IN RE CUEVAS

285 SCRA 59 Legal Ethics Lawyers Oath

In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the San
Beda College of Law. Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with murder)
for the death of the neophyte. He pleaded guilty and was later convicted to the lesser
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas was granted
probation and he continued taking up law. In 1995, he was discharged from probation.
In 1996, the Supreme Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on the condition that in
case he will pass, his oath taking will have to be approved by the Supreme Court first.
Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar exams and in 1997, he filed a petition before the
Supreme Court asking the latter to allow him to take the Lawyers Oath.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving
aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a
disgrace to the profession. Cuevas participation in the senseless killing of the neophyte
is highly reprehensible however, the Supreme Court is willing to give him a chance
considering that Cuevas has received various certifications regarding his good behavior
while on probation.
The Supreme Court also stressed that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited
for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select
witnesses. As a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected to abide by the oath strictly and to
conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

SEBASTIAN vs CALIS
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his
oath as lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), [1] in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was
referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required
for complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00).

On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester
Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences
with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the
processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer
with the Commission on Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant
issued Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five
Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After
receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental
to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be
asked during interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she
will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as
sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to
support her assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant
demanded the return of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there
was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite
sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee
which was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant
that it will be given to her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6,
1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name
of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel
who were also recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer
Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying
spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas
telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994,
complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and
respondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres
Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainants passport with a
promise that he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant

opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the
amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of
P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.

WHEREFORE,
it
is
respectfully
recommended
that ATTY.
DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the
fees paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court. [4]

On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to
respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his
wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out
that the respondent had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions
to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by
complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during
interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant
together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2]
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment
on the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the
scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by the
respondent.[3] As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the
respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against him
proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on
the case, finding that:
It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing
a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or
employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal
recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant
under an assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on
the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent
of the fees paid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a
forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case
was elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for review. The Board in a
Resolution[5] dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with amendment
the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, with an amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis
be DISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation
contained in its Resolution dated December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find
the resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the
finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not established
because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she did
not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The
only service of the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a
visa for the United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could
give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward
would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund
her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material
gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A
lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.[6] The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person
of good moral character.[7] This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the

practice of law.[8] We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt
as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. [9]

1.
2.
3.

It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty
of complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have
victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign
lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally
disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false
assurances. Not only are respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the
moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the
Bar and the administration of justice.

4.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. [10] We must stress that membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only
during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. [11]
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the
orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are
contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in
removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical,
unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00
she paid the respondent is in order.[12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to
return the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding
on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal records of
respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the
amount he collected from her.
SO ORDERED.
CAYETANO VS MONSOD
Legal Ethics Practice of Law
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does
not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the
chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least
ten years.

5.

Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held
various positions in various foreign corporations.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What
constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in
trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some
legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

IN RE DAVID
Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a
lawyer for a period of five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this
suspension in `his written report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise
the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8,
1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer
but as an agent. (For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek,
subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion for execution. In another civil case of the
CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to
demolish homes.
In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the
suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified

Monsods track record as a lawyer:

Sy Even myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in
Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as
part of firm name under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature
of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office
of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be
appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the
constitutional restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits
directly.

existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and

procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court
but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,
the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order
or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA
14 SCRA 109 Legal Ethics Practice of Law Isolated Appearance

PLA vs AGRAVA
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.
FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice
as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner
contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is
in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent
cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual
practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination
can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time
he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos
in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule
to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna.
Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as
he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to
the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated
but rather hes doing it for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fules appearance for
his friend should be given credence.

ULEP VS LEGAL CLINIC INC

223 SCRA 378 42 SCAD 287 Legal Ethics Advertisement in the Legal Profession
Practice of Law

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford
the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The
Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further,
the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is
highly reprehensible.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement:

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal
Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal
Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists
are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence
in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that
besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The
Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such
is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice
is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it
offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction
however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the
bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

1.
2.
3.

Advertisement in a reputable law list

Use of ordinary simple professional card
Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
CUI vs CUI
CUIVSCUIFACTS:
Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doa Antonia Perales who died
intestate in1939. Jesus alleged that during the marriage of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents
acquired certain properties inthe City of Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the death of
their mother, the properties were placed under the administration of their dad.that while the latter was
84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured the transfer to themselves the
said lotswithout any pecuniary consideration; that in the deed of sale executed
on March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared as one of the vendees, but on learning of this
fact she subsequently renounced her rights under the sale and returned her portion
toDon Mariano Cui by executing a deed of resale in his favor on October 11, 1946; that defendants,
fraudulently and with thedesire of enriching themselves unjustly at the expense of their
father, Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs,secured a loan of P130,000
from the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained, defendants
constructedthereon an apartment building of strong materials consisting of 14 doors,
valued at approximately P130,000 and another building on the same parcels of land,
which buildings were leased to some Chinese commercial firms a monthly rental
of P7,600, which defendants have collected and will continue to collect to the prejudice of the
plaintiffs;Jesus alleged that the sale should be invalidated so far as the portion of the
property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was effected,
Antonio was then acting as the agent or administrator of the properties of DonMariano Cui.Jesus lays stress
on the power of attorney Exhibit L which was executed by Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March

2,1946, wherein the former has constituted the latter as his "true and lawful attorney" to
perform in his name and that of theintestate heirs of Doa Antonia Perales.
ISSUE
: WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.
HELD
: YES.While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or administrator is disqualified from purchasing
property in his handsfor sale or management, and, in this case, the property in question was sold to Antonio
Cui while he was already the agentor administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui, we
however believe that this question cannot now be raised or invoked.
The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but this prohibition has
already beenremoved.
Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent may now buy property
placed inhis hands for sale or administration, provided that the principal gives his consent
thereto. While the new Code came intoeffect only on August 30, 1950, however, since
this is a right that is declared for the first time, the same may be givenretroactive effect if no
vested or acquired right is impaired (Article 2253, new Civil Code). During the lifetime Don Mariano,and
particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein appellants could not claim any vested or acquired right in these
properties, for,as heirs, the most they had was a mere expentancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this
practical and liberal provision of our new Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity.

IN RE ALMACEN
31 SCRA 562 Legal Ethics A Lawyers Right to Criticize the Courts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in
said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing
party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said
motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate
of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when

members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client
was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court wanted
to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his
lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked
that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.
Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every
petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts
in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of
all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party
of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the
court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.

IN RE CUNANAN
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers

Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by
raising
it
to
75
percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue:

Whether

or

Not

RA

No.

972

is

constitutional

and

valid.

Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have
said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession
is
concededly
judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial
and
legislative
departments
of
the
government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions
for
the
license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
IN RE EDILLON
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions
of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of
IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws
are
void
and
of
no
legal
force
and
effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee
to
the
IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court
in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable
as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of
its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all
members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

IN RE VICENTE CHING
Legal Profession Admission to the Bar Citizenship Requirement
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio
City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that
he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Chings father
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married
before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one
parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified
public accountant a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a
councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a
Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of
majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case
21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar
in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the SolicitorGeneral recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of
Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court
cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had
lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted
that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be
extended any further). Chings special circumstances cant be considered. It is not
enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and
a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further,
Ching didnt give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship
(but I guess its simply because he never thought hes Chinese not until he applied to
take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.

2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a probation thereafter which

was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not
allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyers oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation was already
terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before
it was terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyers oath office and admit him to
the practice of law.

FACTS: Atty. Narags spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her
husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having
children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who
abused him and filed the complaint out of spite.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the
STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the
principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind
that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible
member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period
of time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The
petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyers oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and
thereafter to practice the legal profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred.

ROYONG VS OBLENA

HELD: Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute
the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public
knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when
a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may
withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics
for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must
be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from
adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by
creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards

FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of
the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an
investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between
complainant
and
respondent
seems
to
be
consensual
sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did
not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The
Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and
deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of
good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him
unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent
removal
of
the
respondent
as
lawyer
and
judge.

NARAG VS NARAG

IN RE ARGOSINO
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar
applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which
caused the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he
was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was sentenced with

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the
adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston

Oblena

was

disbarred.

RATIO:

The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for
one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even
though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on
his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify
positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is
required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held
by
the
public
in
the
place
where
he
is
known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied
for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact
that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render
him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

CANTIMBUHAN vs CRUZ
In the case ofCantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr.(126 SCRA 190) we decided a similar issue
andallowed the appearance of two senior law students as friends of the complainantpetitionerCantimbuhan to prosecute the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz,
Jr., of theMunicipal Court of Paraaque.Similarly, in the case ofLaput v. Bernabe(55
Phil. 621) a law student was allowed torepresent the accused in a case pending before
the City Court of Manila.Court procedures are often technical and may prove like shares
to the ignorant or the unwary.In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear
for party litigants in places where dulyauthorized members of the bar are not available.
(U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). Forrelatively simple litigation before municipal courts,
the Rules still allow a more educated orcapable person to appear in behalf of a litigant
who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protectionof the parties and in the interest of
justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trialcourts and higher courts is
more stringent.In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant
himself. In theverification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nues
to conduct thelitigation and to sign the complaint in Ms behalf, indicating his awareness
that Nues in not aregistered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the
pleading to be admittedrather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited:So it has
been held that, where a pleading isnotsigned by the attorney asrequired,but is
verifiedby the party, substantial rights have not been affectedand the defect may be
disregarded as against a motion to strike. (71 C.J.S.954- 955)Rules of pleading,
practise, and procedure must be liberally construed so asto protect the rights and
interests of the ties. As we stated inPaulino v. Courtof Appeals(80 SCRA 257):xxx xxx
xxx... pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in orderthat
litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims,Cases in Legal
EthicsBachelor of Laws 3A48 and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to
legal technicalities,may be avoided. ...The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the

relocation survey. We agree with the appelleethat the appellants are now estopped on
this issue because they themselves prayed in thestipulation of facts that the findings of
the geodetic engineer would be bases for the decisionof the court of first instance. We
see no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in thelower courts' findings that
the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of VictorianoBulacan.WHEREFORE,
the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer
may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

IN RE JOAQUIN
Facts:
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently
read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of
a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more
than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now,
from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various
courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts,
including
the
Supreme
Court.
Case

1:

Cases

involving

Traders

Royal

Bank

(TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders
Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00.
This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by
TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro BorromeoThakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo
obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as
security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo,
covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him
by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.
Case

2:

Cases

involving

United

Coconut

Planters

Bank

(UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure
repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter
commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was
afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for
P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo,
as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
Case

3:

Cases

involving

Security

Bank

and

Trust

Co.

(SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court
battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had

obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single
Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance
Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its
liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and
UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought
an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private
practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his
appearance because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends. Such act of Sison
in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed
to be used as an instrument of harassment against him.

Issue:

RAMOS vs MANALAC

Whether

the

respondent-accused

is

liable

for

constructive

contempt?

Held:
Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt
repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to
the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due
respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of
imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses
of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges
or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

NORIEGA VS SISON
125 SCRA 293 Legal Ethics Isolated Practice of Law
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as
a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage
in the private practice of law; yet Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity
under the name Manuel Sison in order for him to engage in private practice and
represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the
same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out
to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view
of close family friendship and for free; that he never represented himself deliberately
and intentionally as Atty. Manuel Sison in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages
of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison, and in
one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote his
name as Atty. Manuel Sison; that due to the inept and careless work of the clerical
staff of the JDRC, notices were sent to Atty. Manuel Sison,
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by
evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison.
There is no evidence that Sison has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral
conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the
court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners question the
validity of the CFI ruling that they will be held in contempt for refusing to vacate the
land. The said property, being collateral for a loan to a Mr. Rivera, was foreclosed due
to non-payment of loan amount and its interest within the prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera
later sold the property to Ms. Lopez, who later filed petition that she be placed in
possession of the land. The petitioners question the ruling of the court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The decision of the lower court (CFI) is valid;
(2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid; and,
(3) (Possible Legal Ethics Issue) the term appearance would include only presence
in courts.
HELD:
YES on first two issues. NO on the third issue. Petition was dismissed. Cost against
the petitioners.
RATIO:
Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be sustained for the
reason that it is in a nature of collateral attack to judgment which on its face is valid and
regular for a long time. It is a well known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid
and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought principally for the purpose
(Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717).
The second issue was also not taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of
possession in foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the
purview of Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is merely ministerial and
complementary duty of the court.
In the third issue, the word or term appearance includes not only arguing a case
before any such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as by simply filing
a formal motion, plea or answer.

