Aritmetics of Irresponsibility

Analysis 01/05
Working Group - Political Analysis
ARITHMETIC
OF
IRRESPONSIBILITY
When and how to make a functional transition
of responsibilities from the international
Sarajevo, June 2005.
community to the local authorities
Arithmetic of Irresponsibility
Contents:
Can the BiH society become responsible?
Can the international community (OHR) renounce its responsibility?
Can the state institutions assume governance of the state?
12
Can political parties assume the responsibility over the reform

process in BiH and be partners in constructing its future?
16
Political transition
16
Substantive transition
19
The role of political parties
20
Conclusions
23
Recommendations
23
The articles, essays and analysis that appear in these pages do not represent any consensus of
beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they nd here,
for some of our authors will disagree with each other, but we do expect understanding for
promotion of divergent ideas. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any
article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility
for giving them a chance to appear.
The Editors
Editorial Board:
Z. Kulundi
D. Vuleti
D. Sarajli
Layout:
Sead Jusufovi
A. Kapetanovic
M. Kuljugi
Z. Dizdarevi
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Bro Sarajewo
Tel: +387 33 264 050
Sumbula Avde 7
71000 Sarajewo, Bosnien und Herzegowina
Analysis by an independent research group made with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Sarajevo Oce
Dear Reader,
Today Bosnia and Herzegovina is still struggling to function as a viable and stable
democratic state. Its identity crisis is accompanied by a loss of self-condence and
ownership over social processes. Autism of state administration, exacerbated by the
dogmatic Dayton-driven realism, ten years after the signing of the Framework Peace
Agreement, prevents the possibility of the international community to build its exit
strategy from Bah, so that local institutions could nally assume their responsibilities.
Apart from the regular ocial reports on the progress of reforms in Bosnia by
governmental institutions and international organizations, it is important to present
a critical view by independent domestic experts, on the reform process, covering
political, economic, and social elds. Mainly foreign experts and think tanks have made
observations of the reform process in Bah lacking domestic credibility.
In this context an independent working group of local experts and the oce Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung Sarajevo started in 2005 a project titled political analysis. In these
quarterly papers, that will be published during the year 2005 the working group wants
to contribute to the public debate among policy makers, researchers, and experts at
national and local levels on the development of the Bosnian society into a modern
state.
These documents are also an attempt to give the reader an in-depth view of some of the
political and economic problems in the context of the ongoing reforms.
The rst analysis paper titled Arithmetic of Irresponsibilitydeals with four key issues
Can the Bah society become responsible? Can the international community (OHR)
give up its responsibility? Can the state institutions assume governance of the state?
Can political parties assume the responsibility over the reform process in Bah and be
partners in constructing its future?
Finally, we would like to thank the oce Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Sarajevo for its
contribution to this project, in particular Mr. Michael Weichert, director of the Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung Sarajevo for his fruitful cooperation with the working group.
Sarajevo, June 2005

The Editorial Board
Can the BiH society become responsible?

Responsibility entails ownership over current social processes and the ability to anticipate
future ones. Ten years after the signing of the Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as
the Dayton Agreement, BiH cannot be described as belonging to the category of ownership
societies.1 The political elite does not control the present, nor has it proved to be willing to
allow BiH to have the status of an ownership society in the near future. In their stead, for the
past ten years, this has been done by the international community, trough a wide spectrum
of organisational forms.
Peace was attained through the engagement of an international military coalition led by the
US and under the umbrella of the NATO alliance. The process of drafting the Constitution,
which was incorporated into the peace construct as its annex, was led by foreign experts.
IFOR, and later SFOR, and EUFOR at the moment, guarantee the implementation of the Peace
Agreement. Moreover, the neighbouring countries (Serbia and Monte Negro, and Croatia)
are also a kind of guarantors of peace, though the last reason for Belgrade and Zagreb to be
the guarantors of self-sustainability of BiH has worn out. The democratisation process, along
with elections, was led by OSCE. The World Bank and IMF have looked after, and continue to
look after the scal stability. The currency board arrangements, a doctrine of solid currency
base and strict scal discipline, is maintained by the Central Bank, led by a foreign expert.
OHR personies the entire international activity and responsibility in BiH, intensied by the
so-called Bonn powers of the High Representative.2 Until now, on the basis of those powers,
OHR has passed more than 200 decisions as the most direct substitution of competencies of
local institutions in strategic areas: from constitutional matters, economic and judicial reforms,
down to media regulations and property matters.3
Scores of pages have been written about the phenomenon of the international communitys
attempts to impose responsibility on Bosnians and Herzegovinians. They varied from
compliments on successful stabilisation of peace and state development, to open criticism
of the wrong approach of the international community, and pessimist scenarios on the
There is a kind of agreement between sociological theory and practice that an ownership society is the society
whose elite is capable of making strategic decisions in response to societal problems, which is responsible for
those decisions, as well as independent from external impositions in the planning stage, and whose activities
create or maintain a free and prosperous society of individuals.
At the Peace Implementation Conference held in Bonn in December 1997, it was decided that the High
Representative would enjoy greater powers in order to impose reform legislation and remove from oce person
whose actions obstructed the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The Bonn powers gave OHR the de facto
rule, which exceeded even the BiH Constitution, as dened by Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement.
www.ohr.int/decisions.htm
impossibility of an antagonised multi-ethnic society to become responsible at all.

