Wittgenstein Rhetoric

Semiotica 2016; 208: 4977
Dinda L. Gorle*
Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

DOI 10.1515/sem-2015-0121
Abstract: Wittgenstein surprised with the rhetorical inversion of his style of

writing, often at the expense of thought. In his works, he skillfully constructed
the fragmentary paragraphs to solve the confusions of language. The result of
Wittgensteins conscious endeavor is the persuasive effect of new reasoning in
the ornamental type of the philosophical writings about language. Wittgensteins
verbal genres are the interplay of deduction, induction, and abduction, formed
consciously and subconsciously, following the three categories of Peirces
semio-logical reasoning. Wittgensteins rhetoric changed the first certainty of
philosophy into the abductive uncertainty of his later works, keeping the story
of Wittgensteins reasoning in suspense.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, stylistics, linguculture, Peirce, speculative rhetoric,
deduction-induction-abduction, Barthes
If I do not quite know how to begin a book that is because something is still unclear. For I
should like to begin with the original data of philosophy, written & spoken sentences, with
books as it were. And here we encounter the difficulty of Everything is in flux. And
perhaps that is the very point at which to begin.
(Wittgenstein 1930, CV 1998: 11)
1 Persuasive and ornamental speech

Ludwig Wittgensteins (18891951) new philosophy, as he envisaged it, was to
be the idea of writing books and writings in conflicting rhetoric to question the
readers. Wittgensteins philosophy has become so diversified and specialized in
the secondary literature, that we would need a number of examples to show that
the first form of systematic knowledge developed into Wittgensteins creative
philosophy of language. Perhaps he could derive his twentieth-century modernity from the difference between his present knowledge and the knowledge of
our ancestors. Instead of talking in monologue for himself, Wittgensteins life
also decided to feature the dialogue as didactic tool of persuasion. Regardless of
*Corresponding author: Dinda L. Gorle, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway,
E-mail: gorlee@xs4all.nl
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Dinda L. Gorle
fame or adversity, Wittgenstein in his later years kept true to his first vocation of
finding the social dialogue with the readers.
Perhaps Wittgensteins personal development could make sense of the world
in which he lived by following the footsteps of the orator of Athens, Demosthenes
(c. 384322, BCE). So the legendary story goes that the lawyer Demosthenes was a
stutterer (Ostwald 1973: 356366; Gray 2012: 34). After years of practicing law in
the courts of Athens, Demosthenes wanted to overcome his weak voice to become
a famous orator with passionate orations to persuade the Greek audience.
Standing on the beach of Athens, Demosthenes put a mouthful of pebbles in
his mouth to improve the tone of his voice. This handicap practiced his vocal
appropriateness or political adequacy to train the acoustics of his eloquent voice
against the noise of the sea. The Greek statesman won his own battles, composing
and delivering his series of political speeches, and reaching his success in public
policy as the great orator of the golden age of Greek oratory.
Demosthenes and young Wittgenstein stuttered for words in the articulation
in public, inhibiting their power to speak straightforwardly (McGuinness 1988: 52).
When writing the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgensteins first speech disfluency was clearly observed by his friend Paul Engelmann, when he listened to
his explanation of the work. Nervously, Wittgenstein stammered the paragraphs of
the incomprehensible and controversial manuscript, while Engelmann, as he said,
with a sensitive understanding for what he wanted to say helped him find the
right words by stating myself the proposition he had in mind (qtd. in CPE: 94).
Perhaps the blocking of sounds and articulation of words remained after the
disappearance of the stammer as the desire of Wittgensteins fragmentariness in
narrative speech.
Wittgenstein also seemed to fulfill the biblical story of Ezekiels prophetic vision
(c. 600 BCE). During the hard times of the Jewish exile in Babylon, the prophet
Ezekiel pronounced divine speeches promising to the banished Israelite people the
garden of Eden (Ezek. 36: 35 Authorized King James Version). The vision of the
future fixed on the future in the Promised Land. Following the exile, the Jews would
restore the ruins of the Temple at Jerusalem (Ezek. 4048). Ezekiels spiritual images
explained the process of restoration in the volumes of the outer wall, the dimensions
of the inner courtyard and the sanctuary of the Hebrew Temple. The complex
dimensionality of Jerusalems sacred temple was measured exactly by Ezekiel. His
gift of prediction was full of detailed information about the numerical and algebraic
dimensions of the breadth and length, the height and depth of the parts of the
Temple. Metaphorically, the deduction of the outer wall, the induction of the inner
courtyard, and the abduction of the sanctuary gave the three dimensions of Ezekiels
building tools to draw an analogy between the shape or form of the architectural
framework and Wittgensteins narrative style and genre.

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The domain of Wittgensteins life started with the philosophical oratory of his
early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The basic thoughts of this book were
about solving the questions of grammar and logic. The effectiveness of this academic
volume was in the paragraphs measured in the numbered and subnumbered items.
Tractatus is the only work of Wittgenstein that was published during Wittgensteins
lifetime. The other writings, from the 1930s onwards, The Blue and Brown Book and
his masterwork Philosophical Investigations right up to his last pages in On Certainty
(OC) feature his mature philosophy. These and other new works (articles, lectures,
and notebooks) were written and rewritten by Wittgenstein to achieve the final
formulation of his world view. However, Wittgensteins works and writings were
circulated in the provisional form of stencils produced to be read by interested
colleagues and students suitable for early dialogue in academia.
The dimensionality of the contemporary scientific rules shaped Wittgensteins
early linguistics of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein focused on true or false propositions, which he judged not only by appearances but from the facts of logic
and mathematics. In the series of propositions, he revealed the list of free variables used in the confusions of language in order to clear up the doubtful
points. According to Lunsford, the subversive difficulties indicate the relativism
of the vitality, the sense of excitement and playful purpose (1992: 77) regarding
the production of words with a new meaning. As a creative philosopher,
Wittgensteins new ideas solved the good and false meaning of linguistic
problems through the cultural background of the community. The novelty of
Wittgensteins language philosophy animates and inspires the fact that language
is not a fixed collection of words and sentences, but a shared instrument for all
speakers and readers. Language shows the linguistic-and-cultural mannerisms of
linguculture (Anderson and Gorle 2011: 222226).
Wittgenstein did not write only logical books but composed his albums
written in daily language (PI 2009 [1953]: 4; see Pichler 2002, 2004, 2009; Gorle
2012: 6869, 187, 228). Like Barthes, Wittgenstein transformed the ordinary statements of language into literature, creating for the author a kind of social, theological, mythic, aesthetic, moral end (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 492). The literary speeches
and conversations signify that the traditional type of the architectural and premeditated book existed to reproduce an order of the world as opposed to chaos; but
the relative order led Wittgenstein to transfigure it into a kind of written word
according to a special code (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 491492). After publishing the
coded form of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote that he was, as Barthes, not able to:
achieve the status of the Book (of the Work); it is only an Album The Album is a
collection of leaflets not only interchangeable (even this would be nothing), but
above all infinitely suppressible to the complete annihilation of the Album, with

