RULE 58

[G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001]

TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.

GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and
HON. PRUDENCIO CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon
City, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita Idolor which
seeks to set aside the decision [1] of the respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the
Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[3]granting Idolors prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.[4]
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor
executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the
mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. The object of said mortgage is a 200square meter property with improvements located at 66 Ilocos Sur Street, Barangay
Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 25659.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of
Gumersindo de Guzman, filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor before the Office
of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted
in a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which agreement is quoted in full [5]:
Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa usaping binabanggit sa
itaas, ay nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito na ayusin ang aming alitan gaya ng
sumusunod:
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang P520,000.00
noong September 20, 1994.

Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No. 25659) under
Registry receipt 3420 dated July 15, 1996.
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace period) to settle
the said amount.
Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, I agree to execute
a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase without interest within one year.
Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.
At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga katakdaan ng pag-aayos
na inilahad sa itaas.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent
Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office of the Barangay captain
who subsequently issued a certification to file action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in
the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to
respondent Gumersindo, as the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June
23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo
Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among others alleged
irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of
the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by
the trial court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
private respondents, the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City

from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the
subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. The trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari seeking annulment of the trial courts order dated July 28, 1998 which
granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the
assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for
reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V.
Idolor. The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in ruling (I) that petitioner has no more proprietary right to the issuance
of the writ of injunction, (2) that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos did not ipso facto result
in novation of the real estate mortgage, (3) that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is merely a
promissory note of petitioner to private respondent spouses; and (4) that the
questioned writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erred in
finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private
and public respondents from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and
consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private
respondents.
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land was not
yet lost since her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had neither
lapsed nor run as the sheriffs certificate of sale was null and void; that petitioner and
the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by
respondent sheriffs; that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale
was not a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and
interests.[6] Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following
requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be

protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of

such right.[7] Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of
an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure
to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially
protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has
attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence
of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. [8]The controlling reason
for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. [9] It is to be
resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. [10]
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more
proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance
of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public
auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriffs certificate
of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23,
1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem the
property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses
de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed
property. When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale against
private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to
be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two
(2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying
injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no
claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity. [11] The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground
for an injunction.[12]
Petitioners allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriffs sale dwells on the
merits of the case; We cannot rule on the same considering that the matter should be
resolved during the trial on the merits.
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated
September 21, 1996 between her and spouses de Guzman before the Office of the

Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the express and unequivocal intention of the parties to
novate or modify the real estate mortgage; that a comparison of the real estate
mortgage dated March 21, 1994 and the Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated September 21,
1996 revealed the irreconciliable incompatibility between them, i.e., that under the
first agreement, the amount due was five hundred twenty thousand (P520,000) pesos
only payable by petitioner within six (6) months, after which it shall earn interest at
the legal rate per annum and non-payment of which within the stipulated period,
private respondents have the right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage
while under the second agreement, the amount due was one million two hundred thirty
three thousand two hundred eighty eight and 23/100 (P1,233,288.23) inclusive of
interest, payable within 90 days and in case of non payment of the same on or before
December 21, 1996, petitioner should execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase
within one year without interest; that the second agreement Kasunduang Pag-aayos
was a valid new contract as it was duly executed by the parties and it changed the
principal conditions of petitioners original obligations. Petitioner insists that the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos was not a mere promissory note contrary to respondent courts
conclusion since it was entered by the parties before the Lupon Tagapamayapa which
has the effect of a final judgment.[13]
We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of
the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects
or principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by
subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. [14] Under the law, novation is
never presumed. The parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are
abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. [15] Accordingly, it was held that no
novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into between the
parties was intended to give life to the old one. [16]
A review of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos which is quoted earlier does not support
petitioners contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate
did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts
were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the
Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation where she
acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured
by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her

obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will
execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one year in
favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the new obligation expressly
recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, in other words,
the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no
novation.[17] We find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent courts
pronouncement as follows:
In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the original
undertaking. The agreement adverted to (Annex 2 of Comment, p.75 Rollo) executed
by the parties on September 21, 1996 merely gave life to the March 21, 1994
mortgage contract which was then more than two years overdue. Respondent
acknowledged therein her total indebtedness in the sum of P1,233,288.23 including
the interests due on the unpaid mortgage loan which amount she promised to liquidate
within ninety (90) days or until December 21, 1996, failing which she also agreed to
execute in favor of the mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgaged property for the
same amount without interest. Evidently, it was executed to facilitate easy compliance
by respondent mortgagor with her mortgage obligation. It (the September 21, 1996
agreement) is not incompatible and can stand together with the mortgage contract of
March 21, 1994.
A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer with the view that
he would find it easier to comply with his obligations under the Contract to Sell does
not novate said Contract to Sell (Rillo v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]).
Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has the force and effect
of a final judgment. That precisely is the reason why petitioner resorted to the
foreclosure of the mortgage on March 27, 1997, after her failure to comply with her
obligation which expired on December 21, 1996.
Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local Government Code
of 1991, which requires the lapse of six (6) months before the amicable settlement
may be enforced, is misplaced. The instant case deals with extra judicial foreclosure
governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended.
Notably, the provision in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos regarding the execution of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase within one year would have the same effect as

the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage wherein petitioner was given
one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale in the Registry of property to redeem
the property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of redemption would entitle the
purchaser to possession of the property. It is not proper to consider an obligation
novated by unimportant modifications which do not alter its essence. [18] It bears stress
that the period to pay the total amount of petitioners indebtedness inclusive of interest
amounted to P1,233,288.23 expired on December 21, 1996 and petitioner failed to
execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase on the said date up to the time private
respondents filed their petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. The failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the kasunduan
to settle her obligation effectively delayed private respondents right to extra-judicially
foreclose the real estate mortgage which right accrued as far back as 1994. Thus,
petitioner has not shown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated September 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250. February 28, 2001]

RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, vs. HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR.,

Presiding Judge, 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of VictoriasManapla, Negros Occidental,respondent.
R E S O LUTIO N
QUISUMBING, J.:

In a verified complaint[1] dated June 15, 1997, Rimeo S. Gustilo charged

respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real, Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct, gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
relative to Civil Case No. 703-M entitled Weddy C. Libo-on v. Rimeo S. Gustilo, et
al.for recounting of ballots of Precinct Nos. 27 and 27-A, Barangay Punta Mesa,
Manapla, Negros Occidental.

Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay

Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental in the May 12, 1997 elections. His lone
opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the incumbent punong barangay and the
representative of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) to the Sangguniang
Bayan of Manapla and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental. Both
complainant and Libo-on garnered eight hundred nineteen (819) votes during the
elections, resulting in a tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board of Canvassers was in
complainants favor and he was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay of Punta
Mesa, Manapla.[2]
On May 20, 1997, his opponent filed an election protest case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 703-M, before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental. Liboon sought the recounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary prohibitory
injunction, and damages.
On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the parties and
set the hearing on June 6, 1997.[3]
On May 27, 1997, however, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May
29 and 30, 1997.
The next day, respondent granted Libo-ons motion. The hearing was advanced to
May 29 and 30, 1997 cancelling the hearing for June 6, 1997. [4] Complainant avers that
he was not furnished a copy of this Order dated May 28, 1997.
On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and annulled the proclamation of complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of
Punta Mesa, Manapla.[5]Complainant declares that no copy of this Order dated May
29, 1997 was served on him. That same day, however, he was able to secure copies of
the orders of respondent dated May 28 and May 29, 1997 from the COMELEC
Registrar of Manapla, Negros Occidental and the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). Moreover, it was only in the afternoon of May 29, 1997 that
complainant received a copy of Libo-ons petition in Civil Case No. 703-M and
respondents Order dated May 21, 1997.

On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay.[6] That
same day, he also filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Silay
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 69 docketed as Special Civil Action No. 1936-69.
On June 5, 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as
null and void the order nullifying complainants proclamation as duly elected punong
barangay.[7]
Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially,
complainant moved for his inhibition.
On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and after
hearing Libo-ons motion for permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain
the status quo between the contending parties.[8]
Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed the
order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He also claims that by preventing
him from assuming office, he was excluded by the DILG from participating in the
election of the Liga ng Mga Barangay on June 14, 1997.
In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations. He claimed that when Libo-on
filed his motion to advance the hearing of the prayer for injunction on May 27, 1997
in Civil Case No. 703-M, complainant was served a copy by registered mail as shown
by the registry receipts attached to said motion. Considering the urgency of the matter
and since there was substantial compliance with due process, he issued the Order of
May 28, 1997 which cancelled the hearing set for June 6, 1997 and advanced it to
May 29 and 30, 1997.
Respondent claims that on May 29, 1997, Libo-on and his counsel appeared but
complainant did not, despite due notice. The hearing then proceeded, with Libo-on
presenting his evidence. As a result, he issued the TRO prayed for and annulled
complainants proclamation. Respondent admits that the Order of May 29, 1997,
particularly the annulment of complainants proclamation, was outside the jurisdiction
of his court. But since the COMELEC ignored Libo-ons petition for correction of
erroneous tabulation and Libo-on had no other remedy under the law, he was
constrained to annul complainants proclamation, which from the very beginning was
illegal. He justified his action by our rulings in Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 316

(1995) and Tatlonghari v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 849 (1991), which held that a faulty
tabulation cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation.
Respondent also faults the RTC of Silay City for issuing the Order dated June 5,
1997, which lifted the TRO he issued and declared void his nullification of
complainants proclamation. Respondent contends that complainant should first have
exhausted all remedies in his court before resorting to the special civil action
for certiorari with the RTC. The latter court, in turn, should have dismissed the action
for certiorari for failure to exhaust judicial remedies.
With respect to his Order of June 11, 1997, respondent explains that it was never
meant to reverse the Order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997. He points out
that both parties in Civil Case No. 703-M were present during the hearing after due
notice. After receiving their evidence, he found that unless a TRO was issued, Libo-on
would suffer a grave injustice and irreparable injury. He submits that absent fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption, his acts, even if erroneous, are not the subject of
disciplinary action.
In its evaluation and recommendation report dated November 29, 1999, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondents errors were not honest
mistakes in the performance of his duties. Rather, his actions showed a bias in favor of
Libo-on and evinced a pattern to prevent the complainant from assuming office as the
duly elected punong barangay despite his having been proclaimed as such by the
Board of Canvassers. The OCA recommends that respondent be fined P20,000.00 and
warned that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in
a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied).
xxx
4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala
stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to
immediate notice to all parties of all applications for TRO.

The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the
court may act on the application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a
summary hearing. In other words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed with. [9] In
the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May
29, 1997 after receiving the applicants evidence ex parte. His failure to abide by
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority,
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
Worse, he compounded the infraction by annulling complainants proclamation as
the duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla and prohibiting him from
assuming office. Respondent admits that his court was not vested with the power or
jurisdiction to annul the proclamation, but seeks to justify his action on the ground
that the proclamation was void ab initio. In so doing, respondent wantonly usurped a
power exclusively vested by law in the COMELEC. [10] A judge is expected to know the
jurisdictional boundaries of courts and quasi-judicial bodies like the COMELEC as
mapped out by the Constitution and statutes and to act only within said limits. A judge
who wantonly arrogates unto himself the authority and power vested in other agencies
not only acts in oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process, but also
creates chaos and contributes to confusion in the administration of justice.
Respondent, in transgressing the jurisdictional demarcation lines between his court
and the COMELEC, clearly failed to realize the position that his court occupies in the
interrelation and operation of the countrys justice system. He displayed a marked
ignorance of basic laws and principles. Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. By annulling complainants proclamation as the duly elected punong
barangay, despite being aware of the fact that his court had no power to do so, not
only is respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority, he also manifests unfaithfulness
to a basic legal rule as well as injudicious conduct.
Moreover, in willfully nullifying complainants proclamation despite his courts
want of authority, respondent knowingly issued an unjust order.
Note that the RTC of Silay City corrected respondents errors by declaring null and
void his Order dated May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his previous errors
of judgment by proceeding to hear Libo-ons motion for permanent injunction and
issuing a second TRO on June 11, 1997 on the ground that extreme urgency and grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise if no injunctive remedy were granted.

Respondent insists that his act did not reverse the Order of the RTC in Special Civil
Action No. 1936-69, since the second TRO he issued satisfied the notice and hearing
requirements of Circular No. 20-95.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites
be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right.
[11]
The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected,
which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a
showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage. [12] In this
case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong
barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was
entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the complainants exercise of
such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing
candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain
the status quo. We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the
evident purpose of the second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in
the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay. Respondent must be held liable for
violating Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that, In every
case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism.
In a similar case, a judge was fined P5,000.00 for failure to observe the
requirements of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 when he issued a TRO enjoining a
duly proclaimed barangay captain from participating in the elections of officers of the
ABC of Taft, Eastern Samar.[13] Note, however, that in the instant case, the respondents
infractions are not limited to the mere issuance of a restraining order without
conducting the summary conference required by Administrative Circular No. 20-95.
He also annulled the proclamation of the complainant knowing very well that he had
no such authority. When his first restraining order was set aside and nullification of
complainants proclamation was declared null and void by the RTC of Silay City, a
superior court, he again issued a TRO, which showed his partiality to complainants
political rival. Respondent is thus guilty of violating Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct; knowingly rendering an unjust order; gross ignorance of the law
or procedure; as well as bias and partiality. All of the foregoing are serious charges

under Rule 140, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. We agree with the sanction
recommended by the OCA, finding it to be in accord with Rule 140, Section 10 (A) of
the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, this COURT finds respondent judge GUILTY of violating Rules
3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, knowingly rendering an unjust order,
gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and bias and partiality. Accordingly, a fine
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is hereby imposed upon respondent with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 168637

