ONG, John Patrick C.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
(177 SCRA 668)
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from presidency via the nonviolent people power revolution and forced into exile.
Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government.
Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of
television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of Marcos loyalists and the
unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation to
the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanatism and blind
loyalty of their followers in the country.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not
define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises
of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section

21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power
(Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace.
The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more
chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive
actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt
to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the
government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

FACTS:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed
by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties.
Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make
recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like
the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection
clause. The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure

that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x
x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the
PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings
would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but
will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of
graft laws.

TOPIC: POWER OF CONTROL

DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003

FACTS:

DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued
by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR
12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12, Israel Gaddi, issued a
Memorandum, (pursuant to DENR Admin Order 99-14) directing immediate transfer of
the DENR [Region] 12 offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato
Respondents filed with RTC a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
TC issued TRO enjoining petitioner from implementing assailed Memorandum
Petitioner filed MR with motion to dismiss raising the ff grounds:
1. Power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature
2. The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on EO 429, which
reorganized Region 12
3. The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the SC in the case of Chiongbian vs.
Orbos (1995)
4. Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is executive in nature
citing Chiongbian, the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Subsequently, TC rendered judgment ordering that the assailed Memorandum be

not enforced for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, TC ordered that the seat of the DENR Regional Offices be returned to
Cotabato City.
Petitioners MR was denied. Appeal before the CA was dismissed outright on
procedural grounds. Another MR was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region
12 Office.

RULING:

The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under
Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to
reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members
exercising control over a particular executive department. In the case at bar, the DENR
Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII
Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

G.R. No. L7708 May 30, 1955
Facts:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him
for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary
who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando
Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter
Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the
governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that
he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive
Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in
connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who
shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of
control over a mayor.

HELD:
No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary
who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local
governments over which he has been granted only the power of general
supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he
does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or
offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as
already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935
Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment
of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a
copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may
in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of
municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral
turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final
conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend
a mayor not because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power
granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.

Jose Villena vs Secretary of the Interior

G.R. No. L46570 April 21, 1939
FACTS:
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the
Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the
president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena
averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or
jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power
of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing
trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior
must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under
existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as
the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing

elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law
which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under
investigation.
HELD:
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a
mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides
that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by
final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude .
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is
necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a
similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of
the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater
power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised
conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law,
remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the
lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of
the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative
Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The
power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be
issued to give way for an impartial investigation.

TOPIC: Power of General Supervision

RODOLFO GANZON VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
Facts:

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against
him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is
because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given
to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.

JUDGE DADOLE VS COA

G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002
FACTS:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for
each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such
additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not
exceed P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities subject to the
following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs; b) That
all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A.
6758shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary
requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied
and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
functions/personnel in accordance with R.A.7160."
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowance to petitioners. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances
of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to
reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices
of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration
and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional
Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be
denied. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in
behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
COA. In a resolution dated May 28,1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy
of Mandaue City. They also maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and
therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Respondent COA, on
the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government
to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set
limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to
check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government
units.

ISSUE:
Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the
power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The
said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of
the President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will
see to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in
the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.

TOPIC: APPOINTING POWER

GPI VS SPRINGER
50 PHIL 259
Facts:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of
the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were
elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts.
Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of
section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that
"The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee

consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the
Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power
shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37
which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC.
The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the GovernorGeneral who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the
head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was
furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as
well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of
NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed
against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

Issue:
Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.

Rulings:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has
nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public
office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled
corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing
it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the
NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that
indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill
public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it
does not weaken the executive branch.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison

Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from disbursing

payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misons
appointment asCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional
by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain
theconstitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the
(CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four
groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.

(1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the
Constitution,

(2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law,

(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and

(4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.

The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd
and 4th groups are the present bone of contention.

Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by
the president with or without the consent/confirmationof the CA

Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give

effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people
adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicableconstitutional
provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may
want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

The 1935 Constitution requiresconfirmation by the CA of all presidential

appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices.
Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of
appointment with hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two
extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring
theconsent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the
President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers.
The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
exclude presidential appointments fromconfirmation on the CA except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art
VII.
Therefore,
theconfirmation on
the appointment
of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required.

The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is

within the constitutional authority of the President.

CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989
FACTS:
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista
as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory
made the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA)
requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the
COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito
Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not
require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA, Cory designated
Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered
Bautistas appointment as ad interim.

Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COAs actions. She impleaded
Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the
appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left
the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be
allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to COAs confirmation.
Held:

Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies,
commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the
Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision
Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to appoint, without
confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is
not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by
the President is to be made and finalized even without the review or participation of CoA.
Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act
on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance,
expressly stated in her oath.

Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus
cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure
of the President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.

To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office
of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such,
by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that
she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She
certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due
process properly safeguarded.

It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law, after petitioner
Bautista had elevated her case to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an
Acting Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights (pending decision in this case)
instead of appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter course would have added
only more legal difficulties to an already difficult situation.

Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the
benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing
or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.

Petition granted.

Rufino vs Endriga
G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006

FACTS:

On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order

No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a
Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President
Marcos issued PD 15, the CCPs charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a
non-municipal public corporation free from the pressure or influence of politics. PD 15
increased the members of CCPs Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino
asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed
new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the
CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A.
Cabili (Cabili), and Manuel T. Maosa (Maosa).

On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new

trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well
as two other incumbent trustees.
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and
assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this
Court questioning President Estradas appointment of seven new members to the CCP
Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the
CCP Board shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the
next regular meeting x x x. In case only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be
filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
[CCP]. The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant
may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP.
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition. The
Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP
trustees. On the other hand, the appellate courts Decision ousted the Rufino group from
the CCP Board.

In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could
only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the
trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority
to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank
and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect
their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of officers lower in
rank than the appointing power.

On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino groups motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga groups motion for
immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the
authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.

RULING:

NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended which authorizes
the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is
unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the Presidents power of control under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to
insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the

President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity,
virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally
exist under the 1987 Constitution.

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP shall enjoy autonomy of
policy and operation x x x. This provision does not free the CCP from the Presidents
control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP
Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but
ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the Presidents power of control.

The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the Presidents
control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the Presidents
influence. By stating that the President shall have control of all the executive x x x
offices, the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even
to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater
than, and subsumes, influence.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Jose Pao

G.R. No. L27811 November 17, 1967

Facts:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao.
The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone.
Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a
co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The
Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied
his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He
also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of
power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued
that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary.
HELD: The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go
over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a
decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to
appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive
departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in
person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary
at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are not required by the
Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that
the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which
assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority

of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any
order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of
Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain
valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no
reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Pao cannot be reversed.

TOPIC: LIMITATIONS OF APPOINTING POWER

AYTONA VS CASTILLO
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President
Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the
former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo
as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo
warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank
governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred
that the ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary
to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency
or administration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President
Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound
to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not
do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve
partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for

the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason,
be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make
the corresponding appointments.
Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to
continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is
competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president.
Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration
and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person
is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his
appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it
is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

JORGE V MAYOR
G.R. No. L-21776
February 28, 1964
FACTS:
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through
regular and successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad
interim Director of Lands in December 13, 1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd,
his appointment was transmitted to the CoA in 26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the
said ad interim appointment.
President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim
appointments extended and released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of
Congress that ended on December 13 1961.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration,
informed Jorge that pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge
that his appointment was among those revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and that his
position of Director of Lands was considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been
designated by the President to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for
mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed Director of Lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid
revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.

RULING:
No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no
evidence on record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress
that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of which this Court
may take judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the night of December 13,
1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to
the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the
close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The appointment,
therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No.
2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA
and thereafter, the office never became vacant.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or
seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias
V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting
that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution
which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the

JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules,
the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the
position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which
led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC
to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of
appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent
frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as
the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period
therein fixed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.

3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.

4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC.

HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by
the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the

operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case
or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short
list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact
that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the
preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as
may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the
nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it
already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the
process.

3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time
to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution
were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect
their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists
the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or
discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be
complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be
the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the
defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to
be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Case Digest - Guevara vs. Inocentes

G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966

FACTS:
The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as
Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath
of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum
Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made
by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress
at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended
an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January
23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to
be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor
under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution. which states that:

The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session
which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioners
ad interim appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed
when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1)
the specific provision in the Constitution which states that: until the next adjournment of

Congress means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special

session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and
the House of the Representative merely suspended its session and to be resumed on
January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has
been in continuous session without interruption since January 17.

ISSUE:
Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara is valid.

RULING:
Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointment
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress"
The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until disapproval of
the Commission on Appointments and (b) adjournment of Congress, whether special or
regular session. In this case, the second mode of termination took effect when the
Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966 which made the
appointment of petitioner Guevara ineffective. The contention that the Commission on
Appointments should be first organized before the second mode can be made effective
is untenable because they are two different and separate modes of termination.
Since the termination of ad interim appointment cannot be separated, the well-known
maxim in statutory construction applies. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. OnMarch

2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address
transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC
en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)of
the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service
laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo,Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively.Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office.The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment,signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
xxx
...the term ad interim appointmentmeans a permanent appointment made by
the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,
although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the
constitution protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus,
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has
qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is
possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and
any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.Once an
appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only
by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice
and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress

without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes
are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim
appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles
over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one,however, can complain because it is
the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad
interim appointees.

Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided
by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions,including the COMELEC xxx

Was the renewal of appointment valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final
decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on
the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits,
being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating
on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any
appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well
as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because
of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the
appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is
one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as
required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-

passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because

there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such
new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven
years

DE RAMA VS CA
353 SCRA 94 G.R. No. 131136 February 28 2001

Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L.
de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC),
seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying
his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were
midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of
Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for
the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC
upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been
approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioners failure
to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.

Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved,
but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of
applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the
Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically
provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations.

Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III

FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for
office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30
days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he
can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal
cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies
solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or
pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because
the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency
in administrative cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or
administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency
in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof

beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated,
he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres
was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the
cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres
appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not
yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms
of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive
act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before
he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section

64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the
authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such
power been intrusted.
Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
G.R. No. L15905 August 3, 1966
FACTS:
Barrioquinto and Loreto Jimenez applied for amnesty, but deny having committed the
crime of murder with which they were charged. Barrioquinto was at large, (but was later
apprehended) Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for appeal
had expired, Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy and committed from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area
where the offense was committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
On January 9, 1947, the Amnesty Commission issued an order returning the cases of
the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case
saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime, they
cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The respondents and the dissent say that the amnesty courts must not decide on cases
where the defendants have not pleaded guilty to the offense charged. But the Court said
that that would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty commissions were
established. Since there is no law which gives immunity to a person for whatever offense
admitted before the amnesty commission in case the offense does not come within the
terms of the proclamation and he is not given amnesty, few would take the risk of
submitting their cases.
Besides even if it were true that Agapito Hipolito was the one who killed the victim, the
accused could still be found guilty of being principals or accessories who may be entitled
to the benefits of amnesty if it could be established that they were members of the same
group of guerillas who killed the victim in furtherance of resistance.

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the
war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be
found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting
an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8,
which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized
under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he
surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the
14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused
because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in
fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to
them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

HELD:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36,
RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty

as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature
of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions
entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having
committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary
or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for
the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of
the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be
regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or
not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty
Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created
thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits
granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or
claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented
shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.

TOPIC: PARDONING POWER

Gaudencio Vera et al vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L18184 January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder done
against a certain Lozaes. The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese
occupation. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having
committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the
witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozaes, categorically
denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the
case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked
only by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead
that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated
against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently,
the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of guilt.
HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an
act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes
certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the
existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against
him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would
bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. The present rule
requires a previous admission of guilt since a person would not need the benefit of
amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered by the proclamation.
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them
to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of
her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment. The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not
absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his
former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due
to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.