10

IN RE INTEGRATION

Pedro

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest
recommendation on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commissions] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Honorable
(Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible
through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in
Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

SYLLABUS

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

1. EVIDENCE; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOCUMENT; POWERS AND DUTIES OF

NOTARIES PUBLIC, DISCUSSED. The rule is well established that before private
documents may be admitted in evidence their due execution and delivery must be
proved (section 321, Act No 190). Their due execution and delivery may be proved (a)
by any one who saw the document executed, (b) by evidence of the handwriting of the
maker, or (c) by a subscribing witness (section 324, act No. 190). There are certain
statutory exceptions to the foregoing rule (section 326, Act No. 190). A public document
duly acknowledged before a notary public, under his hand and seal with his certificate
thereto attached, is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution
and delivery until some question is raised as to the verity of said acknowledgment and
certificate. One of the very purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before
a notary public is to authorize such documents to be given in evidence without further
proof of their execution and delivery.

JOHNSON, J. :

RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
x x x the admission to the practice of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16,
1973.
ANTILLON VS BARCELON

The present action relates to the possession and ownership of a certain piece or parcel
of land which is particularly described in paragraph 2 of the complaint.
The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna on
the 28th day of August, 1913. The plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of said parcel
of land; that the defendant was illegally interfering with his possession of the same; that
prior to the commencement of the present action the defendant had presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration (Cause No. 8350) for the registration of said
parcel of land in his name as administrator of the estate of Antonio Bueno, deceased;
that the present plaintiff opposed the registration of said parcel of land, alleging that he
was the owner of the same; that said cause was brought on for hearing in the Court of
land Registration and was finally decided; that the Court of Land Registration, after
hearing the evidence, reached the conclusion that the petitioner (the defendant herein)
was not entitled to have said parcel of land registered; that said parcel of land belonged
to the oppositor (the petitioner herein); that notwithstanding said decision of the Court
of Land Registration the defendant herein continued molesting the plaintiff and
interfering
with
his
possession
of
said
parcel
of
land.
The

JOSE ANTILLON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONCIO BARCELON, administrator of

the
estate
of
Antonio
Bueno,
deceased, Defendant-Appellant.
Courtney

for Appellee.

DECISION

HELD:
YES. On all issues.

J.

Guevara

Hixson

for Appellant.

defendant

answered

said

petition

by

general

denial.

Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable Pedro
Concepcion, judge, reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of said
parcel of land; that he had purchased the same from Albino Villegas (Exhibit F); that
Albino Villegas had acquired the title to said land by purchase from Petra Dionido

11

(Exhibit E), and rendered a judgment in favor aisle the plaintiff and against the
defendant in accordance with that conclusion, together with a judgment for damages in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P54, and costs.
From that decision the defendant appealed to this court and made several assignments
of
error.
In his first assignment of error he alleges that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibits
E and F of the plaintiff. In support of said assignment of error the appellant alleges that
said documents had not been properly identified and that their due execution and
delivery
had
not
been
proved.
An examination of the evidence with reference to said Exhibits E and F shows that, at
the time said exhibits were affray as proof, the defendant objected to their admissibility
upon the ground that they were impertinent immaterial and irrelevant; that the two
exhibits were no more than ordinary papers. In reply to that objection the attorney for
the plaintiff pointed out that said exhibits were public documents duly acknowledged
before a notary public. The attorney for the defendant then made a further objection
that they had not been properly identified. The court admitted said documents, and the
attorney
for
the
defendant
duly
excepted.
Said objection and exception present the questions: How may a document duly
acknowledged under the hand and seal of a notary public be proved? Must the parties
to said document be called as witnesses to prove its genuiness and authenticity? Must
the witnesses to said document be called to show its execution and delivery? Must the
notary public be summoned as a witness to prove the due acknowledgment of such
document? Does not the certificate duly made under the hand and seal of the notary
public make such document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
execution and delivery? Is not a document acknowledged before a notary public under
his hand and seal admissible in evidence as proof of its execution and delivery without
additional proof of its identity and authenticity? Must the execution and delivery of
documents acknowledged before a notary public under his hand and seal be proved
the same as ordinary documents not so executed and delivered? If so, then, what is
the advantage of having the execution and delivery of documents acknowledged before
a
notary
public
under
his
hand
and
seal?
No question was presented during the trial of the cause as to the verity of the
acknowledgment under the hand and seal of the notary public to said Exhibits E and
F.
The rule is well established that before private documents may be admitted in evidence
as proof, their due execution and delivery must be proved. (Sec. 321, Act No. 190.)
Their due execution and delivery may be proved (a) by any one who saw the document
executed, or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or (c)
by a subscribing witness. (Sec. 324, Act No. 190.) There are certain statutory
exceptions to the foregoing rule in this jurisdiction. (Sec. 326, Act No. 190.)
To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents an
exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents executed

before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials. The courts
and legislatures have recognized the valid reason for such an exception. The litigation
is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in
which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. The
work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business
with official would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others,
a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private
documents.
(3
Wigmore
on
Evidence,
sec.
1631.)
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts
they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken
to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each
case
may
appear
to
require.
A notary public is sometimes spoken of as a public officer. (Ley del Notariado de 15 de
febrero de 1889; Ley del Notariado para las Islas Filipinas). He is an officer known to
the Law of Nations; hence his official acts receive credence, not only in his own country,
but in all others in which they are used as instruments of evidence. (Kirksey v. Bates,
7 Porter (Ala.) , 529; 31 Am. Dec., 722; Governor v. Gordon, 15 Ala., 72; Pierce v.
Indseth, 106 U. S., 546, 549; Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 5; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2
Peters
(U.
S.)
,
170.)
The functions of a notary public as a public or as a quasi-public officer has been
recognized by the common law, the civil law as well as by the law of nations. He is
recognized as a necessary official in nearly all the civilized countries. (Governor v.
Gordon, supra; Pierce v. Indseth, supra; Johns American Notaries, sec. 1.)
The notary public is recognized by the law merchant, and his official acts are received
as evidence, not only in his own, but in all countries. His duties are, often, of great
variety and importance, consisting for the most part, in protesting inland and foreign
bills of exchange, promissory notes, etc. Also the authentication of transfer to property,
administering the oath as to the correctness of accounts or statements of important
documents, which are often necessary for transmission to points where the parties
directly in interest are unable to appear in person. The taking of depositions for actions
pending in foreign or distant courts. The taking of the affidavits of mariners and masters
of ships, their protests, etc., requiring care and judgment. In all such cases the notarys
certificate or jurat, when accompanied with his official seal of office and proper
certificates of his official character if the act is to be used beyond his own county or
State, is received as prima facie evidence. (Johns American Notaries, sec. 1.)
All documents acknowledged by a notary public and certified to by him are considered
public documents in this jurisdiction. (Art. 1216, Civil Code; Gochuico v. Ocampo, 7
Phil.
Rep.,
15.)

12

The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary

public certifies the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal
he thereby gives such a document the force of evidence. (29 Cyc., 1076; Bradley v.
Northern
Bank,
60
Ala.,
252.)
Section 331 of Act No. 190 provides that, "every instrument conveying or affecting real
property situated in the Philippine Islands, acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law prevailing in the Philippine Islands, may, together with the certificate of
the acknowledgment or proof, be read in evidence in an action or proceeding without
further
proof."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Indeed, one of the very purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a
notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and
delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given in evidence without
further proof of their execution and delivery. (Johns American Notaries, section 168;
Bowman v. Wettig, 39 Ill., 416; Harrington v. Fish, 10 Mich., 415.)
Our conclusions is, therefore, with reference to the first assignment of error, that a
document duly acknowledged before a notary public under his hand and seal, with his
certificate thereto attached, is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution and delivery, unless and until some question is raised as to the verity of said
acknowledgment
and
certificate.
What has been said with reference to the first assignment of error, we believe, also
answers the contention of the appellant in his second assignment of error.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in admitting Exhibit G
(G-1). Said exhibit is the record of the Court of Land Registration in an action in which
the present defendant was the petitioner and the present plaintiff was the upsetter.
While the appellant does not say so, the inference is that his objection is based upon
the ground that said exhibit had not been identified by the custodian of said document.
By section 18 of Act No. 2347, the clerks of the courts of the respective provinces or
districts are ex officio deputies of the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
and, as such, may identify records made up in the Courts of First Instance relating to
the registration of land under the Torrens system. By virtue of said Act, the clerk of the
Court of First Instance, being ex officio deputy of the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, was fully authorized to identify said record, being the custodian
thereof.
With reference to the other assignments of error, we find nothing in the record which
would justify a modification of the decision of the lower court based thereon.
A careful examination of the record shows that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to
the peaceable and quiet possession of the land in question. Therefore, the judgment of
the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
ARRIETA VS LLOSA

FACTS: A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Llosa by Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly
notarizing a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were already dead prior to
its execution. In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale. But before affixing his notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the
signatures, verified the identities of the signatories, and determined the voluntariness
of its execution.
However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case
admitting to the fact the instant case is only a product of misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order. The
designated Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended the dismissal of the
instant case. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the above recommendation
and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason to continue
with the disbarment proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of
law.
HELD: YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six months from practice of law
with a warning that another infraction will be dealt with more severely. Citing Section 1
of Public Act No. 2103 also known as the Notarial law, the Supreme Court explained
the importance of adherence to said law as part of the responsibility of a duly deputized
authority to conduct such notarial process. Due diligence is to be observed, this being
part of a lawyers professional responsibility and procedural lapse is not an excuse to
cater to the convenience of clients. Any violation is tantamount to misconduct. Such
misconduct is a ground for disbarment as stated by the Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed the primary responsibility of
lawyers as stated in Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes. A lawyer must also refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity may be disbarred or
suspended.
NUNGA VS VIRAY
FACTS: Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious
misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the
time the said documents were executed. . After issues were joined, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines conducted an investigation. The report showed that respondent Viray
notarized a deed of absolute sale when he was not duly commissioned as notary public
as of that date. Respondent alleged that from 1965 to date he was always
commissioned as notary public. . According to respondent, there was no year in his
practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. He further explained

13

that in the alleged documents, he had PTR for that purpose and therefore, he would
not have obtained a commission without the PTR. The Undersigned noted after going
over the records of the case that although both parties were required to submit their
respective memorand[a], only complainant complied with the order.

to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts, and to his clients.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act is a valid ground for disbarment.

YUMOL vs FERRER

HELD: YES. Notarization is invested with public interest because it converts a private
document into a public one, making such documents admissible in evidence without
further proof of the authenticity thereof. Notarizing without commission is a violation of
the lawyers oath to obey the laws (the Notarial Law) and by making it appear that he
is so authorized is a deliberate falsehood which violates the lawyers oath and of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Facts: The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human Rights, files a disbarment case
against respondent, Attorney IV said commission on ground for grave misconduct. The
respondent was found to have issued 2 orders awarding custody of a child to a
complainant in the Commission, ordered a bank to reinstate the bank account of the
said complainant, engaging in private practice, notarizing public documents, and
attending court hearings while filling up his DTR at the Commission as present at the
same time. The case was referred to the IBP and the investigating commissioner
recommended suspension for 2 years which was modified by the IBP Board to 6
months.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by
the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is
hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and
his present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law
also for THREE (3) years.
FLORES VS CHUA
FLORES
306

VS.
SCRA

CHUA
465

FACTS:
The complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Chua, a practicing lawyer
and a notary public, for various offenses amounting to malpractice, gross misconduct,
violation of his lawyers oath, the CPR as well as the provisions of the laws of the
Philippines, to wit: (a) Fraud through falsification and forgery of public document; (b)
foisting falsehood and fabricated public document to molest and harass parties; and (c)
libel,
misrepresentation
and
unlawful
advertisement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charges against Atty. Chua sufficient to warrant disciplinary action
against
him.
HELD:
Yes. When a notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his
shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands
him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of legal profession. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor

ISSUE: WON respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following
alleged
acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government
employee;
2.
Falsifying
his
Daily
Time
Records;
3.
Issuing
unauthorized
orders;
and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for
engaging
in
private
practice.
RULING:
The
court
held
on
the
following:
1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private
practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to some conditions
with indispensable requirement to secure approval from the CHR. In the absence of
such approval, the respondent is not allowed in private practice and proved to have
falsified his attendance in the DTR while appearing in court at the same time without
approved
leave
of
absence.
2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR authorized his practice as
a
notary
public.
3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is merely to investigate all forms
of
human rights
violation.
They
cannot
try and
decide cases.
With the above constituting grounds for suspension of lawyers stated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the court ruled to modify the suspension of 1 year as
sufficient sanction.

HECK vs JUDGE SANTOS

Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Judge Anthony E. Santos, who retired on
May 22, 2002, for allegedly violating the Notarial Law before his appointment as judge,

14

on

April

11,

1989,

or

some

twenty

years

ago.