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the excuse that I dont like this one: this is the method of Groucho and Chico Marx,
reading aloud and tearing up each clause of the contract which is meant to bind
them. (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 492)
Wittgensteins fragmentary albums unite the unbroken and broken signs in his
stream of discourse (Gorle 2007). In the theory of logic in the literary framework, Wittgenstein attempted to operate the simple and complex signs of
language to create a permanent fixture between the official form of published
book and the intimacy of the album.
One could argue that Wittgenstein followed the Peircean categories of sense,
meaning, and significance (NEM 3: 844), expressing in his reasoning the three
stages of thought. Wittgenstein created the pragmatic stages formulated in
words, paraphrases, and arguments. Although the three stages of thought
would suggest Wittgensteins reading of Peirces work, the inescapable truth is
that Wittgenstein did not read Peirce, although he could have discussed the
semiotic themes, and particularly Peirces semiotics, with his English friend,
mathematician Frank Ramsey (Gorle 2012: 2730). This means that
Wittgensteins thoughts and its overlaps with Peirces organization of work
institute a semiotic connection between them (Gorle forthcoming). Peirces
categories form the basis for Wittgensteins demonstrative and fallible thoughtsigns in the use of language, while language is suffused with the undemonstrative and unfallible signs of non-thought. Wittgensteins philosophical confrontation and linguistic negotiation regarding the use of alternative and creative
forces in ordinary vocabulary, phraseology, and textology (Gorle 2004: 197
198) was to be understood in a general sense, reaching the understanding of
general readers.
The complex interplay between the domestic accommodation of linguistic
forms with the cultural pressures of Wittgensteins hard times consider the
political background of the Habsburg monarchy, the impact of both World Wars,
and the Cold War gave Wittgenstein the threatening challenge of transacting
the globalized, but still fragmented, world view implying the conflict and war
around. The political puzzle of Wittgensteins survival dealt with a constantly
changeable and manipulable situation of world politics. The political uncertainty has become transplanted in the fragmentariness of Wittgensteins short
paragraphs or aphorisms (Gorle 2007). He spoke not in the general voice of
universal scholar, but as individual person facing the world around. Instead of
dealing with the immediate situation of the danger in his environment, he
tended to escape from reality to build his version of pseudo-reality in
composing the persuasive rhetoric. Wittgenstein wanted to tell the truth in
fragmentary albums. The albums had an emotional reference to Wittgenstein

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as a person and scholar, but also maintained the historical tension of being
inspired by the genres of Platos Dialogues and the influence of Saint Augustine
(Gorle 2012: 107128). Plato benefitted for Wittgensteins eyes the pedagogical
argumentation in teaching pure logic, while Augustine added the sacred writings of biblical writings, hymns, and sermons.
In Wittgensteins intellectual company, the archaic teaching of philosophy
and religion of Plato and Augustine gave the special form and unorthodox shape
to the philosophical pseudo-reality of Wittgensteins personal reality:
As recognized faithful patrons, their mission and persuasiveness taught Wittgenstein the
way that passive words can turn into active deeds. On reading the sources, Wittgenstein
underwent a change of heart: Platos evidence alerted him to the hazards of interpretation,
whereas Augustine taught him interpretative translation. The supportive forces of Platos
socio-political thought the utopian ideal of the good life and good society of the Laws
and Augustines personal or perhaps egotistic notebooks of Confessions inspired
Wittgenstein to pursue his scientific learning, aiming to resolve the social confusions
of language today with his authoritative answers and to confide his own philosophical
schemes in his lectures and publications. (Gorle 2012: 138139)
As a teacher, Wittgensteins style emphasized the degree of experimental learning and the value of scientific method in his lectures. This new style is transplanted into Wittgensteins new reasoning of humanities. The literary effect of
the emergence of linguistics was for the readers or students the wide exposure to
the grammatical, logical, and rhetorical otherness, including fragmentary
reading, writing, and speaking. Analytic philosophy addressed the new and
contemporary interests of the twentieth century audience.
Against the ancient sources of the genres in the traditional drama, epic, and
lyric, Northrop Fryes division of poetic rhetoric refers to two kinds of rhetoric:
persuasive speech for applied literature and ornamental speech meaning the
lexis or verbal texture of poetry (1973 [1957]: 245). At first sight, both kinds of
rhetoric seem:
psychologically opposed to each other, as the desire to ornament is essentially disinterested, and the desire to persuade essentially the reverse. In fact ornamental rhetoric is
inseparable from literature itself, or what we have called the hypothetical verbal structure
which exists for its own sake. Persuasive literature is applied literature, or the use of
literary art to reinforce the power of argument. Ornamental rhetoric acts on its hearers
statistically, leading them to admire its own beauty or wit; persuasive rhetorics tries to lead
them kinetically towards a course of action. One articulates emotion; the other manipulates it. (Frye 1973 [1957]: 245)
The rhetorical sides of Wittgensteins philosophical works appear in the long

and mostly unedited narratives as they seem to be in the first version or the

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variety of different re-versions, written by Wittgensteins hand; or else the

rhetorical sides can shrink back to smaller units of the edited titles or appear
in editorial volumes. After Wittgensteins death (1951), Wittgensteins rhetoric
became a mixed genre for the readers of his edited volumes. These are composed out of Wittgensteins own materials, but include the alien (radical, even
mythical) imagery of all kinds of textual editors, revisers, and translators of his
work. The ethical criticism of these reviewers can refer back to Fryes assertive,
descriptive, or factual reorganization (1973 [1957]: 245) of the realism of
Wittgensteins own writings into the critical rearrangement of his total framework of language philosophy.
Returning to the linguistic ornaments and schemes to plan the logical truth
of language, Wittgensteins volumes concentrate on the rhetorical inversion of
the persuasive (meaning non-logical and emotional) forms of style, discourse,
passage, phrase, and words, often at the expense of logical thought. Focusing
on emotional aspects of the persuasive style, ornamented with scientific argumentation, Wittgensteins treatment of language reached forward by decades
into the contemporary mistreatment of social media of the twenty-first century.
As language philosopher, he was constantly aware of the philosophical certainty
of his work, but often sharply contrasted with the uncertainty of the fragmentary
albums. Wittgenstein created in natural language the groundless manuscripts of
interweaved paragraphs and aphorisms, which must be read not directly but
indirectly to be rightly understood as critical remarks. This paradox has created
the puzzle of reading Wittgensteins writings.
2 Speculative rhetoric
Practical creativity as the linguistic and psychological engagement with everyday life was the subject of Wittgensteins lectures about aesthetics delivered at
the University of Cambridge in 1938. The published lectures about the confusions of the term of aesthetics were not written by Wittgenstein himself, but
compiled and taken down by the students (including Yorick Smythies and Rush
Rhees) in their notes, which were edited in that provisional form after
Wittgensteins death (LA). This happened, of course, without his agreement on
this procedure, since Wittgenstein actually wanted the students to stop making
notes at his lectures (Monk 1990: 403; see Klagge and Nordmann 2003: 331332).
During the dialogue of Wittgensteins lectures, he gave practical examples from
architecture, music, the art of hairdressing, costume, and other cultural examples.
To define the objective meaning of aesthetics, he answered to Rhees question that:

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I may join up with the things I like; you with the things you dislike. But the word [of
aesthetics] may be used without any affective element; you use it to describe a particular
kind of thing that happened. It was more like using a technical term possibly, though not
at all necessarily, with a derogatory element in it. (LA: 10-11, see Drury 1984: 141)
The solution of the philosophy concerned with personal art was that one must
get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living (LA: 11). To
determine what is portrayed as beautiful or ugly objects of art, looking like
good or bad artifacts, one needs to go back to the basic social patterns in
Wittgensteinian cultural forms of life (Lebensformen). The forms of life mix
aesthetics with the cultural remarks about modern life to integrate into the
mechanism of science (LA: 1117). As underlying forms of life, including
the theories of art and science, the cultural forms build the speech-act of the
language-game (Gorle 2012, forthcoming). The language-games have removed
the traditional rules, but are not un-ruled, since they must function within a
shared culture to be rightly understood in a particular society. The efforts to
creativity in language reaffirms the constantly fluctuating activity of cultural
beliefs, practices, commitments, joined with the strength of scientific theories
to perform the pervasive force of Wittgensteins ornamental language-games.
In the attempts to solve the vagueness of the creative play-acts in
Wittgensteins language-games, the deliberate effort to reasoning is the use of
the logical method to grasp the meaning of the subject. Wittgenstein appeared to
follow the semio-logical method of the formal logician and active scientist Charles S.
Peirce. As argued in my book Wittgenstein and Translation: Exploring Semiotic
Signatures (Gorle 2012), the method of semiotics can define Wittgensteins logical
methodology. Peirces laboratory inquiry serves here as the method of threeway
reasoning for Wittgenstein. While semiotics, as a methology, remains neutral
(and here undiscussed), the scientific inquiry is orthodox reasoning, linked to the
classical logical rules. Nevertheless, it is, in Peirces doctrine of semiotics, transposed in other working forms of semio-reasoning and can become unorthodox
thought. These forms of reasoning are usual to grasp and drive the flux and flow
of ruled thought of the creative and non-ruled imagination in Wittgensteins mind
and heart.
Peirces article Ideas, Stray or Stolen, About Scientific Writing, discussed
the abstract forms and concrete shapes of scholarly writing between logical (and
illogical) problems. Scientific communication must be trained to the scientific
life in which the coupling of the ideas of rhetoric and science would hitherto
equally have been regarded as a typical example of incongruity (EP 2: 325),
something Wittgenstein would certainly agree with. Peirces general idea of
rhetoric will include the rules of expression as stringent as any of those by

