LTD Compilation 1

LTD Case Digests Batch 1
Missing
18 Director of Lands v IAC Abdon
1. Collado v CA (online)
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court. She
attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert Pangyarihan 1, stating this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. About a
year later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-applicants and more applicants joined (petitioners).
The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to
petitioners application.
ISSUES:
2. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their predecessors-in-interest 2 as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of rights among
them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate taxes.
The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land application. It is also not within any government reservation.
Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33 (establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation). Since EO 33 contains
a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, the Lot is excluded from such reservation.
Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO 33, the President had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public
domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable through Proclamation No. 1283. They say that the proclamation expressly excluded an
area of 3780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question
is part of the excluded town site are and that under CA 141, town sites are considered alienable and disposable.
3. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course.
Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had become final and
executor and is no longer available because of res judicata. The land registration court had jurisdiction over the case, which involves
private land. The Republic is stopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction because the Republic participated in the proceedings before
the court.
Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was null and void because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over
the case. The land in question was not alienable and disposable.
4. WON the petition-in-intervention is proper. (more on procedural)
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:
Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CA annulled the decision of the Trial Court. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant for
registration of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
1 Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands

2 Sesinando Leyva

domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable.
The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has
been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Petition is DENIED.
1. PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.
Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141 3 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 19424 and
PD 10735 (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in
possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title
to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State.
Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since,
the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be
counted because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable
and disposable public agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forest lands or other
inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637, revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The new
proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to MWR coverage.
The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several
documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy
Land Inspector of the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collados application attached a technical description stating that
the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, there is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
2. ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.
The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties.
The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental ights. Estoppel or
laches does not validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application would sacrifice
justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of public properties registered and which are not capable of
private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
5. Legarda v Saleeby
3 Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894.
4 A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title.
5 Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.

CONSUELO LEGARDA and MAURO PRIETO vs. N.M. SALEEBY
G.R. No. L-8936 2 October 1915 Johnson
FACTS
- Legarda and husband Prieto (plaintiffs-appellants) and Saleeby (defendant-appellee) occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila,
between which is a stone wall.
- 2 March 1906 the plaintiffs filed a petition for the registration of their lot with the Court of Land Registration (CLR), which eventually
granted the same on 25 October 1906 and ordered the issuance of an original certificate of title (OCT) under the Torrens system. The said
registration and certificate included the wall and the land it occupied.
- Teus, the predecessor of the defendant, filed a petition for the registration of his lot with the CLR, and on 25 March 1912, the court decreed
the said registration and issued an OCT under the Torrens system. Both also included the wall and the land it occupied.
- 13 December 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall was included in the defendants OCT and immediately filed a petition in the CLR
for the correction of the error.
- The CLR denied the petition on the theory that during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to
make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
ISSUES
(1) Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? - Plaintiffs
(2) W/N the defendant could be considered an innocent purchaser protected by certain provisions of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) No
HELD/RATIO
(1) The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land, to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it cannot be denied that the
proceeding for the registration of land under the Torrens system is judicial. It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and
binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
- Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two
different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes
that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration.
While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive
influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to
be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the Torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has
been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
- The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure
in this registered title, then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate,
then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his

registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so
as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them.
- The appellee was the first negligent in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in
an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. Granting that he was the owner of the land upon
which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever
closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.
(2) Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses that the vendor
would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties who are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent
purchaser." Persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights
against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.
- Said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. The phrase "innocent purchaser should not be
applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in no sense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original
certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there
cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or
his successors. Teus cannot even be regarded as the holder in good faith of that part of the land included in the certificate of the appellants.
- The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who
had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included
in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by
reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and
who was innocent of any act of negligence.
TRENT, dissenting:
- Such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the introduction and adoption of the so-called Torrens
system for the registration of land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands
conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the
office of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
x x x one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the Torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is
avowedly modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all
others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished by the Court of Land
Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the
contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to
loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by
and let a default judgment be entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he
was served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default

judgment was entered. x x x I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder
of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was
issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings.
The judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the number of cases wherein registered land owners in
the future will fail to appear and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby
enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally,
arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land Registration.
6. FELDA ALBIENDA, petitioner, -versus- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELES SUMAGPAO and RUBEN SUMAGPAO, respondents.
Facts:
1. The spouses Ruben Sumampao and Angeles Sumampao, were applicants for a free patent over a piece of the land designated as Lot
No. 1548, Pls-67, situated in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
2. Respondents instituted in the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur an action against Albienda for correction of the latter's certificate
of title, TCT No. T-1718, and for recovery of possession of said portion of the land, with damages.
3. The complaint alleged that respondents acquired Lot 1548 under a deed of sale dated November 11, 1968 executed in their favor by
Antonio Baldonase; that sometime in 1973, petitioner Albienda, claiming ownership over the adjoining land designated as Lot No. 1550,
took possession not only of said Lot 1550, but also usurped a portion of eight [8] hectares of Lot 1548 belonging to respondents; and
that despite repeated demands, refused to vacate said portion and to restore possession thereof to respondents.
4. Petitioner averred that Lot 1550, containing an area of 196,848 square meters, originally belonged to Enesaria Goma, in whose name
the same was registered under the Torrens System on July 23, 1958; and later petitioner acquired the same for value in good faith; that
upon registration of the deed of sale executed in favor of petitioner, the latter was issued TCT No. T-1718 covering Lot 1550 with an
area of 196,848 square meters, which is the same area stated in the certificates of title of petitioner's aforenamed predecessors-ininterest.
5. Petitioner alleged that even granting arguendo that the technical description appearing in her certificate of title was erroneous, the
action for correction thereof and for reconveyance of the disputed property was unavailable, as more than one year had elapsed since
the issuance of the original certificate of title in 1958.
6. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents Sumampaos
Issue: Whether or not the description of a parcel of land in the petitioner's certificate of title may be corrected to conform with the technical
description appearing in the "survey return" on file in the Bureau of Lands, notwithstanding the lapse of more than one (1) year since the
issuance of said certificate of title.

