G.R. No.

L-23052

January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five
minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and
took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his
head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood
flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them
brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition
to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and
the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by antitetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged
therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint which
was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the
University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co.,
the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was
also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from
engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his
incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates
and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his
minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his
counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section,
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P.
Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4);
that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was
replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the
catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the
said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that
whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately
attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting that
because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the
Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent
such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them
under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had
been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory
of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of
Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the
City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance,

or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability
of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the
present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took
place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover,
Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a
street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged
that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm
drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and
zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not
been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by
the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and
to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public
places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection
of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes,
the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of
poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of
nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance,
and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling,
and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other
animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within
the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change
the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to
such provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide
suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and
culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be
obstructed.

This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2,
1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to
provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and
Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and
appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national
primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers
and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and
whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of
Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
ordered.
1wph1.

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES
GONZALES, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude. It
vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any public officer or private individual.
An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive
franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement,
petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal
sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de
Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to
the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary
men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents'
stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The
items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. 2 During its pendency, petitioner de

Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he
also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite
demands. 3 Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even
then, not all the seized items were returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. 4 In its Decision

dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the latter
jointly and severally:

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% per annum from
January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items not returned;
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and P15,000.00 for and as
exemplary damages; and
4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed the Decision with

modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the
dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against defendants (petitioners),
ordering the latter jointly and severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her application
for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26 pieces of girl
scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully
paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of P30,000.00, for and as moral
damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally against defendantsappellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS
WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE
CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE
PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless
to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any warrant.

Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner
corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October
1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made
a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the
raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time
between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for
petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a
warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure
would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the
search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." 8 These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their

warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed
their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and
their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private
respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and

liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is
entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is

the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the
pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the
Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the
nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly

responsible,viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32
of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32
of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents.
Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court
of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents') merchandise
and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the
protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to
infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers
conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court's
query posed in its decision now under consideration as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned
over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure
of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the
officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods

unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time
despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of franchise
holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID
PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend immediately
unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant
with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the said
paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. Orders
the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. 14
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting
goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable
and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of

respondents' goods without any warrant.

And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team
for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages.

Again, they did not.

We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for
the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages

can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights,
serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of
embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies.
Respondent Cruz declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am doing business with
borrowed money only, there was commotion created by the raiding team and they even stepped on some of
the pants and dresses on display for sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing
expressions. I was trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18
Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many people have been watching
the PC soldiers hauling my items, and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am
claiming P25,000.00 for damages. 19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like that what I have been
selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. Many people were around
and the more the confiscation was made in a scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses
even those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market goers that
morning. 20

It will also serve as a

stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a
virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly
done both by government and indirectly by private entities.
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages.

21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest
from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts
items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this
Decision until the payment thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZFLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO,
ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN,
BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL.
GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO,
1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.

YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages
may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well.

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by
various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General
Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order,
elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during
these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military
men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize,
harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1)
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to
them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no
cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la
Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez,
Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen
Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated
Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun,
Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants'

contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of
a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming
that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since
there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties
in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant
Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise
direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the
same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their
opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the
plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a
comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose
W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V.
Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and
leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he
(Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to
plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted
plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On
May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside
order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and
Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty.
Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty.
Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin,
represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8,
1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as
prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.

Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was
not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth ProtacioMarcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing
the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983
and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11,
1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to
set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order
of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of dismissal of the
complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver

6. Col. Panfilo Lacson

2. Col. Fidel Singson

7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

3. Col. Rolando Abadilla

8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango

4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

5. Col. Galileo Montanar

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or complaint, dated
November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and refers to defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is granted and
the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent
court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents
were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26,
1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;

(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted
in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of
great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain
basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law
compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the
community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it
and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom
of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which
reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function In support of
said contention, respondents maintain that
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to safeguard public
safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the
continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the
security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and
effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General Ver's order
to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in
Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task
force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest,
rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the
named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of the armed
forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to recover from
respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy
considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and from
potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16
Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from
being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605;
Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now a settled
jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US
483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98
S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d
198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).

Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for the
suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. As
held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had
authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or
expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left
to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are
without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of
the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the
courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this
authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as
they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation
No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to
launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a
blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law
of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with
vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from
within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely
trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the
very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the
struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised,
the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ
by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the
main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are
inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as
grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension
of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered
by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755
which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any
act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial
Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights
and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their
right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent
superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and
employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and

asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise
his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the
latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled
people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if
not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect
that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly,
as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col.
Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo
and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly
caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that
gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which
constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing
any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and
liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among
others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and
confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which
were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they
were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal
treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses
perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil
Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our
law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on

what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged

in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the
defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against
all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of
them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando
Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of
November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True,
the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin
Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad,
counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo
Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have
been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies
thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio
Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla,
Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff.
They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be
assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case.
Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order
of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly
intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a
contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the
plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be
sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its
order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for
further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military or
police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art.
32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs
for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same
time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a
superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who
committed such transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to
properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under
the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a government of laws, existence of the
government be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher.
For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it
breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." 1

As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded secret

marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to
what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme Court stands as the
guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic
role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution
negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without
due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto unless it was caned for as an act of selfdefense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have infutrated the cities and
suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police officers constitute an equally
perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino after her
assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and access to all human rights instruments
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government's commitment to observe the precepts of
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which
the people decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been
created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against all such
violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military or
police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art.
32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs
for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the same
time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a
superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who
committed such transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to
properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under
the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a government of laws, existence of the
government be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher.
For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it
breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded secret

marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to
what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme Court stands as the
guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic
role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution
negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without
due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto unless it was caned for as an act of selfdefense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have infutrated the cities and
suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police officers constitute an equally
perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino after her
assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and access to all human rights instruments

adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government's commitment to observe the precepts of
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which
the people decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been
created and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against all such
violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.

G.R. No. 141309

June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September
29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioners
motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional
rights arising from petitioners issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared
invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco
Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope,"
and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its
effectivity, cigarette brands Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at
the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93
reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654,
specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and
which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to
Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a
certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from
receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on
September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. 9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994,
the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the

deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by
this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint 11 for damages against petitioner in her private capacity.
Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the
issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right
to equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued
RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely
as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondents
counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner
would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the
defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretarys certificate
authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato
and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco
Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.13
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on
the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of
public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad
faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to its
counsel to execute the same.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of
her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this
provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred
that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general
law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public
officers liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the
same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged
the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers "acts" from which civil liability may
arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers violation of constitutional rights, is a
special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v.
Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith.
Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the
just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. 15 An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it

would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.17
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where
the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts
done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts
done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or
instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so
tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision
thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or
things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.19
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and
harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special
and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special
act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not
be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so
to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.20
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the
special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act
is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication.21
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces, cities, and
municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special
provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for
defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the
local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or attempting to
enforce the same. As explained by the Court:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as
regards the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . .
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In
other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object

thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present
action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City
Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before enactment and
after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or
other charges," and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the
Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of
Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments.
Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to
particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed
by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as
the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a
subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining
in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general,
i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to
ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant
force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or
other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give
way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
xxxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another persons constitutional rights only if the public
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should
be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives
or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by
the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement
democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a
matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of
the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with ones duty. And
so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most
cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."25
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation
of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have
acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.
It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the
commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property, or reputation.28 There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and
not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been
rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer,
and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. 29 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an
evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not
precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.30
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of
constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant. 31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code,
and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino,
could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.
In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or
abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled
people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression, joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior
and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public
officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that
while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done
in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the
official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise
to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is
the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of
public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter
on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public
officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers.
Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely
filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not
necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure
to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the secretarys
certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the defect of
respondents complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999
which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioners motion to dismiss,
is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is herebyDIRECTED to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 141309

Present:

- versus -

FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

December 23, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:

It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise
to a liability in favor of particular individuals. [1] The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong
only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has
suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-performance. [2]
By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision[3] in this case.
As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect
on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion, Hope, and More were
considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993,
or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope,
and More as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the
provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the
minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr.
sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in
particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC
37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 3793, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad
valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded
payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is
defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and
finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others,
that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in
her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope
of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter
is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of
malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondents counsel
in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the
allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the
parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping

was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretarys certificate authorizing its counsel to
execute the certification against forum shopping. x x x x
xxxx
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise
even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section
38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article
32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith
need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect
of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys
certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same. [4] [Citations and underscoring omitted.]

In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the
trial court to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK. [5]

Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision. [6] After respondent
filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution,[7] denied with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En Banc. [8] She
contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier decision
rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of
superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the
due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code. [9] Petitioner hence moves for the
reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.[10]
In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,[11] the Court referred the case to the En Banc. Respondent consequently moved for
the reconsideration of this resolution.
We now resolve both motions.
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing to the public collectively (the body
politic), and the duty owing to particular individuals, thus:
1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is
owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual;
who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.
The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the
distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws
are properly executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and illconsidered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like
nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and
assert that they were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public
to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself
rather than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by
considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty
to any particular individual of the community.
These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to define
the general doctrine.
2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to includes those who, while they
owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by
reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under
a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually
receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them.
A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording
the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public
in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector,
each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the
particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance. [12]

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it
must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem
instructs, [t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to
the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability. [13]
Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual cannot have a
cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of
the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a
public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual.
[14]

The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.[15]

The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account

of the public officers improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can never be suffered to
sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage
alone does not constitute a wrong. [16] A contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury,
can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance of a duty
owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have the
likethe complaining individual has no better right than anybody else. [17] If such were the case, no one will serve a public
office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a
particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded. [18]
Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can
hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right
only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Courts pronouncement in
its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioners motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit
for tort for impairment of rights and liberties.[20]
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff,
meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. [21] Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de
Leon,[22] we granted the petitioners claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor launch due to the
illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[23] we upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of
damages as there was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his horserace prize winnings.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the
then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No.
37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals,[24] we declared as having fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. [25] A
public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to
promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not
to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative
rule.
Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must
allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A
careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained
by the respondent. The phrase financial and business difficulties [26] mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion,
ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a particular injury. In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently
demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax
assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.
With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission
attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act

or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.[27]
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.[28]
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a
motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the complaint
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the
relevant and material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The admission does not
extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to
judicial notice.[29]
The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes
that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.[30]
The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of
the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights,
citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[31] where we said:
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even
on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties. [32]

The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any allegation of bad faith, the
cause of action in the respondents complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v.
CA),[33] where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
had fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. This is a logical inference. Without the decision in CIR
v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondents rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the
laws were violated by the petitioners administrative issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically
admitted by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not from either the due process
of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that RMC 37-93 was a
legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring prior notice before RMCs could
become operative. However, this Court did not make an express finding of violation of the right to due process of
law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on
uniformity of taxation; a statement that does not amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of
respondents constitutional right. Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the nonuniformity of tax provisions, the nature of the constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article VInot Section 1,
Article IIIof the Constitution.
This Courts own summation in CIR v. CA: All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 3793 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance, does not lend itself to an interpretation that the RMC
is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaints reliance on CIR v. CAwhich is cited in, and a copy of which is annexed to, the
complaintas suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail.
Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of respondents complaint loses the
needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the
allegation that only respondents Champion, Hope and More cigarettes were reclassified.
If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of respondents cause of action for violation
of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads:

2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93
(hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically Champion, Hope and More as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached
hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX A. The issuance of a circular and its implementation
resulted in the deprivation of property of plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in
violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.)

But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, done without due process of law and in violation of the right of plaintiff
to the equal protection of the laws are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in petitioners motion to
dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are not deemed as facts.
In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,[34] this Court declared that the test of
sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In the instant case, since what
remains of the complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the reclassification of respondents
cigarettes, there will not be enough facts for the court to render a valid judgment according to the prayer in the
complaint.
Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on violation of due process, it may
be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those related to
taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers;
remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the respondentwithout even having to pay the assessment under protestas
recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.:
In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco
requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July
1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.
On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.[35]

The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual
recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondents claim of due process infringement.
At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be instructive.
42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presents a parallel to our own Article 32
of the Civil Code, as it states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, or any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress.

This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners intending to win liability cases against
government officials when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens.
Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation, [36] has emerged as the leading case
on the victims entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and unconstitutional
abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal narcotics officers broke into Bivens home at 6:30 a.m. without a
search warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed Bivens, searched his premises, employed
excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip search in the federal court house,
fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner,
however, charges against him were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal
agent acting under color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional
conduct, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the
agents violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,[37] a liability suit for
money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three students who had
been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University as they protested against U.S. involvement
in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,[38] local school board members were sued by high school students who argued that they
had been deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from school for having spiked a punch bowl
at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In Butz v. Economou,[39] Economou, whose registration privilege
as a commodities futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on
a Bivens action, alleging that the suspension was aimed at chilling his freedom of expression right under the First
Amendment. A number of other cases[40] with virtually the same conclusion followed.
However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials and employees may
prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,[41] that a Bivens remedy will
not be allowed when other meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff) are
available. It has also been held that a Bivensaction is not appropriate in the civil service system [42] or in the military justice
system.[43]
In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of America, [44] petitioner
Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he (Vennes) owed
$250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes business, forced a total asset sale, and put
Vennes out of business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled:
The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayers remedies under the
Internal Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we
have found none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it has strongly
suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens:
When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in
the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.
xxxx
Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who challenge overzealous
tax assessment and collection activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both
administratively and judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized
taxpayer actions against the United States to recover limited damages resulting from specific types of
misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the politically
sensitive realm of taxation, Congresss refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has not
been inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Venness Bivens claims against IRS agents
for their tax assessment and collection activities.

In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS employees for alleged violation of due process rights
concerning a tax dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said:
In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and
otherwise, for
correcting and redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS employees in connection with any collection
activities. Although these provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for
wrongful acts of IRS personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate that it provides all sorts of
rights against the overzealous officialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the
government for a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of taxes chaotic if a
taxpayer could bypass the remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS
employees.[45]

American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner.

Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), which provides:
Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. When
an action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in
the performance of official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make defense
against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action
shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same be paid
by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.
No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has
acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression.

Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the
trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of
a suit against the State.[46]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioners motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision
and DENY respondents motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008Resolution. Civil Case No. CV-97-341-MK, pending
with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141309 : June 30, 2009]
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO V. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted

hereunder,

for

your

information,

is

resolution

of

the

Court En

Banc dated June

30,

2009

G.R. No. 141309 (Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation). - Before the Court is respondent's February 2,
2009 Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the December 23, 2008 Resolution[2] in this case.
It may be recalled that on June 19, 2007, the Court rendered the Decision[3] affirming the trial and the appellate courts'
uniform ruling denying petitioner Vinzons-Chato's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CV-97-341-MK. Dissatisfied, she moved
for reconsideration on July 20, 2007.[4] The Court, however, issued the April 14, 2008 Resolution denying her motion with
finality.[5]
Petitioner then filed, on April 29, 2008, her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En Banc[6] and reiterated her
prayer for the reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.[7] On May 30, 2008, she manifested to the Court that she
received a copy of the April 14, 2008 Resolution only on May 28, 2008,[8] and that she had no knowledge of the aforesaid
resolution at the time she prepared and filed her April 29, 2008 Motion for the referral of the case to the Banc[9] She thus
reiterated her motion for referral and prayed that the case be definitively resolved by the Court En Banc, given that the
issue involved was one of first impression.
Acting on petitioner's motions, the Court issued the June 25, 2008 Resolution[10] referring the case to the Banc, On July
23, 2008, respondent, arguing in the main that the June 19, 2007 Decision had already attained finality, moved for
reconsideration of this resolution.[11]
On November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the case as referred by the Division.[12] And, on December
23, 2008, it rendered the Resolution granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. By that Resolution, the Court ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-97-341 -MK pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City.