Practice has conrmed, to an extent, each of these views, but it would be dicult to say that
any of them, taken alone, would be an objective enough illustration of the problems of BiH
ownership. Since 1995, when the Dayton Agreement was signed, until the present time, BiH
has gone through four pages of external imposition of ownership.
Many consider the initial period of stabilisation of peace (1995-1997) to be the most
successful, primarily because it attained its objective in full the termination of bloodshed
and the establishment of sustainable peace. The introduction the Bonn powers (1997-2000)
saw the beginning of a stage of semi-protectorate of sorts, aimed at imposing a system
which was later to become self-sustainable.4 The wish of the international community, to
create partners willing to take the helm led to the year 2000 and the establishment of the
principle of partnership between the international community and the local authorities. One
of the principal features of this period was the fact that the High Representative decreased
considerably his interventions in the preparation and adoption of laws the processes were
led by domestic institutions, and the High Representative, Wolfgang Petrisch, reached for his
powers only in cases of blatant violations of the Dayton principles, or to make the work of
domestic partners easier. With the arrival of the new High Representative, Paddy Ashdown,
which coincided with a change of government through democratic elections, this partnership
was slowed down, and eventually basically abandoned, although there were attempts to
maintain some of its forms, to show to the public that it was still functioning.5 A doctrine
of haste reforms was adopted, with an almost unrealistically limited time frame. Namely, the
starting assumption was that ten years of standing still would be best released by applying
the bulldozer technique, aimed at using all the tools and strengths available to cut through
a path towards full institutional and reform quantity (establishment of new institutions and
adoption of new laws), even at the expense of sacricing a quality partnership with domestic
authorities.
The new approach, widely promoted as the formula for meeting European standards, did not
leave enough room for developing a strategy and dividing the tasks, and certainly no room
for anticipating possible consequences of these urgent reforms. Domestic institutions did not
have the capacity to follow the pace, and more and more they left the initiative to OHR which,
at a certain point, became a complete functional substitute for the failing state bureaucracy.
For more on the rst two phases, see: Prospect for Balkan Stability-Ownership, Transitional Process and Regional
Integration in BiH, by Christopher Solioz, PSIO Occasional Paper, Geneva, Graduate Institute of International
Studies, 2001.
The Bulldozer initiative, launched to adopt a set of reform laws, presented as a joint project of domestic
authorities and OHR. However, it was a project devised by OHR, which also prepared the strategy for its public
promotion, so the entire project supervision was ultimately from OHR.
Defence and judicial reforms, the Bulldozer Initiative, scal reforms and the introduction of
VAT, public campaigns, consultations on the arrival of EUFOR.... all these activities were led or
co-decided on by OHR experts. Even the initiative to promote the tourism potentials of BiH
came from Paddy Ashdown, who has promoted the same concept in the world several times.
The fact that international organisations in BiH have better public relations services than those
of domestic institutions, and that they used them to promote the above mentioned reform
activities, strengthened the impression of the public that domestic institutions have become
totally atrophied, and that elections were losing any sense. In some surveys, Ashdown, the
High Representative, was even selected as the most popular politician, in competition with
prominent domestic ones.
The EU interpreted this balance of powers as chronic immaturity of the political elite to make
its own decisions, which reected negatively on the integration processes, from the failure
to enter the Partnership for Peace (PfP NATO) to a general slow-down of stabilisation and
association with the EU. Although the public was presented with dierent reasons, such as lack
of cooperation with ICTY, the key reason was, nonetheless, the weakness of the institutional
potential of BiH.
It seems that in its strategic haste, OHR is making BiH a victim of its own success. It established
the BiH Ministry of Defence, without abolishing the MoDs of the entities. BiH has de facto
three separate command structures and three armies. A state data protection agency has
been established, but similar intelligence mechanisms at entity levels have not been removed.
What the newly established Ministry of Security is supposed to be doing at the level of the
state is done by the Ministries of the Interior at entity levels, etc. Instead of being reduced,
the bureaucratic monster is multiplied to the level that exceeds even the complicated Dayton
construct, building parallelism that even far better developed countries would not be able to
cope with.
Anxiety is even greater due to the fact that ten years, four stages of transition, and more
than ve billion dollars, have not been enough to make BiH a state capable of taking the
strings into its own hands. It is believed that the problem is that, as even Ashdown himself
now admits, the international presence in BiH has mutated to such an extent that it takes for
itself what little air was there keeping the domestic institutions alive. A decision to decrease
the international presence in BiH as been made, but there is still no exit strategy that would
prevent the suocating domestic institutions from getting all the oxygen back suddenly and
with no measure.
This is the fth, and probably the nal attempt to make domestic institutions, at least, partners who
are willing to share the responsibility. The current High Representatives term of oce expires in
November this year, and lobbying for his successor is already under way. The successor could assume
oce disarmed from the Bonn powers. The new High Representative will be an envoy of the EU, and
not of the UN, as the case has been until now. The fth stage will be Brussels-oriented, i.e. it will be
a stage of standardisation of BiH aimed at its EU membership. A change of terminology and names
will, of course, not make the fth stage successful, unless there are, prior to it, certain systemic,
essential reforms, which the international community has been reluctant about all these years.
The Dayton-based constitutional, political and scal construct allowed for this peculiar
mutation of international presence into a protectorate, i.e. it allowed for BiH society to rise to
functionality. Thirteen parallel legislative and executive instances with 120 ministers and with
parallelism in the functioning of essential areas (defence, nance, interior, etc.) an inconsistent
scal system that prevents the state from drawing original revenue ... are all anomalies too
serious to have their removal avoided yet again.
That is why the exit strategy of the international community, i.e. the Brussels- reorientation of
BiH, will have to start from creating an optimum in the constitutional, political and economic
systems, in order to nally create a solid basis for transition of powers. The tenth anniversary
of the signing of the Dayton Agreement is indeed a good opportunity for a denition, at last,
of the existential and functional minimum of state bureaucracy which would and this is the
basic precondition for the Stabilisation and Association Process act as the leader of the fth
phase. Until now, similar attempts of removing the taboo from the Dayton Agreement have
failed because of their ideological overdrive and a lack of direct communication with the
public. This time, the message must be much clearer the current system is unsustainable,
because it is too expensive, and because the citizens of the Federation BiH, Republika Srpska,
and BiH, simply cannot nance it. In such communication, ideology and power of the majority
are simply not the key words.
In parallel with the quest for the optimum functional system for BiH, the exit strategy of the
international community must deal with details of how the state-level bureaucratic system
functions. If a panel of experts was capable of identifying the weaknesses in the functioning of
the United Nations, there is no reason whatsoever for this principle not to be brought town to
the micro-sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where local and international experts could deal
jointly with the weaknesses in the state apparatus of BiH. This is, in fact, necessary, in order to
determine a methodology for short-term (by 2007) and long-term solutions (by 2015).
According to all the relevant estimates, 2007 is the year when the international community
wishes to reduce its presence in BiH (military, economic, and political) to a level acceptable from
the point of view of international law and the Brussels standards. Should it become by the end
of 2007 that BiH has the capacities to assume ownership, possibilities would be opened for PfP
membership and for rising to a higher level of potential EU membership. The next international
examination may be expected in 2010, when BiH is to be voted on as a non-permanent member
of the Security Council (provided such a model remains after the reform of the UN).
2015 seems to be a realistically objective time-frame for consolidating the pending Balkan
issues, for determining a clear doctrine of further EU enlargement.6 and thus for the ultimate
denition of the geo-strategic and geopolitical fate of the Balkans. BiH would thus have ample
time to adapt itself to the new circumstances and to undertake reforms that would elevate it
from a semi-protectorate to an ownership society, a functioning state capable of ghting for
its own armation in global economic, political and other multi-lateral mechanisms.
Determination of a wider time-frame is an important presumption of the international
community exit strategy. Other than cosmetic cross-outs, the strategic haste leaves no room
for a thorough reform of the existing bureaucracy. No state-level institution has a developed
strategic planning segment, or, for example, public relations. Nor is it equipped to draw a
sectoral short-term or long-term strategic framework in compliance with its constitutional
competencies.7 Moreover, at the present time, BiH does not have any developed foreign policy
or security doctrine, nor does it have a strategy for negotiations with IMF or the World Bank. The
establishment of the Civil Service Agency created merely a precondition for de-politicisation
of civil service. What about structure, development and decision making, internal and external
information ow, coordination? It is for these very reasons that BiH needs more time and
more specic nancial support from the EU, so that domestic institutions could prepare,
both functionally and organisationally, not only to assume powers from the international
community, but also to conduct serious preparations for EU membership.8
This autism can only be overcome if the fth phase was to deal with a more detailed
improvement of the existing Dayton-driven status quo. There are two other fundamental
preconditions for the fth phase to be ultimately successful. First, that the insistence on
ethno-national consensus should grow into a national (to be read as state-making) agreement
on the common BiH future of all the free citizens belonging to the constituent peoples and
minorities, who are thus not, as such, hostages of respective ethnocracies. The second is
that the international community, i.e. the OHR as its personication with an address and a
telephone number, supports the concept of the new BiH societal agreement, and devise its
exit accordingly, and implements it in full.
Although the EU dened its borders in its 2003 New Neighbourhood Policy. According to that document, only
Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Western Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and
Macedonia) are potential EU candidates. Everything outside that is neighbourhood. EU will not go beyond that.
The only exception which conrms the rule, to an extent, is the poverty reduction strategy, initiated by the
international community, whose experts participated to a considerable extent in its development.
One of the open possibilities are the so-called twinning programmes, which include foreign experts paid by the
EU, spending time in BiH and assisting the state administration reform.
Can the international community (OHR) renounce its responsibility?