Held:
3. No. Such is contrary to the settled principles aplicable to the Torrens System of land recording.
4. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land, to put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title except claims which were noted in the certificate at the time of registration, or which may have arisen subsequent
thereto.
5. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act: "Every decree of registration shag bind the land, and quiet title thereto ... it shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons . . . whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citations, or included in the general
description 'To All Whom It May Concern.' " When the decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only
one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, and such petition can prosper only if no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest in the land. Said Section 38 categorically declares that "upon the expiration of
the said term of one [1] year every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible."
6. The original certificate of title covering Lot 1550 was issued on July 23, 1958 in favor of Enesaria Goma. The fact that sometime in
October 1958 Loida Baterbonia (one of the subsequent owners) had written the Director of Lands for a recomputation of the area set
forth in the certificate of the said land is of no moment, for up until the sale of Lot 1550 to petitioner in 1972, no action had been
brought before a court of competent jurisdiction to correct the error, if indeed there was such error.
7. The instant action to correct the certificate of title in question was filed 19 years after the issuance of said certificate of title. The period
allowed by law for setting aside the decree of registration of a certificate of title-had long elapsed, the original certificate of title issued
in the name of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest had become indefeasible. The Transfer Certificate of Title derived therefrom is
likewise unassailable, for under Section 39 of Act 496, "every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the
same be free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate."
8. Every person dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no
way oblige them to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
7. Capitol Subdivision v Province of Negros

FACTS:
Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar
Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.
Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000, payable in
instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained
a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again
mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co.
These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the
foreclosure sale.
Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.
In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual
installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full payment.
Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the
installments due to the Bank in 1949.
Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was
issued.
It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose
Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.
For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that
Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or
on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the
explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that
it took possession of the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond
their comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare
such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
HELD:
The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances
indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the
notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property
was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the
latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which
would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the
Banks knowledge and participation.
Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that
some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that
Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
8. Traders v CA
FACTS:
1. Maximo and Patria Capay executed a mortgage in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the
former.
2. The mortgage covered several properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of the present dispute
3. The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
upon the mortgaged property.
4. A petition was filed before CFI of Rizal alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. This was
initially granted
5. On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the disputed
property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays certificate of title.
6. The injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated
and on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was
issued in its name on the same day.
7. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the
Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272,[2] was entered in the banks name. The notice of lis pendens,
however, was not carried over in the certificate of title issued in the name of TRB.
8. The Capayas filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of the property with damages and attorneys fees.

9. The CFI declared that the mortgage was void.
10. This was appealed with the CA
11. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in whose
name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774,[3] was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
12. The CA ruled in favor of Capayas
13. For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court[6] was denied in a
Resolution dated September 12,1983.
ISSUE: WoN the title of the nonbank respondent can be questioned? NO
HELD:
- When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6) new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained
any notice of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next sold each of
these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property
in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their respective portions of said property.
- There was nothing in the certificates of title of their respective predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their
suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective
predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the
principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.
- The main purpose of the torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such further inquiry.
- Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate.
- The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone
dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the
title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court.
- Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in
no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
- The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
- SECOND:
o The foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected the properties
and inquired from the Register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the property they
were purchasing-an exercise of diligence above that required by law.
- THIRD
o between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting
loss.
o The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not annotated in TRBs title. The
Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and
the consolidation of title in the banks name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption.

9. Hermoso v CA
HERMOSO, vs. CA
FACTS: The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot
3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots form part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr.,
Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia.
Since 1978, petitioner, Laureno Hermoso and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants
thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On July 4, 1995, the DAR issued an order
granting the petition. The DAR was directed to issue emancipation patents in their favour after a parcellary mapping has been undertaken by
the Bureau of Lands over the subject landholdings.
Banag filed before the DAR an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the
motion. Respondents, Heirs of Francia, filed an MR. They claimed that the lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes
in an Order dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land.
On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order affirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the motion for issuance of emancipation patent in
favor of Banag. The Office of the President denied respondents appeal.
Respondents then filed with the CA. They maintained that P.D. No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June 5, 1973
Order of the DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes. Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands as early as October 14, 1978.
On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision which reversed the O.P.s decision putting the land under the coverage of P.D. No.
27.
ISSUE: Whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27.
Petitioners argument: The S.C. decision, which has become final and executorY, declared him a tenant of the landholding in question, in
effect, the subject lots are considered as agricultural lands and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27.
Respondents argument: The lands were already declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973. Hence, they are no longer subject to P.D. No. 27.
HELD: Lots are NOT covered by P.D. No. 27.
RATIO:

1. For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is
agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
2. the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. TheY were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.
4. The subject properties are strategically located in the urban center of the town of Meycauayan wherein there are already existing developed
and occupied residential subdivisions and even low cost housing projects subsidized by funds from government financial institution. Likewise,
there are also industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the National Planning Commissions report.
5. Lands not devoted to agricultural activity and those that were previously converted to non-agricultural uses are outside the coverage of the
CARL. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial
and residential lands."
7. It is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands."
These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can
readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such
development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract
from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
LTD NOTES:
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types:primary classification and secondary classification.
The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public
domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is
referred to as secondary classification.23
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural
lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June 15, 1988, explicitly
provides:

Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to
existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully
paid his obligation.
On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 states:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands.
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1)
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture
or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined
by the sanggunian concerned x x x
10. Chavez v NHA

Chavez v. NHA (2007)
Doctrines:
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all natural resources are owned by the State and they cannot be alienated except
for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Facts:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for
the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40 hectares but the JVA was amended). The
JVA also provides that as part of the consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL
and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in
relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
Issues:
.W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain (Chavez claims that the power to
reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively with PEA).
.W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as required (Chavez claims
that they were not).
.W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain (Chavez claims that there was no

proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable).
.W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void since it did not undergo public bidding but by negotiated contract.
.W/N RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects, its charter does not mention that it has the exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public
domain. In fact, EO 525 provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken by a national government agency or entity
authorized by its charter to reclaim land.
There
a.
b.
c.
are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation project:

approval by the President;
favorable recommendation of PEA; and
undertaken by any of the ff:
i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject to
consultation with PEA.
Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the Project has met all 3 requirements:
a. There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos issued Proclamations approving and
implementing the reclamation of lands.
b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement of the reclamation phase from PEA. This is shown in the fact that PEA was a
member of the EXECOM which was in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Project.
c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency authorized to reclaim lands under its charter and other
laws. While the charter of NHA does not explicitly mention reclamation in any of its listed powers, such power is implied since it is
vital or incidental to achieving the objective of an urban land reform and housing program.
2. YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. As such, it decides
whether areas, like foreshore or submerged lands, should be reclaimed or not and whether they should be classified as alienable and
disposable.
In this case, when the President approved and ordered the development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work,
making DENR a member of the EXECOM (committee tasked to implement the project), the required authorization from the DENR to
reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its
ratification of the reclamation project.
3. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the administration and disposition of the NHA) and 465 (increased the
reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were issued, the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted
to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed lands were transferred to the
NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or
patrimonial properties of the State. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred

to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be able to transfer such lands to qualified entities and thus, it
will not achieve its purpose.
4. VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of their titles to the NHA, the latter can
therefore legally transfer them to RBI or to any other interested qualified buyer without any bidding. Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a
government agency not tasked to sell lands of the public domain.
5. NO. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to
the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In this
case, RBI is a private corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least 60% of its shares.
11. Republic v CA
April 10, 1989 | Melenchio-Herrera, J
FACTS:
1. in 1941, the late Nicolas Felisilda was assigned a Farmlot and Homelot, both situated in Polomolok, South Cotabato; a Certificate of
Permanent Assignment of said lots was issued to him
2. 1960, Nicolas Felisilda filed Free Patent Application for the Disputed Property with the Bureau of Lands
1. It was only sometime in 1963, or after the death of Nicolas Felisilda, when Lands Inspector Cejas acted upon said application and
processed it, after Felisilda's widow, Catalina sought his help
3. October 1963 a Notice of Application for Free Patent was released by the Bureau of Lands
1. Inspector Cejas submitted a Certification to the Director of Lands that upon ocular inspection of the land, he found that the
applicant had been in continuous occupation and cultivation thereof since 1941; that the applicant "is still living"; that it was free
from claims and conflicts at the time of inspection; and recommending that patent be issued to the applicant
4. April 1967 Free Patent was issued to Nicolas Felisilda followed by the issuance of the corresponding OCT which was subsequently
cancelled and TCT was issued in the name of the Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda
5. June 1972, Heirs of Nicolas Felisilda sold a portion to Manuel Serranillo, and 2 hectares to Francisco Laiz or the totality of the area
covered by the Free Patent
1. TCTs were issued to Serranillo and Laiz; Serranillo subdivided the area and was issued 307 TCTs
6. If the Deeds of Sale of 14 June 1972 to Serranillo and Laiz are to be taken at their face value, the Disputed Property was sold beyond
the prohibitory period of 5 years from the issuance of the Free Patent on 14 April 1967
1. RP: as early as 1970, the Heirs had already alienated portions of the land to Serranillo and Laiz except that the formal contracts
were not executed until 1972
2. even on September 1970 and April 1971, Serranillo had executed acts of ownership by entering into notarized contracts to sell
portions
7. November 1972, a Protest entitled "Sta. Cruz Homeowners Association Inc., Occupant-Claimant-Protestant, vs. Heirs of the late Nicolas
Felisilda" was filed with the Bureau of Lands
1. protestants were the actual occupants of the controverted land
2. Free Patent Application had been falsified, the patentee having died in 1962
3. land in question had been sold to other parties before the expiration of 5 years
8. Director of Lands ordered the investigation of the Protest

1. As recommended by Land Inspector del Rosario, Director of Lands declared the Free Patent granted to Nicolas Felisilda was null and
void as it had been fraudulently issued
9. the widow, Catalina and Land Inspector Cejas were jointly indicted for Falsification of Public Document; both were absolved
10. 1980, the Republic, as petitioner, filed a Complaint for cancellation of Free Patent, the OCT and TCTs with the CFI General Santos City
1. Application for Free Patent and the Notice of Application for Free Patent were accomplished after the death of the applicant Nicolas
Felisilda, in violation of Section 91 of the Public Land Law; and that the land was sold within the prohibitory period of 5years
contrary to Section 118 of the same law
11. defendants denied the commission of any fraud stating that the application had been flied by Nicolas Felisilda during his lifetime but
was acted on officially only after his death
1. majority of the protestants were mere lessees while the rest had entered the land later as plain squatters
12. CFI dismissed the Complaint
ISSUE: WoN the free patent and OCT issued to Felisilda and the derivative TCTs be cancelled (YES)
--WoN there was falsification (NO)
--WoN the lands were disposed of during the prohibitory period of 5 years (YES)
HELD: CA reversed, cancel the Free Patent, and OCT issued to Nicolas Felisilda, TCT together with all the 307 derivative titles issued in favor of
Serranillo and the TCT issued in favor of Franscisco Laiz; lands ordered reverted to the mass of the public domain
The Issue of Falsification
OSG: although Nicolas Felisilda died on 10 October 1962, the Application for Free Patent was filed on 11 October 1963 and somebody
appeared before the Lands Inspector attesting to the truth of the fact that notices regarding his filing of an application had been posted at the
required places
SC: not persuaded that falsification attended the filing of the Application for Free Patent
in a Second Indorsement of the District Land Office, dated 11 July 1973, its Officer, it stated that the lot was applied for by Nicolas
Felisilda under Free Patent, on 11 October 1960 that was during his lifetime. The Application was not acted on, however, until much
later.
While inefficiency was apparent, it cannot be equated with irregularity for, pursuant to Section 105 of the Public Land Law, the heirs of
an applicant are entitled to have the Patent issued to them if they show compliance with requirements. They are subrogated to all the
rights and obligations of their predecessor-in-interest who, in this case, had perfected his rights as a settler prior to his death
Authority of Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands.
The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91 of the Public Land Act
o prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such his investigation despite the existence of a Torrens title
Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of title
under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a title issued on the basis of a Free Patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured.
That indefeasibility, however, is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the
purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
o It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit
therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of any such title.
And in so far as the timeliness of the action of the Goverment is concerned, it is basic that prescription does not run against the State
(Article 1108, Civil Code)
Barter and sale of the land in 1970

Section 118 of the Public Land Act provides that lands acquired under Free Patent shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of the issuance of the
patent.
o barely 3 years after its issuance, or in 1970, Catalina had bartered a portion thereof with Serranillo, as she herself had declared
in the investigation proceedings
o after respondent Serranillo had acquired the property, he caused the same to be subdivided into small lots; September and
November 1970, he sold some portions.
Felisilda's widow had disposed of the land within the prohibitory period because as she herself stated she needed
money to finance her medical expenses
The purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is to preserve and keep in the family of the patentee that portion of
the public land which the State has gratuitously given to them.
Deeds of Sale on June. 1972 in favor of Serranillo and Laiz cannot overcome the fact that as early as 1970, Serranillo was already
exercising acts of ownership over the land. They were evidently merely confirmatory documents designed to circumvent the
prohibition.
Reversion Allowed
Public Land Act, Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisions of sections 118, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the
effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvement to the State.
12. Bureau of Forestry v CA

FACTS:
In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an approximate area of
30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his
lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under
the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30
years. The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the lands, with an area of approximately 19.4
hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland Block.
In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in place of the latter,

attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title. Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute
petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of
Forestry to the PFC.
In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of Filomeno Gallo. It
ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within a Timberland Block, petitioners
failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is
that these are agricultural lands.
ISSUE:
WON the classification of lands of public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be
changed or varied by the court. NO
HELD:
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified and certified as such by the Director of Forestry in 1956. The
lands are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration
proceedings.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land is
more valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain
but the Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.
Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since the application filed by
them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain and cannot be acquired by
prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
13. Heirs of Amunategui v Director of Forestry
Facts
There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as
forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of
Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified
as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885
containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
Issue: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of the private person.
Held:
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain

licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950
that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done
because it was classified as "public forest. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never
ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain.
14. Averia v Caguioa
G.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
1. petitioner opposed the registration of a deed of sale on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. But he refused to participate in
the hearing of the registration proceedings claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon
the said case under Sec. 112 of Act 496, the "Land Registration Act."
2. The respondent court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of
the evidence presented by the private respondent herein.
3. In the oppositors petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower court had no competence
to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required under LRA Sec. 112. The petitioner
cites Fojas as v. Grey, where the SC declared that:
In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under LRA Sec. 112. it has been held that summary relief under LRA Sec.
112. can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in
any case where the incident properly belongs.
Issue: whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an
antecedent contract to sell.
HELD: YES but still a new trial should be conducted at which the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the
opportunity to be heard because the lower court arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and
without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.
Ratio:
Fojas vs. Grey was a correct interpretation of Sec. 112, however, it is not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose
in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11,
1979.
In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine a questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land
Registration Commission with 2 certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or
petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTC the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but
also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions."
Consequently, the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there
was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court
is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as
the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
15. Malabanan v Republic

Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Mario Malabanan applied for the registration of 71,324 sq. meters of land.
He claims that he bought the land from Eduardo Velazco who also claims that his great grandfather owned the land
Malabanan submitted a certification from DENR CENRO stating that the land is alienable and disposable in 1982
The prosecutor did not oppose the registration.
RTC granted Malabanans request for registration.
Republic interposed an appeal claiming that Malabanan did not adhere to the requirement of time required by the law and the he
failed to prove that the land is an alienable and disposable land.
7. CA ruled in favor of the republic reasoning that the possession of the land before it is declared alienable and disposable cannot be
included in the computation of possession of the land, thus Malabanan did not adhere to the period requirement of the law.
Issue/Held:
1. Can the heirs of Malabanan register the land? NO
ARGUMENTS: Petitioner: 1) 14(1): With respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of alienable property as disposable
may be counted in computing the period of possession. (Naguit Doctrine)
2) 14(2): possession of the land for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, regardless of its classification. So long
as during the time of application, it is classified alienable and disposable.
OSG: 1) The land should have been declared alienable and disposable prior to June 12, 1945. (Herbieto Doctrine)

2) 14(2): 14(2) speakes of private lands. The Court has yet to decide a case that presented 14(2) as a ground for application. Assuming that
the 30 year period can run against public land, the period only runs after the land has been declared alienable and diposable.
COURT:
1) 14(1): 14(1) of CA 141 is virtually the same as 48(b) of PD 1529. 48(b) is more descriptive in nature of the right enjoyed by a possessor.
14(1) seems to presume the pre-existence of a right. If the position of OSG is to be followed that the land has to be declared alienable and
disposable prior to June 12, 1945, then all lands not classified as alienable and disposable AFTER June 12, 1945 cannot be registered. As
explained in Naguit, it is sufficient that the land is declared alienable and disposable at the time that it is registered. Hebierto Doctrine is
indeed obiter dictum.
2) 14(2): 14(2) provides the registration of land whose possession is after June 12, 1945. It involves application of those who acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of the existing law.
The law mentioned in the provision refers to the Civil Code. Under the CC, prescriptive acquisition may be ordinary or extra ordinary. It is
therefore proper to refer to CC on the provisions of property.
Artcle 422 is controlling in the conversion of the land of public dominion to patrimonial property. It is only when a land becomes patrimonial
that it becomes susceptible to prescription. There must be an express declaration by the State that an alienable and disposable land is no
longer intended for public service. It is only after such express declaration that the period may begin to run.
CONCLUSION: 14(2) applies to the case at bar. Possesion of the land is traced back to 1948. Since the land in question has no express
declaration of being patrimonial, Malabanan failed to adhere to the period as required by law.
16. Republic v Rizalvo REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR.,
FACTS:
Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed with MTC of Bauang, La Union (as a land registration court), an application for the registration of a lot in
Bauang, La Union
RIZALVOs allegations:
o hes the owner in fee simple
o he obtained title over the land via a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962
o he is currently in possession of the land.
o He presented:
Tax Declaration No. 222066-1994 in his name
Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application
OSG filed an Opposition: neither Rizalvo nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of ownership.
o the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private
acquisition

There was no private oppositor so MTC: issued Order of Special Default against the whole world except the Republic of the Philippines
and entered the same in the records of the case.
At the trial, Rizalvo testified that
o He acquired the subject property by purchase from his mother, Bibiana (Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962).
o He was in adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property
o No one was questioning his ownership over the land
o He was the one paying the real property tax (bundle of ORs covering the period of 1953 to 2000)
o He was the one who had the property surveyed( no one opposed the survey and they placed concrete markers on the
boundaries of the property during such
o He was not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mothers ownership and possession of the subject property
Bibiana testified that:
o She bought the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, (Absolute Deed of Sale of July 8, 1952)
o Before she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner of the subject property and was in possession thereof,
without anyone questioning her status as owner.
o She was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and that she even installed improvements on the subject
property
After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the subject land, Land Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar
of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union submitted a report w/c certified that
lot was within the alienable and disposable zone and that the Rizalvo was indeed in actual occupation and possession of the land.
In contrast, OSG did not present any evidence.
MTC: approved the application and ordered the adjudication and registration of the land to Rizalvo
CA: Affirmed MTC
ISSUE: W/N Rizalvo and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the
manner and length of time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title? NOOOO.
HELD:
Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove compliance with
Section 14 of PD 152918 or the Property Registration Decree.
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
xxxx
Applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish the ff:
FIRST, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain: (SATISFIED)
CENRO certification and report states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone since January 21,

1987----- a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the
classification of the land described, in the absence of contradictory evidence. Both constitute a positive government act, an administrative
action, validly classifying the land in question. (The classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government)
SECOND, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same (SATISFIED)
There was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon absent any showing that the
lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
THIRD, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (FAILED)
Rizalvos oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 (1948 Deed, 1948 Tax
Declarations and the Real property tax receipts from 1952) are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession BUT, they lack proof of occupation and
possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier.
What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
QUESTION: will possession of the subject land since 1948, entitle Rizalvo to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529?
NOOOOO.
An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws. (Civil Code and jurisprudence)
PRESCRIPTION is one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.
SO: Rizalvo would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject
property even exceeds thirty (30) years. HOWEVER: based on JURISPRUDENCE, thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of
acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2)32, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
period of acquisitive prescription can only begin to run from such declaration (be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law)
CENRO certification and report is not enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2).
No evidence indicates any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth. SO: no basis for the application of the 30 year prescriptive period.