Aggrieved by these developments, respondent filed the instant motion for reconsideration, raising the
following grounds:
I.
THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ELEVATE THE INSTANT CASE TO THE EN BANC, AND
THE EN BANC HAD NO JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER THE DECISION OF JUNE 19, 2007, SINCE THE AFORESAID
DECISION HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. THE RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 25: 2008 ELEVATING THE CASE
TO THE EN BANC, AND RESOLUTION" DATED DECEMBER 23, 2008 RECONSIDERING THE DECISION, ARE BOTH NULL AND
VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
II.
THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION CASTRATES SECTION 32 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND DEFEATS AND NEGATES THE NOBLE
OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH IT WAS INCORPORATED IN THE CIVIL CODE.
III.
THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT CONTAINS FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ON THE SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR INJURY
SUFFERED BY IT.
IV.
THE COMPLAINT LIKEWISE CONTAINS FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS SHOWING RESPONDENT'S ENTITLEMENT TO DAMAGES
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
V.
CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUSION, THE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT CLEARLY ALLEGES FACTS AND NOT
CONCLUSIONS, AND HENCE, A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
VI.
AN ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS NEITHER NEGATED NOR PRECLUDED BY THE AVAILABILITY OF
REMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
VII.
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE. [13]
The Court denies the motion.

At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or resolution therein rendered becomes final
and executory, the Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court En Banc.[14] In this case, at the time petitioner
filed her motion for the referral of the case to the Banc on April 29, 2008, the Division Resolution (dated April 14, 2008)
denying her motion for reconsideration had not yet attained finality, considering that petitioner had yet to receive a copy of
the said resolution. She, in fact, manifested that she was only served a copy of the same on May 28, 2008.[15] Further, no
entry of judgment was yet issued by the Court in the case. The June 25, 2008 Resolution, therefore, which referred the case
to the Banc, is a valid issuance.
Likewise valid is the December 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court En Banc reconsidering the earlier decision. Considered as
En Banc cases are those assigned to a Division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the
attention of the Court En Banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the Court En Banc.[16] It is
noted that here, the Court En Banc already accepted the Division's referral of the case on November 18, 2008.[17]
The Court also possesses ample authority to treat the motion for referral as a second motion for reconsideration given that
petitioner, in the same motion, reiterated her plea for the reversal of the June 19, 2007 Decision. While it is a settled rule
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, this Court, in not a few instances, even when entry of
judgment had already been issued, still entertained a second motion for reconsideration, referred the case to the Banc, and
resolved the motion.[18]
Be that as it may, the Court has an inherent power to suspend its own rules, to except a particular case or save a petition
from its operations, wherever the demands of justice so require.[19]
As to the other grounds raised in the motion, suffice it to state that the Court has amply addressed them in the assailed
resolution and finds no compelling reason to overturn its ruling as stated therein.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the Court DENIES respondent company's motion for reconsideration
WITH FINALITY." (Ynares-Santiago, J., maintains her dissent.)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

+.wph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the
widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her
right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same
court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
t.hqw

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may
be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two
enactments are quoted hereinbelow:
t.hqw

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the
expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
Commission, thus:
t.hqw

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a
private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit
and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the
vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a
criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in the
criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He
should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:

t.hqw

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves
his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the
offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of
the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this
article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action
should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil
action is thus independent of the result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
t.hqw

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these
terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been
used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the
Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not
the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the
Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for
assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature
when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the
bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or
frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97
[1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not
included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of
them merely concurred in the result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal
action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the
Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in
article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29
SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action
(Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of
the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the
result.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the
Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in
article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29
SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action
(Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of
the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the
result.

G.R. No. 135306

January 28, 2003

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR.,petitioners,
vs.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA,
ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight to the death to make it possible for you to continue writing it.

Voltaire

VOLTAIRE'S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to free speech and free press liberties that belong
as well, if not more, to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we all strive to achieve
for ourselves and our posterity can better be reached by a free exchange of ideas, where the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the free market not just the ideas we desire, but including those
thoughts we despise.1
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious
organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN,
AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their
own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C.
LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue
of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at
mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng
kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the
pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human
relations; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim
world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the article did not mention
respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an
expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to
Muslims.2
On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since
the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified
It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not identified with specificity. The
subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x. It is thus
apparent that the alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the libel
could not readily identify the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim
member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented in this case failed to convince
this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied to the herein plaintiffs.3
On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed
article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god
by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims
sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and
protect the interests of all Muslims.4
Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court (a) on the existence of the elements of libel,
(b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through
false and malicious statements.5 It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. 6 It is the publication of anything which
is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. 7 Defamation is an invasion of a
relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.8
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action
for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. 9 The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does
not make it actionable by itself.10
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual.
Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right
of action11 without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under
the Bill of Rights.12 Thus, in Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 we dismissed a complaint for libel
against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground that private respondents failed to state a cause of action since they made no allegation
in the complaint that anything contained in the article complained of specifically referred to any of them. Private respondents,
incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual
members, filed a class action suit for damages in behalf of all sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental. The complaint filed in
the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City alleged that Newsweek, Inc., committed libel against them by the publication of the
article "Island of Fear" in its weekly newsmagazine allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by wealthy
landowners and sugar planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers but also brutalized
and killed them with impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood,
slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put the sugarcane planters in a bad light, expose them to
public ridicule, discredit and humiliation in the Philippines and abroad, and make them the objects of hatred, contempt and
hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. We ratiocinated
x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must
be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that
each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he
can bring the action separately, if need be x x x x The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or
more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is
indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons
allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue
for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they
belong to in order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each Muslim, as part of the
larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession; each has
a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find
the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the nonbelievers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that
can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do
not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company,14 the United States Court of Appeals held that one guiding principle of
group libel is that defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual unless it can
be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case, 15 a person had allegedly committed libel against all persons of the
Jewish religion. The Court held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. In an English
case, where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the Court considered that if the libel were on the
whole Roman Catholic Church generally, then the defendant must be absolved. 16 With regard to the largest sectors in society,
including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of the state, or civil action on
behalf of the individual, will lie.
In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than 600 million, were defamed by the airing of a
national television broadcast of a film depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess accused of adultery, and
alleging that such film was "insulting and defamatory" to the Islamic religion. 17 The United States District Court of the Northern
District of California concluded that the plaintiffs' prayer for $20 Billion in damages arising from "an international conspiracy to
insult, ridicule, discredit and abuse followers of Islam throughout the world, Arabs and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" bordered
on the "frivolous," ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an actionable claim for defamation. The California Court
stressed that the aim of the law on defamation was to protect individuals; a group may be sufficiently large that a statement
concerning it could not defame individual group members.18
Philip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of Libel,"19 discusses the inappropriateness of any action
for tortious libel involving large groups, and provides a succinct illustration:
There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a description of the members.
Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description of the member implicit in the description of the body,
or is there a possibility that a description of the body may consist of a variety of persons, those included within the
charge, and those excluded from it?

A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a charge that all of the lawyers were
shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point in a great city, such as Times Square in New York City, were
shysters would obviously not include all of the lawyers who practiced in that district; but a statement that all of the
lawyers who practiced in a particular building in that district were shysters would be a specific charge, so that any
lawyer having an office within that building could sue.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to anyone in
particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff does not
establish any personal reference to himself.20 At present, modern societal groups are both numerous and complex. The same
principle follows with these groups: as the size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover
damages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first, where the
group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to
each individual member; and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and
expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in
libel cases.21
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly
defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics,
Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion
divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and
theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a
heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification.
The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects: Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian,
Lutheran, and other groups the essence of which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple may be a corner house in the
fringes of the countryside. As with the Christian religion, so it is with other religions that represent the nation's culturally diverse
people and minister to each one's spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided into smaller groups with varying
agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical. These divisions in the Muslim population may still be too
large and ambiguous to provide a reasonable inference to any personality who can bring a case in an action for libel.
The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the course of the
deliberations in this case. We extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating discussion on group libel

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one being, in general, written, while the other in
general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a
"relational interest" since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.
The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying one's
reputation as good as one's character and conduct warrant. The mere fact that the plaintiff's feelings and sensibilities
have been offended is not enough to create a cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that something be
communicated to a third person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged
communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing
in the community.
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a defamation action is upon the
allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily
considered defamatory if it "tend[s] to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt,
ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgracex x x." The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement
as one that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him."
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of his prima faciecase that
the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.
The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory charge has been
made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for damages suffered by reason of defamation of
another person, even though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is
necessary that the publication be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a publication may be clearly
defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by him.
If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's reputation has been injured x x x x
In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that the plaintiff is
the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a
group or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to
show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.
If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of the
group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory language was used
toward a small group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to
each member so that each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in
certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a society, a football
team, a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a particular company.

In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there is nothing
that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group,
no member has a right of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal application
and was so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class referred to was so
numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be
maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications concerning groups or classes of persons engaged
in a particular business, profession or employment, directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to
those directed at miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.
Distinguishing a small group which if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a large group which if
defamed entitles no one to sue is not always so simple. Some authorities have noted that in cases permitting
recovery, the group generally has twenty five (25) or fewer members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on
size. Suits have been permitted by members of fairly large groups when some distinguishing characteristic of the
individual or group increases the likelihood that the statement could be interpreted to apply individually. For example,
a single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University football team was permitted to sue when a writer accused
the entire team of taking amphetamines to "hop up" its performance; the individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant
position on the team and had played in all but two of the team's games.
A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and whether a statement will be
interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members
with the same brush and the more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes more
than twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size may be seen to dilute the harm to individuals
and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit.
x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within the foregoing group
classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are all the political and ideological beliefs; there are the
many colors of the human race. Group defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various
racial, religious and political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes to prevent concerted efforts to
harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime to circulate insidious rumors against racial and
religious groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such broadside defamation has been lacking.
There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the courts for libel on these groups,
but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too large and poorly defined to support a finding that
the plaintiff was singled out for personal attack x x x x (citations omitted).
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer
to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely
claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an intentional tortious act causing mental distress and
not an action for libel. That opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire22 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that words
heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and do not enjoy
constitutional protection; and Beauharnais v. Illinois23 where it was also ruled that hate speech which denigrates a group of
persons identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit such speech on
the same ground as defamation of an individual.
We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately preceding paragraph. Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort
action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual24 to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due
to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the
disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle
of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished
from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of
emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the
community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the
country.25It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions
for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.
Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff
must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental
distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.26
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The
defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff. 27 Generally,
conduct will be found to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse
his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or her reaction.28
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. 29 "Severe emotional
distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis,
psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.30 The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered
emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element
of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.31

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.
Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In
determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind;
the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not
enough.32
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell33 illustrates the test case of a civil action for damages on intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring the American fundamentalist preacher and evangelist Reverend Jerry
Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state having an incestuous, sexual liaison with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued
Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt for damages. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that
the parody was not libelous, because no reasonable reader would have understood it as a factual assertion that Falwell
engaged in the act described. The jury, however, awarded $200,000 in damages on a separate count of "intentional infliction of
emotional distress," a cause of action that did not require a false statement of fact to be made. The United States Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision overturned the jury verdict of the Virginia Court and held that Reverend Falwell may not
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It was argued that the material might be deemed outrageous and may
have been intended to cause severe emotional distress, but these circumstances were not sufficient to overcome the free
speech rights guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Simply stated, an intentional tort
causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free speech.
It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High Court as a "public figure," he was an individual
particularly singled out or identified in the parody appearing on Hustler magazine. Also, the emotional distress allegedly
suffered by Reverend Falwell involved a reactive interest an emotional response to the parody which supposedly injured his
psychological well-being.
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional distress
allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence
on record that points to that result.
Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional infliction of emotional distress in this manner34
There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable for mere insult, indignity,
annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other circumstances of aggravation. The reasons are not far
to seek. Our manners, and with them our law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a
remedy in the form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance. Liability of course cannot be extended to
every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind x x x The plaintiff cannot recover
merely because of hurt feelings.
Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this succinct observation, viz:35
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt. There must still be
freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may
blow off relatively harmless steam.
Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of recovery for emotional harm that would "open up a
wide vista of litigation in the field of bad manners," an area in which a "toughening of the mental hide" was thought to be a
more appropriate remedy.36 Perhaps of greater concern were the questions of causation, proof, and the ability to accurately
assess damages for emotional harm, each of which continues to concern courts today.37
In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded by subsequent First Amendment
doctrines. Back in simpler times in the history of free expression the Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory, known as
the Two-Class Theory, that treated certain types of expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the First
Amendment. The most celebrated statement of this view was expressed in Chaplinsky:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First Amendment principles have passed it by. American courts no
longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or
offensive.38 Cohen v. California39 is illustrative: Paul Robert Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los
Angeles courthouse in April 1968, which caused his eventual arrest. Cohen was convicted for violating a California statute
prohibiting any person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct." The U.S. Supreme Court conceded that
Cohen's expletive contained in his jacket was "vulgar," but it concluded that his speech was nonetheless protected by the right
to free speech. It was neither considered an "incitement" to illegal action nor "obscenity." It did not constitute insulting or
"fighting" words for it had not been directed at a person who was likely to retaliate or at someone who could not avoid the
message. In other words, no one was present in the Los Angeles courthouse who would have regarded Cohen's speech as a
direct personal insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence against him.
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket. The conviction could only be
justified by California's desire to exercise the broad power in preserving the cleanliness of discourse in the public sphere,

