KRISTINE CONFESOR

1- ESTRELLADO

1.
THE FAMILY

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Family relations include

1. Between the husband and wife
2. Parent and Children
3. Among other ascendants and descendants
4. Brothers and Sisters whether full or half blood
General Rule
For a suit between members of the same family to prosper, the ff are
required, otherwise the case will be dismissed.:
1. Earnest efforts towards compromise have been made
2. Such efforts have failed
3. Such earnest efforts and the fact of failure must be alleged
>>Exceptions CVLFJF
1. Civil status of Persons
2. Validity of Marriage or Legal Separation
3. Grounds for Legal Separation
4. Future Support
5. Jurisdiction of Courts
6. Future Legitime
HIYAS SAVINGS BANK V. ACUNA
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the
same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that
earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper. Article 151 is applicable only in cases which are exclusively
between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows
that the same may be invoked by a party who is a member of that same
family.

FAMILY HOME
Dwelling place of a person and his family
Guidelines

It is deemed constituted from the time of actual occupation as a

family residence
It must be owned by the person constituting it
It must be permanent
Rule applies to a valid and voidable and even to common-law
marriages under 147 and 148
It continues despite death of one or more spouses or unmarried
head of the family for 10 years or until there is a minor beneficiary
Theres only one family home

General Rule:
Family home is exempt from
1. Execution
2. Forced Sale
3. Attachment
>>Exception:
1. Non-payment of taxes
2. Debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home
3. Debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution
4. Debts due on Laborers, Mechanics, Architects, Builders,
Materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building
Requisites to be a beneficiary
1. Relationship is w/I those enumerated
2. They live in the family home
3. They are dependent for legal support on the head of the family
Requirements for the Sale, Alienation, Donation, Assignment or Encumbrance
of Family Home
1. The written consent of the person constituting it
2. His/her spouse
3. Majority of the beneficiaries of legal age
***In case of conflict, the court shall decide
In case of Death
The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years, or for so long as there is a minor beneficiary
The heirs cannot partition the home unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor
Requisites for Creditor to avail right under 160
1. He must be a judgment creditor
2. His claim is not among those excepted under Art. 155
3. He has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is worth
more than the maximum amount fixed under 157
Procedure to avail of right under Article160

1.
2.

3.
4.

The creditor must file a motion in the court proceeding where he

obtained a favorable for a writ of execution against the family
home.
There will be a hearing on the motion where the creditor must
prove that the actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount fixed by the FC either at the time of its
constitution or as a result of improvements introduced thereafter
its constitution.
If the creditor proves that the actual value exceeds the maximum
amount the court will order its sale in execution.
If the family home is sold for more than the value allowed, the
proceeds shall be applied as follows:
a. First, the obligation enumerated in Article 155 must be
paid
b. Then the judgment in favor of the creditor will be paid,
plus all the costs of execution
c.
The excess, if any, shall be delivered

PARTICIO V. DARIO III

To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.
Legal support, comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the following
characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor
and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It
cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is
reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
MODEQUILLO V. BREVA
A family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by
law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who
owns the home.
Art. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of FC, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled
to the benefits accorded to a family home under FC. It does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2 of Title V have a retroactive effect.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153
of the Family Code. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment
arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on 1976 and the
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the CA on Jan, 1988 prior to the
FCs effectivity.

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO

A. Grounds
Thus the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child are:

TANEO, JR. V. CA
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said,
however, that the family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land
on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to
enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs.[9] It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted
judicially by filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court and
extrajudicially, by recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of
property declaring the establishment of the family home. The operative act
then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the
Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of
the Civil Code. Under the FC, registration was no longer necessarily (see 153).
In this case, March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question,
erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The
money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964.
Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet
constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of
Article 243(2).

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

I.
1.
2.

KINDS OF FILIATION

Natural
a) Legitimate
b) Illegitimate
Legal Fiction through Adoption

Legitimate Children
Conceived or born during the marriage of parents;
Maybe through natural means or by artificial insemination
1.

Natural/Biological
Liyao v. Liyao, (2002): A child conceived or born during a valid
marriage is presumed to belong to that marriage, regardless of the
existence of extramarital relationships.

2.

Artificial Insemination
Requisites of children conceived through artificial insemination to
be considered legitimate
1. Artificial Insemination made on wife
2. Sperm comes any of the following
a. Husband
b. Donor
c.
Husband and Donor
3. In case of donor sperm, husband and wife must
authorize/ratify insemination in a written instrument
a. Executed and signed by husband and wife
before the birth of the child
b. Recorded in the civil registry together with the
birth certificate of the child

CABANG V. BASAY
Cabang mistakenly occupied the lot owned by Basay that was the subject
matter of a case that was earlier decided up to the Supreme Court. The writ of
execution was opposed on the ground that the houses of petitioners family
home was still subsisting and being such, it is not subject to execution.
SC: The family home must be established on a) the absolute community, or b)
the conjugal partnership, or c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the other. It cannot be established on a property held in coownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on the
community property, or conjugal partnership and partly on the exclusive
property of either spouse with the consent of the owner-spouse.
In the case at bar, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which
their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and the question
of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate
courts judgment. Thus, Cabangs continued stay on the subject land is only
by mere tolerance of respondents. A family home cannot be established on
property held in co-ownership with third persons. The family home must be
established on properties of the ACP, CPG, or EP of either of the spouses with
the consent of the other, or EP of the unmarried head of the family.

KINDS OF FILIATION
IMPUGNING LEGITIMACY
PROOF OF FILIATION
LEGITIMATION
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE OR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Illegitimate Children
Those conceived and born outside of a valid marriage
>> Exceptions:
a) Children of marriages void under Art. 36
b) And under Art. 53, second marriage of a widow or widower who has
not delivered to his or her children by his or her first marriage the
legitime of said children

1.

2.
3.

Physical impossibility for sexual intercourse within the first 120

days of the 300 days which immediately preceded thechild's birth
due to:
a. By the impotence of the husband;
b. By the fact that husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that access was not possible;
c.
By the serious illness of the husband
Other biological or scientific reasons, except Artificial Insemination.
And in case of Artificial Insemination, the consent of either parent
was vitiated through fraud, violence, mistake, intimidation, or
undue influence.

B. Action for Impugning Legitimacy

The action for impugning legitimacy of a child may be brought within 1, 2, or 3
years from the knowledge of the birth, or the knowledge of registration of
birth.
1. Within 1 year if the husband or any heirs reside in the same city
or municipality where the child was born or the birth was recorded
2. Within 2 years if the husband or all heirs live in the Philippines
but do not reside in the same city or municipality where the childs
birth took place or was recorded
3. Within 3 years if the husband or all heirs live outside of the
Philippines when the childs birth took place or was record in the
Philippines
If the birth of the child has been concealed or was unknown to the husband,
the above provisions shall be counted:
1. Discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child; or
2. From the discovery or knowledge of its registration
3. Whichever is earlier
Legitimacy can only be attacked directly
General Rule: Only the husband can impugn the legitimacy of a child. If he
does not bring action within the prescribed periods, he cannot file such action
anymore thereafter, and this is also true with his heirs.
>>Exception: That the heirs of the husband may file the action or continue the
same if it has already been filed and the husband died
a. before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action
b. after the filing of the complaint without having desisted
c. If the child was born after the death of the husband.

III. Proof of Filiation

II.

IMPUGNING LEGITIMACY

A. Rules
A. Rules

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO

Legitimate or illegitimate children may prove their filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence.
General Rule: They may only prove their status using the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Their record of birth appearing in the civil registry.
2. An admission of his filiation (legitimate or illegitimate) by his
parent or parents in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by said parent or parents. (SEMPIO-DIY)
3. Proof of open and continuous possession of status as legitimate
or illegitimate child
4. Any other means stated by the rules of court or special laws
163-171 CASES
DE JESUS V. ESTATE OF DIZON
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing, is in itself a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest
in an appropriate action the legitimacy of the child born to his wife. Thus, it is
only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
BADUA V. CA
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 are not applicable in the instant case. These
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife but not where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple.
BABIERA V. CATOTAL
Article 170s proscriptive period does not apply in an action to cancel a
persons BC for being allegedly VOID AB INITIO.
Article 171 of the FC applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wifes child, i.e., to declare that such child is an illegitimate
child, but not to an action to establish that such child is not the wifes child at
all.
The provision presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is
an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latters child at all. The resent action does not impugn petitioners filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera because there is no blood relation
to impugn in the first place. This is an action to nullify or cancel petitioners
BC for being void ab initio.

LIYAO V. TANHOTI-LIYAO
only the father may impugn the legitimacy of the child or in proper cases, his
heirs under the conditions set forth in Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning
the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, the heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved
CONCEPCION V. CA
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has
no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas
husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.[26] Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

ONG V. DIAZ

Jinky, who was already married to a Japanese national Hasegawa

Katsuo, had an affair with Rogelio Ong. They lived together for
about 4 years (January 1994 to September 1998) and had a child
Joanne Rodjin.

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Jinky and Joanne and

stopped supporting the minor alleging that he is not the father of
the child. Subsequently Jinky filed a complaint against Rogelio
because of his continued failure and refusal to give support to the
child and to acknowledge the child as his.

The heirs, who substituted Rogelio when he died, insisted that the
decision of the appellate court remanding the case to the trial
court for DNA testing analysis be set aside and to declare Joanne
as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa.

It was established however, that Hasegawa was living outside of

the country and comes home only once a year. No evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of Joanne Rodjin.

SC: The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child.

A child born to a husband and a wife during a valid marriage is

presumed legitimate. This presumption of legitimacy of the child,
however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary.

With the advancement in the field of genetics, and availability of

new technology, it can be determined with reasonable certainty
whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The
DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the

individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is

unique for each person, except for identical twins.
the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA. Biological samples include blood, saliva, and
other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

B. Action for claiming filiation

The child can bring the action during his or her lifetime and even
after the death of parents. The action does not prescribe as long as
he lives.

If the child is a minor, or is incapacitated or insane, his guardian

can bring the action on his behalf.
172-176 CASES

FERNANDEZ V. CA
Violeta Esguerra, single, mother and guardian ad litem of petitioners Claro
Antonio Fernandez and John Fernandez, pointed to Carlito S. Fernandez as
father of petitioners. She claimed that she and Carlito started their illicit
sexual relationship six months after their first meeting sometime in 1983
which resulted to the birth of petitioners. Violetta averred that they were
married in civil rights and claimed it was unknown to her that Carlito was
married until the birth of their child and discovered that their marriage license
was spurious.
o CLB, identifying their father as Carlito Fernandez,
o Baptismal certificate of Claro stating the same,
o photographs taken during baptism and in the house of Violetta
showing Carlitos showering of affection to Claro.
o witnesses who contended that Violetta had introduced Carlito at
different times to them as her husband.
Carlito denied Violettas allegations and averred that he only served
as a sponsor in the baptism of Claro. Such claim was corroborated by
his officemate who was also a sponsor of said baptism.
W/N the documentary evidences presented by petitioners are sufficient to
prove their filiations.
NO.
o Photographs- are far from proofs that private respondent is the father
of petitioner Claro. As explained, he was merely a sponsor to the
baptism; the photo showing Carlito showering his affection to Claro falls
short as evidence to prove paternity.
o Baptismal Cert naming him as father- has scant evidentiary value
because there is no showing that private respondent participated in its
preparation.
o CLB is not also competent evidence on the issue of paternity
because the records do not show that private respondent had a hand in
preparation thereof.

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO

FERNANDEZ V. FERNANDEZ (20 PESOS)

Spouses Dr. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia were childless.

So they purchased from a certain Miliang a baby boy named as
Rodolfo. Jose died on 1982 leaving his wife and Rodolfo an estate
which became the subject in their execution of deed of extrajudicial partition. On the same day, Generosa executed a deed of
absolute sale to Rodolfos son.

After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the

deceased Jose Fernandez filed an action to declare the
extrajudicial partition void ab initio on the ground that Rodolfo is
not the son of the spouses and he merely took advantage of
Generosas physical and mental incapacity.

Rodolfo presented
o
baptismal certificate and
o
an application for recognition of backpay rights by Dr.
Fernandez stating hes the son of the latter.

RTC declared the deeds null and void and found Rodolfo was not
legitimate nor a legally adopted child of the spouses Fernandez. CA
affirmed the trial courts judgment.

W/N Rodolfos filiation can be collaterally attacked in an action for the nullity
of the sale and extrajudicial settlement. W/N Baptismal Certificate is
admissible as proof of filiation.

HELD: COLLATERAL ATTACK. YES.

o
While ones legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct
action, this doctrine cannot be applied in the instant
case considering that respondents claim was that
petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the spouses
Fernandez. It is not a situation wherein they deny that
Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife.