Even if the CENRO certi was considered as an express declaration required, Rizalvos still not entitled to registration because the land was
certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere 13 years after
and far short of the required 30.
States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal
of social justice is still constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law.
Dispositive: REVERSED CA AND TC. Denied application for registration.
16. Republic v Metro Index Realty and Development Co. (Reyes, J, 2012)
Doctrine: Lands declared alienable and disposable are not necessarily patrimonial properties and only patrimonial properties may be subject of
a claim of imperfect title by prescription.
Action: judicial confirmation of title.
Land: 3 parcels of land in Brgy Alulod/Mataas na Lupa, Indang Cavite with a total area of 39,490 sqm.
Applicant: Metro Index Corp.
Metro index presented two witnesses. Enrico Dimayuga (Metro's Project Documentation Officer) and Herminia Sicap-Fojas.
Enrico
testified that
Metro bought the land from Herminia, Melinda, and Hernando Sicap,
the lands have been declared for taxation in Metro's name since 2006,
the DENR certified that the lands are disposable and alienable.
there are no adverse claims to Metro's application
that Metro and the Sicaps have possessed the properties for more than 50 years
Herminia testified that

she and her siblings inherited the land from their parents
their parents possessed the land since 1956 (shown by taxdec)
they had cultivated the land since they inherited it and paid taxes thereon
lands are planted with cocount, banana, santol, palay, and corn
RTC granted the application because land was alienable and disposable and not w/in any military or naval reservation, and possession had
been open, continuous, notorious and adverse to the whole world.
CA denied Republic's appeal saying trees and taxdecs substantiate the claim of possession.
ISSUE: WON Metro is entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under PD 1529.
HELD: NO.

Metro likely basis its imperfect title and its application on Section 14(2) of PD 1529.
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
But properties under public dominion are not susceptible to prescription. Only properties of the State that are no longer earmarked for public
use, otherwise known as patrimonial, may be acquired by prescription. For properties not declared as patrimonial,
prescription does not run against the State.
The SC finds no evidence of such official declaration and for such reason alone, the application should have been dismissed outright.
The premise of the lower courts that public land, once declared alienable and disposable, can be acquired by prescription is erroneous. These
lands are not necessarily patrimonial.
Plus, tax declarations merely infer possession. The CA should not have settled with them as proof of possession, it should have required
further proof of possession and cultivation. Too few trees are planted; there was only casual cultivation which does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership.
17. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque v Ebio

Paranaque vs Ebio
Villarama Jr., J.
Facts:
Mario Ebio and his heirs claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land in Batangay Vitalez, Paranaque which was an accretion of
Cut-cut creek. They assert that the original owner of the land was Jose Vitalez who gave it to his son Pedro way back in 1930. Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot
Pedro had a daughter who married Mario Ebio. Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in
favor of Mario Ebio. In 1964 and in 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits for the construction of their house within the property.

In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08 seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the
construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek, traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
Several conferences were held between the Barangay and the affected residents but no agreement was reached. The respondents received a
letter ordering them to vacate the area. Respondents went to the RTC and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC: denied, Respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not
instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted.
CA: reversed RTC, the subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly proven by the Appellants.
Petitioners argument: since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed
along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain.
Respondents argument: They have been in possession of the land since 1930 and have acquired title through acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
1.)
Whether the subject lot is available for acquisitive prescription YES.
2.)
Whether the respondents have acquired title through acquisitive prescription. YES.
Held.
Issue #1 the lot is available or acquisitive prescription.
The subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the
law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
It is explicit from the provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of
the adjoining property must register the same under the system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
Issue #2 Respondents have acquired title through acquisitive prescription.

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as
1930. Respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right
despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not
the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended
as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
18. Director of Lands v Abairo
Makasiar, 1979.
FACTS:
1. On March 1, 1971, respondent Lilia Abairo filed an application for registration under the Land Registration Act of a parcel of land
containing an area of about 573 square meters situated in Centro, Cauayan, Isabela, alleging open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owner by herself and through her predecessors-ininterest since time immemorial up to the
present.
2. On the initial hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the petition for registration except the assitant provincial fiscal who entered his
opposition in behalf of the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry. However, the Asst Prov Fiscal but who subsequently withdrew
his opposition on the ground that there was a new law extending the period for filing registration petitions up to 1976. The fiscal also
submitted a report of the Director of Lands to the effect that he is withdrawing his opposition. The fiscal likewise submitted a letter from
the Bureau of Forestry showing that it has no opposition to the application for registration of title.
3. The CFI confirmed the ownership of Abairo over the said parcels of land.
4. The Solicitor General filed an MR against the decision, on the ground that respondent Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the
application for registration of title as it was filed on March 1, 1971, after December 31, 1968, the date set by R.A. No. 2061 as the time
limit for the judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles like that of applicant, and before the effectivity on June 19, 1971, of
R.A. No. 6236 extending the time limit for such purpose.
5. The CFI denied the MR, which denial is now the subject of this case before the SC.
Issue: WON Abairo has filed the peititon for registrtion within the period set by RA 2061 as amended by RA 6236? YES.
RATIO:
4. R.A. No. 6236, enacted on June 19, 1971, further amended Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 (which was previously amended by R.A. No. 2061)
by extending to December 31, 1976 the time limit for the filing of applications for the judical confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
5. It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of their titles at any time prior to the cutoff date of
December 31, 1976 (as provided for in R.A. No. 6236) did so on time, even if such application were filed during the intervening period
from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971, like the application of respondent Abairo, who instituted the same on March 1, 1971.
6. Moreover, the application which private respondent filed on March 1, 1971, could be considered as re-filed after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6236 on June 19, 1971, less than four months thereafter.
7. Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the period for filing such applications time and time
again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the law to own disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce
the number of landless among the citizenry.

19. Director of Land v Dano
J. Melencio-Herrera | February 21, 1980
DOCTRINE(S):
Time limitation for filing a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title as stated in CA 141 must be raised in an MTD or an
answer at the first instance. It is not a jurisdictional issue and is subject to waiver if not pleaded in an answer or MTD.
The intendment of the lawmaker to record as much leeway as possible to applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles is evident from the statutory history of section 47 of the Public Land Act.
FACTS: Ida Dano, representing the heirs of Francisco Dano, filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land in Misamis Occidental,
praying in case the land may not be registered as private land, she requests that her imperfect or incomplete title to the property may be
confirmed in favor of the heirs of Francisco Dano. Petitioner opposed the application because the land sought to be registered is foreshore
land which is part of the public domain and hence cannot be the subject of private ownership. The lower court decided in favor of Dano on the
basis of open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and notorious possession dating back to more than 30 years.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue that respondent filed her application for registration beyond the time
prescribed in Sec. 45 and 47 in of CA 141, which said the application was not to extend beyond December 31, 1968 (she filed the application
January 8, 1969). The Misamis CFI denied the MR on the basis of Rule 9.2 of the ROC (defenses and objections not pleaded either in a Motion
to Dismiss or the Answer are deemed waived) and the doctrine in Vicente v. Lucas (where the defendants never pleaded the statute of
limitations they are deemed to have waived it and it is error for the lower court to dismiss the proceeding on that ground).
Petitioner filed a second MR arguing the issue is jurisdictional and can henceforth be raised at any stage in the proceeding, though this 2 nd MR
was denied. The CFI held the date prescribed in Secs. 45 and 47 of CA 141 is not jurisdictional but a limitation to file an application. It upheld
its earlier decision.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal for registration of land past the deadline set in CA 141 (YES,
because the period indicated in Sec. 47 is a time limitation petitioner did not aver in his answer, and because the intent of the
law was to give as much leeway as possible to applicants of judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.)
1. The period fixed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act CA 141, as amended, is not jurisdictional but is more of a time limitation. It is a
defense or objection which should have been set up either in a Motion to Dismiss or in an Answer. Since petitioner had never pleaded the
statue of limitations, he is deemed to have waived the same.
2. The defense of prescription cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal. Petitioner raised that issue for the first time only
in his MR.
3. Even bearing in mind that prescription does not run against the State (Art 1108 (4), Civil Code) and the rights of the State may not be
waived by mistakes of officers entrusted with the exercise of such rights, the intendment of the lawmaker to record as much leeway as
possible to applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is evident from the statutory history of section 47 of the
Public Land Act.
a. In the original text, the time limitation was not to extend beyond December 31, 1938.
b. An amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act 292, section 2, approved on June 9, 1938, extended the expiry date to December