which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the State, holding that no objective distinctions can be made between vulgar
and nonvulgar speech, and that the emotive elements of speech are just as essential in the exercise of this right as the purely
cognitive. As Mr. Justice Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another man's lyric x x x words are often chosen
as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." 40 With Cohen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally laid the Constitutional
foundation for judicial protection of provocative and potentially offensive speech.
Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First Amendment protection. Only one small piece of the Two-Class
Theory in Chaplinsky survives U.S. courts continue to treat "obscene" speech as not within the protection of the First
Amendment at all. With respect to the "fighting words" doctrine, while it remains alive it was modified by the current rigorous
clear and present danger test.41 Thus, in Cohen the U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was no showing
that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened to provoke imminent violence; and that protecting the
sensibilities of onlookers was not sufficiently compelling interest to restrain Cohen's speech.
Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, suffered the same fate as Chaplinsky. Indeed,
whenBeauharnais was decided in 1952, the Two-Class Theory was still flourishing. While concededly the U.S. High Tribunal
did not formally abandon Beauharnais, the seminal shifts in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence substantially
undercut Beauharnais and seriously undermined what is left of its vitality as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt a
crushing impact on Beauharnais and rendered it almost certainly a dead letter case law are Brandenburg v. Ohio,42 and,
again, Cohen v. California.43 These decisions recognize a much narrower set of permissible grounds for restricting speech than
did Beauharnais.44
In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute
for advocating the necessity, duty and propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reforms; and for voluntarily assembling with a group formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Appellant challenged the statute and was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that
the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.45 Except in unusual instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of
lawlessness as long as such speech is not translated into action.
The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof. Smolla affirmed that "Brandenburgmust be
understood as overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of treating group libel under the same First Amendment
standards as individual libel."46 It may well be considered as one of the lynchpins of the modern doctrine of free speech, which
seeks to give special protection to politically relevant speech.
In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit. As correctly pointed out by Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the
question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the
named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it
so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for
the rest of the class.47
The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned. In the present controversy, Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert
the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously
lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of
their interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those absent
will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing."48
Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts complained
of,49 and so it must be, as moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but
to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. 50 Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be
awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 51 Unfortunately,
neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately
established by respondents."
In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another individual's religion is as commonplace as selfappointed critics of government, it would be more appropriate to respect the fair criticism of religious principles, including those
which may be outrageously appalling, immensely erroneous, or those couched as fairly informative comments. The greater
danger in our society is the possibility that it may encourage the frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether
Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This would unnecessarily make the civil courts a battleground to assert
their spiritual ideas, and advance their respective religious agenda.
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper religious conduct or belief; neither does it
have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast asunder, for the
validity of religious beliefs or values are outside the sphere of the judiciary. Such matters are better left for the religious
authorities to address what is rightfully within their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when it
comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rights under modern jurisprudence where "[a]ll
ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment even those ideas that are universally condemned and run
counter to constitutional principles."52 Under the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas."53 Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate court decision would surely create a chilling effect
on the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 August 1998 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-37733. September 30, 1982.]
ALMARIO T. SALTA, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI of
Manila, Branch XIV and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-38035. September 30, 1982.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. HON. AMANTE P. PURISIMA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch VII and ALMARIO SALTA, Respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for Petitioner.
Jesus de Veyra for his own behalf.
Nestor L. Kalaw, Edgardo M. Magtalas and Juan C. Gatmaitan for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Salta was employed as branch manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). As such, his duty was to grant
loans or to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the the amount of the loan applied for. PNB filed two civil
complaints against Salta charging him of indiscriminately granting certain loans in a manner characterized by negligence,
fraud, and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. The two civil cases were
assigned to two different salas of the Court of First Instance of Manila. At the same time, the bank caused to be filed, a
criminal case, based on the same acts. Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on the ground that the elements of the
crime charged were not proven. Based on his aquittal petitioner filcd a Motion to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. The
two presiding judges in the separate civil cases took diametrically opposing views. One judge denied his motion and the
other granted it. Hence, these petitions by the blank in one case and by Salta in the other.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying thc motion to dismiss and reversed the order granting the said motion. It
held that since the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred
in the complaints, the civil actions can be maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS; ALLEGATION OF FRAUD WARRANTS
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS. The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense
the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the same acts
for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the
cause of action averred in the complaints. The following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the
complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud: "That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the
aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and
scheme aforementioned."
2. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; CIVIL ACTION MAY PROSPER REGARDLESS OF RESULT OF CRIMINAL ACTION; RATIONALE. It is
significant to note that under Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be
filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of
the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same
manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATION OF NEGLIGENCE WARRANTS FILING OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION. That there is
allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint states that "the defendant as manager of Malolos
Branch, in gross violation of the bank rules and regulations, and without exercising necessary prudence, . . . . extended a
number of credit accommodations. . ." On this allegation of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained as an
entirely independent action from the criminal case. Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no
application
thereto.
DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:

In these two cases, the only issue to be resolved is whether a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a
separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case, which is for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The petitioner, Almario T. Salta, in G.R. No. L-37733, takes the affirmative stand on the issue as above indicated, as he
made manifest in his motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 79583, of the CFI of Manila, Branch XIV, which was, however, denied
by Hon. Jesus de Veyra, presiding. In a similar motion aforementioned petitioner sought to dismiss another civil case (Civil
Case No. 88343), pending before Branch VII of the same CFI of Manila, presided over by Hon. Amante Purisima who
granted the motion to dismiss.

We have, therefore, the unedifying spectacle of two cases involving the same issue disposed of by two judges in a manner
directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion,
the two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. For purposes of convenience, however, although the petitioner in
G.R. No. L-37733, Almario T. Salta, is the private respondent in the other case, G.R. No. L-38035, in which the petitioner is
the Philippine National Bank, We shall refer in this decision to Salta as "petitioner," and the PNB, as "respondent
bank."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos branch. As such, his duty was, among others, to
himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the
performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the
policies, rules and regulations of the bank.
In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner indiscriminately granted
certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in manner characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest
partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. This is how the respondent bank found
petitioner to have discharged his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila
(Civil Case No. 79583, Branch XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil Case No. 88343, Branch VII) on September
23, 1972, to recover losses the bank suffered. At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a
criminal case with the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District at San Fernando, Pampanga, Criminal Case No.
CCC-V-668, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In the criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the prosecution has rested, granted the
motion in a 64-page Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, therefore, the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer) to Evidence) should be as it is
hereby granted and accused ALMARIO T. SALTA ACQUITTED of the offense charged in the Information the prosecution
having to prove the essential ingredience and/or elements of the crime charged, with costs de oficio."
With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based on Section
3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. . . ."
It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically
opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it.
We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued by Judge de Veyra, which, for its brevity, but clear and
convincing, We quote as follows:
"Having been acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of violation of the Anti-Graft Law, Defendant now seeks the
dismissal of the civil case which arose from the same set of facts. The motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason that
acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes
a finding that even civilly the accused would not be liable there is no such a finding. Apart from this, Plaintiff in this
present civil case bases its case either on fraud or negligence evidence that only requires a preponderance, unlike beyond
reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal cases.
"The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied for lack of merit."
To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision
of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud,
one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was
filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the
complaints. It needs hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner disputes, particularly as to the sufficiency
of the allegation of fraud in the civil complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following allegation in the complaints
unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud
"That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts,
which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned."
That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint states that "the defendant manager of
Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the rules and regulations, and without exercising necessary prudence, . . . extended a
number of credit accommodation . . ." On this allegation of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained as an entirely
independent action from the criminal case. Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no
application thereto.

The ruling in the case of PNB v. Bagamaspad, involving the same respondent herein, and also against its branch manager,
unherringly charts the course to be followed in final resolution of these cases. Thus
"The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on the provisions of Article 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code,
defining and enumerating the duties and obligations of an agent and his liability for failure to comply with such duty. . . . A
careful study and consideration of the record, however, convinces us and we agree with the trial court that the defendantsappellants have not only violated instructions of the plaintiff Bank, including things which the bank wanted done or not
done, all of which were fully understood by them, but they (appellants) also violated standing regulations regarding the
granting of loans, and what is more, thru their carelessness, laxity and negligence, they allowed bans to be granted to
persons who were not entitled to secure loans."
If petitioners civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from the averment of fraud, then on
the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.
The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio v. Alvendia is not only enlightening, but authoritative. Thus
". . . in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make
these actions `entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34 and 2177). Hence in these cases,
I think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d) does not apply."
It is significant to note that under Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to
be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result
of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same
manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently
even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the courts disposition of the criminal case of no
effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a
nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the
distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a
specie of an offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently
of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.
The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action is
reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from,
private counsel representing the interest of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in the present instance, the
prosecution of the criminal case is left to the government prosecutor undertake, any mistake or mishandling of the case
committed by the latter should not work to the prejudice of the offend party whose interest would thus be protected by the
measure contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 of the New Civil Code.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it should be stated with emphasis, for its decisive effect on how the issue raised in this case
should be disposed of, that in no manner may the resolution of the Circuit Criminal Court be read as positively stating that
the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist, as required in the provision relied upon by petitioner, Section
3(C), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. As Judge de Veyra put it, "acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle
for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly, the accused would not be
liable there is no such finding." There, indeed, could not be such finding because the criminal court, aware that the civil
case is not before it, would be acting in excess of jurisdiction if it were to make any pronouncement in effect disposing of a
case pending before another court, over which it had not acquired jurisdiction. Even if this were authorized by the Rules of
Court, the validity of such rule would be open to serious doubt as it would be affecting a matter of jurisdiction, which is
substantive in character, considering the constitutional limitation of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, that said
rules should not increase or diminish substantive rights.
WHEREFORE, the order denying the motion to dismiss issued in Civil Case No. 79583 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(G. R. No. L-37733) is affirmed, while the order granting a similar motion in Civil Case No. 88343 of the same court (G. R.
No. L-38035) is reversed. Let the records of these two (2) cases be remanded to their respective courts of origin for proper
further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26737

July 31, 1969

LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and CORAZON, all surnamed MARCIA and represented by
their mother LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendants-appellees.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for defendants-appellees.
CAPISTRANO, J.:
This is a direct appeal on questions of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 6880 of that court.
On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided within
the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical
injuries to two other persons.
An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje
in the Court First Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action
for damages. On November 7, 1960, the accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged in the
information. Said defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1961, while
defendant's appeal was pending decision in the Court of Appeals, Clemente Marcia's heirs, namely, his widow, Laura Corpus,
and their minor children, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for
damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co.,
Inc., defendants, praying that said defendants be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of damages claimed by the
plaintiffs. On November 9, 1962, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the
appealed judgment and acquitting the appellant after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist,
and that the collision was a case of pure accident.
On December 29, 1962, the defendants filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by
the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action. The motion was denied.
At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action
based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the
collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four
years. The lower court, in its order of May 31, 1966, dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was based
upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed direct to this Court on questions of law from the order
dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. The contention is unmeritorious in view of
the following considerations.
(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a
bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action. In the celebrated case of Chantangco vs.
Abaroa, which was an appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S. 476; 54 L. Ed.
1116; 40 Phil. 1056, Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said:
It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil action.
This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain inference from
the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility.
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code
which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries. Although in the case

of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the term "physical injuries" used in
article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In the case of People vs. Buan, G.R. No. L25366, March 29, 1968, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Supreme Court, said that the "offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance
of the offense." It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence,
that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other
persons. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide
through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved 2 his
right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec.
3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did
not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.
(2) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was based upon a quasidelict, 3 the trial court's finding that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An action upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasidelict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the said period was not interrupted by the institution of
the criminal action for reckless imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958.)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, with special pronouncement as to costs..
Footnotes
This and the following footnotes express my opinion on certain controversial articles of the New Civil Code, which
was drafted when I was a member of the Code Commission.
1

(a) The holding in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, etc., et al., supra, at the term "physical injuries" used in Article
33 of the Civil Code includes homicide or murder, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law. I recall that when the
draft of what is now Article 33 of the New Civil Code was presented for deliberation by Code Commission Chairman
Dean Jorge C. Bocobo, a great civilian, before the Code Commission (then composed of besides Chairman Bocobo,
Professor Guillermo B. Guevarra, Dean Pedro Y. Ylagan, and Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, members), said
Chairman made, in substance, the following remarks: In America the injured party in crime has the initiative, through
his lawyer he immediately files a civil action for damages against the offender. In the Philippines the offended party
depends upon the fiscal to demand in the criminal action the damages he has suffered. I think it is about time to
educate our people the American way by giving the injured party in crime the initiative to go to court through his
lawyer to demand damages, and for this purpose we should give him an independent civil action for damages. Let us
begin with just three crimes which are of common occurrence, namely, defamation, fraud, and physical injuries.
Depending upon the success of the experiment, when the new Civil Code may come up for revision about fifty (50) or
one hundred (100) years from now, it will be up to our successors in the Code Commission to add more crimes to the
three already mentioned or make the provision comprise all crimes causing damages to the injured party. This civil
action, as in America, should proceed independently of the criminal action and should be proved only by
preponderance of evidence. Defamation may be oral or written. Fraud comprises all forms of estafa. Physical Injuries
is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and does not include homicide or murder because where physical injuries
result in homicide or murder, the reason for the law (namely, to give the injured party personally the initiative to
demand damages by an independent civil action) ceases, for the reason that a dead person can no longer personally,
through his lawyer institute an independent civil action for damages. (All the members of the Code Commission
agreed with the Chairman and the draft of the article was unanimously approved.)
In the Revised Penal Code, the crime of homicide is treated in Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons), Chapter One
(Destruction of life), while the crime of physical injuries is separately treated in Chapter Two of the same title. This
shows that the two crimes are distinct from each other, that physical injuries is not included in homicide.
(b) Article 32 (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) of the Civil Code is also intended, insofar as it
provides for an independent civil action, to educate the Filipino the American way by going immediately to the courts
to file a civil action for damages in vindication of his constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in the article in case
of violation of any of them.
(c) Article 34 of the Civil Code, insofar as it authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, is also intended
for the same purpose.
(a) The crime of reckless imprudence resulting in the death of Clemente Marcia and physical injuries to two other
persons not being one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of
an independent civil action for damages, the heirs of the deceased correctly reserved their right to institute a separate
civil action for damages against the bus driver, Felardo Paje, who stood charged with the crime of homicide and
2

double physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The reservation was in accordance with what is now Rule 111,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of a civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
The civil action for damages against Felardo Paje was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, Section 3, which, in
part, provides:
Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
At any rate, said civil action was correctly suspended in the Court of First Instance until final judgment by the Court of
Appeals in the criminal action was rendered pursuant to Section 3(b) of said Rule 111 which provides that:
After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and
the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered.
The decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the appellant Felardo Paje of the crime of reckless imprudence
charged against him on the ground that it did not exist, extinguished the civil action for damages filed against him, in
accordance with Section 3(c) of Rule 111 which states that:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ....
This rule finds support in the celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra.
(b) Section 2 of Rule 111 which provides:
Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
is defective and imperfect in many ways:
First. Article 31 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action. An independent civil action is an
action that is based upon the same criminal act as in the case of Articles 32, 33 and 34. When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action being based
upon an obligation not arising from the criminal act but from a different source, is not an independent civil action
within the meaning of Articles 32, 33 and 34. Article 31 (drafted by Code Commissioner Capistrano) which provides
that:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
states a self-explanatory rule different and distinct from that laid down in Articles 32, 33 and 34. For example: A is
prosecuted for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The heirs of the deceased institute a civil
action for damages against him based upon quasi-delict, under Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which is separate and
distinct from criminal negligence punished as a crime or delict under the Revised Penal Code. Quasi-delict is culpa
aquiliana and is separate and distinct from criminal negligence, which is a delict. The distinction is made in Article
2177 itself which in part provides that:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Code Commission Chairman Bocobo, who drafted Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, took the distinction from
modern authorities in civil law. Accordingly, the report of the Code Commission on the Project of Civil Code makes
reference to the sources of the distinction, thus:
The foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter, is a distinct and

independent negligence, which is the 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
'culpa extra-contractual' or 'quasi-delict' has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound, and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist." .
Therefore, under the proposed article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a 'quasi-delict' or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
(Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, With Comments and Annotations, Vol. 4, p. 470.)
Second. As above explained, Article 2177 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action in crime.
The article precisely distinguishes quasi-delict or civil negligence from criminal negligence (reckless imprudence) and
authorizes the institution of a civil action for damages based upon quasi-delict and not upon criminal negligence,
which is a delict and not a quasi-delict. In accordance with Article 31, the civil action for damages based upon quasidelict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of
the latter. Hence, even if the defendant is acquitted in the criminal action of the charge of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, the civil action for damages for the death of the deceased based upon quasi-delict may
proceed to judgment.
Third. The proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111, with reference to the correctly cited Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted for the purpose explained in
footnote one and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule
111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.
In view of all the foregoing, Section 2 of Rule 111 should be amended so as to read as follows:
Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
before or after the criminal action is instituted. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Notice shall be given in the criminal action of the
institution of the civil action or of the intention to institute the same.
The prayer of the complaint in the civil action asked that the defendants, Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., be ordered to pay jointly and severally the damages claimed by plaintiffs. This prayer,
considering the action as one upon a quasi-delict, is not in accordance with law. In quasi-delict, according to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to pay damages is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The article then, in part continues: "The owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise, are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed, or on the occasion of their functions." Hence, the bus driver, Felardo
Paje, was responsible for the quasi-delict, he being, in the language of the American law, a tort-feasor. Likewise, the
bus operator, Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., was liable for the quasi-delict of its bus driver. This liability is not
solidary but primary, with right to full reimbursement pursuant to Article 2181, which provides: .
3

