ConLawIOutline:Cashin,Fall2015

I.TheRoleoftheSupremeCourtintheConstitutionalScheme
JudicialReview
Federalists:
Civiceducationnotenoughandwouldcarryatyrannyofitsown.Directdemocracyisespecially
susceptibletofactionandtyranny.Favoredthepresidency,Senateandlessfavorably,theHouse.
Wantedlargeelectiondistricts.Nobranchwouldbeabletospeakauthoritativelyfor"the
people."DesireforinterstatecommercewasathreattotheprinciplesunderlyingtheRevolution.
AntiFederalists:
RepublicanTheoryreliedoncivicvirtue:foundedupondialogueanddiscussionamongthe
citizenry,puttingthegoodofthecommunityoverself.Hostiletoadramaticexpansioninthe
powersofthenationalgovernment,distrustedtheideaofrepresentativeselectedbythepeopleto
serveinthefaroffnationalcapital.Opposedtheconstitutioninfavorofdecentralizationbecause
theywantedhomogeneityinordertobuildthecommunityandencouragecivicdutya
centralizedgovernmentwouldgetridofthathomogeneity
Federalist10(1787Madison)
Factionsareabigproblem(peopleboundbyacommoninterestaimingtoworkagainstthe
interestofothers).Youcantgetridoftheircausebutyoucanmitigatetheireffects
1)Createarepresentativegovernment:thesepeoplecansortoutthecommunitygoodfor
theirdistrictANDcreatesaninterestnotonlyinpersonalinterestbutintheinterestofthe
Americanpeople
2)Letrepresentativeshavealargeconstituency:createsheterogeneity,whichmakesit
hardforafactiontocometogetherandusurppower
Federalist51(1788Madison)
Structuraldevicestolimitthefallibilityofpoliticians
Eachbranchofgovernmentshouldbeindependent/haveawillofitsown
Shouldbeelectedbythepeopleexceptionforthejudiciarybranchbecause:
1)Thejobrequiresspecificandcarefulqualificationthatthepublic
mightnotbebesttosee
2) Thejobispermanent
ChecksandBalances
Enablethegovernmenttocontrolthegoverned,butalsoobligethegovernment
tocontrolitselfthroughhorizontaldivision
Thedifferentbodiesofthegovernmentwillcontroleachotherthrough
stalemate,andatthesametime,controlthemselves
Maximizesthepowerofthepublicbyfragmentingthepowerof
thegovernors
Alsoverticaldivisionofpower(federalvs.state)
Legislativebranchisthemostpowerful
Tokeeptheirpoweratbay,twodifferenttypesofelectionswillbehad
foreachportionofthelegislature

Representativeselectedbythepeople
SenatorselectedbytheRepresentatives
Letanotherbranchcontroltheirpower
Executivebranchisweakneedsaddedpowertovetothelegislature
Willhelpcontrolmajorityfactions
Thegovernmentwillbederivedfromsociety,butsocietywillbebrokenintoso
manyparts/interests/etc.thattherightsoftheminoritywillnotbeindanger
fromthemajority
Federalist78(1788Hamilton)
TheConstitutionrepresentsthewillofthepeople:thecourtistheintermediarybetweenthe
peopleandthelegislature
Thecourtmightbetheweakestbranchbecauseithasnoinfluenceoverthepurseor
sword,butitisbestsuitedbecauseitisremovedfrompoliticsandcangivejudgment
insteadofwill
Marburyv.Madison(1803)
Facts:
MarburywasappointedbyAdamsandconfirmedbytheSenatetoserveasaJusticeof
thePeaceinDCinthefinaldaysbeforeJeffersonwasswornin.Jeffersonrefusedto
deliverthecommissionsofthejusticesappointedbyAdams.Marburysoughtawritof
mandamustocompelSecretaryofStateMadisontodeliverthecommissions.
Holding(Marshall):
Marburyscommissionwascompletewhenitwassignedandhewasviolatedsoheis
owedaremedy,buttheSupremeCourtiswithoutConstitutionalArt.III,2(The
ExceptionsClause)powertodirectthePresidenttodeliverMarbury'scommission
TheSupremeCourtcanorderanyofficialaroundiftheyhavebrokenthelaw,but
theCourtdoesnothavejurisdictionovertheissuebecauseCongress
unconstitutionallygaveoriginaljurisdictiontotheSupremeCourtin13ofthe
JudiciaryActof1789
Largerholding:Thejudicialbranchhastheabilitytoreviewtheactsof
otherbranchesofgovernmentandallotherbranchesmustabide
Reasoning:
Argument
Counterargument
TheConstitutionimposeslimitsofgovernment
TheCourtspowertodecidecasesunderthe
powersandthattheselimitsaremeaninglessunless Constitutionstillcouldhavesignificantcontent
subjecttojudicialenforcement.Hefurthered
evenifthejudiciarylackedthepowertoinvalidate
arguedthatitisinherenttothejudicialroleto
federalstatutes
decidetheconstitutionalityofthelawsthatit
applies,stating,Itisemphaticallytheprovince
anddutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthe
lawis.
Judgestakeanoathofofficeandwouldviolatethis Oathsaretakenbyeveryofficerofgovernmentto
bindtheofficetothedischargeofhisduty
oathiftheyenforceunconstitutionallaws
JudicialreviewisappropriatebecauseArticleVI,
AlthoughtosaythattheConstitutionshouldcontrol
2,theSupremacyClause,makestheConstitution overallotherlawsdoesnotnecessarilymeansthat
thejudiciaryhasthepowertoinvalidatelaws.
thesupremelawoftheland.
PlainmeaningtheConstitutionwaswrittenand Statutesrepresentthemorecurrentwillofthe

ratifiedbythepeople,amoreextraordinaryform
thanamerestatute,andisthereforemeanttobe
specificandpermanentwithlimitsnotthebe
transcended
Framersintendedatleastinpartthatjudicial
reviewcouldhappenseeFederalist78

people

Countermajoritariandifficultybutthismeantthe
SupremeCourtcouldruleoppositeofpopular
opinionfortheirownwill

LimitsonJudicialReview
Cooperv.Aaron(1958)
Facts:
TheLittleRockNineweretryingtodesegregateandenterawhiteschool,butthe
ArkansasGovernorandLegislaturefelttheywerenotboundbytheSupremeCourts
rulinginBrownv.Board.
Holding:
OncetheSupremeCourtsayssomething,itbecomesbindingonallstateactors
everywhere
ComparedtoMarbury(ifstatelawv.Constitution,SCOTUSmustprefer
Constitutionandstrikedownthestatelaw),Aarongoesbeyondandsaysoncethe
constitutionisrenderedonadecision,itisbindingoneveryone
ImplicationsofthisstrongviewofConstitutionalPower
Underenforcednormjustbecausesomethingisntenforcedbythecourtdoesnt
meanitispermissibleundertheConstitution
Counterargumenttoholding:
DontwewantasituationwhereallthebranchesconsidertheConstitution
independently?
ThereisabenefittothisasLincolnsuggests,ifwedidntletother
branchesconsidertheconstitution,theywouldbeabletorunaround
makingactsthatareoutwardlyunconstitutional,butwouldwaituntilthe
Courtdoessomething
ExParteMcCardle(1869)
Facts:
AftertheCivilWar,CongressimposedmilitarygovernmentonmanyformerConfederate
statesunderauthorityofCivilWarReconstructionActsandalsocreatedtheHabeas
CorpusActof1867,whichauthorizedfederalcourtstogranthabeascorpusreliefto
anyoneheldincustodyinviolationoftheConstitutionorlawsoftheUnitedstatesfor
eitherastategovernmentorthefederalgovernment.
McCardle,aformerconfederate,washeldinmilitarycustodyonchargesof
publishinglibelousandincendiaryarticles
HepetitionedforawritofhabeascorpusandarguedtheActwas
unconstitutionalbecauseitprovidedmilitarytrialsforcivilians.
***ThenCongressrepealstheHabeasCorpusActof1867infearthatiftheSupremeCourtruled
onit,theywouldstrikedownthemilitarygovernmentsystemusedforreconstruction***
Holding:
TheSupremeCourtheldthatitwasokthatCongressrepealedtheHabeasCorpusAct,
andthatitdidnothavejurisdictiontohearMcCardlesconstitutionalclaimsbecauseof

CongressauthoritytocreateexceptionsandregulationstotheCourtsappellate
jurisdiction.
DistinguishablebylimitingthisholdingtocontextoftheCivilWar
PossibleCounterargument:somearguethatinvalidatesArticleIII
CourtholdsnoHCAwastechnicallyalreadyapartoftheappellatejurisdiction
oftheSupremeCourt,sowhenCongressmadeitanexceptionthatHabeas
CorpusintheActwasnotunderSCOTUSjurisdiction,whichwasokbyArticle
III
UnitedStatesv.Klein(1871)
Facts:
KleinsuedforindemnificationofpropertytakenduringtheCivilWar
Inordertowinhadtoprovehewasnotarebelagainstthenationalgovernment
Historically,presidentialpardonwasevidenceofnonparticipationandKleinhad
receivedone(wastohelpreunitethecountry)
However,inthemiddleofcaseastatuteisenactedthatsaysifyourea
recipientofapardon,youwerearebelanddontgetindemnity
Holding:
Supremecourtdisagreeswiththerule
Ifwefollowwhattheruletellthecourttodo,itwouldallowthepoliticalbranch
toprescribetherulesofdecision
Thisinfringesonthepowersofthejudicialbranch(breachonseparation
ofpowers)
Givingeffecttothestatutechangestheeffectofthepardonthatthepresidentintended
Notethatthepresidentialpardonhasnocheckonit(breachonseparation
ofpowers)

PoliticalQuestionDoctrine
Bakerv.Carr(1962)
Facts:
BakerfromTennesseesuedCarr(TennesseeSecretaryofState)forlackof
reapportionmentofthelegislativedistrictsinlightoflargepopulationshifts;Baker
argues14thamendmentrightswereviolatedassuchbecauselackofreapportionment
dilutesvotes.
Issueiswhethertheclaimisjusticiable
Holding(Brennan):
Theclaimisjusticiable
6FactorTEST
1)Constitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoapoliticaldepartment(doesthe
Constitutionclearlysaysanotherbranchdecidesorhasdiscretion?)
2)Lackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingit
3)Impossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationunsuitablefor
judicialdiscretion
4)Impossibilityofundertakingindependentresolutionwithoutexpressinglackof
respectforthepoliticalbranches
5)Existenceofanunusualneedforunquestioningadherencetoapolitical
decisionalreadymade(foreignpolicy)