31, 1941.
c. Subsequently, section 1 of Republic Act No. 1011, approved on June 2, 1947, further extended the time limit to December 31, 1957.
Republic Act No. 2061, approved on June 13, 1958, again prolonged the period to December 31, 1968.
d. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6236, approved on June 19, 1971, the time prescribed was extended to December 31, 1967.
e. Again, on January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 lengthened the cut-off date to December 31, 1987.
4. The Court cited Director of Lands v. Abarro where it held that Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in
extending the period for filing such applications time and time again, to give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the law to
own disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the citizenry.
20. Director of Lands v IAC
GR No. 73002 / 29 Dec 1986 / J. Narvasa
FACTS (not in dispute)
Acme Plywood & Veneer Inc. applied for registration of five parcels of land in Isabela, totaling 481,390 sq. m. acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe, on 29 Oct 1962.
The land was owned by the Infiels and their ancestors since time immemorial.
Registration proceedings commenced on 17 Jul 1981, at which time the 1973 Constitution was applicable, which prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. The
prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution in force when Acme purchased the lands.
Acme claims the government recognized its ownership and possession when it negotiated for the donation of the townsite to the
municipality of Maconacon, Isabela. The company through its BOD did donate the land on 15 Nov 1979, which was accepted by the
municipality.
Acme also claims it had continous possession over the land since its purchase, and has in fact introduced improvements worth more
than P45 million, confirmed by the court in its ocular inspection.
CFI granted the registration, which was affirmed by the IAC. Appeal by the Director of Lands to the SC.
ISSUE / HOLDING
W/N the title that was transferred to Acme from the Infiels could be confirmed in the 1981 registration proceedings. - YES. Judgment
affirmed.
o W/N the lands were lands of the public domain at the time of registration. NO - private land.
RATIO
If these lands were still lands of the public domain in 1981, then Acme cannot register them. Therefore the main question is the
character of the lands.
Following the holding in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, Acme CANNOT register. In that case, Meralco purchased two lots in Tanay, which
had been possessed by the vendors and their predecessors-in-interest since prior to WWII. The CFI assumed that the lands were public
lands and denied registration, on the ground that under Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 (the Public Land Act) only natural persons who are Filipino
citizens can apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land.
In his dissent to Meralco, C.J. Teehankee traced a line of cases (Cario, Susi and Herico) which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that pen, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law (30 years) creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

The Court overturns Meralco and adopts the doctrine of C.J. Teehankee's dissent.
o Cario - Registration is expected from all but there is no basis that lack of registration would forfeit ownership already gained.
The effect of the proof (talking about registration), wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
o Susi - There was a presumption that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he
(Susi) has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since 26 Jul 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond
the control of the Director of Lands.
o Herico - The petitioner's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent
Thus, possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State. Sec. 48(b) CA 141 says, the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title"
Conclusive presumptions cannot be rebutted. Thus registration proceedings would be a mere formality, limited to ascertaning whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time. Registration would not confer title but confirm title already
vested.
If the land is considered a private land to which the Infiels (vendors) already had title before Acme's purchase in 1962, then Acme had a
perfect right to acquire them, there being no prohibition under the 1935 Constitution or even the 1973 Constitution prohibiting
corporations from acquiring or owning private lands.
Even assuming arguendo that the land remained "public", despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, there is
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only prohibition was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
The fact that registration proceedings were instituted under the 1973 Constitution cannot impair a vested right which came before it.
The Court has already held that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
The correct rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land.
Teehankee, C.J , concurring o Simplest way to explain it is this. Only natural persons can file under CA 141 Sec. 48(b) since they're the only ones who can actually
and physically possess public lands for the required 30 year period. Juridical persons cannot. But, when these natural persons have
complied with this period, the Act confers title to them.

Applications for confirmation of title is procedure, and absence of it cannot defeat the substantive title already granted by the Act
because of acquisitive prescription.
Melencio-Herrerra, J. , dissenting
Meralco should not be overturned. There is a statutory prohibition that only natural persons can apply for certificates under 48(b) of CA
141 as well as the Constitutional provision which prohbiits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain.
o
21. Republic v CA
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CA and SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA and FLOR DE VEGA
G.R. No. 108998 24 August 1994 Bidin
FACTS
- 17 June 1978 respondent spouses, then natural-born Filipino citizens, bought two lots in San Pablo City (with a total area of 91.77 sq.m.) as
their residence from Cristeta Dazo Belen.
- 5 February 1987 the spouses, no longer Filipino citizenshaving opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalizationfiled an
application for registration of the title of the two parcels of land before the RTC of San Pablo City.
- The court approved the said application and confirmed the spouses title and possession over the lots, finding that the evidence established
that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before
June 12, 1945.
- The CA affirmed the lower courts decision, ruling that they were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land and that their purpose in
initiating the action to merely confirm their title over the land: It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and
register the title which one may already have.
- The petitioner argues that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not
in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court
adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
ISSUE
- W/N a foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel of land that he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141) - Yes
HELD/RATIO
- It matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the
period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said
period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required
length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in
turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-ininterest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
- The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of.
- The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It merely confirms but does not confer
ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon. A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to
prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister
Simplicia. Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest
Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest
was affected.
- Private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by
virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the
prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiass mother.
- What should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec.2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to
enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the
case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same,
the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee
of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
- Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said

properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain.
They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban,
or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
- The dissenting opinion states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents, Section 6 of which
provides that transferees should submit to the register of deeds "a sworn statement showing the date and place of his birth; the names and
addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the
Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he
is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act." However, Nowhere in the provision is it
stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an
application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the
issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application
for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants.
22. Republic v Espinosa
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
Petition for review on certiorari
March 3, 1999 - Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) filed with the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu an application 3 for land registration covering a parcel
of land with an area of 5,525 square meters. He alleged that: (a) the property is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from
his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessorin-interest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. He also presented two (2) tax
declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels name to prove that she had been in possession of the property since 1965. To support his
claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a Certification dated December 1, 1998 issued by
the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application.
August 18, 2000 - MTC granted Espinosas petition for registration