Whoever pays for the damages caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has
paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
The prayer of the complaint, based upon a quasi-delict, against the bus driver, Felardo Paje, and the bus operator,
Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., should have been that the plaintiffs recover the damages claimed from either of
them. The bus operator defendant Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., could have filed a third-party complaint
against the defendant bus driver, pleading its right for reimbursement under Article 2181.
When is the bus operator solidarily liable with the bus driver? Article 2184 of the Civil Code provides:
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have
by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. .... "If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of
article 2180 are applicable.
This article (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) is intended to cover only the owners of private motor
vehicles for private use. It is not generally applicable to motor vehicles for public use and convenience because the
operator thereof, usually a corporation, cannot in the very nature of things, be in the motor vehicle at the time of the
mishap. However, if the manager of the bus company was in the bus at the time of the mishap, Article 2184 may be
applied by analogy.
In the case of De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-15247, February 28, 1962, it was
held that in quasi-delict, the bus operator is solidarily liable with the bus driver in view of article 2194 of the Civil Code
which provides:

"The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
This article (drafted by Code Commissioner Capistrano) merely restates the basic rule in American law that joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort. In the case of a quasi-delict committed by a bus driver, he alone is
the tort-feasor; the bus operator is not a joint tort-feasor. For this reason the liability of the bus operator is not
governed by Article 2194 but by Article 2180.
Joint tort-feasors in American law are the same as co-authors or co-principals of a quasi-delict in the civil law, and it is
only to them that Article 2194 is applicable. A bus operator is not a co-author or co-principal of the tort committed by
its bus driver; hence, it cannot be made solidarily liable with the bus driver under Article 2194. Its liability is that of an
employer under Article 2180, with right to full reimbursement under Article 2181.
To make the bus operator solidarily liable with the driver would diminish its right to full reimbursement from the driver
because in passive solidarity, the solidary debtors share equally in the obligation (Article 1208, Civil Code).
Consequently, if the bus operator's liability were solidary, in the event of full payment by it of the obligation, its right to
reimbursement from the bus driver would only be of one-half of the obligation because its share of the solidary
obligation would be one-half. This would result in reducing by one-half its right to full reimbursement under Article
2181.
The prayer for solidary liability in the complaint against the defendants Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner
Transportation Co. Inc., considering the complaint as based upon criminal negligence, is likewise not in the
accordance with law. In crime committed by an employee within the scope of his duties, the employer's liability is
subsidiary, not solidary, in accordance with Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY
MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY
CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated
November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:

1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and
existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza
Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be the
employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged
responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant
SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as security
guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON
V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per
Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while
the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasioffenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the
complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela
is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their liability
under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial
Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt
acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).

Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary
or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon
Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the
concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are
mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on
crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasidelict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the verified
complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by the
Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also
cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that
Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their
negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability
for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil
action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or
SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to
wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus,
petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the
criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action
contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was
done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held
liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is
even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed
the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended
by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action
(Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not
by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the
present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private
respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon
Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to
acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed
with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA
98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the
Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
(if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as
"voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant
to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto.
However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held
that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be
noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for
Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is

not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore
erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of
attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is that the
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following
elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA
33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the
defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that
Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty;
and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not
operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and
wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the
defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can
present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are
sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava
Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow
them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well
as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-891751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE
MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In
1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of
pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to
his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President
and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating
that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to
leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to
him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to
submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his
complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private
respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December
10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was
still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to
the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other
documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating
his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the
fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private
investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were
filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of Article
290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). Two of these complaints were
refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints
with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
lwph1.t

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been
terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However,
the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias
appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office,
petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal
dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry,
without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to

pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's
fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the
amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private
respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for
the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed
for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy
the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and
which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles
is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising
their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article
21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [ Id. it p.
40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While
the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for
e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr.,
G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United
General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21,
1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners
have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible
existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that
he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table

drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners
do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners,
the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors
suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And
this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972
after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the
crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on
December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis
and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively,
then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September
27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against
Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal
complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short
Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he
landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various
actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements
about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that
Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment
with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage
suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee
the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted
moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or
property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into
confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a
seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is
no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of
seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of
forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p.
10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs
and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions
can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.]
Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file
criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a
clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047,
June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and
attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent,
all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a
person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not
render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576].
The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if
there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268,
January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints
against Tobias, observing that:
xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5)
of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the
Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of
Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these
cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential
decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief
Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the
fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants
compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a
supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six
(6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be
expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia,
commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident
likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be no
mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress,
and cause damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed
during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the
complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six
complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number of
anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made by
Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible
filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering
the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal
case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal
of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six
criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for
the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision,
pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of
committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well
as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment;
and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds
that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absqueinjuria. It is
argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result
of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners
herein). " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
lwph1.t

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or
amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also
Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987].
This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to
dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which
petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error
in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the
award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and
tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners
against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001.]

SERGIO AMONOY, Petitioner, v. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA,Respondents.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a persons rights, even if it causes loss to another,
does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle does
not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a persons right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or
extinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must act with justice, give others their
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
cralaw : red

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41451, which set aside the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal. The
RTC had earlier dismissed the Complaint for damages filed by herein respondents against petitioner. The dispositive portion
of the challenged CA Decision reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE, and in its stead judgment is rendered ordering the defendant-appellee
Sergio Amonoy to pay the plaintiffs-appellants Bruno and Bernardina Gutierrez as actual damages the sum of [t]wo
[h]undred [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00)." 3
Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA Resolution, 4 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as follows:

jgc:chanro

bles.com.ph

"This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of
therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda. On 12 January 1965, the Project of
Partition submitted was approved and . . . two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Fornilda. The attorneys fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Fornilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure
the payment of his attorneys fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and
the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated.
"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the
latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.

"Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their
foreclosure in Civil Case No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy v. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda
before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorneys fees
charged [were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00
as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorneys fees. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at
public auction.
"They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was held
where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A deficiency was
claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50.
"Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.
"More than a year after the Decision in Civil Case No. 12726 was rendered, the said decedents heirs filed on 19 December
1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal[,] Civil Case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al v. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the
annulment thereof. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
on 22 July 1981.
"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26
August 1985. On Amonoys motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the
demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC IVth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin
Antonil and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a twin Musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng
Paglalapastangan, and Musiyung Makahingi ng Utos sa Pagpapapigil ng Pagpapagiba at Pananagutin sa Paglalapastangan)
with full titles as fanciful and elongated as their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary
restraining order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners houses.
"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of Possession,
as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish the
houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are hereby set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore
issued, is made permanent. The six (6) parcels of land herein controverted are hereby ordered returned to petitioners
unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third persons." 5
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had already been
destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner
before the RTC on December 15, 1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower courts ruling
and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was also denied.
Hence, this recourse. 6
The Issue
In his Memorandum, 7 petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner [was] liable to the respondents for
damages" 8
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:

chanrob1es
virtual

1aw

library

Petitioners Liability
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a loss without injury
damnum absque injuria for which the law gives no remedy. 9 In other words, one who merely exercises ones rights does
no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents house. He maintains
that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of
respondents house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of
Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of
respondents house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrezs testimony. The appellate
court quoted the following pertinent portion thereof: 10

"Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy your house?
A. Not all, a certain portion only
x

Q. Was your house completely demolished?

A: No, sir.

chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Q. How about the following day?

A. It was completely demolished"

Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?

A. Until 1987.
Q. About what month of 1987?
A. Middle of the year.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who completed the demolition?
A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy." 11
The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition, which allegedly commenced only on May 30, 1986, was
completed the following day. It likewise belies his allegation that the demolitions had already ceased when he received
notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his
acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received
the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:

gc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law.
It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another . . . . Over and above the specific
precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice . . .; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it
is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others." 12
Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, 13 the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible . . . ."
cralaw

virtua1aw

library

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but
also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Courts Order and wittingly
caused the destruction of respondents house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right. 14
Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage
or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioners liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
15
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

chanrob1e

SO ORDERED.

virtua1

1aw

1ibrary

..

[G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.]

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, Petitioner, v. ROMEO A. JADER, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter
had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant
petition for review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted
by the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 to wit:
jgc:chanr

obles.com.ph

"Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last
year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits 2, also Exhibit H). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth
year law student (Exhibit A) and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits H-2, also Exhibit 2) which was approved by
Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On
May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits H-4, also
Exhibits 2-L, 2-N).
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

"In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among
the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiffs name appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with
the following annotation:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"JADER ROMEO A.

Def. Conflict of Laws - x-1-87-88, Practice Court I - Inc., 1-87-88. C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits
3, 3-C-1, 3-C-2)."
crala

virtua1aw library

"The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled
on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of
the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits B, B-6, B-6-A). At the foot of the list of the names
of the candidates there appeared however the following annotation:
chanrob1es

virtual

1aw

library

This is a tentative list. Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (Exhibit B-7-A).
"The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the
program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest

brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter
handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took
pictures of the occasion (Exhibits C to C-6, D-3 to D-11).
"He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him
good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits D
to D-1).
"He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job
from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit G) and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University (Exhibits F to F-2). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was
not able to take the bar examination." 2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take
the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latters negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to
believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the
tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY
PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorneys fees and the cost of suit.
Defendants counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 3
Which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Courts Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of
plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS for moral damages. Costs against Defendant-Appellee.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader,
considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out
of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.
chanro

bles virtuallawlibrary:red

The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into
between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are
considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the schools commitment under the
contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with
the formers agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing
prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial
notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her
students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient
notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institutions way of announcing to the whole world that the
students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have
satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the
obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latters grades and performance and
also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time
when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a
suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with
the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. 5 It is the
school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and
comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should

run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the
schools rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision
and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality
which caused the damage or injury. 6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of
rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. 7 He must see to it that his own
professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the
rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for
instance by not promptly submitting a students grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of
the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
chanrobles.com.ph:red

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. 8 In
civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with
due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with
whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of
liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. 9 Schools and professors cannot just take
students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the
latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. 10 Want of care
to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally
calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. 11 Petitioner ought to have known that time
was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate
concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its
students grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme
Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioners liability arose from its failure to
promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent
court:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had been informed
during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet,
defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the
degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendantappellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included
plaintiff-appellants name in the "tentative" list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the
deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out
that plaintiff-appellants name was allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the
hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation
day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff-appellant Jader could have done something to
complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of
his failing grade in Practice Court I." 12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay
of information to Respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the
loss occurred must bear it. 13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is
abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If mere fault or negligence in ones acts can make him liable
for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latters actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the
Court of Appeals findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he
could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on
respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his
affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we
fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites,

enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking
the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also
prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.
chanrobles.com

virtual

law

library

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with
legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorneys fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages
is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-15526. December 28, 1963.]

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority stockholders of the
Allied Technologists, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, COL.
NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineering Group, Office of the Secretary of National Defense,
THE FINANCE OFFICER of the Department of National Defense, THE AUDITOR of the Dept. of
National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED TECHNOLOGISTS, INC., Defendants-Appellees.
Montenegro, Madayag, Viola & Hernandez, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Solicitor General for defendants-appellee Secretary of National Defense.
Rosauro Alvarez for defendant-appellee Allied Technologists, Inc.
L.D. Panlilio for defendant-appellee Pablo Panlilio.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; SINGLE AND INDIVISIBLE CAUSE OF ACTION; CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION
INSEPARABLE FROM CLAIM FOR NON-PAYMENT OF FEES. The contention of the appellants in the case at
bar that their claim for recognition as co-architects of the Veterans Memorial Hospital is divisible and separable
from their allegations for non-payment by the government of a portion of the architectural fees and that the
lower court should have merely ordered the striking out of the moot portion of appellants cause of action and
proceeded with their claim for recognition was held to be without merit, because the allegations of the
amended complaint show that there is an indivisible and single cause of action which is primarily to prevent
payment exclusively to the defendant architect, the architectural fees, and that the matter of recognizing
them as co-architects of the hospital was merely incidental thereto.
2. ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; RECOGNITION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDING NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF APPEAL.
Where the sole object of the appeal in a case is only to secure for appellants a recognition that they were
co-architects in the construction of a hospital so as to enhance their professional prestige, it is held that a
judicial declaration to that effect is unnecessary, because a brilliant professional enjoys the respect and
esteem of his fellow men, even without a court declaration of such fact, while an incompetent one may
summon
all
the
tribunals
of
the
world
to
proclaim
his
genius
in
vain.
3. ID.; ID., "INJURY" UNDER ART. 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE REQUIRES A LEGAL RIGHT VIOLATED. The
appellants contention in the case at bar that their claim for recognition as co-architects is authorized under
Article 21 of the Civil Code on the ground that the word "injury" in said article refers also to honor or credit, is
held to be without merit, because this Article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right and such
right is violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and it presupposes
losses or injuries, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation, which situation
does not obtain in the case at bar.

DECISION

PAREDES, J.:
This is an appeal by plaintiffs Enrique J. L. Ruiz and Jose V. Herrera from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 26601, dated February 25, 1959, dismissing plaintiffs complaint.
On September 11, 1950, a contract was executed between the defendant Allied Technologists Inc.,
(corporation, for short), and the Republic of the Philippines, for the construction of the Veterans Memorial
Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders and officers of the corporation. The construction of the hospital
was terminated in 1955. On August 20, 1954, and June 20, 1955, Civil Case Nos. 23778 and 26601,
respectively, were filed by same plaintiffs herein, making as parties-defendants in both cases, the same
defendants herein, the Secretary of National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez (Engineer), the Finance Officer,
and the Auditor of the Dept. of National Defense, Pablo D. Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc. Civil Case No.
23778 was dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954 and the dismissal was affirmed by this Court on July 7,
1955, in G.R. No. L-8638. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed on September 13, 1955. On appeal, this
Court reversed the order of dismissal, under the impression that the real controversy was confined merely
between defendant Panlilio and plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera over the 15 percent of the contract price, which was
retained by the Department of National Defense. The retention of the 15 percent of the contract price in the
sum of P34,740.000 was made to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the
construction. The last case, however, was remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings. Panlilio and
the corporation filed their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by the Department of National
Defense was already paid to defendant corporation, as sought for by the plaintiffs in their complaint. In view
of this development, the trial court invited the parties to a conference, in which the plaintiffs indicated their
conformity, to the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the retention of the 15% of the contract price;
but insisted upon the hearing of the second question, which sought the declaration and recognition of plaintiffs
Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three architects of the hospital. The trial court, nevertheless, dismissed the
complaint, for being already academic and moot. Hence, this appeal by plaintiffs-appellants, who alleged in
their lone assignment of error that "the lower court grievously erred in ordering the dismissal of the case, with
costs against the plaintiffs."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the only ground relied upon by the lower court to dismissing the case,
without any trial, is the allegation contained in pars. 4 and (e) of the answers of the appellees Panlilio and
Allied Technologists, Inc., respectively, that the amount retained by the Department of National Defense had
already been paid; that except for this bare allegation of the appellees, no evidence was adduced to prove the
truth of the same; that even assuming for the sake of argument, that the same is true, nevertheless the first
part of the first cause of action still remains, for which they had insisted upon a hearing in order to establish
their right to be recognized as two of the three architects of the hospital; that because the pleadings do not
show any ground which might legally justify the action taken by the lower court, the latter should not have
ordered the dismissal of the entire case but should have ordered only the striking out of the moot portion of
appellants first cause of action, citing Pacal v. Ramos, 81 Phil. 30, 33; 27 C.J.S. 209-210; Bush v. Murray 205
N.Y.S. 21, 26, 209 App. Div. 563; Bearden v. Longino, 190 S.E. 12, 183, Ga. 819). Appellants further argue in
their brief that they base their cause of action on article 21, New Civil Code.
The appeal has no merit. The order appealed from, states
"Considering the manifestation of counsel for plaintiffs that the latter would insist on the hearing of the aboveentitled case for the purpose of establishing their right to be recognized as the architects of the Veterans
Hospital together with defendant Pablo D. Panlilio, and it appearing that plaintiffs Amended Complaint with
Injunction prays, among others, That this Hon. Court order defendants Secretary of National Defense, Col.
Nicolas Jimenez, and the Finance Officer and Auditor of the Department of National Defense to pay the Allied
Technologists, Inc. the balance unpaid by virtue of the contract executed on Sept. 11, 1960 (Annex C hereof)
for services rendered under Title I and to be rendered under Title II of said contract; that paragraph 4 of
defendant Pablo Panlilios Amended Answer to said complaint alleges `That whatever amounts were retained
by the Dept. of National Defense on the contract price, which retention was authorized by the contract, was
paid by the Dept. of National Defense to the Allied Technologists, Inc., as sought by the plaintiffs; that
paragraph (e) of the ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT of defendant Allied Technologists, Inc., also
alleges That whatever amounts were retained by the Department of National Defense, per the stipulations
contained in the contract, have already been paid by the said Department of National Defense to the Allied
Technologists, Inc. and, therefore, the present action seeking to compel the afore-mentioned Department of
National Defense to pay to defendant Allied Technologists, Inc. the amounts retained by the Department of
National Defense is academic, groundless, unfounded and malicious, that the said allegations of the separate
answers of defendants Pablo Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc., are not and can not be denied by plaintiffs,
and that it is this Courts understanding that defendant has no objection to the dismissal of this case it is
ordered that this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against plaintiffs."
cralaw virtua1aw library