The complaint alleged that Santos subscribed and forwarded, on a nonregular basis, notarized documents since January 1980, when in fact, it was only until
January 9, 1984, that he became a duly commissioned notary public. The complaint
further alleged that Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the
expiration
of
his
commission
in
December
1989.

The City Fiscal of Toledo City filed this case for disbarment against Dominador E.
Flores, a member of the Philippine Bar, for unprofessional and unethical conduct, more
specifically, for notarizing certain documents during the years 1961 and 1962, after his
commission as notary public had expired.lawphil.net The complaint further alleges that
the respondent deliberately omitted to submit to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu certified copies of the entries in his notarial register as well as of the documents
acknowledged before him, as required by the Notarial Law, in order to conceal the fact
that he did not at the time have an appointment as notary public.

Issue:
Can a retired judge perform notarial duties without commission?
Held:
The retirement or resignation of a judge will not preclude the filing thereafter
of an administrative charge against him for which he shall still be held answerable if
found guilty. It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary and that an administrative complaint against a member of
the
BAR
does
not
prescribe.
The respondent did not object to the complaints evidence neither did he claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980-1983, nor deny the
accuracy of such. He merely answered that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial
Register.
Judge Santos is thus, found guilty of notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission and is ordered to pay the fine of P5, 000.00.
However, considering that the complaint against respondent was filed twentyfour (24) years after the commission of the act complained of and that there was no
private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected
by the documents so notarized, the action for disbarment will not prosper.
Respondent, as a retired judge, deserved to enjoy the full measure of his wellearned retirement benefits.

In his answer, the respondent admitted having notarized some documents in 1961 and
1962 but claimed that his commission, which expired on December 31, 1960, was
renewed in 1961, to expire on December 31, 1962.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General who, on November 11, 1965, submitted
the following findings and recommendation:
(1) That respondent's commission as notary public for the city and province of
Cebu expired on December 31, 1960;
(2) That respondent had not been commissioned as notary public for the city
and province of Cebu for the year 1961 and 1962;
(3) That notwithstanding his lack of commission as notary public for the years
1961 and 1962, respondent notarized several documents (Exhs. B, C, D, E,
F, G), which documents became the basis of the cancellation by the city tax
assessor of the tax declarations of the properties involved in said documents
in the names of the former owners and their transfer to the new owners;
(4) That respondent had not filed his monthly notarial reports and copies of
the documents he had notarized or the years 1961 and 1962 with the notarial
section of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, nor had he surrendered his
notarial register to said office for the year 1960, when his commission as
notary public expired.
xxx

IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT OF DOMINADOR FLORES

A.C. No. 546

December 18, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISBARMENT OF DOMINADOR E. FLORES, respondent,

vs.
CITY FISCAL LUIS R. LOZADA, complainant.
CASTRO, J.:

xxx

xxx

Respondent, in spite of the many postponements given to him and the

repeated warnings issued by the investigating fiscal that if he still failed to
appear at the hearing, the case would be considered submitted without his
evidence, failed to appear at the last date set for the reception of his evidence.
Even respondent's own counsel, who pleaded that a last chance be given his
client by postponing the hearing again for the last time to another date, and
that if his client would still fail to appear at the latter date, he would withdraw
as his counsel (p. 150, t.s.n.), did not appear anymore at the last hearing set,
obviously knowing that his own client would not appear, as he in fact failed to
appear thereat (pp. 153-155, id.).lawphil.netRespondent's complete lack of

15

interest and indifference in presenting him defense to the charges and

evidence against him in this case can only mean that he has no strong and
valid defense to present herein.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that sufficient grounds exist to proceed
against the respondent Dominador E. Flores in this administrative case on the
grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct in office as attorney, and violation
of the lawyer's oath, and for this reason, it is respectfully recommended that
after appropriate proceeding, said respondent be removed from the practice
of law.
On November 22, 1965 we required the respondent to answer the above-quoted report
of the Solicitor General. After several extensions of time granted to him, he finally filed
his answer on March 15, 1966, in which he stated, among other things, that "he admits
his negligence in not renewing his commission as notary public, and of notarizing
documents without previous authority", and prays this Court "to temper justice with
mercy, and to render such orders that will give herein poor respondent, who has no
derogatory record so far, another chance to make a living and prove his worth as a
good member of the bar". The ease was set for hearing on May 4, 1966. On this date
neither the Solicitor General nor the respondent appeared. Although the respondent
was thereafter given time within which to file a memorandum in lieu of oral argument,
the respondent never submitted any.
It is to state the obvious that the evidence conclusively establishes the misconduct
imputed to the respondent. The six documents referred to in the Solicitor General's
report are an extrajudicial partition of an estate, a deed of sale with a right of
repurchase, and four deeds of absolute sale all involving unregistered lands.itcalf The respondent presented these documents to the city assessor of Toledo, and it
was on the strength of the former's representation that he had authority to ratify the
instruments that the latter accepted the documents for registration and cancelled the
tax declarations in the name of the former owners of the properties involved. As the
Solicitor General aptly observes, without the criminal falsification of these documents
by the respondent, the city assessor would not have made the corresponding transfers
of the tax declarations of the properties, which transfers thus impaired the integrity of
the documents and caused disturbance of and prejudice to the property rights of the
parties thereto.1
Against the evidence presented by the complainant, the respondent did not even
attempt to present any. He did not even attend the investigation conducted by the
provincial fiscal of Cebu to whom the Solicitor General endorsed this case. Several
times the investigation was postponed to afford the respondent an opportunity to
appear and be heard in his defense, but not once did he show up. Nor did he manifested
desire to present evidence before this Court when required, pursuant to section 5 of
Rule 139, to file an answer to the formal complaint lodged by the Solicitor General.
Instead he now offers the unacceptable excuse that in the past the preparation of "his
petition for renewal of his commission" was attended to by a friend who, "for one reason
or another .....failed to comply with [the respondent's] last request."

The respondent's reprehensible conduct, constituting as it does not only malpractice

but also the commission, in six separate and distinct occasions, of the crime of
falsification of public document, justifies his disbarment. 2 His excuse, contained in his
answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, can hardly be reconciled with his first
answer in which he stoutly denied having no commission to act as a notary public for
the years 1961 and 1962, and even expressed mock surprise "why it had been reported
that he had none." This facile resort to contradictory denials cannot be regarded as
anything better than trifling with this Court, and makes the respondent undeserving of
the mercy which, he so fervently prays, justice should be tempered with.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Dominador E. Flores is disbarred from the practice of
law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further, ordered
to surrender his lawyer's certificate of title to the Clerk of Court within ten days from the
date this judgment becomes final.
ZORETA VS SIMPLICIANO
MELANIO L. ZORETA vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO [A.C. No.
6492.
November
18,
2004]
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for
allegedly notarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as
notary
public
had
expired.
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned
documents, he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the
Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his
commission as notary public without having renewed said commission amounting to
gross
misconduct
as
a
member
of
the
legal
profession.
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to
present any evidence. His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer,
which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia
A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again
unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainants evidence that he was
not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in
presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only mean he
has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is
not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
ISSUE:

What

is

the

significance

of

the

commission?

RULING:
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not
be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible,

16

constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of
public
documents.
For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and
disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment. In the case of Nunga v.
Viray, the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done
by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey
the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is
duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging
in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations
fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

The Solicitor General submitted his report and recommendation dated 28 March 1990.
The Solicitor General found that the first charge of malpractice against respondent
Baltazar had not been substantiated. The only evidence submitted by complainant was
his own testimony given at a hearing called by the Solicitor General
ATTY. MONTOYA:
How many square meters did you sell to Herminia Feliciano?
WITNESS [Marciano Joson]:
50 square meters.

JOSON VS BALTAZAR
MARCIANO
vs.
ATTY. GLORIA M. BALTAZAR, respondent.
Tereso Ma.
Montoya
and
Rolando
Alfredo V. Granados for respondent.

The Court required respondent Baltazar to file an answer and this she did. The
complaint and answer were then referred to the Office of the Solicitor General on 29
August 1963 for investigation, report and recommendation.

JOSON, complainant,

INVESTIGATOR:
Is that sale in writing?

F.

Montoya

for

complainant.

WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

FELICIANO, J.:

ATTY. MONTOYA:

In this administrative case for disbarment instituted by Marciano Joson, Atty. Gloria M.
Baltazar, now Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre, is charged with violation of the Revised Penal
Code and grave malpractice as a lawyer. In his complaint, Marciano Joson alleged that
on 10 July 1957, respondent Atty. Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre notarized a deed of sale
executed by complainant in favor of one Herminia Feliciano, but:

What did you find in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Malolos, Bulacan?

1. respondent had made it appear in the deed of sale that complainant-vendor

sold 150 square meters of his unregistered land in Pulilan, Bulacan, instead
of only 50 square meters which was the real agreement of the parties; and
2. at the time respondent Baltazar notarized the deed of sale, she was no
longer authorized to do so since her notarial commission had expired on 31
December 1956 and was renewed by her only on 17 September 1957.

WITNESS:
I saw that instead of the 50 square meters which was agreed upon by us, it
was 150 square meters.1
Such testimony, of course, is not competent, in view of the parole evidence rule, to vary
the terms of the written agreement of the parties with respect to the area of land sold
therein. By itself, complainant's testimony is insufficient to show the existence of a
mistake or imperfection in the writing or that the deed of sale failed to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. 2

17

Moreover, complainant admitted in his testimony that he had read the deed of sale and
had seen that the area of the land sold was set out as 150 square meters but had not
protested about it:
ATTY. GRANADOS:
Now, after the deed of sale Exhibit A was prepared, did you read it?
WITNESS [Marciano Joson]:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. GRANADOS:
And you found that it conformed to all that was agreed upon between you and
your vendee?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. GRANADOS:
Who else, if you know, read Exhibit A before it was executed by you?
WITNESS:
My wife.
ATTY. GRANADOS:
And she also expressed her conformity to all that was stated in Exhibit A?
ATTY. WITNESS:
Yes, sir.

It was also brought out that complainant had discussed with his vendee the possibility
of return of the land to complainant upon refund by the latter of the purchase price
thereof, thus indicating, as the Solicitor General pointed out, that complainant's claim
about the deed of sale not reflecting the true intent of the parties in respect of the area
sold, was merely "a scheme designed to nullify the sale to enable the complainant to
eventually recover the property sold." 5
In respect of the second charge, respondent Baltazar did not deny that her commission
as notary public had expired by the time she notarized the deed of sale. Respondent in
her defense, however, maintained that she had applied for renewal of her commission
prior to its expiration in 1956; that the court employee in charge of renewing her
commission had prepared the necessary documentation with respondent signing the
oath of office and commission in advance and that she had left an amount of money to
cover the fees and services of that employee who was supposed to deliver to her the
renewed commission; that respondent forgot about the matter and in good faith
continued to act as notary public in the honest belief that her commission had been
renewed with the filing of the petition which she considered a routine formality; and that
when she learned in August 1956 that her petition for renewal had not been filed, she
applied anew for renewal of her commission and was in fact re-commissioned as notary
public on 7 September 1957.
It appears to the Court that the respondent considered the requirements for
appointment or renewed appointment of a notary public as a casual formality, since she
did not bother to ascertain whether her commission had in fact been renewed before
acting as such. By respondent's own testimony, she had become
aware before notarizing the deed of sale that her petition for renewal of her notarial
commission had not been filed. 6 The Court is, therefore, unable to accept her plea of
good faith simply on the basis of her claimed belief that her commission would, as a
matter of course, be approved upon the filing of her petition for renewal of her
commission.1wphi1
In In the Matter of the Disbarment of Dominador E. Flores: City Fiscal R. Lozada v.
Dominador E. Flores, 7respondent attorney notarized six (6) documents consisting of
an extrajudicial partition of an estate, a deed of sale with right of repurchase and four
(4) deeds of absolute sale, all involving unregistered land, at a time when his
commission as notary public had expired. The Court characterized his conduct as
"reprehensible", "constituting as it does not only malpractice but also the commission,
in six separate and distinct occasions, of the crime of falsification of public documents,
[which] justifies his disbarment 8 and disbarred him.