Petitioner appealed to the CA
Arguments: Espinosa failed to prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law.
As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabels possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale; the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978.
According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years is
inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Espinosas failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal. Under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy
of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of
Lands.
The annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
CA dismissed petitioners appeal; affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years,
despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private.
Motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of
confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Decision: Reversed
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Section 48(b) of the PLA originally stated that the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July
26, 1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was
adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No.
1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been
acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had already
been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be
denied because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945?
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the
basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on January
24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not the case that there is an option
between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither
contemplated under Section 48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is
still possible to acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the
application.
ICAB: There is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already
acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in
Isabels name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she first came
supposedly into possession.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and
disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles
420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of national

wealth, are considered private.
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription.
For prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject property is no longer
earmarked for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued at least ten
(10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior
to the conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed,
while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable,
possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the States if
such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property belongs
to the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
Incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
Petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such
notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
Even if Espinosas application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are
numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of
the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management
Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the property which is certified as correct by the geodetic
surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR.

Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable
and disposable.
Espinosa also failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation
and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing
considerations.
23. Republic v TAN Properties
Republic v. Tan Properties
555 SCRA 477
Facts:
In 1999, TAN properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and
with an area of 56,4007 hectares. To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying
that the land applied for was alienable and disposable.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ground that TAN Properties did not
prove that the land was alienable and disposable.
Issue:
Whether or not the applicant proved that the land is alienable and disposable.
Held:
No.The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus
to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable
rests with the applicant.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and
authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for
lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained
the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO
to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot
10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705
with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable
and disposable.
24. Director of Lands v CA
FACTS:

1. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of
its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision
2. Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.
3. This was assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro
4. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all
surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
5. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
6. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
1. the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
2. Thus, it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
7. Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion[10] in holding
1. x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper
of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
2. Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation to comply
with the notice requirement of due process
8. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect.They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WoN publication confers jurisdiction to the land registration court? YES
HELD:
- Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
order.
- The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.
- Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices
to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court.
- However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents
o We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process
rationale behind the publication requirement.
- In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529
requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be
complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include
owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure
of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property.
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The reason why said requirements are all required is due to due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not
as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published
therein may not reach the interested parties on time
25. Sps Llanes v Republic

FACTS:
6. Spouses Gabriel and Maria Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of land in Malvar Cadastre located in San Juan,
Malvar, Batangas.
7. The Republic submitted to the RTC its Opposition to the Spouses Llanes application, anchored on the grounds that:
9. neither the Spouses Llanes nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
10. the muniments of title and/or tax declaration(s) and tax payment receipt(s) of the Spouses Llanes appeared to be of recent vintage and
cannot constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land or of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner.
8. The Spouses Llanes submitted Certifications issued by the DENR IV, Forest Management Bureau (FMB) dated 9 March 2000 and by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Batangas City dated 15 June 2000, both declaring the subject property
as alienable and disposable.
MCTC granted the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes.
9. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting the Application for Registration of Title of the
Spouses Llanes because the latter failed to comply with the statutory requirement of possession for 30 years, the subject property
becoming alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997 per the CENRO Certification.
10. The Spouses Llanes then verified the correctness of the CENRO Certification and found that CENRO committed a mistake therein.
CENRO itself rectified its gaffe by issuing another Certification dated 20 July 2004, consistent with the DENR Certification, that the
subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The Spouses Llanes attached the corrected CENRO Certification
as Annex A to their Appellees Brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court, without providing any reason, did not
consider the same.
CA denied the application for registration of Sps. Llanes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application for land registration of Sps. Llanes should be granted
HELD: Yes. The application for land registration should be granted.
RATIO:
Under Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherwise known as Property Registration Decree. Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings, expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
2. The three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title are:
(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation; and
(3) that such possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Thus, Section 14(1) requires that the property sought to be registered should already be alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed.
o
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or an administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.
A certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and
disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the
application.
In the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC Certifications from DENR Region IV and CENRO, Batangas City, to
prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property. However, the two Certifications contained different dates as to when
the subject property became alienable and disposable: 26 March 1928 per the DENR Certification, but 22 December
1997 according to the CENRO Certification. The discrepancy was discovered only when the present case was already before the
Court of Appeals. The Spouses Llanes immediately verified and secured a corrected Certification from the CENRO, which confirmed
the DENR Certification that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928. The appellate court,
however, did not consider the corrected CENRO Certification.
This Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity, to consider the corrected CENRO Certification even though it
was only presented during the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Spouses Llanes should not be made to suffer the grave
consequences, which include the possibility of losing their right to their property, arising from the mistake of CENRO, a government
agency.

o
The subject property has been in the possession of the Spouses Llanes and their predecessors-in-interest even prior to 12 June
1945. The Spouses Llanes presented the testimony of Servillano to support this: the subject property was then owned by his
grandmother, Eugenia, and cultivated and planted with rice by his father, Francisco. The perimeter of the subject property was also
planted with madre cacao and acacia trees. The subject property was subsequently transferred by way of sale from Eugenia
to Servillanoand his wife, Rita, in 1965; and from Servillano and Rita to the Spouses Llanes in 1995. In addition, generations of
Gabriels family have declared the subject property under their names and paid real property taxes thereon. The earliest tax
declaration was in the name of Eugenia, issued as early as 1948.
Tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. Moreover, while tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute
evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.
The evidence submitted by the Spouses Llanes, taken as a whole, establishes that the subject property became alienable and
disposable as early as 26 March 1928; and the Spouses Llanes and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject property, in the concept of an owner, even prior to 12 June 1945. In contrast, the
Republic did not present any evidence to refute that of the Spouses Llanes. The Spouses Llanes were able to sufficiently discharge
the burden of proof that they have an imperfect title to the subject property capable of judicial confirmation.
26. Republic v Heirs of Fabio

REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO
CARPIO, J.:
Facts
-Respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, an application for registration of title situated
in Barangay Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The respondents sought the registration of title under the provisions of Act No. 496 or the Land
Registration
Act,
as
amended
by
Presidential
Decree
No.
1529
(PD
1529).
-In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot, including all the improvements, having acquired the same through
a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession
of
the
Lot
in
the
concept
of
an
owner
for
more
than
100
years.
-On 29 September 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision ordering the registration of the Lot in the name of Juan Fabio.
-The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
claimed that the trial court erred in ruling that respondents have acquired a vested right over the Lot which falls within the Calumpang Point
Naval Reservation.