A cursory reading of pars. 18 and 19 of the amended complaint with injunction and prayers (1) and (2)
thereof, reveals that appellants first cause of action is composed of two parts, as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) A judicial declaration or recognition that appellants Ruiz and Herrera, together with appellee Panlilio, were
the architects of the Veterans Hospital; and

(b) An injunction restraining the appellee government officials from paying their co-appellee Panlilio the sum
retained by the former, as per stipulation contained in the contract for the construction of the hospital because
"they will not only be deprived of the monetary value of the services legally due them, but that their
professional prestige and standing will be seriously impaired."
As appellants admitted, they no longer consider the Secretary and other officials of the Department of
National Defense, as parties- defendants in the case, said officials can no longer be compelled to recognize the
appellants, Ruiz and Herrera, as co-architects with appellee Panlilio of the Veterans Hospital. And, as the
amount retained by the Department on the contract price, which retention was authorized by the contract,
was, as sought by the appellants, already paid to the Allied Technologists, Inc., there is nothing more for the
trial court to decide, even without first ruling on the special defenses of appellees Panlilio and the corporation.
Moreover, by discarding the Secretary and other officials of the Department of National Defense, as partiesdefendants, appellants could not expect the trial court to order them to recognize and declare appellants as
co-architects in the construction of the hospital. And this must be so, because the construction agreement
expressly provides that the architect being contracted by the Government was appellee Pablo Panlilio. The said
agreement states that the same was entered into by the government, party of the first part and "Allied
Technologists, Inc. . . . and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio, architect, hereinafter called the party of the second part" and
"The Allied Technologists, Inc. for rendering engineering services and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio, architect, for
rendering architect services." And the contract was signed for the Government by "Ramon Magsaysay,
Secretary of National Defense (party of the first part)," and Allied Technologists, Inc. as to By Enrique J. L.
Ruiz, President, Contractor, Pablo D. Panlilio, Architect."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellants maintain that their claim for recognition is divisible and separable from their allegations regarding
the non-payment by the government of a portion of the architectural fees; thereby concluding that what the
lower court should have done, should have been merely to order the striking out of the moot portion of
appellants cause of action, and should have proceeded with hearing their claim for recognition. But the
allegations in pars. 18 and 19 of the amended complaint, show otherwise. There is an indivisible and single
cause of action which is primarily to prevent payment exclusively to defendant Panlilio of the amount of
P34,740.00, which said appellants contend should be paid to appellee Allied Technologists, Inc.; the matter of
recognizing them together with Pablo Panlilio as architects of the hospital, being merely incidental thereto. The
case of Pacal v. Ramos, 81 Phil. 30, cited by appellants is not applicable. In this case, the grounds for quo
warranto are separable from the grounds for election irregularities which are distinct and separate causes of
action, entitling the petitioner to separate and unrelated reliefs. These two grounds were alleged under
separate paragraphs and they were two independent actions improperly joined in one proceedings. In the case
at bar, in one paragraph, (par. 19 of the amended complaint), as first cause of action, the claim for recognition
is inseparably linked with their allegations regarding alleged threatened payment of the P34,740.00 to Panlilio
alone, because "they will not only be deprived of the monetary value of the services legally due them, but that
their professional prestige and standing will be seriously impaired." When the very defendant Allied
Technologists, Inc. itself asserted in its answer to the amended complaint, that the amount was paid to it, an
assertion which was not at all denied, plaintiffs-appellants cause of action under said par. 19 dissipated
entirely.
There is a veiled insinuation that appellants thesis would fall under the provisions of the Rules on declaratory
relief, because appellants wanted merely a declaration of their rights in a contract in which they were
interested. The trial court, however, was correct in refusing to make such declaration, because it was not
necessary and proper under the circumstances (Sec. 6, Rule 66). Appellants were not parties to the
construction agreement. The sole object of the appeal is only to secure for them a recognition, that they were
allegedly the co-architects of Panlilio, in the construction of the hospital, so as to enhance their professional
prestige and not to impair their standing. If this is the goal of appellants, a judicial declaration to that effect
would seem unnecessary. Let us ponder over the thought that a brilliant professional enjoys the respect and
esteem of his fellowmen, even without any court declaration of such fact, and that an incompetent one may
summon all the tribunals in the world, to proclaim his genius in vain.
But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states
"Any person who wilfully cause loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages."
Contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate right or property,
but also to honor or credit (I Tolentino Civ. Code, p. 67). It may be added, however, that this article also
envisions a situation where a person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material or otherwise,
which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that damages were ever asked
or alleged in connection with this case, predicted upon the article aforecited. And under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case, one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to
extend the recognition, was an act contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the Order appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

[G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964.]

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir, for Defendant-Appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for Plaintiff-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; WHEN ACTIONABLE WRONG. Ordinarily, a mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary
preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promisor must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN AN ACTIONABLE BREACH OF PROMISE
SUIT. When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages
may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under
Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.
3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS IN PETITION FOR BELIEF MUST STATE FACTS
CONSTITUTING DEFENSE. An affidavit of merits supporting a petition for relief from judgment must state
facts constituting a valid defense. Where such an affidavit merely states conclusions or opinions, it is not valid.
4. ID.; TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER; CLERK OF COURT MAY BE VALIDLY DESIGNATED. The procedure of
designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of
the Rules of Court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANTS CONSENT TO DESIGNATION OF COMMISSIONER NOT NECESSARY WHERE HE
IS IN DEFAULT. The defendants consent to the designation of the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
evidence is not necessary where he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court.
6. AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; MUST CONTAIN FACTS AND NOT CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. Affidavits of merit to
be valid must contain facts and not mere conclusions of facts.
7. ID.; ID.; WHEN CONCLUSION OF FACT, NOT A FACT, DEEMED CONTAINED IN AFFIDAVIT. An affidavit of
merit stating no facts, but merely an inference that defendants failure was due to fortuitous events and/or
circumstances beyond his control, is held to contain a conclusion of fact, not a fact.
DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and
serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
c

hanrob1es

virtual

1aw

library

Dear Bet
"Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
"Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing"
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING"
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant
to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.09 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
attorneys fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it out. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings
the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the
petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
cralaw virtua1aw library

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before the court. Instead, on the following day his counsel
filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that
he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latters residence on the possibility of an
amicable settlement. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8,
1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties
and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time, however, defendants counsel informed the court
that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendants aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to
this
Court.
In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be
duly supported by an affidavit of merit stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of
Court.) Defendants affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good
and valid defense against plaintiffs cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been
due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this, stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes v. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani v.
P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced
before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan v. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed
out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by
Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendants consent to said procedure, the same did
not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez v. Ramas, 40
Phil., 787; Alano v. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary
to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of
promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960) as
reiterated in Estopa v. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not

an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil
Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued. (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations
were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to- bes
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding
My mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his aforestated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised
as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral
and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219(10) of the new Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid
of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . . .
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Courts opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower courts judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

[G.R. No. L-18630. December 17, 1966.]

APOLONIO TANJANCO, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS,Respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for Petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; REQUISITES FOR RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 21, CIVIL CODE. The
essential feature under Article 21 of the Civil Code is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence
on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. v. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. v. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).
2. ID.; ID.; NO RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 21, IF SEDUCTION IS ABSENT; CASE AT BAR. In the
case at bar the facts show that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have
cut short all sexual relation upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code and, no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions
may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against defendant-appellant, if any.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellants action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein),
Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time, reciprocated the tender feelings" ; that in consideration of
defendants promises of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendants pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly
until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal
access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendants
refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that
plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorneys fees.
Upon defendants motion to dismiss, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower
court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that
the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed
with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this
jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa v. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640; Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, L14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus v. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals
relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the
original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission
stated:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible
that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ART. 23. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.
"An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: A seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of X. A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she
and her parents would have such a right of action."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commissions memorandum refers to
a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part or the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. v. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. v.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
"To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer" (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in
all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal
age, single, and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon
thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendants visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent
outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the
defendants promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the formers earnest and repeated pleas to have
carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December, 1958 when the
defendant was out of the country, the defendant though his protestations, of love and promises of marriage succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime
in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make
good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and
refrained from seeing the plaintiff, since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has
broken their engagement and his promises."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiffappellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the
plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the childs own
rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is
affirmed. No costs.

[G.R. No. 101749. July 10, 1992.]

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B.
CIRILO, Respondents.
Conrado G. Bunag for Petitioner.
Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo Law Office for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.

REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE AS A RULE
CONCLUSIVE UPON THIS COURT. The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of
fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and
jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon
this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.

2.

ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURTS FUNCTION IS LIMITED TO REVIEWING ERRORS. Our jurisdiction
in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it
is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this
Court is not expected required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within any of the exceptions
which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

3.

CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; GENERALLY NOT ACTIONABLE; EXCEPTION.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

4.

ID.; ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; RATIONALE. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in
cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under
Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes.

5.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARDED WHERE PETITIONER FORCIBLY ABDUCTED RESPONDENT AND HAD
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE WITH HER. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts or
petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her
will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitutes acts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions
which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21, in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and 2234 of
the Civil Code.

6.

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXTINCTION OF PENAL ACTION DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT
EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY; EXCEPTION. Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence,
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There
is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.
Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute
a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not
carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two
proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized,
with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses
and the quantum of evidence in criminal civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove
its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Thus, in
Rillon, Et. Al. v. Rillon, we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be
first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of
the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17,
1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo v. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.,"
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly,
respondent courts resolution of September 3, 1992 2 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual
findings of the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its
findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
j

gc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they
had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of
his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, Defendant-Appellant Bunag,
Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
"Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Jr.,
together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted the evidence,
summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:
ch

anrobles

virtual

lawlibrar

`Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a college course
in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios
Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion.
Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a
quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda
at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she
believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

`Plaintiff rode in the case and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right
side. The car traveled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in
Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead

threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if
she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car traveled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they
reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male combatants because of
her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel
where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight back and
repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held her
two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his companion
to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting
on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her
vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n., pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
`After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but the latter
would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry
her, so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi
together after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag,
Jr.s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 oclock in the evening
(t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) oclock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr.,
father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag,
Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications for
marriage license (Exhibits `A and `C) and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house
of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.
chanr

obles

law

library

`On September 29, 1973 complaint Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her
to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep
and eat because of the deception done against her by defendant-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
`The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on
September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 oclock in the evening, his sister who is the
mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff
might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next
day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of
Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabreras house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona,
Las Pias, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, `Pare, the children are here
already. Let us settle the matter and have them married.
`He conferred with plaintiff who told that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her sufferings as
Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married.
"Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and
raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latters father to their relationship.
"Defendants-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made
plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her
officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the)
aforesaid hospitals canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino
Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiffappellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and
plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but
these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his
real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, the couple checked out of the hotel and
proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pias, where they stayed until September 19,
1973. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with plaintiff-appellant over money and the
threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

"During this period, Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and
telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty.
Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation,Defendant-Appellant Bunag, Jr.s
employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the
whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his sons whereabouts when he was told of the couples
elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied
having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent
Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia,
that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4
ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorneys fees,
as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower courts decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from
civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal
several errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows:
(1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2)
in finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendantappellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendantsappellants promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both
appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to
consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioners defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of
facts and violative of the law on preparation of judgments; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law
and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an
agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the
alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible
abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement
to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits
presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the
parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In
effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously
reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained
to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in
case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors
of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is
not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant
case reveal any feature falling within any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a
review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the
records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private Respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since the action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in
awarding damages.
chanrobles.com : virtual law

Library

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article
2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy
the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts or petitioner in forcibly abducting private
respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in
order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of
moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21, in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of
a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor
filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscals Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex
delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of
the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of
herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal
of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same
parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different
rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal civil proceedings. In a
criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of
evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, Et. Al. v. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal
prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-17396. May 30, 1962.]
CECILIO PE, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ALFONSO PE, Defendant-Appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol, for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS. Defendant won Lolitas affection thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery and seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latters family who was allowed free access because he
was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in
a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiff even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home, Held; The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the New Civil Code.
DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00, exclusive of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts
alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an
unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status,
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of
law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the
time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married

man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolitas father. Because
of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him
as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their
infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about
their love affair reached the ears of Lolitas parents sometime in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and
sisters checked up her things and found that Lolitas clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a
crumpled piece of paper inside Lolitas aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4"
by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant. In English it reads:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and thats 13th of this month and we will have a date on the
14th, thats Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love"
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is
no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the new Civil Code which provides:
"Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married
man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that an illicit
affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of
plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable
for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas
affection. Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it
was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties
and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita
simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better
judgment and in full consciousness of the disastrous consequences that such an affair would naturally bring on
both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with
defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot
lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter
to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the
frequency of his visits to the latters family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative
and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the
rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to
their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is
a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from
the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant
not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,500.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. Costs against
appellee.

[G.R. No. 47013. February 17, 2000.]

ANDRES LAO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO
CORPORATION and ESTEBAN CO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 60647. February 17, 2000.]
ESTEBAN CO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES LAO, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 60958-59. February 17, 2000.]
THE ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
ANDRES LAO, JOSE LAO, and TOMAS LAO, Respondents.
DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court revolve around
discrepant statements of accountability between a principal and its agent in the sale of cigarettes.
chanrobles.com

virtual

The common factual background at bar follows:

virtual

law

library

chanrob1es

1aw

library

On April 6, 1965, The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (Corporation for brevity) entered into a
"Contract of Sales Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and
shipped by the Corporation to his business address in Tacloban City. Lao would in turn remit the sales
proceeds to the Corporation. For his services, Lao would receive commission depending on the kind of
cigarettes sold, fixed monthly salary, and operational allowance. As a guarantee to Laos compliance with his
contractual obligations, his brother Jose and his father Tomas executed a deed of mortgage 1 in favor of the
Corporation in the amount of P200,000.00.

