pe tencre. This includes your ability to tell the look of a wolf , :rncl it irrclrrtlt's
;rlso your shooting cornpetence. So, your lethal shot at tht wolf-n,rrrilt'sls
rclevant virtues and conlpetences seated in you. Ncvcrthclcss, y()ur killrrri
rc1ly hcld tlrc vicrv tlrirt rt,istlonr rs rr1/ir'i'lt, urrtl rrot-jtrst l(l('rr,//)/, lirr lr.rprrrt'ss
. Iltrvctticdtotitcortlvs,rnt(('nlr.rll).rs\;r{csinlp()ttiurt lirrlllt'ttounl ol Aislrrttlr.trcllrrrs
tlrtisslrlrl;trtl,.tllc.tsltttllt< ttrtcrrslriglrlrrilrtctl.()ftorrrst',rrlirll.rrroililtrl',,il1,1((rilt.ilil
rrrort'tlct,nl.(S<'r'l,rr.r \t.rItlr{.rIltonArrrlotlt'st'tlrirslr1'l{irlr.utl
I
i.tt.I'tlnl'r!l
tl
I'lttlo't,1y
lil.rutrltlrt,\l,lrl,,r,i
ry6
of that wolf falls short. The performance of your basic action (say, pulling
the trigger) aimed to kill a wolf does manifest those perceptual and execu*
tive conrpetences on your part. But that airned performanre stillfalls short, in
that its success does not manifest competence, not fully, depending as it does,
essentially, ofl luck.*
Compare your performance of a basic action (again, pulling the trigger)
aimed to kill an animal that looks like a utolf. Here success does fully rnanifest
competence, and is fully apt.
The basic action (pulling the trigger) rnust trivially succeed, since one
pulls the trigger as a basic ar:tion if and only if one aims to pull the trigger
simply by doing so. lly contrast, consider the action of pulling the trigger
not only in an endeavor (or with the airn) to pull the trigger, even if one does
have that amin doing so. Suppose one aims (also) thereby to
kill
an animal
,'l lttr L
r37
tlrc l)crirrrtctics
lntl
Irt' Stoit's.
llrtlr
sidcs
prcfc'rcr)('cs,
r
KNOWLEDGE AND
r38
AC ION
keeping with deliberative virtue). For neither side will there be the sort of
luck (bad or good) that affe cts action in our sheep and wolf crses.J
That interpretation clashes, however, with Aristotle's enrphasis on thc
need for external instruments and settings for properly virtuous action.
What follows will thus explore a different interpretation of Aristotle, and a
different way to connect knowledge and action.
in accordance with liberality.s True, the physical giving of the gift derives
from choice. But the action itself enconlpasses not only the choice but also
its proper inrplenrentation, through the intention involved (since choice
entails intention). In developing this option it will help to understand
nlore fully what is involved in hosting an intention. Though this option
is inspired by Aristotle, and though it seenrs a plausible way to understand
his view, it is no less interesting to clevelop it on its merits than as a way to
tu
C.
I. The staternent of the alternative option does not italicize "soul" irr
the statement of Aristotle's view. It does of course need to cohere with
that statenlent, but it does so in a different way. The earlier interpretation
pales r.vith increasing understanding of the concept(s) of "soul" among
the Greeks.
I cannot improve on the following brief statenrent ofAristotle's view:
The soul of an animate oranism, in [Aristotle's] . . , frarnework, is nothing
other than its system of active abilrties to perforrn the vital functions that
organisnrs of its kind naturally perform, so that when an orlanisnr cn!{ages
in the relevant activities (e.g., nutriiion, urovenrent or thought) it does so in
virtue ofthe systern of abilities that is its soul,n
Whereas the activities of the St<lic soul are plar,rsibly restricted to inner acts
such as choices, that is not Aristotle's view. Aristotelian ac:tivity of sotrl
can be constituted by externalia such as the actual hanclirrg ()vLlr of gootls
5. It sinrplifies theoretical fbrnrtrlati<>n to rrlkrw, as linlitir)q cirsc of'tlrc "lry" r"cl;rtiorr, thc t':rst'
where one os by oinu. Ilrrt firr ()ul plrrposcs tllis is <lptiorrlrl. Wc r..otrltl ort firr'.r t'orrt'cptiorr ol
basic cti<>n clctilrcrl rrot:ts "oinr sirrrply by oirtu" l)ut irs "oinq rvllclc tlrcrc is notlrinr-t clsc lt)'
intclltittllltllv dttirs whit'll ollc os." Alttl tllis rvotrltl rrot sigrrifit',lrltly it fli'('t tllc relt'vrtttt lc.r
stltt ittg itt otlr ltt:ritt tcx t, llrortqlt it rvortltl t't'tlr tit c sotrtc t clirlrtlu l:rt iol r,
lr. l;l'oltr tllt' ,u tir lr' t'rttrtlt'.l "An( r('nl 'l lrt',tr tt's ol Sorrl," lrr' l lt'rrrlr rk I trrcrrz, irr tlt' ,\l,tttlottl
I ir r, 'r loyt,,li,r ol l'ltilowtlr y.
'7 l:trrtu"Arrrt'rrt 'llrt',rrr',,o1 \orrl"rrrllrt',\t,tttlottl l'.rt,',1,ttr'11,rl ltltilr:otlry
r39
z. Let's begin with pro-attitudes in general. These will involve favorings generall includirrg physical appetites but also resistible attractions to choose that
nray derive from the advice of others, for exanrple, or fronr reasoning of one's
own. Favorings in this general sense may also be emotional without being
physical, in that they derive from, or help constitute, our ernotions, including
those that are social without being physical. Conative dynamics, "deliberation" in a broad sense, whether conscious or unconscious, is a balancing act,
rvhereby favorings are weighed on the scales ofchoice until a resultant results.
In deliberation, such a favoring rnay be either initial or resultant. Ifinitial
it might take the forrn of a hope or a wish. Will such a hope or wish rise
to the level of intention when future directed? Not necessarily. Intention
is restricted to distinctive contents, whereas one can hope or wish for just
;rbout any outcome. Intention is at nlost a favoring that. one bring about a certain outcome.
If one cloes resultantly favor that one bring about a certain outcome
sometinre in the future, as opposed to merely wishing or hoping, must
one not assume that the necessary costs are worth paying? In the rany
cases where nleans are requirecl, rnust one not presuppose that these will
lrc economically enoug]r available? Of course, one need not be sure. But
you could hardly be seriously committed to bringing about the relevant
()Lrtconle, while convinced that you could bring it about only at prohibitive
cost. This could not be a serious commitment, not rationally anyhow.
()ne needs at least that ruuch, even if one does not yet have a detailed
plan in nrind. The plan at that point nrry anrount to little nlore than a plan
s. lt nrisllt lrc irlrructl tlr,rt Aris(otc'liln "rrt tivity <lf-sottl" is nurrowly rcstrit'tctl to activities cf
nrtlitio1, l()\'('rn('nl, or llrou1ltt, so tlrrl tlrcsc:r'c rtot.jrtst ('.\'r,,1/)/('J itt gcttcrii'firrlll. lJrrt, firr
ont'tlrirrg l)('r( ('l)tl()n \\'rll Irt' rrt lu,lt',1, strlt'ly',,rrtl rvitll l)('r'( cl)tion (of'tlrr't'nvit'ollrucrrt),:rrrrl
rrutlitiorr (rrrg,r's{ rollol lr,,r,l), t \t('ur,rlr,r (t lrt'olrt't Ist't'l, llrt'lootl irrrit'stt'tl) rvill lrt'tortittt
tivc ol tlrt'
I
r40
to make a plan, rnaybe even a cletailed plan for how the plan will be rnade.
Real conrrnitment, real intention to bring something about, in any case
seems to require that one think one will succeed, even if this thought falls
short of outright judgment andjudgmental belief.e
then one is only wishing or hoping that one will bring about the outcome. In order to upgrade that favoring so that it constitutes intending,
one must have more by way of an actual or potential plan that will take
one from where one sits to attaining the outcorne.
Aristoteiian action involves choice based on a resultant favoring of
one's implernenting; a plan to attain a goal at which one thereby airns.
One chooseso one acts, in the endeavor to attain that goal, which
attempts to implenlent one's plan, We focus here, for simplicity, on simple endeavors, such as turning on a light, where an initial choice is all
it takes, if all goes well. A courpetentiy rnade choice would then be "in
accordance with" competence (virtue). This is why the choice to shoot
the wolf-looking anirnal is conrpetent.
Suppose we think of the actior as involving not just the choice, but
also, say, the physical handing over of the cash, in a liberally generous
action. In this case a competent action can still be disrstrous, as in thc
killing of a wolf-looking sheep. Moreover, the action can even be conrpetent and successful while still falling short, as in the killing of the wolfin wolf's clothing, where an essential nreans-encl belie f is (iettierccl.
Is not the shooting of the woif in wolf's clothing n accordottct'u,iflt virtuc?
Woulcl it not do all that a prarticular action r:an clo to constittrtc flotrrishins?
Arguably, it woulcl n<lt. ()rrc'c wc, incluclc the: cxtcrnlliu irtvolvccl in thrrt firll
action, incluclinu tllc clcltlr of thrrt wolf, on('c wc sly tll:rt tllis is prrrt of wlr;rt
,1. lJrrt
I4I
cotrstitutes the flourishing of the agent through the success ofhis action, the
momentum is hard to stop until we reach the proper Aristoteiian view. This
view would include, among the factors relevant to such flourishing, notjust
the success of the outcome but also the aptness of the agent's performance.
Only thus is the success not just "by chance" in the way Aristotle deplores.
Aptness would require not only that the a4ent's plan be implemented so
that the desired outcome does come forth. The outconle must also manifest
the agent's relevant competence. In particular, the agent must contpetently
irnplement his full plan, which includes the cornpetent adoption of the relevant sequence of steps, and its sustainnrent as it unfolds.
Of course, the shooting of the sheep in wolf's clothing does not attain
the agent's ain1, so it is not an action in accordance with virtue: it does
not even result in the success of the agent's main first-order aim, which
is to kill a wolf, not a sheep. What of the killing of the woif in wolf's
clothing? Why is this not an action in accordance with virtue? Because,
although the action succeeds in its main aim, it succeeds by luck, so that
relevant competence is not sufficiently nraniGst in the killing ofthat wolf'o
to. Essentially involved in such supposed cor"lpetence is the agent's belief (explicit or implicir) that
ilthe anitual he sees looks like a woll, then it is a woll But this is something our shooter does not
know. Because he is Ciettiered, he does not rca7ly knotu how to brins about the lbllowing outcorrre: tlntt ln' kills thc wolf be,forc /rirr. (Which, in the intended sense, leaves it open that there be a
wolfbefbre hinr that he knows how to kill.) This "rpe:ri/icknow-hor,v is nrissins despite his rerention of a?ocral ability to kill wolves. He does not know tlut by shootinq the aninlal trefbrc'l"rirlr
that looks like a wolfhe wotllti kill a wolf. So, he lr'ks thc rerrrirctl sitrrltion-spccifit't'orrrprctclli:c. His stlccess in killilrg a wolf , by slrootirr tlrc rlrn;rl tlr;rt kroks likc .r rvolf , is lr('lr('c rr()r ;
stt(('csstllttll;ulifi'stst'clcvltnt('()ntl)ct('ll(('.()rlr':rt'rrtl.rrkstllt.t,rulrlt.l<'sPt.trfit (()nrl)(.t(.n((.
r42
conlpetitor who actually competes allcl succeeds, and not to those who stay
on the sidelines, no nlatter how nruc'h nlore gifted they nray be. Relevant,
adnrirable goodness is fully preserlt only in the actiorl that succeeds. Only
derivatively, secondarily, might the competence, the disposition, als<r
be adrnirable. Even if there were no recognition of our distinctions in
Aristotle's writings (which, as we have seen, there is in fact), it would seenl
natural to distinguish between the Olyrnpic athlete who succeeds only by
luck and the one who succeeds aptiy, through competence. Only the latter
flourishes fully.
i.
Finally, thus interpreted, Aristotle enat-rles a solution to the Meno pLtzzle as to the value of knowiedge over lnere true belief. The traveler who
reaches Larissa through com.petence acts "in accordance with" virtue-
D. Knowledge
and Action
littlc crcclit
Sirrrilarly situatcrl, Strpcrstitiorrs I lunter intcrprcts r liglrt brcczc us cn('()rrragcn)cnt fl'onr Iris qotl of'tlrt'lrunt to t;rkc:r slrot in tlrt'rl;rrk. llc bclir.vr.s tllut
tlrc gotl rvill gtrirlt' lris lr;rtttl :rttl (lr;rt lus slot rvill sur't't't'tl. ( )rr tlr;rt b:rsis. lrt.
t:rkt's lrls sllot in llt'tl:tt"k ,tntltlor's \u( ( ('('(1, lrut tlt.ulks orrly (rt I ;rtlv I rrr'k.
r43
ls either hunter, poised to clraw and shoot, able to shoot and thereby kill
their prey? If this nleans whether it is logically possible that the shot succeed, then the answer is, obviousiy, yes. Nothing precludes the logical possibility that such a shot kill sonre prey.
z. Does Hopeful Hunter at the mornent of shooting have the ability to then
kill sorne prey? Well, again, if this ilreans only whether he is "abie," whether
it is lrtgcally posshle that he shoot ancl kill, then the answer is just as obviously
yes. However, our talk of ability often requires n1ore. A shot in the dark
woulcl not normally be thought to nranifest ability. If the dark night is also
silent and odorless, if nothing can guide the hunter's hand, if the shot is ranclomly directed, then, even if success is logically possible, it would rnanifest
little ifany ability. Hopeful Flunter does not even believe that shooting as he
cloes has much chance of succeeding. In his opinion the chance is near zero,
which seemingly precludes any real ability to srlcceed by shooting.
3. Rut is that only an illusion? Why not say that he does have that ability,
cven if he is not aware of it? A basic action is available to him, one he could
perforrn, by performing which he would bring about the killing of some
prey. And this is all it takes for hinr to be able to kill the pre|, for hirn to
have that nrere ability. Of course, Superstitious Hunter shares that ability,
cven if he too lacks the relevant knowledge. By hypothesis he does believe
he has it, indeed believes he knows what gives it to him, but the source of
his beliefis not a source of knowledge.
Neither Hopeful Hunter nor Superstitious Hunter seems to attain success creditable to the ageut. In each case, one might plausibly reason as
firllows: "The success is gained only through a kind of luck incompatible
with relevant credit. Neither hunter's success manifests their competence.
Poorly situated as they are, neither hunter so nluch as has the required
conlpetence."
hand, what is a cornpetence if notjust a disposition to sucwhen one tries? Why doesn't Superstitious Hunter have such a disposition? Surely he would succeed if he tried. He would apply his true belief
.rs to cfilcicnt lllcrtrs, wottld ac:t accordingly, and would thereby succeecl.