6)Potentialembarrassmentfromanswersbyvariousbranchesonthesame
question
Weonlycareabout3factors
1)Resolutionoftheissueiscommittedtoanotherbranchconstitutionorstatute
saysitbelongstoanotherbranch
2)Therearenojudiciallymanageablestandardsfordecidingtheissue
3)Judicialresolutionofthismatterposesadangerofembarrassmentabroad,risk
ofdomesticdisturbance,orlackofrespectforacoordinatebranch
Applytheelementstothefacts
1)Constitutioncommitsissuetoanotherbranch?
Nothisissuesurroundsthe14thamendment,whichisntexpressly
committedtoabranch
2)Istherenoamanageablestandardfordeciding?
NoEqualprotectionclaimhasbeenaroundawhileandhasenough
historytohaveastandard
3)Isthereadangerofembarrassment,domesticdisturbance,orlackofrespect
foranotherbranch?
No
Dissent(Frankfurter):
ItsreallyjustaGuarantyClauseargument,notEqualProtectionsClauseargument
GuarantyClauseisnotjusticiablebecauseinLuther,itfallsunderanother
branch,ithasnomanageablestandard,andthereisariskofdomesticdisturbance
fortheSupremeCourttosayitsnotanokformofgovt.
ButthisCourtsaysitISanEqualProtectionsClauseargument,which
meansissuesraisedinLutherdontapply(howeverwereitaGuaranty
case,itwouldvebeendismissible)
Byrulingonthiscase,whichisclearlyonpolitics,itspendsalotoftheCourtspolitical
capital,andcouldmeantheCourtlosesprestigeandlegitimacyintheeyesofthepeople
whenissuescomeupthatreallymatter,wewonthavetherespectneededtomake
toughdecisionselsewhere
Nixonv.UnitedStates
Facts:
FederaldistrictcourtjudgeNixonhadbeenconvictedofmakingfalsestatementtoa
grandjuryandrefusedtoresignfromthebenchandcontinuedtocollecthisjudicial
salarywhileinprison.
TheHouseofRepresentativesadoptedArticlesofImpeachmentandTheSenate
votedforremovalfromoffice.
Holding:
Judicialreviewofimpeachmentwouldbeinconsistentwiththeframersviewof
impeachmentintheschemeofchecksandbalances(Category1)
Theframerssawimpeachmentastheonlylegislativecheckonthejudiciaryand
judicialinvolvementwouldundercutthisindependentcheckonjudges.
NixonholdsthatthejudiciarywillnotreviewtheSenatesuseofa
committeetoholdahearingandmakearecommendationinan
impeachment.
Viethv.Jubelirer(2004)

Facts:

RepublicanscontrolledthePennsylvanialegislatureandtheydrewelectiondistrictsto
maximizeRepublicanseats.
Issueispoliticalgerrymanderingjusticiable?
Holding(Scalia):
Nopoliticalgerrymanderingisnotjusticiablebecausethereisnobecausethereisnta
manageablestandardtoruleonthisandthereneverwillbe(racialgerrymanderingIS
justiciablethough)
Kennedyconcursthereisntastandardnowbuttherecouldbeinthefuture
HadKennedyagreedw/theplurality,summaryjudgmentwouldbe
availableinpartisangerrymanderingcases

II.Federalism
ThePowersofCongress
McCullochv.Maryland(1819)
Facts:
ThestateofMarylandhadattemptedtoimpedeoperationofabranchoftheSecondBank
oftheUnitedStatesbyimposingataxonallnotesofbanksnotcharteredinMaryland.
Thoughthelaw,byitslanguage,wasgenerallyapplicabletoallbanksnot
charteredinMaryland,theSecondBankoftheUnitedStateswastheonlyoutof
statebankthenexistinginMaryland
Holding:
Congresscancreateabank
WevedoneitthislongandCongressalreadydebatedit
JustbecauseCongressdiditdoesntmeanitsconstitutional
Buteventhoughthosememberswereskeptical,theystill
acquiesced
Rejectscompactfederalism
Framersdidnotdelegatethisauthoritytothestates,thepowerscame
fromthepeoplenotthestates
Technicallythestatesratifiedtheconstitution
Althoughitsagovernmentofenumeratedpowers,thereareimpliedpowers
Marylandarguesthatbecausetheconstitutionwassilent,itprovesitwas
notintended
Doesntexcludeimpliedpowers
Itisspecificallybroadpurposelysoitwilllastinthefuture
Mustbebroadenoughthatitisflexible,butcantbeso
broadtorewritewhatsthere.Alsocantbesorigid
Congresscantdoanything
Limitingprincipleimpliedpowersarethosemeansthatfurther
theendsexpresslyauthorized
Ifthisprincipledidntactuallycreatealimit,itwouldnt
begoodnow
Necessary=usefulbecauseitdoesntsayabsolutelynecessary
Butthisisinthegrantssection,notthelimitssection,whichmeansitis
partoftheceiling

Readingitasabsoluteandindispensiblewouldputthecourtina
policingpositionandwouldexpandthecourtspower
LimitingprincipleLettheendbelegitimateandbew/inthe
scopeoftheconstitution
MarylandcannottaxtheFederalBank
Powertotaxisthepowertodestroy
IfCongresslegitimatelyhavethepowertomakeabank,thenitsnot
appropriatetoallowastateactortodestroyaninstitutionmadeunderthe
SupremelawoftheLand.
ThefederalgovernmenthasnorepresentationinMaryland
Apoliticalbodyonlygetstotaxwhenpoliticscancheckit

EarlyCommerceClause(Dontreallyneedtoknow)
CommerceClause
ArticleI,Section8Congresshasthepowertoregulatecommerceamongforeignnations,and
amongtheseveralstatesandwithIndiantribes
Gibbonsv.Ogden(1924)
Facts:
NYlegislaturegivesLivingstonandFultonexclusiverightstouseNYswaterways,and
theylicenseOgdentodriveferriesonNYwaters(thoughthehadamonopoly)
Gibbonsbeganoperatingacompetingferrycompanyandgothislicensefrom
federallaw
Issue:doesCongresshavepowertomakealawthatgoesagainstastate's
law?
Holding:
ThefederallawpreemptedtheNYlawundertheCommerceClauseandGibbonscould
operatehisferries
Commerce=commercialintercourse(abroadunderstanding)
Commercecoversallphasesofbusiness,notjustthephysicalexchange
ofgoods(includingthetravelingofgoods)thatwasthecommon
understandingofcommercebythepublicatthetime
Among=intermingledwith
Standard:Ithastoberestrictedtocommercethatinvolvesmorethanone
state
Hammerv.DagenhartAKATheChildLaborCase(1918)
Facts:
In1916CongresspassedtheChildLaborActthatsaysyoucannottransportinterstate
goodsthathavebeenproducedbychildrenunderage14/workmorethan8hours,etc.
Commercewasdefinedastheshipmentofgoodsacrossstatelines
Holding:
TheChildLaborActisunconstitutional
Itviolatesthe10thAmendment
Regulationofproductionbelongstothestates
Federalist45(1788Madison)

TheFederalgovernmentspowers(intheConstitution)donotthreatenStatespowers,butthe
stateswilllosesomeofsovereigntyandimportance,butthisisessentialtopreservetheUnion,
whichisessentialtothepublicgood.
Ultimately,itdoesntposeadangertotheStatespowers
PowersgrantedtofederalgovernmentintheConstitutionarentnew;rather,they
invigoratetheoriginalpowersbyofferinganewmodeofadministeringthem.
Federalist46(1788Madison)
Boththefederalandstategovernmentsaresubjecttothewantsofthepeople(voters)
Stategovernmentshavenaturaladvantagesinsecuringthesupportofthepeople
Staterepsandofficialsliveinclosecontactwithelectorate
MembersofCongresswillbebiasedtowardtheirhomes,countiesandtowns
Iffederalgovernmentencroachedontherightsofthestates,thestateswould
haveasignificantadvantageinresistingsuchactionandcouldvotefederal
representativesoutofoffice
Statescouldbandtogether
UnitedStatesv.E.C.KnightCo.(1895)
Facts:
Thegovernmenttriedtosetasidethesugarrefinerysacquisitionofotherrefineriesunder
theShermanAntitrustAct(becausethatcompanywouldcontrol98%ofsugar
production)
Reasoning:
TheShermanAntitrustActcouldnotbeusedtostopamonopolyinthesugarrefining
industrybecausetheConstitutiondidnotallowCongresstoregulatemanufacturing
TheCommerceClauseisonlyforcommerce,andthesugarrefineriesarethe
productionofsugaratthemanufacturingstage,whichisnotcommerce
StreamofCommerce/TemporalTEST:everythingbeforeandafterthe
actualsaleisntcommerce
The Court said that the Act could not be applied because the monopoly was in
production of sugar, not in its commerce.
Further, the effects on commerce (acquisitions and effect on consumer
price) were too indirect, and thus, outside the scope of federal power.
TheShreveportRateCasesAKAHouston,East&WestTexasRwyv.U.S.(1914)
Facts:
TherailwaychargedmoretocarrygoodsfromTexastoShreveport,Louisianathan
withinTexas,eventhoughthedistancestraveledwithinTexasweremuchfarther.
TheInterstateCommerceCommissionsetamaximumrateforshipmentbetween
ShreveportandTexastoeliminatediscriminationagainstShreveport.
Holding:
UndertheCommerceClause,Congressmaysettheratesforintrastaterailroadrates
becauseoftheircloseandsubstantialeffect/directimpactoninterstatecommerce
Congressauthorityextendstothetrainsbecausetheyareinstrumentsofthe
actualcommerce
Congressmustprotectinterstatecommerceandmaytakeallnecessary
stepstodoso,evenifthatmeansitaffectstheintrastateaffairsof
interstatecarriers

TheLotteryCaseAKAChampionv.Ames(1903)
Facts:

CongressmadetheFederalLotteryActof1895thatsaidforeignlotterytickets

cannotbetransferredacrossstatelines
Thisinturnpreventedtheproductionoflotterytickets
Holding:
Congresscanregulatethelotterytickets
Thisclearlyfitsasasomethingamongstatesbecausetheitemsarecrossing
betweenthestates
Powertoregulatecommerceincludestheabilitytoprohibititemsfrom
beingininterstatecommerce.
Dissent:
Thisdoesntregulatecommerce;itregulatesmorals,andmakeseverythingsubjecttobe
commerce(evenwhenitsjustinterstatecommunication)
Anythingthattravelsacrossstatelinesthathasremotelyanyvalue(regardlessof
whatitisorhowremoveditisfromcommerce)issuddenlyconsidered
commerce,andturnsthecommerceclauseintoageneralpolicepower
A.L.A.SchechterPoultryv.UnitedStates(1935)
Facts:
TheNationalIndustrialRecoveryActletpresidentapprovecodesoffaircompetition
UndertheLivePoultryCodeoftheAct,ifyouboughtchickens,youhadtobuy
allthechickens,includingthesickones
PlaintiffboughtchickensinNY,andsoldtheminNYthisisnot
interstatesohowcanitberegulated?
Holding:
TheActisunconstitutional
TheCourtdeclaredtheCodeunconstitutionalbecausetherewasnota
sufficientlydirectrelationshiptointerstatecommerce,eventhoughtheCourt
acknowledgedthatvirtuallyallofthepoultryinNewYorkwasshippedfrom
otherstates.
ThestreamofcommercehadendedoncethechickensendedupinNY
Thepersoninvolvedinslaughtering/sellingthechickensinNYto
someoneelseinNYhaveanindirectrelationshiptointerstatecommerce
Carterv.CarterCoalCo.(1936)
Facts:
TheBituminousCoalConservationActestablishedasystemoflocalcoalboardsto
administeracodetodeterminepricesforcoalaftercollectivebargainingbyunions
Wageandhourstermswouldbindallmineoperators
Thelawcontainedfindingsastotherelationshipbetweencoalandthenational
economyanddeclaredthattheproductionofcoaldirectlyaffectedinterstate
commerce
Holding:
Thelaborprovisionswerestruckdown
Goesbacktoclassicformalistlogic(likeinE.C.Knight)
Productionisnotcommerce;itsprecommerce

