1.

Clarence Rogelio Castilar

Greater metropolitan manila solid waste management committee v. Jancom
Environmental Corp.
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/jun2006/gr_163663_2006.html

Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial courts
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus.47

There are instances, however, when an error may be committed in the course of
execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances call for
correction by a superior court, as where:

1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

That a writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed,
substantially to every essential particular thereof,49 it is settled. It may not thus
vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce,50 nor go beyond its terms.
Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and
exceeds it, it has no validity.51
The inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it
into execution according to the mandate. They cannot vary it, or examine it for any
other purpose than execution, or give any other or further relief, or review it upon
any matter decided on appeal for error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further than
to settle so much as has been remande
2. Grant Mesa
Pallada v. RTC of Kalibo (304 SCRA 440)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri19/mar1999/gr_129442_1999.html
It bears stressing that a similar provision is found in Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court.

The Court is not prepared, however, to invalidate the Writ of Execution issued below.
The petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part of petitioners, designed to
prevent the final disposition of the case. In People v. Leviste 15, it was held that:

While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule
15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial

cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be
disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible be
decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
3. Marlouis Planas
Lao v. King
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/aug2006/gr_160358_2006.html
Thus, the alleged variance between the trial courts decision of September 25, 2002
and the respondents Motion for Execution is mere figment of the petitioners'
imagination. As we see it, the reliefs sought by the respondent in his said motion
are merely the logical and necessary consequences of the judgment rendered by
Judge Bruselas, Jr. in his decision in Civil Case No. Q-01-42972.

Besides, and as correctly pointed out by the CA, the respondent's motion prayed for
the issuance of an order of execution so as "to give immediate effect to the
judgment dated 25 September 2002." This only shows that the respondent merely
intended to enforce the necessary implications of what was adjudged by the trial
court in its decision.

Too, the petitioners might have lost sight of the fact that there was no order by the
trial court which specifically granted the reliefs prayed for by the respondent. As it
is, the questioned Order merely directed, in general terms, the issuance of a writ of
execution in accordance with the courts resolution of the issues, as embodied in
the dispositive portion of its decision. Clearly, the Order did not grant any relief not
otherwise granted in the decision of September 25, 2002.
4. Kimberly Loto
Dormitorio v. Fernandez
http://www.lawphil.net//juri1976/aug1976/gr_25897_1976.html
Nor can it be denied that as the later decision in Civil Case No. 6553 was the result
of a compromise, it had the effect of res judicata. This was made clear in Salazar v.
Jarabe. 14 There are later decisions to the same effect. 15 The parties were,
therefore, bound by it. There was thus an element of bad faith when petitioners did
try to evade its terms. At first, they were quite successful. Respondent Judge,
however, upon being duly informed, set matters right. He set aside the writ of
execution. That was to act in accordance with law. He is to be commended, not
condemned.

3. There is no merit likewise to the point raised by petitioners that they were not
informed by respondent Judge of the petition by private respondent to set aside the
writ of execution. The order granting such petition was the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. 16 The motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. 17 Under
the circumstances, the failure to give notice to petitioners had been cured. That is a
well-settled doctrine. 18 Their complaint was that they were not heard. They were
given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. So they did. That was to
free the order from the alleged infirmity. Petitioners then cannot be heard to claim
that they were denied procedural due process.
5. Bryan Paule
Bachrach Corp v. CA (296 SCRA 487)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri19/sep1998/gr_128349_1998.html
The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has
gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution.
16 No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such
execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts
and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust,
the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its
enforcement. 17 So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an
injunctive relief. 18 Evidently, in issuing its orders of 13 July 1995 and 29 August
1995 assailed by PPA in the latter's petition or certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals, the trial court in the case at bar would want to preserve status
quo pending its disposition of the specific performance case and to prevent the case
from being mooted by an early implementation of the ejectment writ. In holding
differently and ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the appellate court, in our considered view, has
committed reversible error.

Having reached the above conclusions, other incidental issues raised by petitioner
no longer need to be passed upon.
6. Eissel Danganan
So v. CA
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/aug2002/gr_138869_2002.html
In the case at bar, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Froilan L. Navarro8 states
that as a consequence of the coronary artery triple bypass operation of petitioner
So, "the patient is still weak, depressed, recuperating from the surgical procedure.
He could not stand stressful situation and physical activities. He needs coronary
rehabilitation for at least one year under direct supervision of a coronary care
therapist." It is our considered opinion that the present physical condition of
petitioner So presents a compelling reason to modify the decision of the trial court

and impose, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine in an amount equal to double the

amount of the checks involved.
7. Arman Candelaria
Reburiano v. CA (301 SCRA 342)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri19/jan1999/gr_102965_1999.html
This provision safeguards the rights of a corporation which is dissolved pending
litigation.