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), TINGA,
INC./MEAD
JOHNSON
PHIL., VELASCO, JR., and
RICHARD SMYTH as General
BRION, JJ.
Manager and FERDIE SARFATI, as
Medical Sales Director,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), G.R. No. 170684
INC./MEAD JOHNSON PHIL.,
Petitioner,
- versus COURT
OF
APPEALS
MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS,
Respondents.

and Promulgated:
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions. The first petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, assails the
Decision[1] dated January 28, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated June 23, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885. The second petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil., assails
the Resolutions[3] dated August 12, 2005 and October 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885.
The facts are undisputed.
Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.),
Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. from January 6, 1997 until March 23, 2000 as Territory
Manager in its Medical Sales Force Division.[4]
On February 4, 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and
Lagrosas former girlfriend, attended a district meeting of territory managers at
McDonaldsAlabang Town Center. After the meeting, she dined out with her
friends. She left her car at McDonalds and rode with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When
they returned to McDonalds, Lim saw Lagrosas car parked beside her car. Lim told
Menquito not to stop his car but Lagrosas followed them and slammed Menquitos
car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Lagrosas approached them and
hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried to intervene,
Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.
Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain in
writing why he should not be dismissed for assaulting a co-employee outside of
business hours. While the offense is not covered by the Code of Discipline for
Territory Managers, the Code states that other infractions not provided for herein
shall be penalized in the most appropriate manner at the discretion of management.
[5]
In his memo, Lagrosas admitted that he accidentally hit Lim when she tried to
intervene. He explained that he did not intend to hit her as shown by the fact that
he never left the hospital until he was assured that she was all right.[6]

In the disciplinary hearing that followed, it was established that Lagrosas

and Lim had physical confrontations prior to the incident. But Lagrosas denied
saying that he might not be able to control himself and hurt Lim and her boyfriend
if he sees them together.
On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective
immediately.[7] Lagrosas then filed a complaint[8] for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13 th month pay, attorneys fees, damages and
fair market value of his Team Share Stock Option Grant.
On February 28, 2002, Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a
Decision[9] in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99, declaring the
dismissal
illegal. He noted that while Lagrosas committed a misconduct, it was not connected
with his work. The incident occurred outside of company premises and office
hours. He also observed that the misconduct was not directed against a co-employee
who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. Nevertheless, Labor Arbiter
Hernandez imposed a penalty of three months suspension or forfeiture of pay to
remind Lagrosas not to be carried away by the mindless dictates of his
passion. Thus, the Arbiter ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby [rendered]
finding that respondent company illegally dismissed complainant
thus, ORDERING it:
1) [t]o reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights,
privileges and benefits and to pay him full backwages reckoned from [the] date of
his illegal dismissal on 23 March 2000 including the monetary value of his
vacation/sick leave of 16 days per year reckoned from July 1, 2000 until actually
reinstated, less three (3) months salary as penalty for his infraction;
2) to pay him the monetary equivalent of his accrued and unused
combined sick/vacation leaves as of June 30, 2000 of 16 days x 3 years and 4
months 10 days x P545.45 = P23,636.16 and the present fair market value of his
Team Share stock option grant for eight hundred (800) BMS common shares of
stock listed in the New York Stock Exchange which vested in complainant as of
01 July 1997, provisionally computed as 90% (800 shares x US$40.00 per share x
P43.20/US$ = P1,244,160.00).
3) to pay him Attorneys fee of 10% on the entire computable amount.
All other claims of complainant are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside the
Decision of Labor Arbiter Hernandez in its Decision[11] dated September 24,
2002. It held that Lagrosas was validly dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting
his co-employee and another person with a metal steering wheel lock. The gravity
and seriousness of his misconduct is clear from the fact that he deliberately waited
for Lim and Menquito to return to McDonalds. The NLRC also ruled that the
misconduct was committed in connection with his duty as Territory Manager since
it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers.
Lagrosas moved for reconsideration. On May 7, 2003, the NLRC issued a
Resolution[12] reversing its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that the incident was not
work-related since it occurred only after the district meeting of territory
managers. It emphasized that for a serious misconduct to merit dismissal, it must
be connected with the employees work. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find this time no reason to alter
the Labor Arbiters Decision of February 28, 2002 and hereby affirm the same in
toto. We vacate our previous Decision of September 24, 2002.
SO ORDERED.[13]

Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in

an Order dated February 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99 (NLRC
NCR CA No. 031646-02).[14] Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of
execution.[15] Notices of garnishment were then served upon the Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and the
Bank of the Philippine Islands for the balance of the judgment award.[16]
Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court gave
due course to Bristol-Myers petition and issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO)[17] enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and notices of
garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 17, 2004.[18]
Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It
argued that since it has posted an injunction cash bond, the TRO cash bond should
be legally discharged and released.

On January 28, 2005, the appellate court rendered the following Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of May 7,
2003 and the Order of February 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. [00-03-0282199] (NLRC NCR CA No. [031646-02]), are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
public respondent NLRCs Decision dated September 24, 2002 which reversed the
Labor Arbiters decision and in effect sustained the legality of the private
respondents termination and the dismissal of his claim for the fair market value of
the
[Team
Share]
stock
option
grant
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, withMODIFICATION that the petitioner
shall pay the private respondent the monetary equivalent of his accrued and
unused combined sick/vacation leave plus ten (10%) percent thereof, as attorneys
fees. The injunction bond and the TRO bond previously posted by the petitioner
are DISCHARGED.
SO ORDERED.[19]

The appellate court considered the misconduct as having been committed in

connection with Lagrosas duty as Territory Manager since it occurred immediately
after the district meeting of territory managers. It also held that the gravity and
seriousness of the misconduct cannot be denied. Lagrosas employed such a degree
of violence that caused damage not only to Menquitos car but also physical injuries
to Lim and Menquito.
Lagrosas filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and
injunction cash bond in view of the Decision dated January 28, 2005. On August
12, 2005, the appellate court denied the motion as premature since the decision is
not yet final and executory due to Lagrosas appeal to this Court.[20]
Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 28, 2005, the
appellate court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the
petitioners Motion
[f]or
Reconsideration dated September 6, 2005 is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the
Resolution of August 12, 2005 is RECONSIDERED andSET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order cash bond in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00) which was posted by the petitioners on July
19, 2004 is ordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[21]

The appellate court held that upon the expiration of the TRO, the cash bond
intended for it also expired. Thus, the discharge and release of the cash bond for
the expired TRO is proper. But the appellate court disallowed the discharge of the
injunction cash bond since the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued pendente lite. Since there is a pending appeal with the Supreme Court, the
Decision dated January 28, 2005 is not yet final and executory.
Hence, the instant petitions.
In G.R. No. 168637, Lagrosas assigns the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DECLARING THAT THE
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT
WAS LEGAL HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LABOR LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE AND
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE
COURTS POWER OF REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF
DISMISSAL, BEING A PENALTY TOO HARSH IN THIS CASE, DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LABOR LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE AND DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO
CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS POWER OF
REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION.[22]

In G.R. No. 170684, Bristol-Myers raises the following issue:

[WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISALLOWING THE RELEASE AND
DISCHARGE OF PETITIONERS INJUNCTION BOND.[23]

Simply put, the basic issues in the instant petitions are: (1) Did the Court of
Appeals err in finding the dismissal of Lagrosas legal? and (2) Did the Court of
Appeals err in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond?