PROOF OF FILIATION FAILED.

o
BC Although it may be considered as a public
instrument, it is only an evidence to prove the
administration of sacrament on the date stated therein
specified, but not the veracity of the statements and
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.
o
Family portrait DID NOT offer sufficient proof of filiation.

application for recognition of backpay,

o
the public document contemplated in Art. 172 FC refer
to written admission of filiation embodied in a public
document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the
public document was executed as an application for the
recognition of backpay.
Petitioner Rodolfo is NOT a child by nature of the spouses
Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the
subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa and Rodolfo is null and void insofar
as Rodolfo is concerned.

LAGABALA V. SANTIAGO (DONATION OF JOSE)

Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. Alleging that Jose

had fraudulently registered it in his name alone,

Santiago sisters sued Jose for recovery of title, ownership, and

possession against herein petitioner Ida Lagabala to recover from
her 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came
into her possession upon Joses death.
o
Respondents (sisters) alleged that Joses share in the
property belongs to them by operation of law, because
they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died
intestate without issue. They claimed that the deed of
sale of the property executed by their brother to
petitioner is a forgery.

Petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida Lagabala but Ida
Santiago and that she is the daughter of Jose, thus she is entitled
to his share in the subject property. She argued that the purported
sale was in fact a donation to her.

RTC ruled in favor of Ida

CA reversed
o
BC of Ida Lagabala presented by respondents showed
that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his
wife.

W/N petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the
daughter of Jose Santiago.

NO.

Art. 263 of the CC refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy

of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a mans
child by his wife.
o
the present case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy but for recovery of title, possession and
thus outside the scope of Art. 263s proscriptive
periods.

BC plainly states that Ida was the child of spouses Leon

Lagabala and Cornelia Cabrigas. Therefore, this certificate is
proof of filiation of Ida. If the BC presented in evidence is not
hers,
o
then she should have presented hers considering
that she has presented her Baptismal Certificate.
o
Besides, Bap Cert is not a proof of the parentage of
the baptized person. This document can only prove
the identity of the one baptized, the date and place
of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal
sponsors and the priest who administered the
sacrament, nothing more.
o
Further, petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the
same birthdate as Ida Lagabala. The similarity is too uncanny
to be a mere coincidence. Not being a child of Jose, it follows
that petitioner cannot inherit from him through intestate
succession. Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case; Jose did
not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property

o
o

to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Neither

may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation.
ITR that listed her as filers daughter is insufficient to prove
filiation, The entries made in an income tax return only shows
that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.
Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.

LOCSIN V. JUAN LOCSIN, JR

Juan Locsin, Jr. herein respondent, filed with the RTC a petition
praying that he be appointed as administrator of the intestate
estate of the deceased Juan Locsin, Sr.
o
Alleged that he is acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and that he is the only surviving legal heir of
the decedent.
o
machine copy of his CLB found in the bound of the
volume of birth records in the office of the LCR.
o
LR officer as witness.
o
photograph showing him and his mother in front of a
coffin bearing Juan Locsin, Sr.s dead body as claim that
he and his mother have been recognized as family
members of the deceased.

The heirs of Juan Locsin, Sr, herein petitioners filed an opposition

averring
o
He is neither a child not an acknowledged natural child
of Sr.
o
CLB is spurious and adduced CLB found in the
CRGeneral, Metro Manila indicating that the birth of the
respondent was reported by his mother
o
No signature of the late juan locsin.

RTC found the CLB and photograph sufficient proof of illegitimate

filiation.

CA affirmed.
As between the original certificate of live birth issued in the place where the
alleged birth took place and a certified true copy issued by the civil registrar
general but has entries different from the one issued by the local civil
registrar, which copy must prevail?

BIRTH RECORD.
o
Since the records of birth cover several decades and
come from all parts of the country, to merely access
them in the civil registry general requires expertise. To
locate one single record from the mass, a regular
employee, if not more has to be engaged.
o
It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro
Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957
birth record originating from the local civil registry of
Iloilo City.
PHOTOGRAPH with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we
recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage
and sanction fraudulent claims.

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO
o

Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before

a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming
the estate of the deceased.

BERNABE V. ALEJO
Late fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered da son with his secretary, herein
plaintiff appellant Carolina Alejo on 1981. Spouses Bernabe died in 1993
leaving Ernestina as the sole heir.

Carolina, on behalf of their child Adrian, filed a complaint praying

that Adrian be declared acknowledged as illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given his share of the deceaseds estate, which is
being held by Ernestina.

RTC dismissed the complaint citing Art. 175 of FC

o
the action must be instituted during the lifetime of the
parent,
o
hence, the death of Fiscal Bernabe has barred the
action and since the father has not recognized by writing
or action, it should have been bought during his lifetime
to give him the opportunity to affirm or deny the filiation.

CA reversed.
ISSUE: The child was born in 1981. The alleged father died in 1993. May the
child be allowed to prove his filiation despite the clear provision of Art. 175 of
the Family Code which requires that if the action to establish illegitimate
filiation is based on the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent?
HELD: YES

The child should be allowed to prove his filiation as he was born in

1981, and therefore, his rights are governed by Art. 285 of the Civil
Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4
years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

-Art. 285 is a substantive law, as it gives the child the right to file
his petition for recognition within 4 years after attaining the age of
majority.

The Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an

action for recognition because the right had already vested prior to
its enactment.

The rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are

applicable to spurious children. Our overriding consideration is to
protect the vested rights of minors who could have filed suit, on
their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. The State as
parens patriae should protect a minors right.

DELA ROSA V. VDA DE DAMIAN

One of those claiming the estate of the late spouses Rustia, is Guillerma
Rustia who acted as an intervener and sought recognition on 2 grounds.
o
1st, compulsory recognition:

through the open and continuous possession of the

status of an illegitimate child and
2nd, voluntary recognition
o
through authentic writing
o
the report card that identified Guillermo Rustia, named
Guillerma as one of the children.
o

ISSUE: W/N Guillerma can still claim compulsory acknowledgement from

Guillermo Rustia.
HELD: NO
ACTION PRESCRIBED. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the
status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative
father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through
the courts.
o
Furthermore, any judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment
has dual limitation:
The lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
father. On the death of either, an action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.

In this case, Guillermas right to claim compulsory

acknowledgement prescribed upon the death of
Guillermo Rustia on 1974.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION FAILED. An authentic writing, for purposes of
voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent.
o
This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by
the father to be his.
o
Did Guillermas report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo qualify as
authentic writings under the Civil Code? Unfortunately not.
o
The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there, as her
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no
participation in its preparation.
o
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo
himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa which
was published in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 2,
1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping
of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed
manuscript was fatal to Guillermas claim.

TEOFISTO VERCELES V. POSADA (MAYOR)

Posada, a young lass from a barrio in Catanduanes, was impregnated by
Verceles, the mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes.

Verceles denied fathering the child.

o
he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza
Posada and that it was Clarissa Posada who placed his
name on the birth certificate as father without his
consent.
o
Clarissa, on the other hand, presented as evidence
o
letters sent to her by Verceles starting from the very time
that she missed her menstruation and 3 other
handwritten letters, 2 of which were in his letterhead as
mayor of Pandan.
o
pictures Verceles gave her of his youth and as a public
servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the
back.
o
P2,000 pocket money and another P2,000 for her
delivery. Clarissas testimony was corroborated by her
mother.
ISSUE: W/N the child is petitioners illegitimate child.
HELD: YES.
o
the letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to
the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used
an alias (Ninoy) in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in
these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioners fading
photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye
will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and
the same person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
o

ADMISSION of his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters

between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.

The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which

establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172(2) of the FC. The
letters are not just grounds for compulsory recognition but in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. In addition, the array of evidence presented by
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
petitioners illegitimate child.

DELA CRUZ V. GRACIA (UNSIGNED AUTOBIOGRAPHY)

21 y/o petitioner LENIE and then 19 y/o DOMINIQUE cohabited;

Jenie got pregnant, and lived in Dominiques parents; Dominique
died

APPLICATION OF REGISTRATION of childs birth using Dominiques

surname Aquino proof submitted:
o
CLB
o
AUSF w/ Autobiography (unsigned)
o
Affidavit of Acknowledgment by Doms father; all
attested that Dom had continuously acknowledged his
yet unborn child, and paternity is not questioned

LCR denied Jenies application for registration; the child cannot

use the surname of the father because he was born out of wedlock

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO

and the father died before the birth of the child and has no more
capacity to acknowledge his paternity
LENIE invokes Art. 176
o
Illegitimate may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the father
through

CLB or

when an admission in a public docu or

private handwritten instrument.

Provided, that the father has the right to

institute an action before the courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime xxx
o
Recognition made in any of these documents, is in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgment of childs
paternity; no JA needed (De Jesus v. Dizon)

W/N the unsigned handwritten statement of deceased father of minor can be

considered as a recognition of a paternity which would entitle the minor to use
his fathers surname.

OSG- mere recognition of pregnancy, not paternity

SC: Art. 176 does not explicitly state the need of signature but
IMPLIED.

It must be read in conjunction with other provisions (Art. 175:

same way and on the same evidence as Art. 172 of legitimate
children (2) private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.)

SUBSTANTIALLY SATISFIES REQUIREMENTS

o
Death 2 mos. prior to childs birth
o
Autobiography and facts from testimonial evidence of
Jenny
o
Corroborated by Doms father and his father whose
hereditary rights could be affected by registration of
questioned recognition
o
Pedigree:

Relationship

Family genealogy

Birth, marriage, death

Dates and places where facts occurred

The private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence; it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

NEPOMUCENO V. LOPEZ (UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN NOTE)

Petition and recognition of Support filed by for Lopez who was born
out of extramarital affair of her mother and Nepomuceno.

Lopez said Nepomuceno did not affix his signature in BC but

nevertheless obligated himself to give financial support through a
letter for 1,500 beginning Aug. 15, 1999

W/N there is clear and convincing evidence of Nepomucenos paternity

through 172 (2) private handwritten instrument and signed by parent
concerned which would entitle Lopez for support as illegitimate daughter

SC: The action for support has to determine filiation being lodged
on the obligation to support found in Art. 195 in rel 194 (4) parents
of illegitimate children and the leg/illeg of the latter.
NO. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about
filiation to petitioner. In establishing filiation, the putative father
must claim the filiation himself and must be written by the father.
Therefore, it is beyond ambit of 172(2) which admits its competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the party concerned.
o
No signature in Handwritten Note
o
No signature in BC
o
Consistent denial of paternity, nor contemporaneous
actions

GOTARDO V. BULING (BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY)

Divina Buling filed for compulsory recognition and support pendent

lite, petitioner is father of child Gliffze; She was a casual employee
of PCIB while Gotardo is accounting supervisor; he courted her,
sent greeting cards on Valentines day, birthday, special occasions;
reciprocal love. They had sex, result- Gliffze. Petitioner was happy
and they planned to get married but Gotardo backed out. Suit
ensued.

Gotardo denied paternity claiming discrepancies in dates of their

sexual intercourse and conception of child; inconsistent
testimonies

RTC: Dismissed. Insufficiency of Evidence

CA reversed. Discrepancies were due to mistake in appreciating

the question of counsel, ordered to recognize Gliffze
W/N the CA committed error

NO.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate

paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity,
such as citizenship, support (as in this case), or inheritance.

Burden of proof of paternity is in the one who alleges it

(Ong v. Diaz)
o
4 significant procedural aspects

Prima facie case

Affirmative defenses

Presumption of Legitimacy

Physical Resemblance
Prima Facie: when a woman declares supported by corroborative
proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; then
burden of proof shifts to the father. (Herrera v. Alba)
o
In this case, Rodulfo, her uncle corroborated her
testimony
Affirmative Defenses:
o
Incapability due to impotency
o
Mother had sexual relations w/ other men
Petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations of promiscuity; his denial cannot overthrow the
respondents clear and categorical assertions
o

Nepomuceno countered that Araceli had not proven that he was

the father and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten
note due to NPA threats
RTC: treated the note as contractual support granted Respos
prayer for pendent lite support. Rested her case
o
RTC on Pets demurrer: CLB was not prima facie
evidence of her filiation as it did not bear his signature.
DISMISSED.
o
CA: reversed. Lopez is illegitimate child of Pet. He paid
the hospital bills and committed to provide financial
support; that Pet acted in bad faith in omitting a
statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking
o
Pet: no explicit statement in documentary evidence
presented that he admits filiation

PERLA V. BARING (SEAMAN; COHABITATION; 15 Y/O SON)

Antonio Baring landed a job as seaman and abandoned his child

Randy with his common law spouse for 2 years, Mirasol.