Thc inttritir>rr rcrsists. nonctllclcss, that even Superstitious Flunter
tlocs rrot srrct'ccrl tlrrouslr (rclcv:rrrt) corrrpctcncc. His ability to thcn
slrooI s()nlc l)r'('y is t'onstitutcrl irr csscntill p;rr-t lry ln inr:onlpctcl)t,
rrtrjtrstifictl lrt'lit'f . ll lr('\\/('r'c'to sut't'r'ctl on tlr:tt or't',rsion, it worrlrl lrc
4. On the other
r'ecrd
r44
r45
as
tion offragility. Suppose a pewter mug would shatter upon hitting a certain
stlrface but only because a hovering fiend would zap the mu[T as it hit the
surface. This would nrake the relevant conditional true: the rnug would
shatter on that occasion, but this would not rnake it fragile. For the latter
to be the case, one would need at a minimunl that the mug would shatter
when in a relevantly interesting conbination of condition and situation.
'f he essential presence of the determined fiend rnakes that situation irrel-
as
to constitute
j. How might Superstitious Hunter arrive at his true beliefthat his shot in the
dark would succeed? He nright believe that his god of the hunt would ensure
that the shot would succeed, regardless of its direction or speed or timing.
Alternatively, he might have an irnaging ability that enables hirn to believe
that if he next shot thus, in a certain specific way (with that irnaged orientation and speed), his shot would succeed, and that this is so because this belief
is guided by the god (although in fact it's just what first came to rrrind, with
no reliable basis whatsoever). In neither case is it plausible that Superstitious
Hunter now has a relevant competence to hit prey. He does have a disposition
to do so, based essentially on his superstitious belief, but this beliefcannot constitute a competence that might rnake the success of his shot credtable to him.
6. Why
supposedly by the god of the hunt, his success ratio woulcl be near zero. No
r,vhich is conrpatible with the :rgent's having solnc rluitc nrinia clegree to eirrn hinr ruore thrrn ncgligilllc crcdit. (At lcrst hc
conrpetcntly er.roueh, rvith tllc rrow spectling ofl'thc tror.v.) In wllt fi.rl
rlskrr.trvltn()ll z('r()l)l()l).tl)lltlolsltrt('\\\\',tsllr<'r,t'r1l)('st()l)li,rll,rr'.rrl,rlrlt'.ulrl[lt'ltcrtll.ul
.ur\'()llrt'r. lf I ltrrrtt't". rlrot r',,lrtr'.'n It1'.rr, lt r(',r\()nrn1, tlr<'rr lrc rrrrl,,lrl strll r',un srlrst.llrlr,rl
,
r ('('(l
r46
the insubstantiai knowledge that one can oby otrtg, under a practical modc.
of presentation. (Sorneone who can wiggle their ears at will would have
the insubstantial knowledge that he can do so by doing it, and can implernent that knowledge at will, but others lack that knowledge-how under a
practical mode of presentation. What is the dif{erence, and how does the
ear-wiggler gain his distinctive knowledge? Does he acquire an apt beiief,
at least a functional one? What then is the conrpetence that is rnanifest to
the effect of his having that knowledge-how?)
So, the easiest way to avoid the regress is to understand competence as
a certain sort of clisposition to succeed, which need not in turn be understood as knowledge-how constituted by knowledge-that, so that it lies
beyond sheer ability.''
E.
l-,..
as apt
z.
r47
t,l
t{)
will do so.
'What if the belief is true
though incompetent? Suppose it is formed with no
adequate evidence although it is the sort of belief that requires evidence. An
inconrpetent nleans-end belief could hardly help to constituce a conrpetence
fully creditable to the agent, one whose exercise rnight yield creditable success. This agent's success again rnanifests no relevant competence.
l. Such conlpetence is constituted by knowledge how to attain one's objectivc. What constitutes the competence is this know-how, but included in
ir is then the knowledge that the nleans would yield the outconre. Suppose
tlrat Sintone aptly hits her target in irnportarlt part through knowing that
lrcr nrc:rns u'oulc1 yielc1 her end. If she /or'.s know that by ptrlling that trigger
sltc woulcl hit tlrlt tllrgct, Irowcver, ancl if shc clocs know that she pulls the
trisscr, tlrcn slrc nrust know tll:rt sllc will hit hcr trrrsct. This is s<lnlc.thing
slrt'nust krlorv tlt'sri(t'lrorv "uns;rfc'''lrcr bclicf-sccnls, sint'c sllc nligltt s<r
t';rsilylr,rvt'l'rt't'rirrtlrt'sinul.rtiorrr'ot'kpit,rvlrt'rcprrllinglrc'r'triggt'rwotrltl
rt-.rtlrrct',rrrly,ur .rlr,rr I r\'(' .,lr(rl
r48
When Sirnone aptiy hits her targets up aloft, she seenrs to enjoy animal
knowledge of her surrounclings, and of how she can affect thern through
her basic actions. What is true of Simone is true of all animals whose conduct is thus explicable through nleans-er1d, belief-desire psychology. It is
through apt beliefs about our surroundings that we gain the know-how
that makes us effective animal agents.
That is all it takes for us to have anirnal knowledge, even in cases
where we may intuitively incline to think that the subject soinehow does
not really know. T'hs intuition can alstt be accornmodated, but perhaps
only by invoking a rc.llcctiue knowledge that can be lost with no loss of
animal knowledge.
F. Reflective Knowledge
I. A belief
it is apt, but it
st:
cond-orclcr
competence.
inc'luclcs an indis-
r49
perceptual beliefs about what she does see through the screen? Can she now
answer with affirmative correctness even though just as easily the screen
nright then reflect oniy a filnr, with Simone unable to tell any difference?
At the rnonrent ofinterest she might indeed see the scene before her, seeing
that things are thus ancl so, even thoughjust as easily she would be seeing no
such thing, but only the contents of a movie.
Plausibly, Simone could then (at that nroment) competently affirm that
tlrings are ndeed thus ancl so before her, based on her apt visual expericnce as of their being (indeed) thr-rs and so. The scene is perfectly visible in
normal sunlight, as it is r,vhen she looks out the window some fine morning. And the knowledge thus acquired could of course help constitute
her conrpetence to shoot a target that she sees. Nevertheless, it is hard to
credit her af1irmation as really knowledgeabie. And we can now ofrer an
cxplanation.
Sinrone plausibly enjoys first-order "anin1al" knowledge of the scene
before her, as she views it through the perfectly transparent screen. She
then seenr.s to exercise her first*order visual competence to get it right. She
c:xercises (a) perceptual conrpetence to form visual experiences through her
visual systems, and (b) conceptual cornpetence to host appropriate visual
scemings on that basis, and to fornr visual judgments thus based in turn.
And this animal knowledge then helps constitute her conrpetence to shoot
the targets that she sees through the screen. I..levertheless, she is rnissing
sonrething episternically inrportant. For, she is unable to believe aptly that
;rs she forrns her judgnrent she has any such access to the scene before her.
'f his is because it is then random whether the scene is at that mornent
transjudge,
parent or illusory. As she is about to
she rnight just as easily then (at
tlre nroment ofludgnrent or infinitesimally thereafter) view a film as a real
s('clle, and she has no way to tell the difference. For this reason, she is unable
to judge or presLlppose-at that very nronlent as she decides whether to
,rfljnn-that her visually based affirm.ation would be likely enough to be
t'orrect. She is unable to know whether at the monrent of interest she has or
rvill have the SSS crompetence required.'l
(k>rtsicler thcn hcr.jtrclnrent that it is sunny outside at a nroment when
tlrc scrccrr r/o's ltntpcttto r'pcrfe'c:tly tratrsparent, errabling her to see that it
rs inclcccl sur)uv:rt tll:rt v('r'y n)()nrcnt. Tllc nlcrc qlJinnatior in the endeavor
II. Wt'(,ul .r\slrtttt' lll.rt, .rt lll, nr()ru( nl rltt' tn.rtlr'ltt't tt,lgtnt'nt. llt't sitt,rtiott totrltl
nl\l.illl,ll('()tt\l\'.trl rr,l/l//rr,/)'lt,'ntlr.rn\l),u('nl \(t('('nl()\(t('('lt rr.tllt lnovrr'.
sw,itt'lr
r50
it tlrat in aflirming
cllllrcc bc rr;ursl);rrcnt, so tlr:rt lrt'r';rflinn;ttiort n,lltlrcn lrc;rrt, lrrrt ('()nrpllilrlv it is not so tlr.rt lrt'r'.rfllrnl,rtitrl ll,.rll/,/ tlrt'rr lrt'.rpt. ( )lr tlrt't'olttt'.u'y, it
rrrir',lrt l()() ('.rstlV t lrt'lt lrt' ill,rrl.
I5I
3. In line with the foregoing reflec:tions, we need to distinguish affirnrations that are judgments fronr those that are not. An affirnration is a judgrllent only if it is in the endeavor to affirnr reliably and indeed aptly. It may
1r"rst be alethic, in the endeavor to afhrnr correctly, or it rnay have only sore
pragmatic and norl-cognitive aim. The guesses of a ganre-show contestant
can then be thus alethic affirnrations in the endeavor to get it right without
beingjudgrnental afiirrnations in the endeavor to get it right aptly.
(';lsc, Sirtronc clocs scrcnl tcl have the sutrcredal aninral knowledge that par-
itl.'t. t\ rt()l
,r r/t,','l t',rt,'tt.
r52
4.
J. There is however
a difference between
rmation then
is
-forutard
s-
safe.
If Simone aloft lacks creclal anirnal knowledge, then, it is not for the rcrit. It is not because it is-llsc th:rt
she would afiirm aptly on the scenc before her. If Sinrone ak>ft lacks crccl:rl
animal knowledge it is rather because, cvcn if it happcns t() bc true: thlt il'
she affirrrr.ed perceptually, shc r,,rrulr/ afflnlt aptly, rhis is n()t sonlc)thing sllc is
in a position to know, 4ivcn hr>w casily shc tt,qltt tltut ltaw ''l rurclcr sinlrrlation, itrdisc:cnt ibly so.
(lonsiclcr'<ln tltc otlrcr lrlrttl Sinlorrc'ls slrc f;rt'cs tlrc nrntlornly tnrrrs
1)rrcnt s('rc('n. Ilt'r- rc'rt'e'1'rtrr;rl .rllirrrr,rtion rt tlr.rt poirrt is n()t onlv
son that the screen-dependent Sinrone lacks
i53
7. Yes, that example leaves it open that at least subcredal animal knowledge
is required fbr aptly successful, relevantly creditable intentional action. So,
that general claim is left open by the example. But is it a quite generally true
r:laim? Chapter 7 will begin with a focus on this issue.
-#**ir
'{'
,$"d
Intentional Action
andJtdgment
A.
Taking Stock
r. We have explored
action, which ntay after all require rlothini nlore tharl a good guess,
especially if one rtrust act whetr nothing epistenrically better is available. In response we nray recluce the level of klowleclc requirecl ttr
that of sinryly thnkng that the nreans-end proposition is trueo so long as
this thought is colnpetently enough sustairred, c:ven with coltrpetellcc
'nvhose reliability lies well below Jo perc:t:nt. We rteec{ not evett insist
that this is literally knowleclge. We can allow that we speak rtretaphorically in calling such guess-like thoughts "ktrowled4e." This neecl tror
concern us if our interest is not so tnttch senlantic as rttctatrllrysic:al analysis. But we have seen how proper it see ttrs to rcc'optrizc in Errglisll r killtl
of subcredal aninlal knowle clge, as in the c:ase of thc, fllwle ss cyc-cxaltl
subject.
r55
2. Evetr that rnuch is made cloubtful by actions still to sonle extent apt
and creditable without anything properly called knowiedge to serve as the
nleans-end connection. Not even subcredal knowledge seenrs required.
Take a case in which we need to choose arbitrarily by just supposing
that a certain nleans-end proposition is true. 'We may need to act on that
assunrption just as an arbitrary choice among 3o equal options, one of
which nrust be chosen. We might just barely guess by opting for straight
swimrning in one of 3o clirec:tions, and we nright reach land that way, and
our cloing so nlay be apt to some extent. Our guess is rnininrally competent.
At least we do not swinr in circles! So that seenls a way to get it right on the
direction of reac:hable land, in a way that manifests some degree ofaptness.l
C)n the other hand, we need not even positively guess. We need not positively think that the choice we have made is right, and that our choic e will
be a successful means to our end. 'We can insteacl lust supprrse and hope that
the chosen option will yield success, while acting on that assurnption. Here
one's action nright be succ:essful and even apt to some extent, despite the
element of luck owed to the arbitrariness of our supposition. Here again,
what may enable the action to attain sonre degree of aptness is that it succeed (one reaches land) in a way that nlanifests (suflicient) competence, so
as to be a success sonrewhat creditable to the agellt.
3, That conclucles our inquiry into r,vhether apt action requires knowledge
of at least the anirnal level. Arbitrary suppositiorl carlnot constitute knowlecige of any sort.' Apt action connects with epistemology rnore tenuously
than by requiring knowledge of the nreans to one's end. Nothing nrore is
necessarily required than arbitrary supposition on which one is willing to
risk action. Such supposition will sonretinres enable apt attainnrent of one's
end by connecting it to soille nleans, helping thus to constitute a much fuller
c:onlpetence nranifest in suc-cessful attrinnrent of that end.
A value ofaninral krrowledge hence resides not in its being neccssary for apt
intentional action, but rather in its often being a constitutive part ofwhat is
r. Oourpare the pitcher who ltrckily hits a honre nrn withont nranifbsting competence (period)
as a hotuc rtrn hirter (trnhkc the uniclrre llabe l{uth). It still seenls possible to say that his suc-
:.
cess nrirnifbsts s()lrc (sliglrt) tlcqrcc of'corrrpctcnce , rntl instrrntiatcs sourc (corresponclinely
sliulrt) tlcqrcc of-lptrrcss.
Hct'c wc slrorltl irrtclrlct tllc ";r'bitrrincss" of'tllc supl)()siti()ll til prct'lutlc tllc solt of'sublintin:rl rcli,rlrllitVtll.rt t'n.llrl('\()urcyc t'x:rrrrsrrlrjt't't'suucsst'st()(.()llstitutc.rsortof'sulrt'rcrl:rl
k rror','lctlHr..
r5
evarlt means-end infornration, however tenuous that grasp nray be, whether
through a reliable*enough though subcredal thought that the means will
yielcl the desired end, or through a rnore substantiai judgment to that effect.
Moreover, such "knowledgeable" success ts more fully creditable to the agent
than is the success due to suppositional luck. And the relevant crednl anirnal
knowledge would bring creclit beyond that ofits subcredal correlate.
4. Cornpatibly with
B. What
Is an Intentional Action?
A Preliminary Account
I.
intention.
Br-rt it is ftr fronl cle r that the swinlrucr's sLlcccss cloe s nrrf nlanifbst a spcciflc: cclrupc)tcncc to rcrc'lr sllorc. ()orrrpctcnr:cs ncccl n<>t trc infhlliblc, aftcr
:rll.'l'lrcy t';ur bc.jtrst rcli:tblc'to s()nrc'tlcgrcc,'uvllir'll t':ur bc cxtrcntcly krw.
A lron('r'un lrittt'r rrrirr,lrt,rnr firt'tlrc r.fit'r's, t'xt'r-t'sing;t t:ifi ttrun:rtt'llctl itt
r57
the history of the sport. Here reliability is still quite low, while artainmer
is nonetheless intentional and creditable to say the least.l
If our switnmer's shore is distant and the crossing clifticult, success may
rerurn.