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which the excellence of composition in Chinese or in Urdu is judged (EP 2: 326,

see EP 2: 329) in order to become a cross-cultural tool. Peirce stressed:
as an ens in posse, a universal art of rhetoric, which shall be the general secret of
rendering signs effective, including under the term sign every picture, diagram, natural
cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in ones handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, concept,
indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, sentence, chapter, book, library, and in
short whatever, be it in the physical universe, be in in the world of thought. (EP 2: 326)
The universal art (EP 2: 326) of the signs of language can be broadened and
enlarged by Peirce with just contempt of mere words to transfigure into the
literary culture (EP 2: 325) of figures of non-verbal speech. The outcome will be
Peirces speculative rhetoric (EP 2: 326330; see Liszka 1996; Freadman 2004:
9394, 103), concerned with the methods that ought to be pursued in the
investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth (CP 1.191).
Instead of speculative rhetoric, Peirces other name of speculative rhetoric was
pure rhetoric or the methodeutic of rhetoric. Methodeutic shows how it
[rhetoric] differs from critic: how, although it considers, not of what is admissible, but what is advantageous, it is nevertheless a purely theoretical study, and
not [just] an art (NEM 4: 26). The new, but formal, science of speculative
rhetorics serves as the objective logic of the utility (meaning, generally, the
scientific utility) (NEM 4: 27). Speculative rhetoric applies persuasively, economically, and mathematically to the practical questions of knowledge of
education, learning, and erudition.
Continuing the Roman trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, Peirces
speculative rhetoric is divided into speculative grammar, speculative critic,
and speculative rhetoric (EP 2: 327). Speculative grammar and speculative criticism have been argued, as Peirce proposed, but the details remain unclear.
Peirce added that speculative rhetoric has been comparatively neglected (EP 2:
327). In the oratory of speech and language, the image of the rhetoric of fine
arts stands to provide the activity of practical persuasion to direct the form
and shape of the text, according to the individual and collective knowledge
(EP 2: 329) of the author. Speculative rhetorics is inspired by the formalistic
treatment of the relationship of perfection to execute the truth of content.
Wittgensteins strategy contains a good deal of practical philosophy. He wrote
and rewrote his temporary and fragmented versions, but after his Tractatus he
never wrote a final or definitive version to be made public. Instead of Peirces
ideal of semiosis, Wittgensteins pseudo-semiosis (discussed in Gorle 2012) did
not improve on the speculative expression of Peirces Ideas, Stray or Stolen,
About Scientific Writing. Unusual words, sentences, or fragments needed for

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Wittgenstein the dry-cleaning process of recovering the unusualities and

restoring them to working order (CV 1984: 39; CV 1998: 44; see Gorle 2012: 61).
Wittgensteins grammatical (terminological) puzzle in the article Some
Remarks on Logical Form (1929) started with:
Every proposition has a content and a form. We get the picture of the pure form if we
abstract from the meaning of the single words, or symbols (so far as they have independent
meanings). That is to say, if we substitute variables for the consonants of the proposition.
The rules of syntax which applied to the consonants must apply to the variables also. By
syntax in this general sense of the word I mean the rules which tell us in which connections only a word gives sense, thus excluding nonsensical structures. The syntax of
ordinary language, as is well known, is not quite adequate for this purpose. It does not
in all cases prevent the construction of nonsensical pseudopropositions (RLF: 162)
The vagueness of content and the form of the writings expressed Wittgensteins
struggle. In 1930, he suggested a more positive tone:
But it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world sub specie aeterni other
than through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way so I believe it is as though
it flies above the world and leaves it the way it is observing it from above, in flight. (CV
1980: 5; retranslated in CV 1998: 7)
Wittgensteins flight of thought avoided the confusions of the earlier philosophy of

language. Instead, he formalized the scientific value and the utility of the methods of
reasoning, the conclusion(s) are regarded as Peirces interpretants. The series of
Peirces three interpretants that follow and interact with each other are the immediate and dynamical interpretants, as well as the final interpretant, also called the
emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants. The interpretants are building-signs
of earlier signs, actively involved with the constructive and deconstructive interpretation to give special content and form to the signs of communication. The
exhaustive analysis of interpretants does not always reach the final analysis of
semiosis, but the reasoning of the sign system gives in informal logic the temporary
(Peirces pseudo-semiosic) style of communication (Gorle forthcoming).
Wittgensteins reasoning minimized the risk of subjectivity and provided
maximum objectivity. To achieve this ideal of seeking rational truth through
persuasive untruth, he observed his own writing style and grounded his own
demonstrative and fallible data by a variety of inferential reasonings, in accordance with Peirces semiotics and the three categories. The three-step methods
of reasoning are expected to eventually yield true conclusions. Logical reasoning
was traditionally either deductive or inductive reasoning. Peirce revolutionized
the traditional dichotomy which he expanded and redefined as a trichotomy
by including his discovery of abduction (from 1867). The decision-making

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distinguished between explicatory (or analytic) reasoning in deduction and

ampliative (or synthetic) reasoning for induction; together with Peirces discovery of abductive reasoning, Peirces steps of logic were three-dimensional.
Explicatory (or analytic) reasoning corresponds to deductive inference, as in
this example taken from Peirces metaphor of the beanbag:
Rule
Case
Result
All the beans from this bag are white.

These beans are from this bag.
These beans are white. (CP .)
Deduction simply substitutes for the facts presented in the premise, what is
implicit in them. Since all of the beans in the sample are white, the sample from
the known whole to the parts of the bag means that the deductive argumentation stays as it is (whiteness) and does not draw upon the unknown or the
partially unknown. This makes deduction the only form of necessary (that is,
explicatory) reasoning to reach truth in itself. Deduction as such forecloses
critical examination or evaluation of its premises and does not engage in the
introduction of new insights, nor in the rejection of hypotheses already adopted.
While deduction makes no error, non-deductive reasoning does not lead to
necessary conclusions but to other conclusions which can be probable or merely
plausible. While deduction proves that something must be and induction
shows that something actually is operative, Peirce suggested that abduction
merely suggests that something may be (CP 5.171). Apart from the traditional
reasoning about the clear signs seen in reality (deduction and induction), the new
abduction (also called hypothesis or retroduction) is the hidden logic of the real
impulse of the intuitive sensing of the known parts to the unknown whole and
come to the conclusion. Abduction is Peirces talent for guesswork. As temporary
guidepost to logic, induction and abduction are the statistical inference to logic,
since Out of a bag of black and white beans I take a few handfuls, and from this
sample I can judge approximately the proportions of black and white in the
whole (CP 5.349). While induction and abduction are similar viewpoints, they
point to different approaches (as shall be argued further).
Instead of the ampliative or synthetic arguments of deductive reasoning, the
inductivist character rests on what actually is (CP 5.171) in the reality of
propositions. Peirces signs of inductive reality are:
Rule
Case
Result
These beans are from this bag.

These beans are white.
All the beans from this bag are white. (CP .)

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Inductive inference gives the course of experimental investigation (CP 5.168).