In compliance with the contract, Lao regularly remitted the proceeds of his sales to the Corporation,
generating, in the process, a great deal of business. Thus, the Corporation awarded him trophies and plaques
in recognition of his outstanding performance from 1966 to 1968. However, in February 1968 and until about
seven (7) months later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales report. In a conference in Cebu, Ching Kiat
Kam, the President of the Corporation, reminded Lao of his enormous accounts and the difficulty of obtaining a
tally thereon despite Laos avowal of regular remittances of his collections.

Sometime in August and September 1969, Esteban Co, the vice-president and general manager of the
Corporation, summoned Lao to Pasay City for an accounting. It was then and there established that Laos
liability amounted to P525,053.47. And so, Lao and his brother Lao Y Ka, enlisted the services of the Sycip
Gorres and Velayo Accounting Firm (SGV) to check and reconcile the accounts.

Ching Kiat Kam allowed Lao to continue with the sales agency provided Lao would reduce his accountability to
P200,000.00, the amount secured by the mortgage. The Corporation thereafter credited in favor of Lao the
amount of P325,053.47 representing partial payments he had made but without prejudice to the result of the
audit of accounts. However, the SGV personnel Lao had employed failed to conclude their services because the
Corporation did not honor its commitment to assign two of its accountants to assist them. Neither did the
Corporation allow the SGV men access to its records.

Subsequently, the Corporation discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction business so much so that
it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales to finance his business. In the demand letter of
April 15, 1979, 2 counsel for the Corporation sought payment of the obligations of Lao, warning him of the
intention of the Corporation to foreclose the mortgage. Attached to said letter was a statement of account
indicating that Laos total obligations duly supported by receipts amounted to P248,990.82.
Since Lao appeared to encounter difficulties in complying with his obligations under the contract of agency, the
Corporation sent Ngo Kheng to supervise Laos sales operations in Leyte and Samar. Ngo Kheng discovered
that, contrary to Laos allegation that he still had huge collectibles from his customers, nothing was due the
Corporation from Laos clients. From then on, Lao no longer received shipments from the Corporation which
transferred its vehicles to another compound controlled by Ngo Kheng. Shipments of cigarettes and the
corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo Kheng.
chanrobles.com.ph

red

On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for accounting and damages with writ of
preliminary injunction 3 against the Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. 4452 before the then Court of
First Instance of Leyte, Branch I in Tacloban City, which court 4 came out with its decision 5 on March 26,
1975, disposing as follows:
jg

c:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, and upon a clear preponderance of evidence in favor of the
plaintiffs,
the
court
hereby
renders
judgment
as
follows:
chanrob1es

virtual

1aw

library

1. Ordering both the plaintiffs and defendant corporation to undergo a Court supervised accounting of their
respective account with the view of establishing once and for all, by a reconciliation of their respective books
of accounts, the true and correct accountability of Andres Lao to the defendant corporation. Pursuant thereto,
both plaintiff Andres Lao and the defendant The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation are directed
to make available all their records pertainting [sic] to their business transactions with each other under the
contract of sales agent, from 1965 up to the time Andres Lao ceased being the agent of the defendant. A
Committee on Audit is hereby formed to be composed of three (3) members, one member to be nominated by
the plaintiffs, another to be nominated by the defendant corporation and the third member who shall act as
the Committee Chairman to be appointed by this Court. As Committee Chairman, the Court hereby appoints
the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court, Atty. Victorio Galapon, who shall immediately convene the Committee
upon appointment of the other two members, and undertake to finish their assigned task under his decision
within two (2) months.

2. Ordering the defendant corporation to pay Plaintiffs the amount of P180,000 representing actual loss of
earnings.
3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P130,000.00.
4. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
5. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs, attorneys fees in the amount of P40,000.00.
6. Ordering the plaintiff and the defendant to pay the compensation of the commissioners pro-rata.
7. Finally ordering the defendant to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED."
cralaw
virtua1aw

library

The Committee of Audit that was eventually constituted was composed of Atty. Victorio L. Galapon, Jr., as
chairman, Wilfredo Madarang, Jr. and Cesar F.P. Corcuera, as representatives of the Corporation, and Lao
himself. On September 16, 1976, said committee submitted a report 6 with the following findings:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Total remittances made by Mr. Andres Lao in favor of Associated from April 10, 1965 to November 1969 which
are substantially supported by official receipt P13,686,148.80 Shipments by Associated to Mr. Andres Lao duly
supported by bills of lading, factory consignment invoices and delivery receipts 9,110,777.00 Shipments by
Associated to Mr. Andres Lao, covered by bills of lading and factory consignment invoices but with no
supporting delivery receipts purported to have been delivered to Mr. Lao on the basis of sales made by him as
reported in his monthly sales reports (except for sales in December, 1968 and November and December 1968
where the sales reports were not available to 4,018,927.60 the Audit Committee). Shipments covered by bills
of lading and factory consignment invoices but with no supporting delivery receipts 597,239.40. Shipments
with covering factory consignment invoices but not covered by bills of lading and delivery receipts
126,950.00"
On February 28, 1977, the trial court 7 promulgated a supplemental decision wherein it dismissed Laos claim
that he had made an overpayment of P556,444.20. The alleged overpayment was arrived at after deducting
the total payment made by Lao in the amount of P13,686,148.80 from the total volume of shipments made by
the Corporation in the amount of P13,129,704.60, without including the amount of P597,239.40, representing
alleged shipments covered by bills of lading and factory consignment invoices but with no supporting delivery
receipts, and the amount of P126,950.00, representing shipments with factory consignment invoices but not
covered by bills of lading and delivery receipts. The trial court, in rejecting the claim of overpayment, held that
"when he (referring to Lao) made partial payments amounting to P325,053.47 subsequent to the demand in
September, 1969, he is deemed to have admitted his liability and his claim of overpayment is not only

preposterous but devoid of logic." Therefore, with the sums of P597,239.40 and P126,950.00 included in the
total volume of shipments made by the Corporation in the amount of P13,129,704.60, Laos total remittances
of P13,686,248.80 were short of P167,745.20. Thus, the trial court held:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff Andres Laos accountability to defendant
Corporation in the amount of P167,745.20 and ordering him to pay said amount of P167,745.20 to defendant
The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The Corporation appealed the decision, dated March 26, 1975, just as Lao appealed the supplemental
decision, dated February 28, 1977, to the Court of Appeals. Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62532-R, the appeal was
resolved in the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 1981, 8 disposing thus:
C

"WHEREFORE, in connection with the decision of March 26, 1975, defendant corporation is hereby ordered to
pay plaintiffs P150,000.00 actual damages for loss of earnings, P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. As modified, the decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
As for the supplemental decision of February 28, 1977, the same is hereby reversed and set aside, and
defendant-appellant corporation sentenced to reimburse Andres Laos overpayment in the amount of
P556,444.20. Costs against defendant-appellant corporation."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The Corporation presented a motion for reconsideration 9 of the said Decision but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated May 18, 1982. 10 A motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. 11
Meanwhile, on June 24, 1974 and during the pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, Esteban Co, representing the
Corporation as its new vice-president, filed an affidavit of complaint 12 with the Pasay City Fiscals Office
under I.S. No. 90994; alleging that Lao failed to remit the amount of P224,585.82 which he allegedly
misappropriated and converted to his personal use. Although the amount supposedly defalcated was put up as
a counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4452 for accounting, the Corporation averred that it reserved the right to
institute a criminal case against Lao.
On July 31, 1974, after finding a prima facie case against Lao, the Pasay City Fiscal filed an information 13 for
estafa against Lao, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2650-P before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXVII. Lao sought a reinvestigation 14 of the case, contending that he was never served a subpoena
or notice of preliminary investigation that was considered mandatory in cases cognizable by Court of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Court. Apparently, the preliminary investigation proceeded ex-parte because
Esteban Co made it appear that Lao could not be located.
On December 17, 1974, without awaiting the termination of the criminal case, Lao lodged a complaint 15 for
malicious prosecution against the Corporation and Esteban Co, praying for an award of damages for violation
of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5528 before Branch I of the
then Court of First Instance in Cotabato City.
In his resolution dated January 3, 1975, 16 then Pasay City Fiscal Jose Flaminiano found merit in the petition
for reinvestigation of the estafa case. He opined that Lao had not committed estafa as his liability was
essentially civil in nature. The Fiscal entertained doubts about the motive of the Corporation in instituting the
criminal case against Lao because of the undue delay in its filing, aside from the fact that the estafa case
involved the same subject matter the Corporation sued upon by way of counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4452.
Eventually, on May 13, 1976, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, in Pasay City, promulgated a
decision 17 acquitting Lao of the crime charged and adopting in toto the said Resolution of Fiscal Flaminiano.
On March 18, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Samar 18 handed down a decision in Civil Case No. 5528,
the action for damages arising from malicious prosecution, disposing thus:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court declares that the defendants filed Criminal Case No. 2650-P against the plaintiff for
estafa before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXVII, Pasay City, without probable cause and with
malice and therefore orders the defendants Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and Esteban Co
to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. P30,000 as actual damages;

b. P150,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED."
alaw

cr
virtua1aw

library

The Corporation and Esteban Co both appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R.
No. 61925-R.
On April 18, 1977, Lao presented a motion for execution pending appeal 19 before the trial court. The
opposition of the Corporation notwithstanding, on June 8, 1977 the trial court issued a special order granting

the motion for execution pending appeal, 20 and on the following day, the corresponding writ of execution
issued. 21
On June 10, 1977, the Court of Appeals issued a Restraining Order enjoining the execution of subject
judgment. 22 The said order was issued on account of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction 23 filed by the Corporation and Esteban Co with the said appellate court. Docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 06761, the petition was received by the Court of Appeals on June 9, 1977. A supplemental to the
petition and a "compliance" were also received on the same time and date. 24 On June 21, 1977, Lao moved
to lift the restraining order.
On September 14, 1977, the Court of Appeals resolved in CA-G.R. No. 06761 thus:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted, the special order granting execution pending
appeal is annulled and the restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs."

cralaw virtua1aw library

On October 21, 1981, the Court of Appeals likewise rendered a Decision 25 in CA-G.R. No. 62532-R, affirming
the trial courts finding that Criminal Case No. 2650-P was filed without probable cause and with malice; and
held the Corporation and Esteban Co solidarily liable for damages, attorneys fees and costs.
The Corporation and Esteban Co moved to reconsider 26 the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 61925-R but to no
avail. The motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution promulgated on May 18, 1992. A motion for
leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration 27 met the same fate. It was likewise denied in a
Resolution 28 dated June 23, 1982.
From the said cases sprung the present petitions which were ordered consolidated in the Resolutions of
December 15, 1982 and November 11, 1985. 29 Subject petitions are to be passed upon in the order they
were filed.
G.R. No. 47013
A petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 06761 that Lao filed,
contending that:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The Court of Appeals cannot validly give due course to an original action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus where the petition is fatally defective for not being accompanied by a copy of the trial courts
questioned process/order.
2. The Court of Appeals, cannot, in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, disregard, disturb and
substitute its own judgment for the findings of facts of the trial court, particularly as in the present case,
where the trial court did not exceed nor abuse its discretion.
3. The Court of Appeals did not act in accordance with established jurisprudence when it overruled the trial
courts holding that the posting of a good and solvent bond is a good or special reason for execution pending
appeal.
For clarity, the petition for review on certiorari questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals that nullified
the special order granting execution pending appeal is anchored on the antecedent facts as follows:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After the Court of First Instance of Samar had decided in favor of Lao in the action for damages by reason of
malicious prosecution, Lao filed a motion for execution pending appeal 30 even as the Corporation and Co had
interposed an appeal from the said decision. In that motion, Lao theorized that the appeal had no merit and
the judgment in his favor would be rendered ineffectual on account of losses incurred by the Corporation in
the 1972 floods in Luzon and in a fire that cost the Corporation P5 million, as well as the fact that the
properties of the Corporation were heavily encumbered as it had even incurred an overdraft with a bank; for
which reasons, Lao evinced his willingness to post a bond although Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
does not require such bond. Lao thereafter sent in a supplemental motion 31 asserting that the Corporations
properties were mortgaged in the total amount of Seven Million (P7,000,000.00) Pesos. The Corporation and
Co opposed both motions.
On June 8, 1977, after hearing and presentation of evidence by both parties, the Court of First Instance of
Samar issued a special order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. 32 The following day, June 9,
1977, the corresponding writ of execution pending appeal issued. 33 At 8:00 a.m. on the same day, the
Corporation and Co filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals, the filing of which petition was followed by the filing of a supplement to the petition and
a "compliance" with each pleading bearing the docket stamp showing that the Court of Appeals also received
the same at 8:00 a.m. 34
In the petition under consideration, petitioner Lao contends that the supplemental petition and compliance"
could not have been filed with the Court of Appeals at the same time as the original petition; pointing out that
the supplemental petition contains an allegation to the effect that the special order granting execution pending
appeal was then still "being flown to Manila" and would be attached to the petition "as soon as it arrives in
Manila which is expected tomorrow, June 10, 1977 or Saturday." 35 Petitioner Lao thus expressed incredulity
on the fact that both the supplemental petition and the "compliance" submitted to the appellate court a copy

of the special order bearing the same time of receipt. He theorized that the writ of execution could have been
issued by the Court of First Instance of Samar at the earliest, at 8:30 a.m. on July 9, 1977. Petitioner Lao
then noted that, the restraining order enjoining execution pending appeal did not mention the date of issuance
of the writ subsequently issued and the names of the special sheriffs tasked to execute it simply because
when the restraining order was issued the copy of the writ of execution was not yet filed with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner Lao also averred that because his counsel was furnished a copy of the restraining order
through the mail, he was deprived of the opportunity to take immediate "remedial steps in connection with the
improvident issuance of the restraining order." 36
In their comment on the petition, respondent Corporation and Co assail petitioner Laos insinuation of
irregularity in the filing of their pleadings. They aver that in view of petitioner Laos allegation, they, made
inquiries in the Docket Section of the Court of Appeals, and they were informed that the receiving machine of
said section was out of order when the pleadings were received "as the time of receipt appearing therein is
always 8:00 a.m." 37
This Court cannot gloss over, as it has never glossed over allegations of irregularity in the handling of
pleadings filed in the Court. However, in the absence of concrete proof that there was malicious intent to derail
the propriety of procedure, this Court has no basis on which to arrive at a conclusion thereon. The
documentary evidence of simultaneous receipt of pleadings that should ordinarily be received one after
another is simply insufficient to warrant any conclusion on irregularity of procedure.
All court personnel are enjoined to do their jobs properly and according to law. Should they notice anything in
the performance of their duties that may generate even a mere suspicion of irregularity, they are duty-bound
to correct the same. In this case, more diligence on the part of the personnel handling the receiving machine
could have prevented the stamping on the pleadings with erroneous date and time of receipt and would have
averted suspicion of an anomaly in the filing of pleadings. Persons responsible for the negligence should be
taken to task. However, since this is not the proper forum for whatever administrative measures may be taken
under the premises, the Court opts to discuss the merits of the petition for review on certiorari at bar rather
than tarry more on an administrative matter that is fundamentally extraneous to the petition.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Petitioner Lao maintains that the Court of Appeals should not have been given due course to the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus considering that it was fatally defective for failure of the petitioners
to attach thereto a copy of the questioned writ of execution. On their part, private respondents concede the
mandatory character of the requirement of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that the petition "shall
be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto." However, private respondents asked that their
submission of a certified true copy of the special order granting execution pending appeal attached to their
"compliance" dated June 9, 1977 38 be taken as substantial compliance with the rule.
The Court gives due consideration to private respondents stance. Strict adherence to procedural rules must at
all times be observed. However, it is not the end-all and be-all of litigation. As this Court said:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not remain
assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but
primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate
cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of
substantial justice." 39
Thus, in holding that the Court of Appeals may entertain a second motion for reconsideration of its decision
although the filing of such motion violates a prohibition thereof, the Court said:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (I)t is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is
desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict
about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended
to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the
protection of substantive rights of the parties." 40
In the case under consideration, private respondents substantially complied with the Rules of Court when they
submitted a copy of the writ of execution sought to be enjoined on the same day they filed the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Cos allegation of irregularity as to the time of receipt of
the "compliance" to which copy of the writ was attached being unsubstantiated, the presumption of regularity
of its receipt on the day the original petition was filed should prevail.
Petitioner Co argues that the Court of Appeals cannot disturb the factual findings of the trial court and
substitute its own in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus where the basic issue is one of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is well-settled, however, that in a petition for certiorariand
mandamus, the Court of Appeals, when inevitable, may examine the factual merits of the case. 41 In the
present case, it was necessary and inevitable for the Court of Appeals to look into the diverse factual
allegations of the parties. It is worthy to note that petitioners motion for execution pending appeal was
premised on his contention that the award of damages in his favor would be meaningless on account of
respondent Corporations precarious financial status. On the other hand, respondent Corporation countered
that it was operating at a profit, an assurance that at the time, it was a stable business entity that could
answer for its obligations. In the face of these contradictory allegations, the appellate court correctly opted to
make its own finding of facts on the issue of the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution pending