Mirasol Perla averred that they were sweethearts and when she
got pregnant he promised to support her
o
CLB and BC indicating Antonio as father and testified he
supplied the info.
o
Randy, 15 y/o testified that he was at a vacation in his
Aunts house and Antonio promised for support.
o
Witness neighbor corroborated

Antonio, now married, denied having fathered Randy but admitted

that he knew of Mirasol
o
He did not have a hand in preparation of CLB
o
Hilots daughter: Her mother told her that the child has
no acknowledged father and was left to her Mother but
Mirasol took the child away when he was 5 years old

RTC: Granted. No bad faith or ill-will on part of Randy and Mirasol;

admission of sexual intercourse; child as witness

CA upheld: Certified true copies of illegitimate filiation CLB;

baptismal cert. While they do not bear signature of Antonio, they
are proofs that Amntonio is the known father
W/N the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy

SC: NO.
o
Failure to establish Illegitimate filiation
o
Art. 172

CLB, Admission in PD, or PWI signed

Open & Continuous possession of legitimacy

or ROC
o
Art. 175 illegitimate means to establish filiation same
as legitimate
o
CLB w/o signature has no probative value; no hand in
preparation

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO
o

o
o

Testimony of Randy about 1994 cannot be considered

as an open and continuous possession; there must be
manifest intention to consider child as his which cannot
be attributed to pure charity. It was only one instance,
not continuous, spontaneous, and uninterrupted.
BC- lack of participation, not proof of parentage,
inadmissible as proof of filiation and cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence
Admission of Sexual Encounters Mirasol must rely on
the strength of her evidence, not the weakness of
defense

SALAS V. MATUSALEM (LOOSE MORALS)

Anabelle Matusalem claimed that Narciso Salas is the father of her

son; that he, then 56, made her believe he was a widower, rented
an apartment where they lived, but when she refused to give her
the child to Salas family after Salas confession of having sired an
illegitimate child, they were abandoned and left to friends and
relatives mercy.

Narciso countered and described Anabelle a woman of loose

morals having borne her first child out of wedlock. That she was
again pregnant of another child, and that out of altruism he
shouldered the expenses.

RTC ordered monthly support

CA affirmed:
o
ROC; testimony about apartment, etc. even absence of
CLB

W/N filiation of the child was duly established according to 175 in relation to
172 and therefore entitled for support.

SC: NO
o
o
o

CLB is not competent evidence of paternity w/o fathers

hand in preparation for the certificate; neither can it be
taken as public instrument and has no probative value
BC can only be considered as evidence of administration
of sacraments on the date specified; not necessarily
competent evidence as to the veracity of entries therein
Handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill,
photographs- have scant evidentiary value; letters were
not signed by Narciso and contained no statements of
admission, although they were authentic, not qualified in
172.n
Testimonies by themselves are insufficient to establish
paternity

AGUILA V. SIASAT (SSS)

Alfredo Aguilar & Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, intestate without

debts.

Rodolfo Aguilar filed a case for mandatory injunction against Edna

Siasat alleging that he is the sole heir; the titles were missing but
found in Siasats possession; thus he asked that it be surrendered
to him
o
School records Aguilar are his parents
o
ITR which stated that Candelaria is his mother
o
SSS of Alfredo, as public instrument subscribed and
made under oath during his employment which bears
his signature and thumbmarks and indicates that
Rodolfo was his son and dependent
o
Employment Sheet where it was indicated that he is his
son
o
Certificate of his Marriage where it is declared that the
spouses are his parents
o
Employment Recommendation Letter
o
Certification issued by LCR Bacolod of destruction of
records
o
Testimonies
Edna claimed that he is not the son of the spouses but a mere
stranger who was raised; not a natural nor adopted child; that
since Alfredo predeceased his wife, Candelaria inherited the
conjugal share of Alfredo; that upon death of Candelaria, her
brother and sister inherited her estate and the subject tiles were
not stolen but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria, who
is her Aunt.
o
Testimony of Aureas who stated that she does not know
petitioner, that he knows of Rodolfo, but denies
petitioner as son of spouses
o
Affidavit that Candelaria is the sole heir of her husband

W/N SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by
Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son is public document that
satisfies the requirement of Art. 172(2) to establish petitioner as son of
spouses

SC: YES
o

SSS FORM satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation

and relationship to the spouses; by itself, it constitutes
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
CA erred when it treated document as mere proof of
open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; it is an express recognition.

IV. LEGITIMATION
Legitimated children are illegitimate children who because of the subsequent
marriage of their parents are, by legal fiction, considered legitimate.
Requisites for Legitimation
1. The child was conceived and born outside of wedlock
2. General rule: Parents, at the time of childs conception, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other

Exception: RA 9858- children born of parents who were

disqualified only because either or both of them were below 18
years of age at the time of childs conception may be legitimated.
Grounds for impugning Legitimation
1. The subsequent marriage of the childs parents is void
2. The child allegedly legitimated is not natural
3. The child is not really the child of the alleged parents
V. Rights of Legitimate and Illegitimate Children
1. Surname
a. Legitimate and legitimated: surname of mother and
father
b. Illegitimate: uses surname of mother but the fathers
surname may be used if father has explicitly recognized
the child as his (RA 9255, Revilla Law)
2. Succession
a. Legitimate and legitimated: those granted in Civil Code
b. Illegitimate: share of a legitimate child
3. Support
a. Legitimate and legitimated: in accordance to provisions
in the family code
b. Illegitimate: entitled to support but support will come
from separate properties of parents

ADOPTION
I.
II.

III.

RA 8552
a. Who may adopt
b. Who may be adopted
Adoption Procedure Under 8552 IRR
a. Pre-adoption Services
b. Effects of Adoption
c.
Rescission of Adoption
d. Effects of Rescission
e. Rectification of Simulated Births
RA 8043: Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
a. Who may adopt
b. Who may be adopted
c.
Where to file application
d. Documents to support Application
e. Inter-country Adoption Board
f.
Trial Custody

LEGITIMATION
The law merely makes

ADOPTION
Law merely creates by

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO
Persons Affected
Procedure
Who applies
Effect

legal what exists by

nature
Only the natural
children
Extrajudicial acts of
parents
Only by both parents
Same status and rights
with that of a legitimate
child not only in relation
to the legitimazing
parents but also other
relatives

fiction a relation which

did not in fact exist
Generally applies to
strangers
Always by Judicial
Decree
H & W adopts jointly
Creates a relationship
only between the child
and the adopting
parents

I. RA 8552: DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998

A. WHO MAY ADOPT (SEC. 7)
1. Filipino citizens
a. of legal age
b. In possession of full civil capacity and legal rights
c.
Of good moral character
d. Has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude
e. Emotionally and Psychologically capable of caring for
children
f.
At least 16 years older than adoptee, except when the
adopter is biological parent of the adoptee or is the
spouse of the adoptees parent
g. In a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family
2. Aliens
a. Possession of the same qualification as of qualifications
for Filipinos
b. His/Her country has diplomatic relations w/ the
Philippines
c.
Has been living continuously for 3 years (Provided that
absences not exceeding 60 days per 1 years for
professional business, or emergency reasons are
allowed) in RP prior to the filing of application and
maintains such residence until the decree is entered.
d. Has been certified by his or her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country
e. His/Her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adoptee
f.
Has submitted all the necessary clearances and such
certifications as may be required
***Items c, d, e may be waived under the ff circumstances:
1. Adopter is a former Filipino Citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the 4thdegree of consanguinity or affinity
2. One ho seeks to adopt the legitimate or illegitimate child
of his/her Filipino spouse

3.

3.

One who is married to a Filipino Citizen and seeks to

adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative within the
4th degree of consanguinity or affinity by the Filipino
spouse

Guardians
With respect to their ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her accountabilities

Case Study Report

Consent Necessary for Adoption (sec.9)

1. The prospective adoptee if 10 years or older
2. The prospective adoptees biological parents
Legal guardian or the govt instrumentality or institution that has
custody of the child
3. The prospective adopters legitimate and adopted children who are
10 years or over, and , if any, illegitimate children living with them
4. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Matching
Placement
Supervised Trial Custody
Home Study Report
Recommendation and Consent
Petition for adoption
Adoption Decree

II. ADOPTION PROCEDURE (sec. 10-32, RA 85520

A. Pre-Adoption Services
The DSWD shall provide for the following services:
1. Counseling services for the biological parents,
prospective parents, and prospective adoptee
2. Exhaust all efforts to locate the biological parents, if
unknown
B.

Effects of Adoption (sec. 16-18)

1. Parental Authority
i. All legal ties between the biological parents
and adoptee are severed, and the same shall
be vested on the adopter, except if the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter
2. Legitimacy
i. The adoptee shall be considered legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter for all intents
and purposes and shall be entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate children born to them without
discrimination of any kind
3. Succession
i. Adopter and adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation, in legal and intestate
succession. If adoptee and his/her biological
parents had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.

C.

Rescission of Adoption (sec. 19)

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s)

NOTE: A decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date of the original

petitions filing. It also applies in case the petitioner dies before the issuance
of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee.
Child to be Adopted
Biological parent signs a deed of
Voluntary Commitment (Rescissible
within 6mos.)
Voluntary Commitment: Declaration
for availability of adoption
Involuntary commitment:
Announcement of Missing
Child in Tri-Media

Application for Adoption

Case Study Report

HW shall adopt jointly, except:

1. If one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other
2. If one of the spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate child
provided that the other spouse has signified his/her consent
3. If spouses are legally separated from each other
*** if spouses jointly adopt, parental authority shall be exercised jointly.
B. WHO MAY BE ADOPTED? D-L1-IQ-18-R-D
1. Any person below 18 years old who has been administratively or
judicially declared available for adoption
2. The legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse
3. An illegitimate child by a qualified adopter to improve the childs
status to that legitimacy
4. A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his or her
child since minority
5. A child whose previous adoption has been rescinded
6. A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died, provided
that no proceedings shall be initiated within 6mos. from the time of
death of said parent(s)

Declaration
of
Abandonment
Declaration of Availability
for Adoption

Adopter
Inquiry at DWSD
Attendance of DSWD Adoption For a
and Seminars

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO
Adopted may request for rescission, with the assistance of DSWD,
if a minor, or over 18 but incapacitated, based on the ff grounds:
1. Repeated Physical and Verbal Maltreatment despite
having undergone counseling
2. Attempt to the life of the adoptee
3. Sexual Assault or Sexual Violence
4. Abandonment or Failure to comply w/ parental
obligations
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adopted based on causes as
enumerated in Art. 919 of the NCC.

III. RA 8043: Inter-Country Adoption Act

of 1995
Intercountry Adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino
child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the
petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of
adoption is issued outside the Philippines.

Tamargo v. CA (1992)
Where the petition for adoption was granted after the child had shot and
killed a girl, the Supreme Court did not consider that retroactive effect may be
given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the adopting parents
so as to burden them with liability for a tortuous act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and
unconscionable.

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

B.

At least 27 years of age and at least 16 years older than the

child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the
adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or
the spouse of such parent.
If married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption
Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and
responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws,
and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an
accredited counselor in his/her country
Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude la
Eligible to adopt under his/her national w
Is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to
give the necessary moral values and example to his children,
including the child to be adopted
Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied
under the Philippine Laws, the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act.
Comes from a country with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a
similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption
is allowed under his/her national laws.

WHO MAY BE ADOPTED (sec. 8)

1. Only a legally-free child may be subject for inter-country
adoption
2. A legally-free child is one who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the DSWD of the Philippines, in
accordance with PD603
3. No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless
it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted
locally
4. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the
ff documents must be submitted to the Board:
a. Child study
b. CLB or Foundling Cert
c.
Deed of Voluntary Commitment
Decree of Abandonment

Death Cert of Parents

Medical Evaluation/History
Psychological Evaluation, as necessary
Recent photo of the child

C. WHERE TO FILE APPLICATION (sec. 10)

Application shall be filed with the Philippine RTC having jurisdiction over
the child, or w/ the Inter-country Adoption Board through an
intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and
accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents.