Induction assumes that what is true for a whole collection is true of a number
of instances taken from it at random (CP 5.275). The conclusion of the fair
sample taken from the bag is that we can judge that all the beans are, both now
and in the future, white. Induction is a statistical proposition, since the sign
points outside itself to the object referred to, giving a fragment torn away from
the object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole
(CP 2.230).
Induction establishes a clear cause-consequence relation between premise and
conclusion (semiotically, between sign and interpretant). The conclusion requires
the investigator to follow the judgment almost blindly, but there can be no
absolute certainty in induction. The active inquirer (reader), spurred by his or her
intellectual curiosity (CP 5.584), is in fact making predictions and thereby judging
the unknown by the known. New knowledge is inferred by extrapolating it from
actual fact toward the unknown of the future. Induction is therefore something like
a practical truth (CP 6.527), bringing the inquirer halfway on the path of logic,
leading closely from interrogation and doubt to certainty and truth.
Every scientific inquiry and pseudo-scientific story (the case) needs to formulate and adopt certain beliefs or rough hypotheses on which to further build
the argumentation. The belief uses instinctive reasoning to come to the abductive hypothesis. In the abductive inference, we catch a new case from a rule and
result (CP 2.623). Peirce explained: On the table there is a handful of white
beans; and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans
only. I at once infer as probability, or as a fair guess, that this handful was taken
out of that bag (CP 2.623) or in the practical example of Peirces beanbag:
Rule
Case
Result
All the beans from this bag are white.

These beans are white.
These beans are from this bag. (CP .)
Abductive mannerisms are radically contrasted with the forward reasoning of

deduction and induction, since they concern backward reasoning through new
ideas. Abduction is based on hunches and guesses of the inquirer. The emotional or affective attitudes of the case is the intuitive feeling adopted through
the case inside the result. The intuitive opportunities state the possibilities of
may and maybe not. Through the abductive experiment, the experience is a
surprising requirement to offer new information and new grounds for reasonable
doubt of what seems to happen in reality.
Of the three modes of reasoning, abduction is the only one to open up new
ground (NEM 3: 206) and to introduce novelty into the intellectual (or pseudo-

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intellectual) observation of the case. Induction moves from ideas to things,

whereas abduction is a reverse operation, moving from things to ideas, from
outside to inside. Abduction seems to start with capturing the inquirers flavors,
tastes, and expectancies, until it reaches the hypotheses on the story. Weak as the
absolute truth value of abduction may be and in fact is (at least when compared to
the probative force of its stronger counterparts of deduction and induction),
abduction is nevertheless the creative force of logical reasoning, breathing the
air of originality into what would otherwise be a reasonable (CP 5.174) but
utterly rationalistic and, thereby, lifeless process of reasoning. Abduction must be
defined as individual creativity bringing new ideas into the story.
Peirce relabeled a mode of thought which, for all his conjectural tentativeness of feeling, was often plausible in real cases. Abduction suggests more than
gratuitous guesswork of the problems of the story, but introduces the lightning
flash breaking through logical analysis to shed new light on the underlying
instinctual feeling with a moral or ethical element. The tentative explanation is
iconically prefigured in the premises. The first premise describes what the beans
must be like to qualify as beans from Peirces bag. The interpretant (final
conclusion) of the abduction is the iconic quality, here the whiteness of the
beans. The rest is guesswork based on rational instinct, recreating feeling not
from the mind but from the heart. It is believed that abduction looks somehow
into the unseen universe of mind and heart in the attempts to form some
hypothesis concerning the forms, shapes, and other features of the subject.
The abductive overtones of logical reasoning are acritical feelings or psychological reflections, suited to Peirces Ideas, Stray or Stolen, About Scientific
Writing. The judgment of abduction gives no certainty; the decisions have the
emotional nature of some form of intuitive perceptions. The more or less intellectual feelings are expressed by the ejaculatory sentence It seems to me that
to explain the story of abduction. Abductive judgments offer personal values
and rebuild the signs to acquire the feelings of the meaning (or meanings) of the
case, at a distance from the moral control of self-control of data through the
settling of doubts within, firstly, induction and subsequently, deduction.
Abduction starts the evolution of the speculative reasoning, in which abductive
beliefs are the first and essential steps of poetic unreasonableness to move
further on the way toward final reasonableness the truth of the conclusion.
Abduction is not included in the purely cognitive laws and dispositions.
Abductive forms are not (or not yet) regarded as intellectual inquiry but, rather,
answer imaginary forms of inchoate questioning of new ideas, out of which
rational discourses may possibly emerge to solve the case. Abduction speaks
about the emotive, religious, and political values as implicit argument, integrated
into explicit argument, remaining as the surprising phenomenon of feelings or

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other acriticial reasonings of the story. Despite the hidden nature, abductive
reasoning is adopted within deduction and induction, but, as the case may be,
is often not discussed as meaningful element of illogic transformed into logic.
3 Narrative style and genre

Peirces logical reasoning seems to put in order Wittgensteins persuasive and
ornamental genres of the primary works, as well as in the ongoing editing of the
edited secondary works. Mastering the linguistic and cultural obstacles of the
language-game, Wittgenstein has named, explained, and made understood (or
perhaps misunderstood) the varieties of meaning (such as persuasive, economical, and mathematical meanings) he used. The ostensive definitions went into
what he called the collection of the general term proposition (for Satz; Glock
1996: 274, 315319), also called sentence or theorem. Wittgenstein fostered a
more realistic formation of the definable and undefinables of the logical
elements in the expression of the contemporary speculative rhetoric. The practical and theoretical questions of rhetoric seem to be split into three stories of
deduction, induction, and abduction.
What I mean is not however giving up an old style a new trim. You dont take the old forms
& fix them up to suit todays taste. No, you really speaking, maybe unconsciously, the old
language, but speaking it in a manner that belongs to the newer world, though not on that
account necessarily one that is to its taste. (Wittgenstein 1947, CV 1998: 69)
In one story, the first flow of thought is expressed in the catalog of definable and
undefinable elements in Wittgensteins Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP 1933),
the Bible of logical empirism. This slim but rich book was, miraculously, written
by the young Wittgenstein as an Austrian soldier serving in the trenches of the
First World War, but served, translated into English, at a later date as
Wittgensteins doctoral thesis, submitted to the University of Cambridge. Under
the professorial aegis of Bertrand Russell, the manuscript needed to comply to
academic standards to qualify for a dissertation. Apart from the introduction
written by Russell (TLP: 723), strongly criticized by Wittgenstein himself, the
text of the Tractatus expresses the quasi-mathematical body of rules concerned
with deductive reasoning whose formal decisions form logical precedents in
respect of succeeding cases. Tractatus corresponds to statements of the facts of
life in imperative propositions, like a legal document (Gorle 2014 [2005]).
The essentially rational argument was grounded in pure ratio and proportion, but the total design of the Tractatus was based on an open-and-closed

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syllabary in numbered and subnumbered materials, ordered together in a formal

series (TLP: 83 [ 4.1252]). The deductive nature of the Tractatus was clear from
Wittgensteins counting of the separate paragraphs of the proverbial propositions of the text. The quasi-mathematical technique of sign-counting in the
diversity and variety of arrangements of Wittgensteins ideas showed that:
The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions
n.1, n. 2, n. 3, etc., are comments on proposition No. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc., are
comments on the proposition No. n. m; and so on. (TLP: 1 fn.)
Wittgensteins own medley of punctuation, the words in italics, or sentences

used in brackets are used as special parenthetical remarks of his logical style
and propositional genre (TLP: 127 [ 5.4615.4611]; see also CV 1980: 13, 48, 68;
CV 1998: 15, 55, 77). Steiner described the Tractatus thus:
The Tractatus is a graphic example of the kind of book, of the forms and motions of spirit,
which I am trying to define. It is built of aphorisms and numbers, as if borrowing from
another kind of certitude. It makes its own syntax and idiom an object of doubt and rigorous
appraisal. Wittgenstein has a poets capacity to make every word seem new and full of
untapped, possibly destructive vitality. At several points the Tractatus, with its economy of
image and its typographical effects, reads like a poem. (Steiner 1969 [1967]: 114)
Despite the basic formality of the book, the Tractatus had, however, some
informality in the poetic appendices which gave the personalized (that is,
persuasive and ornamental) tone of Wittgensteins belief in abduction. Also,
Wittgenstein began the account of the Tractatus by the epitaph dedicated to the
memory of my friend David H. Pinsent followed by the quotation of a poetic
line from the Austrian journalist, poet, and playwright Friedrich Krnberger:
und alles, was man weiss, nicht bloss rauschen und brausen gehrt hat, lsst sich
in drei Worten sagen ( and all that one knows, having heard only the raging
and roaring, can be said in three words). To illuminate the condensed matrix of
the Tractatus, Wittgensteins Preface (TLP: 2729) briefly expanded the pejorative implications of the epigraph in the abductive overtones of his self-belief:
The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method
of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language.
Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can
be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. (TLP: 27)
The alternation of the ego-directed phrasing of as I believe clearly formulates

the break of the literal or figurative opinions to the definitive silence of
Wittgensteins final judgment, ending the rational speech of the Tractatus.