Suppose he happens to swing that way, and does score a rvinning return. Is
he then competent to hit a winning return?
V/hy not say that he does have a competence to do so, though not a very
high conlpetence? After all, he does ainr to hit a winning return, alcJ he
does secure various elenrents of conrpetence in his performance. His eyes
are open. He is alert and focused. He faces and swings in the right direction' Et cetera' His overall competence to return that serve is of course
extremely low; nonetheless he has sorue degree of it. And this degree is then
exercised in pursuit of his firm and present aim to nrake the return. He does
succeed in doing so, nloreover, and his effort with that degree of aptness
is crucial to the success of his attempt. Here again it seenrs rather plausible
that the aim is attained intentionally, as was the aim of the swimmer.
2. Competence
is tlrrrs stiPlrl,1i1,1.1"
given dotnain,
frorn (b) attainnrent of success that nranifests cttmpetuzcc (period) in that
domain. Attainrnents of sort (a) rnay qualify as intentional actiorts, and
for this they need only attain sollre degree of aptness, corresponding to
the degree of pertinent cornpetence then exercised by the agent. Only
with attainrnents of sort (b) do we reach success that is apt (period) in
a
conrpelling
case.
A prisoner is told by hisjailer that throughout the conring night hisjaii cell r,r,'ill
be unlocked, but the jailer's testimony is only a cruel joke. The prisoner does
form the belief, though, and by acting on it that night, he escapes, since c:onlpletely by accident the door ras unlocked. Is his escape intentional? Is it apt?
waiter. The waiter does intend to Llpset his boss, to c1o so by knocking over a
stack ofdishes. So he arranges the tall stack in the kitchen in preparation for the
execution of his plan. Br-rt before he can exc'cute, his nervy interntiotr nrakes
hinr nervous, which rnakes hinr sturttblc onto the stack, thus knocking it over
and upsetting the boss. Here there is a clear and powcrfirl intuition that thcr
waiter upsets the boss rruintentionally, even though he cloes so bcc:ause of his
intention to do so. 'What then rnakcs the cliflcrrcncc bctwecn this casc artcl otrr
earlier cases? Is it not true in all ofthcrn thlt thc ascnt suc:ccccls in tkrin what hc
intends, and succeecis accorcling to plarr? It is by krrockirrg ovcr tllc clisllcs thar
thc waite-r upscts tllc: boss. Anrl it is by s'uvirruirrg irr ccrtuin wirys thr tllc tcnnis
rtovit'c ntl tlrc g()lfi'r-ltt;rin su('('r'ss,;rrrtl by slvinlrrrirrg in :r t'crt;rin clircr'ri<ln
tlr;rt tlrt'srvirunrt'r 'c;rclrcs s.rlc'slr,r'c, rvlrit'lr is lris uo.rl. So, rvlrV is orn'intuition
s,t nru,'lr nr()r'('lxrrvt't litllv,rr,l tlr'. isivt'lv tlr,rt lltt'r'u',ritcr-sut't't't',ls lllil/1,'l'intcnI l(
)tt,tIly
r58
1,,1,r,rt
11,,,
rJg
4. Here
fi:st a clegree of aptness, but aptness ptriorl requires xtffidcnt reliability, for
rrctit'rtrs
ritlllltl of
bcinr
IO
Take again a golfer's hole-in-one. Cornpetence to hit a hole-in-one specifically (or at least reliability at cloing so), in his conditions nllrst of course be
very low. But that ostensible problenr we have aiready surpassed. The golfer
nonetheless does hit the hole-in-one intentionally. Ifin so doing he does not
manifest competence, nroreover, it is not necessarily because the competence
manifest is too low. We have already seen low reliability to be no insuperable
obstacle to intentional success.
More problematically, however, golfers nornrally do not airn at hittng
a hole-in-orue specifically. It need not be through so ainring that the golfer
attains his success, though the success is attained intentionally nonetheless.
'We
must hence relax the condition that in order to attain X intentionally
one nrust have aimed to attain X specificaily. One nlust have ainred to attain
Y, for sonle Y related appropriately to X. In the golfer's case, here is a likely
Y com.ing as close as possible to the hole (with sinking the shot being the
limiting case). Of course, that does not provide a general solution to how Y
rnust be related to X in general. One suggestion is this: X rnust be a deterrninate ofY. Better yet, X nrust be a deterrninate ofY such that the alent favors
Y&X over Y&-X in such a way that he aims to attain rnore specifically the
following [Y, preferably 4.In this way, an airn can be a conrplex, hierarchically orclered aim.a
+. Recall in any case the shot in the clark whereby Strperstitious Huntcr harpens to kill a ratrbit. I now see no good way to cleny that htrnter s nltrch crerlit as is cltrc: orrr ittcky golfcr anti
orrr lucky swimnrer. lt seenrs [rest to grrrnt thrrt Hrultcr tlocs "intcntiorr.rlly" kill tht rabbit.
as cloes our swinlllrcr rerrch slr<:rc, lultl as tlocs orrr golfi'r sink lris sllt>t. lrt car'll r'usc irrtprot'
tallt c()nlpctcnccs:rrc cxclt'iscd to thc ctlct't of';ur:rirrrctl*fi)r su('('css. (lorrrll:ttibly. it sccrttr
nllttcr of-tlcgt-cc ltor,v lllur'lr tllc srttt'ss is rlrtc to ltt<k Ilollt'tlrclcss,:tttl llolv Iltttt'lt tlttc to
('()rnl)ctcn( ('. Sonrt'rlt'1ilt'c ol't;rus.rlr It'tlrt \('('nls,lttt'(lrt'.r1t'ttl irt .rrr\,(.r\c. As to rvlllrt .lcglcc
of cottst'tttt'ntl.tl(tt'rlrt/tlrst lt'tltl ls tlt'rt'rvt'tl, llr.rl r.','nrs.r (()nl('\tu.rl ltr.ll('r (()ntlnri('nt ()rl
rclt'r'.ilrt llr.r( ll(r'rtltslrrrr lrVt trl tlr,'1t.'rlllr('lrl (l()lil.rlll ()l.r( tl()il.
INTLNl'rONAL
2,
ACl',f
II
altogether.
Suppose I rvin the garue. Do I win intentionally? I clo intend to win. And
I attain my aim aptly, through the exercise of cornpetence. 'What if I lose?
Do I lose intentionally? Again, I ainr to lose, and if I artain that objective,
I will do so competentiy as well. It rvill not be a fake loss. Thar is nor what
I want. No, it will be a real loss, where I am reary trying to win. yet, my
|t)erdrdxng ainr is to fttse by so trying. Paracloxically, it appears that one
can
seriously aint both to win, and to lose. How can this be?
How? In the r,vay of our exanrple, with one aim being subordinate to the
other. But the subordinacy is special, not the usuai. The usual way in which
one airn is subordinate to another is through one's intention to attain the
latter by means of the fornrer. Our special way in which one ainr is subsidiary to another is through one's intention to attain the latter by hosting the
fornrer. Thus, it is not that I aim to lose to my grandson by tuinnng.Rather,
I aim to lose to ruy grandson by seriou sly aimingto win. Still, the questions
renrain: If I win, do I win intentionally? rf rlose, do I lose ntentionally?
I am not sure what to say. My or,vn inclination is to distinguish and label.
Perhaps the thing to say is that my losing would be ouerarchingly intenrional,
nry winntng deruatvely intentional. V/hy so? Well, rhe masrer intention
here is the intention to lose. That is what rnost deeply explains my conduct.
IJut in pursuit of that ainr, I do seriously ainr to win, as I clo want my grand.sorl to score a witl that is real, not.just fake. If I unexpecte dly win, however,
tlten rny wirl i.s still irrtcrltional, br.rt only clerivativcly so, since the guicling
nlaster intcnti<ln is tlrc intcnti<ln tr> losc, not to win.
Altcnltivcly,.rrrt.rlrigltt s:ry tlt:rt rlrrly tlrc lllltstcr, <tvcr;rrr.llillg illtcllti<tn
rvitll rvllit'll olrt' frt'l'li)tllls .r tloirr is t';r1l;rblt' of'nr;rki tlr;rt tl.irrg irrtt.rrti.nrl. ltut I sct' lr('r(' rr.tlrinll nr.r't. tlr,rrr.irrst ,r l,t.r-l.,,rl issrrt.. 'l'lrt.str u(.tur.t.'f
r6z
the relevant phenonlena is now in plain view, and it retnains oniy to apply
labels. True enough, that is not to say that labels catrnot be nrisapplied, by the
standard of the natural language. But nor is it given a priori that the language
will always stancl ready to deliver already dedicated labels that appropriately
distinguish what is there to be distinguished. C)urs, I sense, is a case ofthe latter sort. Is it really a deterlrrinate issue whether I win "intentionally" when
my rnaster intention was to lose, rny intention to win only clerivative?
In the appendix to this chapter, we take up what it is to intend, which
deserves our attention through its central involvenrent in our account of
intentional action. Ilut fbr now we continue to develop that account.
Let
us
nretaphysical
"by" relation.
When sonteone has ten cents in their pocket this coulcl be by having ten
pennies, or by having two nickels, or by haviug a dinre. These are all ways
of having that amount of nroney in one's pocket. When sonreone makes
the light go on, this could be by ac'"ivating a sensor' or by flipping a switch.
These are alternative ways of nraking the light go ot1. [f one activates the
sensor, this could be as passive a doing as when, pushed ofl a cliff, cne does
fall to the ground below. Alternatively, it could be a deecl, a doing of one's
own, and perhaps even something one does intentionally. This could in
turn be dorre by the raising of one's right lcg. Of collrse, one nright raise
one's leg as a ntere cloing, under the doctor's nrallet.
One's raising of that leg is not just the rising of the leg, rn'hic:h could be
r63
r/oes, not even to anything that one does passively. Still, one does perhaps
raise one's leg passively under the rrrallet, and uery plausibly otte nright raise
it thus passively in one's sleep, In this last case a doing is one's own doing-
are thus relyini on the notion of an action that is basc. This I understarrd as sirnply a deed D that one does intentionally, there being no other
cleed f)' Ity tloing which one intentionally ainrs to do D (alternatively: there
3.
forced up by sonreone who seizes it, or could rise in a sLlrgeott's hands once
anlputated. There seenls a diflerence between those ways in which oneos
leg nright have risen, and one's raising that leg. The latter ts tcrhap,s sonlething that one r/oes, even though one crallnot help cloing it otlc:c the ntallet
strikes. If a purse is in the way, olle does kick that nurse; that is sorlrething
one surely cloes. If ollc: r/ocs roll clowrthill whctl ptrshccl frttrtl tltc: top, thett
in a sinlilar way onc riocs raisc' onc's lcg whc,rl tllc rlrllct strikcs. T'llcsc are:
bcing no such D' that one does intention ally in the endcaurrr to do D).
One inrportant uotion to be used below is that of an aim A's being
.rttairrccl pnrtly-by onc's cloirtsciecd I)'. The ainr nright be a deed of one's
owrr, clcccl l), as abovc. lltrt othcr ainrs nright also be attainecl portly-lty
clcccls tlf-onc's ()w n.
tlritrgs tlr:rt onc tlocs cvcn if'rlonc is llropcrly tlwttccl s "()l)c's tlwll tloiltg'"
lly t'ontt';tst, tltr'l'ising of'tlrc lcg tllrrt is rtllll)tlt:ttctl, or firrc'ctl trp plrysi,,rllv lry st,nt(.()lt('t'ls.',.rr l,y,r tlu\t ol'rvilttl, r't)l'l't'slr(tlltls l() l)()tlrirrg tll:tt tlllc
Wllcn ()r)c rinrs to tkr l), tlrcrc is;r clcccl l)'lt, wlliclr olrc intcrrtionally
.tillts to tlo l), wlrt'l-t' l)
l)' in tltt. lillitilrrr t';rsc. Wllt.n ollt. is t.ornpctcrrt
t<l tltl I) sttt't't'sslilllv, nt()t('ovt'r', tll.rl is lrt't';rust'()n(' is ( ()nrl)(.lr.nl lo tlo I)
164
by doing I)', for sonle D'; rvhich is cornpatible with the possibility that one
do D by doing D", fbr soflle I)" distinct from l)'' Oue may be competent
to do D by doing l)', rnoreover, bttt nof competent to do D by doing D"' In
that case, if one always tried to do D by doing D", one would not really be
competent to succeed when one tried to do D, In order to be conlpeterlt to
successfully do I) when one tried, there ntust rather be a I)' such that one
would succeed reliably enough when one triecl to clo D by cloing D', and
such that one would try reliabiy enough to do D by doing D'. (Or, rather,
there must be sonre set of actiolls like D' such that, in trying to do D, the
agent would reliably enotrgh pick one or another of the mernbers of that set
as
certain basin, D' = twisting open the right faucet with one's right hancl, and
D" - twisting opell the left faucet rvith one's left hand'
Normally, however, one tnust coordinate one's own basic deeds so as to
bring about one's objective. One's basic deeds nrust forrtr a spatiotemporal
array such that olle attailts oue's aim only through the courbination of the
mebers of te array, where the array sufilces for the attainnre nt of the airn.
Here the ainr is attained suffrciently-by the combined doing of the basic
deeds
A is an inditidual
attaintnent by indiuidual
sufiiciently-by a set X, all deeds in which are deeds of I'
Attainment
set
of
I iff A is attained
Thus, one rnay filI the basin quickly by first opening the right faucet with
one's right hand, and then openine the left fattt-et with one's left hand. If no
other basic cleecl is requirecl for the actional sufliciellcy of that set, then the
quick filling of that basin is an individual attaillnrertt of onc's own.
-5.
ret
tw.
by group
(; ill-(;
sc't
X.
ncl therc
cleeils in
rtttirr-
IJccatrsc rlll ot(.()nrc rlriuht bc rgcntirrlly <lvcrrlctcrrrtitlctl . lllorc tlistiltcti<llls rlrc rclcvtlt
llcrc,6rrt tllis initi;l skcrcli u'ill onlit.r firll tlisplrty ol'tlrcrll. Morcovcr, wc ('rlll rrow ltr:kc
rrsc
rlf'flrt. itlcrrs Ilt.r.c i 1ltlt'r'to rrrr:rlyzc r.ollt't tivc lrt'tirrn, grossilrlv irlvol'"'irtr-l ilgcllts spt'crrtl
IJ
I.
an intentional action. It is an intentional apt affirn1atiorl. But intertional action requires only the attainrnent
of tlrat action's corlstitutive ainr through some degree of corrrpetence. This
degree need not lie above the threshold of reiiability required for epistenric
conrpetence. So, the apt correc:tness of that aflirmation need not itself be
aptly attaine d. ln order to aptly attaitr such aptnrs.s, one needs a second-order
conrpctenc:e to attain it reiiably enough. (Aptrtess can be attained inten*
ticlnally, ho'"vcvcr, witllout being attaincd reliably enough.)
succeecls,
Tlrtrs, rln rlpt jtrrlurucrrt rtralrfies oll orlr accoul)t as irr) apt irrrentional
It is (l) tlrc' :rt'tion of intcntionally gcttinu it right (on I certairr
wllt'tlrr'' (lu('stl()rr) rvrtlt;rn ;trt Positivt':lflir'rtrtion, rvllt'rt'([r) tlr:rt lc'tion ol
rr-tion.
rlrl/'
r,',,
rr itrr'// lcr lot'ttt,',,1 ,rltl1', srrt lr tll.rt ils \l( ('('\\ nr,rllifi'sts l)('r'tr
('(rll llr,'t.ll ol lll.'.'tt('lllt(
.ll'('lll.
r.'t'r,ltttr-'"
. ll('lll t otlll)('l('ll(
is a
i'te'tional
JUDGMENT
167
action.