There are numerous facts that hinder a positive answer to this question. Under the present
circumstances, when there is still no one to whom responsibility may be handed over to, and
when there is still no clear plan or time-frame, the departure of the international community
is neither possible, nor desirable. The international community (primarily the OHR) must learn
from its own mistakes.
If the imposition of responsibility on domestic authorities from Dayton onwards can be divided
into four phases, of which the rst three had a natural sequence and logical connections,
it remains unclear what kind of synergy may be built following the vacuum in the transfer
of responsibilities, created with the arrival of Paddy Ashdown. The stabilisation the Bonn
powers partnership - ownership sequence was harshly interrupted after the partnership
stage. The insistence of international structures on rapid reforms generated such a situation
to a large extent, while ignoring the impotence of the local authorities to make their own
institutions capable of assuming ownership over reforms and social processes in BiH.
And a precedent for assuming ownership existed from the period of creation of partnership,
when the authorities of the Alliance for Democratic Change9 showed clearly that they did
not intend to give in to the torrent that allowed the international community to devise key
decisions and often implement them itself. There are quite a few examples that may illustrate
a more robust attitude of the Alliance towards the tendency of the international community
to impose responsibility. The most illustrative one is from 2001, when an open conict arose
over an attempt of an irresponsible international ocer to sell a strategic telecommunications
area, the third GSM operator licence, for an insultingly small amount of two million dollars
at the time when other transition countries were generating ten times more by selling their
GSM operator licences.10 With arguments and determination, the then authorities managed to
stop the sale, and the irresponsible international ocer had to leave the country rather soon
afterwards.
A more robust approach to the requests and tasks placed before them by the international
community allowed the then authorities to assert themselves as an impertinent, yet
9
A coalition put together to prevent nationalist parties from taking power again at the 2000 general elections.
A great weakness of the Alliance was its lack of homogeneity, lack of clear common programmes, and overdiversied interests. Its key advantage was in the fact that it was willing to assume responsibility and it did not
want to allow international representatives to take over full management over domestic processes.
10
On 30 April 2001, after it issued a BiH mobile operator licence to JP PTT BiH, the Communications Regulatory
Agency (CRA) published an open bid for the third operator. In the bid, the cost of concession (the right of use for
a period of 15 years) was set at a xed amount limited to two million convertible marks. In a meeting with a
local ocial, the then CRA Director, Jerken Torngren, described the procedure for selecting the third operator
as a beauty contest.
constructive counterpart to the international bureaucracy, which threatened to assume

control over the determination of direction of key reforms in BiH. Introducing the principle
of partnership relations, the domestic authorities opened the space for pragmatic bridges to
be built in the gaps of the narrow Dayton framework. Various working bodies, coordination
boards, committees, ad hoc bodies were created,11 wherein entity and state authorities
decided on joint positions in relation to polices of the IMF, the World Bank, OHR, the EU,
individual foreign governments, etc.
However surprised by the approach of the Alliance authorities, the then High Representative,
Ambassador Wolfgang Petrisch, gradually adapted to the new rules of the game, even
capitalising on the success of the partnership concept. In his farewell address, Petrisch did not
hide a certain dose of fascination with the transformation that had taken place during his term
of oce. As he said, upon his arrival he had found divided ethnic communities, which looked at
one another with suspicion, or even open animosity, and at his departure he saw a state ready
to assume ownership. Petrisch located the principal reason for this success in the assumption
of ownership by BiH leaders.12 Recognising the fact that his own success would be linked with
the success of the local authorities in assuming responsibility, Petrisch claimed decisively that
the next stage in the process was the so-called ownership over reform processes. Conditions
were thus starting to be created for phasing out, i.e. for a gradual transfer of responsibilities
from the international community to domestic authorities and institutions.13
Refusing to recognise the fact that success is in the ability of domestic authorities to assume
ownership and responsibility over the reforms, at the very beginning of his term, the new High
Representative, Paddy Ashdown, fell into the trap whereby the failure of local authorities to
assume responsibility was to grow into his own failure.
Taking up the duties of the High Representative of the international community in BiH in May
2002, Ashdown chose to give his inaugural address before members of the BiH Parliament.
His rst address was supposed to symbolise the establishment of a more open relationship
between the institution of the High Representative and the local authorities, based primarily
on equality in decision-making. However, practice has shown all the clumsiness of Ashdowns
symbolism and the way he has been using it. Placing the BiH ag in front of the OHR building,
opening the gate to the public, and then closing it. Nationalisation of OHR as a symbol of
greater participation of BiH brains in the decision-making of this organisation, never really
11
European Integration and Economic Relations Board, Anti-Terrorism Team, Citizenship Review Commission, etc.
12
Farewell address of the High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sarajevo, 24 May 2002: Its leaders and you, the citizens, have assumed the responsibility of turning your
homeland into a real home.
13
This approach was accompanied by specic reforms directed towards equipping domestic institutions to take
the lead a new Law on the Council of Ministers was adopted, as well as the Law on Civil Service, SIPA, etc.
happened, as its foundation, apparently, was not a clear intent, but rather a media trick.
The decision to use the services of BiH embassies when abroad, as a symbol of condence
in the state institutions, gradually evolved into a basic lack of consultation with (and even
information to) the local authorities in key bilateral meetings in global centres of power. The
insistence on symbolism distanced Ashdown from the substance.
Although he started by addressing the Parliament as the highest legislature in the country,
there have been rare occasions when Ashdown communicated directly with MPs in relation
to his decisions, let alone consulted them. And when he was not using his Bonn powers to
the full extent, the High Representative was trying to play the role of a catalyst in the political
processes in BiH rarely dealing with pragmatic and operative matters that would improve
the Dayton framework, as he pledged to do in his inaugural address (Dayton is the foundation,
not the ceiling). Instead of dealing with processes, Ashdown has been playing political games
without any true comprehension of political relationships inside BiH. The model of cooperation
and consultation in decision-making, between the international community and the domestic
authorities, that the optimists were hoping for after Ashdowns initial public addresses, never
came to life. Very soon after his arrival to the post of the High Representative, it became clear
that a technocrat was replaced by a politician.
If an ambassador was replaced by a politician, who replaced the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC)? How come the PIC Steering Board agreed to Ashdowns adventure? The answer
to these key questions will, as ever, come with time. Until then, the responsibility for strategies
mistakes is on Ashdown as much as the PIC, i.e. the international community in BiH.
It is evident that in his attempt to understand such a complex society, the High Representative
has focused more on dening BiH on a philosophical level, rather than focusing on operational
issues and reforms which required just a little bit of pragmatism. Attention was given to
particular interests of ethnic communities, with an explanation that the task is not to sink or
eliminate ethnic identity and dierent peoples are the pillars that support the state that give
it its strength.14 Following Ashdowns conviction that national parties represent respective
constituent peoples, the international community was drown into national arithmetic, which
prevented any detection of common interests of BiH as a state and a society. Using the rhetoric
whereby the ethnic tissue of the proud history of BiH is slowly recovering and renewing itself
and the state is not the constitution, but rather its people, Ashdowns vision and the vision of
the international community has been reduced to observation through a prism that dissolves
the interests of BiH society into individual interests of the three ethnic communities. Never
thinking about the identity of BiH as a state or a society, the international representatives
continued to reduce BiH to a sum of diversities.
14
Introductory address by Paddy Ashdown, the new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 27
May 2002.
Addressing the public immediately after the general elections in October 2002 and announcing
that he would judge people by their deeds rather than their words,15 Paddy Ashdown provoked
a public debate over his ambiguous statements which indicated a recognition of the factual
situation of division on the ethnic principle. These debates, however, diverted the attention
from the unnoticeably introduced principle of control of local authorities, rather than that of
partnership, which Ashdown announced in his address: these elections are a new moment.
The rst phase is over. In the next phase, we must accelerate the pace of reforms... Therefore,
we have no choice but to accelerate the pace of reforms in BiH. Our partnership with new
bodies of governance will continue on that basis.16 Aware of the fact that partnership cannot
continue on that basis, Ashdown opened a back door to the urgent reform policy, which forced
the impotent institutions to give the lead to OHR.
Thus the new High Representative announced, and the PIC conrmed, the end of the
concept of partnership in the form it had existed in until then, and announced a new phase
of partnership with domestic authorities. This new phase, however, was not ownership, as
anticipated, but rather the phase when OHRs rapid reforms amnestied the inability of the
newly elected authorities to assume ownership over the reform process. Focusing on the
speed of reforms rather than their essence and quality, i.e. totally ignoring the need for the
implementation of reforms to be led to the end, OHR limited the concept of partnership,
thus reducing it to mere counting of reforms that the international community and the local
authorities will use to present as good statistics at the end of his and their terms of oce.
The results and eects of reform were eliminated as a tool to value the ability of the local
authorities to become independent and assume ownership.
By creating a large number of paper reforms, the local authorities and the international
community agreed to an institutional illusion, which could be disastrous not only for the
process of assuming ownership, but also for the success of reforms themselves. Ownership
has been devalued, as it has been reduced to ownership over imaginary reforms. An illusion
has been created that a high number of reforms adopted would result in a high passing
grade of the High Representative. This imaginary success would justify the requests for a
decrease of the High Representatives powers and a transfer of responsibilities to the local
institutions would be sought. In doing so, the lack of institutional potential in BiH as a factor
of sustainability of reforms, was completely ignored. The result is a painful realisation that
any sudden transfer of reform processes to local institutions would cause a total bureaucratic
implosion.
The lack of seriousness of the coalition of domestic authorities and the international
15
Address by the High Representative for BiH, Paddy Ashdown, to international investors, Sarajevo, 9. October
2002.
16
Ibid.
10
community in dealing with the problem of a lack of capacity of domestic institutions is