A. WHO MAY ADOPT? (sec. 9)

Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad
who has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the
Act may file an application if he/she:

D. EFFECTS OF RESCISSION (sec. 20)

1. The parental authority of the adoptees biological parents, if known,
OR the legal custody of the DSWD shall be restored if the adoptee
is still a minor or incapacitated
2. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopters and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished
3. The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended
certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original CLB.
4. Successional rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but
only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights
acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
E. RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATED BIRTHS (sec. 22)
A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a
child shall not be punished for such act: Provided,
1. That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the
child and that he/she has been consistently treated by that person
as his/her own son/daughter
2. That the application for correction of the birth of registration and
petition for adoption shall be filed within 5 years from the effectivity
of this Act and completed thereafter.
3. That such person complies with the procedure for Legal Adoption
as specified in this Act, which includes the Child and Home Study
Report of DSWD to determine if tbe alleged conditions in the
application for rectification exist, and other requirements as
determined by the Department

d.
e.
f.

D.

APPLICATION SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE FF DOCUMENTS

WRITTEN AND OFFICIALLY TRANSLATED IN ENGLISH (sec. 10)
1. CLB of applicants
2. MC and Divorce Decree, if applicable
3. Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above
10 years of age in the form of sworn statement,
4. Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly
licensed physician and psychologist
5. Income Tax Returns or any document showing the financial
capability of the applicant
6. Police clearance
7. Character reference from the local church/minister,
applicants employer and a member of the immediate
community who have known the applicant for 5 years
8. Recent postcard-sized pictures of the applicant and his
immediate family

E.

INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD

1. As the central authority in matters relating to intercountry adoption
2. Ensures that all possibilities for adoption of the child
under FC have been exhausted and that Inter-Country
adoption is in the best interest of the child.

F.

TRIAL CUSTODY
1. The governmental agency or the authorized and
accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents
shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of
the child. It shall also provide for the counseling and
other related services
2. The trial custody shall be for a period of 6 mos. from the
time of the placement
3. It starts upon actual physical transfer of the child to the
applicant who, as actual custodian, shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the person of the child
4. The adopting parents shall submit to the government
agency or the authorized and accredited agency, which
shall in turn report of the childs adjustment. The
progress report shall be taken into consideration in
deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.

LAHOM V. SIBULO

KRISTINE CONFESOR
1- ESTRELLADO

Dr. Diodado Lahom & Isabelita adopted the latters nephew Jose Sibulo at
age of two. LCR of Naga changed the surname of Jose.

Isabelita moved to rescind the adoption on 1998 when RA 8552

already took effect.
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 deleted the right of the adopters to
rescind the decree of adoption
o
Sec. 19 Grounds for Rescission

If a minor or if over 18 years of age but is

incapacitated

Repeated physical & verbal maltreatment by

adopters

Attempt of the life of Adoptee

Sexual Assault

Abandonment and failure to comply with

parental obligations
o
Not subject to rescission by adopters, but they may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Art. 919 in
CC.
o
Proscription in RA 8552 should not retroactively apply to
cases where the ground for rescission of adoption
vested under the regime of the Art. 348 of the CC and
Art. 192
Jose moved for dismissal
o
No jurisdiction; cause of action in view of RA 8552
RTC:
o
Has jurisdiction, being a family court
o
Grounds prescribed. having been known for more than 5
years prior to the filing

May the subject adoption decreed on 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by

an adopter after effectivity of RA 8552? If yes, has it prescribed?
SC: NO. Yes

The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at

the time of the commencement of the action.

Law governing at the time the petition was filed (Rep. v. Miller)
o
Having been instituted after 8552s effectivity, it cannot
be pursued.
o
Even before the passing of statute, the action to rescind
is subject to the 5yr bar rule under Rules of Court and
that the adopter would lose the right after the lapse of
said period.
o
A person has no vested right in statutory privileges.
Adoption is merely a right created by statute.

LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

Minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene were the children of Amelia and the late
Manuel Ramos. After Manuels death, the children were left under the

custody of their paternal grandmother because Amelia left for Italy. When the
paternal grandmother died, the children were taken cared of by a paternal
uncle.
Landingin, the 57-year old aunt and sister of the late Manuel and an
American citizen residing in Guam, now desires to adopt the 3 children. In her
petition, she alleged

that the mother of the children had abandoned them and had not
communicated with her children neither with her in-laws.

Amelia has already remarried and has 2 children with her 2nd
husband. That petitioner and her other siblings were the ones
financially supporting the children.

She is already a widow and living alone because all her children
are already married and are gainfully employed.

They have given their consent in writing to the adoption, and also
promised to help her in supporting the children financially.

Likewise, the paternal uncle where the children are currently

staying also signified his willingness and commitment to support
the minors while in petitioners custody.

The Child Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer

Pagbilao stated that the surviving parent consented to the
adoption as evidenced by the Affidavit of Consent executed by the
childrens mother Amelia as the mother came home on May 2,
2002 and stayed for 3 weeks.

The minors likewise, consented to the proposed adoption.

Pagbilao then recommended that the children be adopted by

petitioner.
During the trial however, Landingin failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
also failed to adduce documentary evidence that, indeed, Amelia assented to
the adoption.
W/N petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of
the biological mother?
W/N the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioners children
sufficiently complies with the law? and
W/N petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees?
SC:
Section 9 of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides:
Whose consent is necessary to the adoption:
X x x x.
(b) The biological parents of the child, if known x x x .
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interest of the child.

Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is indispensable

for the validity of a decree of adoption.
In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia to the
adoption. Petitioners argument that her consent is no longer necessary
because she left for Italy and never came back, hence, Amelia had
abandoned the children and it was just by twist of fate that after 12 years
Amelia was on vacation and was able to meet Pagbilao, must be rejected.
If, as claimed, that the biological mother had abandoned them, she should
have adduced the written consent of the childrens legal guardian. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
does not constitute abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.
Here, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine, the eldest of
the 3, to prove that Amelia abandoned them. The Home Study Report tends
to show otherwise. Elaine during the interview said that in serious problems
she already consult her mother and petitioner-aunt. And while petitioner and
other paternal relatives are continuously providing for most of their needs and
education, Amelia would also send financial support ranging from
P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 a month through her parents and share
P3,000.00 to P5,000.00 thereof with the children.
Thus, Amelia left for Italy without intention of abandoning her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her
children to her now deceased mother-in-law.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos report and the joint affidavit of
consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove.
As to her financial capacity, the Report stated that petitioner is 57 years old,
employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips
of around $1,000.00 per month. That she owns her house at Quitugua Subd.,
Yigo, Guam but the same is still being amortized. Given these limited facts, it
is doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial
aspect of rearing the 3 children in the US. While she claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children, the OSG is correct in stating
that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter.
Moreover, no proof was adduced to prove her allegation that her children and
siblings are willing to support the minors herein.

IN RE: LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

Michelle was given to the spouses Lim in 1977 while Michael was delivered in
1983. They were only about 11 days old when they were given to the spouses

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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Lim who had them registered as if they were their own children. They were
reared and cared for and were sent to exclusive schools and used the
surname Lim in all their school records and documents. In 1988, the
husband died and the surviving spouse entered into another marriage with an
American citizen, Olario.
Monina (the surviving spouse) then filed two separate petitions to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 or the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998 to those individuals who simulated the birth of the child.
Both children, who are already of legal age, gave their consent including
Michelles husband to the adoption. Olario likewise executed an affidavit of
consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support
and successional rights.
While petitioner insists that joint adoption is no longer possible because
Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner before the
Los Angeles Superior Court, the filing of said case is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between Monina and Olario,
the marriage still subsists.

FC denied the petition because inasmuch as Monina has remarried, her

petition should have been jointly filed with her new husband.
ISSUE: Whether Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
SC: It is undisputed that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petition by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. The law is explicit.

Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads

o
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt subject to the
exceptions. The word shall means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child,
it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule is to insure harmony between the spouses.
Neither would the exceptions apply.
1ST the children are not the legitimate children of the petitioner or of her
husband; 2ND the children are not the illegitimate children of the petitioner ;
and
3RD petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

Future support cannot be the subject matter of compromise, such

are void. (Art. 2035, CC)

Refusal to support children or descendants without justifiable

cause is a sufficient condition for the disinheritance of parents or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 920, CC).

Unjustified refusal to support ones children or spouse is a

sufficient cause for disinheriting a spouse (Art. 921, CC)

Spouses are jointly responsible for the familys support. Support

expenses shall be paid from the CP, or in absence thereof, the
income/fruits
of
their
separate
properties,
or
in
insufficiency/absence thereof, from the separate properties (Art.
70)

SUPPORT
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. KINDS
B. CHARACTERISTICS
C. HOW SUPPORT IS GIVEN
II. WHO ARE OBLIGED TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER
III. PROPERTIES ANSWERABLE FOR SUPPORT
IV. ORDER OF SUPPORT
A. IF THERE ARE MULTIPLE OBLIGORS
B. IF THERE ARE MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS
I.

SUPPORT
Consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family (Art. 194)

The right and duty to support, especially the right to education,

subsists even beyond the age of majority (Art. 194)

The amount of support is in proportion to the means of the provider

and the needs of the receiver, and can be reduced or increased if
such circumstances change (Arts. 201-202).

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation- that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age-emancipation terminates
parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.

The obligation to give support shall be DEMANDABLE from the time

the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be PAYABLE except from the date of
judicial or extra-judicial demand (Art. 203).

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still

considered the legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
legitimate child as provided for under Article 174 of the Family Code.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child,

When, WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE of the person obliged to give

support, it is given by a stranger, the stranger has the right to claim
the same from the person obliged, unless it appears that he gave it
without intention of being reimbursed (Art. 206).

When the person obliged to give support UNJUSTLY REFUSES or

FAILS to give support when urgently needed, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement

There are also certain requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. None of the qualifications were shown and proved during
the trial. Neither are the requirements on residency and certification waivable
as the children are not relatives within the 4th degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or Olario.

from the person obliged to give support. This particularly applies

when the father or mother of a minor child unjustly refuses to
support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed
(Art. 207)

A. KINDS OF SUPPORT
1. Legal- that which is required to be given by law
2. Judicial that which is required to be given by court order whether
pendente lite or in a final judgment
3. Voluntary or Conventional by agreement
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT (PREVIEW)
1. Personal
2. Intransmissible
3. Not subject to Waiver or compensation with regard to future
support
4. Exempt from attachment or execution, except if support is
contractual or given by will. In such cases, any excess legal support
can be subject to levy on attachment or execution
5. Reciprocal on the part of those who are by law bound to support
each other
6. Variable
C. HOW SUPPORT IS GIVEN (ART. 204)
1. Payment of the amount;
2. Accepting the recipient in the home of the provider, unless there is
a legal or moral obstacle from doing so
II. WHO ARE OBLIGED TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER (ART. 195)
1. Spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants
3. Parents and their children (legitimate and illegitimate) and the
children of the latter (legitimate and illegitimate);
4. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood;
5. Illegitimate brothers and sisters, EXCEPT when the need for
support of one (of age) is due to a cause imputable to his/her fault
or negligence (Art. 196)

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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NOTE: Both legitimate and illegitimate children are entitled to support

III. PROPERTIES ANSWERABLE FOR SUPPORT (ART. 197-198)

1. From the separate property of the obligor. If no separate property,
the ACP/CPG (if financially capable) shall advance the support, to
be deducted from the obligors share upon liquidation of such
regime.
2. Pending legal separation or annulment, support (Pendente lite) for
spouses and children will come from the ACP/CPG. After the final
judgment granting the petition, mutual support obligation between
spouses ceases. (But in legal separation, court may order guilty
spouse to give support to innocent spouse.
[Note: De facto separation does not affect the ACP, except that the spouse
who leaves the conjugal home without just cause shall not be entitled to
support (Art. 100)
IV. ORDER OF SUPPORT (SDAB)
A. Order of support if there are multiple obligors (2 or more; Art. 199)
1. Spouses
2. Descendants, nearest in degree
3. Ascendants, nearest in degree
4. Brothers and Sisters

When two or more are obliged to give support, the payment shall be
divided between them IN PROPORTION to their resources
Also, in case of URGENT NEED and by special circumstances, judge
may order only one obligor to furnish support without prejudice to
reimbursement from other obligors of the share due from them
(Art. 200)

B. Order of priority if there are multiple recipients (Sempio-Diy)

1. Observe order in Art. 199 (SDAB)
2. But if the concurrent obliges are the spouse and a child subject to
parental authority, the child shall be preferred

CASES on SUPPORT
DE ASIS V. CA

The mother filed an action for recognition and support. The

putative father denied paternity and instead filed a counterclaim.

The parties agreed to dismiss the case in a manifestation, provided

the alleged father would no longer pursue his counterclaim.

Subsequently, the mother filed another case against the alleged

father again, for support and recognition.

The putative father moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of res judicata.

SC: Such manifestation does not bar the mother from filing a subsequent
case for support on behalf of the same child against the same defendant
because such manifestation and the agreement to dismiss the case on
condition that the defendant will not pursue the counterclaim constitute a
form of renunciation as they severed the vinculum that gives the child the
right to claim support from the putative parent.

THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE SUPPORT CAN NEITHER BE RENOUNCED

nor transmitted to a third person. To allow renunciation or
transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to
support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the
recipient to a public burden.

IT CANNOT BE COUNTENANCED. An agreement for the dismissal of

a complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the
dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise that
cannot be countenanced.
-If paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially
established and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. The
admission may be binding upon the respondent, such admission is at most
evidentiary and does not conclusively establish lack of filiation.
GAN V. REYES (3 Y/O KID WILL GO TO SCHOOL)

Apprehensive that she would be unable to send her 3-year old

daughter to school, she wrote Gan demanding support for their
love child.

Gan denied paternity of the child.

o
Since the childs birth certificate indicated her father as
UNKNOWN, then there is no legal basis for the claim
for support.

Gan was declared in default and was ordered to recognize the

child Francheska Joy as his illegitimate child and to support her. A
writ of execution was issued citing as reason the childs immediate
need for schooling.

Meanwhile, Gan appealed the judgment of the CA. He then filed a

petition for certiorari insisting that
o
judgment sought to be enforced did not yet attain
finality.
o
reason that he should be allowed to prove his defense of
adultery.
SC: There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground
that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. The
Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments
in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an
appeal.

This is an exception to the general rule,

GR: taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment. The

aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of
all judgments for and makes no distinction between those that are
the subject of an appeal and those that are not.

To consider then petitioners argument that there should be good

reasons for the advance execution of judgment would be to violate

the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate

execution.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always
the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view
of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to
refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains
finality while time continues to slip away.
Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of
adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the
mother of the child.
The money and property adjudged for support and education
should and must be given presently and without delay because if it
had to wait for the final judgment, the children may in the
meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed
and lost years in school because of lack of funds.
o
One cannot delay such funds for support and education
for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however
much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot
cure the evil and repair the damage caused.

MANGONON V. CA (LOLO PACO AND TWINS)

Ma. Belen Mangonon and Federico Delgado were civilly married.

The marriage however, was subsequently annulled due to absence
of the required parental consent under Article 85 of the Civil Code.

7 months after the annulment, Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica

and Rina. Federico totally abandoned them and Mangonon had to
rely upon her 2nd husband for assistance.

Demands made upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco,

the latter being generally well known to be financially well-off, were
unheeded.

Petitioner then filed, for and in behalf of the twins a petition for
declaration of legitimacy and support with application for support
pendente lite before the RTC of Makati.
o
As legitimate children and grandchildren, the twins are
entitled to general and educational support under

Articles 174 (2) and 195

(b) in relation to Articles 194 (1) and (2) and

199

(c) of the Family Code.

Mangonon argued that

o
in case of default on the parents part, the obligation to
provide support falls upon the grandparents of the
children;
o
thus, Federico, or in his default, Francisco should be
ordered to provide general and educational support in
the amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.

Francisco stated in his answer that

o
CLB of twins do not bear the signature of Federico
o
1st establish their legitimacy as there is no basis to
claim support until a final and executory judicial
declaration has been made as to the civil status of the
children.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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Whatever good deeds he may have done to the twins

were founded on pure acts of Christian charity.
o
And assuming that he could be held liable for support,
he has the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying
the support or receiving and maintaining in the dwelling
here in the Philippines the person claiming support.
o
He further posits that because petitioner and the twins
are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code
provisions on support because laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (Article 15,
NCC).

Federico, on the other hand, alleged

o
he left for abroad and stayed there for a long time
within the 1st 120 days of the 300 days immediately
preceding March 25, 1976 (birth of the twins) and that
o
he only came to know about the birth of the twins when
the latter introduced themselves to him 17 years later.
He did not tell them that he could not be their father in
order not to antagonize them.
The trial court said that,

the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied.

o
constant communication with their grandfather
Francisco.
o
Francisco admitted having written several letters to Rica
and Rina. In said letters, particularly at the bottom
thereof, Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina
Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that the
twins bear the surname Delgado.
o
Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as Lolo
Paco or Daddy Paco. In his October 13, 1989 letter
he said, as the grandfather, am extending a financial
help of US$1,000.00.
SC:
The pertinent provision is Article 199 of the FC;

Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support, the

liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided: (SDAB)
The spouse;
The descendants in the nearest degree;
The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
The brothers and sisters.
Tolentino explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those
more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may
be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those
who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.
o

There being prima facie showing (letters from GP) that Mangonon
and Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, they are primarily
charged to support their childrens college education. In view
however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support
shall be borne by Francisco.

Under Article 199 of the FC, as the next immediate relative of the
twins, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of
their parents. It having been established that he has the financial
means to support the twins education, he, in lieu of Federico
should be liable for support pendente lite.

While respondents have the option under Article 204 to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has the right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case
there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

In this case, Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option.

o
Prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between Francisco and the petitioner and
daughters was quite pleasant. The correspondences
exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of
thoughtfulness and concern for anothers well being.
The photographs presented a seemingly typical family
celebrating kinship. All these, however, are things of the
past.
o
With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at
one another, the relationships had been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact
that those who they considered and claimed as family
denied having any familial relationship with them. Given
all these, we could not see the twins moving back here
in the Philippines in the company of those who disowned
them.
LIM V. LIM (BOTH NO SOURCE OF INCOME; CONCUBINAGE)
Spouses Cheryl and Edward and their 3 children live with Edwards parents,
and his grandmother. Edward is receiving P6,000.00 from their family
business. Cheryl, on the other hand, had no steady source of income.

In 1990, Cheryl together with her 3 children left her in-laws house
after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with inhouse midwife of his grandmother in what the court described as
a very compromising situation.

She then sued Edward together with his parents and grandparents
for support.

RTC ordered Edward, his parents and grandparents to provide

support in the amount of P40,000.00. P6,000.00 from Edward
while the balance of P34,000.00 shall be borne by his parents
subject to the subsidiary liability of the grandparent.
o
The court held that Edwards parents (petitioners in this
case) and his grandmother Chua Giak were jointly liable
with Edward because of the latters inability to x x x to
give sufficient support x x x.

The petitioners argued before the CA

o
While Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself
sanctions its effects by providing that that legal support

should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the

family
o
Article 194 of the Civil Code as amended by the FC.
their liability is activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the childrens minority. At the time
Cheryl sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children hence, the
obligation to support ends with them.
SC: While parental authority under Title IX pertains to parents, passing to
ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide
legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents
but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.

CHERYL IS UNABLE to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient

legal support to her children, then all school-bound.

AMOUNT OF SUPPORT BY EDWARD IS INSUFFICIENT to meet

respondents basic needs.

This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their

children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
nearest degree, both in the paternal and maternal line (Cheryls
family had already been giving support to respondents) following
the order established in Article 199 of the FC.

To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to

sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material
deprivation of children because of paternal inability to give
adequate support even if the ascendants one degree removed are
more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to

their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives by blood of lower degree.

Hence, only the children of Cheryl and Edward are entitled to

receive support from their grandparents.

Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to
her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.

Petitioners wish to exercise the option under Article 204 is

unavailable. It will force Cheryl to return to the house which, for
her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the
level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward
for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her
steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral
impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception
clause of Article 204.

DOLINA V. VALLECERA

In the complaint for violation of RA 9262, Dolina added a prayer for

financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child.

Vallecera opposed the petition as Dolinas action was essentially

one for financial support rather than for protection against woman
and child abuses.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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SC: To be entitled to legal support one first establish the filiation of the child,
if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate
child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The childs remedy is to
file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory recognition.
If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.
In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights
but their filiation must be duly proved.
While the Court is mindful of the best interest of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers
legitimate family.
LIM-LUA V. LUA
Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Danilo
Prayed for support pending litigation for her and their children 500k
citing huge earnings of Danilo
RTC granted
213 FC, support is demandable from the time the plaintiff needed the
said support but is payable only from the date of the judicial demand.
Retroacts to the time of filing of judicial demand. (7mos. x 250k=1,
750, 000). The monthly support is w/o prejudice to any
decrease/increase thereof as circumstances may warrant.
Respondent
Petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering she does not
maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and
respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance
and well-being according to familys social and financial standing.
Disallowing deductions would result to unjust enrichment, making him
pay for the obligation twice.
That the groceries and Volkswagen and BMW are considered as
advances for support in keeping w/ the financial capacity.
Petitioner
CA erred to have allowed the deduction of the value of 2 cars and the
maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items were
not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or keeping them
alive.
SC: CAs decision reversed
Support pendent lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for
declaration of nullity/annulment of marriage are guided by the rule on
provisional orders.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Art. 209. Pursuant to the

natural right and duty of parents

over the person and property of their unemancipated children,
parental authority and responsibility shall include
the caring for and rearing them
for civic consciousness and efficiency and
the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. (n)

PA and R may not be renounced or transferred, except in the cases

authorized by law. (Art. 210, FC)
GLF-SPA-SES
Except:
1.
Guardianship (waiver of parental authority, allowed)
2.
Legal Adoption (waiver of parental authority, allowed)
3.
Final Order or judgment of a competent court
4.
Substitute Parental Authority
5.
Separation of Parents
6.
Entrusting of disadvantaged children to heads of
a.
Childrens homes
b.
Orphanages
c.
Similar institutions duly accredited
7.
Surrender of the child by its parents
(waiver of parental authority, allowed)

Done in writing

To any public institution;

Benevolent or Charitable institutions

The father and the mother shall JOINTLY EXERCISE PARENTAL AUTHORITY
over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. (Art. 211, FC)
Children shall always
observe respect and reverence towards their parents and
are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under
parental authority.
IN CASE OF ABSENCE OR DEATH of either parent,
the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children,
unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian
of the person or property of the children. (n)
IN CASE OF SEPARATION OF THE PARENTS,
PA shall be exercised
by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account
all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,

unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Considerations
(PC-RC-HE-TAC-FC)
Previous Care and Devotion
Religious Consideration
Home Environment
Time Availability for Care of the Child
Financial Considerations
Compelling Reasons
(CHINMIND)
Communicable disease
Habitual Drunkenness
Immorality
Neglect and Abandonment
Maltreatment of the Child
Insanity
Non-employment
Drug Addiction
IN CASE OF DEATH, ABSENCE OR UNSUITABILITY of the parents,
substitute PA shall be exercised by
the surviving grandparent.
In case several survive, the one designated by the court,
taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the
preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. FILIAL PRIVILEGE RULE
No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to
testify
against his parents and grandparents,
except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime
against the descendant or
by one parent against the other. (315a)

SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person
shall exercise SUB PA over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

In default of parents/JAG>>214-BS21-CAC21
IN CASE OF FOUNDLINGS, ABANDONED NEGLECTED OR ABUSED children
and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted
in summary judicial proceedings
to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions
duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Disadvantaged Children
1) Foundlings- infant found by others abandoned or exposed,
without known parent or person having custody or charge of it
2) Abandoned- no proper parental care or guardianship/ deserted
for a period of atleast 6mos.
3) Neglected- basic needs have been deliberately unattended or
inadequately attended
4) Abused- physical abuse/maltreatment by his parents/other
persons
Protection
Heads of Childrens Homes
Orphanages
Similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government
agency
DSWD
-legal availability for adoption; process of declaration
-LCR will issue foundling certificate to be transmitted within 7 working days
to NSO
Art. 218.
The school, its administrators and teachers, or
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child Care
shall have SPECIAL PA and responsibility
over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
-

Authority and responsibility shall

apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219.
Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be
PRINCIPALLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor.
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE.

Art. 223.
The parents or, in their absence or incapacity,
the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides,
for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child.
The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of
his choice or appointed by the court, and
a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and
the child shall be heard.
-

EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN
Art. 220.
The parents and those exercising PA shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following RIGHTS AND DUTIES:
To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct
them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in
them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
supervise their activities, recreation and association with others,
protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
To demand from them respect and obedience;
To impose discipline on them as may be required under the
circumstances; and
To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents
and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221.
Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be CIVILLY LIABLE for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and
under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 222.
-

The courts may appoint

a guardian of the child's property or
a GUARDIAN AD LITEM
when the best interests of the child so requires. (317)

However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner

at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the
circumstances so warrant,
the court may also order the
o
deprivation or suspension of parental authority or
o
adopt such other measures as it may deem just and
proper.

the commitment of the child for NOT MORE

THAN THIRTY DAYS in entities or institutions
engaged in child care or in children's homes
duly accredited by the proper government
agency.