E: that is to say, it involves a resultant favoring that one bring about E by irnple-
rnenting
certain plan for doing so, where this plan includes one's now Xing.
Such resultant favorings (resultant attrctions to choose) nright be subc:onscious, and rnight then have a standing in the domain of the conative analogous to the standing of credences (resultant attractions to affirnr)
Appendix:
.W.hat
Is
It ro Intend?
we
.rrly
tlrrt srrc.lr :r
pl.r,rislrt
pla, is
6c rcstrlt-
r6g
o'success,"
So
ctalRoots ofFluman
Knowledge
A.
Pragmatic Encroachment
What
sorts
an
archer-hunter's shot? This involves how well that shot contributes to the
overall hunting-relevant objective: say, a good afternootr's hunt. One way it
can contribute is by being successful, by aptly hitting a target of high (hunting) value, and killing that prey. Such aptness does not require that the shot
be also meta-apt. A shot can aptly kill its pre!, manifesting the archer's skill,
even though it was too risky a shot, and betrayecl poorjudgment. An apt
shot can thus fail to be nleta-apt. On a nreta*level we ask whether the risk
under4one is appropriate. What might this involve? How (:arl we understand a way of manaing and assessing risk while brac:kcting suc:h prac:tic:al
objectives as how rlruch it nratters to that huntcr or t() his tribc that hc not
rnisuse his energy, titttc, ancl rcsr>ttrcc:s?
Strppose rt srrrccss/irl ltttttt t<l lrc tlrc prinl:rry olr.jc<'rivc irr rllc rl<lnurin of
Irrrrrrirtg, unrl tlrc ('()rrcsl)()rrtlirrgly prirtt;rrv v:rluc in tlrc critit':rl cv:rlu:ttiorr 1lr-o1rcr-to tll,rt tlotr.rin. Yt's, of't'ortt'st', lrrrl rvl.t ls il tll.rt t'onstitutcs
Wc nlust lrc f lcxiltlc orr lrow, iu:r sn,cll (()r)tcxt, tllc pr'()p('r'rrltinr;rtc lluntillu-l'cllrtivc:rilll is
sct: \\'lt('tlr('r'. lor t'x.rnrlrl<', tlrt'r',oo1l l11 is lcl,rtivt'to.rn ,lfit'r'lltl.rr', tll lt'l;tiv('t() ir tl:ry,s--111'
r70
{1at
agents altogether.
'We
turn next fronr perfornrance nornlativity in general to virtuc epistenrology more specifically.
Pragnratic Encroach nrent thror-r gh
Nornrs of Assertion and Belief
When we are told that knowleclge is the norm of assertioll, this can be
understood as advocating a necessary condition for propu assertiotr,
nanrely knowledge,'What is this propriety? Arguably, it itivolves social
epistenlic nornls, These rlray or may not derive fronr hunratr c:otlvetrtiotr.
They ntay rather be nornrs set, not by convelltioll, but by the neccls of att
inforrnation-sharing social species. Leaving open the exact source, cotltent,
and nature of such nonns, I rely only on the plausibility of their existence.
Without going further into the sourcre and objectivity of epistenric:
nornls, we can still wonder: What sort of thing deternrines thcir correctness? Let's suppose for the sake of ar[Turent that in some illlportant sensc
z. Thisisthenclefendedsalvay'olexpl;riuirrghorvrcpttsnalrtwcfirtrlccrtrtittMoorc-plrltt{oxicll
cl:rirus, such as "p btrt I don't know that p" or "p but I t'lon't believc it" or'"r bttt I'tll Itot.ittstified in believing it." What nrkcs knorviedge lilc nornl irs rlpposcrl t(), sity, tl'tlth, or belic:f', or
justified belief? Arguably, rvhat is rlistirrctive is that knowlcdqc is thc ntost tcttcrl strch trotlr
that explains the others. Ycs. tnrth.lrclicf', antl .jtrstificrl bclief':rrc lso tlorttts ilt that it wotrltl
be irrcorrcct t() assct-t,uvllcll rlnc l:rr'ks urty of-trutll,llclicf', tlr-jttstifit'.rtioll.lrttt tlr.rt is pllrrrsilrly
bcclrusc in lckinq rnv of-thcsc one l<.'ks rrlso ktl<lrvlctlgc. Stl it is krlrl',vlctluc tlt.rt tlltts tttrifics
tltc rclcvllllt sct ol'rrornrs. IIorvcvt'r', if'tllis is tlrc;rt-grttlcrtt, tllcrl kttorvlctluc (lt:tt ollc kttor'r's
rrr;ry [rc ;r nl()r'(' lrl.rrrsil,lc r'rrrtlitl,rtc lirr lrcirrg tltrr f/tr' rlol rtl ol'.tsst'l't iott. l lris rs [lt'c.ltsc tllct't'
.r lt. s<.vt.r'.rl M.rolt' l).u.r(l()\r,.rl ,l.rurrr t trvclt'.1 trot lry tlrr' krt.rr','lc,lit' ttot ttt lrttt orlly lrv tlrc
Lltrrrvlt'tl.1t' tlt,lt ()n( klr,,rr'. lr)rnr. rrol.rlrll,tlrr.'l,,ll,)\\'tltl',: "r lrrrl I tlttlltt rvllt'tllt'r I'lrr-irrstr
lir.,l lr llrrrrkrrrl', tlr.tt I knr)\\'rt " llut tltt'.,t'tsrtlt'.,r('l)( t tltll,'t.rl l,t.ttll l)l('\('lll ( ()ll( ('l ll\.
S0CIAL R()Ol
T7I
knowiedge i.s a norm of assertion, that one falls short ifone afflrnrs, whether
publicly or privately, what one does not know. Such affirmation can be
an act either of thought or of speech. Judgment in particular is an aflirnrative act of thought.3 Knowledge then is a nornl ofjudgnrent. And this is of
course conrpatible with knowledge being apt belief, or belief whose correctness nranifests (sufficient) conrpetence and not (too rnuch) luck. The
conclusion to draw is then that aptncss is a norln of belief. And this fits our
picture platitudinously. A belief cloes surely fall short ifit fails to get it right
through conlpetence. It falls short in the way any perfornrance with an airn
falls short if it faiis to secure its ainr through conlpetence. That knowledge
is a nornr of belief is then a special c:ase of the fact tbat aptnes.r, success that
rrranifests cttrnpctcncc, is a norln of perJormancc.a
What, however, does such conrpetence require? Core epistemic colnpetence is a dispositional ability to discern the true fronr the false in a certain
donr.ain. Infallibly so? Surely not: that is askine too rnuch. Reliably? Well,
yes, reiiably enougll, What then is the standard? How rnuch reliability is
required for it to be, episternicaliy, reliability enough?
Is it really appropriate, hor,'ever, to reqriire a precise specification of a
threshold? Is this not as inappropriate as it would be to insist on an exact
threshold for justification enough to constitute justification, or an exact
threshold fbr confidence enough to constitute belief? We are content to
assunre that tlrcre are such thresholds (or twilight zones) for justificatiorl
and for belief. Why can't we extend that tolerant attitucle to the supposecl
threshold of reliability for epistenric competence? Can't we just assunre that
there is such a threshold, even if we callnot specify it rrrore precisely?
Fair enorigh. But we nright still wonder about the dimension of episternic justification and that of episternic conlpetence (whether these are
clifTerent or at bottorn the sarne), and even about the dinrension of confidence. All three are nragnitudes, each plausibly involving a threshold.
.t. This is a tenrporary expedient for expository purposes; in due course rve will find reason to
clistinsuish rrorc cl;rbot'atcly trctr'vceu thc state ofbelieving anri the assertive act ofjnclenrent.
.1. Tlris provirlcs rlrt urtlcrstlnrling of'thc'kuorvlctlce trornr olassertion difibrent fi-om that
firtnrcl in Tirrrotlry Willirrrlrson's Kr,rr,/r'r{qc tutd Its Linits (()xfirrd: ()xforcl university Press,
:ooo). Scc cspcr'irrlly ch. r t, "Asscrtion," rvltcrc thc kllowlcdcc rtrle is unclerstoocl as qoverning rr.r'rr'r/irrr corrstitutivclv, [r1'.rrr,rlt>ry lvitlr tllc w:rys irr rvlricll tlrc ltrlcs of'chcss cr>trstitutivcly
!a()vcrn tlrc Itic.t'.. ()ru';rtt'orrlt is irr tt'r'rrs <lf'lllc t'onstitrrtirlrr of'_jtttlgtttcltt:ultl sscrtiorr us
:t'tions, Irut tlrc (.()nstrtutiorr is tt'lt'ologrr.rl t.rtlrt't tll;ul n()r'nrirtivt'. f trr.lgrrrt'rtt is not lirt rs,trlrstilttlit'cl,.rflilrrr,rti,rrt tlt.rt ts sttlrlt'r t t() { ('lt.ttl) u()rnl\. [:r,t'rl rl.lllnnr.rtl()n l\,rr'r'{\'rrii)'srrlr.icr't
tostrr'lt ll()rr)l\, rl D,'r',1 Dill lrt'(ott\ltlillit,(l),\()\lrl)l('( t. ltt,l',rrrt rrt r\ l()r lr\( ()ll\tllulr\,('l\,.lli nr,r
tt()n \\'llll rt'll,rnr 'l,lr\ (lr('n( r'llrt'tt'lr',,1,r1t,.rl,,tttstrtlrlr()ll), rr.urrcl\'. Irtttlt.ul,l.rl)trrcrr
172
'What
sorls of consicleraWe might still wonder how such a threshold is set.
tions deternr.ine it? In particular, is the epistenric threshold invariant across
the practical situations ofboth subject and attributor?
How reliable is reliable enough? Will this vary clepending on how much
is practically at stake for the subject? For the attributor? Take a fact that p.
Earlier we distinguished (a) the degree of reiiability required for arl appropriate public assertion of that fact (or for the clam to know it) from (b) the
degree required for the subject to just know it, regardless of whether he
claims to do so, and also from (c) the degree required even just to believe
competently thatp, to tnanifest in so believing a reliable enough conr.petence.
These degrees nray well coincide, determined as they all are by what we
can appropriately store for later retrieval even when the original basis is
lone from. memory. If we put aside pragmatic concerns such as whether
a check will bourlce, or whether one will be late for a tneeting in another
city, what then determines whether a conlpetence is episten:tically reliable
enough?
How can we
assess
are set aside? The concerns that remain would be cognitive or theoretical.
'What
is distincUsing a catchall label, let's call thern "(purely) episternic."s
tive of these? They presunrably involve truth, and its reliable acquisition.
A competence is epistemic only if it is an ability, a disposition, to discern
the true trom the false in a certain domain. But infallibility is too rnuch to
require, which triggers once again our persistent question: How reiiable
is reliable "enough," and is this som.ething that varies from subject to subject, or from attributor to attributor, or both?
When we bring in extra-epistenric concerns about physical safety, or
bouncing checks, or irnportance of tinrely arrival, in the epistemc assessnlent
of a belief, are we proceeding as inappropriately as when we assess the tennis appropriateness of a serve by how well it inrpresses a friend entering the
stancls? There appear to be domain-intertral stanclards that deternrine proper
risk in tennis. And the sanle seenrs true of huntitrg, and ofindefinitely nlany
other domains of hunran perforrnanc:e. These adrnittcclly resist precise fornr.uiation. They presurnably concern ltow sucrct: ss is asscssccl intcrnally to thc
dornain. f)onrain-internal stattclarcls of suc:h suc(:erss wotrlcl lrclp clctcrtltillc
173
sinlrrltion,
ls
wlrcn
;r
ilrilitv w('(..u1
5. ltrlrfirllt.t';rtt'oultwcnriry, lrt'r'rl l.,rult'outo(ltt'l'tontct-ttsllc'srtlcstltcpl'tttlt'ttti;rl:rlrtl ltlot:tl.
su, lr.slrcrlr.rlrslllt';t.sllrctr,.Ilt',rvt'lll.tt ()l)('nlot rto\t'..1n,1 ,ssltllt'lirl'srrrrrlrritVtlt.tl .ttlVtltllct
rrrrlrr,)n((.t n\l.rllrlrtrtltllr.,r.
l.rrrr,,,rtlr('rnrlltttlt'tllt'trtlt'ol tlrt"'rt,trllt.rl()ll)t.tl'ltl,lli(-."
:rlso;rsscss l11, 1iootl ;t lntili(( scrve is, onc tlt;t is rot prrrt of'lt lrt:ttch; its rrrllity
is prt'stttrt:rlrly cot tt'l.rtt'tl rt'rtll lrou.'lt:rrtl it u,oultl lr,vt'lrt'cll fi)rir) ()l)p()r)cnt t() lllrrrrllc it in
nt;rtt l.
174
biasting serve by the tennis charnpiotr. These latter seen properly ASSessable as apt, so long as they succeed within the hunt or the nratch. Sttppose
the long shot does kil1 the prey and the blasting low-percentage serve does
win the point, and suppose these perfbrnrances to be part of a pattern reliably enough predictive of succress over the course of a hunt or of a match.
That particular hunting shot, and that particular serve, would then each
be assessed as both apt and neta-apt, as one rvhose sucrcess manifests a
domain-specific conlpetence of the perfortner, and one that runs appropriate risk (perhaps when viewed as part of a relevant overall pattern), even if
the risk of failure for that isolated perfornrance is quite high.
It seems otherwise, however, in the donrain of knowledge. Take the
speculative belief-in*one's-bones based on an ability to discern truth,
though with low reiiability. That belief will not be considered an instance
of knowledge, surelyi nor will it be rirought to hit the ttrark of truth through
a reliable enough cpistenric cornpetence exercised by the believer. If that
ability falls very far short of reliability, if it falls near the server's t5 percent
rate of slrccess, then it will not be granted the status of a knorvledge-level
epistemic competeltce. When taken at face value, its deliverarlces will provide neither knowledge nor reliably enough apt beliefl,
Why is a batter's 15 percent conrpetertce deerned outstanding, as is a
175
judg-
rnent require nlore reliable conrpetence than the baseball hit or the basketball field goal? At least in part, I suggest, the answer is that epistemic
conlpetences are relevant not oniy to the attainnrent of a good picture of
things for the believer, but also to inforrning others, enlarging thereby the
pool of shared infornration. Risky inforrned guesses do not pass rnuster as
objectively endorsable apt attainnrerrts of the truth, properly stored for later
use, and transrnissible tcl others through pr"rblic assertion,
Why not? Why would our need to infornr others have so much explanatory payoff beyond that of our need to know things ourselves? And why
might the social dimension of epistenrology inrport a requirenlent of reliability higher than seenls proper in other domains, where performance is
recognized as apt despite the low reliability of the competence rnanifest?