On the first issue, serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal of an
employee is defined simply as improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment. To be serious within the meaning and intendment of the law, the
misconduct must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial
or unimportant. However serious such misconduct, it must, nevertheless, be in
connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for his separation. The
act complained of must be related to the performance of the employees duties such
as would show him to be unfit to continue working for the employer.[24]
Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, it
(a) must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties;
and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.[25]
Tested against the foregoing standards, it is clear that Lagrosas was not
guilty of serious misconduct. It may be that the injury sustained by Lim was
serious since it rendered her unconscious and caused her to suffer cerebral
contusion that necessitated hospitalization for several days. But we fail to see how
such misconduct could be characterized as work-related and reflective of Lagrosas
unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.
Although we have recognized that fighting within company premises may
constitute serious misconduct, we have also held that not every fight within
company premises in which an employee is involved would automatically warrant
dismissal from service.[26] More so, in this case where the incident occurred outside
of company premises and office hours and not intentionally directed against a coemployee, as hereafter explained.
First, the incident occurred outside of company premises and after office
hours since the district meeting of territory managers which Lim attended at
McDonalds had long been finished. McDonalds may be considered an extension of
Bristol-Myers office and any business conducted therein as within office hours, but
the moment the district meeting was concluded, that ceased too. When Lim dined
with her friends, it was no longer part of the district meeting and considered
official time. Thus, when Lagrosas assaulted Lim and Menquito upon their return,
it was no longer within company premises and during office hours. Second,
Bristol-Myers itself admitted that Lagrosas intended to hit Menquito only. In the

Memorandum[27] dated March 23, 2000, it was stated that You got out from your
car holding an umbrella steering wheel lock and proceeded to hit Mr.
Menquito.Dulce tried to intervene, but you accidentally hit her on the head,
knocking her unconscious.[28] Indeed, the misconduct was not directed against a coemployee who unfortunately got hit in the process. Third, Lagrosas was not
performing official work at the time of the incident. He was not even a participant
in the district meeting. Hence, we fail to see how his action could have reflected
his unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.
In light of Bristol-Myers failure to adduce substantial evidence to prove that
Lagrosas was guilty of serious misconduct, it cannot use this ground to justify his
dismissal.Thus, the dismissal of Lagrosas employment was without factual and
legal basis.
On the second issue, it is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.[29]
A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the
applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party
or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.[30]
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally
decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is
to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction,
and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.[31]
In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment
pending final resolution of this case or unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the
Court.[32]

By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the
case by granting Bristol-Myers petition and reinstating the Decision
dated September 24, 2002of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for
dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash
bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.
Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary
awards granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of
the writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in
effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of
the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas
claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.[33]
Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court erred in
disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond.
WHEREFORE, the two consolidated petitions are GRANTED. In G.R.
No. 168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, the Decision dated January 28, 2005,
and the Resolution dated June 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
83885 are REVERSED. The Resolution dated May 7, 2003, and the Order
dated February 4, 2004 of the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99
(NLRC NCR CA No. 031646-02) are REINSTATED and hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead
Johnson Phil., the Resolutions dated August 12, 2005 and October 28, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885 are REVERSED. The injunction cash
bond in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000) which
was posted by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. on September
17, 2004 is hereby ordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to it.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
NELSON JENOSA and his son NIO
CARLO JENOSA, SOCORRO
CANTO and her son PATRICK
CANTO, CYNTHIA
APALISOKand her

G.R. No. 172138

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

daughter CYNDY
APALISOK, EDUARDO
VARGASand his son CLINT
EDUARD VARGAS, and NELIA
DURO and her son NONELL
GREGORY DURO,
Petitioners,

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus REV. FR. JOSE RENE C.

DELARIARTE, O.S.A., in his
capacity as the incumbent Principal of
the High School Department of the
University of San Agustin, and
Promulgated:
theUNIVERSITY OF SAN
AGUSTIN, herein represented by its
September 8, 2010
incumbent President REV. FR.
MANUEL G. VERGARA, O.S.A.,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 16 June 2005 Decision[2] and 22 March
2006[3] Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78894. In its 16
June 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of respondents
University of San Augustin (University), represented by its incumbent President
Rev. Fr. Manuel G. Vergara, O.S.A. (University President), and Rev. Fr. Jose Rene
C. Delariarte, O.S.A. (Principal), in his capacity as the incumbent Principal of the
High School Department of the University (respondents) and ordered the dismissal
of Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646 for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. In its 22 March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion

for reconsideration of petitioners Nelson Jenosa and his son Nio Carlo Jenosa,
Socorro Canto and her son Patrick Canto, Cynthia Apalisok and her daughter
Cyndy Apalisok, Eduardo Vargas and his son Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nelia Duro
and her son Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioners).
The Facts
On 22 November 2002, some students of the University, among them petitioners
Nio Carlo Jenosa, Patrick Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell
Gregory Duro (petitioner students), were caught engaging in hazing outside the
school premises. The hazing incident was entered into the blotter of the Iloilo City
Police.[4]
Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted among the school
authorities, the apprehended students and their parents. During the 28 November
2002 meeting, the parties agreed that, instead of the possibility of being charged
and found guilty of hazing, the students who participated in the hazing incident as
initiators, including petitioner students, would just transfer to another school, while
those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The
parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their signatures
to the minutes of the meeting to signify their conformity.[5] In view of the
agreement, the University did not anymore convene the Committee on Student
Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.
On 5 December 2002, the parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent a
letter to the University President urging him not to implement the 28 November
2002 agreement.[6] According to petitioner parents, the Principal, without
convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students.
On 10 December 2002, petitioner parents also wrote a letter to Mrs. Ida B.
Endonila, School Division Superintendent, Department of Education (DepEd),
Iloilo City, seeking her intervention and prayed that petitioner students be allowed
to take the home study program instead of transferring to another school. [7] The
DepEd asked the University to comment on the letter.[8] The University replied and
attached the minutes of the 28 November 2002 meeting.[9]