The parent exercising parental authority

shall not interfere with the care of the child
whenever committed but
shall provide for his support. Upon proper
petition or at its own instance, the court may
terminate the commitment of the child
whenever just and proper.
EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON
THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP over the property of the unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court appointment.
-

In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,

unless there is a judicial order to the contrary

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of

the child exceeds P50,000,
the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such
amount as the court may determine, BUT
not less than ten per centum (10%)
of the value of the property or annual income,
to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for
general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the

proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where

the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding

in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall
be heard and resolved.
The ORDINARY RULES ON GUARDIANSHIP shall be merely
suppletory
except
1. when the child is under SUB PA, or
2. the guardian is a STRANGER or
3. a parent has REMARRIED, in which case the ORDINARY
RULES ON GUARDIANSHIP shall apply.

Art. 226. The PROPERTY OF THE UNEMANCIPATED CHILD

earned or acquired with his
work or industry or by
onerous or gratuitous title
-

shall belong to the child in ownership and

shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education,
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.

The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's
property shall be limited
primarily to the child's support and
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family

Art. 227. IF THE PARENTS ENTRUST THE MANAGEMENT or administration of

any of their properties to an unemancipated child,
the net proceeds of such property
shall belong to the owner.
The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an
amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the
administrator were a stranger,
unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child.
In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to
the child's legitime
Espiritu vs. CA (Mothers Infidelity; Trauma)
-The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of
a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the childs interests.
-In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations.
If a child is under 7 years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by compelling reasons.

-Either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody but it is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.

SC: The convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.

Santos, Sr. vs. CA (Substitute PA; Lt. v. Stewardess)

242 SCRA 407
-The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of parents death, absence, or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine cases involving
adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the
law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in
choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors
should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take
into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the
childrens well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and
the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may be
considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children.

-The legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents despite the
latters demonstrated love and affection. Wealth, too, is not a deciding factor.
-The fathers previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism. It cannot, however, be construed as abandonment.
LAXAMANA vs. LAXAMANA (Drug Dependence)
September 3, 2002
The results of the psychiatric evaluation submitted to the trial court states
that Reymond Laxamana is not yet considered completely cured (of his drug
dependency) even though his drug urine test for shabu was negative.
Likewise the children aged 14 and 15 when asked whether they like to be
with their father but they said that they entertain fears in their hearts and
want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent. The trial court
then awarded custody of the children to their mother. Is the court correct?
No. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are
inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The psychiatric
evaluation that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take
custody of the children but there is no evidence to show that he is unfit to
provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and
intellectual training and development. While the children were asked as to
whether they like to be with their father but there was no showing that the
court ascertained the categorical choice of the children.
In controversies involving the care, custody, and control of their minor
children, the contending parties stand on equal footing before the court who
shall make a selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if
over 7 years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers
to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent chosen is
unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned taking into
account the respective resources as well as the social and moral situations of
the opposing parents.
JOYCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO (Lesbi)
Is a mother allegedly a lesbian unfit to have custody over a child below seven
years of age?

As a general rule a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children

under the age of 7. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be
ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. The so-called
tender-age presumption under Article 213 may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relationship as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that
under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may constitute a
compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been
unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor
child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or
have distracted the offending spouse from exercising parental care.
SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus)
Loran and Marie Antonette are the parents of Lorenzo Emmanuel. They lived
with Maries parents. Due to in-law problems, Loran suggested that they
transfer to their own house but Marie refused so he, alone, left the house and
was, later on, prevented from seeing his son. He then instituted a petition for
habeas corpus and custody. Ordered to show cause why Lorenzo Emmanuel
should not be discharged from restraint Marie moved for the reconsideration
of the order which the court denied. She went to the CA which the affirmed the
denial of the lower court.
On certiorari, she contended that there was no evidence at all that the 3-year
Lorenzo was under restraint and no evidence of maternal unfitness to deprive

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the mother Marie of her son of tender years. That the writ is unwarranted
considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering
further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any
notion of such mother illegally restraining her own son.
She maintains that Loran had the burden of showing a compelling reason but
failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof. Accordingly, the proper
remedy is an action for custody and not habeas corpus as the latter is
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of
the minor. Loran, on the other hand, argued that under the law, he and Marie
have shared custody and parental authority over their son. That at times that
Marie is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight
stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the
maternal grandparents.
SC: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the FC, Loran
and Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their minor son and
consequently, joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the
absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are entitled
to the custody of their child. In this case, Lorans cause of action is the
deprivation of his right to see his son, hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that
in all questions regarding the care and custody of the child, his welfare shall
be the paramount consideration.
Article 213 of the FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves
as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can
raise it as a counterargument for Lorans petition for custody. But it is not a
basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under 7 years of
age.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. CA 527 SCRA 380 (Makati v. Bora)
Spouses Franklin and Agnes have a 4-year old daughter named Simone. Their
problem started when Agnes wanted to stay in Makati while Franklin would
like to stay in their conjugal home in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan.
One day, Agnes went to Boracay, asked for money and for Franklins
permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation.
He later however, discovered that neither Agnes nor their daughter would be
coming back to Boracay. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus for Agnes
to produce Simone. The CA granted joint custody of the minor child to both
parents.
SC: The CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction when it granted joint
custody of the minor child to both parents.The Convention of the Rights of the
Child provides that in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative

authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a

primary consideration.
The so-called tender age presumption under Article 213 of the FC may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother
is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
affliction with a communicable diseases. Here, the mother was not shown to
be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers
custody.
HERALD DACASIN vs. SHARON
Sharon, Filipino, married to an American, Herald, obtained a decree of
divorce from an Illinois court. The court awarded to Sharon sole custody of
their daughter Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes. Subsequently, the parties executed in Manila an
agreement for the joint custody of their daughter and chose the Philippine
courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
agreement. Sharon, in fact undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon
for alleged violation of the agreement as the latter exercised sole custody over
Stephanie.
SC: At the time the parties executed the agreement on January 28, 2003, 2
facts are undisputed:
Stephanie was under 7 years old (having been born on September
21, 1995); and
Sharon and Herald were no longer married under the laws of the
US because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated
in fact or in law is also undisputed: no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother x x x. (Article 213 (2) FC). This
award of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory,
grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here.
The agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime
between them over their minor child under 7 years old contravenes Philippine
law.
The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated
because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole
custody under the law if the child is below 7 years old and any agreement to
the contrary is void. The separated parents cannot contract away the provision
in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below 7 years anymore
than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral,
habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease
will have sole custody of a child under 7 as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody
regime under the 2nd paragraph of Article 213.

The rules seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary

agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the
visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with
regime of sole maternal custody under the 2nd paragraph of A. 213 which
merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the
minor under 7 years of age, in case of disagreements.
Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime
2nd paragraph of A. 213 of the FC vesting on the mother sole
custody of a child under 7 years of age.
Default standard on child custody proceedings - the best interest
of the child.

NERI v. HEIRS OF UY (Over property of minor children)

GUARDIANSHIP: A father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor
under PA does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of wards
property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance
with the proceedings set forth in the Rules of Court.
-

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the

property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose
of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction
in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian
of the minor under Parental Authority, does not have the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10165 THE FOSTER CARE ACT OF 2012

CHILD- refers to a person below 18 years of age, or one who is over 18 but
unable to fully care of or protect oneself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of physical or mental disability or
condition.
Child with Special Needs refers to a child with developmental or physical
disability.
Foster Care the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a
child by a poster parent.
Foster Placement Authority (FPA) the document issued by the DSWD
authorizing the placement of a particular child with the foster parent. The
Foster Family Care License is renewable every 3 years unless earlier revoked
by the DSWD.
Matching the judicious pairing of a child with foster parent and family
members based on the

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capacity and commitment of the foster parent to meet the

individual needs of the particular child and the
capacity of the child to benefit from the placement.

WHO MAY BE PLACED UNDER FOSTER CARE:

1) abandoned, surrendered, neglected, dependent or orphaned;
2) a victim of sexual, physical, or any form of abuse or exploitation;
3) with special needs;
4) whose family members are temporarily or permanently unable or
unwilling to provide the child with adequate care;
5) awaiting adoptive placement and who have to be prepared for
family life.
6) needs long-term care and close family ties but who cannot be
placed for domestic adoption;
7) whose adoption has been disputed;
8) under socially difficult circumstances such as, but not limited to, a
street child, a child in armed conflict or a victim of child labor or
trafficking;
9) committed a minor offense but is released on recognizance, or one
who is already in custody supervision or whose case is dismissed;
and
10) in need of special protection as assessed by a social worker, an
agency or DSWD.
Provided, That in case of (2), (3), (6), (9), and (10), the child must have no
family willing and capable of caring and providing for him.
WHO MAY BE A FOSTER PARENT:
1) Must be of legal age, 16 years older than the child
unless foster parent is a relative,
of good moral character,
physically and mentally capable and
emotionally mature;
2) -Must have a
genuine interest, capacity and commitment in
parenting and
is able to provide a familial atmosphere for
the child;
3) -Must have a
healthy and harmonious relationship with
each family member living with him or her,
have sufficient resources to be able to
provide for the familys needs;
4) Must be willing to
further hone or be trained on knowledge,
attitudes and skills in caring for a child and
must not have the maximum # of children
under his foster care at the time of
application or award.
5) the relatives of the child shall be deemed as best suited to become
a foster parent who is given priority if all the above qualifications
are met.

6)

-an alien
-

7)

who possessed the above qualifications and

who has resided in the Philippines for at least
12 continuous months and
maintains such residence until the
termination of placement by the
DSWD or expiration of the foster
family license, may also qualify.

Foster parents shall

have the rights, duties and liabilities of
persons exercising substitute parental
authority, BUT
there is a prohibition on inflicting corporal
punishment upon the child (Article 233 Family
Code).

GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION WHICH SHALL BE DONE BY THE DSWD

RADEP
a. return of the child to biological parents;
b. placement for adoption of the child;
c. death of the child;
d. death of both foster parents;
e. expiration of the FPA; and
f. placement becomes prejudicial to the welfare of the child, such
as but not limited to, abandonment, maltreatment, sexual assault,
violence or other forms of abuse. In this case, the foster child with
the assistance of a registered social worker, shall have the option
to apply for termination of placement.
Long-Term Foster Placement Authority (LTFPA)- if a child has been under the
care of the foster parent for at least 7 years, the foster parent may apply for
LTFPA with following conditions:
a. return of the child to his biological parents or placement
adoptive family is not imminent;
b. foster parent continues to possess the required qualifications
and a valid foster family care license for the entire duration of the
foster care;
c. a child, 10 years old or over, assisted by a social worker, gives
written consent for a long-term stay; and
d. the DSWD shall regularly monitor, asses and reevaluate the
foster home situation every 3 years to determine it is the best
interest of the child to continue living in the foster home on longterm basis.
LTFPA- does not require eventual adoption of the child but the child enjoys the
rights of the child under Article 3 of PD 603, and other laws. The foster child
however, has no mandatory rights to succession.
If foster parent unilaterally terminates the LTFPA before the child reaches the
age of majority or finishes tertiary education, the foster parent shall make
provisions for the education and basic needs of the child, in accordance with

the standards in which the child had been raised or has become accustomed
to within said period if the foster parent has the means to support the child in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Adoption of the foster child by foster parent conditions:
1) must have all the qualifications as provided by RA 8552 or RA
8043;
2) trial custody is waived; provided a harmonious relationship exists
between the child and his foster parent and family members;
3) procedure is governed by RA 8552 or RA 8043, as the case may
be.
Assistance to a Foster Child:
1) monthly subsidy from the DSWD. Primarily for the support of the
expenses of the child to lessen the foster parents financial burden
but may be waived by the foster parent if financially capable.
2) an automatic PhilHealth beneficiary of the foster parent. If not, the
foster parent must seek enrollment with PhilHealth.
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY vs. TAGUIAM 558 SCRA 223
July 14, 2008

Taguiam was an adviser of a Grade V class of the above said

school. The grade school principal granted the written request of
the class president authorizing the class to hold a year-end
celebration at the school grounds and to use the swimming pool.
Taguiam distributed the parents/ guardian permit forms to the
pupils.

One of the pupils, Chiara Mae Federico, form was unsigned but
Taguiam presumed that she was allowed to join the activity since
her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit.

Taguiam warned the children not to go the deeper portion of the

pool. Subsequently, 2 of the children sneaked out and went after
them.

While she was away Chiara Mae drowned.

SC:

As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, Taguiam

should have made sure that the children were protected from all
harm while in her company. She should have known that leaving
the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result
in an accident.
A simple reminder not to go the deepest part of the pool was
insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation
presented to the children, especially Taguiam knew that Chiara
Mae cannot swim.
Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed
the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.
o
This a clear violation not only of the trust and
confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils
but of the school itself.