further illustrated by the Report on developments in the sixteen priority areas referred to in
the European Commissions Report on Feasibility of Negotiations between BiH and the EU on
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Namely, despite the facts indicating weakness
of state institutions, the local authorities still have the energy to claim in the Report that
the implementation of the Law on the Council of Ministers and the Law on Ministries and
Other Bodies of Administration in BiH has progressed signicantly.... Stang is under way in
compliance with the Law on Employment in the Civil Service.. The Committee charged with
nding premises at the Oce of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers meets regularly and
its meetings are dedicated to working on solutions for nding adequate premises for the new
state institutions... As the basis of coordinated joint eorts of all the BiH institutions in the
process of integrating BiH in the EU, coordination instruments have been adopted: the Decision
on horizontal and vertical coordination in the process of European integration, the Decision
on methods of assessing the harmonisation of legislation with the acquis communautaire, the
Programme of Activities for implementation of priorities in 2004 ... 17
This example shows that not only has the international community thrown the local authorities
into the water before they were able to swim, but the local authorities themselves voluntarily
agreed to have a rock tied to their legs. Instead of facing the fact that state institutions are
not capable of further assumption of responsibilities thrown at them by the international
community, they are satised with the signicant progress in the implementation of the Law
on the Council of Ministers and stang which is progressing in compliance with law, although
it is quite clear that ministries function with just over one half of their capacities. It is enough
that committees meet regularly and that coordination instruments have been adopted,
although neither have produced a single result or solution.
Therefore, after Paddy Ashdown, free from the chains of partnership, provided the
international community and the local authorities with the luxury of being satised with
urgent reforms with no adequate implementation, he, in fact, created the conditions for a
transfer of ownership. The ownership phase can only follow after the phase of distribution of
responsibilities and their gradual transfer to the local authorities. A transfer of responsibilities
without the development of institutional capacities as the bearers of such responsibilities
would be the sudden return of oxygen to the domestic institutions, which they are unable to
absorb.
Instead of the ownership stage, which it has given up on, OHR now announces the
Brusselisation stage. However, this stage cannot commence until the local authorities have
17
Progress Report on 16 priority areas from the Report of the European Commission to the Council of Ministers of
the European Union on the Feasibility of Negotiations between BiH and the European Union on the Stabilisation
and Association Agreement.
11
fully assumed the responsibility for political, reform, and social processes in BiH. A transition
to this phase needs to be devised in such a way that it would be as painless as possible for the
state and the society, without endangering the success of reforms themselves.
This should, rst and foremost, be a true transition into ownership, rather than a sudden transfer
of responsibilities. This process should progress gradually, and parallel to strengthening the
institutional capacities of the state, through an intense reform of public administration. And
according to European standards, but led by the local authorities rather than the international
community.
The international community must nally decide what are the priorities to be inherited by the
new High Representative. Ashdown started o with priorities such as Europe, development of
the state, foreign debt, public expenditure, defence. He later moved on to the judiciary and the
public broadcasting service. For a while he stuck to jobs and justice18 and at Christmas 2003,
in his address resembling that of the British Queen, he announced six new priorities which he
has not mentioned since. Such random choice of priorities further prevented the creation of a
comprehensive picture of what it is that could make the state functional and sustainable.
In this determination of priorities, the international community should focus less on the idea
of changing or amending Dayton; instead, it should focus more on making sure that those
institutions that have completed the structures of the Dayton Constitution, nally become
functional. Potential changes or amendments of the Dayton Agreement can only come from
within, as the result of internal political processes and agreements, and certainly not as yet
another imposition by the international community.
The High Representative could demonstrate his commitment to the transfer of responsibilities
to local institutions by introducing, prior to the expiry of his term of oce, the practice of
consultation with local authorities in the process of key decision-making. For example, by
giving an opportunity to the state parliament to be consulted when selecting his successor.
And nally, the key thing that Ashdown could do before the expiry of his term of oce is
to work with political representatives of both the governing and opposition parties, with
representatives of civil society, science, etc., to devise the fth phase, be it ownership or
Brusselisation if possible, before we actually enter it.
18
Reform package inaugurated jointly by the Alliance authorities and OHR.