Complainant had, moreover, made admissions during the hearing before the Office of
the Solicitor General that he had signed the deed of sale voluntarily having seen "that
the document was prepared correctly ("Mahusay ang pagkakita ko sa paggawa ng
dokumento"). 4

Under the foregoing case, respondent Baltazar's conduct must be similarly

characterized as malpractice and falsification of a public document. Notarization of a
private document converts such document into a public one, 9and renders it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity. 10
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

18

Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a

substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are
not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the courts and administrative offices generally.11
Since only one instance of unauthorized notarization is here involved, rather than
repeated acts as in City Fiscal R. Lozada v. Dominador E. Flores, and considering the
circumstances of this case, the Court considers that suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months would be an adequate administrative penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Gloria M.
Baltazar-Aguirre from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing
from receipt of this Resolution. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to the courts
and the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent.
TAN TIONG BIO a.k.a. HENRY TAN,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6634

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus -

CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 23, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Tan Tiong Bio,
a.k.a. Henry Tan, against Atty. Renato L. Gonzales for allegedly notarizing a conveying
deed outside the territory covered by his notarial commission and without requiring the
personal presence before him of the signatories to the deed before notarizing the same,
in violation of the Notarial Law and the lawyers oath.
As records reveal, complainant purchased several parcels of land at the
Manila Southwoods Residential Estates (Southwoods, for short), a mix residentialcommercial complex situated in Carmona, Cavite owned/operated by Fil-Estate Golf
and Development, Inc. (FEGDI) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI has its
office at Renaissance Towers, Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. In one of the transactions
adverted to, complainant, as vendee, was made to sign and execute Deed of Sale No.
1108[2] (Deed 1108, hereinafter) covering a lot described in and covered by the vendors
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-427206. Following payment of the contract
price in full, including miscellaneous expenses, TCT No. 968702 in complainants name
was delivered to him with the corresponding completed deed of sale. Respondent
Renato L. Gonzales, employed as corporate counsel for FEPI and
appointed/reappointed from 1996 to 2001 as notary public for Quezon City [3], was the
notarizing officer of Deed 1108 on which the name and signature of Alice OdchigueBondoc (Bondoc) appear as the vendors authorized representative.
As complainant would allege in his Complaint Affidavit dated November 17,
2003, and its annexes, sometime in 1995, he made another Southwoods purchase
covering Lot 10, Block 27, Phase 3 (or Lot10). Several years following his payment of
the amount of P2,068,523, representing the full purchase price for Lot 10 and after he
had signed a deed with the space for the title number and technical description left in
blank, complainant repeatedly asked for but was not able to secure a certificate of title
for the same or a refund of his payment. The rebuff, according to complainant, impelled
him to file a case for estafawith the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
In connection with the estafa charge, so complainant claims, Ms.
Bondoc, signatory (for FEGDI as vendor) to Deed 1108, executed a counter-affidavit
therein stating that she had not personally met nor transacted with the complainant
either with respect to the negotiations for the sale of the land covered by TCT No. T427206 nor during the execution of Deed 1108. Complainant would add, however, that
Ms. Bondoc admitted that she and the complainant did sign the said deed of sale, but
at different times and in different places, and not in each others presence, [4] like other
signed hundreds of deeds (of sale) over other documents for our behalf of the President
[of Fil-Estate] with buyers [she] had never (even) met. [5]
It is on the basis of Ms. Bondocs foregoing statements that complainant
initiated the present disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
it being his posture that respondent Gonzales notarized Deed 1108 without requiring
him, or Ms. Bondoc, to appear and acknowledge before him the due and voluntary
execution thereof, a practice not only violative of the Notarial Law, but detrimental to
his interests and those similarly situated as well.

19

Respondent, in his Verified Answer,[6] was less than categorical on the matter
of whether or not complainant and Ms. Bondoc, vis--vis Deed 1108, indeed appeared
before him and attested to the contents and the truth of what are stated in the deed.
Instead, he alleged as follows:
10. Because of the hundreds of documents I have
notarized, I do not recall with absolute certainty the details of the
notarization ceremony of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question.
Nevertheless, what I do know is that I have personally met both
complainant and Atty. Bondoc and notarized documents which they
had acknowledged. Based on the admissions of both the
complainant and Atty. Bondoc that they have not personally met, it
appears that in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale in question, both
complainant and Atty. Bondoc appeared before me and signed, but
at different times.
11. As a matter of practice, I require the personal
appearance of all parties who seek to have deeds of sale notarized.
However, the parties need not necessarily sign and acknowledge
their acts in one anothers presence. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
13. Thus, complainant cannot dispute that both signatories
to the Deed of Absolute Sale personally appeared before me ., albeit
at different times. That is all that is required by law. The fact that the
signatories to the Deed signed and acknowledged the same on
different occasions is of no moment, and certainly does not constitute
misconduct on my part.
xxxxxxxxx
15. The only basis for the charge of professional
misconduct against me is that I allowed the signatories to
acknowledge their signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale at
different times. However, complainant fails to cite any law or rule
which obliges a notary public to require the parties to the instrument
to simultaneously appear before him, as in fact, there is none.
Thus, even if I did not require complainant and Atty. Bondoc to
personally appear before me at the same time, I cannot be faulted
for such, as I am not required to do so. [7]
The respondent parlays in his answer the idea of laches, arguing that the
transaction in question took place in 2001, while complainant initiated the disbarment
charge only in November 2003.
At the preliminary conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission), complainant and respondent entered into the following stipulation of
facts, to wit:

[T]he Deed of Absolute Sale No. 1108 was duly executed

by Mr. Henry Tan and Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc as authorized
signatory of the seller; that the subject document was notarized by
respondent as document no. 367, page no. 74, book no. 8, series of
2001 of his notarial register; that respondent admits that his notarial
appointment covers Quezon City and that the subject document was
notarized in Pasig City, specifically, at the Renaissance Tower; and
that the parties admit that Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc and Henry
Tan Tan were not present at the same time when the subject
document was notarized xxx (Underscoring added.)
After due hearings, Investigating Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila submitted
his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION dated August 27, 2004, which, as approved
by the IBP Director for Bar Discipline, was forwarded to the Court.
In the report, the Commission recommended that respondent be adjudged
liable and penalized for violating the rule proscribing one from acting as a notary outside
the area covered by his commission, but recommended the dismissal of the complaint
insofar as it charges the respondent for notarizing a document without the personal
appearance before him of the party-signatories thereto.
We agree.
As aptly found by the Investigating Commissioner, delving on the second part
of the recommendation, complainant failed to substantiate with competent proof his
allegations that respondent performed the notarial procedure on Deed 1108 without his
(complainant) being present to acknowledge the due execution thereof. Being a
notarized document, Deed 1108 and the solemnities attending its execution are
disputably presumed to be regular. [8] Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the
certification in Deed 1108 that the vendor and the vendee personally appeared before
the respondent to acknowledge the same must be upheld. As we said in Vda. De
Rosales v. Ramos,[9] when a notary certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
document under his hand and seal, the document thus notarized is converted into a
public document. To us and to the Investigating Commissioner, [10] the declaration of
Ms. Bondoc in her counter-affidavit before the prosecutors office is not the clear and
convincing evidence required to overturn the presumption of regularity. Ms. Bondocs
declaration that she had not met or dealt directly with Southwoods buyers does not
necessarily prove that such buyers and FEPIs representatives in the purchase did not
in fact appear before the notary public to acknowledge the fact of contract execution
before him. If at all, Ms. Bondocs declaration simply means that she has not personally
met the buyers, or, with like effect, that she, as representative of the seller, has not
appeared together with the buyers before the notarizing officer. As it were, the Notarial
Law is silent as to whether or not the parties to a conveying instrument must be present
before the notary public at the same time when they acknowledge its due execution.
There can be quibbling, however, that the respondent breached the injunction
against notarizing a document in a place outside ones commission. As reported by the
Investigating Commissioner, respondent acknowledged that from February 1,
1996 to September 30, 2001, within which period Deed 1108 was notarized, his notarial

20

commission then issued was for Quezon City.[11] Deed 1108 was, however,
notarized in Pasig City. To compound matters, he admitted having notarized hundreds
of documents in Pasig City, where he used to hold office, [12] during the period that his
notarial commission was only for and within Quezon City.
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondents act of
notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his
notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps not
on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the
Court said in Nunga v. Viray [13] is very much apropos:

seriously affects the standing and character of a respondent as an officer of the court
and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired. [18]

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member

of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission
is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and
purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. [14] Hence,
the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a
formality definitely more than casual.[15]

In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,[21] the Court meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from law practice on Atty. Simpliciano as well as his permanent
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for notarizing several
documents after his commission as notary public had already expired.

For all legal intents and purposes, respondent, by performing through the
years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized, has indulged in
deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent likewise
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer
to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
To be sure, respondent cannot plausibly seek refuge in the complainants
alleged delay in filing the instant complaint for disbarment. He cannot, as a means to
defeat the present charge, invoke the complainants ill-motive in filing said complaint.
We have, time and again, held that the Courts disciplinary authority cannot be defeated
or frustrated by a mere delay in filing the complaint, or by the complainants motivation
to do so. The practice of law is so delicately affected by public interest that it is both a
right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
public welfare.[16] Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not prescribe.[17]
Needless to stress, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his
capacity as member of the bar and as a notary public. His proven transgression does
not, however, merit disbarment, as urged by the complainant. This most severe form
of disciplinary sanction ought to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that

The IBP Report recommended the revocation of respondents commission as

a notary public (in any jurisdiction), if still existing, and that he henceforth be disqualified
from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. A one-month suspension
from the practice of law for violation of Canon 1[19] and Rule 1.01[20] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is also recommended for the respondent.

Considering the circumstances and the extent of respondents willful

malfeasance, and guided by Zoreta, a penalty higher than that recommended by the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline ought to be imposed.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Renato
L.
Gonzales is PERMANENTLY BARRED from being commissioned as Notary
Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land, through the
Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
let the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified of this Decision which is hereby ordered
duly recorded in the personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
BENILDA M. MADDELA v. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO
A.C. No. 6491, 31 January 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Davide, CJ,
J
.) A disbarment case was filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by h
ereincomplainant Benilda M. Maddela (Maddela) against Atty. Rosalie DallongGalicinao (Atty. Galicinao) foracts unbecoming a public servant and a lawyer, grave misconduct
and slander.Maddela averred that she loaned an amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) from Atty.Galicinao. In November 2001, since part of the loan remained
unpaid, Atty. Galicinao went to Maddela'soffice and took the latters cash gift check
amounting to Five Thousand Pesos (P
5,000) in her absence and without her knowledge. There, Atty. Galicinao 'uttered
unsavory and humiliating words' against her. Onother
occasions,
Atty. Galicinao
collected from Maddela an amount equivalent to one-half of the face valueof the checks
she received as benefit from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

21

P
a
g
e
| 27
Legal Ethics Case DigestJudge Philip Aguinaldo3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
On 10 December 2002, the respondent went again to the office of the complainant and
demandedone-half of the value of the check repres enting a cash gift of
Five Thousand Pesos (P
5,000). Maddelarefused, reasoning that it was a cash gift, not a JDF check and,
therefore, not covered by their agreement.Maddela's refusal to part with the amount
angered Atty. Galicinao, prompting the latter to raise her voice,utter 'unsavory remarks'
against Maddela, and banged her fist on top of the Maddela's table, causing theglass
top of the table to break.To further support her bid for the disbarment of Atty. Galiciano, Maddela, through
the affidavit of acertain Mr. Rilloraza, alleged that Atty. Galicinao is also guilty of notarizing
documents outside the area of her commission. Maddela claimed that although
Atty. Galicinao was not yet a lawyer, she was issued anotarial commission and even notarized
certain documents outside of her commission.Maddela likewise alleged that despite
the death of Atty. Galicinaos husband, Atty. Galicinaocontinued to receive and
encash for at least (3) three months checks corresponding to her husband's salariesas
Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Nueva Vizcaya. Maddela even pointed out that
Atty.Galicinao continued to claim the higher allowable deductions as a married individual
despite the death of her husband. Atty. Galiciano denied the allegations but with respect
to the documents that she notarized outsideof her notarial commission, she reasoned
that she did such for her relatives and she did not derive any income from the transactions
. In 2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her report andrecommendation. She
stated that Atty. Galicinao was able to prove that she was not the creditor of theMaddela
and that Atty. Galicinao did not claim her husband's salary and avail herself of the higher allowabletax
deductions even after his death. However, she will be suspend ed for six
(6) months for the acts of notarizing outside the area of her notarial commission
and obtaining the JDF checks of the complainantfrom the cash clerk in violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 27-2001.On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-227
in
CBDNo. 031060, annulling and setting aside Commissioner Maala's recomm endatio
n; dismissing theadministrative complaint against Atty. Galicinao with respect to the
charge of violating a Supreme CourtCircular for collecting a loan for which she acted
as a guarantor; and imposing upon the respondent thepenalty of reprimand for her act of
notarizing documents outside the area where she was commissioned as anotary public. The said ruling
was affirmed by the Supreme Court with a modification as to the penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Galicinao should be disciplined for having notarized
documents outside of hernotarial commission
HELD:Notari zation is
invested
with
s u b s t a n t i v e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s u c h t h a t o n l y t h o s e who
are qualified may act as notaries public.
We have declared on several occasions, that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are

qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.