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Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: DDE
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently (AGADA) revived by a final judgment,
parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case
filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party
concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person
exercising parental authority. (327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or
the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
CIVIL INTERDICTION.
The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may
also SUSPEND PARENTAL AUTHORITY if the parent or the person exercising
the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of
lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have
resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising
parental authority.
If the
degree of seriousness so warrants, or
the welfare of the child so demands,
the court shall
deprive the guilty party of PA or
adopt such other measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.
-

The suspension or deprivation may be

revoked and the PA revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the
same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has
ceased and will not be repeated.

Art. 232.
If the person exercising parental authority

has subjected the child or

allowed him to be subjected
to SEXUAL ABUSE, such person shall be
permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)

Art. 233.
The person exercising SUB PA
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the
parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict
corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
RA 7610 CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION
CHILD ABUSE refers to maltreatment of a person below 18 years of age or
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition. It includes:
A. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
B. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
C. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as
food and shelter;
D. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
Articles 234 and 236 as amended by RA 6809 emancipation and effects of
termination of parental authority and its exception
EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY
234) Emancipation takes place by the attainment of age of majority.
Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of 18
years.
235) R
236) Emancipation for any cause shall terminate PA over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws
in special cases.
Contacting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of
21
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty
or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards
below 21 years of age mentioned in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
237) R

SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW

I. Scope and Application
238) Until modified by the SC, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious
manner, without regard to technical rules
II. Separation in Fact bet H & W
239) When H and W are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the
other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction
where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may
be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the
transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said
transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto
cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the
parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.
240) Claims for damages by either spouse, except cost of the
proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action.
241) Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other
spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family
cases, if one exists, or in the RTC or its equivalent, sitting in the
place where either of the spouses resides.
242) Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other
spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said
petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition
should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for
the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of
the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the
spouse concerned.
243) A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge
personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the
initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be
assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings.
244) In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought,
the court shall inquire into the reasons for his or her failure to
appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible.
245) If, despite all efforts, the attendance of non-consenting spouse is
not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment
as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge
shall endeavor to protect the interest of the non-appearing spouse.

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246) If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition
shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits,
documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion
of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the
witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies,
directing the parties to present said witnesses.
247) The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
248) The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber
specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the
fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be
governed by these rules.
III. INCIDENTS INVOLVING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
249) Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225, and 239 of this Code
involving parental authority shall be verified
250) And shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child
resides.
251) Upon filing of the petition, the court shall notify
a. Parents, or in absence/incapacity
b. Individuals, entities or institutions exercising PA over the
child
252) The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary
proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are applicable
IV. OTHER MATTERS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
253) The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern the summary proceedings filed under
41- presumptive death
51- delivery of presumptive legitimes
69- fixing the family domicile
73- exercise of legitimate profession; disagreement
96 and 124- administration of community properties
217- Entrusting disadvantaged Republic vs. CA (May 6, 2005)
A petition for declaration of presumptive death
is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and
not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.
In Republic vs. Lorino (January 19, 2005) the SC held that
in Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Article 247
thereof, are
immediately final and executory. An appellate court acquires no
jurisdiction to review a judgment, which by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right
nor is part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege (Veloria vs.
COMELEC).

In REPUBLIC vs. TANGO G.R. No. 161062 July 31, 2009 the SC held
Article 238 of the FC, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court
proceedings in the Family Code.
In turn, Article 253 of the FC specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states: The foregoing rules
in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings
filed under Articles 41, 51. 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable.
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads: The
judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
It follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the FC. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts.
Others Constitutional provisions strengthening marriage as an institution
(91).
children to child care facilities
in so far as they are applicable

prove non-filiation during lifetime. The

legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
370. A married woman may use:
i. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands
surname
ii. Her maiden first name and her husbands surname
iii. Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as Mrs.
371. In case of annulment of marriage, and wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse,
she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husbands surname, unless.
i. The court decrees otherwise,
ii. She or the former husband is married again to another person
372. When the legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
***NOTE: guilt of the wife in LS is immaterial unlike in cases of annulment
373. A widow may use the deceased husbands surname as though he were
still living, in accordance with Article 370.

SURNAMES
New Civil Code

364. Legitimate and Legitimated Children shall use the surname of the father.
Their Mothers surname may be used as their Middle Name.
365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter
Deemed legitimate children for all intents and purposes
Both a right and an obligation
366. Repealed by 176
a. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegtimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through
i. The record of birth appearing in the LCR
ii. Or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father.
iii. Provided, that the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to

374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
a. Add a middle name or the mothers surname
b. Add the roman numerals II.III. and so on
376. No person can change his name or surname without Judicial Authority
(RA 9048, March 22, 2001)
RA 9048: city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is authorized to
correct:
1. Clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or,
2. To change the first name or nickname of a person in the LCR
w/o need of judicial order
Proceeding is summary through the presentation of affidavits
Substantial change is adversarial through Rule 108 of RoC
Rationale:
1. To exclude change of first names from coverage of
Rule 103 (change of name, and
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries In the Civil
Registry)

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Until and unless an administrative petition for the change of

name is first filed and subsequently denied

GROUNDS for change of surname or nickname

1. Ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to
write/pronounce
2. Habitual or continued use and has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community
3. Change will avoid confusion
377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for
damages and other relief.
378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another persons surname gives a
right of action to the latter.
379. The employment of pen names or stage names is permitted, provided it
is done in good faith and there is no injury to third persons. Pen names
and stage names cannot be usurped.
380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different
names and surnames.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND VICENCIO

Cynthia Vicencio is a legitimate offspring of her mother and Pablo
Vicencio who abandoned them and never reappeared. Her mother
subsequently married to Yu, whose surname she seeks to adapt on
the ground of embarrassment and confusion as to her parentage.
Ernesto Yu testified for petitioner but did not resort to adoption
which would have been easier for Cynthias cause to be attained.
CA granted.
OSG interposed objection there being no valid cause to warrant
change of surname.
o
Might even result to legal complications due to the fact
that there are 2 legitimate common children in the
subsequent marriage of her mother and yu.
o
Suggestion of adoption was not opted by Yu as a
remedy.
-A legitimate child generally bears the surname of the father. It
must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege not a matter
of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
-More confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a
legitimate child is allowed to use the surname of the stepfather,
who did not legally adopt her.
-While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the
surname of their respective stepfather even without the benefit of
adoption such as in the cases of Calderon and Llaneta, wherein the

Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the

stepfather, in those cases the children were not of legitimate
parentage.
Art. 368 Surname of illegitimate children
-Illegitimate children shall generally, use the surname of their
mother if not recognized by the putative father.

6)

RA 9255 An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their

Father

when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no

showing that the desired change of name is for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by Julian for dropping his
middle name is convenience. How such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIA
May an illegitimate child be allowed to use her natural mothers surname as
his/her middle name when the child has been subsequently adopted by
his/her natural father?

In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang

454 SCRA 2155, March 30, 2005
May a person be allowed to drop his middle name?
Julian is the legitimated son of spouses Anna Maria Carulasan
and Song-Pei Wang. Since the couple decided to settle in
Singapore where Julian will study together with his sister,
Anna Maria filed a petition seeking to drop his middle name
and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang as he
might be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore
because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names
or the maiden name surname of the mother is not carried in a
persons name.
Held:
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or affiliation of a
person and further distinguish him from others who may have the same
given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is
legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public instrument or a private handwritten instrument, he
then bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his
fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a
given name, a middle name and a surname.
Before the registered name of a person may be changed he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason that may justify
such change. Among the grounds are:
1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
2) when the change results as a legal consequence as in
legitimation;
3) when the change will avoid confusion;
4) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and is unaware of alien
parentage;
5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alien parentage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and

Facts: Catindig decided to adopt his illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia with Gemma Astorga Garcia. The petition for adoption was granted and
ordered that Stephanies surname be changed from Garcia to Catindig but
nothing was mentioned with respect to Stephanies middle name. In his
motion for clarification/reconsideration petitioner Catindig prayed that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name. He contends that
there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name
in case there is only one adopting parent;
it is customary for a every Filipino to have as middle name the surname
of the mother;
the middle name or initial is part of the name of a person;
adoption is for the benefit of the and best interest of the adopted child,
hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by
either the Catindig or Garcia families.
SC: As correctly submitted by the parties, there is no law regulating the use of
a middle name. Even Article 176 of the family Code, as amended by RA 9255,
is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the
mothers surname is only considered in Article 375 (1) of the Civil Code, in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers name shall be
added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her mother and father.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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-

Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle name

will maintain her maternal lineage.
It is to be noted that

Article 189 (3) of the Family Code and

Section 18, Article V of RA 8552

provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent.
To allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will
not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill the noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.

REPUBLIC vs. CAPOTE

514 SCRA 76 (February 2, 2007) [more on procedure Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court]
Capote is the guardian of minor Giovanni Gallamaso who is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso.
Giovanni was born in 1982 (NCC) and his mother used the surname of
the father when she registered the child despite absence of marriage
between them. The alleged father failed to take up his responsibilities on
matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. The
childs pleas for attention along that line fell of deaf ears.
As his mother is in the US and might eventually petition the child to join
her in the US, the continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of the natural father, may complicate Giovannis status as
natural child.
The Republic contends that the

purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely

affected by the childs change of name should have been made
respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
SC: THE SUBJECT OF RIGHTS MUST HAVE A FIXED SYMBOL FOR
INDIVIDUALIZATION WHICH SERVES TO DISTINGUISH HIM FROM ALL OTHERS;
THIS SYMBOL IS HIS NAME.
When Giovanni was born in 1982, the provision that will apply is Article
366 of the Civil Code: A natural child acknowledged by both parents
shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one
of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers
surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the
part of Giovannis putative father to actually recognize him.

Meanwhile Art. 176 of the Family Code which repealed, among others,
Art. 366 of the Civil Code provides:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under

the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. X x x x x.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by

the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated or an
acknowledged child.
-

Rule 108- correction of entries (summary proceeding)

Rule 103- special proceedings for change of name (must be adversarial)

Adversarial proceeding- where a party seeking relief has given

legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required
by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and
the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein.
GRANDE V. ANTONIO

Out of illicit sexual relationship, two sons were born. The children
were not recognized by Antonio as his own in CLB.

Grande left for US with 2 children

Antonio filed a judicial approval for recognition with prayer to take

Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors. RTC Granted

Can a father compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon
his recognition of their filiation?
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation
is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father.
An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. There was no legal basis for the CFI to order
the change of the surname of respondent. The order or ruling contravenes the
explicit and unequivocal provision of Art 176 of the FC amended by RA 9255.
Art 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father(herein respondent) or the
mother (petitioner) who is granted by law the right tot dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is
clear and free from ambiguity.

RA 9048AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE

CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN
AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Approved: March 22, 2001
- NO ENTRY IN A CIVIL REGISTER SHALL BE CHANGED OR CORRECTED
WITHOUT A JUDICIAL ORDER
EXCEPT:
1. CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORs and change of first name
or nickname which is defined as a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
naked eye or obvious to the understanding, and can be changed
only by reference to other existing record/s; and
in Section 4 thereof
2. THE FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IS RIDICULOUS, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
3. the new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously use and he HAS BEEN KNOWN BY THAT FIRST NAME
or nickname in the community; or
4. the change will AVOID CONFUSION.
- First name refers to a name or a nickname given to a
person which may consist of one or more names in addition
to the middle and last names.
- No correction must involve the change of N-A-S-S
a. nationality; b. age; c. status; or; d. sex.
The remedy may only be availed of once (2006 Bar)..
Petition must be verified.
If the petitioner has migrated to another place in the country and it
would be very expensive and impractical to appear before the local
civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed
then it can be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the
place where he is residing or domiciled.
Filipinos presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries with
the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The CRG shall exercise his power within 10 working days from
receipt of the decision granting a petition, to impugn such a
decision on any of the following grounds:
1. the correction is substantial or controversial as it
affects the civil status of a person;
2. the correction is not clerical or typographical; or;
3. the basis in changing the first name or nickname of a
person does not fall under Section 4 of RA 9048.