On 3 January 2003, petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Iloilo City (trial court) docketed as Civil Case
No. 03-27460.[10] Petitioners assailed the Principals decision to order the immediate
transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to due process because
the COSD was not convened.
On 5 February 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
directed respondents to admit petitioner students during the pendency of the case.
[11]
The 5 February 2003 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, let [a] Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
issue. The defendants are hereby directed to allow the plaintiffs minor
children to attend their classes during the pendency of this case, without
prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may
be liable.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and asked for the dissolution of the
writ. The trial court denied respondents motion. Respondents complied but with
reservations.
On 25 March 2003, respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Respondents alleged
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that
petitioners were guilty of forum shopping. On 19 May 2003, the trial court denied
respondents motion. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 21 April 2003, petitioners wrote the DepEd and asked that it direct the
University to release the report cards and other credentials of petitioner students.
[13]
On 8 May 2003, the DepEd sent a letter to the University advising it to release
petitioner students report cards and other credentials if there was no valid reason to
withhold the same.[14] On 14 May 2003, the DepEd sent another letter to the
University to follow-up petitioners request.[15] On 20 May 2003, the University
replied that it could not release petitioner students report cards due to their pending
disciplinary case with the COSD.[16]

On 28 May 2003, petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction

praying for the release of petitioner students report cards and other credentials
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-27646.[17]
The trial court consolidated the two cases.[18]
On 17 June 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
directed the University to release petitioner students report cards and other
credentials.[19]Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondents alleged
that they could not comply with the writ because of the on-going disciplinary case
against petitioner students.
On 26 June 2003, the COSD met with petitioners for a preliminary conference on
the hazing incident. On 7 July 2003, the University, through the COSD, issued its
report finding petitioner students guilty of hazing. The COSD also recommended
the exclusion of petitioner students from its rolls effective 28 November 2002.
On 14 July 2003, the trial court issued an Order denying both motions for
reconsideration.[20]
On 1 September 2003, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Respondents insisted that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646. Respondents
also alleged that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 16 June 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition
and ordered the trial court to dismiss Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and 03-27646 for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies or for being premature. According to the Court of Appeals,
petitioners should have waited for the action of the DepEd or of the University
President before resorting to judicial action. The Court of Appeals held:

From the foregoing, it is clear that the court a quo committed grave [abuse]
of discretion amounting to LACK OF JURISDICTION in
INTERFERING, pre-maturely, with the exclusive and inherent authority of
educational institutions to discipline.
In directing herein petitioners [respondents in this case] to re-admit herein
private respondents [petitioners in this case] and eventually, to release the
report cards and other school credentials, prior to the action of the
President of USA and of the recommendation of the COSD, the court a
quo is guilty of improper judicial intrusion by encroaching into the
exclusive prerogative of educational institutions. [21]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.[22] In its 22 March 2006 Resolution,

the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in holding that Branch 29 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City in Civil Case Nos. 03-27460 and
03-27646 did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies?
2. Was the recommendation/report/order of the Committee on Student
Discipline dated 7 July 2003 valid, and did it justify the order of
exclusion of petitioner students retroactive to 28 November 2002?[23]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Discipline in education is specifically mandated by the 1987 Constitution which
provides that all educational institutions shall teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline.[24] Schools and school administrators have the authority to
maintain school discipline[25] and the right to impose appropriate and reasonable
disciplinary measures.[26] On the other hand, students have the duty and the

responsibility to promote and maintain the peace and tranquility of the school by
observing the rules of discipline.[27]
In this case, we rule that the Principal had the authority to order the immediate
transfer of petitioner students because of the 28 November 2002 agreement.
[28]
Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the minutes of the 28 November
2002 meeting and signified their conformity to transfer their children to another
school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia Duro even wrote a letter to inform the
University that they would transfer their children to another school and requested
for the pertinent papers needed for the transfer.[29]In turn, the University did not
anymore convene the COSD. The University agreed that it would no longer
conduct disciplinary proceedings and instead issue the transfer credentials of
petitioner students. Then petitioners reneged on their agreement without any
justifiable reason. Since petitioners present complaint is one for injunction, and
injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must come to court with clean
hands. In University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr.,[30] a case involving
student misconduct, this Court ruled:
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it
must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so because among the
maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a
frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he
who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant
may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as
to the controversy in issue.[31]

Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason,
come to court with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.
Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and unfair conduct, we deny
them relief. We uphold the validity of the 28 November 2002 agreement and rule
that the Principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students based on the 28 November 2002 agreement.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 16 June 2005 Decision

and the 22 March 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC.,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167715

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,

- versus -

PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PFIZER,
INC.
(PHIL.) INC.,

and

PFIZER
November 17, 2010

Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to

annul and set aside the Resolutions dated January 18, 2005 [1] and
April 11, 2005[2] by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
82734.

The instant case arose from a Complaint [3] for patent infringement
filed against petitioner Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. by respondent
companies, Pfizer, Inc. and Pfizer (Phil.), Inc., with the Bureau of
Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO). The
Complaint alleged as follows:
xxxx
6. Pfizer is the registered owner of Philippine Letters
Patent No. 21116 (the Patent) which was issued by this
Honorable Office on July 16, 1987. The patent is valid until
July 16, 2004. The claims of this Patent are directed to a
method of increasing the effectiveness of a beta-lactam
antibiotic in a mammalian subject, which comprises coadministering to said subject a beta-lactam antibiotic
effectiveness increasing amount of a compound of the
formula IA. The scope of the claims of the Patent extends

to a combination of penicillin such as ampicillin sodium

and beta-lactam antibiotic like sulbactam sodium.

7.
Patent
No.
21116
thus
covers
ampicillin
sodium/sulbactam
sodium
(hereafter
Sulbactam
Ampicillin). Ampicillin sodium is a specific example of the
broad beta-lactam antibiotic disclosed and claimed in the
Patent. It is the compound which efficacy is being
enhanced by co-administering the same with sulbactam
sodium. Sulbactam sodium, on the other hand, is a
specific compound of the formula IA disclosed and
claimed in the Patent.

8. Pfizer is marketing Sulbactam Ampicillin under the

brand name Unasyn. Pfizer's Unasyn products, which
come in oral and IV formulas, are covered by Certificates
of Product Registration (CPR) issued by the Bureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) under the name of complainants.
The sole and exclusive distributor of Unasyn products in
the Philippines is Zuellig Pharma Corporation, pursuant to
a Distribution Services Agreement it executed with Pfizer
Phils. on January 23, 2001.