In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before
he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit
from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and
benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.
To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for
a new appointment.

TOPIC: MILITARY POWER

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and
for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The
IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call
out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for

civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head
of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Lacson Vs. Perez

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on
May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress
the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters
of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of
Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also
contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests
and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents
have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain
regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1,

2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an
individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized
for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting
officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject
hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the
near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in
the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding
their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have
been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled
for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected
to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking

earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacaang.

Randolf David vs President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria MacapagalArroyo

(GMA)

issued Presidential Proclamation 1017

(PP1017)

and

is

to

be

implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.

Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions
of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the

military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

However, the exercise of such

power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon
the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that
PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to
the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create
or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the
state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al.,

G.R. No. 190259.June 7, 2011.
Facts:

On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the
PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Three days
later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of
the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the
former AO (the term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring to
the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy,

petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all
ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the
Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs autonomy as these
issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and to seize
the regional governments powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual
basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as
AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence
in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

Held:

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre,
the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
SahaliGenerale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not
take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood

under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution

directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the
same.

3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents
exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As
the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly
to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling
out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible
to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military
to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents
exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since
not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the
takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation
1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to
the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President
had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect
the Presidents actions.(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

TOPIC: DIPLOMATIC POWER

NICOLAS vs. ROMULO
G.R. No. 175888

FACTS:

Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina,
Suzette S. Nicolas.

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States, the United States, at its request, was granted custody
of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring
defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty.
He shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate
Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities,
accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.

However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the
United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines
and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement
provides that in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed, Smith, United
States Marine Corps, be returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy
in Manila.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they
would allow such transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a
different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution is also violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD:

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a
different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory
is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces
Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining
power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over
the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do
not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State
due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign
armed forces.

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different
treatment when it comes to detention as against custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during
the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement
to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the
detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but
also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the RomuloKenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the
detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA
itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of
the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

Bayan v. Zamora,

G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a
treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada
with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the
rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials
and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

ISSUE:

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

RULING:

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did
not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under
a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article
XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being
unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To
require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,
is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the
sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed
to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts
or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.

Go Tek vs. Deportation Board

Board G.R. No. L23846 September 9, 1977

FACTS:

On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against
Go Tek, a chinaman, praying that the board recommend his immediate deportation to the
President because he was an undesirable alien on the basis of these allegations:

Go Tek was a sector commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit of
the Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States;
And he was in possession of fake dollar checks in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC.

Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss.

The complaint was premature as he had a pending case in the city fiscals office for
violation of Art. 168.
The board had no jurisdiction over the case because the board may only deport aliens
on the grounds expressly specified by law citing an obiter in Qua Chee Gan.
The Board denied the motion ruling that a conviction is not required before the State
may deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose
function is to make a report and recommendation to the President.
Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI.
The CFI granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the Qua Chee Gan case. It held
that Sec. 37(3) of the Immigration Law requires conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude and, thus, the complaint was premature since mere possession of forged dollar
checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law.
The Board appealed the decision to the SC.

ISSUES:
Can the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which
is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law? YES.

Is prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Tek necessary to allow the board to
continue its investigation? NO.

HELD:

Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order
of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 1 of the Revised
Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation
of the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation, as
charged against the alien, under Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law.
When deportation is effected by the President in the exercise of his powers, it need not
be under any ground specified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law; such a requirement is
relevant only when the deportation is effect by the Commissioner of Immigration.
Sec. 69 of the RAC and E.O. No. 398, creating the Deportation Board, do not specify the
grounds for deportation
There is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because
the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine
whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the
security welfare or interest of the state.
The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which
warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in
accordance with Sec. 69 of the RAC.
After all, the inherent right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued
presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified.
As the President is granted full discretion as regards deportation, it is fundamental that
an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a
case.