-The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
Whether the respondents have acquired a right over the Lot.
The Court's Ruling
Second Issue: Validity of Respondents' Title
Petitioner asserts that both the trial and appellate courts failed to recognize the import of the notation in the survey plan stating that the Lot
falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. At the time the application for registration of title was filed, the Lot was no longer open to
private ownership as it had been classified as a military reservation for public service. Thus, respondents are not entitled to have the Lot
registered
under
the
Torrens
system.
Persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the properties in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands. Here, respondents failed to do so,
and are thus not entitled to have the Lot registered in their names. Clearly, both the trial and appellate courts gravely erred in granting
respondents'
application
for
registration
of
title.
27. Yu Chang v Republic
Feb 23, 2011 | Villarama, Jr., J
FACTS:
11. Petitioners father, L. Yu Chang and the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property wherein
the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400 sq.m residential lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili, in exchange for a
land of same size located in San Juan, Pili.
1. L. Yu Chang and his family erected a residential house and a gasoline station thereon
12. a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation of their rights over the property was executed by L. Yu Chang's 5 children: Rafaela, Catalina,
Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in favor of herein petitioners
1. After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and subdivided into 2 lots
2. Petitioners also declared the lots in their names for taxation purposes
13. petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother and co-petitioner, Vicente filed a petition for registration of
title over the lots under the Property Registration Decree
1. they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the
above described parcels of land for more than 100 years
14. The Republic, through the OSG, filed an Opposition
11. neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto
12. the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land
13. that lands are public domain
trial court granted petitioners' application

Republic appealed the decision to the CA
o failure to show compliance with the requirements of the law
o land was classified as public forest land
CA reversed the trial court's decision

o petitioners were not able to present incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered are alienable and disposable
o testimony of Lamberto Orcena, Land Management Officer III of CENRO, Iriga City, who testified that prior to October 30, 1986, the
subject properties, was classified as forest land
o even if the area is now being used for residential and commercial purposes, such fact will not convert the subject parcels of land
into agricultural land
o there must be a positive act from the government declassifying the land as forest land before it could be deemed alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
ISSUE: WoN CA erred in dismissing their application for registration of title on the ground that they failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (NO)
HELD: CA affirmed
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073, in order that petitioners application for registration of title
may be granted, they must first establish the following:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain
(2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier
o Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public domain and that they have an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.
o
petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of their application are alienable and
disposable land of the public domain
o Instead, they contend that the properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building
structures, residential houses and even government buildings
o Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry: a forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. The
classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
Republic presented a Report of the Land Investigator/Inspector which disclosed that the lots were classified as alienable and
disposable only on October 30, 1986
o Prior to that period, the land could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.
o Petitioners possession of the subject forest land prior to the date when it was classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.

o
The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence
until after forest land has been declared and alienable.
28. Tan v Republic

Tan vs Republic
Facts:
On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920
square meters.
The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April
25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years.
RTC granted the application.
CA reversed. , the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the
concept of an owner.
The petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the CA, alleging that the evidence they presented prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. The petitioners claim that the
evidence they presented are enough to demonstrate that they acquired title over the subject property by prescription:
o
the testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias, stating that:
the petitioners have been in actual, notorious and open possession of the subject property since the time they purchased the same in
1996;
the petitioners have regularly paid the taxes due on the subject property;
the petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Victorio Garcia, Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio Gatdula, had been in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years and had religiously paid the taxes due thereon; and
the subject property is agricultural, alienable and disposable;

o
the testimony of the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito Pena, stating that:
he resides near the subject property;
he witnessed the execution of the deed of sale that petitioners entered into with Gregonio Gatdula; and
the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years;
o
the testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), stating that:
no opposition to the petitioners application was filed before the LRA;
an examiner of the LRA found nothing wrong with the petitioners application;
no title covering the subject property was previously issued;

o
Tax Declaration Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961, 1967 and 1974 in the name of Victorio Garcia;
o
Tax Declaration Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and 1985 in the name of Felipe Gatdula;
o
Tax Declaration Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and 1994 in the name of Gregonio Gatdula;
o
Tax Declaration Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-05078 in the name of the petitioners;
o
Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Indang, Cavite, which approved the reclassification of several lots,
including the subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;

o
DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on July 13, 2000,
which converted several parcels of land, including the subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;13
o
Certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) CALABARZON dated October 29, 2002, stating
that "the subject area falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per LC Map 3091 certified on June 21,
1983".
Issue: W/N the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. NO
Ratio:
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial
that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must
prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
29. Republic v Ching
Mendoza | Oct. 20, 2010 | In division
Facts
Jose Ching, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Antonio Ching filed a verified Application for Registration of Title covering a parcel of land before
the RTC. Ching alleged that he purchased the subject land from the late former governor and Congressman Democrito Plaza as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale of Unregistered Lands. The RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to show cause why his application for
registration of title should not be dismissed for his failure to state the current assessed value of the subject land and his non-compliance with
the last paragraph of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Accordingly, respondent filed a Verified Amended Application found to be sufficient in form
and substance.
The OSG filed an Opposition to the application. Specifically, the OSG alleged that (1) neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto
[Sec. 48 (b) C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073]; (2) the muniments of title and/or any tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicant

attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; (3) the
claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who have failed to file an
appropriate application for registration within six (6) months from 16 February 1976 under P.D. No. 892; and (4) the parcels of land applied for
are portions of the public domain.
The DENR likewise filed its opposition.
The RTC dismissed the application as it was not convinced that the Deed of Sale sufficiently established that Ching was the owner in fee simple
of the land. The RTC dismissed his motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed the RTCs earlier resolution and granted respondents
application, ruling that the RTC erred in failing to consider the additional documents attached in respondents Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
OSG files petition for certiorari under Rule 45. SC granted the petition, reversed the CA and denied the application.
SC:
Applicants for registration of title under Section 14 of P.D. 1529 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The Court finds no evidence in this case that would show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The requirements of alienability and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier under Section 14(1) are
indispensable prerequisites to a favorable registration of his title to the property. Absent one, the application for registration is materially
infirmed. Since respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to show that the land has been classified as alienable and
disposable, then the application for registration should be denied.
At any rate, it is clear that there was no substantive evidence to show that he complied with the requirement of possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest tax declaration that respondent tried to incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
does not measure up to the time requirement.
In his Memorandum, respondent proffered that should not the land be registrable under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, it could still be registered
under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529. He cannot.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence, the property
sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Thus,
absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.

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1 Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands

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10. Chavez v NHA

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are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation project:

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Barter and sale of the land in 1970

12. Bureau of Forestry v CA

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15. Malabanan v Republic

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Herminia testified that

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17. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque v Ebio

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ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

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25. Sps Llanes v Republic

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26. Republic v Heirs of Fabio

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trial court granted petitioners' application

CA reversed the trial court's decision

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28. Tan v Republic

the subject property is agricultural, alienable and disposable;

he resides near the subject property;

no opposition to the petitioners application was filed before the LRA;

no title covering the subject property was previously issued;

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