What follows will gradually develop an answer to these questions.
Take the Hail-Mary shot by a player in rhe last seconds ofa basketball garne.
The shot goes through the hoop and earns credit through the player's apt
perfornrance, even though this long shot had a very low chance of success.
A social entity, the teanr, is involved, and the player's perfornlance is assessed
as part of the team's perforrnance. Nevertheless, his unreliable shooting
corllpetence (frorn that far out) nright still be maniGst in a performance
that attains a clegree of aptness, his ganre-winning field goal. That shot can
rrranifest cronrpetence, evell if from that distance his percentale is quite
krw, say Io pe rce llt. The percentage clf the average player, after all, even the
average pro, nlay fall well trelow that.s Even if his relevant competence is
nc>t at all rellrarkeblc, nr()rcovcr, it cloes involve sonre skill. He at least threw
in thc rilrt gcrrcrrrl clirccti<lrr. In adclitir>n, therc was r1o alternative play
rctrrirt'c'pistcnrit'r'cli;rbility:rlrovr'i() l)cr-('crrt
(:rs
rvt'tl,r), still
ll
l)cr('ct)t
r76
that would have had greater chance of success, as there was no time to pass
to a teamrate. The teanr-involving social dirnension of lrasketball hence
does not preclude that a perft>rnrance rrright attain an inr.pressive degree
of aptness while manifesting very unreliable conrpetence. Why not allow
similarly that aptness ofbelief might be based on unreliable competence?
The foregoing suggests a distinction between:
whose correctness nranifests sonle degree of conrpetence
on the part ofthe believer, and on the nratter at hand, and in the circunlstances,
and
threshold ofreliable conlpetence
set by the needs ofhuman flourisiring in infornration-sharing conrnrunities.
reliably enough thought that is apt (lteriod), above
Given this distinction, we might rvell allow that a thought can attain
sonle degree of aptness rvithout alrrounting to knowledge. Thus, the
well-infornred hypotheses of a self-conficlent Sherlock Holnres or Albert
Einstein can anlount to sonrewhat apt thoughts (affirnrative thoughts),
while falling short of knowledge. In a way they are: sonrewhat apt affirmations, whose correctness does nranifest conlpetence far above the average for the sort of question and the circunlstarlces involved. Nevertheless,
they are not reliably enough apt aflirmations. They neecl to be confirmedin some cases through nlore peclestrian, reliable ways-before they can
attain the status of outright knorvledge. Only through such confirmation
could they finally attain the status of reliable enough apt belief. And only
thus can they be really apt (pcriod).
Note further how this nright help explain the sta nding of rorm-requiring
conlpetence (or epistenric justification) for assertion. There is a nornr of
assertion that derives fronr a default reliability requirenrent inrposed on
'We
mernbers of human cornnlunities.
are accordingly required to assert
only what manifests reliable enough competence. What is properly asserted
is only what is underwritten thus reliably. The standing ofthis norm derives
in turn front the requirements for altproltratc sharing of infornration, conducive to human flourishing through rnutual reliancc. So, the cxplarration
of the noril)'s stancling will clcrivc fronr tlrc rccltrircnrcnt of rcliability if
sharing is to c<lnclu(rc pr()pcrly to suclr flourislring."
The act or attitude that we retain even once our conficlence wanes
sufficie'tly
is the affirrrlation, or the willingness to affirnr, that
the letter is indeed an ,E,,
tt't
{(t it riglt ou that qtrcstirtrt. The act or attitude that we no longer perfbrnr or host is the afiirnration,
or willingness to
affirnr accordingly, in the encleavor to get it righr relably utouglt,
ndeerl aptly.
'l lr.' ,lt,tttrt.t, rt'lr'r'.utl lr.'tt'r. tll.rt rrl ( () l('nrl)ot.rl nlt'tsrtl!t'r ll\'( l('\lln()n\', lrul
llt,', t,).,., l('ntltrrr.tl nur('nr(trrr, .,lr.rt rtt,,,tl r',rrlr, t rr tllt l.tl,'r .r'lr'.'.,
177
r-;rr
tlltrs:lln()ultt to
rnt lrttl.'s.tls,r
\ll(
((
\\ "1 . l',tlt
^'r
r78
an apt intellectual perfornlance, a perforrtrance that attains its aiur irl a way
that manifests the perforrner's contpetence.
The kowledge that we are reluctant to attribute here requires full-fledged
jgdgntent, notjust a slless. Compatibly with that, we can allow a lower grade
of "knowledge," whether metaphorically or literally, olle that requires only
apt guessing, and not apt judging. Aptjuclging, nloreover, requires that the
perforrner attain his airn, and do so in a way that rnanifests "r'nough" relevant
conlpetence. Accordingly, to really know fiuclgnrentally) one nlust aflirnr in
the endeavor to get it right aptly (and relial-rly enough), ancl or]e lnust attain
that objective in a wav that rnanifests one's relevant conlpetence. Since the
eye-exanr glresser cloes not evenjtrdge, he cral)llot knor.vjuclunrentally."
.What
Is
r7g
The following exarnple nright help nrake plausible how the standard for
knowledge can remain stable through variation in the stakes.
Suppose that H(igh) is in a high stakes situation and has excellent evidence for
his belief that p, but not good enough to give hinr knowledge that p. L(ow)
for his part also has good evidence for believing that p, but not nearly as good
as H; yet L's evidence is good enough to give L knowledge that p, since the
stakes are so low in his context. Suppose H and L both store their beliefs
in the normal \ ay we do all the time. Weeks later they both believe the
sanle thing basedjust on their retelltive nlenlory, now while asleep and quite
removed from any high stakers situation. Should we now say that L knows
while H does not, even though L's evidential basis is weaker than that of H,
and there is no other relevant dlflbrence beyond the different stakes at the
tinre of acquisition of the respective beliefs?
r. Wr>ultl
.j
rrsl ;r
.rr
That, nloreover, is cotupatible with the fact that what you krlow weii
fbr it to
enough for storage Inay rrof be sonlething yotl know well enough
so you
high.
provide a proper practical brsis for action whetr the stakcs are
inight know sornethin "flat oLlt" even ifyou do not know it well enough
to act on it when the stakes are high'
on the flip sicle is the apt Hail-Mary shot, or its intellectual correlates in
thought
the beliefs of our inraginecl Holnres or Eiustein. Your affirnrative
still
might be apt even when it is not even flat-out knowledge' It nright
reliable
admirably get it right through conlpetence, with a competence
thought
enough for speculative thought, or thinking in the dark' Yottr
mighi still tall short: it might not be reliable enough for storage' 11or'
acrdirrgly, reliable e'ougtr for human knorvledge, plain and sir'ple'
B. Knowledge andJudgment
Belief and lts l\elation toJudgment
a certain
Earlier we clisti'guished two varieties ofbelief; first, crredence above
confidence thresh<llcl; secouci, afltrntative judgnent or the corresponding
disposition
disposition, This latter "af{irttrative" variety is belief as a kind of
corquestion
to affirm alethically, itt thcr etrcleavor to auswer the pertinent
on/off act of
rectly, reliably .rro.,gl',, ancl incleecl aptly. Sr-rch afiirrtration is atr
is then
t)enial
rnincl.
judgrnent rhat takes place iD the privacy of the subject's
both
affirmation of the n*g.tiorr, ar1cl suspension is the itrtentional ornission
(while
provisional
be
either
carl
ofaflirmatio, a'cl of de'ial, an o'rission that
rnls of it. (Thus' denial of <p> is airnration of (not-P), ,rtd ,.trp"nsiotl on the questioll w|ethcr p is intentional
of denial
omission of affirnration that p, alone with intentional itntissiotl
private,
<lf
act
supposccl
that p.) Florv thcn shoulcl we ntakc, scrnse of tllc
affrrrrration? How nlore firlly lnd cxplic:itly shoulcl wc urrclcrstancl
'rental
is or rnight
this strpposccl:rct? Why sllr>ulcl wc s() nrucll us lltlw tllat tltcrc
could then be expiainecl in
te
bc :rtry stlclt?
Ljrrtlt'rli.rhly, llrt'r't' is of' (.()ur-s(. tlrt. .lr/.,t'l'.rr't
ttt,lt,
r8o
rt't firt
of-
ll.ttl',tl
rBr
social species. A newscaster or a teacher might assert with testimonial propriety even when they do not voice their own beliefs.'3 If the speaker plays
no role in any such epistenric institution, however, no such role as that of
newscaster or that of teacher, then their assertion is epistemically proper only
when it voices their own lrelief. Otherwise it would be irnproperly insincere.
But what sort ofbeliefis at issue here? Is it beliefas confident enough credence
or is it rather judgtnent, an act ofafiirrnation or a disposition to affirnr with the
aim ofafiirnring correctly, rvith truth, reliably enough, and indeed aptly?
Suppose such judgnrent to be r,vhat nrost directiy determines proper,
sincere public aflirmation. A speaker's afiirnlatiorl of what he does not n
this sense judge to be true wouid then involve an episternically improper
clash: what he is willing to say publicly then clashes with what he says to
hinrself nJitro interno.In orcler to avoid such inrpropriety, what the speaker
affirnrs publicly must conlport with what he rvould aflirnr to hinrself in the
privac:y of his own rnincl. Otherwise there would be either some speech
flaw, or sorne failure of sincerity. Fully epistenrically proper aflirmation
reqr-rires the avoidance of any such flaw or failure. It nrust express in unflawed speech what the speaker thinks (in act or disposition). The speaker
speaks with epistenric propriety only if he speaks as he thinks, with sincer-
r.j. As-fcnnitcr Lrckcy has ruecle clelr, irt her 1.t',tntirrq.lron Llbrd.s (Oxfbrcl: Oxfbrd University
l)rcss, :oolt) rnrl in crrllicr papr'r-s.
1.1 . llr t'ourrtinr-r:rs pi5rrrit'nv srrclr lirrgtristic flw'. I :rlr;rssrrllillg tht flaws in thc chrnnel
of'tt'slintrrrirtl r',rrtlrrurit.rtion s() ('()ur)1. Strpptlsc s()nl('()r'rc rttlkcs lul crr()r irr rrtatripttlat'ott
illg s\"tttlt,rlt ,ts tltr't tvolk ou[ .t Pttlof
lt.rpcl , ,r [)r-otrf lll(',ult to tlctcrllint' lrclicf'tltrorrgh
irttttir\', ltr tn\'\'r('\\, tlr.rt rr',trtll'l t.rttnt.r\.ur ('l)l\(('rrrtt fl,rrr'. (iorrrr,rlilrll', rtl'torrrt', r'Pistt'll t tt ll.rr!
s(
illll(
1il t l tllt't
r'lrl
',r rr l
r82
be proper expresstotl
requires by rvay of sincerity and avoidance of flaw would
thresh,;fi nr,lr,rc:e al,ouc a certain tlueslrcld ttf cotrfitlence. But what will set that
to himself in the
old? woulc1 it not be what the subject is rvilling to affrrm
privacy restrictiou'
endeavor to answer correctly? Maybe so, but why the
not just
why the restriction to what the subject affirms to hinrself? Why
otre faces the corunclerstand belief as a disposition to assert publicly when
ainr ofanswer*
responding qtlestion and one endeavors to answer it with the
then hold
coulcl
"lnute"
ing.orr"ctly? Well, for one thing' 11o one radically
Moreover, our answer itr terms of private affirmation is unaf-
any beiiefs.
factors might so
fected by the fact that epistenlically irreievant pragmatic
frnally' ours is tire
easily itrfluence what one is wiliing to say in public' Atrd'
conscious
account of belief that will nlost srrroothly bear on the subject's
theoretical
or
reasoning, as he invokes prernises in his practical deliberatioll
pondering, all ofwhich can take place in the privacy of his own thought'
which
be reduced
which it was fornred. After that point your accessible basis rvill
just
the fact
to whatever still supports your continuitlg to so believe, often
that you can
that you cio still believe as yon clo, along with the reliability
properly attribute to your relevrtlt lncnlory'
degree of confi*
Despite having acquirecl such a belief with a very high
well facle in tancler' with dwindling awareness of
dence, this confiJ"n..
'ray
later confrdence wiil align
one,s original basis for so believing. In fact, such
with sytrchronic connot with the original conficlence anci its basis but rather
r of that bclicf' What is
fidence in o'e's f ..serrt reliability on the subject nratte
This can
.rf ,.lirbility thet is appropritc fbr retetttit>rr of a trclit:f?
tire clcgre.
for rclirtrlc:c tln that
dif{er cruc:i;rlly f.ronr thc clcgrcc r>frcliatrility latcr reclttirccl
il llis ptrblic asscrbclicf eithcr i, tlrc strbjcc:t's privatc r'onsc:ious rc:asortillg tlr
privrrtcly
ti.rr. Wllilt ()rc is l:rtl.r.irrstifrctl i,
'r:rsscrtiltg
filr
'tltrlicly
()l) tllc;tttlottllt:rt stltkc
irtt(l
'rcrtrisirru
lr;rrrrl
tlt.pt.rl tlrt.ttres(ion.rt
'vill.f-t..trr.sc
rlt''tsst't'titlg'
()f
()t
s()
(
t('('rn('s\
l)l-('lrrisirrt
.rltt.st.ll'()l 0nt.', , ()nlnttillttV ilt tltt'
SOCJIAI, ROOTS
oF I{UMAN KNOWI-EDGE
r83
altogether. At that point one is still storing imnrensely nrany beliefs. What
determines whether a beliefis thus stored with epistemic propriety?
What is the use, the epistenric use, of such stored beliefs? Largely it is
the use they stili have even when we have forgotten the bases on which
they were initially stored, or retained over time. Howevero we do want our
beliefs to be reliable beyond some rnininrunr. We want to be able to appeal
to thenr properly at any arbitrary later tinrc rvhen they may becorne relevant.
So, we are allowed to store a belief when its basis endows it rvith at least
indefinite future, and the uses he rnay fincl for his stored beliefs. Even just
for an arbitrary subject in isolation fronr his group, some level of reliability
is required if he is to store a beliefwith episternic propriety. We would want
such a level in his stored beiiefs, so that we can in the indefinite future trust
those stored beliefs to have that level given just their storage in his nlenlory.
What is pragnratically at stake in a particular situation can vary enornrously, ofcourse, and the degree ofreliability required in a beliefworthy of
trust as a basisfor action will depend on the stakes in that particular situation.
Consider extraorclinary situations where the stakes are abnornraily high
and where reliability is at a prenriunr. These nlust be distinguished from
ordinary situations with normal stakes, A reasonable degree of reliability is
required for trormai questions in orclinary situations of quotidian interest.
f his is the degree of reliability requirecl for ordinary human knowledge.