The protection of that
interest necessarily requires that those not qualified orauthorized to act
must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrativeoffices in general. It must be underscored that the
notarization by a notary public converts a privatedocument into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the
authenticity thereof (
Nunga v. Viray
, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 [1999]).Thus, we are not satisfied with respondent's
explanation that she notarized documents outside of the area of her notarial commission as a
favor to her relatives and for free. Whether the respondent derivedprofit from her act of notarizing outside
the area of her authority is of no moment. The fact remains that shenotarized outside the area of her
commission. Considering, however, that her misconduct as a notary public was committed while
she was not yet a lawyer, she could not be disciplinarily dealt with as a lawyer.
Thepenalty that should be meted to her should, therefore, be as a notary public before
she was admitted to theBar. The penalty of fine would be a sufficient sanction.

PEOPLE VS TUANDA
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to
lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court
of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several

22

pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks.
These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made
no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted
of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further
suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense
involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her
suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of
the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she
intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty
of the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section,
and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects
of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of
the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from
this Court.
ARCIGA vs MANIWANG
In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then
a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In
1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters
parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arcigas parents believe that they were
already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until
Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in
preparation of securing a marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped
communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out
that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwangs wife and this
irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral
conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise
to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arcigas shady
past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with
Maniwang was born.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases
of Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs
refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment
(though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme
Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

TOLOSA vs CARGO
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant, vs.ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
Facts;
Complainant filed a disbarment case towards respondent claiming immorality. Alleging
further that Atty. Alfredo Cargo and his wife is having an affair and that his wife even
left their conjugal home to live and rent in a place paid by the respondent.

23

Several issues were also raised alleging immorality and altercations between the
complainant
and
the
respondent.

for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan from complainant's
son
Luis
Constantino,
Jr.
Facts:
Respondent borrowed P1,000.00 from complainant's son Luis, Jr. but failed to pay as
promised and he unjustifiably refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated
demands from the complainant and his wife after the son has left the country.

Issue;
WON Atty. Alfredo Cargo be disbarred.

As a result a complaint was filed against Saludares for unbecoming an officer of the
court and for violation of respondent's oath of office. Saludares in reply, reasoned out
that he was unable to pay because Luis, Jr. failed to appear at the appointed place of
the
payment
because
he
was
out
of
the
country.

Ruling;
The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the Solicitor General in not finding
the respondent guilty of immorality due to lack of sufficient evidence. However, the
court ruled further to WARN Atty. Alfredo Cargo and REPRIMAND him of conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court.
LIZASO vs AMANTE

Ruling:

SHIRLEY CUYUGAN LIZASO, complainant, vs.ATTY. SERGIO AMANTE, respondent

Facts;
Complainant entrusted Att. Sergio Amante of P 5,000 as investment of which a return
of 10% daily interest plus repayment of principal after two months were promised.
Respondent failed to do so after several attempts of the complainant to recover the
same.
The investigation of the office of the Solicitor General showed the respondent
submitting falsified documents claiming the complainant's loan of P 20,000 to him and
that the amount of P 5,000 now in contest was just a repayment thereof.
Issue;
WON Atty Sergio Amante be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court ruled to SUSPEND INDEFINITELY the respondent having been
found engaging in unlawful, dishonest and immoral conduct citing Rule 191 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
CONSTANTINO vs SALUDARES
LUIS
vs.
ATTY.

The complaint was forwarded to Sol. Gen for investigation who rendered a report that
Saludares be charged with violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of
the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from the
practice
of
law.

G.
PRUDENCIO

CONSTANTINO, complainant,
G.

SALUDARES, respondent.

The Court ordered the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. Saludares from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
Grounds

for

ruling:

It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him, he must meet the issues and overcome
the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity which is at all times expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA
439 [1967] ). The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish
respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures
of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics and that from the very beginning, respondent had no intention to
honor and/or pay his just debt which is a conduct of unbecoming, thereby degrading
not only his person but his profession as well. While it is true that there was no attorneyclient relationship between respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an
attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]
).
It is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his
just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. This
dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses
for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt.

Case filed by complainant Luis G. Constantino against Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares

24

CF SHARP vs TORRES
CF Sharp Crew Management, a corporation engaged in overseas maritime
employment filed a complaint against its Legal and Claims Manager, lawyer and
medical doctor Nicolas, who was tasked by the company to oversee the management
and administration of legal cases and medical-related claims filed by seafarers against
its various principals. According to the company, on various occasions, it issued checks
for P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00 and P296, 808.40 to settle
the claims of Bernardo, Rodelio, Joseph and Edmundo. Instead of giving the checks to
the seafarers, Nicolas deposited the same in an account at International Exchange
Bank. With respect to Rodelio, Nicolas only gave the amount of P216,936.00 and
P8,303.00 instead of P652,013.20, these through checks not issued by the company.
Due to failure of Nicolas to answer, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended
that he be suspended for one year. In his belated Verified Answer, Nicolas alleged that
his failure to answer on time was due to the fact he was arrested for non-bailable
charges filed by complainant against him, and the fact that complainant gave a wrong
address. He averred that the seafarers claims had long been settled; he could not have
encashed them as they were made payable to particular payees; when he resigned in
2008, CF sharp required him to sign promissory notes in order for him to reimburse
certain amount not yet accounted by him, in exchange for clearance documents. The
IBP Board recommended that he suspended from the practice of law for two years.
The Courts ruling:
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP
in its report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary
and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith[1]. The highly fiduciary
nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or from his client[2]. This is the standard laid down
by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyers failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics[3].
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had
duly proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed
respondents modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks
purportedly for the purpose of settling seafarers claims against the complainants
various principals, only to have such checks (except for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized bank account,
particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account

No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-settled that when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client[4]. This, respondent failed to do.
Clearly, respondents acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his clients interests
which he is duty-bound to protect[5]. They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law[6].
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the
penalty recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers misappropriated their clients money, the Court imposed upon them the
ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v.
Mijares III[7], the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his clients money
intended for securing a certificate of title on the latters behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v.
Reyes,[8] the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated the
insurance proceeds of her clients deceased husband.
As already discussed, respondents conduct of misappropriating complainants money
has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the
moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral
acts[9]. As a member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession[10]. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege,
and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of the Court to withdraw the same[11], as in this case. In view of the foregoing,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBPs recommendation regarding the return
of the settlement money respondent received from complainant, considering, among
others, that it was not specifically prayed for in the latters administrative complaint and
that the civil liability of respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing cases
involving the same parties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
COSMOS vs LOBU

25

Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century
Foundry Shop where he and his family resided in the premises. After several attempts
to settle a pending unfair labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all
his business, including equipment and rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his
compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000.

Rule that certiorari will not be granted where petitioners have plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law will not be enforced where it would result in further
delay in satisfaction of judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. It is about
time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-fromcommendable efforts to defeat labors just claim.

On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the
third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its
favor. Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personal
properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the
purpose of conducting the public auction sale.

A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth
and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For even such case, Atty Busmente
had not exculpated himself. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of
the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that should not act like an
errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If
he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good
standing in the bar.

Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of

jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb
23, 1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration.
Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated
July 17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same properties.
Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a
second motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower
court, decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has made out a case for certiorari and
prohibition.
(2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the
court while sustaining the dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu.
Held:
Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of Respondent CA reinstating appeal is
nullified and set aside.
The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent CA being perpetually restrained
from taking any further action in such appeal, except that of dismissing it.
Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was
resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor
controversy. There was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which
was dismissed by the CFI Manila. What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly
cannot plead ignorance , as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceedings
before this Court. He was a prinicipal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in
favor of the petitioner labor union.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter
"IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC),
the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter
presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

26

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before
the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by
some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the
proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo
Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The
Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar,
resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage
because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on
the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of
having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and
Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor
Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant
vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala
and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions
were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned
"talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers,
notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the
billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and
dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their
votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the
election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to
P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary
allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with
campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine
International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a
recess x x x."

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the
canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec,"
headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged
by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon
himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with
some embellishments.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and
extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for
president of the IBP.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15,
1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the
principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on
Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the
veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the
Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening
adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard,
Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated
Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989),
and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press,
July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8,
1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly
employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon,
Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."

II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and
commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that
there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of
Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional,
or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors
would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."

27

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in
connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House
of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and
transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive
campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable
sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L.
Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice.
The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in
coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved
to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities
enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections
of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice
Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio
A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to
conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's
Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas
issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three
five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three
protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters
and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine
National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the
charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB
planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates.
The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some
candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor
Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports
that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado
were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the
IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal
interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they,
invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly nonpolitical, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is
strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer
or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any
Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts
relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The
following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited,
whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the
Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any
form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other
than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one
page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such
statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof;

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and
assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and
personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has
Resolved to accept and adopt the same.

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates,

as well as the advertisement thereof;

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold

his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues
or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink,

28

entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar

consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an
expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of
any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14
prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of
the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a
candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to
the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the
following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president,
executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board
of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling
around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the
invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended
the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p.
123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter
presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n.,
July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter
officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally
hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to
fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP
President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989
after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86).
He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms
which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P.
Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C.
Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza,
Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius
Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin,
Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores,
Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose
S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo,
Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the
commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite
those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1
989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their votes
to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June
29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo)
show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment &
Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his
Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary
Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo
Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony
Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was
informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116118).

RAMON M. NISCE

29

Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket,
testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine
Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to
follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant
Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his
fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on
the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to
assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP
chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July
10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon
and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed
him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey
the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty.
Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to
the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to
hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which
included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at
the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group
had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989,
pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own
slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive
Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C.
Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la
Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel
(Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western
Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive
Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for
Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy
Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia),
Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys
Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B.
Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario
Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C.

Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite
and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention.
He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about
P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce,
however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured
him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeantat-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that
he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he
Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket
to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty.
Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato
Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday
Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff
(mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself,
the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000
for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day
with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez,
Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto
Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico
J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon
Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla,
Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza,
Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis
Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio

30

Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita
Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge
Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52
(not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The
group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for
the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel
where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which
were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions
manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in
the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr.
Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested
that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who
would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and
beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per
Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty.
Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza.
He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following
persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money
every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their
partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates
at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she
occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the
convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty.
Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at
the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo
A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo,
Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon
Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag,
Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array
Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo
Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero,
Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano
Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner,
gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of
his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during
the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are
fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity).
He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her
slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own
firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation
through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting
the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was
already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P.
College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

31

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the
Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a
downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and
P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department
manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified
that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58;
Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who
committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John
E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio
Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal,
Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R.
Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun,
A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg,
Onofre Tejada.

(candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center'
or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the
convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys.
Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their
moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying
the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way
of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another,
because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made
(t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May
during any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of
last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size
sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government'
(Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from
his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon
group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so
because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the
significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of
Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in
the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle
which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor
Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured
the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early as
the later part of May.

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be
distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists
of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were
printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those
authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the
convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials
distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The election was
more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill
of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls
(amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a
candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that
campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He
saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989,
pp. 142-145).

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon,
Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a
candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

32

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to
withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vicechairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and
president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May
1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green
Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers
of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty.
Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be
available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter
presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region
(t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier
committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This
statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the
alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was
Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be
nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate
for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court
Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a
candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that
labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He
mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June
29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western
Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates
flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila
Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered
to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid
seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had
been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the
three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday
Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because
a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to
campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied
by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete
City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at

the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because
he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman,
Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy
that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for
Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of
campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter
president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar
association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol
provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp.
9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include
the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd
election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed
that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53
for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left
an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates
for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory
to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a
travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of
the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon,
Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The
Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island
hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member

33

House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the
formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions
aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates;
the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her
ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the
Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates
which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the
employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of
assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of
labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza
Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and
some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of
some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for
some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may
be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among
the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that
office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended
it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the nonpolitical character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded
elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature
of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the
Court hereby ORDERS:

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the ByLaws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers,
as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the
duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
observance.

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers
bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor
of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected
by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions)
from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should
be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this
Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and
outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of
the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding
committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee
has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to
have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information
from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution
(See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7)
members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates
(approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the
following national officers:

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of
the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall
then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of
Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions
shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

34

Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the

Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to
be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective
regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board
of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be
the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of
Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the House of
Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby
repealed

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they
are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en
banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions
within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case.
Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central
Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and
executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of
the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this
Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified
in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that
election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court
to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here
made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other
measures as are warranted in the premises.