There is, therefore, no reason why the suit filed by private respondent should not be
allowed to proceed to execution. It is conceded by petitioners that the judgment
against them and in favor of private respondent in C.A. G.R. No. 16070 had become
final and executory. The only reason for their refusal to execute the same is that
there is no existing corporation to which they are indebted. Such argument is
fallacious. As previously mentioned, the law specifically allows a trustee to manage
the affairs of the corporation in liquidation. Consequently, any supervening fact,
such as the dissolution of the corporation, repeal of a law, or any other fact of
similar nature would not serve as an effective bar to the enforcement of such right.
8. Nadjib Basir Bantuas
Saligumba v. Palanog
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/dec2008/gr_143365_2008.html
Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings
absent any formal substitution. Yet, despite the courts alleged lack of jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioners, petitioners never bothered to challenge the same,
and in fact allowed the proceedings to go on until the trial court rendered its
decision. There was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even an action to
annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners themselves could not feign
ignorance of the case since during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner
Ernesto Saligumba, son of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present
during the delimitation of the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5
November 1977.31 Petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. was likewise furnished a copy of
the trial courts orders and notices. It was only the Answer filed by petitioner
Generoso Saligumba in Civil Case No. 5288 that confirmed the dates when the
spouses Saligumbas died and named the latters children. Consequently, Atty.
Miralles was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been properly
relieved as counsel of record. His acts bind his clients and the latters successors-ininterest.

In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown
much interest in the case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba
were declared in default for failure to file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto Saligumba

was out of the country working as a seaman. Only petitioner Generoso Saligumba
filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in this Court was signed only by
petitioner Generoso Saligumba as someone signed on behalf of petitioner Ernesto
Saligumba without the latters authority to do so.
9. Kassandra Quiban Arnaldo
PNB v. Bondoc (14 SCRA 770)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri1/jul1965/gr_l-20236_1965.html
judgment becomes final.2

A judgment is revived only when the same cannot be enforced by motion, that is,
after five years from the time it becomes final. A revived judgment can be enforced
by motion within five years from its finality. After said five years, how may the
revived judgment be enforced? Appellee contends that by that time ten years or
more would have elapsed since the first judgment becomes final, so that an action
to enforce said judgment would then be barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellee's theory relates the period of prescription to the date the original judgment
became final. Such a stand is inconsistent with the accepted view that a judgment
reviving a previous one is a new and different judgment. The inconsistency becomes
clearer when we consider that the causes of action in the three cases are different.
In the original case, the action was premised on the unpaid promissory note signed
by Joaquin Bondoc in favor of the Philippine National Bank; in the second case, the
Philippine National Bank's cause of action was the judgment rendered in Civil Case
No. 8040; and in the present case, the basis is the judgment rendered in Civil Case
No. 30663. Parenthetically, even the amounts involved are different.
10. Bob Ryan Diator Gani
Infante v. Aran Builders, Inc.
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/aug2007/gr_156596_2007.html
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should
indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority only over a particular territory defined by the Supreme Court
11. Levy John Lalusis
Camacho v. CA (287 SCRA 611)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri19/mar1998/gr_118339_1998.html
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court. Pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)

years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. Resolving the same issue in Gonzales v. Court
of Appeals6 the Court emphasized

On several instances, this Court has invoked the principle of equity in computing the
5-year period to execute a judgment by motion. We have ruled that if the delays
were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should not be included in
computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion . . . .

Along the same line, the Court elucidated in Republic v. Court of Appeals7

To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds.8 These
exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage.

In the case under consideration, the judgment sought to be executed became final
and executory on 23 May 1983. The writ of execution was issued on 25 July 1983
but on 28 September 1983 petitioner moved to defer execution.
12. Patricia DL Diaz
Macapagal v. Gako
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/feb2008/gr_158848_2008.html
It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within
five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.
Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, by action. However, there are
instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five
years upon meritorious grounds.

In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,9 this Court held that in

computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that
there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an
appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or
otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time
within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during

which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by
any delay occasioned by the debtor.

There had been many instances where this Court allowed the execution by motion
even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage
Let it be stressed that with respect to Macapagal and Silverio the Decision of the
trial court has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to
change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of
clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to
any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor
altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability
of final judgment.
13. Dea Ballesteros
Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. v. Lee
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/jan2006/gr_159806_2006.html
We note that when the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, judgment
had already been rendered on the remaining factual issues such that the partial
judgment had become a complete judgment. Thus, a writ of execution could already
issue.