Direct/indirecttest
Regulationofhowthecoalisproducedwouldnothaveadirecteffecton
theinterstateeconomy
NLRBv.Jones&LaughlinSteelCorp.(1937)
Facts:
The National Labor Relations Act created a right of employees to bargain collectively,
prohibited unfair labor practices such as discrimination against union members, and
established a National Labor Relations Board to enforce the law.
The Act applied when there was an effect on commerce
The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was the fourth largest producer
of steel with factories, mines, steel fabricating plants, warehouses, and
steamships operating throughout the United States, and employed
thousands.
Holding:
TheNLRBcouldenforcethelawagainstthesteelcompany
TheSteelbusinesswaspartofthestreamofcommerceandlaborrelationswithin
ithadadirecteffectoncommerce
TheCourtdidnotaddressifproductionvs.commercewasanissue
Thepowertoregulatecommerceisplenaryandmaybe
exertedtoprotectinterstatecommercenomatterwhatthesource
ofthedangerswhichthreatenit.
Wickardv.Filburn(1942)
Facts:
UndertheAgricultureAdjustmentAct,thesecretaryofagriculturesetaquotaforwheat
productionandeachfarmerwasgivenanallotment.
FarmerFilburnownedasmalldairyfarminOhioandgrewwheatprimarilyfor
homeconsumptionandtofeedhislivestock
Filburngrewmorethanallottedbutonlybecausetheextrawashisown
personaluse,yethestillgotintrouble
Holding:
TheAgricultureAdjustmentActisconstitutionalandcanregulateindividualslike
Filburn
SubstantialeffectTEST
Looksnotjusttotheindividualpartyinthecase,butlooksattheeffects
ofifawholeclassofpeopledidthesamething
Hisactivityofgrowingthewheatwaseconomic,andeven
thoughregulatinghimispurelylocal,ifeveryonedidwhat
Filburndiditwouldhaveanegativeimpactoninterstate
commerce
Aggregationisokforpurelyintrastateeconomicactivity
Therearenomoredistinctionsbetweenproduction/commerceanddirect/indirect
effectsoninterstatecommerce
UnitedStatesv.Darby(1941)
Facts:

TheFairLaborStandardsActof1938prohibitedshipmentininterstatecommerceof
goodsmanufacturedbyemployeeswhowerepaidlessthanaprescribedminimumwage
ORwhoworkedmorethantheprescribedmaximumnumberofhours.
Holding:
TheFairLaborStandardsActcanregulateshipmentofmanufacturedgoodsininterstate
commerce
TheActisnotaboutthespecificmanufacturing,labor,orwages,butisaboutthe
shipmentofthegoodsininterstatecommerce
Prohibitionofgoodsininterstatecommerceisalegitimateendtherefore
directregulationofwages/hoursisameanstoachievetheend
TheCourtexpresslyoverruledHammerv.Dagenhartandemphaticallyrejected
theviewthattheTenthAmendmentlimitsCongresspowers.Thus,it
establishedthatalawisconstitutionalsolongasitiswithinthescopeof
Congresspower.
TheTestfortheCommerceClauseAfter1937
Together,NLRBv.Jones,USv.Darby,andWickardexpansivelydefinedthescopeof
Congressscommerceclausepower
Congresscouldexercisecontroloverallphasesofbusiness
Congresscouldregulateanyactivitythattakencumulativelyhadaneffectoninterstate
commerce
10thAmendmentwasnolongeralimitonCongressspower;rather,afederallawwould
beupheldsolongasitwaswithinthescopeofCongressspower
Commerceclausewasinterpretedsobroadlythatseeminglyanylawwouldmeet
thisrequirement
TitleIIoftheCivilRightsActof1964
Allpersonsshallbeentitledtothefullandequalenjoymentofgoods,services,accommodations,
etc.w/odiscriminationorsegregationonthegroundsofrace,color,religion,nationalorigin,etc.
Themotives/pretextwereclearlypoliticalandmoraltotrytodesegregate,butCongress
usedcommercetomakethishappen
HeartofAtlantaMotelv.UnitedStates(1964)
Facts:
The Heart of Atlanta Motel, situated close to many interstates, was located in downtown
Atlanta, advertised nationally, had 216 rooms, and about 75 percent of its registered
guests from out of state.
The Motel had a policyofrefusingaccommodationstoBlacks
TheMotelsoughtdeclaratoryjudgmentthatTitleIIwasunconstitutional
Holding:
TitleIIoftheCivilRightsActisconstitutionalandappliestotheMotel
Becausesomanyguestsareoutofstate,andbecauseofthetransientnatureof
hotels,thismotelispartofinterstatecommerce
Notallowingblackstostayhasasubstantialandharmfuleffecton
interstatecommerce
TheActisokbecauseaslongasthemeanschosenare
reasonablyadaptedtogettothisendofmaintainingefficient
interstatecommerce,theyreok

Katzenbachv.McClungAKAOlliesBBQ(1964)
Facts:
OlliesBBQafamilyownedrestaurantinBirmingham,Alabamaservedalmost
exclusivelylocalsinAlabama
2/3ofemployeeswereblack,owneroftheBBQhadgoodhistorywithblacks,
butdidntwanttoservethemintherestaurant(theycouldonlygettakeout)
Approximately46%ofitsmeatcamefromoutofstate
OlliesBBQchallengedtheconstitutionalityofTitleIIapplyingtoitand
calledforacasebycaseevaluation
Holding:
TitleIIisconstitutionalandapplies
Courtsaysthisfallsunderinterstatecommercebecausethefoodsupplycomes
fromoutofstateANDbecausetherestaurantservespeoplewhoaretraveling
interstate
Discriminationobstructsinterstatetravelandthereforeinterstate
commerce

ModernCommerceClauseDoctrine
UnitedStatesv.Lopez(1995)
Facts:
TheGunFreeSchoolZonesActof1990Congressmadeitafederaloffenseforany
individualtoknowinglypossessafirearmataplaceknowntobeaschoolzone
Holding(Rehnquist):
TheActisunconstitutionalundertheCommerceClausebecauseitdoesntregulatea
channel,instrumentalityoractivityofinterstatecommerce
Specificallydiscussionfocusedontheactivitymerelypossessingagundoesnt
haveenoughofasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce
TEST
1)Useofchannelsininterstatecommerce
HeartofAtlantaHotelsw/regulationofhotelsandtransitoryguests,
Darbyregulationofinterstategoods
2)Instrumentalitiesofinterstatecommerceorpersons/thingsininterstate
commerce
InstrumentalitiestheShreveportratecases(therailroadlineitselfisthe
instrumentality),somethingthatfacilitatesthemovementsofpersonsor
things
Personsorthingsiseasyitsthemovement
3)Activitieshavingasubstantialrelationshiptointerstatecommerce
JonesandLaughlin(regulatingunfairlaborpractices),Perezloan
sharkingcase,Katzenbach/OlliesBBQ,HeartofAtlantamotel,
Wickard(ourwheatfarmergrowingforownconsumption)
Aggregationisokifactivityiseconomic
Ifsomethingispurelyintrastate,activityitcangetinif:
1)Itispartofalargerregulatoryscheme
Reichsmokingweedinyourdormroomisokunder
commerceclausebecauseitispartoftheeconomic

regulatoryschemeofstoppingtheinternationaldrug
trade.
Thisincludesnoneconomicactivity
OR
2)Thereisajurisdictionalhooknarrowingtherangeofthings
regulated
Onlygoingtoregulatepossessionofgunsw/in1000feet
nearaschooliftheguntraveledininterstatecommerce).
UnitedStatesv.Morrison(2000)
Facts:
TheViolenceAgainstWomenAct,enactedin1994,providedacivildamageremedyfor
thevictim
Thestatutewasbackedupbylegislativehistoryshowingthatgendermotivated
violenceaffectsinterstatecommercethroughtravelandengagementin
employment
Holding:
TheViolenceAgainstWomenActviolatestheCommerceClause
Theactfailsthetestspecifically#3becausethoughitisanactivityw/aneffect
oninterstatecommerce,theactivityisnotitselfeconomic
Onlyeconomicactivitycanbeaggregatedtoproduceasubstantialeffect
oninterstatecommerce

Treaty,Taxing,andSpendingPowers
Missouriv.Holland(1920)
Facts:
USsignsatreatywithGreatBritaintoprohibitkillingcapturingandsellingofmigratory
birdsCongressisrequiredbythetreatytopassalawinconcurrence
Holding:
ThetreatyisvalidanddoesnotviolatetheTenthAmendment
TheTenthAmendmentonlyreservestothestateswhatisNOTexpresslygiven
totheFederalGovernment
ThetreatypowerisexpressedintheConstitutioninArticle6,Clause2
andisthesupremelawoftheland
Ifthetreatyisproper,thenitsgoodlaw,whichhereitwas
UnitedStatesv.Butler(1936)
Facts:
UndertheAgriculturalAdjustmentActof1933Congressneededtoputafloorinthe
marketandstabilizeagriculturalproduction,sofarmerswouldnotsellasmuchproductin
ordertokeepdemandup,butinreturntheywouldbesubsidizedsoastonotloseprofits

Holding:
TheAgriculturalAdjustmentActisunconstitutional
TheActviolatedtheTenthAmendment
Itsoughttoregulateproduction,andthatisanareaofstateconcern
TheActisOK,however,whenconsideringtheTaxingandSpendingPower
Theonlyrequirementisthatthetaxing/spendingbeforthegeneral
welfare(whichCongressoftengetsdeferenceon),anddoesnotviolate
anotherpartoftheConstitution
Courtagreesw/Hamiltonratherthanw/Madisonthatthetaxing
andspendingpowerisindependentofanenumeratedpower
StewardMachinev.Davis(1937)
Facts:
Federalunemploymentcompensationsystememployersmadecontributionstostate
unemploymentfund(inadditiontothenormalU.S.Treasury)andinreturnreceivedatax
break
Holding:
Thesystemisconstitutional
ThispromotedthegeneralwelfareduringthetimeoftheGreatDepressionand
didntviolatetheconstitution
Coercionbecomesacriterionforconsideration
Theregulartaxwasntdeemedcoercivethereforeitwasok
Therewillalwaysbesomedegreeofcoercioninvolvedw/atax,
butfreewilltooptintothetaxmustbeassumed
Relatednessifthestatecantdoitbyitself,thenationmustdoit
SouthDakotav.Dole(1987)
Facts:
Afederallawsoughttocreatea21yearolddrinkingagebywithholdingaportionof
federalhighwayfundsfromanystategovernmentthatfailedtoimposesuchadrinking
age
5%offederalhighwayfundswouldbedeniedtoanystatethatdidnotcreatea
21yearolddrinkingage=0.5%ofoverallstatebudget
Holding:
Theconditiononthehighwayfundingwasconstitutional
Itwasdirectlyrelatedtooneofthemainpurposesbehindfederalhighway
money:creatingsafeinterstatetravel.
Itwasonlymildencouragementandnotofalevelconsideredcoercive
TEST
(1)Theactmustpromotethegeneralwelfare
(2)Theactmustbeclearandunambiguousinordertomakestatesfullyawareofwhat
theyarerequiredtodoandwhattheywillloseiftheydonotcomply,allowingthestates
policymakingapparatustotakepoliticalaction
(3)Theconditiononspendingmustberelatedtothefederalinterestbeingputforward
(4)Theactcannottreadonotherconstitutionalprovisions
(5)Thelawcannotbecoercive,althoughmildencouragementisexpectable.