12
Can the state institutions assume governance of the state?

In the current constellation, something like this seems almost impossible. A more optimistic
answer may be reduced to a phrase that state institutions are currently in the process of
consolidation, development and further development. Seeing the glass either as half empty
or half full, it is quite clear that there is no coherent concept of reform of state administration,
which is why even the omnipotent High Representative does not know with any certainty
which principles, criteria and time-frame would allow BiH to have a state administration ready
to transfer voluntarism into professionalism.
This has, to a large extent, been contributed by the indecisiveness of one part of the
international community, primarily the OHR, in insisting on priorities that would allow the
institutions to prepare to absorb greater powers and greater responsibilities. The priorities of
Petrischs term of oce were in compliance with the intentions of the partnership concept,
i.e. the intention to transfer gradually to the ownership stage. This meant fully functional
state institutions, through the reform of the Council of Ministers and of public administration
in general, with adequate improvement of the economic situation.19 In simple terms, the
adoption (imposition20) of the Law on the Council of Ministers created new institutions which
were supposed to lead the key reforms (justice, security, European integration, education, and
later defence) However, more than two years since this Law came into eect, it is clear that
the international community and the local authorities have been satised by creating state
institutions on paper only. According to informal estimates, the level of stang of civil service
in the ministries of the Council of Ministers is 55% on average, with the percentage of less than
30% in some ministries (Ministry of Security, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Ministry
of Civil Aairs). Moreover, it is disconcerting that, according to the same estimates, there is
no 100% stang in the civil service in any ministry, and that in some ministries placement of
assistant ministers requires well over a year. The situation is the same with the oces of the
Council of Ministers, where key senior positions, such as that of the Secretary General or the
Director of the Legislative Oce, remain vacant for up to a year.
The fact that the international community imposed the establishment of new institutions
without careful consideration or with no analysis of feasibility of such reforms is illustrated by
the problem of housing those institutions. Most ministries do not have adequate premises.
Ministries of Foreign Trade, Civil Aairs, Transportation and Communication, Justice and
Security, do not have adequate premises for housing the current sta, let alone new ones, and
their budgets do not provide for funds for any rental of premises. There are at least two key
19
Address by the High Representative for BiH, Ambassador Wolfgang Petrisch, to the North Atlantic Council, 8
September 1999.
20
Law on the Council of Ministers was imposed by the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, on 3 December 2002.
13
reasons that keep the state bureaucracy inert and unprepared for consolidation.
The rst is in the fact that OHR did not want/dare to venture into any changes of the existing
Dayton construct, which has, through ethnic consensus and unquestioned insistence on
ethnic balance, numbed the wheels of the bureaucratic machinery. This is, of course, not a
matter of threatening ethnic representation as guarantee by the Constitution and certainly
unambiguous, but rather the abuse of this constitutional principle. At the moment, it goes so far
that the criterion of ethnic representation is translated into the imperative of ethnocratic, and
often nationalistic aliation. A systemic vacuum had created a new caste of Bosniacs, Croats
and Serbs suitable for key positions in the civil service, as opposed to those who meet all the
criteria other than the mot important one closeness with the ethnocratic centres of political
power. OHR seems not to have registered this illogical situation, or perhaps it considered it
too minor to deal with it. 21 However, over time, this nuance has become the dominant shade,
which led the High Representative to instruct all the political parties to consult OHR prior to
public presentation of any candidacy. He thought that the establishment of the Civil Service
Agency, a regulatory body tasked with guarding the principles of professionalism in the
civil service, would be an adequate lter for removing impurities. There certainly have been
improvements, but the situation is far from satisfactory. How else to describe the fact that
even after the introduction of sta discipline, sta aairs have multiplied, not only hindering
the reform process, but worse still, alienating the state bureaucracy from those it is supposed
to serve. There are countless examples from diplomatic service, when blind insistence on
a particular candidate jeopardise good bilateral relations between BiH and Croatia, or when
following his appointment as an ambassador, the person only later turned out not to meet
the basic criteria. All the way to public bickering on who should have the key position of
the Director of SIPA (not as to the representative of which constituent people, but rather of
which political option), then the Director of the RS Police, and prior to that the Director of SBS,
Indirect Taxation Authority, etc.
The abuse of constitutional principles of ethnic representation and the elevation of stang
policy to the pedestal of doctrine per se, have instigated a functional implosion of civil service
to the extent recognised by Brussels as immaturity of domestic institutions. This is, in fact,
the beginning of another important cause for the institutional inertia, which is, in fact, a
21
OHR never admitted its mistake explicitly, though it did shyly, through statements by its spokespersons and
using rhetoric manoeuvring. Thus, just before the High Representatives meeting with German Chancellor
Schroeder, on 3 May 2005, OHR made a statement that insistence on mono-ethnic TV channels would not lead
BiH to Europe. That is why the European Commission insisted on the establishment of a single, economically
viable public programme service, which would represent equally all the peoples in BiH, stated Kevin Sullivan,
OHR spokesperson (FENA Agency, 3 May 2005). OHR reacts to the attempt of ethnocracies to complete their
super-power by introducing three separate channels, but misses, for example, an opportunity to prevent the
inauguration of a system that legitimises such requests.
14
consequence of the rst one. If the measure of satisfaction were in the number of newlyestablished institutions, especially if compared with 1997, then no one would have the right
to be dissatised. However, dissatisfaction starts with the realisation that the number of
institutions is not key, but rather their functioning is. Just as the determination of success
of Brusselisation does not stand to be compared with the past, but rather with the current
European criteria. This system of parameters reveals mistakes that led, rst, to a wrong
assessment, and later, to wrong solutions. Subjection to illogical constitutional principles of
hyper-federalisation led to the fact that the mandate and the competencies of state institutions
are not devised well. Overlaps of competencies and parallelism led to an inadequate
distribution of sta. There is an illusion of stang, though at the functional level problems
explode in a chain reaction. Moreover, institutions are not adequately interconnected, and as
such they are unable to deliver what the society expects of them economic, foreign policy,
scal, and defence doctrine, generating and developing long-term and short-term strategies
for assuming ownership from the international community.
To paraphrase an old Chinese proverb, there are at least a hundred ways leading out of the
present situation. Translated from the Chinese to the BiH context, each of those one hundred
ways requires political will and national consensus on the willingness to assume ownership
over current social processes and to develop the ability to anticipate those yet to come.
BiH institutions must build a common plan to optimise the assistance the EU has earmarked
for BiH in the coming three year period. The rst thing to be insisted on is joint work on the
exit strategy for OHR, which would show which segments of international presence are to
be decreased, in order to see which domestic capacities need to be strengthened. Domestic
institutions must work on this together with representatives of the international community.
One of the priorities is to develop a strategy of international positioning of BiH, to include an
Action Plan for EU membership. The international community may be an important consultant,
with all its experts, while domestic institutions would be in the lead.
Within the reform package for strengthening state institutions, one of the key priorities should
be the establishment and structuring of analytical and research capacities in BiH institutions.
It is rather devastating that no state institution has a modern, developed and structured
analytical department. In relation to this, a possible solution could be the establishment of a
Directorate for Strategic Planning and Analysis, to include sub-organisational units: Economic
Research and Analysis Unit, Security Studies Unit, International Relations and Foreign Policy
Unit, etc. This would allow the development of a state policy, to be implemented by respective
ministries. Advantages of such an approach are manifold: this would allow for the creation of
state strategy at a single location, sectoral state strategies would be connected into a whole,
state institutions would be provided with analytical services from a single locating, the EU
would have a principal interlocutor in the process of analysing and planning the association of
15
BiH with the EU. A shortcoming of this approach is the need to establish a new state institution,
requiring a change in the budget and a consultation with IMF. The solution may be reached
if the rst two years of the work of the Directorate for Strategic Planning could be subsidised
by the EU through the CARDS programme. Furthermore, as part of the so-called twinning
programme, practical assistance could be provided by EU experts, i.e. experts from transition
countries from the region that have already become EU members.
There is an evident lack of cooperation with non-governmental research institutions and
universities. A formal framework for cooperation needs to be developed in such activities. It
is necessary to network state institutions, immediately and without delay, with universities
and prominent domestic and foreign think-tanks, in order to utilise their ideas and thinking
on improvements. OSCE has sponsored a programme of voluntary work of young experts in
the BiH parliament, which proved to be a good basis for the same approach to be applied in
other institutions. This would allow for systemic communication with researches in the eld
of European integration and democracy, and it would also help create a data base on human
resources that can be counted on. For example, the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies of the
University of Sarajevo has, in collaboration with the La Sapienza University from Rome, the
University of Bologna and the London School of Economics and Political Science, educated
approximately one hundred students with Masters Degrees in European Studies (philosophy,
sociology, law and economics), human rights, state management, European integration, etc.
Their masters theses, i.e. the best ones, should be utilised in nding the solutions to numerous
questions. This is also an important human potential that may be engaged, even occasionally,
by state institutions, particularly those which are expected to do most of the work in the
preparation of accession to the EU.
There is an evident lack of not only state strategy, but also of sectoral strategise in public and
media relations. EU approximation requires serious reform moves, and later even referenda
on certain issues. A precondition for all this is in public opinion surveys and public campaigns
on the necessity of reforms, their good and bad sides. Current state institutions dealing or to
be dealing with EU accession do not have the capacities for planned strategic action towards
domestic, or foreign public opinion.22 In view of the specic position that BiH is in, guidelines
should be developed immediately for such a strategy, that should go even further informing
the European public opinion on all the advantages of BiH accession to the EU. Without
a well structured administrative network and decisive assistance from the international
community, it is hard to imagine even the drafting of guidelines for such a strategy, let alone
its implementation. In this segment, BiH must not wait to become a PHARE candidate and
22
In order to underscore the importance of developing public information strategy on all aspects of enlargement
in the candidate countries, in June 2003, the European Commission redirected the remaining PHARE funds
towards nancing public campaigns and the development of such strategies.
16
request funds for the strategy only at that time. Using all the experiences and resources
available, BiH institutions must have the guidelines by the end of 2005, and even specic
projects related to the building of public awareness on the signicance of EU membership, as
well as all the problems it brings with it.
Each of the hundred ways out of the present administrative inertia includes a serious reexamination of the political spectrum. Political parties as interest groups, which are also the
stakeholders in the political process, must be placed under critical social scrutiny. In addition
to the social elite in the widest sense, they are the most responsible for the current autism,
and sobering them up seems to be the conditio sine qua non for a badly needed turn, such
as the assumption of responsibility from the international community. In certain organised
societies, this issue would be laughed at, but in BiH, the question whether political parties can
assume the responsibility for the reform process seems to be of essential importance, and that
is why we will try to oer an answer.
Can political parties assume the responsibility over the reform process
in BiH and be partners in constructing its future?
Societies and states where political parities are partners with civil society organisations, thinktanks, NGOs... have the possibility of going through the process of transformation of society
more easily, as true transition requires a consensus of the entire society, which is dicult to
achieve. In the absence of strong civil society institutions, political parties continue to be the
most inuential institutions in BiH, capable of generating political changes, as the consequence
of 50 years of life in system where a single party, and since 1990 three parties, were the sole
creators of the fate of society. That is why we will aord them due attention and examine their
abilities to assume ownership over reforms, and the responsibilities that go with it, but also to
be partners in the process, both for the international community as the inevitable factor, but
also for the civil society as it is. For that purpose, we shall analyse the circumstances of political
transition they act in, the essential transition they are to eect, and their internal abilities.
Political transition23
It may be said that there are ve basic steps in a political process, irrespective of whether it
is a democratic or a totalitarian system: articulation of demands, aggregation of demands,
23
Theory describes policy as a mechanism for making collective decisions and solving particularly conicting
problems and a process of authoritative allocation of values applicable to all. See in Blondel, Jean. How the
Process of Political Transition from Communism can be Monitored and how the Moment of Consolidation can be
Determined. Post-communist Transition as a European Problem. Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2002, p.21.
17
creation of rules, implementation of rules, and adjudication on violations of those rules.24