9. Sometime in January and February 2003, complainants

came to know that respondent [herein petitioner]
submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to
several hospitals without the consent of complainants and
in violation of the complainants' intellectual property
rights. x x x

xxxx
10. Complainants thus wrote the above hospitals and
demanded that the latter immediately cease and desist
from accepting bids for the supply [of] Sulbactam
Ampicillin or awarding the same to entities other than
complainants. Complainants, in the same letters sent
through undersigned counsel, also demanded that
respondent immediately withdraw its bids to supply
Sulbactam Ampicillin.

11. In gross and evident bad faith, respondent and the

hospitals named in paragraph 9 hereof, willfully ignored
complainants' just, plain and valid demands, refused to
comply therewith and continued to infringe the Patent, all
to the damage and prejudice of complainants. As
registered owner of the Patent, Pfizer is entitled to
protection under Section 76 of the IP Code.

x x x x[4]

Respondents prayed for permanent injunction, damages and the

forfeiture and impounding of the alleged infringing products. They
also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction that would prevent herein petitioner, its
agents, representatives and assigns, from importing, distributing,
selling or offering the subject product for sale to any entity in the
Philippines.
In an Order[5] dated July 15, 2003 the BLA-IPO issued a preliminary
injunction which was effective for ninety days from petitioner's
receipt of the said Order.

Prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period, respondents filed

a Motion for Extension of Writ of Preliminary Injunction [6] which,
however, was denied by the BLA-IPO in an Order [7] dated October
15, 2003.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was

also denied by the BLA-IPO in a Resolution [8] dated January 23,
2004.

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA assailing the October 15, 2003 and January 23, 2004
Resolutions of the BLA-IPO. Respondents also prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction for the
reinstatement and extension of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the BLA-IPO.

While the case was pending before the CA, respondents filed a
Complaint[9] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City for
infringement and unfair competition with damages against herein
petitioner. In said case, respondents prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent
herein petitioner from importing, distributing, selling or offering
for sale sulbactam ampicillin products to any entity in the
Philippines. Respondents asked the trial court that, after trial,
judgment be rendered awarding damages in their favor and
making the injunction permanent.

On August 24, 2004, the RTC of Makati City issued an

Order[10] directing the issuance of a temporary restraining order
conditioned upon respondents' filing of a bond.

In a subsequent Order[11] dated April 6, 2005, the same RTC

directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
prohibiting and restraining [petitioner], its agents, representatives
and assigns from importing, distributing or selling Sulbactam
Ampicillin products to any entity in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, on November 16, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to

Dismiss[12] the petition filed with the CA on the ground of forum
shopping, contending that the case filed with the RTC has the
same objective as the petition filed with the CA, which is to obtain
an injunction prohibiting petitioner from importing, distributing
and selling Sulbactam Ampicillin products.

On January 18, 2005, the CA issued its questioned

Resolution[13] approving the bond posted by respondents pursuant
to the Resolution issued by the appellate court on March 23, 2004
which directed the issuance of a temporary restraining order
conditioned upon the filing of a bond. On even date, the CA issued
a temporary restraining order[14] which prohibited petitioner from
importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam
Ampicillin products to any hospital or to any other entity in the
Philippines, or from infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No.
21116 and impounding all the sales invoices and other documents
evidencing sales by [petitioner] of Sulbactam Ampicillin products.

On February 7, 2005, petitioner again filed a Motion to

Dismiss[15] the case for being moot and academic, contending that
respondents' patent had already lapsed. In the same manner,
petitioner also moved for the reconsideration of the temporary
restraining order issued by the CA on the same basis that the
patent right sought to be protected has been extinguished due to
the lapse of the patent license and on the ground that the CA has
no jurisdiction to review the order of the BLA-IPO as said
jurisdiction is vested by law in the Office of the Director General of
the IPO.

On April 11, 2005, the CA rendered its presently assailed

Resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss, dated November 16,
2004, and the motion for reconsideration, as well as Motion to
Dismiss, both dated February 7, 2005.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of

patent infringement when the patent allegedly infringed
has already lapsed?

b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of

the Director of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property
Office?

c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions

with two seemingly different causes of action and yet
pray for the same relief?[16]

In the first issue raised, petitioner argues that respondents'

exclusive right to monopolize the subject matter of the patent
exists only within the term of the patent. Petitioner claims that
since respondents' patent expired on July 16, 2004, the latter no
longer possess any right of monopoly and, as such, there is no
more basis for the issuance of a restraining order or injunction
against petitioner insofar as the disputed patent is concerned.

The Court agrees.

Section 37 of Republic Act No. (RA) 165, [17] which was the
governing law at the time of the issuance of respondents' patent,
provides:

Section 37. Rights of patentees. A patentee shall

have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the
patented machine, article or product, and to use the
patented process for the purpose of industry or
commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippines for
the term of the patent; and such making, using, or
selling by any person without the authorization of the
patentee constitutes infringement of the patent.[18]

It is clear from the above-quoted provision of law that the

exclusive right of a patentee to make, use and sell a patented
product, article or process exists only during the term of the
patent. In the instant case, Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116,
which was the basis of respondents in filing their complaint with
the BLA-IPO, was issued on July 16, 1987. This fact was admitted
by respondents themselves in their complaint. They also admitted
that the validity of the said patent is until July 16, 2004, which is
in conformity with Section 21 of RA 165, providing that the term
of a patent shall be seventeen (17) years from the date of
issuance thereof. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof and that the admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. In the present case, there is no dispute
as to respondents' admission that the term of their patent expired
on July 16, 2004. Neither is there evidence to show that their
admission was made through palpable mistake. Hence, contrary
to the pronouncement of the CA, there is no longer any need to
present evidence on the issue of expiration of respondents'
patent.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioner

that after July 16, 2004, respondents no longer possess the
exclusive right to make, use and sell the articles or products
covered by Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116.

Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court lays down the

requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, viz:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief

demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or

(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is

doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.

In this connection, pertinent portions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the

same Rules provide that if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, a
temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte.

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that two requisites must

exist to warrant the issuance of an injunctive relief, namely: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage.[19]

In the instant case, it is clear that when the CA issued its January
18, 2005 Resolution approving the bond filed by respondents, the
latter no longer had a right that must be protected, considering
that Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116 which was issued to them
already expired on July 16, 2004. Hence, the issuance by the CA
of a temporary restraining order in favor of the respondents is not
proper.

In fact, the CA should have granted petitioner's motion to dismiss

the petition for certiorari filed before it as the only issue raised
therein is the propriety of extending the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the BLA-IPO. Since the patent which was the
basis for issuing the injunction, was no longer valid, any issue as
to the propriety of extending the life of the injunction was already
rendered moot and academic.

As to the second issue raised, the Court, is not persuaded by

petitioner's argument that, pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Director General of the IPO and not the CA has
jurisdiction to review the questioned Orders of the Director of the
BLA-IPO.