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The closure of the Tractatus seemed to metamorphose Ezekiels vision of

building the temple into the framework of the right propositions at the right time
and space. In Wittgensteins words:
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes
them as senseless, when he has climbed through them, on then, over them. (He must so to
speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. (TLP: 189 [ 6.54])
Philosophy can be compared to the biblical ladder of wisdom. In Jakobs

spiritual vision, the ladder reached from earth to heaven with angels climbing
up and down the steps (Gen. 28: 12). Wittgensteins metaphor let it be known
that philosophy works not in evolution, but in reality (Kishik 2008: 6668).
Philosophy shows gradually, by steps of logic, the translation from the naive
confusions of language until the final steps of Jakobs ladder, reaching the
Holy Temple of God.
Away from the abstract principles of reasoning, the concrete meaning of
most propositions can be clearly formulated in the deductive strategy. Yet the
rest, the so-called unclear propositions, has the obscure or oblique sense of
Wittgensteins confusions made in the use of language. In the final sentence
of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein famously declared: Whereof one cannot speak,
thereof one must be silent (TLP: 189 [ 7]). The unclear propositions suppose
the solution of Wittgensteins inexpressible (Unaussprechliche) problems of life
(unsere Lebensprobleme). The solution is applied to the thoughts of silence,
which can hardly be solved by logical reasoning, but rather by the speculative or
hypothetical reasoning of Peirces abduction. Without the illogical consequence,
the meaning of the non-verbal silence can become nonsensical, cryptic, or
even mystical (TLP: 187 [ 6.522]). In Wittgensteins terms, the mystical feeling
can come alive in the personal silence (TLP: 187 [ 6.446.45]).
Wittgensteins skeptical interpretation of what the opaque or sterile silence
is has remained a controversial refrain from scientific logic and religious mythology. The myth of Wittgensteins silence can be demythologized into the sense
of emotive language. By any standard, we live in two worlds, interacting within
our mind and soul. Apart from the known microcosm of the world around us,
there must exist the unthinkable macrocosm of the unknown or unseen world
(TLP: 151 [ 5.621]). The limit between both worlds solves the problematic area
between rational certainty and the uncertainty of emotive language in the bodily
act of avoiding or rejecting Wittgensteins silence. To eliminate the uncertainty
of verbal statements with obscure meaning, the non-verbal silence is clarified by
the speculation of the figurative, optional, or necessary mysticism of what ought
to be thought of as silent speech of Wittgensteins soul. The vague and

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allegorical sense of non-language is the abductive process structured by the

speculation of Peirces unconscious feeling with an intellectual backing. The act
of magic can be described as Wittgensteins logical end to the Tractatus, in
which he moved the expressive form of logic into the meaning to the inexpressive areas of non-logic. The deductive precision of the inductive clarity of the
illumination of facts foregrounds the possibility of sense-experience by reaching the solution accepting the fair hints and guesses of abduction (Gorle 2014
[2005]).
Le style cest lhomme. Le style cest lhomme mme.
The first expression has a cheap epigrammatic brevity.
The second, correct, one opens up a quite different perspective.
It says that style is the picture of the man.
The second story bridges the deducibility gap between the paragraphs of
Wittgensteins Tractatus and the counterparts, The Blue and Brown Book (BBB
1969) and Philosophical Investigations (PI 1968, 2009). The latter albums show
how the logical reasoning of deduction has been broken down to the inductive
patterns of the narrations of human experience, giving neither true not false
propositions. The narrative description on the literal level is almost a number of
episodes, but the novel can grow from the episodic narration to the logical
reasonableness (truth) in the future, despite the fact that in induction the view of
the future remains an unruled unknown or indeterminate world.
The rule of The Blue and Brown Book prepares the way for Philosophical
Investigations, but these allusive, uncharacterized, or even self-contradictory
sets of manuscripts does not obey real logic. The lack of rule in Wittgensteins
albums signifies that the reader (inquirer) needs to ascertain what actually is
(CP 5.171) going on in the variety of different propositions. The subject shows, as
in a detective novel, how the events of paradigms and aphorisms can be
regulated at all into the forms of a real story; but the story remains on the
metaphorical level. The opinions of Wittgensteins sturdy tome of the
Philosophical Investigations have been forwarded in many argumentations and
explanations by analysts, read by scholarship, and judged by evidence; however, the characterization of Wittgensteins Brown Book, first introducing the
concept of language-game, might give other answers to the dramatic mode of
narration (see Gorle 2012: 221230, 237271).
The line of the fin-de-sicle Viennese political author and moral playright
Johann Nestroy (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 27, 8587, 9091) berhaupt hat der
Fortschritt das an sich, dass er viel grsser ausschaut, als er wirklich ist (The
trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is,

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see PI 2009 [1953]: 2) is noted for the witty engagement with Wittgensteins
stylistic and technical achievement of the Philosophical Investigations. Can this
volume in the edited form be approached from the general question: is bigger
better? By measuring the dense complexity of the volume of the Philosophical
Investigations, compared to the brief volume of the Tractatus and preparatory
Blue and Brown Books, the question is: does the bigger size of the new
philosophy advance the progress of Wittgensteins successes (or failures)?
The first edition of the substantial volume of Philosophical Investigations (1953) consisted of two
parts of longer or shorter paragraphs, but without subtitles or thematic note to identify the
nature of both materials, implying both related paragraphs and unrelated episodes. Was the
limited degree of self-illumination in Wittgensteins narrative program necessary to understand accurately the vast collection of different stories in the Philosophical Investigations?
According to the Editors Note of the third edition with some modifications of the
English translation (PI 2001 [1953]), the editors (Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush
Rhees) remarked after Wittgensteins death (1951), that their task was certainly
not a radical revision of Wittgensteins writings:
What appears as Part I of this volume was complete by 1945. Part II was written between
1947 and 1949 Part II was written between 1947 and 1949. If Wittgenstein had published his
work himself, he would have suppressed a good deal of what is in the last thirty pages or
so of Part I and worked what is in Part II, with further material, into its places. (PI 2001
[1953]: Editors note)
In fact, the good deal of Wittgensteins editorial revision concerned the

practical problems of the variant readings for words and phrases written
on slips which Wittgenstein had cut from other writings and inserted at these
pages, while the words standing between double brackets are Wittgensteins
references to remarks either in this work or in other writings needed the
editorial choice [that] never affected the sense (PI 2001[1953]: Editors note).
The thematical note to Part II (PI [1953] 2001: 147197) has remained more or
less unclear, but became christened during the work of the following team of
editors (Elizabeth Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte), preparing
the 4th edition (PI 2009 [1953]). Part II was given the subtitle Philosophy of
Psychology A Fragment (PI 2009 [1953]: IXIV) after the re-arranged set of
remarks written between 1946 and 1949 dealing chiefly with questions in what
Wittgenstein called the new philosophy of psychology (Hacker and Schulte in
(PI 2009 [1953]: XXIII). Wittgensteins new science was, as he said himself in the
Preface to the Philosophical Investigations (written in 1945 in Cambridge), still
characterized by the fragmentariness of the old and new manuscripts of the
Philosophical Investigations. These manuscripts were, for the various editors,