However, since appeal had been duly perfected, though not yet finally resolved,
execution was not a matter of right, but of discretion provided good reasons
therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance of the writ must be stated
in a special order after due hearing.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.

(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. On motion of the

prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said
court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal
may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing. (Underscoring ours.)

...

Unfortunately, the assailed Order of the trial court failed to state good reasons for
the issuance of the writ. The trial court deemed that execution should issue as a
matter of right because it mistakenly held that the partial decision had become final
and executory. As discussed above, the latter proposition is without legal basis.

Clearly, the assailed Order of the trial court, which granted the motion for execution
pending appeal, fell short of the requirements of Section 2, Rule 39
14. A Zerina Domingo Lanete
Intramuros Club, Inc. v. CA (341 SCRA 90)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/sep2000/gr_135630_2000.html
we find that the petition was not rendered moot or illusory by the fact that
execution was effected and possession of the tennis courts restored to private
respondents. The resolution of the instant petition requires a determination of
whether respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretionary power to
order execution pending appeal as prescribed in Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, and where such grave abuse of discretion is established the
execution pending appeal pursuant to the resolutions of respondent court may be
voided. Thus, the Court finds that the petition presents a live and justiciable
controversy.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads ---

Discretionary execution. ---

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. --- On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record

or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or
final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
On the matter of hearing, we uphold respondents position that respondent court
did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting the motion for execution pending
appeal without a full-blown or trial-type hearing. We have interminably declared
that due process basically entails the opportunity to be heard, and we hold that the
same principle underlies the provision on hearing in Section 2 of the abovecited
Rule 39. The records of the instant case clearly disclose that petitioners have filed
their comment28 to private respondents motion for execution pending appeal, and
their arguments as embodied in said comment did in fact form part of the
discussion of respondent court in its assailed resolution of July 9, 1998.1wphi1
At the same time, it must also be remembered that the determination of the
existence of "good reasons" is also a discretionary power, and the reviewing court
will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion absent a showing of grave
abuse thereof.40 In the present case, we find that respondent court was well within
its discretion in issuing its questioned resolutions, which clearly set out the reasons
for granting private respondents motion for execution pending appeal. The
observation on the deteriorating and unsanitary conditions of the Victoria Tennis
Courts came from tennis players who regularly use the said courts, and there is no
indication that the letter was contrived or fabricated simply to procure for private
respondents the restoration of possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts. We find no
merit to petitioners contention that the letter is inadmissible because it was not
among those formally offered in evidence during trial at the RTC --- the letter was
dated November 10, 1997 and it could not have formed part of the evidence in trial
at the time the parties formally rested their cases on June 11, 1996.41 Verily, it
could only have been submitted in evidence before respondent court, while the case
was on appeal therewith
15. Rj Almazan
Planters Products, Inc. v. CA
http://www.lawphil.net//juri19/oct1999/gr_106052_1999.html
So also, mere issuance of a bond to answer for damages is no longer considered a
good reason for execution pending appeal. To consider the mere posting of a bond
as a "good reason" would precisely make immediate execution of judgment pending
appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. 13

The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception
to the general rule. 14 Applying the rule on statutory construction, it should be
interpreted only so far as the language thereof fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general rule rather than the

exceptions. 15 In light of the foregoing, this Court is unable to agree with the Court
of Appeals that the petitioner admitted the correctness of the special or
discretionary execution when it posted the supersedeas bond. Besides, in its
"Urgent Omnibus Motion" before the trial court, petitioner prayed that the Order of
the lower court dated April 8, 1992, directing execution pending appeal, be set
aside.

Then too, it can be gleaned that there is no good reason to grant execution pending
appeal, under the premises. To repeat, the ground for granting execution pending
appeal must be a good reason. Thus, when the Court has already granted a stay of
execution upon the adverse party's filing of a supersedeas bond, the circumstances
justifying execution despite the supersedeas bond, must be paramount; they should
outweigh the security offered by the supersedeas bond. 16 In the present case,
however, the Court discerns no reason paramount enough to warrant the execution
pending appeal. To rule otherwise would be to make the remedy of execution
pending appeal a tool of oppression and inequity instead of being an instrument of
solicitude and justice. 17
16. Crisanto Ando
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corp
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/mar2002/gr_110701_2002.html
We find that there is neither grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge nor a change in circumstances so as to warrant a setting aside of the assailed
Special Order granting execution pending appeal.