The principal dierence between political processes in totalitarian and in democratic states
is access to these steps. In democratic systems, there are numerous groups and organisations
involved in this process, though each in its own way and in the segment of their interest.
Furthermore, they are specialised and autonomous one from the other, and are the result
of a free and open civil society. There are groups which are free to articulate and consolidate
their request peacefully, with no fear of persecution by the institutions of the system, just
because they may dislike what they want. Additionally, there are various organisations: state,
non-governmental, business, political, which are given an opportunity by law to create rules,
to implement them and to adjudicate on violations of those rules, with no fear of being
supervised or punished over it. Contrary to this, in a totalitarian system, there are but three
key creators and implementers of rules: party, state and bureaucracy. All other organisations
granted the right to take part in the process are marginalized and not specialised to discuss
a wide set of issues though dierent fora, thus creating an ideological image of inclusion of
the masses, while ultimate decisions are made in the narrow circles of political elites. It is for
this that the elites and the system as a whole are obsessed with fear and the desire to know
everything and control everyone, which eventually leads to a totalitarian system.25 If we state,
at the end of this theoretical elaboration, that the former system is heaven, and the latter is
hell, we can assume freely that our society is somewhere in between, in a limbo.
Here, as well as in other transition countries, the process of transition had to go through thee
stages:26 collapse of a centralised decision-making system, emergence of a strong multiparty system and autonomous intra-state authorities, and nally the development of strong,
autonomous groups and associations within civil society.
The rst stage can be said to have been done well in BiH. The system was so broken and
segmented that it has not been able to recover even ten years after the war. It was set up
on the foundation that enabled the prevention of further war, but insucient for further
development of a normal society striving towards European standards.
The second phase, the emergence of a strong multi-party system, is still under way, since the
sheer number of parties is no guarantee for the construction of such a strong multi-party
system. In view of their number in BiH, a positive outcome of this phase is to be expected in
the reverse process, i.e. with a decrease of the number of parties in the political arena.
At the moment, there are 72 parties in BiH, created by constant fragmentation of political
potions and parties, and this excessive fragmentation is certainly not helping in the creation
24
Ibid. p. 22.
25
Ibid. pp. 22-29.
26
Ibid.
18
of a strong multi-party system. Of the said 72 parties, fourteen have won their seat in the
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the general elections in 2002. Of those,
six won representatives mainly on the basis of compensation seats, and each of them currently
has less than 3% support of the constituency.
The creation of autonomous intra-state systems immediately after the war, generated three
totalitarian single-party systems, each of which ruled its own people in its own territory. The
axiom of national exclusivity was imposed and the development of institutions of Republika
Srpska and Federation BiH followed it. There were parallel structures in FBiH, within which
the Croat (Republic) Community of Herzeg-Bosnia had functioned until 2001. In 2000, with
the victory of the Alliance for Democratic Change, conditions started to be created for the
dissolution of these systems. Unfortunately, it never moved any further, due to the fact that the
nine-member coalition of parties could not rise above their particular party interests and place
the general, state interests above them. The Alliance project was buried after 18 months of
hope, at the 2002 elections. Those who had led the Alliance paid the highest price, becoming
the buer-zone for the disappointment and unpopular reforms. Since 2002, parallelisms are at
play again, though in a somewhat more subtle form and under the guise of reformism.
The third phase, the so-called development of autonomous groups and associations within
civil society, has moved in the wrong direction and failed to build a strong civil society. There
are some 800 non-governmental organisations, domestic and foreign, dealing with a wide
spectrum of activities, as well as numerous civic associations. Some are truly independent
and active, some are linked to dierent political options or exist on paper only, and some
are made up of enthusiasts who wish to change something. The fourth group are there only
for nancial gain. It is interesting that there are no independent think-tanks among them, or
advocacy groups that may produce dierent policies and oer solutions. At that, there is a
misconception that the number of NGOs and the quantity of their work illustrates the strength
of civil society.27
The NGO sector in BiH enjoys strong support from international organisations and quite a
bit of money has been spent for that purpose. However, all the work, time and money have
not paid o, because there has been no coordination or common focus from the donors.
Development of civil society and the NGO sector has failed, as it became the purpose in itself,
rather than a tool of democratic development and a change in policy design and decision
making concepts.
27
Few theoreticians and civil society representatives are aware of this: under civil society the West sees what we
already have in the West and what we want to see developed in the rest of the world and to thus anticipate
specic sociological circumstances, such as the role of NGOs in transition, with all their controversies see more
in: Chiodi, Luisa. Promoting Civil Society: Local NGOs in the Balkans Since the 90s in Post-communist Transition
as a European Problem. Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2002. p.61.
19
In view of this outline of steps in the transition of one social system to another, we see that
the sequence of events in BiH has taken a totally dierent direction, and became its own
contradiction. BiH has become the antithesis of transition, since all the steps have delivered
totally unwanted results. There are several reasons for this, which we will elaborate in further
text. However, an indication: an illusion of democracy in a destroyed society cannot replace
a centralised decision-making system, and that is why we continue to have a centralised
decisions-making system, through the OHR, whose legitimacy comes from a shadow of
democracy in the BiH Parliament; also, political pluralism cannot function without a functioning
system, just as civil society cannot play its role if NGOs and other associations and groups have
one goal only - to spend the funds received and to present reports to their fund providers, to
justify their existence, without becoming players in policy design and decision-making.
Substantive transition
Bosnia and Herzegovina may be observed as the most unfortunate of all the transition countries
in the Balkans. The cruel irony of Bosnia and Herzegovina is that after the war, all the forms of
transition have been presented as priorities in the process of European integration, though
now in totally dierent conditions. Following the disappearance of a strong centralised state
system, individual ethno-national identities have grown to such an extent that nationalism as
the ultimate value has superseded the value of coexistence. Namely, if we paraphrase Ortega
- a nation or a society are not strong because of their common past, but rather because of a
clear vision of their common future a question arises: what do we have in common?
A substantive transition is what political parties need to bring into eect if their common
objective is Bosnia and Herzegovina in the EU, and all the political parties do say that that is
their objective, which has no alternative. And what is it that poses itself as a problem before
them? It is the entire set of reforms which establishes European standards as the content and
the substance of the transition process.
Some political parties support the process only declaratively and obstruct it in practice, as
they otherwise stand to lose their electorate and their political inuence. Others are in favour
of reforms both declaratively and practically, but only provided they adapt them to their
wishes and needs, not understanding that acquis is not negotiable and that the most dicult
negotiations are not with EU representatives, but rather with the society and dierent interest
groups in the candidate country, when it comes to explaining the necessity of tough reforms
they are not prepared for. (Negotiations exist only in the interim arrangements until the nal
acceptance of the acquis.) There is a third group, those which are fully in favour of reforms,
with no illusions, those who know what to do and what awaits them, but with no personnel
to do it either at the level of policy design or at the level of its implementation, and not bold
enough to admit to their electorate that after all the pro-European proclamations they would
20
all have to swallow many a bitter pill.