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both old manuscripits and new typescripts, which were re-worked, cut up,
and re-arranged (PI 2009 [1953]: XIX) from rereadings, drafts, and revisions of
early manuscripts.
In the Preface, Wittgensteins conception of writing and reading explored
the inventory of ideas within some fragments of:
all these thoughts as remarks, shorts paragraphs, sometimes in longer chains about the
same subject, sometimes jumping, in a sudden change, from one area to another.
Originally it was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I
thought of differently at different times. But it seemed to me essential that in the book the
thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural, smooth sequence. (PI
2009 [1953]: 3)
Wittgensteins poetic style was based on words and punctuation, on clues of

remarks and short paragraphs and longer chains, jumping together in
thoughts. Far away from composing the traditional book, Philosophical
Investigations shows a vacuum of words for meaning and emphasis. The conclusion was, technically speaking, that deduction offered the general concepts
of mental laws conceived in the traditional book of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein
stressed that deduction was, at least for Philosophical Investigations, an impossibility. In the next paragraph, Wittgenstein continued the negative conclusion
as follows:
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I
realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more
than philosophical remarks; my thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a
single track against their natural inclination. And this was, of course, connected with the
very nature in the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction
over a wide field of thought. The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a
number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and
meandering journeys. (PI 2009 [1953]: 3)
Importantly, there are the clues for understanding the criss-cross of the
whole of Wittgensteins thoughts, which are weakened into the number
of sketches of landscapes in the Philosophical Investigations. Technically,
Wittgensteins biased narrativity in the inductive episodes gave as examples
some fairly selected topics (such as the paradigm of pain or tooth-ache, mentioned throughout PI 2009 [1953]) to argue further the whole trajectory of the
general investigation.
For the new functional generalization of the inductive manuscript, the
logical imagination of the scenery seems to require new sketches from other
perspectives. These were in turn, in Wittgensteins words, badly drawn
or lacking in character, marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman

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(PI 2009 [1953]: 3). Instead of verbal speech, some artificial (scientific) illustrations were needed to pictorially envisage Wittgensteins inductive principles in
practice. The illustrations, such as the duck-rabbit and the picture-face (PI 2009
[1953]: 204), were Wittgensteins own drawings. The meaning of these nonverbal
images (diagrams) enables the reader to see the illogical view of the abstract
symbolism. Yet the drawings find or make an unrepresentative ground for
objects in reality, and even turn into degrees of irreality. Wittgenstein apologized in the Preface of Philosophical Investigations, saying that in order to
give the viewer an idea of the landscape this book is really just an album (PI
2009 [1953]: 4).
In the lengthy survey of the Preface, Wittgenstein struggled historically with
choosing verbal genres for the speculative rhetoric in the Philosophical
Investigations. In the unfinished formulas of fragmentary formulas, he gave the
readers the equivocal statements about the false tautologies (RLF: 167, in
particular TB) presented in the text of the Philosophical Investigations. See, for
example, these two examples of experimental testing (CP 4.155):
Point at a piece of paper. And now point at its shape now at its colour now at its
number (that sounds odd). Well, how did you do it? Youll say that you meant
something different each time you pointed. And if I ask how that it is done, youll say you
concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, and so on. But now I ask again: how
is that done?
Suppose someone points to a vase and says Look at that marvellous blue forget about
the shape. Or: Look at the marvellous shape the colour doesnt matter. No doubt
youll do something different in each case, when you do what he asks you. But do you
always do the same thing when you direct your attention to the colour? Imagine various
different cases! (PI 2009 [1953]: 33).
These things can hardly be fully understood. On closer look, the blue color can
probably be indigo or another color; the experiences of seeing the shape, color,
and even number can give inductive remarks about the unrevealed but
practical appearances of the object. Under different eventualities of life, the
deductive rules of logical appearances can be transformed into other rules. In
ordinary language, the inquirer (reader) meets with colours, sounds, etc., etc.,
with their gradations, continuous gradations, and combinations in various
proportions, all of which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression
(RLF: 165). This means that slight variations in the colors can deal with
properties which admit of gradations, i.e., properties as the length of an
interval, the pitch of a tone, the brightness or redness of a shade of colour,
etc. (RLF: 166167).
The linguistic tautologies play with the same indefiniteness [that] surrounds the emotional physiognomy of abstract colors (Blocker 1979: 139). The

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concrete material is not the formal or conventional color, but presents an

attractive conceptual picture (Blocker 1979: 179) with many different kinds of
meaning. Observing the complex physiognomy of defining the colors, they
represent the cultural variables of the language-game, indeed embracing the
game-with-language-and-culture. The emotional sense shows how one plays a
game of chess with form and content, which doesnt consist only in pushing a
piece from, here to there on the board not yet in the thoughts and feelings that
accompany the move; but in the circumstances that we call playing a game of
chess, solving a chess problem, and the like (PI 2009 [1953]: 33). The circumstances of the game are a cultural story (Anderson and Gorle 2011: 222226).
Induction is the practical interpretation of rule and case, moving from a
persons doubt and interrogation to the result of the individual decision to solve
the cultural story, as observed. The cause-consequence story of induction differs
from the previous, deductive authority of cases and precedents, which leads to
the unquestioned rules of certainty and truth. Wittgenstein provided mixed text
types together, calibrating the proximity of real or fictional narration with the
chronological order of events of episodes. Wittgensteins narration is closely
connected to maintaining the dialogue of events with the readers, whose interest
or effort is the didactic ideal to understand the inductive stories of the
Philosophical Investigations.
The conflicting tests of the actual facts in the two colors or the shape of the
vase can puzzle the scientific activity of reasoning, leading to the confusion in
everyday living. Within other cultural contexts, particularly exotic environments, the shade of the colors and the forms or shapes of Wittgensteins vase
can be observed differently. Analytic reasoning did not solve Wittgensteins
fragmentariness into a whole. Wittgenstein points out that To piece together
the landscape of these conceptual relationships out of their individual fragments
is too difficult for me. I can make only a very imperfect job of it (CV 1998: 90; CV
1980: 78).
Moving from deduction to induction, Wittgenstein pursued the experience
further from formal logic into informal logic. For Peirce, this movement was on
the surface one of the worst of these confusions, as well as one of the
commonest, [it] consists in regarding abduction and induction taken together
as a simple argument (CP 7.218). The reasoning to justify the confirmable
predictions in deduction and induction was based on seeing the phenomenon
in experience. Thereby, in the reasoning of the pure seeing-as, one neglects
the inconsistent but pervasive force of introducing new ideas beyond what is
given in the experimental observation of the world of phenomena. Wittgenstein
suggests the possible hypothesis of abductive guesses to solve the actual cases
(Merrell 2004: 256).

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Its possible to write in a style that is unoriginal

in form like mine but with well chosen words;
or on the other hand in one that is original in form,
freshly grown from within oneself.
(And also of course in one which is botched together
just anyhow out of old furnishings.1)
Finally, the third story is about the abductive style of Wittgensteinian new
ideas called by Wittgenstein freshly grown ideas introduced into the
furniture of pseudo-scientific reasoning. These ideas show the insight into
Wittgensteins privacy in the titles of poems or sentences, and in the lectures,
notebooks, letters, and conversations. In the reading of what happened in the
private occasions (Klagge and Nordmann 2003), one gets a personal feel of
Wittgensteins beliefs, opinions, and also the final judgments. The aphorisms
have a relative isolation, but draw attention to a word, a phrase, or a paragraph. They structure Wittgensteins comments and commentaries, clearing up
a manifold of interesting subjects culture, politics, music, arts, cultural life,
philosophy, the Bible, Jewishness, Shakespeare, and so forth. The form and
content of Culture and Value (CV 1980, CV 1998) collects the separate and
decomposed remarks together in a volume; but originally the remarks were
interspersed or intertwined throughout the written pages of Wittgensteins
scientific work. Despite the fragmentary meaning of the remarks, they give in
its incompleteness a measure of plenitude about Wittgensteins private sensation (Pitcher 1970 [1966]).
Culture and Value gives the diaristic remarks revived in the context of this
album or phrase-book. The remarks do not reflect the entire framework of
Wittgensteins writing nor his rewriting as such: the remarks are borrowed
from his writings to produce in themselves a contradictory and ambiguous effect
of Wittgensteins poetic and thoughtful frame of mind and heart, thereby showing the workings of his abductive heart as opposed to the deductive and
inductive mind. The first edition of Culture and Value (CV 1984 [1980]) consisted
of extractions from the pages of the early writings, Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (TLP), Philosophical Investigations (PI 2001 [1953]), and the
Notebooks 19141916 (TB). Culture and Value followed the step-by-step method
of Notebooks 19141916 of keeping a kind of diary in the habit of writing short
aphorisms (see PR).
1 Wittgensteins original was aus alten Stcken, Winchs translation old bits and pieces
(Wittgenstein 1984 [1980]: 53) was re-translated into old furnishings (Wittgenstein 1998: 60).