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

SO ORDERED.
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of
nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section
3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1)
Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House
of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should
be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one
(1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the
region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part
of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year.

COBB PEREZ vs LANTIN

A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure
to pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor.
The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k.
This was opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more
than the amount of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he
amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the
sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock approximately worth
P17k.
Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to
enjoin the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC
ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous
petitions for injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court
ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their
counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they
claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If
there was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . .
. a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers

35

insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the
duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries
of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

CASTANEDA V AGO
CASTRO; July 30, 1975(glaisa po)
NATURE
- P e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w o f t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f Appe
als
FACTS
- 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit againstAgo in the CFI of Manila to
recover certain machineries.-1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson- 1961
SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writof execution; Agos motion denied,
levy was made on Agoshouse and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved tostop
the
auction;
CA
dismissed
the
petition;
SC
ffirm eddismissal- A g o t h r i c e a t t e m p t e d t o o b t a i n w r i t o f p r e l i m i n a r
y injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ ofexecution; his motions
were denied- 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda andHenson; Ago failed
to redeem- 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issuedwrit of
possession to the properties- 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment
renderedagainst him in the replevin suit saying it was his personalobligation
and that his wife share in their conjugal housecould not legally be reached by
the levy m ade; CFI of QCissued writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Castanedathe Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering thefinal deed of sale;
the battle on the matter of lifting andrestoring the restraining order continued- 1966
Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionto enjoin sheriff from enforcing
writ of possession; SCdismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA
whichalso dismissed thepetition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition- Agos filed
another petition for certiorari and prohibitionw i t h t h e C A w h i c h g a v e d u e
c o u r s e t o t h e p e t i t i o n a n d granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
W O N t h e A g o s l a w y e r , e n c o u r a g e h i s c l i e n t s t o a v o i d controversy
HELD
- N o . D e s p i t e t h e p e n d e n c y i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o f t h e compl
aint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justicedem ands that the petitioners,
long denied the fruits oftheir victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them,
for,the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison,have misused legal
rem edies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to theextended prejudice of the petitioners.- Forgetting his sacred m ission as
a sworn public servantand his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty.L u i s o n h a s a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e c o m e a n i n s t i g a t o r o f c o n t
r o v e r s y a n d a p r e d a t o r o f c o n f l i c t i n s t e a d o f a m ediator
for concord and a conciliator for compromise, avirtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation insteado f a t r u e e x p o n e n t o f t h e p r i m a c y o f t r u t h

a n d m o r a l justice.- A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor

andhonesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to becommended; what the
SC does not and cannot countenanceis a lawyers insistence d espite the patent
futility of hisclients position.It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client
on them erit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause
asdefens el ess,
then
he is
his
duty
to advice
the
latter
toa c q u i e s c e a n d s u b m i t r a t h e r t h a n t r a v e r s e
t h e i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e . A l a w y e r m u s t r e s i s t t h e w h i m s a n d caprice
s of his client, and temper his clients propensity tolitigate.
DE YSASI VS NLRC
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi
owns a hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the
farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III underwent surgery and so he
missed work. He was confined and while hes nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for
illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked
that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,
with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed
to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between
their clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This
case may have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the
lawyers to have both parties find an off court settlement but records show that no such
effort was made. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called
upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He
should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that (a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement. Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of
a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. If he ever did so, or at least entertained the
thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.

36

1.
2.
3.
4.

People of the Philippines v. Toledo and Holgado (digest)

Facts: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation
of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the
morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed,
and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno
Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously
wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando
Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn authenticated
statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and
Filomeno Morales fought and that there was nobody else around. About one month
later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. The disputable
point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a
mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution was presented the witness
Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and
participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the
witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo
was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that
his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in
helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of
Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the
affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal
president of Pinamalayan.
Issue: 1. Is the exhibit (exhibit 1) considered hearsay? Is it admissible as
evidence?
2. Should the accused be acquitted?
Ruling: 1. Yes. The affidavit is considered hearsay because the one who made it was
not presented in court under oath to testify on his written statement. This is the general
rule. But regarding the supporting question, the answer is also yes. The exhibit is
admissible as evidence the reason being that it is one of the accepted exceptions of
the hearsay rule. This is called the Declaration Against interest or in the book of Agpalo,
the dead mans statute. Sec. 38 of the Rules of Court exemplifies this rule.
Sec.38 Declaration against interest.- The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted
in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in
interest and against third persons.
In order for a statement to be admissible (in this case made as an exhibit) it
must comply the following requisites:
That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
That at the time he maid said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
In the case it bar, it is clear as day that the declarant made the statement before the
municipal president before he died and that it was clearly against his interest because
it had the effect of exonerating Eugenio Toledo from liability. Declarant was also aware
of this fact and knows this to be true because otherwise, he wouldnt have made such
a statement. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath.

They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado
declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a
rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando
Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied
me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the
municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence
of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the
other proven facts.
2. Yes. The accused should be acquitted. Any man outside of a court and unhampered
by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative
authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there
was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man
should not be permitted to go to prison. He should be acquitted because of reasonable
doubt.
IN RE TAGORDA
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election,
he campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can
do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help
clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the
latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still
practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing
to receive works regarding preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is
willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of
the lawyers position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.

37

Tagordas liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced

lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being
disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.

BR SEBASTIAN vs CA
FACTS:
[P]etitioner, thru its then counsel of record, Baizas, Alberto and Associates, received
notice to file Appellants Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. Counsel for petitioner
failed to file the Brief thus respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel
to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellants
Brief within the reglementary period. As the latter failed to comply with the above
Resolution, respondent Court issued another Resolution this time dismissing
petitioners appeal.
[P]etitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the
death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose
Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established her
own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in
the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the
Appellants Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also
left the firm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of a partner extinguish the lawyer-client relationship with the
law firm.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed.
RATIO:
Petitioners counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not
merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyerclient relationship between said firm and petitioner. With Baizas death, the
responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained
until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules
of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner
before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of
no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice
to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it
could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that
the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from
counsel regarding its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner
corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of
the latter must have been known to the former. This fact should have made petitioner
more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and
diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process
cannot elicit either approval or sympathy.
DAKANAY vs BAKER
Legal Ethics Use of Foreign Law Firm Name
In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman,
represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to
Torres client. The letterhead contained the name Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay denied
Clurmans liability and at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead
Baker & McKenzie, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was
received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using
Baker & McKenzie.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their
law firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in
30 cities all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a
representation that they can render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.
HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law
firm are enjoined from using Baker & McKenzie in their practice of law.

DE ROY vs CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts,
the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17,
1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September
9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied
by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution

38

because the same was not filed within the grace period as enscribed in the present
jurisprudence .
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the denied the motion and let the petitioner be bound by the negligence of their
counsel
Held: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the
grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglamentary period.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.
ZUALO vs CFI of CEBU
Zualo vs. CFI of Cebu, CA-G.R. No. 27718-R, July 7, 1961
Attorneys should familiarize themselves with the rules and comply with their
requirements. They also are chargeable with notice of changes in the rules which
have been held as including not only express reglementary provisions but also a
regular practice under the Rules of Court.
COLLANTES vs RENOMERON
Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by
Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against
Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latters irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed
of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the
registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which
was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila
plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents
Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.

Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself

elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator

Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration AdministrationNLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the
documents. Despite the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the
registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for
his malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of official tasks.

Held: (1) Yes, a lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule
1.03).
THE
UNITED
STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO BARREDO, PEDRO UREA and ALBINO SARMIENTO, defendantsappellants.
Silvestre
Apacible
and
Pedro
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

Guevara

for

appellants.

CARSON, J.:
The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of the crime of attempted
rape, and each of them was sentenced to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
A large number of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense were called at
the trial, and the record contains some two hundred and fifty pages of typewritten
testimony and documentary evidence. In its last analysis, final judgment as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused necessarily turns upon the degree of credit which should
be accorded the respective witnesses called for the prosecution and the defense; and
a careful examination of the record discloses nothing which would justify us in

39

disturbing the findings in this regard of the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses
testify and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the substantial truth of the
account of the commission of the crime of attempted rape which was given on the
witness-stand by the principal witnesses called for the prosecution.
In his opinion the trial judge sets forth at some length the material evidence adduced
at the trial, and a restatement and review of the evidence at this time would serve no
useful purpose.
Suffice it to say that so strongly were we impressed by the forceful oral argument of
counsel for the appellants with the possibility of a grave miscarriage of justice in the
court below, as a result of the machinations of the personal and political enemies of
one or all of the defendants, that we carefully and exhaustively abstracted and analyzed
for ourselves the great mass of evidence brought here on this appeal, without
discovering anything which, in our opinion, would justify us in holding that the trial judge
erred in arriving at his conclusions as to their guilt.
It remains only to consider the contentions of counsel for the appellants touching the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court below to entertain and adjudicate this action. It
is urged that the court was without jurisdiction in the premises because the information
charging the commission of the crime was filed, and the trial conducted by a special
fiscal, improvidently appointed by the trial judge without authority of law.
Section 1 of Act No. 1699 reads in part as follows: "Whenever the provincial fiscal is
absent from the province, or fails or refuses to discharge thus duty by reason of illness
or other cause, or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is
disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal, the judge of the Court of First Instance for
the province is authorized and required to appoint a temporary fiscal, who shall be paid
out of the provincial treasury the same compensation per day as that provided by law
for the regular provincial fiscal for the days actually employed. The fiscal thus
temporarily appointed shall discharge all the duties of the provincial fiscal as provided
by law which the regular provincial fiscal fails or is unable to perform."1awphil.net
Construing and applying this statute we said in the case of Nuez vs. Low (19 Phil.
Rep., 244): "If the provincial fiscal fails or refuses to discharge his duty in the
prosecution of criminal cases, the judge of the Court of First Instance is not only
authorized but is required to appoint a temporary fiscal to represent the Government in
such cases. The attorney for the Moro Province and his assistant stand in the same
position as a provincial fiscal with reference to this matter. If the Court of First Instance
for the Moro Province did not have authority to appoint a temporary fiscal when the
exigencies of the service demanded it, it might occur that the whole court machinery,
with reference to criminal cases, would be impeded on account of the refusal on the
part of the attorney, or his assistant, to perform their duties. The presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance for the Moro Province has the power to cause the prosecution
of criminal cases to go forward, and if the officer designated by law to prosecute such
criminal cases fails or refuses to perform his duty, then the judge or court must relieve
such officer temporarily and appoint a qualified person to take his place."

From what was said in the case just cited, and indeed from the plain and explicit
provisions of the statute, we think there can be no doubt of the power of the judges of
Courts of First Instance to appoint special fiscals or prosecuting officers, when, in the
exercise of the sound judicial discretion conferred upon them, they find that "the
provincial fiscal is absent from the province, or fails or refuses to discharge his duty by
reason of illness or other cause, or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or
other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal."
The power to appoint special fiscals being thus expressly conferred upon judges of
Courts of First Instance, the mere fact that the judge acts unwisely or improvidently or
under a misapprehension of facts when he makes an appointment in no wise affects
the legality or the validity of the appointment, except, perhaps, in cases wherein it
appears that there has been a manifest abuse of judicial discretion in making the
appointment, the effect of which need not be and is not now considered.
There can be no question of abuse of judicial discretion in the appointment of the
special fiscal in the case at bar; and even if it were admitted that the trial judge acted
improvidently or unwisely or erroneously in making the appointment, the appointment
when made was a valid, legal appointment, and affords no ground for appellant's
contention as to a lack of jurisdiction in the court below to entertain and decide a
criminal action based on an information filed by a special fiscal legally appointed for
that purpose.
Moreover, we do not think that in the case at bar the special fiscal was erroneously or
improvidently appointed.
The appointment of the special fiscal was made in response to a petition filed by
counsel for the private prosecutrix on November 8, 1912, wherein he set forth that on
the 12th of June, 1912 the private prosecutrix filed a complaint against the defendants
in this action in the court of the justice of the peace of Nagcarlang, charging the
commission of the crime on the 9th of that month; that on the 29th of the same month
the accused waived a preliminary trial before the justice of the peace and prayed that
the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance; that the cause was remanded in
the early days of July, 1912; that about the 2nd of October, 1912 the provincial fiscal
conducted an investigation of the alleged crime at the urgent request of counsel for the
private prosecutrix; that thereafter the provincial fiscal promised to file a formal
information against the accused, but later declined to do so, promising, never-the-less
to ask the court to appoint a special fiscal, as he himself, was not disposed to press the
case; that the provincial fiscal had not done anything further at the date of the petition
(November 9 [8], 1912); and that a special fiscal should be appointed to prosecute the
case in view of the manifest indisposition on the part of the provincial fiscal to bring the
accused to trial.
This petition was endorsed over to the provincial fiscal by the presiding judge, and
returned with an extended statement, in which this official set out at length his reasons
for declining to file an information, and proceed with the trial. In substance he stated
that as a result of his investigations based upon the complaint of the private prosecutrix,