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RA 10172 An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
Consul General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in the in the Day
and Month in the Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in the Civil
Register Without Need of a Judicial Order Amending for this Purpose RA 9048
Section 1 of RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 now includes
correction of the date and month in the date of birth or sex of a person
where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error
or mistake in the entry.
Clerical or typographical error refers to misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth
or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records.
No correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of
the petitioner.
Section 5 of RA 9048 is amended: The petition for correction of a
clerical or typographical error, or for change of first name or nickname,
as the case may be shall be in the form of an affidavit subscribed and
sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1.) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or the of the
page of the registry book containing the entry or entries
sought to be corrected or changed;
(2.) At least two public documents or private instruments showing
the correct entry or entries upon which the correction or
changed shall be based;
(3.) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal
registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and
necessary for the approval of the petition.
- No petition for the correction of erroneous entry concerning the date
of birth or the sex of a person shall be entertained except if the
petition is accompanied by earliest school record or earliest school
document such as but not limited to, medical records, baptismal
certificate and other documents issued by religious authorities.
No entry involving change of gender shall be allowed except if the
petition is accompanied by a certification issued by an accredited
government physician attesting to the fact that the petitioner has
not undergone sex change or sex transplant.
Publication of petition once a week for 2 consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Submission of certification from appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or
criminal record.
Published August 24, 2012.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex.

SC: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
-

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.

It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications
for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.
It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating the change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery.

However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Assuming it could be legally done,
it was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all.
RA 9255 AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE
SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER
-Approved on February 24, 2004.
There must be an express recognition by the father either
a. record of birth appearing in the civil register; or
b. admission in a public or private handwritten instrument (Article 172 in
relation to Article 175 of the Family Code.)
Applies to

2. registered births where the illegitimate children use the surname

of the mother.
-Who may file:
1. father; 2. mother; 3. child, if of age; or 3. guardian where an
Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) is executed.
-What to file
1. CLB with accomplished Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission
of Paternity at the back;
2. Public Document-affidavits of Recognition executed by the father
such as the Affidavit of Admission of Paternity or the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment; and
3. AUSF including all supporting documents.
-When to register
the public document not made on the record of birth, or
the AUSF shall be registered within 20 days from the date of the
execution at the place where the birth was registered.
Article 412 Civil Register (87,06) cf. RA No. 9048 An Act Authorizing the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in
the Civil Register without need of a Judicial Order. Amending Articles 376 and
412 of the NCC.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment.

The change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is

substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and

correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided for in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
o
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation
of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers
the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
o
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from while
o
to change means to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute. The birth certificate of the petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
o
-Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
o
-The status of a person in law includes all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married

1. unregistered births; or

23

KRISTINE CONFESOR
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o
o

or not. X x x. (Salonga, Private International Law, 1995

Edition).
-A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity
and civil status.
-The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
-While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry
as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN

565 SCRA 72 (September 12, 2008)
Jennifer was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed 2ndary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
and female characteristics. She was diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy in
her early years and at age 6, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age 13, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development and that for all interests and appearances
as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
In support of her petition, Dr. Sionzon testified that genetically Cagandahan is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally and she has 2 sex organs female and male. This
condition is very rare, and that Cagandahans uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period.
That this condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because Cagandahan has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as
male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
Does her medical condition i.e. congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) make
Jennifer a male?
SC: Article 412 together with Article 376 of the Civil Code had been amended
by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.

Cagandahan undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early

or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person,
like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a
male hormone. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex
anatomy.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
the
subject of outright denial.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently
and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous
genitalia
and the phenotypic features of a male.
We are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of her/his sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of androgen there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed. The Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that
a change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry of his birth
certificate from female to male.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.

the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in
the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court,
for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others,
o
that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38
o
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39
and
o
that the time and place for hearing must be published in
a newspaper of general circulation.40
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.

CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS

while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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IWASAWA V. GANGAN
There is no question that the documentary evidences submitted by
petitioner are all public documents.
provided in the Civil Code: Art. 410.
o
The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considerered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuinenesss. Thus, the
RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground
that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO
who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not necessary
anymore. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they
deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
o
In the instant case, the facts therein remain unrebutted
since neither the Private respondents not the public
prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
REPUBLIC.V OLAYBAR
Respondents name was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean National. Republic moved for
reconsideration when respondents prayer for correction or
cancellation of entries was granted on the ff grounds
o
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court applies only
when there are errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected
o
Granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is in effect
declaring the marriage void ab initio
Petitioner claims
o
that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the
Cert. of Marriage are the ones provided for by the person
who appeared and represented herself as respondent.
o
That petition instituted is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule
108 proceeding.

w/n the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,

nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
o
Sec. 1 Who may file petition- any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the RTC

of the province where the corresponding civil registry is

located.
Sec. 2 Entries subject to cancellation or correction.

Upon good and valid grounds the ff entries in

the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected

Birth

Marriage

Death

Legal separation

Judgment of annulments of
marriage

Judgment declaring marriage void

Legitimations

Adoptions

Acknowledgments
of
natural
children

Naturalization

Election, loss or recovery of

citizenship

Civil interdiction

Judicial determination of filiation

Voluntary emancipation of a minor

Changes of name
Sec. 3 Parties

When cancellation or correction of an entry in

the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4 Notice and publication

Upon filing the petition, the court shall, by an

order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for 3
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province
Sec. 5 Opposition

The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may,
within 15 days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto
Sec. 6 Expediting Proceedings

The court in which the proceedings is brought

may make orders expediting the proceedings,
and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.

Sec. 7 Order

After hearing, the court may either dismiss the

petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the RoC provides for the procedure of cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either
be summary or adversary.
o
If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary.
o
If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the TC
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
o

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and hearing

may be dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is NOT a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition;
it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it
also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file
their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine

the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before
the TC where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined.

In allowing the correction of the record of the subject certificate of

marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did
not in any way declare the marriage void as there was no marriage
to speak of.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169902 March 5, 2010
Remo requested the DFA, upon application for the renewal of her passport, to
revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. The
DFA denied her request.

381. When a person disappears from his domicile,

his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to
administer his property,
the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend,
may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.

SC: The word may in Article 370 indicates that the use of the husbands
surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory.

The same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the
power conferred by the absentee has expired.

A married woman has an option, not a duty, to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the NCC. She is
therefore allowed to use not only any of the 3 names provided in Article 370,
but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden once she is married because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. This
interpretation is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate
descent.

Kinds of Absence
1) Absence that authorizes the taking of provisional measures
prescribed in 381 to 383
2) Absence which may be declared after the lapse of 2-5 years since
receipt of last news from the absentee, depending on w/n he left a
person in charge of the administration of his property in 384-389
3) Absence for 7years which creates the presumption of death in 390392

The conflict between

A. 370 of the NCC and
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996), is more
imagined than real.
RA 8239 including its implementing rules and regulations,
o
does not prohibit a married woman from using her
maiden name in her passport.
o
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her
husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert
to the use of her maiden name except

(1) death of the husband,

(2) divorce,

(3) annulment, or

(4) nullity of marriage.

Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport. A married womans reversion to
the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of
marriage.

Case 1, w/o Agent:

Court may appoint an agent to administer his property and his
whereabouts were unknown, the court upon proper petition may
appoint a person to provisionally present him in any matter where
representation is necessary. The appointee may be a relative, a
friend, or an interested party.
382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made,
the judge shall
take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests
of the absentee and shall
specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his
representative,
regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules
concerning guardians.
383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be
preferred when there is no legal separation.

If we allow petitioners present request definitely nothing prevents her in the

future from requesting to the use of her husbands surname. Undue confusion
and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

ABSENCE 381- 396

***Different from presumptive death,
even a spouse under this chapter may ask for declaration of absence

II. DECLARATION OF ABSENCE

384. 2 years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since
the receipt of the last news, and 5 years in case the absentee has left a
person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may
be declared.
>> Computation period
No news about the disappearance of the absentee, counted from
the date of disappearance.

If there are news, from the time of disappearance referred to in the

news, and not from the receipt of the news.

385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence

1) Spouse present;
2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic
copy of the same;
3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
a. Legitimate
children
and
their
legitimate
descendants including legitimated and adopted
b. Legitimate
parents
and
other
legitimate
ascendants, in default, adopting parents
c.
Illegitimate children and their descendants whether
legitimate or illegitimate
d. Surviving spouse, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces should
there be any
e. Collateral relatives up to the fifth degree of
relationship
f.
The State
4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some
right subordinated to the condition of his death
386. Judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until 6 mos. after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

III. ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY OF AN ABSENTEE

387. An administrator of the absentees property shall be appointed in
accordance with 383.
388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husbands property
cannot alienate or encumber the husbands property, or that of the
conjugal partnership, without judicial authority.
389. The administration shall cease in any of the ff cases:
1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent;
2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate/intestate
heirs appear
3) When a 3rd person appears, showing by a proper document that he
has acquired the absentees property by purchase or other title
In these cases, the administrator shall cease in the performance of his
office, and the property shall be at the disposal of those who may have a
right thereto.
IV. PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
390. After an absence of 7 years, it being unknown w/n the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening
succession till after an absence of 10 years or 5 years, if he disappeared
at age of 75 years.
Basis
Number of Years

390, CC
Atleast 7 years

Character of absence
in the mind of the
spouse present

W/n the absentee is

alive or not is not
certain

Purpose
Presumption

of

Personality
Absentee

of

Opening
succession
Absentee

the
of

Presumption is good
for
all
purposes
except for succession
Need not be a spouse
of the one invoking
the
presumptive
death
Absence for atleast
10years, or 5 years if
absentee is already
75

41
4 years; 2 years if due
to circumstances in
391
There is a wellfounded belief that
the absent spouse
was already dead
Presumption is for the
purpose of remarriage
of the spouse present
Spouse

Declaration
of
presumptive death is
not a basis for
opening
the
succession of absent
spouse
As to who makes the The law itself
The
court
before
presumption
which the case is filed
*Manuel v. People (476 S 483) SC held that Art. 41 repealed 390
391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and
his existence has not been known for four years. (n)
Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is
proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found,
and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property
acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
V.EFFECT OF ABSENCE UPON THE CONTINGENT RIGHTS OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not
recognized must prove that he was living at the time his existence was
necessary in order to acquire said right. (195)

Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the
opening of a succession to which an absentee is called, his share shall accrue
to his co-heirs, unless he has heirs, assigns, or a representative. They shall all,
as the case may be, make an inventory of the property. (196a)
Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without
prejudice to the action of petition for inheritance or other rights which are
vested in the absentee, his representatives or successors in interest. These
rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription. In
the record that is made in the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the
coheirs, the circumstance of its being subject to the provisions of this article
shall be stated. (197)
Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate
the fruits received in good faith so long as the absentee does not appear, or
while his representatives or successors in interest do not bring the proper
actions. (198)

CIVIL REGISTER
Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
The following shall be entered in the civil register:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Births;
marriages;
deaths;
legal separations;
annulments of marriage;
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
legitimations;
adoptions;
acknowledgments of natural children;
naturalization;
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
civil interdiction;
judicial determination of filiation;
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
changes of name. (326a)

Art. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other

judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the
clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has
been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree
to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning. (n)

Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained. (n)
Art. 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized
alteration made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby.
However, the civil registrar may exempt himself from such liability if he proves
that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful
alteration. (n)
Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a
judicial order. (n)
Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
FUNERAL 305-310
I. GENERAL GUIDELINES
Art. 305, The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a
relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under
Article 294.
In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred.
In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 306-7
Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.
in accordance with the expressed wishes of thedeceased.
In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
shall determine the funeral rites.
In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by
the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in articles 294 and
305.
Art. 309, Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully
interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased
for damages, material and moral.
Art. 310, The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a
part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the CPG, if the
deceased is one of the spouses.
Duty and Right to make funeral arrangements (in relation to Art. 199 FC)
1. Spouse
2. Descendants in nearest degree

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KRISTINE CONFESOR
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3. Ascendants in nearest degree

4. Brothers and sisters
5. Municipal authorities if there are no persons who are bound to support or
if such
persons are without means
Guidelines in making funeral arrangements
The persons who preferred in the right to make funeral
arrangements may waive the right expressly or impliedly in which
case the right and duty immediately descend to the person next in
the order
It must be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.

Law shall prevail over the will of the persons who have the right to
control the burial of deceased exhumation, evidential purpose,
disposition of corpse by deceased, mutilation of corpses and
autopsies.

Corpses which are to be buried at public expenses may also be

used for scientific purposes under certain conditions.
Expressed wishes of the deceased is given priority provided that it
is not contrary to law and must not violate the legal and
reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and disposition of the
remains (time,manner, place or ceremony)
In the absence of expressed wishes, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine the funeral rights.
In case of doubt, the persons in Art. 199 shall decide.

Any person who disrespects the dead or interferes with the funeral
shall be liable for material and moral damages.

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