appeal. It should be stressed that what was at issue was not the award of damages itself but the issuance of
said writ.
Petitioner Laos position that the posting of a good and solvent bond is a special reason for the issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal is utterly barren of merit. Mere posting of a bond to answer for damages
does not suffice as a good reason for the granting of execution pending appeal, within the context of "good
reasons" under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 42 In Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 43 the Court
held:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a matter of course.Good reasons,
special, important, pressing reasons must exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude
and justice, it may well become a tool of oppression and inequity. But to consider the mere posting of a bond
a good reason would precisely make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule
rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if
all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result
therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law." 44
G.R. No. 60647
From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar in Civil Case No. 5528, finding that they are liable
for malicious prosecution and therefore, they must pay Lao damages, the Corporation and Co appealed to the
Court of Appeals. In affirming the lower courts decision, the Court of Appeals deduced from the facts
established that the Corporation knew all along that Laos liability was civil in nature. However, after around
four (4) years had elapsed and sensing that Civil Case No. 4452 would result in a decision against them, they
instituted the criminal case for estafa. In awarding damages in the total amount of P330,000, the Court of
Appeals took into account Laos social and business standing. 45
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61925-R, Co filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari; contending that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Samar Court of First
Instance because when the case for malicious prosecution was commenced there was as yet no cause of
action as the criminal case was still pending decision. Co also asserted that he should not be held jointly and
severally liable with the Corporation because in filing the affidavit-complaint against respondent Lao, he was
acting as the executive vice-president of the Corporation and his action was within the scope of his authority
as such corporate officer.
The issue of whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Corporation and petitioner Co should be
held liable for damages on account of malicious prosecution shall be ratiocinated upon and resolved with the
issues submitted for resolution in G.R. Nos. 60958-59. What should concern the Court here is whether
petitioner Co should be held solidarily liable with the Corporation for whatever damages would be imposed
upon them for filing the complaint for malicious prosecution.
Petitioner Co argues that following the dictum in agency, the suit should be against his principal unless he
acted on his own or exceeded the limits of his agency.
A perusal of his affidavit-complaint reveals that at the time he filed the same on June 24, 1974, petitioner Co
was the vice-president of the Corporation. As a corporate officer, his power to bind the Corporation as its
agent must be sought from statute, charter, by-laws, a delegation of authority to a corporate officer, or from
the acts of the board of directors formally expressed or implied from a habit or custom of doing business. 46
In this case, no such sources of petitioners authority from which to deduce whether or not he was acting
beyond the scope of his responsibilities as corporate vice-president are mentioned, much less proven. It is
thus logical to conclude that the board of directors or by-laws of the corporation vested petitioner Co with
certain executive duties 47 one of which is a case for the Corporation.
That petitioner Co was authorized to institute the estafa case is buttressed by the fact that the Corporation
failed to make an issue out of his authority to file said case. Upon well-established principles of pleading, lack
of authority of an officer of a corporation to bind it by contract executed by him in its name, is a defense
which should have been specially pleaded by the Corporation. 48 The Corporations failure to interpose such a
defense could only mean that the filing of the affidavit-complaint by petitioner Co was with the consent and
authority of the Corporation. In the same vein, petitioner Co may not be held personally liable for acts
performed in pursuance of an authority and therefore, holding him solidarily liable with the Corporation for the
damages awarded to respondent Lao does accord with law and jurisprudence.
G.R. Nos. 606958-59
In this petition for review on certiorari of the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61925-R,
regarding Laos claim for damages on account of malicious prosecution, and in CA-G.R. No. 62532-R that
arose from Laos complaint for accounting and damages, petitioner Corporation assigns as errors, that:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library

1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred and/or committed a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
erroneous decision of the lower court. The civil case for malicious prosecution was filed during the pendency of
the criminal case upon which the civil suit was based. There is as yet no cause of action. . . .
2. The respondent Court of Appeals erred and/or committed a grave abuse of discretion when it reversed or
set aside the supplemental decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 4452, which reversal was merely
based on surmises and conjectures. . . .

3. The respondent Court of Appeals erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion when it awarded moral
damages in Civil Case No. 4452 which was not prayed for because Andres Lao prayed for moral damages and
was already awarded in Civil Case No. 5528. Moral damages must be specifically prayed for. . . . 49
Petitioner Corporation contends that the complaint for malicious prosecution brought by Lao during the
pendency of subject criminal case for estafa, states no cause of action as it was prematurely filed when the
criminal case that resulted in the acquittal of Lao was not yet terminated. On the other hand, respondent Lao
countered that the elements supportive of an action for malicious prosecution are evidentiary in nature and
their existence or non-existence cannot be the subject of evaluation and conclusion upon the filing of the
complaint. For Lao, those elements must be determined at the time the plaintiff has offered all his evidence
and rested his case.
Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. 50 As
thus defined, the fact of termination of the criminal prosecution, civil suit or legal proceeding maliciously filed
and without probable cause, should precede the complaint for malicious prosecution. Such a complaint states
a cause of action if it alleges: (a) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least instigated the
prosecution; (b) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (c) that in bringing the
action the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (d) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e.,
by improper and sinister motives. 51
Ocamp v. Buenaventura 52 demonstrates the importance of the requirement that the case maliciously
commenced should be terminated before a claim for damages arising from the filing of such case should be
presented. In that case, a complaint for damages arising from the alleged malicious filing of an administrative
case for serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority and commission of a felony, was held to be premature
during the pendency of said administrative case before the then Police Commission (POLCOM). Observing that
the complaint for damages was based on the claim that the administrative case brought before the POLCOM
was malicious, unfounded and aimed to harass the respondents, the Court there held:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The veracity of this allegation is not for us to determine, for if We rule and allow the civil case for
damages to proceed on that ground, there is the possibility that the court a quo in deciding said case might
declare the respondents victims of harassment and thereby indirectly interfere with the proceedings before the
POLCOM. The respondents case for damages before the lower court is, therefore, premature as it was filed
during the pendency of the administrative case against the respondents before the POLCOM. The possibility
cannot be overlooked that the POLCOM may hand down a decision adverse to the respondents, in which case
the damage suit will become unfounded and baseless for wanting in cause of action. Of persuasive force is the
ruling in William H. Brown v. Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas, 101 Phil. 309, 312, where
this Court said:
chanrobles.com : law library

". . . In effect, plaintiff herein seeks to recover damages upon the ground that the detainer case has been
filed, and is being maintained, maliciously and without justification; but this pretense affects the merits of said
detainer case. Should final judgment be eventually rendered in that case in favor of the plaintiffs therein, such
as the one rendered in the municipal court, the validity of the cause of action of said lessors against Brown,
would thereby be conclusively established, and necessarily, his contention in the present case would have to
be rejected. Similarly, we cannot sustain the theory of Brown in the case at bar, without prejudging the issue
in the detainer case, which is still pending. Until final determination of said case, plaintiff herein cannot, and
does not, have, therefore, a cause of action if any, on which we do not express our opinion against the
herein defendants. In short, the lower court has correctly held that the present action is premature, and, that,
consequently, the complain herein does not set forth a cause of action against the defendants." 53
A similar ruling was laid down in Cabacungan v. Corrales 54 where the Court sustained the dismissal of an
action for damages on the ground of prematurity. The records disclosed that the alleged false and malicious
complaint charging plaintiffs with malicious mischief was still pending trial when the action for damages based
on the subject complaint was brought.
Premises studiedly viewed in proper perspective, the contention of Lao that the elements of an action for
malicious prosecution are evidentiary in nature and should be determined at the time the plaintiff offers
evidence and rests his case, is untenable. To rule otherwise would, in effect, sanction the filing of actions
without a cause of action. The existence of a cause of action is determined solely by the facts alleged in the
complaint. Consideration of other facts is proscribed and any attempt to prove extraneous circumstances is
not allowed. 55 As this Court said in Surigao Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris, 56 "unless the plaintiff has a
valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or
remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible." 57 Thus, the circumstance that
the estafa case concluded in respondent Laos acquittal during the pendency of the complaint for malicious
prosecution did not cure the defect of lack of cause of action at the time of filing of the complaint.
Neither does the Court find merit in respondent Laos submission that the complaint for malicious prosecution
is viable inasmuch as it is also anchored on Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. This may appear to be a
persuasive argument since there is no hard and fast rule which can be applied in the determination of whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under the said articles of the
Civil Code on Human Relations. Indeed, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is
later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights or on

malicious prosecution. 58 However, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights or malicious prosecution,
a reading of the complaint here reveals that it is founded on the mere filing of the estafa charge against
respondent Lao. As such, it was prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of action. Should the action
for malicious prosecution be entertained and the estafa charge would result in respondent Laos conviction
during the pendency of the damage suit, even if it is based on Articles 20 and 21, such suit would nonetheless
become groundless and unfounded. To repeat; that the estafa case, in fact, resulted in respondent Laos
acquittal would not infuse a cause of action on the malicious prosecution case already commenced and
pending resolution.
The complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on Articles 20 and 21 should have been
dismissed for lack of cause of action and therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court of origin. It should be stressed, however, that the dismissal of subject complaint should not be
taken as an adjudication on the merits, the same being merely grounded on the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. 59
As regards the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 62532-R which was spawned by respondent Laos complaint for
accounting, petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it reversed and set aside the supplemental
decision in Civil Case No. 4452 and directed the corporation to reimburse the amount of P556,444.20,
representing Laos overpayment to the Corporation. The Court would normally have restricted itself to
questions of law and shunned away from questions of fact were it not for the conflicting findings of fact by the
trial court and appellate court on the matter. The Court is therefore constrained to relax the rule on
conclusiveness of factual findings of the Court of Appeals and, on the basis of the facts on record, make its
own findings. 60
It is significant to note that as per decision of the trial court dated March 26, 1975, a court-supervised
accounting was directed so as to ascertain the true and correct accountability of Andres Lao to the defendant
corporation. Thus, a three-man audit committee was formed with the branch of clerk of court, Atty. Victorio
Galapon, as chairman, and two other certified public accountants respectively nominated by the parties, as
members.
On September 16, 1976, the said Audit Committee submitted its report 61 and in the hearing of November
25, 1976, the parties interposed no objection thereto and unanimously accepted the Audit Committee Report.
The Committee found that Andres Lao has made a total overpayment to defendant corporation in the amount
of P556,444.20.
Trial by commissioners is allowed by the Rules of Court when a) the trial of an issue of fact requires the
examination of a long account on either side, in which case the commissioner may be directed to hear and
report upon the whole issue or any specific question involved therein; b) when the taking of an account is
necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect;
and c) when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, at any stage
of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. 62 Ultimately, the trial court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, may either adopt, modify, or reject in whole or in part, the commissioners report or it may
recommit the same with instructions, or require the parties to present additional evidence before the
commissioners or before the court. 63
In the case under consideration, it is thus within the power of the trial court to refer the accounting to courtappointed commissioners because a true and correct accounting is necessary for the information of the court
before it can render judgment. Moreover, the technical nature of the audit procedure necessitates the
assistance of a certified public accountant. And since both parties offered no objection to the commissioners
report, they are deemed to have accepted and admitted the findings therein contained.
There is no discernible cause for veering from the findings of the Audit Committee. In arriving at its
conclusion, the Audit Committee subtracted the total remittances of Lao in the amount of P13,686,148.80
from the entire volume of shipments made by the corporation. In determining the total volume of shipments
made by the corporation, the Audit Committee did not include the shipments covered by bills of lading and
factory consignment invoices but without the corresponding delivery receipts. These included shipments in the
amount of P597, 239.40 covered by bills of lading and factory consignment invoices but with no supporting
delivery receipts, and shipments worth P126, 950.00 with factory consignment invoices but not covered by
bills of lading and delivery receipts. However, the Audit Committee considered shipments made by the
corporation to Lao in the amount of P9,110,777.00 covered by bills of lading and factory invoices but without
the corresponding delivery receipts because subject shipments were duly reported in Laos monthly sales
report.
The Audit Committee correctly excluded the shipments not supported by delivery receipts, albeit covered by
bills of lading and factory consignment invoices. Under Article 1497 of the Civil Code, a thing sold shall be
understood as delivered when it is placed in the control or possession of the vendee. Unless possession or
control has been transferred to the vendee, the thing or goods sold cannot be considered as delivered. Thus,
in the present case, the Audit Committee was correct when it adopted as guideline that accountability over the
goods shipped was transferred from the corporation to Andres Lao only upon actual delivery of the goods to
him. For it is only when the goods were actually delivered to and received by Lao, did Lao have control and
possession over subject goods, and only when he had control and possession over said goods could he sell the
same.

red

Delivery is generally evidenced by a written acknowledgment of a person that he or she has actually received
the thing or the goods, as in delivery receipts. A bill of lading cannot substitute for a delivery receipt. This is

because it is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods by the carrier and an agreement to
transport and deliver them at a specific place to a person named or upon his order. 64 It does not evidence
receipt of the goods by the consignee or the person named in the bill of lading; rather, it is evidence of receipt
by the carrier of the goods from the shipper for transportation and delivery.
Likewise, a factory consignment invoice is not evidence of actual delivery of the goods. An invoice is nothing
more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold. 65 It is not proof that the
thing or goods were actually delivered to the vendee or the consignee. As admitted by the witness for the
corporation:
chanrob1es

virtual

1aw

library

A: Factory consignment invoices represents what the company billed the plaintiff Mr. Lao and the bill of lading
represents the goods which were supposed to have been shipped.
x
x
x