Commerce,TaxingandSpendingafterSebelius
NationalFederationofIndependentBusinessv.Sebelius(2012)
Facts:
In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in order to
increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of
health care.
The Individual Mandate required Americans who do not receive health insurance
through an employer or a government program to purchase such insurance from a
private company.
Those who do not comply with the mandate must make a shared
responsibility payment to the federal government based on income and
subject to statutory cap.
The Affordable Care Act also sought to expand Medicaid by making the standard
only that you were poor (not poor plus something else)
Statesthatdidntparticipatewouldloseallfundsfortheirstates
Medicaidprogram
100%ofMedicaidprogram=10%ofentirestatebudget
ThosewhodidparticipatewouldreceivealotmoremoneyforMedicaid;
for3yearsthefederalgovernmentwouldpaythecostoftheexpansion,
thenafterthefederalgovernmentwouldpay90%ofthecostof
expansion
Holding:
TheIndividualMandate
CommerceClause:NO
Usingthe3PartTestinLopez,thisisntachannelorinstrumentalityofinterstate
commercesoitwouldhavetobeanactivity
Thisfailsbecausetheindividualmandateisanattempttocompeland
regulateinactivitybecausethelackofengagingineconomicactivity
wouldhaveeffectsoninterstatecommerce
FederalismConcern:construingtheCommerceClausetopermit
Congresstoregulateindividualsbecausetheyaredoingnothing
wouldpresentanewandpotentiallyvastexpansionof
congressionalauthority;Congresscouldlicenseandregulate
whatpeopledoandnotdo
Brightlinerule:youcantregulateinactivity
Differentiatedfrom/goesbeyondWickard
WickardisnotapplicablebecauseWickardwasengagedinactivityof
growing/sellingwheat,whereasheretheregulatedindividualsarenot
engaginginactivity
SubstantialEffects:youcannotaggregatenoneconomicactivity
orgeneralinactivitytocreateasubstantialeffectoninterstate
commerce
DifferencefromRaich/notpartofanlargerregulatoryscheme(Scalia)
Prohibitingpersonalmarijuanagrowingwastheonlywaytoenablethe
prohibitionofinterstatemarijuanatraffic
Individualmandatewasnottheonlywaytoachievegoals
Didnotrepresenttheexpansionofthefederalpowertodirectintoa
broadnewfield

Raichwaseconomicactivity,butthisisinactivity
Dissent(Ginsburg):
Everybodyisactuallyparticipatinginthemarketbecausetheywillneed
tobeinitatsomepointinlifeitsinevitable.
60%oftheuninsuredwillactivelyconsumehealthcareinayear,
90%within5years
Statestriedtomakeuniversalhealthcareontheirown
itencouragedthesicktomovetothosestatesand
disadvantagedthem,raisedpremiumsforthehealthy
Adverseselectionproblemhealthywillonlygetinsurancewhensick
Leavescompaniesw/2choices:raisepremiumsorexitmarket
Sizeofthemarkethealthcaremarketis17%ofthenationaleconomy
NecessaryandProper:NO
Themandateisnecessarybutnotproper
Necessary=convenientanduseful,doesnthavetobeabsolutely
necessary(McCulloch)
Individualmandateisdefinitelyconvenientandusefuldoesthe
jobitsetsouttodo
Proper=narrowinscope(Comstock)andincidentaltothecommerce
power(McCulloch)
Somethingisonlyproperifitisinserviceto/derivativeofan
expressed/enumerated/grantedpower
Herethepropermandateisgreaterthantheexpressed
powerbecauseitreachesbeyondthenaturallimitsofits
authorityandbringspeopleinwhowouldbeoutsideof
theCommerceClausepowerduetoinactivity
Taxing/Spending:OK
Justbecausethemandatesayspenalty,nottax,thatdoesnotmeanitisNOTatax
itisatax.Labelsdonotaffecttherealityandfunction.
Functionaltesttodetermineatax
Cantbeexceedingorburdensome;youhavetopaywhetheryou
likethetaxornot,andthemoneycollectedisgeneralrevenue
Dissent(Scalia)
Appliedatextualanalysis
Congressusedthewordpenalty18times
Thewaycongressusesthispenaltyisconsistentwiththe
definitionofapenaltyanexactionimposedfor
violationofalaw
Wehavenevercalledanexactionforaviolation
atax
Policyargument:politicalaccountability
Unelectedjudgesshouldnotrewritestatuesespeciallyabout
taxes
Congresscalleditapenaltysoitsapenalty,AND
Congressrejectedanearlierversioncallingitatax
Wedonttypicallytaxdoingnothing
Counter:Constitutiondoesntsayyoucant
MedicaidExpansion

Spending:PartiallyNO
ThewithholdingofMedicaidfundingforlackofexpansionviolatedthe5 th
element(coercion)oftheDoleSpendingTest.
100%ofMedicaid/10%ofastatesentirebudgetiseconomic
dragooningcomparetoDolewhere0.5%ofthestatesbudgetwasok,
butstillscrutinized
*Thisistheonlyexampleofthecourtfindingcoercive
Medicaidchangedtoomuch;itshiftedinkind,notdegree.
Medicaidisnolongeraprogramfortheneediest,butbecomespartofa
comprehensivelargerplanofuniversalhealthcare
TheMedicaidexpansionisokONLYIFthe nonparticipating states would lose
only the additional Affordable Care Funds without also being stripped of their
original and separate Medicaid funding
If the penalty is removed, its ok
Dissent(NotoriousRBG):
Theexpansionisnotanewprogram,butitsthesameprogrammodified
butwiththesamegoaltoenablepoorpersonstoreceivehealthcare
theytrulyneed
IfCongressrepealedMedicaidandthenpassedanewversion
likethatintheACAexpansion,itwouldbelegal

ReconstructionAmendments
TheReconstructionAmendments
ThirteenthAmendmentabolishesslavery
FourteenthAmendmentextendscitizenshiptothoseborn/naturalizedintheU.S.,cantdeny
peopledueprocess/equalprotectionofthelaw
5 grants Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the article by appropriate
legislation
FifteenthAmendmentprotectstherighttovotenotwithstandingraceorpreviousservitude
TheamendmentswereadoptedaftertheCivilWarCreate
They created causes of action to enable people to vindicate these rights (more
conservative response)
They were considered a license for Congress to pass initiatives to enforce them
Alltheamendmentshavelanguagesaying,Congressshallenforcewithappropriatelegislation
Intentionallyshiftingpowerfromastategovernmenttothefederalgovernment(couldnt
trustthestategovernmentsforthis)
Katzenbachv.Morgan(1966)
Facts:
FollowingSelma,thenationwantedtoprotectvotingrightssomadetheVotingRights
Actin1965
Section4(e):citizenswhocomefromPuertoRicototheUSandhavecompleted
upto6thgradeinPuertoRico,youcannotsubjectthemtoaliteracytest
Holding:
Thelegislationisok

Eventhoughitisaformofinterpretingtheconstitution(ex.Amendment14,Sec.
5),whichisajoboftheJudicialBranchandnotCongress,theCourtallows
Congresstolegislateanywaytoenforceitsabilitytolegislateandenforceother
aspectsoftheReconstructionAmendments
14thamendment,Section5givesCongresssomeinterpretationpower;
Congresscanmakelegislationif(TEST):
1)Itcanperceivethatsomethingmaycausefuture/further
discriminationinotherareas(prophylacticidea),AND
2)Itcouldperceivethattheremedywouldbethebestwayto
preventprevious/existing,thoughdifficulttodistinguish,
discrimination
CityofBoernev.Flores(1997)
Facts:
TheReligiousFreedomRestorationAct(RFRA)prohibitedthegovernmentfrom
substantiallyburdeningapersonsexerciseofreligion(evenifthegovernmentmadea
ruleofgeneralapplication)unlessthereisacompellinggovernmentinterestforthe
burdenanditistheleastrestrictivemeans
Alocalzoningprovisiondeniedachurchabuildingpermitsothechurchtriedto
getoutofagenerallyapplicablezoningrequirement(itisunlikelytherewasany
discriminatorymotivationwhencreatedgenerallaw)
Holding:
TheRFRAisunconstitutionalbecauseitexceedsCongressscopeoflawmakingunder
Section5oftheFourteenthAmendment,andbecauseitfailstheCongruenceand
ProportionalityTest
TheCourtrejectsandlimitsKatzenbachv.MorganandsaysthatSectionFive
doesnotallowCongresstomakedecisionsofconstitutionalityandlimits
Congresstomakinglawsonlytopreventorremedydiscrimination
Congresscannotitselfchangethesubstantivemeaningofthelaw
Instead,theCourtcreatesanewCongruence&ProportionalityTEST
Congruencemeansitmustberemedialorpreventive;Proportionality
meansstrongmeasuresonlywherethereisasevereproblem.
Applyingthetesthere:
Notcongruent/remedialbecausewedidnthaveany
religiousdiscriminationinpasthistory.
Notproportionbecausethisgaveanexemptionagainst
ANYgenerallawforsomethingthatwasnteventhat
bigaproblem.
UnitedStatesv.Morrison(2000)
Facts:
In1994,theUnitedStatesCongresspassedtheViolenceAgainstWomenAct,which
containedaprovisionat42U.S.C.13981forafederalcivilremedytovictimsof
genderbasedviolence,evenifnocriminalchargeshadbeenfiledagainstthealleged
perpetratorofthatviolence.
Holding:

TheViolenceAgainstWomenActisanimproperexerciseofCongressSection5power
undertheFourteenthAmendment
TheFourteenthAmendmentisforstateactors;theCommerceClausegetsat
privateactors
Thisactaimedtocreatearemedywithregardstoprivateactorsandwas
invalidundertheCommerceClauseforimproperlyaggregatingnon
economicactivitytocreateaneffectoninterstatecommerce
ItfailstheCongruenceandProportionalityTest
Providedcivildamagesnotrelatedenoughtodiscrimination