As the stakes rise, we need knowledge above such ordinary epistenr,ic quality. We now need knowledge for sure (or for more sure). And we cannot
.jtrst draw a belief fronl storage and trust it simply on that basis, once we are
ilt a cotrtext that dernands additional reasons fbr trust. These special reasons
c'ould take eithcr of two fornrs. They coulcl anronnt to first-<lrder reasons
syrtr:hrotric-ally irr view for a cerrtain answer to our high-stakes qrlestion, or
rlrc:y c:oulcl anrottnt rather to special reasons ft>r lrelicving that we are particul:rrly rclirblc on such strbjcc:t nrattcr,'uvllcn situutccl as wc arc, when we
t l lcll consirlt'r' ort t' tttt'stior r.
Srlt'lr cortlcxts, \v('s.ry. r-r'tuirc';rl'urrrrrrrllly lriglr rcirs()n fir"rrusr.
llut rvlr,rt is tlrrr "tru\l"l I Iou, tlo u,r' rrr,rnrf i'st oru' tt'ust in .r lriqlr st.rkr.s
r84
IlJ
judge affirmatively
situation? Do we nratrifest it by what we are willing to
so' then the stakes
If
even to ourselves in the privacy of our owu thoughts?
what we relevantly believe'
clo afterall affect what we know, for tirey affect
However, one cannot alu,ays take a speaker's say-so on trust, rnaking tlrc
knowledge so attained actionable. It depends on the question and situ;rtion, ancl rvhat is at stake. As the stakes rise, so do the requirenrents prr>pcrly
inrposed on speakers in determining how worthy they are of our trust in
the specific situation, and whether their testinrony yields knowledsc tlr;rt
is relevantly actionable. The normal hunran reactiorl is to accept testirrrorry
at face value, even without specific knowledge of the speaker's credcnti;rls.
Compare how rnemory operates unirnpeded, properly so, even oncc tlrt'
subject's awareness of the initial basis fades and disappears. This is lrow il
is for the great bulk of our body of beliefs. This is how it must bc, siv.'n
human linritations. It rvould be cognitively clisastrous always to relinrlrrislr
that way'
what we are willing to guess privately, to ourselves, is affected
tnere heightthe
that
deny
Even more plausibly, moreover, lve might
in the
ening of the practical stakes affects what we are willing to afiirm
our awareness oftheir source clwindled, or to reject all tcstimony unsupported by known credentials. We are built to retain belicfl cvcn
after we have lost arvareness of their initial basis ancl of how reliable thrr lr;rsis
rnay have been. And we are built to trust testimonv absent special reusons fir'
endeavor
thresftold set by
still willing
for our lives or evell just for ottr cornfbrt. On this view, we are
considerirlg
while
to thi.k, ancl eveu ,,, ,.y, that the ice is solid enough'
our judgrnent
this too uncertain to justify relevaut action' What is ntoreo
evelt constitute ordinary, conlnlollsense knorn4eclge, even though
rnight
one's
The consiclerations bearing thtis otr the nrnemonic charrel fronl
channel fronl
past self to one's present selfapply sinrilarly to the testitnonial
wlrt> spc:tks in
one subject to anothcr. when we take at his r,'ord solllcollc
prclc:pistctttic
rvit|
his owl pefson, wc (:ilt) very oftc |clievc accorclitrgly
(:lll) lls:icrt tlltls irl
pricty, .cl rvc, cllll rcas()rr prac:ticully orr tll:rt blsis, ltltcl wc
tllc tcstificr is
ll.ppclls,
t,rll wllcll spcukillg ill .ur ()wll l)crs()ll. Wllcrl tlris
;ttltl
.ftc., vrit.irg lris stor-r.tl lrclict, ont'sr,,r't'tl ,ur,l rt't.tilrctl t't'li;rlrly t'ttottglt,
tlrt.st.,k..t ,'.)llttllllttit,tt('\
lllpl'11'rtll'trt
tllt'll("ll('1"
beliefs
as
soon
as
distrust.
r8
it
afflrmation.
in a nornrai
context for such afTirmation? What is required at least for affirmation to oneself? Is this degree of confldence the sanre as the degree required for proper
synchronic affirmation to an interlocutor? This is rrrade inrplausible by how
nrisleadirrg public affirmation can be, if speaker and hearer each knows that
the other knows the stakes to be high. In such a case, confrdent assertion is
likely to convey notjust rvhere one takes the truth to lie, but also rvhere one
takes it to lie surely enough to rnake our knowledge relevantly actionable.
Consider the need to guide oneself individually while allowing for one's
cognitive and mnemonic linritations. Consider also our need to guide ourseives cooperatively, with proper allowance for those sanre linritations.
Some threshold of reliabiiity is thus recluired for storing our guiding beliefs,
so that our continuing disposition to affirtrr will satisfy that nrininral degree
ofreliability. This requires the subject's ability to remenrber without exces'W'e
rnust guard against a nrenlory that reduces reliability
sive distortion.
belorv the required nrininrum when the belief is later drar,vtr fronr storage
in a normal setting.
We need a store of beliefs,, of stored dispositions to aflirrn to oneself or
to others in nornral settings: i.e., rn ordiuary settings of hutnan reasoning
or cornrnunication. (iiven human stor;rge lirnitations, we canrlot always or
even often store awarelless of hcxv our beliefs are initially acquirecl, nor carr
we retain a running awareness of their crontinuing basis. Morerover, what is
nrost relevant to our epistemic cooperatioll is the act of assertion, nornrally
just flat-out assertion. This is how propositions can figure as prenrises of
reasoning, practical or theoretical. Propcr cooperation requires sinccrity,
nloreover, "sincerity" t,, oneself (avoidance, frrr exanrple, of wishful thinking) and sincerity to interlocutors.
What then
r87
ro aflirttt.
Wlllt
( l.lnlltttillir.,ltivt,,lr-ts.il.t.
r88
society.
t'it's (lt.rrr is krrrtrvlcrlrlt'. Yt'l \v(' (,ul still ;tssr.'ss lrrlrt.ul ('()nununit'.t(ivc' .tt'ts
rvitlr.rul r'orrnnltttrrr', to ,urv tlislin('tt\,(' firr.rl t'.)lnntunit',ttir''t' r,,tlttt'. So wt'
r8g
tant for hurnan flourishing, for the flourishing of individuals and for the
flourishing of groups. This does not require that there be any distinctive
connlunicative final value. It requires only that conlnrunication be a sufficiently important component ofenough human ways offlourishing, which
can take nlany and various fornrs. It is hard to irnagine a flourishing human
life that will not involve conrnlunication in some inlportant ways at some
stages at least of that life. Moreover, conrmunication enables flourishini not
only instrunrenrally, but even constitntively, as shorvn by the place of comrtrunication in hunran relationships. No human society can flourish while
deprived entirely of conrnrunication. But from this it hardly follows that so
tlruch as a singie act ofconrmunication need have any final value distinctiveiy
its own, or indeed any final value of its own at all. Much less does it follow
that all successful acts of comnrunication nlust have sonre such final value.
Just so, hurnatr knowledge is at least as irnportant for human flourishing
cornrnutricatiou, both for the fl<lurishing ofirrdividual lives, and for the
collective flourishing of groups. But this no nrore requires any distinctive
episternic final value thatr does the irnportance of comrnunication require
any distittctive cotnnlLlllicative final value. It is required at most that
knowledge be an important conlpolrent of enough hunran ways of flourishing, which can take many and various fornrs. We have found it difticult
to imagine a flourishing human life or society that wiil not involve conlnlunication in sotlle important ways. Sinrilarly, it is hard to inragine a flourishing hunran life or society deprived entirely of knowledge. Knowledge
of various sorts will sureiy figure as a conrponent of the flourishing of individual lives and of the flor-rrishing of human beings irr groups.
But is it really true that hunran flourishing requires knowledge in the
ways suggested? We face the A,[enoproblern and its variations. Why is knowlcclge better than nrerely subjectively corllpetent belief? Why is knowledge
bctter than ntcrely true belief? Well, conrpare this: Why is well-based haprilrcss or plcasure bcttcr than thc ccltrally subjectively pleasarlt tone of the
strbjcct ilt alt crrcricncc ntcllinc vic:tinlize:d by a controlling clemon? The
liti'ttfsttt'll rt llctlonit'vir'tinr is no nr()r'c u florrrislrins hunrrur life than is
rllc illttsory lifi'of'rt Mrlr-ix tlwt'llcr, wlrit'lr in,lr'ctl r'rn itsclf inc:luclc nluc:h
as is
rlltrsory or f .tlst'rlt'.rsurt'. I'lrt'srrIrjcr'ti,,'r't'lr,rr'.rr't('r'\v(,rrltl lrt.r'...rlr.rrotrglr, of('()lll-s(', 1rrrt its t onlt'nt tvorrl,l lr.' rllu\(\r'v ltont'lll,'1.'sr. Vl, tints ol t.\lrr.r'it,nr
t,
rgo
SOCJIAI, ROOTS OF
ls
I9I
is bad sirnply
becattse one does not know its first premise. After all, only what one knows
can properly be used as a prentise in such practical reasc>ning. So that's why
the argunlent is bad. Its first prenrise cannot properly be used for good
enough reasoning in line with that argunrent.
'We
are supposed thereby to have a rcASOn to reject that a lottery proposition such as I can be known. However, consicler the practical syllogisrn that
continues the argurrletlt
If one knows that oing is the best thing for one to do now (r>ut of its relevatrt
reference class of options), does otre act wrotrgly if one does not o? What if
one also knows that there is a non-zero objective ch.ance (reiative to otle's
basic evidence) that oins is not best, ancl incleed that there is a tron*zero
objective chance that oing will be horrenclously bad. What if by conrparison what one knows is that only a mitrtrscule nrargin ofvaiue is secured by
oing? By hypothesis one knows that oing is best, so eiin is of cottrse best,
and in fact those horrendolls cronsequences will not ensue upon one's oing.
It ntight still be appropriate for one to hedge olle's trets, hou'ever, by rtot
aing.Just consider the ellorlnous rirk that one runs by oing, wheu this risk
is assessed relative to one's basic relevaut evicletrce.
Suppose for exarrrple that one knows one's ticket to have lost, cvetr without having seell the lottery results. Is it now appropriate fbr one to sell
one's ticket for a penny, since this will nrean a nt:t gain over the other relevant options? But rvhat if one knows that otre 's irascible partner will react
very badly if in fact one's ticket has wotr and one has solcl it frrr a penny.
Or suppose one knows or believes justifiably that God would punish with
eternal darnnation those whose actions turn out so baclly? Wcluld otle act
appropriately by disregarding the objective chance (relative to one:'s basic:
evidence) of such untrward rcsr-rlts? Suppose oue actecl in accord with what
one knows to be best, however srnall rtray be its rrrargin clflpositive valttc.
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
-s.
Ifit
as
fbllows:
is best for llte to sell nry ticket for a penny, then I shall so sell nry ticket.
EPISI'EMIC AGENC]Y
squash it at the end ofyour fall. A doctor's nrallet can nrake a patient kick a
nurse if the nurse is in the way ofthe reflex kick. So, the patient does some-
q#
thing (by kicking the nurse) even if it is not (in a relevant sense) a doing of
his, oue attributable to hirn as his owll doing. He exercises no real a;ency
by kicking the nurse, or by kicking at all on that occasion. The passivity
that is relevant to our project is epistemic passivity. The nature of this passivity will soon emerge.
Epistemic Agency
ism'
to norntativitY, fre eclonr, reasons, conlp etenc e, ancl skeptic
r. our
derive from
f..jy
193
fllere doings,
The region at the opposite extrerne contains suft^erings arld
fall passively
you
where the doer is relevantly passrve. If pushed off a cliff'
a rabbit passively if you
despite how fast you nray be uroving, ancl you kill
two frarneworks. There is, first, the strict deontic framework, which
presLrpposes free, intentional cleterrnination, such as that involving free
c:hoices and free judgments. Ilut there is, secondly, a more loosely deontic
.fitttctirtnal franrework containing no freely and intentionally determ"ined
cncleavors.
tlrcrc distirrr-Tuislr pcrfonn;u)('cs tlrtt ckr fl-orn th<lsc tltrrt do rrot s:rtisf:y at
.We
lc:ast
nrininr;rl st,urtl.u'..ls lirr rrr)l)('r'('l)i\tr'uit'()[)cr'.ltion. lior filnt'ri<lnul pcrfilrnr.u('('s rvt'lt't'l rl() l',l.llitrrtlr', r'r'st'lrtnlt'nt, ()r iuly srtt'll rt';tr'tivc t'nltltion.
EPISTEMIC AGENC]Y
194
'We
find expression in the praise that is correiated with blarne. Yes, there is a
broacler "praise" that requires only favorahle evaluati<ttt, and aligns as nruch
with adlriration as with the assessnlent of agency. We can distinguish the
praise or blarne that applies strictly only to the free agent from broader correlates appliclble also to the functional agent. Agents who nlerely function
are subject to flaws or faults, rathcr than to sitrs or infractiorts or otirer violations that presuppose fieedonr and intention.
o'praise"
However, we neecl not contnrit to any linguistic theses about
or "blare" or their proper or strict application. It is enotrgh to distinguish
the strict cleotic: attitudes frorn nlorc broaclly assessing attitudes, however
these rnay frnd expression in strict Engiish.'
The looser deoltic franrework still reqttires functionin[ls, assessable as
proper or not. Rational functionings, itt particular, involve rational tnotivation ofa sort. Here one func:tions in a ce rtaitr way based ou nrotivating re:tsons,
reasons-f v wlich one functions as one does.r Wherl the line in our exanrple
seets to nte longer than an inch, I function a c:ertain way, just as much as
when I kick t[e nurse because of the, doctor's nrallet. True. it is a passive sort
of functioning. I anr helplessly attracted to assessitrg the lirte as over au inch
z. I have distiguishecl between the re;rctive rttitudes that apply in the tegiotr of freedonr, ancl
our appr-ovai ancl ilisapproval in tire region of fnnctiolrings. ()rantcc1, "praise" crrtl tttarch
in step'rvit| acln"riration, rvhich wotrlcl ,rnt p."tuppose free agency. Arltl rve do extencl talk
.rr.n of "bl, te",fdrbeyond the repion of 1redonr, as when r,ve "blatne" a r'eak strut fbr the
an
collapse of a briige. Aircl there is also the bearing of ftrliy blatrre'r,vorthy negligence . Take
giues f,-.e rein to his unrellective attitudes although he shotrld have beeu urore
,.ihot,ghttiri." W.'c19 blare this agent, but we clo not necessarilv blarrre himsimply fbr havi,tg ,cie,i ill line with iris unreflectivc' anirlral-level beliefl nd clesires. We blar-ne hillr trrore
f,,iiy b...urc of the neeligence of rvhich he is "gtrilty." More over, when he propcrly does not
,g.rri ."ho
r95
region are
lssessrble
or
in our nriddle
(but ot here), such sensitivrty and neglieetrce resicie in the region of fi-eedorlr.
eu"r, iirue clo nor really need thein, the fbliorving linqttistic
-3. gri,r,
plausibly,
"praise"
epistcnric firnctioning on arrtonratic
tt'ltllr!t't
rg6
EPISTEMIC AGEN(]Y
EPISTEMIC AGENCY
are now ipterested in episternic assessillent, itl assessnrent ofjudgments and other cognitive states in respect of the sort of norlnative status
that is constitutive of knorvledge. This is a certaill sort of status that a true
belief needs in orcler to constitute knowleclge, whether at the aninral or at
the reflective level.a How calt we stop the regress of justification for rational
I passivity.
lr;lvc l(),rkt..l l,,r sUtlt.t \t,tlU\;llll()llri ()tll l)l';l(tit';rl rtttittltles. lrl tlrciI sc;tl'<'ll tirt:l
t(.1"t('s\ \t()l)[)rrl,i \l,rla\ llr<'1, t,tr',' ltt tt'tl l() l)l,ll"lll.ltl( .ltllltltlt't. I ,llll ll()t rrlvst'll rt't'tttlttlt'tl
.1. S()rrrc
tlr.rttlrl',(,llll1l\'('tlslltt'ttsltltt'llloll()ltllrlttttll\'(llll('l('\llll('l)l\lt'tttttlt''l't'tt'trrtt'11''t'ris
S"llt"'l't-l"t'r|ltt'tt'
l(llll( lll',llllr.tllott'lltt'l'rrrtl'rt1'rt''tt'rltllltcillt'ltttllr
r97
Our project being epistenlological, such regress stoppers must be nonfunctionally passive in episternic respects. An itch might be functionaliy
assessable as appropriate by callirrg for scratching, which might serve sorne
biological purpose. But the itch is not assessable epistenrically if it does nor
serve any epistenric purpose. So it is not the sort of thing that could have
epistemic status, not even episternic functional status, much less epistemic
free-agential status. Conrpatibly with all of that, however, it might still
serve as a regress-stopping basis for a proper episternic functionins, if the
subject immediately gains propositional awareness of his itch based rationally on nothing other than the itch itself. 'What makes hinr properly aware
of the itch is the self:presenring itch irself.