A: Shipments covered by factory consignment invoices simply meant these are billings made again by the
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation to plaintiff Andres Lao. (t.s.n., November 25, 1976, pp. 45-47
as cited in Respondent Laos Comment, Rollo, p. 259)
Thus, in the absence of proof that the goods were actually received by Lao as evidenced by delivery receipts,
the shipments allegedly made by the corporation in the amount of P597,239.40 and P126,950.00 covered only
by bills of lading and factory consignment invoices cannot be included in Laos accountability.
However, as to the shipments worth P4,018,927.60 likewise covered only by bills of lading and factory
consignment invoices, the Audit Committee correctly considered them in Laos account because such
shipments were reported in the latters sales reports. The fact that Lao included them in his sales reports is an
implied admission that subject goods were actually delivered to him, and that he received the said goods for
resale.
As regards the award of moral damages, petitioner Corporation faults the Court of Appeals for awarding such
damages not specifically prayed for in the complaint for accounting and damages in Civil Case No. 4452.
Petitioner Corporation argues that moral damages were prayed for and duly awarded in Civil Case No. 5528
and therefore, it would be unfair and unjust to allow once again, recovery of moral damages on similar
grounds.
Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner Corporation, the award of moral damages was specifically prayed
for in the complaint albeit it left the amount of the same to the discretion of the court. 66 Moreover, Civil Case
Nos. 4452 and 5528 were on varied causes of action. While the award for moral damages in Civil Case No.
4452 was based on the evident bad faith of the petitioner Corporation in unilaterally rescinding respondent
Laos sales agency through his immediate replacement by Ngo Kheng, the claim for moral damages in Civil
Case No. 5528 was anchored on the supposed malice that attended the filing of the criminal case for estafa.
Petitioner Corporation also opposes for being conjectural, the award of P150,000.00 in Civil Case No. 4452,
representing actual damages for loss of earnings. True, damages cannot be presumed or premised on
conjecture or even logic. A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for duly substantiated pecuniary
loss actually suffered by him or her. 67 In this case, however, the trial court correctly found that an award for
actual damages was justified because several months before their contract of agency was due to expire in
1969, the petitioner Corporation replaced Lao with Ngo Kheng as sales agent for the areas of Leyte and
Samar. This, despite the fact that they had already agreed that Lao would continue to act as the corporations
sales agent provided that he would reduce his accountability to P200,000.00, the amount covered by his bond,
and engaged the services of an independent accounting firm to do an audit to establish Laos true liability. Due
to his ouster as sales agent, Lao failed to realize a net income from his sales agency in the amount of
P30,000.00 a year.
However, the amount of actual damages should be reduced to P30,000.00 only instead of the P150,000.00
awarded by the appellate court. Since the contract of sales agency was on a yearly basis, the actual damages
Lao suffered should be limited to the annual net income he failed to realize due to his unjust termination as
sales agent prior to the expiration of his contract in 1969. Unrealized income for the succeeding years cannot
be awarded to Lao because the corporation is deemed to have opted not to renew the contract with Lao for
the succeeding years.
As to the award of exemplary damages, suffice it to state that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. 68 In the case under scrutiny, the Court finds the award of exemplary damages unjustified or
unwarranted in the absence of any proof that the petitioner Corporation acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, and malevolent manner. For the same reasons, the award for attorneys fees should be
deleted.
WHEREFORE,
In G.R. No. L-47013, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit;
In G.R. No. 60647, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision is SET ASIDE; and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61925-R, finding Esteban Co solidarily liable with the respondent Associated

Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation for damages, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. As above ratiocinated, the
respondent corporation cannot be held liable for damages.
In G.R. Nos. 60958-59, the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 61925-R is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; the respondent
corporation is adjudged not liable for malicious prosecution due to the prematurity of the action; while the
Decision in CA-G.R. No. 62532-R is AFFIRMED, insofar as it ordered respondent corporation to reimburse
Andres Laos overpayment in the amount of P556,444.20, but MODIFIED, in that only an award of P30,000.00
for actual damages is GRANTED, and all the other monetary awards are deleted. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 107019. March 20, 1997.]

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, CESAR M. SOLIS and
FERDINAND R ABESAMIS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and
HOMOBONO ADAZA, Respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CM PROCEDURE, APPEAL, WHEN A PARTY ADOPTS A CERTAIN THEORY THE COURT
BELOW, HE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE HIS THEORY ON APPEAL. An examination of the records
would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time
on appeal. Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one
based on tort or on Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. When
a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for
to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.
2. ID.; ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; IF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS ACTS
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 MAY BE AVAILED OF; CASE AT BAR. The ordinary procedure, as a general rule, is that petitioners
should have filed an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal. This
general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions, among which are, if the court denying the motion to
dismiss acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which
case certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendants
(petitioners in this case) to undergo the ordeal and expense of trial under such circumstances, because the
remedy of appeal then would then not be plain and adequate. Judge Macli-ing committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss the Adaza complaint, and thus public respondent Court of
Appeals should have issued the writ of certiorari prayed for by the petitioners and annulled the February 8,
1991 and May 14, 1991 Orders of respondent Judge. It was grievous error on the part of the court a quo not
to have done so. This has to be corrected. Respondent Adazas baseless action cannot be sustained for this
would unjustly compel the petitioners to needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden
the court with one more futile and inconsequential case.
3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; CONSTRUED UNDER AMERICAN AND PHILIPPINE
JURISDICTION. The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways. In American jurisdiction,
it is defined as: "One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace
v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without
probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case
lies, called the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264., Eggett v. Allen,
96 N.W. 803 119 Wis. 625)." In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as: "An action for damages brought
by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the
mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956)."
cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS THEREOF. In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. All these requisites must concur.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCHARGED ON A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND GRANTED BAIL, NOT THE TERMINATION
OF THE ACTION COMTEMPLATED TO WARRANT THE INSTITUTION OF A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. There
is nothing in the records which shows, and the complaint does not allege, that Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855,
filed by the petitioners against respondent Adaza for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, has been

finally terminated and therein accused Adaza acquitted of the charge. Not even Adaza himself, thru counsel,
makes any positive asseveration on this aspect that would establish his acquittal. Insofar as Criminal Case No.
Q-90-11855 is concerned, what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been discharged
on a writ of habeas corpus and granted ball. This is not, however, considered the termination of the action
contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against
those responsible for the filing of the information against him.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR MALICIOUSLY INSTITUTING A PROSECUTION WHERE ONE
HAS ACTED WITH PROBABLE CAUSE; CASE AT BAR. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. Elsewise stated, a suit for
malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable
cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors,
who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried. In the
case under consideration, the decision of the Special Team of Prosecutors to file the information for rebellion
with murder and frustrated murder against respondent Adaza, among others, cannot be dismissed as the
mere product of whim or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary investigation.
Said decision was fully justified in an eighteen (18)-page Resolution dated April 17, 1990. Here, since the
petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold respondent Adaza for trial for
the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself, through counsel, did not
allege in his complaint lack of probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot be held liable for malicious
prosecution.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, SIGNIFIES THE ABSENCE OF MALICE. As to the
requirement that the prosecutor must be impelled by malice in bringing the unfounded action, suffice it to
state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. At the risk
of being repetitious, it is evident in this case that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by a
sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded belief that respondent Adaza
can be held for trial for the crime alleged in the information.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 25080 dated
January 31, 1992 and September 2, 1992 affirming the Orders, dated February 8, 1991 and May 14, 1991, of
respondent Judge George C. Macli-ing which denied herein petitioners Motion to Dismiss the complaint filed in
Civil Case No. Q-90-6073 by respondent Homobono Adaza.
The facts are not in dispute.
In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon 1 dated March 20, 1990, General Renato de
Villa, 2 who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, requested the Department of
Justice to order the investigation of several individuals named therein, including herein private respondent
Homobono Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup detat. The letter-complaint
was based on the affidavit of Brigadier General Alejandro Galido, Captain Oscarlito Mapalo, Colonel Juan
Mamorno, Colonel Hernani Figueroa and Major Eduardo Sebastian.
Gen. de Villas letter-complaint with its annexes was referred for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite
Team of Prosecutors created pursuant to Department of Justice Order No. 5 dated January 10, 1990. Petitioner
then Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe, 3 the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to continue
the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza included, and assigned
the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators composed of prosecutors George Arizala, as
Chairman, and Ferdinand Abesamis and Cesar Solis as members. The case was docketed as I.S. No. DOJ-SC90-013.
On April 17, 1990, the panel released its findings, thru a Resolution, which reads:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, we find and so hold that there is probable cause to hold herein respondents for trial
for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER Hence we respectfully recommend the
filing of the corresponding information against them in court." 4
The above Resolution became the basis for the filing of an Information, 5 dated April 18, 1990, charging
private respondent with the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, with no recommendation as to bail. 6
Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him, private respondent Adaza filed a
complaint for damages, 7 dated July 11, 1990, before Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6073 entitled, "Homobono Adaza, plaintiff versus Franklin
Drilon, Et Al., Respondents." In his complaint, Adaza charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful
and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and
frustrated murder when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime
in the statute books.

On October 15, 1990, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Adazas complaint on the ground that said
complaint states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action against petitioners.
On February 8, 1991, public respondent judge issued an Order 8 denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss. In the
same Order, petitioners were required to file their answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the Order.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order of denial, but the same was likewise denied by
respondent Judge in another Order dated May 14, 1991. 9 The subsequent Order reiterated that petitioners
file their responsive pleading within the prescribed reglementary period.
Instead of filing their answer as ordered, petitioners filed on June 5, 1991 a petition for certiorariunder Rule
65 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA- G.R No. 25080, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent Judge in ruling that sufficient cause of action exists to warrant a full-blown hearing of the
case filed by Adaza and thus denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss.
In its Resolution promulgated on January 31, 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit
and ordered respondent Judge to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-90-6073. 10 A Motion for
Reconsideration having been subsequently filed on February 28, 1992, the court a quo denied the same in a
Resolution dated September 2, 1992. 11
Hence, this petition, dated October 9, 1992, pleading this Court to exercise its power of review under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
On January 13, 1993, however, this Court, thru the Second Division, dismissed the petition for failure to
comply with Revised Circular No. 1-88, particularly the requirement on the payment of the prescribed
docketing fees. 12
On March 8, 1993, 13 we reinstated the petition and required the respondents to comment on the aforesaid
petition. In the same Resolution, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court enjoining respondent
Judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No. Q-90-6073 until further orders from this Court.
The petition has merit.
In his Comment, 14 dated March 23, 1993, respondent Adaza maintains that his claim before the trial court
was merely a suit for damages based on tort by reason of petitioners various malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance in office, as well as for violation by the petitioners of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was not a suit for malicious prosecution.
Private respondent is taking us for a ride. A cursory perusal of the complaint filed by Adaza before respondent
Judge George Macli-ing reveals that it is one for malicious prosecution against the petitioners for the latters
filing of the charge against him of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. An examination of the records
would show that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is only being raised for the first time
on appeal. Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did respondent Adaza allege that his action is one
based on tort or on Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. When
a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for
to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process. 15 Any member of the Bar, even if not too schooled in the art of
litigation, would easily discern that Adazas complaint is no doubt a suit for damages for malicious prosecution
against the herein petitioners. Unfortunately, however, his complaint filed with the trial court suffers from a
fatal infirmity that of failure to state a cause of action and should have been dismissed right from the
start. We shall show why.
chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary

The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways. In American jurisdiction, it is defined
as:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter, 28
Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause,
and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the
action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119
Wis. 625)." 16
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of
legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R,
November 19, 1956)." 17
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the
New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217
and 2219 (8). 18 To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the

defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. 19 Thus, in order for a
malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. 20 All
these requisites must concur.
Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza against the herein petitioners, none of the
foregoing requisites have been alleged therein, thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
There is nothing in the records which shows, and the complaint does not allege, that Criminal Case No. Q-9011855, filed by the petitioners against respondent Adaza for Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, has
been finally terminated and therein accused Adaza acquitted of the charge. Not even Adaza himself, thru
counsel, makes any positive asseveration on this aspect that would establish his acquittal. Insofar as Criminal
Case No. Q-90-11855 is concerned, what appears clear from the records only is that respondent has been
discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail. 21 This is not however, considered the termination of
the action contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the institution of a malicious prosecution suit
against those responsible for the filing of the information against him.
The complaint likewise does not make any allegation that the prosecution acted without probable cause in
filing the criminal information dated April 18, 1990 for rebellion with murder and frustrated murder.
Elementarily defined, probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable
for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. Elsewise stated, a suit for
malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable
cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors,
who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried. 22
In the case under consideration, the decision of the Special Team of Prosecutors to file the information for
rebellion with murder and frustrated murder against respondent Adaza, among others, cannot be dismissed as
the mere product of whim or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary
investigation. Said decision was fully justified in an eighteen (18)-page Resolution dated April 17, 1990. 23
While it is true that the petitioners were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence enunciated in People v.
Hernandez, 24 which proscribes the complexing of murder and other common crimes with rebellion,
petitioners were of the honest conviction that the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case.
The petitioners thus argued:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Of course we are aware of the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, which held that common crimes
like murder, arson, etc. are absorbed by rebellion. However, the Hernandez case is different from the present
case before us. In the Hernandez case, the common crimes of murder, arson, etc. were found by the fiscal to
have been committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion, or in furtherance thereof. Thus, the fiscal
filed an information for rebellion alleging those common crimes as a necessary means of committing the
offense charged under the second part of Article 48, RPC.
We, however, find no occasion to apply the Hernandez ruling since as intimated above, the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder in this case were absolutely unnecessary to commit rebellion although they were the
natural consequences of the unlawful bombing. Hence, the applicable provision is the first part of Article 48 of
the RPC."25
cralaw:red

While the Supreme Court in the case of Enrile v. Salazar, 26 addressing the issue of whether or not the
Hernandez doctrine is still good law, in a 10-3 vote, did not sustain the position espoused by the herein
petitioners on the matter, three justices 27 felt the need to re-study the Hernandez ruling in light of presentday developments, among whom was then Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan who wrote a dissenting opinion in this
wise:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of
the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 (1956), should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it
conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that
all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are
absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect
of an activity that constitutes rebellion (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was applied by the Court in 1956 during the
communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have
far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative
modes of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of
the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law

then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification." 28
Apparently, not even the Supreme Court then was of one mind in debunking the theory being advanced by the
petitioners in this case, some of whom were also the petitioners in the Enrile case. Nevertheless, we held in
Enrile that the Information filed therein properly charged an offense that of simple rebellion 29 and
thereupon ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for the prosecution of the named accused 30 in
the Information therein. Following this lead, the Information against Adaza in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855
was not quashed, but was instead treated likewise as charging the crime of simple rebellion.
A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always
accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties. 31
Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive. Here, since the
petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold respondent Adaza for trial for
the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself, through counsel, did not
allege in his complaint lack of probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot be held liable for malicious
prosecution. Needless to say, probable cause was not wanting in the institution of Criminal Case No. Q-9011855 against Adaza.
As to the requirement that the prosecutor must be impelled by malice in bringing the unfounded action, suffice
it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. 32 At
the risk of being repetitious, it is evident in this case that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or
by a sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded belief that respondent
Adaza can be held for trial for the crime alleged in the information.
All told, the complaint, dated July 11, 1990, filed by Adaza before Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court
against the petitioners does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules
of Court, must appear on the face of the complaint itself, meaning that it must be determined from the
allegations of the complaint and from none other. 33 The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too
obvious to have escaped respondent judges attention. Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x

14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-existent crime had severely injured and
besmirched plaintiffs name and reputation and forever stigmatized his stature as a public figure, thereby
causing him extreme physical suffering, serious anxiety, mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation."
34
is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts. It does not, therefore, aid in
any wise the complaint in setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners.
It is worthy to note that this case was elevated to the public respondent Court of Appeals and now to this
Court because of respondent Judge Macli-ings denial of petitioners motion to dismiss the Adaza complaint.
The ordinary procedure, as a general rule, is that petitioners should have filed an answer, go to trial, and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal. 35 This general rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions, among which are, if the court denying the motion to dismiss acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which casecertiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendants (petitioners in this case) to undergo the ordeal and
expense of trial under such circumstances, because the remedy of appeal then would then not be plain and
adequate. 36 Judge Macli-ing committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss
the Adaza complaint, and thus public respondent Court of Appeals should have issued the writ
of certiorariprayed for by the petitioners and annulled the February 8, 1991 and May 14, 1991 Orders of
respondent Judge. It was grievous error on the part of the court a quo not to have done so. This has to be
corrected. Respondent Adazas baseless action cannot be sustained for this would unjustly compel the
petitioners to needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the court with one more
futile and inconsequential case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated January 31,
1992 and September 2, 1992 affirming the February 8, 1991 and May 14, 1991 Orders of respondent Judge
George C. Macli- ing are all hereby NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no
further action on Civil Case No. Q-90-6073 except to DISMISS the same.
SO ORDERED.