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During the First World War, the abstract manuscript of the Tractatus was
joined with the private diaries as a separate manuscript in a list of daily events
and moods. This diary written in 19141916 seems to feature the autobiographical
biscript of the Tractatus narrating how the inductive life of military battles around
him influenced the philosophers private identity living the melancholy of physical
and psychological anxieties of a world of horrors. Later, the remarks of Culture and
Value (CV 1984 [1980]) were supplemented with other personal observations taken
from Wittgensteins later course of lectures at Cambridge, private notebooks, and
other forms of diaries. These further remarks were taken from Wittgensteins
unpublished heritage on electronic deposit in the Wittgenstein Archives at the
University of Bergen (from 1990) to publish the larger revised volume of Culture
and Value (CV 1998; see Gorle 2012: 187212). These diaries, precisely because
they were not intentionally created as raw material for philosophizing, seem to
be the instinctive (abductive) rock of Wittgensteins language-game, on which his
deductive and inductive creations and his version of himself were built.
The worknotes about warfare were continued throughout Wittgensteins life.
They were unexpected in the orthographical spelling as far as they affected the
private cryptography in Wittgensteins coded diaries (Pichler 20052006: 143
144; see GT: 75). The crucial step of Wittgensteins cryptography was the codification of the words into a simple rule: the literal code of the alphabet returned
from a z, b y, c x, d w, e v, etc. This Geheimschrift suggests
Wittgensteins secret code, when he wrote entries of the diary during difficult
days. Wittgensteins abductive pensiveness or sad reflection comforted him
during the uphill battles.
For example, during the emotionally charged trip to Skjolden (Norway) in
August 1937 to work in solitude on the Philosophical Investigations (Monk 1990:
361384, esp. 373), Wittgenstein wrote on the ferry from England, in between the
pages of his ordinary work in philosophy, he wrote in secret code that:
Been working a bit. And yet I cannot keep my mind wholeheartedly on the work. At the back [of
my mind] lurks a vague sense of the problem of this life of mine. From the ship to Skjolden. (MS
118: page front cover [Mjmna 13.8.1939], my trans.; see Pichler 20052006: 141)
Three days afterwards, Wittgenstein continued:

Am writing more or less because I am bored. I feel: I am adrift. Vain, thoughtless, anxious.
I wish now not at all to live alone. Fear that I will become depressed and unable to work. I
would now like to live with someone. To see anothers human face in the morning. Still, I
have now become so pathetic that perhaps it would be good that I am alone by necessity.
Am now utterly wretched. Writing it is of course the untruthfulness. Unhinged. (MS 118:
page front cover [16.8.1937], my trans.)

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Arrived at his hut in the Norwegian fjords, he continued that:

In Skjolden. Feeling poorly. Unhappy, helpless, and thoughtless But then I remembered
again how unique Francis is, almost irreplaceable. And how little I am aware of this, when
I am with him.
Am completely entangled in pettiness. Am irritable, think about myself only, and feel
that my life is miserable, but have no idea how miserable it really is. (MS 118: 1r [Skjolden
17.8.1937], my trans.)
As seen in the double translation from secret code to German and translated into
English, Wittgensteins standard formal brain has now rejected the truth of the
mental things and objects in accepting the untruthfulness (Unwahrkeit) of the
feelings of the informal heart. In first-person repetition, he moved from the selfreferentiality of his own monologue into a narcissistic kind of dialogue, embodying the fictional reality around him with the (ir)reality of being alone. The poetic
repetition of singular words in the three-way series of adjectives (vain, thoughtless, anxious and unhappy, helpless, and thoughtless) give the ups-and
downs he now (jetzt) suffered in the space and time, but then (da) written
in coded form to make the text not readily available when found by outsiders.
The emphatic clues of the abductive activity of dreams (the vision of his friend
Francis Skinner [Monk 1990: 331342]) realize the sum total of Wittgensteins
conflicting nervous temperaments of love and hostility.
The aphorisms are essentially fragmentary remarks (Gorle 2007) about
Wittgensteins affective states or private moods, as he himself wrote it down in the
diaries. Beyond the isolation of the separate remarks as such, here translated, the real
volumes of Culture and Value offered a new collection of contextual materials. The
dates of writing the private remarks in Culture and Value are not real diaries, written
every day about daily events. The autobiographical notes happen sporadically,
written at the same time as the main text (the philosophical writing) as the unformulated set of unstable biscript, whenever Wittgensteins psychological need arises to
relieve his emotions to himself. In the ruled and many un-ruled observations,
Wittgenstein balances the high mannerisms of life and the cultural background,
together with his illogical (hardly logical) arguments about what tortured him in
pain, despair, and stupidity in his environment. The common thread of the explanatory hypothesis of Wittgensteins abductive belief, repeated throughout the pages of
the volumes of Culture and Value, is place and time repeated again in the chronological analysis of Wittgensteins private archive of sensations in private moments.
Wittgenstein echoed his ideas and phrases in analogies and similes.
Throughout the pages of Culture and Value, the modelling of comparison connects the whole reasoning loosely together. Wittgensteins crucial paradigms
may seize, grasp, or envision the optical illusion or are similar to,

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remarkable in, familiar with, nothing but, being-as, seeing-as, as if,

as it were, or as you like (see, for example, CV 1998: 61). The modelling may
imply all kinds of poetic metaphors, such as: Resting on your laurels is as
dangerous as testing when hiking through snow. You doze off & die in your
sleep (CV 1998: 41) or Religion is as it were the calm sea bottom as its deepest,
remaining calm, however, high the waves rise on the surface (CV 1998: 61).
For example, in the years 19391940, following the Anschluss of Austria by
Nazi Germany (1938), Wittgensteins survival as an alien citizen of Jewish
extraction was to receive the British passport. The sense of living as a meaningful philosopher sought to express itself in a new cosmology. Considering the
political affliction of the Second World War, he wanted to give up academic life
in Cambridge, hoping to find elsewhere the peace of mind and concentration he
required to finish his book [Philosophical Investigations] (Monk 1990: 401). At
the same time, the friendship with his partner, Francis Skinner, had deteriorated
to the degree that the logical, ethical, legal, and sexual troubles, as seen in a
number of manuscripts (MSS) during these perilous years, were a moral battle.
In these years 19391940, Wittgenstein wrote 67 long or short aphorisms (CV
1984 [1980]: 3439, CV 1998: 4045), which on different dates seem disconnected but on analysis are connected phrases.
The common thread of these private phrases written in the years 19391940
(MS 122) seems to embrace the cultural hypothesis of psychoanalysis (then
fashionable in academic circles). Psychoanalysis displayed, in Wittgensteins
words, the wild courage of the passion of active feelings reverted as
tamed nature broken by death (CV 1998: 40, 43).2 MS 122 has become interlaced
with MS 162 to describe the inventive character of genius. The particular
genius moves away from the mediocrity of primitive or idle thoughts to concentrate on the genuine truth. Wittgensteins example of genius mentioned his
private courage to realize the deep wish to fill a nice notebook with writing as
soon as possible (CV 1998: 41). Since creative art (including Wittgensteins
idea of philosophy) serves to arouse feelings (CV 1998: 42), Wittgenstein then
compared the genius of Freuds psychoanalysis, the deep human passions of the
art of Shakespeares work, and the bottomless interpretation of the persons in
2 Analyzing Wittgensteins short fragments is not an easy way to provide a conceptual attitude
of precise meaning, particularly in their relation to Wittgensteins fashionable clues (keywords, catchwords). The specific guesses of clues create with the language-game the cognitive,
linguistic, and cultural realities of what is called the possible worlds in language and culture
(Gorle 2012: 231237). See the jargon of Wittgensteins terminology aesthetic, art, culture, creative, genius, myth, nature, originality, personality, and many other
terms as defined in Williams (1983 [1976]).