40

he was satisfied that the accused had not committed the crime with which they were
charged; that the evidence against them was unsatisfactory and unworthy of credence;
and that they were victims of a conspiracy of their personal and political enemies to
ruin them by compelling them to stand trial for a heinous offense which they had not
committed.
Thereafter the trial judge, upon full consideration of the statements of counsel for the
private prosecutrix, and of the provincial fiscal held that in the interests of justice it
would not be proper "to deny the petition of the injured woman" and appointed a special
fiscal under the provisions of Act No. 1699.
Holding as we do that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix is sufficient
to sustain a finding as to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, we need
hardly say that we think the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to prosecute
the case, in view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to file an information and bring the
accused to trial. We agree with the contentions of counsel that a conscientious
prosecuting official, whose investigations have satisfied him as to the innocence of
persons charged with the commission of crime, should not institute criminal
proceedings against such persons. But we are of the opinion that in the event that
criminal proceedings have been instituted, and the investigations of the provincial fiscal
have satisfied him that the accused person is innocent, or that evidence sufficient to
secure conviction will not be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due
diligence to that end, it then becomes his duty to advise the court wherein the
proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations, and to move the court to
dismiss the proceedings, leaving it to the court to take such action as may be proper in
the premises. In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power, without
the content of court, to dismiss or dicit nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted,
and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the courts,
that is to say in the presiding judge thereof.
Discretion in the matter of subjecting to trial persons remanded for trial in a Court of
First Instance by a justice of the peace lies with the judge of the court. It is for the justice
of the peace to determine whether the accused shall be remanded for trial. Act No. 194,
secs. 1 and 2, and Act No. 1627, sec. 13, and section 2 of Act No. 194, expressly
provide that in case the justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular
trial, such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge
or Court of First Instance" not that he shall await the action of the provincial fiscal.
When the justice of the peace remands an accused person for trial in the Court of First
Instance, the case becomes forthwith a criminal action pending in that court, and can
only be terminated therein by the court itself.
The duty imposed upon the provincial fiscal in such cases is either to go forward with
the prosecution or to move the court to dismiss the complaint, and in either event to
move with the promptitude necessary to secure the right of the accused to a speedy
trial. It is, in part, to aid him in determining the course to be adopted at this stage of the
proceedings that provision is made in section 2 of Act No. 302 for official investigations
by provincial fiscals. But it is to be observed that it is expressly provided that: "This
section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as justice of the

peace in any preliminary investigation, but only as authorizing him to secure the
attendance of witnesses before him in making necessary investigation for the purpose
of instituting or carrying on criminal prosecutions."
Upon a motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused
person has been remanded for trial by a justice of the peace, it rests in the sound
discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. Ordinarily, of course,
he will dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal
who has personally investigated the facts. But if he is not satisfied with the reason
assigned by the fiscal, or if it appears to him from the record of the proceedings in the
court of the justice of the peace, or as a result of information furnished by the private
prosecutor, or otherwise, that the case should not be dismissed, he may deny the
motion.
It is true, as counsel supported by authority contends, that the practice whereby the
prosecuting officer in some jurisdiction enters upon the records of a criminal case that
"He does not desire to prosecute further" dicit nolle prosequi is a very ancient
one. Under the English rule the uncontrolled right to enter a "nolle prosequi" was the
prerogative of the Attorney-General. The right of the Attorney- General to dismiss
without consent of court was there maintained under the theory that that officer was the
immediate representative of the King, and that the judges should not therefore
challenge the formal expression of his will in this regard.
Some American states have followed the English rule. Others have declined to adopt
it.itc-a1f The modern tendency would seem to be to modify and control the power of
prosecuting officers in this regard either by express legislative enactment or by the
judicial recognition of a custom, "amounting nearly to law" requiring the consent of the
court in all cases wherein it is exercised; and some of the courts which do not consider
themselves bound by common law precedents have declared the English practice
unsound and have held the better rule to be "to ask leave of the court giving some good
reason therefor."
The order is usually taken upon motion by the prosecuting officer and with
leave of the court. (10, Enc. of Plead. and Practice, 556.)
There are States in which a statute, directly or by construction, requires the
consent of the court; or in which a custom amounting nearly to law does; and
others wherein while the prosecuting officer acts practically on his own
responsibility, the court claims the right to control him if it chooses; and in
some it is not plain what the course is. (Bishop, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2,
sec. 1389, 2nd ed.)
In Virginiaa 1803, the General Court consisting of five judges unanimously
decided: "That the District Attorney has not in any case the right to enter
a nolle prosequi without leave of the court." (Anonymous, 1 Va., Cas. 139.)

41

At common law the attorney general alone possessed this power; and might,
under section precautions as he felt it his duty to adopt, discontinue a criminal
prosecution in that form at any time before verdict ... . It probably exists
unimpaired in the attorney general to this day, and it has been by several
statutes delegated to district attorneys, who now represent the attorney
general in nearly everything pertaining to indictments and other criminal
proceedings local to their respective countries.
The legislature finding the power in so many hands, and fearing its abuse ...
provided that it should not thereafter be lawful for any district attorney to enter
a nolle prosequi upon any indictment, or in any other way discontinue or
abandon the same without leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the
offense charged. (People vs. McLeod, 1 Hill., 377, and 25 Wendell, 483.)
Nor was the paper handed by the Solicitor-General to the clerk an entry
of nolle prosequi. Such a proceeding is to be coram judice. It must go on the
minutes of the court and must transpire, at least, with the cognizance of the
court. The minutes are the records of the acts of the court and no entry can
be made thereon except with his consent. This the Solicitor General did not
ask. The nolle prosequi was not, therefore, a complete act ... . Nor is it in our
judgment, within the power of the Solicitor General to nolle prosequi an
indictment at his option without the approbation of the court.
By the act of 1870 it is expressly provided to the contrary. But even before
that Act, although we are aware it has often been done, we know of no
authority for it: The State is the party and the Solicitor General only the
agent to carry on the proceeding. He has not and ought not to have unlimited
power of prosecution, and great evils may result and have resulted from
placing such a power in the hands of one man ... . (Statham vs. State, 41 Ga.,
507.)
The District-Attorney acts for the people in criminal cases except he must have
the consent of the court to enter a nolle prosequi. (Moulton vs. Beecher, 1
Abb., 193.)
In the case of King vs. Robertson (6 Hawaii, 718) the court said: "The proposition of
the counsel for the Attorney-General that at the common law the Attorney-General of
England and of States which have adopted this part of the common law has the right
upon his sole responsibility to enter a nolle prosequi, is not doubtful, and has not been
questioned by this court. But the common law is not in force in this Kingdom . . . .
The uniform practice of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts has been
that the Attorney-General by himself, or by his deputy, when desiring to nolle
prosequi a case after indictment found, asks leave of the court that it may be
so entered, giving the court or the presiding justice some satisfactory reason
therefor.

In the case of United States vs. Valencia (1 Phil. Rep., 642) this court said: "After the
complaint has been presented and certainly after trial has been commenced the Court
and not the fiscal has full control of it. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal
without the consent of the Court."
Section 62, of Act No. 136 prescribing the duties of the provincial fiscal provides that:
"He shall be an officer of the Court and subject to its directions in relation to official
matter pending in the Court of First Instance."
Section 2 of Act No. 194 provides that when a justice of the peace binds the accused
person over to a regular trial, such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to
await the action of the judge of Court of First Instance."
We conclude that in this jurisdiction, under the uniform practice since the
announcement of the rule in the case of United States vs. Valencia, (supra), in the first
volume of our reports, and as a logical and necessary consequence of the above cited
provisions of the statutes in this regard, provincial fiscals have not the power to dismiss
criminal actions pending in Courts of First Instance without leave of court; and that this
limitation upon their power extends to the dismissal of complaints upon which accused
persons have been committed or admitted to bail to await the action of the judge of the
Courts of First Instance.
The trial judge was manifestly of opinion that the long delay of the provincial fiscal
before taking action in the case at bar, and his attitude when called upon the explain
his failure to prosecute at the urgent instance of counsel for the private prosecutrix,
amounted to a substantial failure on his part to discharge his duty in the premises. In
this we are inclined to agree with the trial judge. Without reflecting upon the integrity of
the good faith of the provincial fiscal, we think that he undoubtedly misconceived his
duty, and that he failed to discharge it when he neglected and declined to proceed with
the prosecution. He evidently was of opinion that it rested wholly in his discretion
whether the case should or should not proceed to trial, and that he had the uncontrolled
power to decline to prosecute, with or without the consent of the trial judge. He
manifestly erred in his belief that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix
was insufficient to justify him in proceeding with the prosecution. Men's minds may well
differ as to the probative value of evidence submitted in support of an alleged fact, and
we do not pretend to say that he must have been convinced of the guilt of the accused,
beyond a reasonable doubt, as was the trial judge after hearing the evidence. But we
think that the evidence was undoubtedly sufficient to justify and require his proceeding
promptly with the trial, and submitting the evidence to the court for its final determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In failing so to do, he failed in the discharge of
his duty, and we think that under all the circumstances the trial judge properly appointed
a special fiscal to conduct the proceedings in his stead.
In conclusion we here insert a number of citations of authority touching the degree of
proof upon which an accused person may properly be required to stand trial for the
crime with which he is charged, partly in explanation and support of our ruling upon the
action of the court below in holding that the provincial fiscal had failed to discharge his

42

duty in the premises, and partly for the information of committing magistrates and
prosecuting officers generally.
Chief Justice Marshall, acting as committing magistrate, in holding that evidence
presented by the government, consisting principally of affidavits, was sufficient to justify
the commitments of Aaron Burr, prefaced his opinion as follows: "On an application of
this kind, I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict
the person to be committed, on a trial in chief; nor should I even require that which
should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused: but I ought to
require, and I should require, that probable cause be shown; and I understand probable
cause to be case made out by proof furnishing good reason to believe that the crime
alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it."
(U.S. vs.Burr., 25 Fed. Cas., 14692a.)
Again, in Ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch 75; 2 L. ed. 554), the Chief Justice said: "This
being a mere inquiry, which, without deciding upon guilt, precedes the institution of a
prosecution, the question to be determined is, whether the accused shall be discharged
or held to trial; and if the latter, in what place they are to be tried, and whether they shall
be confined or admitted to bail. "If," says a very learned and accurate commentator,
`upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that no such crime has been committed, or that
the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases only is
it lawful totally to discharge him. Otherwise he must either be committed to prison or
give bail.'" (loc. cit., 125.)
. . . Although in making a commitment the magistrate does not decide on the
guilt of the prisoner, yet he does decide on the probable cause and a long and
painful imprisonment may be the consequence of his decision. This probable
cause, therefore, ought to be proved by testimony in itself legal, and which,
though from the nature of the case it must be Ex parte, though in most other
respects, to be such as a court and jury might hear. (loc. cit, 130.)
In Rhea vs. State (61 Neb., 15,) it was said: "Evidence that would justify a committing
magistrate in finding that probable cause existed for the detention of a defendant need
not necessarily be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty when he is placed on trial."
In re Kelly (28 Nev., 491), it was said: "We are not called upon on this hearing to pass
upon the sufficiency of this evidence to warrant the conviction of the defendant, and
upon that question express no opinion. In this connection it is proper to observe that a
magistrate, in holding a defendant to answer for a crime, is not required to have
submitted evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the person charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. As was said in a recent decision (In re Mitchell [Cal. App.], 82 Pac.,
347): "In order to hold defendant and put him on his trial, the committing magistrate is
not required to find evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction. All that is required is that
there be a sufficient legal evidence to make it appear that "a public offense has been
committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof."