It is true that under Section 7(b) of RA 8293, otherwise known as

the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which is the
presently prevailing law, the Director General of the IPO exercises
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions rendered by the
Director of the BLA-IPO. However, what is being questioned before
the CA is not a decision, but an interlocutory order of the BLA-IPO
denying respondents' motion to extend the life of the preliminary
injunction issued in their favor.

RA 8293 is silent with respect to any remedy available to litigants

who intend to question an interlocutory order issued by the BLAIPO. Moreover, Section 1(c), Rule 14 of the Rules and Regulations
on Administrative Complaints for Violation of Laws Involving
Intellectual Property Rights simply provides that interlocutory
orders shall not be appealable. The said Rules and Regulations do
not prescribe a procedure within the administrative machinery to
be followed in assailing orders issued by the BLA-IPO pending final
resolution of a case filed with them. Hence, in the absence of such
a remedy, the provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory manner, as provided under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
same Rules and Regulations. Hence, in the present case,
respondents correctly resorted to the filing of a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA to question the assailed Orders of the
BLA-IPO, as they cannot appeal therefrom and they have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
This is consistent with Sections 1 [20] and 4,[21] Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.
In the first place, respondents' act of filing their complaint
originally with the BLA-IPO is already in consonance with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

This Court has held that:

[i]n cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has

been to refer the same to an administrative agency of
special competence in observance of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that it
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the
regulatory statute administered. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.[22]

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondents' initial

filing of their complaint with the BLA-IPO, instead of the regular
courts, is in keeping with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
owing to the fact that the determination of the basic issue of
whether petitioner violated respondents' patent rights requires
the exercise by the IPO of sound administrative discretion which is

based on the agency's special competence, knowledge and

experience.
However, the propriety of extending the life of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the BLA-IPO in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial power is no longer a matter that falls within the
jurisdiction of the said administrative agency, particularly that of
its Director General. The resolution of this issue which was raised
before the CA does not demand the exercise by the IPO of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience
and services in determining technical and intricate matters of
fact. It is settled that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.
[23]
This is the case with respect to the issue raised in the petition
filed with the CA.

Moreover, as discussed earlier, RA 8293 and its implementing

rules and regulations do not provide for a procedural remedy to
question interlocutory orders issued by the BLA-IPO. In this
regard, it bears to reiterate that the judicial power of the courts,
as provided for under the Constitution, includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. [24] Judicial power also includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [25] Hence, the
CA, and not the IPO Director General, has jurisdiction to determine
whether the BLA-IPO committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondents' motion to extend the effectivity of the writ
of preliminary injunction which the said office earlier issued.

Lastly, petitioner avers that respondents are guilty of forum

shopping for having filed separate actions before the IPO and the
RTC praying for the same relief.

The Court agrees.

Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an

adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the
institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition.[26]

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at

least such parties that represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.[27]

There is no question as to the identity of parties in the complaints

filed with the IPO and the RTC.

Respondents argue that they cannot be held guilty of forum

shopping because their complaints are based on different causes

of action as shown by the fact that the said complaints are

founded on violations of different patents.
The Court is not persuaded.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as

the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In
the instant case, respondents' cause of action in their complaint
filed with the IPO is the alleged act of petitioner in importing,
distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin
products, acts that are supposedly violative of respondents' right
to the exclusive sale of the said products which are covered by
the latter's patent. However, a careful reading of the complaint
filed with the RTC of Makati City would show that respondents
have the same cause of action as in their complaint filed with the
IPO. They claim that they have the exclusive right to make, use
and sell Sulbactam Ampicillin products and that petitioner
violated this right. Thus, it does not matter that the patents upon
which the complaints were based are different. The fact remains
that in both complaints the rights violated and the acts violative
of such rights are identical.

In fact, respondents seek substantially the same reliefs in their

separate complaints with the IPO and the RTC for the purpose of
accomplishing the same objective.

It is settled by this Court in several cases that the filing by a party

of two apparently different actions but with the same objective
constitutes forum shopping.[28] The Court discussed this species of
forum shopping as follows:

Very simply stated, the original complaint in the

court a quo which gave rise to the instant petition
was filed by the buyer (herein private respondent and
his predecessors-in-interest) against the seller (herein
petitioners) to enforce the alleged perfected sale of
real estate. On the other hand, the complaint in the
Second Case seeks to declare such purported sale
involving the same real property as unenforceable as
against the Bank, which is the petitioner herein. In
other words, in the Second Case, the majority
stockholders, in representation of the Bank, are
seeking to accomplish what the Bank itself failed to
do in the original case in the trial court. In brief, the
objective or the relief being sought, though
worded differently, is the same, namely, to
enable the petitioner Bank to escape from the
obligation to sell the property to respondent.[29]

In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, [30] the

Court ruled as follows:

In the attempt to make the two actions appear to be

different, petitioner impleaded different respondents
therein PNOC in the case before the lower court and the
COA in the case before this Court and sought what seems
to be different reliefs. Petitioner asks this Court to set
aside the questioned letter-directive of the COA dated
October 10, 1988 and to direct said body to approve the
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between

the PNOC and petitioner, while in the complaint before the

lower court petitioner seeks to enjoin the PNOC from
conducting a rebidding and from selling to other parties
the vessel T/T Andres Bonifacio, and for an extension of
time for it to comply with the paragraph 1 of the
memorandum of agreement and damages.One can see
that although the relief prayed for in the two (2)
actions are ostensibly different, the ultimate
objective in both actions is the same, that is, the
approval of the sale of vessel in favor of petitioner,
and to overturn the letter directive of the COA of
October 10, 1988 disapproving the sale.[31]

In the instant case, the prayer of respondents in their complaint

filed with the IPO is as follows:

A. Immediately upon the filing of this action, issue an ex

parte order (a) temporarily restraining respondent, its
agents, representatives and assigns from importing,
distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam
Ampicillin products to the hospitals named in paragraph 9
of this Complaint or to any other entity in the Philippines,
or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent
No. 21116; and (b) impounding all the sales invoices and
other documents evidencing sales by respondent of
Sulbactam Ampicillin products.

B. After hearing, issue a writ of preliminary injunction

enjoining respondent, its agents, representatives and
assigns from importing, distributing, selling or offering for
sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products to the hospitals named
in paragraph 9 of the Complaint or to any other entity in
the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.'s
Philippine Patent No. 21116; and

C. After trial, render judgment:

(i)

declaring
that
respondent
has
infringed Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent
No. 21116 and that respondent has no
right whatsoever over complainant's
patent;

(ii) ordering respondent

following amounts:

to

pay

complainants

the

(a) at least P1,000,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P700,000.00
litigation expenses;

as

attorney's

fees

(d) P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(d) costs of this suit.
(iii) ordering the condemnation, seizure or
forfeiture of respondent's infringing goods or
products, wherever they may be found,

and

including the materials and implements used in

the commission of infringement, to be disposed
of in such manner as may be deemed
appropriate by this Honorable Office; and

(iv) making the injunction permanent.[32]

In an almost identical manner, respondents prayed for the

following in their complaint filed with the RTC:
(a) Immediately upon the filing of this action, issue
an ex parte order:

(1) temporarily
restraining
Pharmawealth,
its agents,
representatives
and
assigns
from importing, distributing, selling or offering for
sale infringing sulbactam ampicillin products to
various government and private hospitals or to any
other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise
infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No. 26810.