As with endeavors, so with firnctionings. It is no nlore plausible that
there could be a whole set of functiorrings each epistemically justified
entirely through rational support by other rnenrbers ofthe set. Foundational
endcauors woulcl be deprived of rational nrotivating bases to explain their
status as rational. Such endeavors would hence seerrl arbitrary and thus ircational. Foundationalfuncttuings do not share that same problenratic status.
Involving no choice at all, they invoive no arbitrary choice. Consider, however, a set of credences of various degrees of confidence, functional states
not chosen freely by the subject. It is nrost inrplausible that such a set could
attain the fu11 episternically nornlative status pertinent to knowledge sirnply in virtue of the rationai interrelations of its rnenrbers, in isolation fronr
the external world that determines their status as true or as false.
Given, self-presenting states have long had a prominent role in episternology. No doubt we can know directly when lve suffer an itch or a pain. We
need not obtain this knowledge rnerely through inference fiorn other things
'"ve knorv. This is fourrdational knowledge. Horv are we to understand its
special status? How can it have this status rvithout the support of reasons?
C.
t. l\cusorts ('onlc in at lcst tw() sorts: thc' f;rctivc ancl the stative. (lonsider
l f trcl qirul{c. IIort, rlocs;r rcltling trcr-on)c son)conc's rc:rs()n ft>r a irclief (r>r,
:lltcrnrttivcly, firr ;t positivc t'rcrlcncc: firr r positivc dcgrcc of <'onfidcncc)
.tlrottt tlrc;un()unt of-lirt'l r'('nr.rirrirrr?'l'lrt'strlrjct't ncctls to lrr':rw:rrc oitlr,.'
lr'.rrlittrl. .tlrtl tltis ,ttt,,u('n('\\ (.ur tlt,.'r r.'r\'(' ,t\ ,r st.t(ivt' t.rlion,rl lr,rsis firr .r
EPiSTEMIC AGENCY
rg8
belief (credence). What fornr nright this awareness take? It often takes the
form of a belief (or creclence), and this belief (credc'nce) can then combine
with other beliefs (;redences) or with pro-attitlldes so as to ground further
beliefs or pro-attitudcs. This is the fornr guidance can take through inferential reasoning, practical or theoretical.
The fact that one is in pain is of course a factive reason for belief (or credence, or confidence) that one is in pain. Getrerally if a fact is to ground a
belief, one neecls sotlte awareness ofit. But awareness that arnoullts to belief
that one is in pain wouid be useless in the present instance, since you would
need to have been guided alreacly in the fornration of the relevant belief.
This is why such facts or their truth*nrakers mttst be self-presenting if they
are to do their foundational work.
lt
guidance the way factive reasons nornrally do so, nanrely through prior
cognitive a\ /arelless of them (via which they are presented), through sonr.e
prior beliefor credence. So the question retnains as to the kind of awareuess
of them that
should not be viewed on an act-object nroclel, where the doing has a separable object. Rather, the jurnp isjust the jurnping in a certaiu w|o the kick
is the kicking in a certain way, anci likewise for the sntile, etc. Sinrilarly,
_S.
This is 6t to srr[scl'ibc to lr r.rrlicrrl ttlvcrbil thcory. sirlt'c tllc "wily irt rvhicll ytltt cxpcricttt'c
u,4rcll yetr cxrcrie nt't.u visu;rlcxpclir.rrt'c rrr;ry rctrrirc tlrc lrostirrgof';r rlopositiollrrl t tllltcllt. Tllis
glrr,r1,,,',riri,r,r,ri r'rurtcnt rn;ri'[',c l.rlsc, lror,"'t""'ct., so tlt;tt tllcl'c is tttl tl'rltll-tll:tkt't.to fitltr'tiorl rts tllc
'onc"s
cr lrcl it'r rt r'. 'l'lrc rlorosit ior r;t l t olt ct tt is l tot lltt"'oltct t" cit llo'. Wc tlotl't scrrs<lIi11'
.,1.,c,.t of
t()nl('ltt\. l{,rtlrcr, tlrt'rr()l)()\lll()ll.ll (()llt('lll lirvt's tlrt'(()llt('llt' ltot tltt'
cspcrrt'lttc
[)t'()l)()sttr,,lr.rl
1r[r1.tl.,rlllrt.t.rpt.rrt.rt'.Il()\lltl,,tlr,.'tt,r()\rlr(,ll,tl.,,t1.'tlll\('\\('llli.rllotlrt'rr'.tYttl('\l]('ll('ll(lllrl
Irrr,,,lVt.,lrrrllrt.lt.rvrrr',,,ltlr,rl\(n\ot\'('\l)('ll('t)(.',rr'lll,llt.'t',llt.tVt'tt,rtrlrt'tl\\'ll,ll\()('\'('1.
EPISTEMIC AGENCY
19g
a state is
not
I.
Let us pausc ancl step back. We have posited various nrental states as cognitively rclcvant ancl takcr) note of thc cognitive nrincl-world relations that
(r.
Ilcrc l ;rll tlirkirrg ol'rr n,lr"nl;rl (.irsc, r()t tlr;t ol'st'lf -irllit tctl prrins, ',vlricll irrtl'otluccs irrclcv;lllt ( ()tlr[)lit ,rliOils.
'7. ()tll lt\'lr,rrlt.rtt,ltl.tr'r1l11' ts.rktn lo tltt'srt'.klt',1 lrt'r pr,tltlt.rn lirr uir,,cnrst ilrtcrrrrrlisnt.
Artolrlt'trrof tlttssort.rlrrllt'slrol lrl()('\l)('r ,'r,.'lt,rrt',llrt'ltt'1 ,)l(t('(l('ll(,'.rl,,,ut lllt'stt.t. lrt.lolt'
zoo
EPISTEMIC AGF,NCY
EPISTEMIC AGENCY
they enable. At one end are passive doings and other self-presenting nrental
states. These attract the subject to assent willy-nilly. They could properly
give rise to such attractiotr irr either of two ways. 'What onc is attracted to
believe is perhaps that one is in such a state, as when a headache attracts one to
believe that onc x{Jbrs a headachc. One thus seenrs to suffer a headache and it is
precisely the suffering ofthe headache that properly gives rise to the seeming.
Does one have r reason for that seeming, a reason for which one is then
attracted to accept that one suffers a headache? Surely one does, yet one's
being attracted for that reason does not require a separate awarelless that one
mttdus
one could collle to beiieve that one does ache, or at least to be attracted
to believe accorclingly. This is out of the question, since it would require that
one have already formecl the belief that one aches. Rather, the rational basing
must involve as a basis the headache itsele which nrust provide the motivating
basis for the seemiug, for the attraction to assent. This attraction must then
vie with whatever else rnight bear motivationally on rr''hat to think about
whether one is in pain (as opposed to discomfort). Out of the clash of such
vectors a resultant rvill enrerge (including as a linritins case the null vector).
That resultant vector will correspond to a resultant seeming or attraction.
Concerning the headache, the resultant vector will be a credence ofa certain
magnitude, perhaps a positive credence with high nragnitucle.
That is one way in which one rnight properly derive a credence with
high rnagnitude. But one rnight do so in a quite different wa|, where the
mental state that attracts one to asserlt has itself a propositional content. It
nright for exinrple be a visttal experience as if one sees a white and square
surface. Now one nray be attracted to accept notjust that one has such a vistual experience, but also that one does see such a surface. And again we need
to aliow that the visual experience can be self*presenting, so that its sheer
presence can provide a rational basis for the corresponding seerning that
one sees such a surface. That is to say, its ability to attract our assent need
not be rnediated by propositional awareness of it in turn. Seernings that are
based thus perceptually or experientially nright then vie with other rational
forccs-rational seemings or attrctions to assent. ()ut c>f this clash wotrlcl
emerge a resultant seerlrinq, a c:redencc whose nr;rgnituclc c'an lrc high.
p()nens
z. Wc llavc
201
your high degree of confidence-of your credence of high nragnitudeand apply a policy that calls for afiirming that p basecl on such a credence?
Might you apply your poiicy through a practical sylloisnr?
No, that is a blind alley. As we have seen already, all three ofthe Agrippan
options are precluded if we restrict ourselves to the region of endeavors.
Free judgntents cannot gain epistemic status arbitrarily, with no rational
basis for the gain. Nor can there be a set of free judgnrenrs each of which
derives its epistemic propriety entirely through rational basing upon other
rnernbers of the set. It does not really nratter whether the set is finite (the
case of circularity) or infinite (the case of infinite regress). In neither case is
it plausible that such a set could attain, in that purely set-internal way, epistemic propriety for its urember beliefs. In neither case could those n1en1ber beliefs attain thus the required episternic justification, a specific sort of
trortnative status required in a belief if it is to constitute knowledge. That
is to say, in neither case would such a status be attained-through such
nlere nrutttal interrelation-for the set's rnember beliefs. It is particularly
implar-rsible that such status could be earned in that set-internal way for
beliefs about an external world beyond the subject's nrind, despite the isolation of the whole set frorn that surrounding world. And the reievant "isolation" is the rational-basis isolation that would deprive onr fiee judgments
of any epistenric reliability.
But why should that spoil the practical syllogisnr for explaining how
judgments cran be formed freely and foundationally?
Here is why. 'We saw earlier why rationally supportive states are
lteeded beyond freely deternrined judgnrents. We need such reasons, so
as to escape foundational arbitrariness. But once we see why we need
such regress stoppers, it is clear why we nrust restrict how a free judgrnent can be "properly based" on such a reason. This basing cannot be
of the sort that involve s juclgnrental awareness of the basis, along with
belief that such a basis brings with it the truth of the belief to be based on
it. Tlris would involve modus pottcns reasoning, with freely judged premiscs arld a freeiy judged cove ring belief. And that rvould not escape the
rcsiolt tlf frcccloltt it-l the rvay rcquired. We would still need to consider
tlrc cristcrlllit'status r>Fthc frccly trcigccl prcnrises (and perhaps also that
of tlrc f rccly.j u rlucrl r'ovcri rr scr lcr:rl i za tior r).
Stl tlt;rt ('itttlrot lrt'r'iglrt. lnstr';rtl, lvc;rlrc;rl to tlrc fiurr'tionll statc itsclfts
,r r';rtion;rllr.rsis. Wt.sr.ur tlrt'tlivitlr.[rr.trvt'r'n tlrc rt.gion of-fi-ccrlonr:urrl tlrc
I't'tiot of'littt( lt(tnurrl\ Wc ltrr',rl..t',r lcl,r(iorr ol r,rliorr,rl l,rsirrri tlr,rt ,rll,,rt,s
r)
EPISTLMIC ACHN(,Y
a basis
f<rr a free
of freedorn.
8. What seenls here strbpersonal is the process wherreby olre is attrrrctetl t<l asscnt tcl thc relcvtnt
propositional content. The atmaction itselt'ofcourse rteetl not be stttrpersonal. Stilllacking irr
this crse is any crxpcricri1 statc analoqorrs lo onc's visu:rl expcricrrcc lrs of'a firc, siry, rlr l llrtntl,
etc. Very plausibly one nriqht insi-st tht rrtl r'licf'cart bc jtrstificd grorrntllcssl),, rvllich'uvr>trltl
seerrr particularly pllrrrsible whcn rrrplicrl to frtr{rrttctrl,t/ (:rs oprosctl to frnctior.rl) bclicf.
Tlrcre wotrLl always llc u rrior ittlclltltttl rr'r'rtrittg ()r'irttru('ti()n t() ;r\scr)t, olr'tlct.rclt.tlrlc fi'oltr
the firll-tlcdrcd l)clicf , sirlr.c r'oll;rtt'r;rl rcrsonirrg rrriglrt llrr"'r'blot kt'..1 till l,clrcl, ;rs rvitll tllc
solrrtion t() ir l);u';t(l()x. likc tlrc I i,rl or tllc Solrtt's. Altlr,rrrrilr I t,rkc tltis to lrc tlrt' rrglrt r,ir'rv ol
tlrc Itt:(tcr', I sttlrpt-t'rs i( lrt'r't'fill'.r strrlrlt'r ('\l)()\rll()n, ()n('ln,rtlrli.rlrlt'ul,lut'(()ur\('tlll() tl)('
rrt,rr
203
EPISTEMIC AGEN(]Y
204
EPISTEMIC AGENCY
his story would not thereby attain a status required for knowledge, that of
competently justified belief. And this carlnot be remedied simply through
the addition of nrembers, of further beliefs, not even unto infinity.
The rernedy favored by many requires relations to g;iven, self-presenting
states in the region of epistemic passivity. We do seern to stop the regress
ofjustification through such foundations, since these given, self-presenting
states are not of a sort to be justifiecJ, nor do they need to be justified in order
to provide justification for further credences or beliefs based upon them. We
might moreover thereby obtain the required relation to the world beyond
belieft and credences, since such self-presenting states are thernselves part of
that world beyond, ancl since they rrght in acldition provicle a reliable channel to the world altogether external to the subject's nrind.
3. Even if that all seems right, what does not seenl right is that only through
the postulation of stich foundationally basing, self-presenting mental states
could we secure the relevant relations of truth reliability to the world beyond
our nrinds. Might there not be subpersonal nrechanisms that equally reliably
relate our beliefs to that external world? Cases of biindsight and of tirrr,e perception show this to be rnore thanjust a collc:eptuai possibility.'