The rule in New York is thus stated in People vs. Shenk (142 N.Y.S., 1081), by the
Court of Special Session: "A committing magistrate is not required to exact the full
measure of proof necessary to secure a conviction, but is obliged to hold one accused
of crime for trial if there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty. But there must be
proof "that a crime has been committed and that there was sufficient cause to believe
the defendant guilty thereof." (Citing, Willet vs. Quinn," 135 N.Y.S., 477;
Perkins vs. Moss, 187 N.Y., 410; 11 L.R.A., N.S., 528; 10 Ann. Cas., 309;
Bungart vs. Wells, 68 N.Y.S., 59.)"
In State vs. McGinley (153 Wis., 5), it was said: "Upon just what ground the trial court
condemned the action of the examining magistrate does not clearly appear. If, in
deciding that the evidence was insufficient to make out aprima facie case, the judge
viewed such evidence from the standpoint of a trial court, grievous error was
committed. An examination to see whether an accused person shall be placed on trial
for an offense charged against him, is a mere inquest. The examining magistrate has
very broad latitude in the matter if the evidence, in any reasonable view of it, satisfies
him that a crime within the charge made has been committed and there is reasonable
cause to believe the accused is the guilty party he is warranted in holding him to bail.
If there is evidence sufficient to give the magistrate any room whatever for the exercise
of judgment, in other words, any jurisdiction to decide the questions of fact within the
broad field of probability, then his decision can not be reversed in the matter attempted
in this instance."
In United States vs. Steffens (27 Fed. Cas., 16384), it was said: "A committing
magistrate acts in a two fold capacity, as a court in deciding questions of law and of
evidence; as a jury in finding questions of fact. But the scope of investigation before the
magistrate falls far short of a trial of a prisoner before the court and a jury. It is not
required before the magistrate as it is before the jury, that all reasonable doubt of the
prisoner's guilt must be removed; it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to
establish probable cause that the prisoner committed the offense charged."
The following cases are also in accord on the point in question: United
States vs. Lumsden (26 Fed. Cas., 15641);In re Van Campen (28 Fed. Cas., 16835); In
re Squires (13 Idaho, 624); State vs. Layman (22 Idaho, 387); Lundstrum vs. State
(140 Wis., 141); Ex parte Patterson (50 Tex. Crim., 271); People vs. Van de Carr (84
N.Y.S., 461).
We find no error in the proceedings in the case at bar prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the defendants and appellants, and the judgment convicting and sentencing them in
the court below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellants. So ordered.
SUAREZ VS PLATON
69 Phil 556 Legal Ethics Duty of the Prosecutor
In May 1935, Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas.
Apparently he was very vocal and he was despising the abuses made by government

43

officers. Incidentally, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais was aboard the train. Orais arrested
Suarez and charged him with sedition. Orais however later moved for the dismissal of
the case upon the instruction of his superior. Thereafter, Suarez filed a case against
Orais for arbitrary detention. Provincial Fiscal Ramon Valdez moved for the dismissal
of the case due to insufficiency of evidence. Suarez asked Valdez to inhibit and later
asked for a special prosecutor to take his place as he alleged that Valdez does not
have the courage to prosecute the case. Valdez was then replaced by special
prosecutor Jacinto Yamzon who also found that there is insufficient evidence to
prosecute the case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano Platon on
the ground that there is insufficiency of evidence. Suarez appealed the dismissal of the
case but his appeal was denied on the ground that mandamus is the proper remedy.
Hence, Suarez filed this Mandamus case to compel Platon to reinstate the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.
HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case if
they find the evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall suffer.

TRIESTE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
145 SCRA 508 Legal Ethics Prosecutor Must Recommend Dismissal of Case If
There is No Ground To Sustain It
Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the Municipality
of Numancia purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of said corporation.
Trieste was then sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
particularly for willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary interest in a
business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or
took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any
interest.
Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the corporation when
he took his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to his sister; he presented evidence
to that effect. The Solicitor General doubted said sale because it was not registered in
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the advertisement of Trigen in the
local rotary club shows that Trieste is the president of the corporation.
In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-Gen gave credit to
the arguments presented by Trieste as it recommended the dismissal of the case on
the ground that Trieste did divest his interest from the corporation by virtue of his selling
his shares to his sister; that said sale cannot be doubted simply because it was not
reported to the SEC; that sales of stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation of the Solicitor General is correct.

HELD: Yes. The Solicitor General is well within his rights to make such
recommendation. A public prosecutor should not hesitate to recommend to the court
the accuseds acquittal if the evidence in his possession shows that the accused is
innocent. If on appeal by the accused from a conviction by the trial court he finds no
legal basis to sustain the conviction, he should not also hesitate to recommend that the
accused be acquitted.

LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA,
LEONILA FUERTES
and
EDGARDO
SERVANDO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto Princess City and ANNA
BELLE CARDENAS,respondents.
A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989
JUDGE
EMMANUEL
M.
ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto
Princess City, respondent.
A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989
JUDGE
EMMANUEL
M.
ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto
Princess City, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm. Matter No. R-705RTJ, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 52, Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo
Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
51, Puerto Princess City 2 with:
1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official hours
rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never
reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries
of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants,
thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of a big
amount of money;
2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic)
money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in
Branch 52, where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April
1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALESAUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;

44

3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as

part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is
the presiding judge.,
Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in
compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these
charges were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as
Adm. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of his accusers,
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged
his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the RTC, Branch 52,
Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for attempted
murder. Adm. Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5,1986
docketed as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria
based on the same alleged offense.
After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her,
the Court resolved to consolidate these related cases.
On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Matter
No. R-705-RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as
defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. It was averred
therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to
exclude her as a co-principal.
By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to Court of Appeals
Justice Oscar M. Herrera for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the
evidence presented by the parties, Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the
charges against them and thereby recommends:
1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave
credits;
2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer;
3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC2909. 4
We now consider these well-thought out recommendations.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R-705-RTJ:
a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and
Annabelle Cardenas. The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who
was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51, RTC, Palawan in August 1983
upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was a ghost
employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said
period, being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide.
Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya verified as true and
correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she
rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September
30, 1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984

and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30, 1984 and from April 23 to 27,
1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked.
Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were, according to complainants,
encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.
Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges,
countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31,
1984.
We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by
substantial evidence. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that
Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under
consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College, showing that Annabelle
Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from
2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M. 5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to
attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours, the school records reveal
that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units),
Ten Commandments (3 units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting
for Single Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be safely concluded
from the passing grades she received in said subjects. Equally damaging to
respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that
Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was
supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her name
was placed on the daily time record as team leader, although she did not actually
conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief.
It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration, the
court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify
her attendance at a court session. Moreover, she could not produce any single order,
transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case, civil or
criminal. All she presented were so-called practice notes.
Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting
her salary "without intervention from your respondent. 7 It was however proved that
Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions, as in fact,
said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his favor
authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate
them as well. 8 Be that as it may, we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to
overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle
Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon, Ilocos Sur for
delivery to her mother, who is a good friend of the Judge; and on the other hand to
support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself.
b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting, Demanding and
Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya. The act complained of was allegedly
committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to Branch 52, RTC Palawan
vice Judge Jose G. Genilo Jr., who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must
be recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 52.

45

It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for
murder, in consideration of the sum of P 2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes,
complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case.
Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she went to Branch 52 at about
5:00 P.M. on August 13, 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer
Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. Nelly Vicente referred
her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the officer-in-charge who then called Judge Abaya from
the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told
her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness." (Your case is
shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness.) She
retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none
because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed.
Nonetheless, the Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it
("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision
dito").lwph1.t When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted, he told her that
he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga
acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs.
Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the
aggrieved party, but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before
he leaves for Manila. Mrs. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her
brothers-in-law about the matter. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00
o'clock in the evening.
Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal, now
Judge Angel R. Miclat about the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her
acceding to the Judge's demand, she delivered the amount of Pl,200.00 to Judge
Abaya on August 15,1985 in his chambers, telling him that was all she could afford.
Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would just contact
her at the next trial for the final judgment. 9
Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs.
Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's
arrival on August 13, 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Fuertes having been closeted with
Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. She further testified that
Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Fuertes' conversation
remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng pera." (This is terrible, he is asking money.) She
added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he instructed her not to
tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had been there. 10
Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City
Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs.
Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking
P5,000.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied. While
he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya, he was informed later on that
Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked, but only about
P1,200.00. 11

Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. Fuertes'
diary, thus:
August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. He asked me for
my case was 50-50. 12
August 15, I went to town to see Baby Francisco, gave P2,000 and I brought the money
to Judge. 13
July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez.
Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the
previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his
request was granted. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the
residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang
affidavit ko through Atty. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care Nanette na idinay
ko. 13-A
Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. Fuertes.
He alleged that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was
denied, not because of any outside interference, but because the evidence of guilt was
strong. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty.
Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that
Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal
case against her son's alleged killers.
We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and
credence to Mrs. Fuertes' testimony:
We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute
such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a
disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected
killer of Mrs, Fuertes' son, she should, under normal circumstances be grateful to the
Judge. Yet she charged him with a serious offense, and travelled all the way from
Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Under the circumstances, We cannot
accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself just to
accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya. That would
be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men.
Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on
cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications. They find
support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. Teologo,
such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with
Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15, (should be 13) 1985; and
(2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs.
Fuertes, as then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation of Judge Abaya. It certainly cannot
be said that Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time regarding the
solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the suspected killers
of her son. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. 14
c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. It is alleged that Judge Abaya
exacted portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC

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as a condition for their continued employment. Edgardo Servando, one of the

complainants herein, and who was appointed stenographer on September 3, 1984
upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such recommendation was
made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial
salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which undertaking he complied
with. However, in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the
Christmas vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical allowance
and year-end bonus, he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash, the
payment of said benefits having been in checks. A week later, he received a notice of
termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31, 1984 from the
Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. 15
Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in
said Branch, Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which
exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her
charges against Judge Abaya. He further stated that when he refused to retract his
charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the
Judge's offer of money, the latter demoted him to process server. 16
Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness
due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's
proddings. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was
due to their inefficiency.
While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and
Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without
attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya, 17 he concluded that "the
evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample
corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. 18
We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true is so demeaning
to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In this regard,
we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.
In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave and serious
misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his
dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote justice by administering
it fairly and impartially. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge
Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. In complicity with Annabelle
Cardenas, he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people, shortchanging
them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice.
The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law. 19 For him then to transgress the highest
ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example
constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as
well as in the civil service system.

By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the
honor and requisites attached to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby
order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as
recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera.
We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct
as above-described the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with
prejudice to her re-appointment to the Judiciary.
II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909
The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A.M. No. R-698-P and for
disbarment in Adm. Case No. 2909 against Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk
of Court of Branch 52, RTC Palawan, stem from her act of having allegedly forged the
signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case
No. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz" for
attempted homicide.
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of
having promulgated it, but explains that these were done with the knowledge and
consent of Judge Abaya, who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch
52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge Abaya's
order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for
reconsideration of the order denying probation. This order, which carried certain
conditions, set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986 at 8:00
o'clock in the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested Atty. Austria to
prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the
Judge.
On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April
16, 1986. On the latter date, the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court,
hence the promulgation of the probation order was again reset to June 3, 1986, with
Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said
order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court.
On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be
promulgated the following day, April 22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same
pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up
to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. As requested, the promulgation was set on
April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign
the probation order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority
granted to her by Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the
probation order and promulgated it.
Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. 1881 of the Civil
Code) 20 in that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order,
she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. She
further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery, he
is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. Lastly,
she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the
Clerk of Court. 21

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Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. As thoroughly explained by

Justice Herrera:
.....her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with
the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting
as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the
probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to
sign the order, even if true, is not a valid justification for her to simulate the signature
of Judge Abaya in the probation order. This is patently illegal. As a lawyer and branch
clerk of court, she ought to know that under no circumstances is her act of signing the
name of the judge permissible. She could have probably released the order with the
statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she could
not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge
signed the order when in fact he did not. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence
of any express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. In the absence
of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications,
petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as
a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed so to do by the
judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and
receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons, or to guardianship, trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith
transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with his findings
in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the
same in his report.
Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of
them.
Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly
devoid of merit. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal
to the Judge because of, and by reason of his highest qualification, and can never be
the subject of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but also subversive of
public order and public policy. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge
be validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize
the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication
before him. The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial and is exclusively
vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. 22
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as
a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. 23 However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character
as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. 24
We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification
as a member of tile Bar, for precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality
of the act complained of.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, Annabelle

Cardenas and Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal
exaction against Judge Abaya, the Court hereby orders:
1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge
Emmanuel M. Abaya, except his earned leave credits; and the DISMISSAL from office
of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment
to the Judiciary; and,
2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909, the resignation of Atty. Ligaya
Gonzales-Austria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987
and any and all benefits accruing during her government service are declared forfeited,
except her earned leave credits. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period
of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate
criminal charges against respondents if warranted.
Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal
records.
ENRIQUEZ SR. VS HON. GIMENEZ
Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership and control
over all existing government-owned waterworks systems. However, Bauan Batangas
passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local waterworks to
the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.
Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be
brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act. Given
this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to commence an action
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.
The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorneys
fees, which the Auditor General disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan had no
authority to engage the services of a special counsel
Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a special
counsel
Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the
various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in
any court except when he is disqualified by law, which in this case he is not. A fiscal
cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special
attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to
appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to
handle and prosecute its case in court.

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The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor
without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the
petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.

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