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the New Testament (CV 1998: 42). To resist the temptation of simplicity in
Wittgensteins untruthfulness in the empirical reality, he created the outlook of
multiplicity of the truth (CV 1998: 41). He originated artistic genius not as inspiration, not as cleverness, but as forms of courage (CV 1998: 44) to tell the truth.
Wittgenstein fluctuated in variations between the heart and the mind in the
notebooks of the fragmentary albums, adopting the explanatory hypothesis
about his private form of reality. Beyond the remarks of Culture and Value, the
hunting-ground of Wittgensteins abductive beliefs stand essentially in the
quotable lines, lectures, notebooks, letters, and conversations. The diaristic
forms and shapes express the intimacy of Barthes-like Journals (Barthes
1983 [1979]). The paradoxical fragments of Wittgensteins journals in the notebooks give a kind of narcissistic attachment (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 480) within
or without his scientific writings. Some of the journals were lectures reflecting
stylized efforts for teaching, for the dialogue with students (as argued, only
published from the students notes). Some were personal writings in correspondence to his family and friends (letters, postcards), some were his own monologue, but not meant with a view to publication since he asked and self-asked
the question Can I make the journal into a work? (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 480).3
Wittgensteins journals act as a particularly dramatic pose, in the best sense of
the word, as the dramatic performance of the alter ego. In the stylistic mannerisms
and figures of his day, Wittgenstein attracted the attention as an instinctive writer,
later encouraging and inspiring the fashionable style of other, alternative writers
(or journalists). Seeking the argument of his abductive journals, Wittgenstein
behaved from intellectual or emotional temperaments. His first argument was,
according to Barthes self-analysis, a text tinged with an individuality of writing,
with a style (as we used to say) with an idiolect proper to the author (as we said
more recently); let us call this motive: poetic (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481).
Wittgensteins poetic behavior is his personal style of writing mere fragments
including the poetic figures of speech. Wittgensteins speech was daily language
for the sake of persuasive clearness. Yet instead of philosophical clichs,
Wittgenstein used as literary ornament the rhetorical devices of emphasis and
bracketed words or sentences. The argument was general logic, including the
ordinary strategies of deduction and induction, but the cryptography of the
whole alphabet turned the text into the engineering manufacture of ego-directed
artifacts. When found and deciphered, it gives way to the speculative interpretation
of Wittgensteins silent field in secret abductive speech.
3 These preoccupations with personal communications are further argued in Klagge and
Nordmann (2003).

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Dinda L. Gorle
The second argument of Wittgensteins journals was the historical background,

in the sense of including the cultural traces of a period, mixing all dimensions and
proportions, from important information to details of behavior (Barthes 1983 [1979]:
481). The archeological traces came in particular after the Tractatus from the cultural
mundanity of Plato, Augustine, and other historical thinkers. Wittgenstein integrated the historical thinkers into the deductive creativity of twentieth-century
modernity; see the long quotation of the Confessions of Saint Augustine starting
Part I of the Philosophical Investigations. The lyrical-romantic visualization of Platos
argumentation created the highly moralistic-educational purpose of Wittgensteins
quasi-conventional deduction. The modern details of old knowledge equally evoked
Wittgensteins feelings of nostalgia in the abductive beliefs.
The third ground is Barthes object of desire (1983 [1979]: 481). The journals
implied Wittgensteins intimacy, the small change of his time, his tastes, his
moods, his scruples in which he (Barthes, not Wittgenstein) may even go so far
as to prefer his person to his work, eagerly snatching up his Journal and neglecting his books (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481). The goal and purpose is to seduce, by
that swivel which shifts from writer to person which is supposed to compensate
the inadequacies of public writing (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 481). Here, Wittgenstein
preferred the abductive speech of his fragmentary lectures and notebooks, even
his correspondence with friends and colleagues, over the fatigue of his scientific
work, which is what he strongly comments on all the time.
The fourth argument focuses on the subject of this article, concentrating on
giving a passionate form to the content of his inner thoughts. The special
impressions of the amorous or idolatrous writer (Barthes 1983 [1979]: 482)
ornaments the serious work with the observations and details of the private
journal. Barthes purely abductive journals are the depiction of Wittgensteins
real individuation, the seduction, the fetishism of language (1983 [1979]: 482).
Barthes illustrated this instruction (or self-instruction) by the biblical proverb
Yea, my reins shall rejoice, when thy lips speak right things (Prov. 23: 16, qtd.
in Barthes 1983 [1979]: 482). Wittgenstein probably hoped that the deductiveinductive knowledge of the philosophy of language could be abandoned to
credit, without probative force, the abductive comfort of loneliness, anxiety,
and melancholy in his autobiographical remarks written throughout his life.
4 Conclusion
To summarize Wittgensteins formidable multitask to give special style and form
to the typescripts and manuscripts, the analysis of his universe of discourse
suggests that he supported Peirces three logical leading principles of deductive,

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inductive, and abductive reasoning.4 Wittgensteins art of speculative rhetoric

in his philosophical writings used the logical rhetoric of deduction. Then, the
deductive rhetoric was recalibrated into narratives of inductive episodes, creating a kind of novel in the procedure of his manuscripts. Wittgenstein realized
that the old verification principles of deduction and induction had become too
narrow, so that in his secret journals he wrote his personal paragraphs by
abductive beliefs, part coded and part uncoded. The shifting of his personal
activities in the use of various modalities of reasoning to himself and to others
echoed Wittgensteins forms of ego-directed truth, displaying the weak or modified feature of his new philosophy. In Wittgensteins discourses, the narrative
speeches are no mismatch with his authority as author-philosopher, but are
emotionally involved with the artistic look of uncertainty of form. Uncertainty
shows the mutually intertwined and interpenetrating meanings of Wittgensteins
fragmentary form. Wittgensteins variety of forms restated in clear and intelligible reasoning the interpretation of his writings, that is the product from the
defective or incoherent untruth to illuminate the truth of logical analysis.
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Semiotica 2016; 208: 4977

Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

Abstract: Wittgenstein surprised with the rhetorical inversion of his style of

1 Persuasive and ornamental speech

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

The rhetorical sides of Wittgensteins philosophical works appear in the long

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variety of different re-versions, written by Wittgensteins hand; or else the

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

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which the excellence of composition in Chinese or in Urdu is judged (EP 2: 326,

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

Wittgenstein the dry-cleaning process of recovering the unusualities and

Wittgensteins flight of thought avoided the confusions of the earlier philosophy of

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distinguished between explicatory (or analytic) reasoning in deduction and

All the beans from this bag are white.

These beans are from this bag.

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

Inductive inference gives the course of experimental investigation (CP 5.168).

All the beans from this bag are white.

Abductive mannerisms are radically contrasted with the forward reasoning of

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intellectual) observation of the case. Induction moves from ideas to things,

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

3 Narrative style and genre

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syllabary in numbered and subnumbered materials, ordered together in a formal

Wittgensteins own medley of punctuation, the words in italics, or sentences

The alternation of the ego-directed phrasing of as I believe clearly formulates

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

The closure of the Tractatus seemed to metamorphose Ezekiels vision of

Philosophy can be compared to the biblical ladder of wisdom. In Jakobs

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allegorical sense of non-language is the abductive process structured by the

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

In fact, the good deal of Wittgensteins editorial revision concerned the

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Wittgensteins poetic style was based on words and punctuation, on clues of

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

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concrete material is not the formal or conventional color, but presents an

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

Its possible to write in a style that is unoriginal

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Three days afterwards, Wittgenstein continued:

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Wittgensteins persuasive rhetoric

Arrived at his hut in the Norwegian fjords, he continued that:

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