ImpliedLimitsonFederalPower
Garciav.SanAntonioMetroTransitAuthority(1985)
Facts:
CongressexpandedtheFairLaborStandardsAct,whichrequiredthatemployersprovide
minimumwageandovertimepaytotheiremployees,tostateandlocalgovernmentsand
municipaltransitworkers.
InNationalLeagueofCitiesv.Usery,theCourthadheldthatregulationofthe
activitiesofstateandlocalgovernments"inareasoftraditionalgovernmental
functions"wouldviolatetheTenthAmendment
Holding:
TheexpansionoftheFLSAisok
TheTraditionalGovernmentFunctionstest,whichgivesstatesimmunityfrom
thefederalgovernmentinareasoftraditionalstategovernmentfunction,is
unworkablebythecourts
Thereisnogoodwaytodistinguishbetweentraditionalandnon
traditionalfunctionsanditleadstoinconsistentresults
ThetestisUNWORKABLE
ExpandingtheFLSAdoesnotunderminestatesovereignty;thestatesare
protectedbytheConstitution.
TheSupremacyclause
Federallawspreemptstatelaws
Federalism
Federallawsarepassedbyrepresentativesofeachstatesothey
haveasayinwhatthelawsare
Anyissueslikesuchshouldberesolvedthroughpolitics
NewYorkv.UnitedStates(1992)
Facts:
TheLowLevelRadioactiveWastePolicyAmendmentsActwaspassedanattemptto
imbueanegotiatedagreementamongtheStateswithfederalincentivesforcompliance.
Theproblemofwhattodowithradioactivewastewasanationalissue
complicatedbythepoliticalreluctanceofthestatestodealwiththeproblem
individually
Thethirdincentiverequiredstatestoconformtofederalregulationsorto
"taketitle"andassumeliabilityforwastegeneratedwithintheirborders
iftheyfailedtocomplywiththeAct

Holding:
TheTakeTitleisunconstitutionalundertheTenthAmendmentbecauseitisanattempt
to"commandeer"thestategovernmentsbydirectlycompellingthemtoparticipateinthe
federalregulatoryprogramandactasfederalagents
Itwasntanincentivebutrathercoercion
Policyargument:thepeopleofthestatedonotknowwhomto
blame/holdaccountableforthepolicytheydontlike
Dissent(White):TheAct,though,isaproductoffederalism
whererepresentativesofthestatebargainedforwhatthey
wanted
BrightlineRule:Congresscannotcommandeerthestatesthiswouldundermine
governmentaccountability
Printzv.UnitedStates(2003)
Facts:
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act required that state and local Chief Law
Enforcement Officers (CLEOs) conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers
Holding:
TheBradyActisunconstitutional
ItviolatestheTenthAmendmentbyenlistingstateofficerstoimplementthe
backgroundcheckprogram
AlsoanaccountabilityproblemCongressmakestheactbutforcesthe
statetobothimplementitandpayforit
Italsoviolatesseparationofpowers
ThePresidentissupposedtoexecutelawsCongresspasses,notCLEOs
andthestate

III.DormantCommerceClause
TheDormantCommerceClauseistheprinciplethatstateandlocallawsareunconstitutionaliftheyplace
anundueburdenoninterstatecommerce;itariseswhenastatehasdonesomethingpotentiallytoerect
barrierstooutofstateinterests
Thereisnoconstitutionalprovisionthatexpresslydeclaresthatstatesmaynotburdeninterstate
commerce.TheSupremeCourthasinferredthisfromthegrantofpowertoCongressinArticleI,
Section8toregulatecommerceamongthestates.
Valuesanimatingthejudgemadedormantcommerceclausedoctrine
Politicalrepresentationreinforcement
Outofstateinterestsarentrepresented,justlikewhatanimatedMcCulloch
Economicefficiency
Theeconomyisnationalanddoesntstopatborders;itisbetteroffifstateandlocallaws
donotimpedeinterstatecommercebecausethatwillhelptheeconomyflourish
Ifastateactstohelpitselfattheexpenseofotherstates,theotherstatesare
likelytoretaliatewithprotectionistlegislationoftheirown.Theresulting
impedimentsofcommercearelikelytostifleprotectionismandharmtheoverall
economy

Nationalunitypoliticaltheoryidea
Protectionismisntokw/theideaofaunifiednation,theframersintendedtoprevent
statelawsthatinterferedwithinterstatecommerce
TEST

DoesthestatelawdiscriminateagainstoutofstateactorsORdoesittreatinstatersv.outof
statersalike?
Alawcanbe:
1)Discriminatoryonitsface
Itexpresslysaysinthestatutethatoutofstateinterestswillbetreated
differently
2)Discriminatoryinpurpose(faciallyneutral)
Mightnotbeexpresslystated,butthelegislativehistory,etc.revealsthe
purpose
3)Discriminatoryineffect(faciallyneutral)
Itmaynotbethatthelegislaturewasmotivatedtodiscriminate
IfitISdiscriminatoryforoneofthesethreereasons,itisinvalidperseandissubjectto
thestrictestscrutiny
1)Looktointerestofstateadvancinglaw,itmustbelegitimate
2)Askiftherearenarrowerwaystoachievetheinterest
Rareexampleofsomethingthatsdiscriminatory,legitimateandtheres
nootherwayisthequarantinelawsinMaine
IfitisNOTdiscriminatory,useabalancetest
StruckdownONLYiftheburdentointerstatecommerceisexcessivetotheout
ofstateactor
Considerpunitivelocalbenefits
Asmallburdenoninterstatecommercew/ahugebenefitforthestate=ok

CityofPhiladelphiav.NewJersey(1978)
Facts:
NewJerseymadealawthatreservedNJlandfillsonlyforNJtrashandprohibitedthe
importingofwastefromoutsidethestate
PrivatelandfilloperatorsinstateANDthecityofPhiladelphia,PAchallenged
thestatute
Holding:
ThecourtsaystheNJlawisinvalid
Thestatuteisdiscriminatoryonitsfaceandsubjecttostrictscrutiny
NJsinterestisenvironmental/healthreasonstosavelandfrompollution
andtocutcosts,whichislegitimate
ThereAREnarrowerwaystoachievethegoal:limitingALLintakeof
waste
Thisisntaquarantinelawbecausethoselawsusuallyexclude
valuelessstuffthathastobedestroyedwhereveritisfound,and
istiedtoaveryspecificareaofconcern,buttrashisabig
businesswithvalueandistoolargeofaclass
C&ACarbone,Inc.v.Clarkstown(1994)
Facts:

NYsubsidizedawastetransferstationtocollectsolidwasteandseparaterecyclable
fromnonrecyclableitems.Thelawallowedrecyclerstocontinuetoreceivesoldwaste,
buttheyhadtobringtheirnonrecyclablestothetransferstation.Thus,thecompanies
couldnotshipnonrecyclablewasteitselfandtheyhadtopayafeeatthetransferstation
evenifithadalreadysortedthewaste.
Itappliedtobothinstatersandoutofstaters
Holding:
TheNYlawisinvalid
Itisfaciallyneutralbutdiscriminatoryineffectandsubjecttostrictscrutiny
Itallowsonlytheinstateoperatortoprocesswastethatiswithinthe
town,andfavorslocalenterprisebyprohibitingpatronageofoutofstate
competitors/facilities
NYsaysitisnotdiscriminatinggeographically
Courtdisagreeswiththisargumenttheactisnoless
discriminatorybecauseinstateorintownprocessorsarealso
coveredbytheprohibition
NYsinterestisafinancingoperation
Therewereothernondiscriminatorywaystoachievethegoal
Therecouldbeataxoncitizens
Generalsafetyregulationscouldbepassed
Valuesanimatingdecision
Nationalunity
Concurrence(OConnor):
Theactisnotdiscriminatoryinstatersandoutofstatersaretreatedalike(itis
significant,though,thattheplaintiffisfrominstate,becauseithintsthatthereIS
representation)
Sinceitisnotdiscriminatory,usethebalancetest
Thereisnonethelessanexcessiveburdenoninterstatetradewhen
consideredinrelationtothelocalbenefits
Dissent(Souter):
Despitebeingamonopoly,thereisnodiscrimination;itisevenhandedbetweeninand
outofstaters
Theentitybeingsubsidizedisaninstrumentofmunicipalityandtheburdenwas
placedlocally,andthevaluesweremet(especiallythepolitical
representation/fairnessone)
DeansMilkCo.v.Madison(1951)
Facts:
Madison,Wisconsinmadeanordinancerequiringthatallmilksoldinthecityhadtobe
pasteurizedwithinfivemilesofthecity.Thelawpreventedmilkthatwaspasteurizedin
otherstatesfrombeingsoldinthecity,butitalsoprecludedmilkthatwaspasteurizedin
otherpartsofthatstatefrombeingsoldinthecity
Holding:
Theordinanceisinvalid
Itwasdiscriminatoryonitsface
Madisonsinterestissafemilk,whichislegitimate
Therewereother,lessdiscriminatorymethodstoachievethegoal

Ex.sendinginspectorstoimportingproducersorbyrelyingon
federalinspections
WestLynnCreamery,Inc.v.Healy(1994)
Facts:
Massachusettsimposedataxonallmilkdealers,butthefundsfromthetaxwentintoa
fundtopaysubsidiestoinstatedairyfarmers
Holding:
Thetaxisinvalid
Itisfaciallyneutralbutdiscriminatoryineffect
BecausethoseinMAaretaxedbutgetthemoneyback,thesoleburden
isontheoutofstaters
Concurrence(Scalia):
Motivatedbythefearthatthedecisionmightsuggeststatescannotsubsidizetheirown
citizens,heproposes4methodswhereaStatecouldtrytodowhatMAdid
DiscriminatoryTaxBAD
NondiscriminatoryTaxw/localexemptionBAD
NondiscriminatorytaxandsubsidyBAD(becomesdiscriminatory)
SubsidycomingfromgeneralrevenueisGOOD
Huntv.WashingtonStateAppleAdvertisingCommission(1977)
Facts:
NorthCarolinamadealawthatwouldrequireallapplesshippedtoNCtobearONLYthe
gradesystemmadebytheU.S.ORnogradeatall

Washingtonhadasystemforgradingapplesthatwasdifferentformand
morestringent/betterthanthefederalstandard

Holding:
NorthCarolinaslawisinvalid
Thestatuteisfaciallyneutralbutdiscriminatoryineffect
Washingtonisthelargestproducerofapplesandwillbearthebiggest
burden
HighercostsforWashingtonapplegrowersanddealersdoing
businessintheNorthCarolinamarketwhowilllosemoneyto
changepackagingtocomply,whileleavingNorthCarolina
counterpartsunaffected
EliminatedtheWashingtonappleindustryscompetitiveand
economicadvantagesthroughitssuperiorandexpensive
inspectionandgradingsystem
Leveledtheplayingfieldamongapplegrowersindealers,which
endedupoperatingtotheadvantageoflocalappleproducers.
Thisgoesagainstthevalueofeconomicefficiency
NorthCarolinasinterestistoprotectagainstpackagingfraudandconsumer
confusion
Thislaw,though,willcreateMOREconfusionbecausethepossibilityof
listingnogrademeansnoinformationforconsumers
Thereareotherwaystoachievetheinterests:includebothU.S.andWAgrades
ExxonCorp.v.GovernorofMaryland(1978)

Facts:

Marylandstatutebansdirectretailsaleofpetroleumproductsfromproducers
Exxonsargumentisthat100%oftheburdenofthelawisfallingonoutofstate
interest(verticallyintegratedcompaniesthathaveretailoutletstheyarefrozen
outoftheretailmarket)
Holding:
Marylandslawisok
Thelawisnotdiscriminatoryuseabalancetest
Thosewhobenefit
MDindependentshopsthatcouldnotgetgastosell
Thosewhoaredisadvantaged
Exxon(andsimilarcompanies)whowouldlosethatprice
benefit,andwhowouldhavetofranchisetheirretailshops
Localbuyerswhowouldbenefitfromverticallyintegrated
companiescompetitivepricing
Themeasureisreallytheflowofgoodsgasisstillflowingintothe
stateANDExxonisstillmakingmoney
Thebenefittoinstateoutweighstheminorburdentotheoneout
ofstategroup(notrepresentativeofallinterstatecommerce)
Dissent(Blackmun):
Thereisdiscriminationineffectoverallinthegasretailmarket
Theburdenfalls98%onoutofstaters
Majoritysresponse:thefactthattheburdenofastateregulationfallsonsome
interstatecompaniesdoesnotestablishaclaimofdiscriminationagainst
interstatecommerceoverall

IV.SeparationofPowers
PowercanbeseparatedhorizontallyorverticallyascontemplatedinMarburyv.Madison
Horizontalbetweenbranches
Verticalbetweenfederalandstate
ThisdoctrinewillfocusonHorizontalSeparationofPowers
OriginalPurposes
Efficiency:youwillgetabetterdistributionof
powerthatwillworkmoresmoothly,andthe
presidentcandispatchauthority

Preventtyranny:itdiffusespowerandmakesit
harderforthegovernmenttocometogetherand
infringeuponpersonalliberty
*Foundersweremostafraidofthelegislative
branch
Federalist47(1788Madison)

Problems
Thereisnowaytomeasurethedistribution
ofpower.
Intrabranchfragmentationpreventsa
concentrationofpowers,andhasledto
inefficiencyandstalemate.
ThePresidentspowerhasgrownitis
muchmorepowerfulandmuchless
checked.Doesthisinfringeonpersonal
liberty?(Ex.drones)

OpponentsoftheConstitutionbelieveitdoesnotsufficientlyseparatepowersamongstthethree
branches
Madisonconcedesthatthebranchesareintertwined,butthisdidnotviolateseparationof
powers
Montesquieu:tyrannyresultswhenonebranchofgovernmentsimultaneously
holdsthepowersofanotherbranch.
Thisdoesnotmeanthatthebranchesoughttohavenopartialagencyin,
ornocontrolover,theactsofeachother
Overlappingisokviaseparationofpowersonlyifthereare
checksandbalances
Federalist48(1788Madison)
Thebranchescanbeconnectedwhilestillbeingseparateanddistinctiftheyhaveconstitutional
controloveroneanother
Simplydefiningtheirindividualboundariesisinsufficientbecausethebrancheswillstill
findawaytousurppowerfromanother(ex.thelegislativebranch)
BottomLineofFederalist47/48
Thefoundersdidntimaginethedifferentdepartments/branchesbeingcompletelysealedand
separated;theycontemplatedsomeoverlappingofpower,howevertheydidntwantadepartment
infringingonthecorepowerofeachbranch
YoungstownSheet&TubeCo.v.SawyerAKATheSteelSeizureCase(1952)
Facts:
Laborleaderscalledastrikeinthesteelindustry.Fearfuloftheeffectastealshortage
mighthaveonnationaldefense(atthetimeoftheKoreanWar)andfacingnonactionby
Congress,PresidentTrumanorderedthattheSecretaryofCommercetotakepossession
ofthesteelmillsandtokeepthemrunning.
Thus,thenationsmillswereseized,absentcongressionalapproval,sothatthey
wouldresumeproduction.
TrumansenttwonotificationstoCongresstellingthemhewasseizingthemills
andtheycouldactiftheydidntlikeitCongressdidnothinginresponse
Holding(Black):
ThePresidentmaynotaffecttheseizureofprivatepropertyabsentcongressional
approval
ArgumentinFavorofSeizure
Itsamilitarycrisis
UnderArticleII,thePresidenthasto
protectthemilitary,andtheframers
originalvisionincludedsomeoverlap
betweenthepowersofthebranches

Counterargument/HoldingsReasoning
Itwasn'texactlyanemergency
BrightLineRule:Congressmakes
laws/legislates,thePresidentexecutes/enforces
thelaws
ExecutivePowers(narrowreading):There
wouldnthavebeenenumeratedpowersforthe
Presidentifwewerentsupposedtoexplicitly
andstrictlyfollowthem
CommanderinChiefPower:Powertodeclare
warandsupplytheforceslieswithCongress,

controllingthemilitarylieswiththePresident;
thisisaboutsupplyingthemilitary
TakeCareClause:ThePresidentcanonlytake
carethelawsbeexecuted,notmakelawseven
asittingPresidentmustconformtothelawsand
theConstitution

Congresswasinformedandstilldidnt
stopTruman/doanything(whichis
consistentwithpastCongressionalsilence)

EvenifthePresidentcouldseizethesteelmills,
hewouldneedtoprovidecompensation,whichis
theappropriationspoweronlyCongresscando
(Douglas)
Apowertomakeseizureslikethisonewas
consideredintheTaftHartleyActandultimately
rejected,whichindicatesCongressdidnot
approveofthispower(Frankfurter)

Concurrence(Jackson):
3CategoryTEST
(1)Whenthepresidentisactingandoperatingunderanexpressedapprovalof
Congress
PresidenthasbothArticleIandArticleIIpowerscombinedsohesina
goodplaceandhisauthorityisstrongest
(2)(Twilight)IfthepresidentisactinginanareawhereCongressissilent
(neitherexpressedgrantnordenial)
ThePresidenthasauthoritytodowhathesdoingunlessCongresslater
objects/doessomethingdisapproving
(3)Whenthepresidenttakesactioncontrarytoexpressedorimpliedwillof
Congress
ThePresidentspowerisatthelowest/canactONLYifhehaspowers
onhisownfromArticleII
TrumansseizurefallsunderCategory3
CongresshadtheopportunitytomakethisapowerundertheTaftHartleyAct
butrejectedit,whichmeansitimplicitlydoesnotwanttogivethepresidentthe
power

ForeignAffairs
UnitedStatesv.CurtissWrightCorp.(1936)
Facts:
CurtissWrightCorp.plannedtosellmachinegunstoBolivia,whichwascontrarytoa
jointresolutionthatbannedsuchsalesandauthorizedthePresidenttoprohibitsalesif
suchprohibitionwouldcontributetoestablishmentofpeace.
IssuehasCongressgivenawaytoomuchlegislativepowertothePresident?
Holding:
Nondelegationdoesntapplybecausethematterwasforeignaffairs,notdomestic
2classesofpowers:domesticandforeign
PowertoconductforeignpolicyDOESNOTstemfromtheConstitution,
butinsteadisintrinsictonationality

ThePresidentisthesoleorganofthefederalgovernmentinthefieldofinternational
relationsapowerwhichdoesnotrequireasabasisforitsexerciseofanactof
Congress
EvenifwehadnowrittenConstitutionatall,thePresident(asthetitularheadof
oursovereigngovernment)wouldhavesomepowersoverforeignaffairs
Presidenthascertaininherentpowersthatrelatetobeinganexecutiveofa
sovereignnaturetheseinherentpowersarethosethatgowithanysovereign
state[allsovereignstateshavethepowertoprotectthemselvesandactintheir
interests]
Notconcernedwithenumeratedpowersframeworkbecausethepurpose
ofthisframeworkwastoprotectthelittleststatesbutthosestatesnever
hadforeignaffairspowertogiveup
ThiswasbeforeYoungstown,butifwewerelookingatJacksons3categorytest,this
wouldbeCategory1becauseCongresshasexplicitlycondonedthePresidentsactions
andinfactaskedforthem

Dames&Moorev.Regan(1981)
Facts:
TherewasahostagesituationattheAmericanEmbassyinIran.PursuanttoIEPA,so
PresidentCarterblockedtheremovalortransferofallpropertybelongingtoIran,which
theTreasuryDepartmentexecuted
AttheIranUnitedStatesClaimsTribunalalllitigationbetweenthetwocountries
wouldberesolved,andawardsofthetribunalwouldbefinalandbinding.The
USagreedtoterminatealllegalproceedings,nullifyattachments,andtobring
aboutthetransferofallIranianassetsheldintheUSinexchangeforthehostages
PresidentReganissuedanexecutiveorderratifyingthetermsofthe
agreement
Holding:
APresidentmayissueanordersettlingclaimswhentheorderisancillarytomajor
foreignpolicyissuesandCongressacquiesces
RehnquistrejectsBlacksreasoninginYoungstownandgoesw/Jacksons3
Categoryframework
NullifyingattachmentsandtransferringIranianassetsfallintocategory1
theywereexplicitlyauthorizedintheInternationalEmergency
EconomicPowersAct
Suspendingclaimsfallssomewherebetweencategory1and2because
Congresshasbeensilentontheissuebutseemstoapproveit
ThereisalonghistoryofCongressionalacquiescencetothe
Presidentwhensuspendingclaims(notenotsettlingthough).
ThismeansCongressionalsilencenowhasaglossof
indicatingacceptance
Youcouldpossiblylimitthiscasetoitsfactseveryone
wantedthiscrisistoberesolved
Medellinv.Texas(2008)
Facts:

MedellinwasconvictedandsentencedtodeathinTexasStatecourt,butargueshewas
notinformedofhisinternationalrightsundertheViennaConventionTreaty(anonself
executingtreaty)
ICJsaidtheUSviolatedtheViennaConventionandmustreconsiderconviction
againstMedellin
Whilethiscasewaspending,Bushissuedamemosayingthestatecourts
hadtocomplywiththetreaty/ICJrulings
Holding(Roberts):
ThememoisinvalidandtheUSdoesnothavetocomplyw/theICJrulings
U.S./MedellinsArgument
Holding/RobertssReasoning
ThememofallsintoCategory1or2because
ThememoisinCategory3becausethisact
Congressratifiedthetreatyandhasnotobjected isunprecedentedandthereisnohistoryof
tothememorandum,andsilencemeans
Congressionalacquiescencetosimilaracts,
andCongresshasnotexecutedthetreaty
acceptanceunderDames&Moore.
meaningitisintentionallynotoperative
Thisislikelyaformalistbrightline
approach:inanonselfexecuting
treaty,ifCongresshasntexecuted
it,thePresidentcannot
Thepresidentsconstitutionalroleuniquely
Thepresidentsauthoritytoactmustcome
qualifieshimtoresolvesensitiveforeignpolicy.
fromstatuteortheconstitution
Thememoisavalidexerciseofforeignaffairs
authoritytoresolvedisputeswithforeignnations.
ThememoisavalidexerciseofthePresidents
TakeCarepower.