Moreover, we now have reason to reconsider the status of contentful
'We
had placed these in the region of epistemically
sensory experiences.
non-functional passivity, where the sutrject is in no $/ay an epistertric agent.
That region supposediy lies beyond the region of epistenric functionings, sonle rationally rnotivated by others, even if no mere functioning is
freely determinerl. But now we have found reason to countetrance such
finctionings-of the blindsighted, for exanrple, and of our titrre perceivers-that have no basis in the region ofpassivity, since they are based on no
proper nrental states at all. Thus. the credences of the blindsighted requirc
no nlental basis at all. They derive rather fronr sttbpersonal states involving
transmission of energy from the environnrent through the subject's receptors and his brain and nervous svstenr, where this all happens subpersonally
yet in soille way that is episternically cronrpctent ancl truth reliablc.
205
Such subpersonally conrpetent credences can thus gain proper epistemic sta-
tus, and can provide an epistenr.ic basis for further credences, and eventually'
even for free judgments. Contentful sensory experiences rre hence not properly
consigned to the region ofpure epistemic passivity; they deserve a place in the
region of functionings. For they too derive fronr subpersonal inputs through
the subject's brain and rlervous systenr, and they too can be nlore or less truth
conlpetent, There is hence no rational obstacie to locating them in the region
of functionings, along with credences and seernings, even if these latter distinctively involve concepts. Credences (and seenrings), it is true, distinctively
involve sonle stricter application of concepts. They rnight hence still deserve to
be distinguished fronr sensory experiences, irt that their contents are immediateiy available to serve as premises for conscious reasoning. Experiences by contrast may not be inrnrediately available for such conlpetent reasoning, not even
throtigh the use ofdenronstratives.'o This is a lesson ofthe speckled hen probiem.
Nevertheless, experiences can still be conrpetentiy veridicai, manifesting thus a
kind ofperceptual competence on the part ofthe perceiver. This distinguishes,
for exarnple, those with good, sharp vision frotn those not so well endowed.
F. The Self-Presenting
We earlier found a stopping place for the regress of justification r,vith passive
states, physical pains anrong thern. "Pains do have propositional content,"
cornes the reply, "anLl can hence be assessed episternically at least to the
sanle extent as perceptual experiences." This controversial issue we can
avoid, ifwe make sonle further distinctions.
ro. Take
9. Morcovcr, ()ur sirrrrlcst llclicli ol'lorit. ;tritlltttc(it., .urrl g('()nl('trv plovitlc lttltllcr c.\iltlllllcs rvlrcrc firtrrrl:rtiorrrl [rclit'l\,r(t.rrrr t'pis(t'rrrit.jrrstrfir'.rtroll rvrtlt nrt lrt'lp fiorrr lrrc-lrclit'l
scll' rrcst'trlirr11, grvcn lrrclrt,rl \l,tt('\. Mr'rt' rtrrlt'tsl.rntlirrr', tl.rrrrrltlr' lit\'('\ ttt tltt' .l( ( ('\\
rr
l,l,'t
lrt'ltt'ls.
Ptrrr'111'11
llrt is n ot v; ilrrblc t () \'()lr. A s yott look ;r\\ly ll'olrl t llc stltt iqglc 'tltrr priclr belief is accessible
llrrorrglr "tlrt'stlrrigglt' I.irrst ostt'rrrlt'rl " or tltc likc. lly ('()ntr:tst, I t'ltrl filrget lttxv I rcqtrirerl
rrrr,lrclicf rvi(ll n.r rlt'trilrrcnt to rls lirll (()r)l('nt tlt;( I t;ur n()w lc(:rilt il) st()t'rlg('. I lrriglrt fitl'
t'x.rrrrtl.'l('l.ilD.ttl illrl)r)lt.tnl r('lll',t()lt\ lrt'lrt'l ttl tlrr'r'lli'r t tll.t ilrl.ttltt's Ol tll,rt l)irltclr) ilr'('
u'ortlrl'()l \'('n('r.rlrr)n Ilrr'lolllr('r \or t ol stllnl,,ill, lt,'lt<'1, u'rtlr rts ltrrlcll'.lctt,trlslr,rtivt'/
I,1,'tt.,tI ,,,trl('nl. \\, 'ultl ur',ulltr r,'nl lV n,rttl ',lr,tut 1,,',lY r'l lrcltt l',
t
206
EPIS'I'IrM
EPIS'I'EMIC] AGENCY
IC AGEN(lY
as bases
207
lowly with no
2. The fallback, fuller answer is one that can apply to all three itertrs: to
representational content?
3. Of
will
lr.rst's
firr fin'tllt'r'bc'lit'fi
less
irnpor-
tant whether there are nlany, or even any, occuparlts ofthe region ofpassivity.
Here is what now seenrs the crucial point for our project: For epistemological purposes we can suspend judgrnent on whether the region of passivity
is ernpty or not. Actually, this had already seenred a relatively unirnportant
question, since even blindsighters can stop the regress while devoid of any
relevant passive states on which they can epistenrically base their beliefs. It is
cornpetence that really nratters fundanrentaliy, by stopping the reryess when
the competence is foundational and does not iuvolve rational basing.
208
EPlSTEMlC] AGENCY
preferable to the other. From the tirn"e we choose which shoe to put on first as
we arise in the mornin4, to the tinre we choose which to renove first as we
retire, we face such choices at nrany turns. C)n many options f?lcecl in an ordinary day, nroreover, even when there are good reasons in favor of choosing a
certain way (unlike the case of the shoes), there will often be countervailing
reasons, and it will be up to usjr,rst how to strike a balance.
The case ofjudgrnent is different fronr that of choice in that there is no
'When tire weight of the evidence
such thing as proper arbitrary judgnrent.
favors neither the aflirmative nor the negative, one cannotjudge arbitrarily,
not properly. One nust rather suspencl. When the balance of reasotrs favors
neither choosing to put the right shoe on first nor choosing not to do so,
however, one can properly choose either way, arbitrarily.
That is one reason why it rnight seenr initially that the scope for free
choice far exceeds the scope for free judgrnent. It nright seem that there is
no scope for proper arbitrary judgrnent rn'hereas there is plenty of scope for
proper arbitrary choice. Since we are bound to be rational except when special forces drive us to irrationality, we are thus apparently forced to juclge as
we do whenever we do judge. Either we are subject to the force of reason,
or we are subject to some irrational force, to sonle bias, perhaps, or to sonr.e
culturally derived superstition. Choice and judgnrent difrer in that regard.
Choice can be very broadly arbitrarl without being irrational, so it can be
freely nrade with no need of force whether rational or irrational.
That does reveal a vast difference betweett choice and judgment in
respect of freedom. Nevertheless, we enjoy broad freeclonr both for choice
'We
need only recall how often we freely conclude deliband forjudgnrent.
'We then decide whether to accept that the balance
pondering.
eration or
of reasons sufficiently favors either side over the other, Very often, on issues
both weighty and trivial, it is up to the agent which way to turn.
EPISTEMiC AGENCY
209
of the deep general beliefs acqr-rirecl through norrnal child developrnent and
of our constant flow ofperceptual beliefs.
Our distinction has aninral, action-guiding beliefs on one side, and
reflective judgments on the other. This distinction is akin to one between
deep biases and conscious, sincere suspension of judgrnent. Pyrrhonists
who avowedly suspend judgment need not be disavowing aninral beliefs
beyond their control. They nray only be fbrbearing from endorsing thenr
consciously and freely. The distinctions are sinrilar even if the bigot disavows his bias whereas the skeptic need not disavow his anirnal belief, he
need only forbear fom endorsing it through conscious judgrnent,
That is not to say that free judgrnent always diverges frorn animal belief,
Suppose we add a long colurnn in our heads as we view it on a piece ofpaper.
We rnay do so flawlessl andyet distrust ourcomputation and refuse to endorse
'We
the result.
consider whether to trust it and decide against doing so. Suppose
we next use pencil and paper. Now we rlray consider anew whether to trust our
result. And here again it is up to us, In this way we can control our beliefs. Ifwe
freely adopt and store the resuit ofour cronlputation, that can guide our conduct
in the ftlture, even after we have forgotten the source of our beliel
That is a case where we seenl freely responsible for the relevant belief.
But there are plenty of cases where present consc:ious reasoning is unable to af{ect entrenched beliefs acqr-rired through past childhood or
present perception. Recall the case of cleeply entrenched bias that is sincerely disavowed at the surface of consciousness. This suggests that conscious endorsenlent need not be driven by a corresponding anirnal belief,
2ro
TlPISTEMIC AGENC
H.
2II
Are we now landed once again irt a sirrrilar predicantent? The skeptic could
after all replicate his doubts on thc sc'cond order. He could put irr question
our trust in our own second-orde'r crornpetence while touting the quality
of his corresponding selGtrust. Once again it would seenl stubbornly irra*
tional to just take our side with no supporting reasons. Rationality would
seem to require reasons synchronically avaiiable to ns, if we are to sustain
our self-trrlst properly against the doubt of clur opponent.
Is it irrational to ignore such an opponent? That depends on the context,
What else requires our attention at the titne? Suppose we put aside practical considerations. Even so, what other intellectual or epistenric concerns
require our attention at the tinre? There rnay surely corne a tinre when we
do best intellectually to insist on our side of a controversy based simply on
self-trust. Ancl our judgment on the lower order may also be well-enough
renderecl, as is requir:ed if that judernent is to constitute knowledge.
A knowledge-constitr-rtivejudgrnent neecl only avoid relevant epistemic flaws,
even ifit could still be enhancecl through further scrutiny and reasoning.
Take two opponents who proceed alike with equally plausible justification, Suppose thenr to be on a par as concerns any consciotts reasoning
they ernploy or nright easily en1ploy. Each considers hinrself reliable on
the question dividing thenr. Each has better things to clo than to resolve
their disagreenlent, rnoreover, even consiclering just intellectual or epistenric concerns. To this extent, accordingly, the two are equally rational in
agreeing to disagree, in carrying on with their intellectual lives. Flowever,
this does not entail that they are on a par epistenrically in doing so, nor
tlrat their beliefs, and their correspondingjudgnlents on the first order, are
cclually well justified epistemically, if what we pick out by such "justificarion" is the nornrative status requisite for knowledge." One ofthe disagreeing trcliefs nray be nruch betterjustified epistenrically than the other.
Thosc opponents are strikingly sinrilar in the ways cletailed. Despite
tlnt, onc of thcnr nrly trust hirlrsclf otr a {irr bcttcr cliachronic trasis than
rs llrt'sl.rtn\ "l)r(kr'.1 or1" Iry "t'llistt'rrrir'.jtrstilir',rtior," rvlriclr rlot's not rrrc';ul tll;rt tlris
('\l)t('s\t()n r\ lo Irc rlt'lrtt,l.rr "lll('\l.lltts t't'rttirt'tl Iirr tr()l)()sitttrtl.rl kon'lt',1{c." All tlrirrris
t,rrrstlt'rt',l, lrrr1',,-ll 1'rllcr .rt,'rnrrrr,tl,t',y'ol "tr)nrl)('l('n(t"'lor tlt.rl rl,,lut
l. l'll,t
EPISTEMIC AGENCY
212
'We
cannot ascend infinite ladders of synchronic endorsement. At sorne point our defense must rest, and it will then matter how
weil founded our relevant dispositions nlay be. At some point we will have
reached the end of the synchronic line. Only diachronic factors might then
bear episternically on the self-trust resident on that level, and those factors must be given their due. If you reason no more and no less well than a
given opponent, at a certain level ofreflection, but the two ofyou stiil difrer
epistenrically in the quality of your relevant diachronic dispositions, this
rnust be allowed its proper bearing in assessing your relevant judgments and
beliefs. Yor"r rnight now be well advised to stiffen your spine and move on.
As we have seen, lve rise above the animal level through eudorsement
based on reasons within our synchronic purview. This does not mean that
we depiorably fall short as reflective humans if unable to reach infrnite levels
of reflection available at most to the infinitely onrniscient. First of all, ought
implies can no less for episternic than for nroral agency.'' Besides, suppose
we could ascend to a higher level yet, under the prompting of disagreement
on a given level. And suppose our relevant beliefs would be epistemically
enhanced by success in this further endeavor. Even so, the better is not necessarily the obligatory. Our belief nright be irnprovable episternically through
such ascent without being so nruch as.flawcd even ifwe clecline to ascend, and
even if we do not so nruch as considcr ascending. We rnight just have better
things to do epistenrically than to defend our treliefon that higher plane.'3
does the other.
"No less," I siry, leaving roolll fbr inrpoltant and subtle issues on the way in which and the
extent to which tl-re ciictunl does rpply even itr the nroral realnr.
r3. This conclucling stance gains plirusibility when we distinguish between (a) positive suspension of belief and (tr) sinrply not seriously considering a questiorl, even wich that question
before our nrinds. The latter is i rethsal to go turther into the nlatter ofwhat attitucle to take
to that question, even the ttitutlc of suspending.
Moreovero it might just be that proper hunran cognitive practice requires no such clefense.
Given all the tracleofii involved in hulrran flourishing (incluciing the cognitive conlponents
of such flourishing), perhaps otrr cognitive practice reqrrires no such lhrther ascellt, despitc
the cognitive enhancement that r,vould supervene upon it. This raises crestions. sonre clearly
non-trivial. What is cognitive practice? What is coqnitivc prlctice? [s there l single hunran
such practice part ofa "hurrran fbmr oflife"? Or are there (nlso?) crrlttrrally specific practices that
bear (as well) on a kincl oi episteruiciustifrcation available to nrcnrbers of'the relevant cultrrrc?
Do all such practices have proper nornrtive bearing, or is tlrere rootl firr illusion in thent, arrtl
even for superstition, at least in the culturally spccitic oncs? T'llis ge rtcral aprroitclr rtiqht rcvcrrl
varieties of epistenticiustificatiou spc:cifrc to spccics ()r cvcn t'rrlturcs. cvc'lr if'tlrcy rrll shrrrc
inrportant stnlctulill sirnilr'itics and;t r'otntnon inl rrt rclillrlc lrttrilrnc'rtl of'trutll. Anlrclruir'
inttritions nligllt tllcrr rcflcct orrr r'onulritnl('uts to srt'll pr:rt'ticcs. lvltctlrt'r'lllcst',u'r'irr'r,itrrlrlc
thlorrgh rlornlulclrikl tlcvek.'pnlcn( or irrlrilrctlrvitll tlrc r'ulturt'. ( ii','cll tlt.rt illtrsitur,tttrl sttpcr'
stit ion .rt't':r ls. r.rt trtitt'tl itr llrrst' lv;rys. ll,rtvt'r't'l , tllcs<' rt',tr'tir't's rr',ttlrl r'('(llrr'('t'r'.tlu,tlion. Alttl
lll('('l)r\l('nlr( ('\',tllt,tltrrrof t'Pislcnlr( l)r .r(lr((\tlrsl rrl (()ur\( trt,rlvcltllllrrt'lr,rltrlrtt'.
F! ?,i ,e
*' .j'
"{'
#'1
&t ..
i.
,P)
${.'g'
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Main HistorcaI
Antecedents