Respondent judge exercised sound discretion in granting execution pending appeal

on the grounds that: (1) ISELCO-I is a cooperative of the people within the area of
coverage that is engaged in the business of retailing electricity to its members - a
commodity basic to their welfare and vital to the industries of the people; and (2) to
deliver electricity to the people, its electric lines, posts, transmissions, transformers
and other accessories must always be maintained in good order and condition.
17. Joseph Adrian Llames
Sibulo v. San Jose (474 SCRA 464)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri/nov2005/am_p_05_2088_2005.htm
Clearly, respondent knew there were properties that could be levied upon, when
Delia Santiago offered to just remit the money to the Clerk of Court of MTCC, Naga
City, for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent even gave her one week
grace period, and waited for her at the office and when defendant did not deliver
the payment to the clerk of court, respondent should have proceeded to levy on the
personal properties of the defendant in accordance with the rules.[7]

To exculpate himself, respondent states that his failure to make the defendant remit
the payment was due to his heavy workload. We are unconvinced by respondents
attempt to excuse his failure. The investigating judge, in fact, found that there were
many other writs he had not implemented.

Finally, we take judicial notice that respondent sheriff was previously found guilty of
negligence in the performance of his duty and fined P1,000 for these other failures,
and he was sternly warned by the Court that a similar conduct in the future would
be dealt with more severely.[8]
18. Casey Anne Alota
Villarin v. Munasque
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/sep2008/gr_169444_2008.html
We note that the aforesaid Notice of Levy was issued with precipitate haste on 30
October 2002, just a day after the issuance of the Writ of Execution on 29 October
2002, barring sufficient opportunity for a demand for payment to be made upon
[petitioners] nor for any opportunity to exercise [petitioners] right to choose which
properties may be levied upon, indicative of a premeditated plan of over levying on
[petitioners] properties.
19. Aileen Jagmis
Mendoza v. Doroni
http://www.lawphil.net//jur/jan2006/am_p-04-1872_2006.html
Respondent should have collected the P60,000 from defendants and turned over
this amount to the clerk of court or deposited it to a fiduciary account in the nearest
government depository bank. In fact, respondent should have collected the P60,000
before turning over possession of the property to defendants. Defendants would
have been only too willing to pay the P60,000 because defendants prayed for the
execution of the writ. By neglecting to collect the P60,000, respondent failed to
implement the writ fully, to the prejudice of the judgment creditors who were
owners of the four destroyed structures.

Execution puts an end to litigation, giving justice to the prevailing party. A decision
left unexecuted because of the sheriff's inefficiency, negligence, misconduct or
ignorance negates all the painstaking effort exerted by the entire judiciary to render
justice to litigants. A sheriff who fails to execute, or who selectively executes, a final
judgment commits not only a great disservice to the entire judiciary, he also
diminishes the people's faith in the judiciary.
20. Lynne Caballegan

Barrete v. Amila (230 SCRA 219)

http://www.lawphil.net//ju/feb1994/am_mtj_92_733_1994.html
In the instant case, complainant was arrested and detained for failure to comply
with the judgment of eviction, on the mistaken belief of respondent judge that she
was thereby guilty of direct contempt of court and thus could be summarily
punished with imprisonment. To make matters worse, complainant's three (3) minor
children, who had no idea whatsoever about the controversy, were dragged into it
when they were incarcerated with their mother.

Since complainant was not guilty of the alleged contempt, the order for her arrest
had no legal basis. Even if complainant had not been guilty of contempt, the
method employed by respondent Judge to compel compliance from her was not
justified the same is not sanctioned by the Rules. In the case of U.S. vs. Ramayrat, 8
the Court ruled that for execution of the final judgment, the Sheriff could have
availed himself of the public force (i.e., assistance of the police authorities), had it
been necessary to resort thereto. It was not up to respondent Judge to ensure
execution of the judgment by ordering the arrest of complainant. In the instant
case, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of authority and misconduct in
office in ordering the arrest of complainan
21. Rhoda de los Santos
Ching v. CA
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/feb2004/gr_124642_2004.html
we find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of
the RTC. The private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove
that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the tribunal,
being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as
determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment
and is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.51

It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong

demonstration that the RTC acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence
material to, and even decide of, the controversy before certiorari will lie. A special
civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed
22. Punky Inciso

Capa v. CA
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/sep2006/gr_160082_2006.html
Petitioners then filed a Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim
for Damages which is a complete turn around from their motion to approve
indemnity bond. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not acting on
the same since the invalidity of the affidavit of third-party claim should have been
raised at the earliest opportunity which is in the trial court. Petitioners could have
then moved for the quashal of the same, thus they could not now invoke the
jurisdiction of the CA to rule on the same when they in fact had already waived the
alleged defect in the affidavit when they sought from the CA the approval of the
indemnity bond they posted in the trial court.
action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.