HecanresolvelegislativesettlementsAND
thisissueisw/astatecourt,notaforeign
one,whichthepresidenthasnoauthority
over
TheICJjudgmentisnotdomesticlawsothe
presidentcannottakecaretoexecuteit

Impactof9/11
ConstitutiongivespowerforCongresstodeclarewarandsaysthePresidentistheCommanderin
Chieftheseideasunderscoretheideaofoverlappingpowers,butputsthebranchespotentially
onacollisioncourse
Twopossiblemodels/positions
Congressistheprimarywarmakerw/the
Presidentatmosthavingthepowerto
repelsuddenattacks

Presidentisthepreeminentwarmaker,
andCongresshasatmostvetoovermost
militaryventures

Thisisconsistentw/atleastwhatsomeof
theframerswanted
Wemightbemovingbacktothismodel
(ex.Obamalikelywouldnotsendtroopsto
Syriaw/oCongressexplicitlycallingforit)
Historically,wehavemovedmoretowards
thismodel
Posessevererisks(especiallypost9/11)
wheremostmilitaryactivityfocuseson
outsideterroristgroups

Hamdiv.Rumsfeld(2004)
Facts:
USCitizenHamdiwasdetainedinAfghanistanforallegedlyassistingAlQaeda,after
whichhewastransportedtoamilitarybriginCharleston.
Hisfatherbroughtahabeascorpuspetition,claimingthataninnocentUScitizen
isbeingheldincommunicadoindefinitely,buttheUSsaystheycanholdhim
indefinitelybecauseheisanenemycombatant
Holding:
UndertheAUMF(AuthorizationforUseofMilitaryForce),theUShastheabilityto
detainacitizenintheUSwhoisanenemycombatant
TheAUMFcanbeinterpretedtoauthorizedetention,butislimitedtotimes
ONLYwhenUStroopsareinactivecombatinAfghanistan
Thenondetentionact,18U.S.C.4001(a),saysnocitizenshallbe
imprisonedexceptwhenauthorizedbyCongresstheAUMFis
authorizationbyCongress
WithauthorizationfromCongress,thePresidentsdetentionof
HamdifallsunderCategory1
Hamdiisentitledtohavehishabeascorpuspetitionheardinfederalcourtandthat
imprisoningapersonisobviouslythemostbasicformofdeprivationofliberty
Thegovernmentarguesfortotaldeferencebecauseseparationofpowerscallsfor
relianceontheExecutivebranchanditspower/areaofexpertise;atmostthe
Courtcanreviewthedefiningofanenemycombatant
ThecourtdisagreesandsaysthoughHamdidoesnotgetthefullbells
andwhistlesofDueProcess,heisentitledtoafairhearingwherehecan
receivethefactualbasisforhisclassificationasanenemycombatant
ANDanopportunitytorebuttheclassification
Thecourtthinksthejudicialroleinimposingandpolicingsome
processhereiscriticaltovindicateseparationofpowers/
maintainseparationofpowersvalues
ItstheCourtsjobtointerpretlawandwontgive
executiveunlimitedpowerbecauseitswartime
Dissent(Scalia):
WhenitcomestocitizensbeingheldintheUSandifyouregoingtosuspendrightsthat
aredeeplyengrainedinourculture,youaregoingtobetransparent
Ifthereissomemilitarysensitivereasonforyouneedingtosuspendtheserights,
thengogetauthorizationfromCongress
Givehimhisrightsandifyourenotpreparedtodothat,lethimgo
Hamdanv.Rumsfeld(2006)
Facts:
Byexecutiveorder,thePresidentauthorizedmilitarytribunalsw/jurisdictiontotry
anyonewhoisNOTanAmericancitizen,andthatdefendantsshallnotbeprivilegedto
seekanyremedyormaintainanyproceedinginanycourtoftheUS
Holding:
SCOTUSheldthatthemilitarycommissionsystemwasillegalbecauseitviolatedboth
theUniformCodeofMilitaryJusticeandtheGenevaConventions

GovernmentsaysthetribunalsareauthorizedbytheUniformCodeofMilitary
JusticeandAUMF(category1)
SCOTUS(Kennedy)saysitscategory3becauseitdoesnotcomplyw/
UCMJ/AUMFbecauseitisprocedurallydeficient
AUMFsaysanyonedetainedmustbedonesoinaway
consistentw/Art.21ofUCMJ(inaccordancew/Geneva
Convention)detentionofenemycombatantmustaccordw/
lawsofwar
Didnotprovideforallowingthedefendanttoaccessall
evidenceagainsthim
Boumedienev.Bush(2008)
Facts:
AfterHamdan,BushgoestoCongressandgetsauthorizationacts(DetaineeTreatment
ActandtheMilitaryCommissionsAct)
Holding:
TheDetaineeTreatActunconstitutionallyrestrictedthewritofhabeascorpus
OnlyCongresscansuspendhabeascorpus,andevenwhentheydothattheyneed
tohaveareasonableequivalent/process

DomesticAffairs
UnitedStatesv.Nixon(1974)
Facts:
NixonsaidesbrokeintotheWatergateHoteltostealinformationfromtheotherparty.
Theywereindicted,butNixonwasnot.
Nixonwasaskedtoproduce43conversations.
Holding:
Issue
NixonsArgument
CourtsReasoning
Justiciability
Theconversationsareintra
Eventhoughthespecialprosecutorisin
branchandnotsubjecttothe theexecutivebranchandhasthepowerto
courtsjurisdiction(between overcomeprivilege,theexecutivehasnt
specialprosecutorappointed doneanythingtorevokethatpowerfrom
byexecutivebranchand
thespecialprosecutorthislawhasnot
Nixon)
beenrescindedsoitsalivedispute
ExecutivePrivilege Executiveprivilegeis
TheCourtsaysitcannotgiveabsolute
absolutebecauseitallows
deferenceexceptwhenitstoprotectthe
thepresidenttofullydiscuss military,diplomatic,orsensitivenational
theissueswithoutfeeling
securitysecretsotherwiseitsqualified
constrained.Evenifitisnot immunity
absolute,itisqualified
BalanceTest:Weightheimportanceofa
enoughtoovercomethe
generalprivilegeofconfidentialityof
subpoena
Presidentialcommunicationsin
performanceofthePresidents
responsibilitiesagainsttheinroadsofsuch
aprivilegeonthefairadministrationof
criminaljustice

ComparewithCheneyv.UnitedStatesDistrictCourt(2004)
Facts:
Cheneymadeanenergypolicytaskforceandexcludedgroupsgotbutthurtso
theybroughtacivilcaseclaimingitviolatedtheFederalAdvisoryCommittee
Act
Holding:
SCOTUSsaidthetaskforcewasok
ItdifferentiatedthisfromNixonbecauseitwascivil,andbalancedthe
needforinformationagainstthePresidentsprerogatives
Nixonv.Fitzgerald(1982)
Facts:
Fitzgeraldfiledalawsuitagainstgovernmentofficialsclaimingthathelosthispositionas
acontractorwiththeUnitedStatesAirForcebecauseoftestimonymade
beforeCongressinthe1970s.Amongthepeoplelistedinthelawsuitwas
formerPresidentRichardNixon
Holding:
ThePrezisentitledtoabsolutepermanentimmunityfromcivildamagesforofficialacts
Rationales
Needtoavoidinhibitingpresidentialdecisionmaking
WewantthePresidenttofeelhecandowhatheneedsandnot
fearlawsuits
BecauseofthesingularimportanceofthePresidentsduties,wedont
wanttodiverthisenergies
Immunitydoesntapplytolowerindividualstheyonlyhavequalifiedimmunity
Clintonv.Jones(1997)
Facts:
ThiswasasuitbroughtagainstClintonduringhisPresidencyrelatedtothingshedid
whilegovernorofArkansas
Clintondidnotargueheshouldbeimmune,butthesuitshouldbedelayeduntil
afterhistermbecauseitwouldundulyinterferewiththepresidentsabilityto
carryouttheimportantfunctionsofhisjob(noteittotallyDIDtaketime)
Holding:
ThePresidentcanbesuedforconductpriortotakingoffice
Immunityexiststosafeguardtheexerciseofdiscretionbyanofficeholderand,
thus,thereisnobasisforimmunityforunofficialconduct.
TheCourtsdecisionisapowerfulstatementthatnoone,noteventhe
president,isabovethelawanddelayingsuitsforasmuchaseightyears
oftenmayprecludemeritorioussuitsfromgoingforward
NonDelegationDoctrine
BlackinYoungstown:Legislativeactivitybelongstothelegislature,Congressmakesthelawand
theExecutiveexecutesthelaw
Thisisnotinplacetodaysotoreconcileitwithtodaysadministration,youneeddoctrine
TEST
Whencongressdelegatesauthoritytoanagency,ithastohavean
intelligibleprincipletoguidetheagencysdiscretion

Delegationcannotbeaverylargeandbroadgrantofauthoritytoa
privategroupthathadnoconnectiontotheExecutive/littlesupervision
NIRA/PanamaRefiningandSchechterPoultryaretheonlytwo
casesw/theCourtusingthenondelegationdoctrine(fortest
part2)
Thedoctrinehasmostlyfailedbecauseitshardtohaveajudicialstandardthatis
predictablethatwontdevolveintothecourtpickingwhichdelegationsitlikesand
doesntlike
Valuesstillanimateseparationofpowersdecisionsthough
Specializedagencieshavegreaterexpertise
ItismoreefficientforCongresstolessenitfocusareas,andallows
Congresstodoitsjobandjusttrytokeepthegovernmentrunning
Itreducestheblame/accountabilityCongressreceivesforunpopular
regulations
Counterargumentsdelegatingauthoritytoagenciesdoesnot
providetransparency
Clintonv.CityofNewYork(1998)
Facts:
LineItemVetoActof1996authorizedthePresidenttocancelinwholeanyitemsof
newspendingorlimitedtaxbenefit
Aleadercouldtakeamassivebillandvetoonlyspecificpartsofitthislikely
existedtopromotedeficitreduction
Holding:
TheLineItemVetoActwasstruckdown
TheCourtsaidthestatuteauthorizedthePresidenttoamendpreviouslyenacted
legislationbyrepealingaportionofit,andthispowerexplicitlybelongsto
CongressviatheConstitution
Amending/repealinglegislationwithoutthetraditionalmethodby
CongressviolatesPresentment
Concurrence/Dissent(Scalia):
IfCongressgavethePresidentanoktojustchoosenottospendmoneyandalsoincluded
somethinglikeifyoubelieveitwillviolatethepublicinterest,thenthatwouldbeok
becauseitincludesaguidingprinciple/standardandisnotastandardlessgrantof
authority
Dissent(Breyer):
TheLineItemVetoActitselfwentthroughbicameralismandpresentmentauthority
CongresscouldlawfullyallowthePresidenttolineitemvetoeachindividualbillifithad
aprovisionforhimtodoso
Whynothaveonegiantbillauthorizingthisauthority?Itwouldbeefficient.
INS.v.Chadha(1983)
Facts:
Chadhawasanonimmigrantstudentadmittedin1966,buthisvisaexpiredin1973
TheINSorderedChadhatoshowwhyheshouldnotbedeportedandan
immigrationjudgesuspendedChadhasdeportation