(2) impounding all the sales invoices and

other documents evidencing sales
by pharmawealth of sulbactam
ampicillin products; and

(3) disposing of the infringing goods

outside the channels of commerce.

(b) After hearing, issue a writ of preliminary injunction:

(1) enjoining Pharmawealth, its agents,

representatives and assigns from
importing, distributing, selling or
offering for sale infringing sulbactam
ampicillin
products
to
various
government hospitals or to any
other entity in the Philippines, or
from otherwise infringing Patent No.
26810;

(2) impounding all the sales invoices and

other documents
evidencing
sales
by Pharmawealth
of
sulbactam
ampicillin products; and

(3) disposing of the infringing goods outside the

channels of commerce.

(c) After trial, render judgment:

(1) finding
Pharmawealth
to
have
infringed Patent
No.
26810
and
declaring Pharmawealth to have no right
whatsoever over plaintiff's patent;

(2) ordering Pharmawealth

to
plaintiffs the following amounts:

pay

(i) at least P3,000,000.00 as actual

damages;
(ii) P500,000.00 as attorney's
fees and P1,000,000.00 as litigation expenses;
(iii) P3,000,000.00
damages; and

as

exemplary

(iv) costs of this suit.

(3) ordering the condemnation, seizure
or forfeiture of Pharmawealth's
infringing
goods
or
products,
wherever they may be found,
including
the
materials
and
implements used in the commission
of infringement, to be disposed of in
such manner as may be deemed
appropriate by this Honorable
Court; and

(4) making the injunction permanent.[33]

It is clear from the foregoing that the ultimate objective which

respondents seek to achieve in their separate complaints filed
with the RTC and the IPO, is to ask for damages for the alleged
violation of their right to exclusively sell Sulbactam Ampicillin
products and to permanently prevent or prohibit petitioner from
selling said products to any entity.Owing to the substantial
identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a
decision in one case will necessarily amount to res judicata in the
other action.

It bears to reiterate that what is truly important to consider in

determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the
same issue.[34]

Thus, the Court agrees with petitioner that respondents are

indeed guilty of forum shopping.

Jurisprudence holds that if the forum shopping is not considered

willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed
without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res
judicata.[35] However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall
be dismissed with prejudice. [36] In the present case, the Court
finds that respondents did not deliberately violate the rule on non-

forum shopping. Respondents may not be totally blamed for

erroneously believing that they can file separate actions simply
on the basis of different patents. Moreover, in the suit filed with
the RTC of Makati City, respondents were candid enough to inform
the trial court of the pendency of the complaint filed with the BLAIPO as well as the petition for certiorari filed with the CA. On these
bases, only Civil Case No. 04-754 should be dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated January 18, 2005 and
April 11, 2005, in CA-G.R. No. 82734, areREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals
is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

Civil Case No. 04-754, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 138, is likewise DISMISSED on the ground of litis
pendentia.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and

gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against
Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that,
for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven
years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the
natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling,
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her
to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about
his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was
just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his
ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom
he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the
latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's
sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered
to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job.
He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even
told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if
she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household
expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the
bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act
No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her
when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house
for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Paraaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to
its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the
bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove
things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment
and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with
the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent
filed another application24for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter
was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex
Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys,
Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the
conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This
came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the
maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts
of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating
in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other
household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the
three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children
directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees
directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00

for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent
have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos.
T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however, that he
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court
directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders,
and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 36 (TRO) against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure
of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND
THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT
R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262
RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where
such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the
RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this
Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not
an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of
which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid
cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section
25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues,
among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may
issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day,
to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues,
without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may
have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted
an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should
not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes
are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to
protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in
view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 an amalgamation of
two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have
expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence
apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the
main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a
relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind
of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the
men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women
and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we
would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity
to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and
abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr.
President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that
the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter
how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic
environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to
the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because
the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the
family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that
in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always
the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing
that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the
basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in
our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and
wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports
groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That
will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is
not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that.
It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but
not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress
has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation
of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should

be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all
make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters,
and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's
expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution
48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating
that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a
family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the
early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the institutional rule of
men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards
the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone
has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the
husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance
than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common
law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the
common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit
in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged
by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can
invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property,
and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze.
They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United
States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not
speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women
per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often
present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide
victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the
role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing.
The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women
and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total
cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of
4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year
2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence
against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A.
9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004, 74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
Cases

200
4

200
5

200
6

200
7

200
8

200
9

2010

2011

997

927

659

837

811

770

1,042

832

Incestuous
Rape

38

46

26

22

28

27

19

23

Attempted
Rape

194

148

185

147

204

167

268

201

Acts of
Lasciviousne
ss

580

536

382

358

445

485

745

625

Physical
Injuries

3,55
3

2,33
5

1,89
2

1,50
5

1,30
7

1,49
8

2,018

1,588

53

37

38

46

18

54

83

63

RA 9262

218

924

1,26
9

2,38
7

3,59
9

5,28
5

9,974

9,021

Threats

319

223

199

182

220

208

374

213

62

19

29

30

19

19

25

15

121

102

93

109

109

99

158

128

RA 9208

17

11

16

24

34

152

190

62

Abduction
/Kidnapping
29

16

34

23

28

18

25

22

Unjust
Vexation

90

50

59

59

83

703

183

Rape

Sexual
Harassment

Seduction
Concubinag
e

155

Total

6,27
1

5,37
4

4,88
1

5,72
9

6,90
5

9,48
5

15,10
4

12,94
8

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the
smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89%
of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence. 75 Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are
much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse
are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles
to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicledrawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be nonvehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result
in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women
are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress'
authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread
gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the

parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the
latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often
serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack
of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A.
9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as
follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5,
1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on
October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as
a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference
between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at
its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so
vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (GoTan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to

safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of

an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days
(5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not
to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently
forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due
process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued
to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that
this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all
of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the
residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation
and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311
of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an
order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject
for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection
is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator
to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of
an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
1wphi1

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and
to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and
the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would
be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of
law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for
equality but will be its fulfillment."118Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be,
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.