At the Copenhagen meeting in 1993, the European Council agreed that accession would
only happen once the candidate country has become ready to assume all the membership
commitments, meeting the required economic and political criteria. For that purpose, general
criteria for membership were adopted: stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, rule
of law, human rights and minority rights, existence of a functional market economy, as well
as the ability to resist the pressures of competition and market forces within the Union, i.e. to
accept all the membership commitments, including objectives of the political, economic and
monetary union.
The role of political parties

Now that we know what is expected of BiH, and before we continue talking about ownership,
we must look at the relevant parties present in the BiH political arena. We will not mention all
of them. Out of 14 political parties in the BiH Parliamentary assembly, according to projections
based on the 2004 votes, only 8 of them will pass the 3% threshold. Of those, three are rightpopulist and yet unreformed nationalist parties/movements: SDA, SDS and HDZ. Close to
them and generated by them are two right-of-centre parties, SBiH and PDP, whose attempts
to resemble their predecessors deprive them of identity and voter support. The opposition
to these parties are the two social-democratic parties, SDP and SNSD, which are still building
their proles and nding their electorate. At that, in its rhetoric, SNSD often leans to the right,
whereas SDP has not been able to truly move to the left for quite some time. Especially after
the loss of support of the intelligentsia and the citizens who have abandoned the left-ofcentre idea and who stay at home on election day. The eight political party which will be able
to cross the election threshold is the Socialist Party (RS), mainly winning all the traditional
leftist and Yugo-nostalgic Serb voters who dislike the pragmatism of SNSD but are not willing
to look at what they see as the fake multi-ethnic SDP.
At least two problems arise in assuming ownership over changes. The rst is that none of the
three political groups may establish alone a coherent government dedicated to true reforms.
Whichever combination we opt for in this situation, we have at least two wrong concepts. If
those are the right and the right-of-.centre, at the very onset we have three parties with three
totally dierent visions of the future of BiH, just like in the other two. If we take the left and the
right-of-centre, we have a similar situation, since the rst three also have a dierent vision of
BiH in the future, though they do not dispute its European orientation, but do have a dierent
level of deviation from their leftist principles in favour of daily politics or winning votes. The
other two parties necessary in this combination are in sharp opposition each with their own
social-democratic counterpart, SBiH with SDP, and PDP with SNSD, which further complicates
the quest for a common language in assuming ownership over the reform process.
21
Another problem are the actual capacities of these political parties human, material,
organisational, which rest on their internal organisation, internal democracy, involvement of
their members and special party groups in the discussions on positions and the very process of
decision-making. It is important to note that each one relies on the concept of a single leader,
though with some variations. All the three nationalist parties had leaders who were strong
personalities with undisputed authority among members. In their absence, the leadership
of the parties was assumed by political elites as compensation for a single leader, and the
members respect the elites basically because they are, in reality, a replacement for the leader
who is no longer there to be the protector of national interests. That is why the obedience of
the members in relation to the elites is undisputed. The two right-of-centre parties also rest on
the concept of the leader-founder, who is still there, though hiding behind the elite he created
himself. Their members are dedicated for as long as they can draw benets from aliation
with the party or closeness to the elite leading it in the name of the president, though for their
own account. Even social-democrats cannot escape the leader cult, though the leader is not
the father of the nation nor the sugar-daddy, but rather the leader of resistance to earlier
concepts, and with support for as long as his principles in the resistance are not questioned,
and for as long as the leader does not fail the expectations. Furthermore, national parties have
a strong basis in the nationally aware masses, and the multiplier of their messages and the
collateral of their reputation and honesty are the respective religious institutions.
A particular problem is in the lack of systemic education of personnel. It is sporadic,
disorganised, unfocused and dependent on members themselves and their willingness to
be engaged. Expert councils, often comprising individuals who had a standing in their areas,
but who have long since ended their academic careers or have not further developed their
knowledge. Young personnel either cannot assert themselves, or opt for employment in
well-paying international institutions or EC projects in BiH, or one of the numerous foreign
organisations. The situation is the same with young experts with true knowledge of the
processes and who are working on the reforms, but who do not want to enter politics as they
have been looking at it for years as the key obstacle to the fullment of the kind of life they
want.
Unfortunately, the international community, embodied in the OHR, is not helping to overcome
this situation. International ocials are often prone to mediocrity and compromise on
European values, thus creating a misrepresentation that European values are negotiable. This
is a typical depreciation of everything that is presented to the BiH society as the goal or the
ideal.
On the other hand, with its conduct and interventions, the OHR removes responsibility from
local politicians for anything that takes place, as it is eventually OHR that adjudicates. If a
reform threatens any national interests, the parties say it is not up to us, the OHR made us do
22
it. If anyone asks them why they havent initiated a process, again they say the international
community wont let us. The worst thing is that OHR agrees to this game, just as it agrees that
the legal reform projects created in the small project teams of the EC Delegation are planted as
successes of domestic legislators, and that voting on a law is considered a completed reform,
irrespective of whether it truly came to life or not.
A real coming-to-be of the concepts of ownership and partnership entail a de-pasivisation
of politicians and political parties which must become true partners for someone to defer
responsibility to them. And to become partners, they must be at the same level of information
and knowledge about the processes they are involved in. The idea of several enthusiasts, to
initiate a State (or even a Regional) political academy, that would provide complete education
for politicians, or at least further develop and expand their views, has never come to life.
Instead, all the organizations involved focused on stemming a democratic nervous system
onto an outdated totalitarian mental set-up, which is afraid of anything that is dierent. Sixty
years ago, Isztvan Bibo said that to be democratic means, rst of all, to be free from fears: not
being afraid of people who think dierently, speak dierently, or are of dierent background...
and not being afraid of all the imaginary dangers that become real dangers just because we
are afraid of them.28 There is still, unfortunately, fear from the other and the dierent, in our
society and in our political life.
In view of the fact that the Constitution of our state was constructed with the assistance
of the international community, and that all the processes of change have been led by the
international community, and that almost all the analyses and initiatives related to the nonfunctioning of that very constitutional organisation come from international institutions (The
Venice Commission, the Balkan Group, the European Parliament), a question arises if our
parties have been at all, since the war, given an opportunity to be responsible for success or for
failure, or has the risk been too great. Perhaps this conrms Malina Kroumovas claim that the
system of international relations, interacting with the historical background, identities and
traditional perceptions, denes the parameters of new political regimes, whose framework is
then later articulated by constitutional and legal structures.29
There is a trend in the public opinion of transition countries that the further the EU is, the
greater is the support of the population to EU integration, and as the moment of accession
approaches, the support grows smaller, as people become pessimistic about the idea. This is
in direct relation to the failed expectations and inability of the political parties to lower the
expectations of the people. This leads to disappointment with politicians, parties and political
28
Bibo, Isztvan, Bijeda malih istono-europskih drava [Misery of Small East-European States], Budapest, 1946.
29
Kroumova, Malina. Dening the Parameters of State Policy towards Minorities: the Balkan Experience in the 90s.
Post-communist transition as a European Problem. Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2002, p. 132.
23
processes overall, ultimately resulting in electoral abstinence. Low turn-out at elections