OncetheAttorneyGeneralreportedtoCongresshisrecommendationto
suspenddeportation,CongresshadthepowertovetotheAttorney
Generalsdetermination
TheHousevetoedthisdecision(andthatfor5others)througha
resolutionpassedwithoutdebateorvotebecauseitwasseenas
partofanotherstatute,notaregularlegislativeact
Holding(Burger):
Thelegislativevetoisunconstitutional
ItviolatedBicameralismandPresentmentbecausetherewereexamplesofone
chamberactionsintheConstitutionandthiswasnotoneofthem(itwasnt
intendedbytheframers)
AnylegislativeactmustbeapprovedbybothhousesofCongressand
giventothePresident
TheHousesactwaslegislativeinnature
1)Ithadthepurposeandeffectofalteringlegalrights
2)W/othevetointhestatute,Congresswouldneedto
gothroughbicameralismandpresentmenttoreversea
decision
3)Thenatureofthedecisioninvolveddeterminationsof
policythatalteredrightsofthosenotinthelegislature
Concurrence(Powell):
Congresssactionisntlegislativebutadjudicativeitmadeitsowndeterminationthat
thesesixpersonsdidnotcomplyw/astatutorycriteria
Congresssonlycheckispolitics,butpoliticswouldnthelpChadha
Dissent(White):
Congressisnttryingtotakesomethingfromadifferentbranch,itisusingthevetoasa
tooltoholdontoitspolicymakingpowerthatithasgivenaway
Deprivingthemofthistoolputstheminahardplacetoeithergiveawayno
control/delegationorlegislatewithgreatspecificitythattheydonotpossess
Therealharmisntoverlappingofpowersbutaggrandizement,andthis
isnotthat
Livingconstitutionideaourgovernmentismorecomplexthantheframerscouldhave
foreseensowecantintelligiblylettheConstitutionworkifwetakeacrampedoriginalist
view
WecanstillgiveeffecttothevaluesoftheoriginalConstitution
Constitutiondoesntsayyoucantdothis
NecessaryandproperclauseCongresscandeterminemeansbestsuitedtoitspurposes,
whichcouldincluderetainingaveto
Thisvetopoweritselfwaspassedthroughbicameralismandpresentmentsoboth
chambersnecessarilyagreew/theirveto
Myersv.UnitedStates(1926)
Facts:
Acivilservicestatuteprovidedthatpostmastersshallbeappointedandmayberemoved
bythePresidentandwiththeadviceandconsentoftheSenate
PresidentWilsonattemptedtoremoveMyers,apostmasterappointedforafour
yearterminPortland,OR,beforehistermran
Holding:

TheremovalwaslawfulbecausetheattemptedlimitationonthePresidentsremoval
powerwasunconstitutionalunderArticleII
(1)Theactofremovalisitselfexecutiveinnatureandmustbeperformedbythe
presidentaspartoftheappointmentspower
(2)UndertheTakeCareclause,itisthePresident,nothissubordinates,who
musttakecarethelawbefaithfullyexecuted
(3)ArticleIIvestsexecutivepowerinthePresident,notsubordinates
AnyCongressionallimitsonthePresidentspowertoremoveareunconstitutional
HumphreysExecutorv.UnitedStates(1935)
Facts:
AstatuteprovidedthatmembersoftheFederalTradeCommission(FTC)couldbe
removedbythePresidentforinefficiency,neglectofduty,ormalfeasanceinoffice.
Thehistoryofthestatuteindicatedthelegislativegoalwastoentrustregulatory
decisionstoabodyofnonpartisanexpertsinsulatedfrompoliticalpressures
PresidentRooseveltremovedHumphreyfromofficeclaimingnotthat
theremovalwasjustifiedbythestatute,butthatthelimitationofthe
removalpowerwasunconstitutionalunderMyers.
Holding:
TheCourtunanimouslydisagreeswithRooseveltandupholdsaforcauseprovisionfor
removal
Theofficeofapostmasterisessentiallyunliketheofficeinvolvedherethat
Myerscannotbeacceptedascontrolling
Theroleofapostmasterisanexecutiveofficerrestrictedtoperformance
ofexecutivefunctionsthathasnodutyrelatedtothelegislativeor
judicialbranches
ThedecisioninMyersonlyappliestoonlypurelyexecutive
officers
TheFTCisanadministrativebodycreatedbyCongresstocarryinto
effectlegislativepoliciesembodiedinthestatuteinaccordancew/the
legislativestandardthereinprescribed,andtoperformotherspecified
dutiesasalegislativeorjudicialaid
Thecommissionactsquasilegislativelyandquasijudicially,and
cannotbecharacterizedaspartoftheexecutive
Buckleyv.Valeo(1976)
Facts:
TheFederalElectionCampaignActcreatedaneightmemberFederalElection
Commissiontooverseefederalelections:twomembersofthecommissionwere
appointedbythePresidentprotemporeoftheSenate,twobytheSpeakeroftheHouse,
andtwobythePresidenttheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerkoftheHousealso
servedasexofficiononvotingmembers
Thecommissionwasauthorizedtoinvestigate,maintainrecords,makerules
governingfederalelections,andimposesanctionsonthosewhoviolatedtheAct
andthecommissionsownregulations
Holding:

ThecourtheldtherewasaproblembecausethePresidentonlyappointed25%ofthe
members.Thismeanstheonlypowersthecommissioncanhaveislegislativepowers
(investigatingandreporting)
Therecannotbesignificantexecutiveauthoritybecausethenthatviolatesthe
takecareclauseandtheappointmentclause
Formalistreasoning:thispartofArt.IIishighlyspecificanddescriptive
anyefforttodepartfromtheappointmentsclauseisnotok
Bowsherv.Synar(1986)
Facts:
TheGrammRudmanHollingsActmandatedautomaticacrosstheboardspending
reductionsinthefederalbudgetundercertaincircumstances
TheComptrollerGeneralistheheadoftheGeneralAccountingOfficeandunder
theBudgetandAccountingActof1921isvestedw/theauthoritytoinvestigate
allmattersrelatingtothereceiptanddisbursementofpublicfunds.Heis
nominatedbythePresidentandcanberemovedonlybyimpeachmentorbya
jointresolutionofCongress(subjecttoPresidentialveto)
UndertheGRH,ifthefederaldeficitexceededstatutorytargets,the
ComptrollerGeneralwouldspecifyspendingreductionsthatwould
automaticallybemandatedbythePresidentunlessotherwiselegislated
byCongress
Holding:
TheGRHActisunconstitutional:Congresscannotgiveitself/retainauthoritytoremove
executiveofficials
SinceCongresshasthepowertoremovetheComptrollerGeneral,hemustbea
legislativeofficer(onlytheexecutivecanremoveexecutiveofficers/Congress
canonlyimpeachofficers)
ButtheComptrollerGeneralwasexercisingexecutivepowersby
interpretingtheGRHstatute,meaningthePresidenthastocontrolhim
Congresscannotexecuteitsownlaws;anotherbranchmust
executeit(oranindependentregulatoryagency)Importantto
ensureabalanceorpowers/checksandbalances
Concurrence(Stevens):
ThisisalegislativeofficerbecauseheismakingpublicpolicyasanagentofCongress
ButCongresscanonlymakepublicpolicythroughbicameralismand
presentment,whichwasviolated
WhenCongressdelegatesauthority,itcannotdosotoalesser
representativeoftheLegislativeBranchtoactonitsbehalf
Dissent(White):
Agreesw/Stevenslogic,butbicameralismandpresentment
CongressmayremovetheComptrolleronlythroughajointresolution,which
mustbepassedbybothhousesANDsignedbythePresident;aremovalofthe
Comptrollerunderthestatutesatisfiestherequirementsofbicameralismand
presentment
Morrisonv.Olson(1988)
Facts:

BecauseoftheWatergatecoverup,CongressadoptedtheEthicsinGovernmentActof
1978.TitleVIoftheActpermittedtheappointmentofanindependentcounselto
investigateandprosecutewrongdoingbyhighlevelfederalofficials.
Iftheattorneygeneraldeterminedthatfurtherinvestigationwaswarranted,a
panelofthreefederalcourtjudgescouldselectanindependentcounseland
determinehisprosecutorialjurisdiction.ThepanelmustconsistononeUSCourt
ofAppealsJudgefortheDistrictofColumbiaandtheothertwofromdifferent
states.
Holding(Rehnquist):
ItwaspermissibleforCongresstovestappointmentinthefederalcourtsbecausethe
independentcounselisaninferiorratherthanaprincipalofficer,sincehecanbe
removedbytheAttorneyGeneralforcauseandthepositionhasinferiorpoweras
comparedwiththeAttorneyGeneral.Alsotheindependentcounselisforalimitedtenure
withalimitedjurisdiction.
SeparationofPowersTEST
IfthereisanyrestraintonthePresidentsremovalpowersuseabalance
test
DotheremovalrestrictionsimpedethePresidentinhisabilityto
performhisconstitutionaltakecareduties?isthenatureofthe
positionsocentraltothefunctioningoftheexecutivebranchas
torequirethatitbeterminableatwillbythePresident?
Applyingthetest
DoestheActundulyburdenthePresident?
Isthereaggrandizing(isanotherbranchtakingpower
awayfromthePresidentlikeinBowsherwhenCongress
retainedaveto)
Theyseenoaggrandizementonthepartof
CongressortheJudiciary(nosupervisoryrole)
DoesthestatuteimpermissiblyunderminethePresident?
No,theexecutivehasaroleincallingfortheSpecial
Prosecutorinthefirstplace,whichequalssome
supervisorycontrol
AppointmentsClauseTEST
Isitaprincipalofficeroraninferiorofficer?
Ifprincipal
OnlythePresidentcanappointandremove
Ifinferior
Congresscanvestthepowertoappointaninferior
officerwith1)thepresident,2)aheadofadepartment,
or3)thecourtsoflaw
ApplyingtheTest
Here,CongressvestedthepowerwiththecourtsoflawSpecial
Division
TheonlywaythisworksisiftheSpecialProsecutoris
inferior
Thecourtsaysshesinferiorbecauseherroleis
limitedandshecanberemovedbytheAG

Dissent(Scalia):
Thespecialprosecutorisnotinferiorbecausesheisntsupervisedandsupervisionisa
waytodetermineinferiority
InEdmondsv.US,theCourtadoptedScaliasdefinitionofinferiormeaning
someonewhoissupervisedbysomeoneelse
Theonlysituationwhereinferioritywillbeimplicatedisifsomeone
otherthanthePresidentmakesanappointment
Thepowertoprosecuteisessentiallyanexecutiveactivityanditusurpspresidential
powerforCongresstovesthisauthorityintheindependentcounsel
Mistrettav.UnitedStates(1989)
Facts:
TheUnitedStateSentencingCommissionof7judgeswascreatedintheJudicialBranch
tomakefederalsentencingguidelines
Holding:
Thecommissionwasaconstitutionaldelegationofpower
Thedelegationwassufficientlyspecificwithaguidingprincipleandoversight
Dissent(Scalia):
FormalistArgument:theConstitutionsstructuralrestrictionshouldbepreserved
Lawmakingorexecuting/exercisinglawsshouldbedonebyCongressorthe
Executive
Thecommissionwasw/inArt.III,whichisnotaccountabletothepublic
FreeEnterpriseFundv.PCAOB(2010)
Facts:
UndertheSarbanesOxleyAct,theSECcouldmakethePublicCompanyAccounting
OversightBoard,whichconsistedof5SECmemberswhocouldberemovedbytheSEC
forgoodcause
Holding:
TherearetoomanydegreesofseparationfromthePresidentitstoomuchofa
constraint
IfyoumakethePCAOBremovableatwill,thenitsok(supposedlylike
HumphreysExecutor)
Dissent(Bryer):
Removalatwilldoesnothing!ItonlyputspressureontheSECtoremovetheperson,but
doesntforceit