Clearly, a third party claimant or any third person may vindicate his claim to his
property wrongfully levied by filing a proper action which is distinct and separate
from that in which the judgment is being enforced. Such action would have for its
object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well
as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof
despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, of course,
and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the
supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor
himself.15

The same paragraph also provides a remedy to a judgment obligee when a frivolous
and plainly spurious claim was filed by a third-party claimant, i.e., to file his claim
for damages in the same court where the third-party claimant filed his third-party
claim or to file a separate action. Thus, petitioners' claim for damages must be filed
in the trial court, whether in the same case where a third-party claim has been filed
or in a separate action for damages which petitioners may institute. This is so in
order to require the filing of proper pleadings and to hold trial so as to give the
parties the chance to submit their respective evidence.
23. Yuri Ann Ruiz
Fiestan v. CA (185 SCRA 751)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri1990/may1990/gr_81552_1990.html
The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The
public auction sale conducted on August 6, 1979 by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos
Sur refers to the "sale" mentioned in Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which
was made pursuant to a special power inserted in or attached to a real estate
mortgage made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation. It must be noted that in the mortgage contract, petitioners, as

mortgagor, had appointed private respondent DBP, for the purpose of extrajudicial
foreclosure, "as his attorney-in-fact to sell the property mortgaged under Act No.
3135, as amended, to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and
necessary to accomplish said purpose .... In case of foreclosure, the Mortgagor
hereby consents to the appointment of the mortgagee or any of its employees as
receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged property at once, and
to hold possession of the same ... 4

There is no justifiable basis, therefore, to apply by analogy the provisions of Rule 39

of the Rules of Court on ordinary execution sale, particularly Section 15 thereof as
well as the jurisprudence under said provision, to an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
conducted under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended. Act No. 3135, as
amended, being a special law governing extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the
same must govern as against the provisions on ordinary execution sale under Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.

24. Acel Gaffud Dabban

Phil Surety and Insurance Co. v. Zabal (21 SCRA 682)
http://www.lawphil.net//juri1/oct1967/gr_l-21556_1967.html
Registration of levy was also declared invalid where the Sheriff's notice did not
contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title covering the levied
property, the volume and page in the registry book where the title is registered,2 or
where the notice was not accompanied by a copy of the order of attachment.3

The evident purpose of the law in imposing these requirements is to make the levy
public and notorious, to prevent liens from attaching secretly and by surreptitious
entries and endorsements, and to enable the affected party to inquire into the date
and circumstances surrounding the creation of the encumbrance,4 as well as to give
him ample opportunity to file timely claim to the property levied upon.

Since the Court of Appeals, in this case, found that no notice of the levy was given
to respondent who was then in occupancy of the land a factual finding which we
cannot now review it is obvious that there was no valid levy on the land, and,
therefore, its registration in the registry of deeds and annotation in the title were
also invalid and ineffective.5 Petitioner's case is not even helped by the allegation
that Fajardo, in whose name the land was registered was duly notified of the
attachment. Where notice to the occupant is required by law for the validity, of a
levy, personal service of the copy of the writ, description of the property and notice
to the owner, who is not the occupant, does not constitute compliance with the
statute.6

25. Mich Bernardo

Sps. Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Dev. Inc.
http://www.lawphil.net//juri20/aug2008/gr_150470_2008.html

ours.)

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact

or question already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still
proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged
in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and
parties, but not of causes of action.

It is on the ground of res judicata, in its second concept conclusiveness of

judgment that the Petition for Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos must be
dismissed. As explained by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision:

In the case at bar, the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive
upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos] OCT No. 239, inasmuch as the said
issue has already been mutually controverted by the parties and ruled upon with
finality by the Supreme Court no less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses
Layos] title.41
For conclusiveness of judgment, identity of causes of action and subject matter is
not required; it is the identity of issues that is material. The issue of the validity of
the Spouses Layos title to the subject property is integral to both G.R. No. 120958
and LRC Case No. B-1784.
Conclusiveness of Judgment in G.R. No. 155612

During the pendency of the Petition at bar, a significant development took place in
the quieting of title case. The Court had already denied in a Resolution dated 13
January 2003 the appeal of the Spouses Layos in G.R. No. 155612 and, in effect,
affirmed the Decision dated 20 February 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 50962. It should be recalled that in said Decision, the appellate court upheld the
validity of OCT No. 242 from which La Paz derived its TCTs and, at the same time,
explicitly found OCT No. 239 of the Spouses Layos spurious.

This ruling of the Court of Appeals on the spuriousness of OCT No. 239, once again,
constitutes res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment on the Petition for
Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment which is also known as
"preclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved
in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. Once a judgment attains finality it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land