favours the radical, nationalist, right-wing parties, thanks to their own disciplined and loyal
electorate. Because of their very nature, such political parties are not the best players in the
transition processes. Just as a warning, the turn-out at the 2004 elections in BiH was 48%, and
the opinion of politicians and parties was the worst ever.
How and to whom does the international community intend to hand over the ownership; over
the process of change, on the basis of what ideal, with what kind of societal support, for what
time and with what kind of consequences?
Conclusions
- The BiH society, or specically, its political-economic elite, is still dependent on the
international community and is unable to assume, immediately and at once, the
responsibility for social processes.
- At the same time, the international presence in BiH is beginning to weaken and is expected
to withdraw, proportionate to the strengthening of BiHs association with the EU. There
are even thoughts that exit from BiH should not be conditioned by anything, including
weakness of domestic institutions. Currently, there is no greater danger for BiH than the
implementation of this idea.
- These two extremes beg for the imperative to devise and plan the departure of the
international community, an integral part of which would also be a clear strategy of
equipping the domestic institutions to assume ownership. One by one, segment by
segment, month by month, year by year.
- Development of the international communitys exit strategy from BiH corresponds with
the imperative to optimise the constitutional system, i.e. the upgrading of the Dayton
framework. One cannot go without the other, just as BiH cannot create the conditions for
Brussels standards without these two key preconditions.
Recommendations
- It is high time for the Peace Implementation Council and domestic institutions to set a timeframe and a sequence of moves for the phasing out. A precondition for that is to waive the
principle of rapid reforms and to determine more realistic deadlines, arising primarily from
the actual capacities of BiH.
- In the coming period, the Peace Implementation Council and the domestic authorities
must commence regular consultations aimed at establishing a joint expert group. This
24
group should, over a period of three months, put together a list of weak points of the
state administration, which would have to be strengthened in order to make it capable of
assuming ownership.
- Following the identication of weaknesses, the expert group would recommend measures
to overcome the existing situation, In collaboration with the EC Delegation to BiH, a shortterm program of utilisation of the twinning programmes should be developed, i.e. new
priorities should be articulated for the utilisation of European funds in accordance with the
list of weaknesses within state administration that are to be removed.
- Starting from the conclusion of this analysis, that one of the weaknesses is a shortage
of adequate analytical/information capacities in state administration, a possibility of
establishing a state-level Directorate for Planning and Analysis under the Council of
Ministers should be considered, to comprise three strategic sectors: economic and scal
analysis, foreign policy and European integration, geo-strategic and security analysis.
The advantage of this concept is a functional unication of departmental analyses and
planning30 and servicing all the state institutions from a single location. The need for this
approach arises from several important challenges that BiH is to face in the coming period:
signing of SAA, determination of foreign policy and security doctrine, determination of
strategy for negotiations with IMF and the World Bank, accession to Partnership for Peace.
- As for the problem of internal information within institutions, and the inter-sectoral
cooperation at state-level, there is an imperative to establish a central, state-level
information service, that would ensure a full ow of information among institutions, removal
of any parallelism in activities, and regular coordination of all the intra-institutional services
providing information. This unit would be tasked, together with the Directorate for Strategic
Planning and Analysis, with proposing to the Council of Ministers a legislative framework for
introducing non-paper communication among state institutions, and legislation related to
security protocols of electronic ocial information, electronic seal and electronic signature,
etc.
- As part of the approach to developing an exit strategy for BiH, as the generator of reforms and
development of capacities of domestic political players to assume ownership over reforms,
the very concept of reform must change. The national question must not be a hindrance to
economic, structural or functional reforms. There can be no political negotiations on expert
proposals. Protection of national interests must be related only to the preservation of
cultural, religious and national identity of ethnic-national groups, and not to all the issues of
reforms. The reason for this is that obstruction of European integration by national interests
creates intolerance towards national groups as obstacles to development, and intolerance
30
In one of its future analyses, the research group will oer specic options for the work of the Directorate.
25
breeds support for national movements which draw their strength from it, and continue to
multiply conicts as an element of their own policy (perpetuum mobile viciosus).
- Separation of economic and other existential issues from national interests and national
issues in BiH may create a space for centre- or left-wing parties to articulate and present
political programmes focused on their issues.
- The procedure of constitutional changes as complicated as the state structure itself, but
there is in BiH a quasi-political player which receives inadequate attention, but which may
act as the driving force of constitutional reforms and harmonisation of legislation with
international acts incorporated into the BiH Constitution. It is the Constitutional Court of
BiH, which is currently hindered by the modied Anglo-Saxon approach to its work, which
means that it can rule on cases only if led by authorised parties with a standing before it,
rather than applying the continental principle of having an autonomous right to initiate
procedures for examination of constitutional norms and legal acts. It should assume this
role as soon as possible.
- Representatives of the international community must not allow unprincipled compromises
to depreciate the European standards and values, if that is the only thing that all the citizens
and all the political parties in BiH have in common. If compromise is still nourished under
the guise of the you must agree yourselves phrase, domestic politicians may be astonished
when, once in the real Brusselisation, they realise that there is, in fact, no compromise and
that the ruling policy is take it or leave it.
- Support to political processes in BiH must be focused on education and development of
target groups of young politicians within existing political parties and with a consensus
from their leadership, rather than diverting attention to the creation of new parties and
fragmentation of existing ones. BiH must have complete and mature politicians, just as it
must have experts outside the sphere of politics. Otherwise, who will the EU negotiate with
in the Brussels phase with itself?
- Projects and studies conduced by some of the civil society institutions must be utilised for
policy design, as analytical and research capacities of political parties and state institutions
are still underdeveloped, since they simply do not have the right people at the right places,
for numerous subjective and objective reasons.

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Analysis 01/05

Working Group - Political Analysis

Sarajevo, June 2005.

community to the local authorities

Can the international community (OHR) renounce its responsibility?

Can the state institutions assume governance of the state?

Can political parties assume the responsibility over the reform

The role of political parties

Sarajevo, June 2005

Can the BiH society become responsible?

impossibility of an antagonised multi-ethnic society to become responsible at all.

Can the international community (OHR) renounce its responsibility?

constructive counterpart to the international bureaucracy, which threatened to assume

community in dealing with the problem of a lack of capacity of domestic institutions is

Reform package inaugurated jointly by the Alliance authorities and OHR.

Can the state institutions assume governance of the state?

creation of rules, implementation of rules, and adjudication on violations of those rules.24

Ibid. pp. 22-29.

all have to swallow many a bitter pill.

The role of political parties

processes overall, ultimately resulting in electoral abstinence. Low turn-out at elections

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