G.R. No.

115381 December 23, 1994

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the
PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Potenciano A. Flores for petitioner.
Robert Anthony C. Sison, Cesar B. Brillantes and Jose Z. Galsim for private respondent.
Jose F. Miravite for movants.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to the general public. They are
enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce to their comfort and convenience. As such, public
utility services are impressed with public interest and concern. The same is true with respect to the business of common
carrier which holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public
regulation when private properties are affected with public interest, hence, they cease to be juris privati only. When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to the control by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
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thus created.
An abdication of the licensing and regulatory government agencies of their functions as the instant petition seeks to show,
is indeed lamentable. Not only is it an unsound administrative policy but it is inimical to public trust and public interest as
well.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
2
Board LTFRB) which, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by
said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service
Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus
operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience
(CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation
not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be "just
and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own
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affirmative allegations. The offending provisions contained in the questioned issuances pointed out by petitioner, have
resulted in the introduction into our highways and thoroughfares thousands of old and smoke-belching buses, many of
which are right-hand driven, and have exposed our consumers to the burden of spiraling costs of public transportation
without hearing and due process.
The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant petition, viz: (a) DOTC
Memorandum Order 90-395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme for provincial bus
services in the country; (b) DOTC Department Order No.
92-587, dated March 30, 1992, defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services; (c) DOTC
Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, laying down rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587; (d)
LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, providing implementing guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. 92587; and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in Case No. 94-3112.
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
On June 26, 1990; then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15%
above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. The text of the memorandum order reads in full:

One of the policy reforms and measures that is in line with the thrusts and the priorities set out in the
Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 1987 1992) is the liberalization of regulations in
the transport sector. Along this line, the Government intends to move away gradually from regulatory
policies and make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Based on several surveys and observations, bus companies are already charging passenger rates above
and below the official fare declared by LTFRB on many provincial routes. It is in this context that some
form of liberalization on public transport fares is to be tested on a pilot basis.
In view thereof, the LTFRB is hereby directed to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all
provincial bus routes in country (except those operating within Metro Manila). Transport Operators shall
be allowed to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent (15%)
below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year.
Guidelines and procedures for the said scheme shall be prepared by LTFRB in coordination with the
DOTC Planning Service.
The implementation of the said fare range scheme shall start on 6 August 1990.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours.)
Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the
following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit:
With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received
on 19 July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus
routes in the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" that will allow operators "to charge
passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent (15%) below the LTFRB
official rate for a period of one year" the undersigned is respectfully adverting the Secretary's attention to
the following for his consideration:
1. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and
determination of rates (a) the rates to be approved should be proposed by public
service operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected
parties in the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the
rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare range scheme on August 6 without
complying with the requirements of the Public Service Act may not be legally feasible.
2. To allow bus operators in the country to charge fares fifteen (15%) above the present
LTFRB fares in the wake of the devastation, death and suffering caused by the July 16
earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be politically unsound; most likely public
criticism against the DOTC and the LTFRB will be triggered by the untimely motu
propioimplementation of the proposal by the mere expedient of publicizing the fare range
scheme without calling a public hearing, which scheme many as early as during the
Secretary's predecessor know through newspaper reports and columnists' comments to
be Asian Development Bank and World Bank inspired.
3. More than inducing a reduction in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) the
implementation of the proposal will instead trigger an upward adjustment in bus fares by
fifteen percent (15%) at a time when hundreds of thousands of people in Central and
Northern Luzon, particularly in Central Pangasinan, La Union, Baguio City, Nueva Ecija,
and the Cagayan Valley are suffering from the devastation and havoc caused by the
recent earthquake.
4. In lieu of the said proposal, the DOTC with its agencies involved in public
transportation can consider measures and reforms in the industry that will be socially
uplifting, especially for the people in the areas devastated by the recent earthquake.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned respectfully suggests that the implementation of
the proposed fare range scheme this year be further studied and evaluated.

On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an
application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all
types of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and below the proposed
basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary, first class and
premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for aircon buses, was sought.
On December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of
six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to the drop in the expected price
of diesel.
The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the
proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate of return of
the proposed increase in rates.
On December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase in accordance with
the following schedule of fares on a straight computation method, viz:
AUTHORIZED FARES
LUZON
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM.
REGULAR P1.50 P0.37
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28
VISAYAS/MINDANAO
REGULAR P1.60 P0.375
STUDENT P1.20 P0.285
FIRST CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.385
VISAYAS/
MINDANAO P0.395
PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.395
VISAYAS/
MINDANAO P0.405
AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415.

On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Pete Nicomedes Prado
issued Department Order No.
92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. The full text of the said order is reproduced
below in view of the importance of the provisions contained therein:
WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as the primary policy, planning, regulating and implementing agency on
transportation;
WHEREAS, to achieve the objective of a viable, efficient, and dependable transportation system, the
transportation regulatory agencies under or attached to the DOTC have to harmonize their decisions and
adopt a common philosophy and direction;
WHEREAS, the government proposes to build on the successful liberalization measures pursued over the
last five years and bring the transport sector nearer to a balanced longer term regulatory framework;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers granted by laws to the DOTC, the following policies and
principles in the economic regulation of land, air, and water transportation services are hereby adopted:

1. Entry into and exit out of the industry. Following the Constitutional dictum against monopoly, no
franchise holder shall be permitted to maintain a monopoly on any route. A minimum of two franchise
holders shall be permitted to operate on any route.
The requirements to grant a certificate to operate, or certificate of public convenience, shall be: proof of
Filipino citizenship, financial capability, public need, and sufficient insurance cover to protect the riding
public.
In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the
applicant. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the
oppositor(s).
In the interest of providing efficient public transport services, the use of the "prior operator" and the
"priority of filing" rules shall be discontinued. The route measured capacity test or other similar tests of
demand for vehicle/vessel fleet on any route shall be used only as a guide in weighing the merits of each
franchise application and not as a limit to the services offered.
Where there are limitations in facilities, such as congested road space in urban areas, or at airports and
ports, the use of demand management measures in conformity with market principles may be considered.
The right of an operator to leave the industry is recognized as a business decision, subject only to the
filing of appropriate notice and following a phase-out period, to inform the public and to minimize
disruption of services.
2. Rate and Fare Setting. Freight rates shall be freed gradually from government controls. Passenger
fares shall also be deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service (normally third class
passenger transport) for which the government will fix indicative or reference fares. Operators of
particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15% above and below the indicative or reference
rate.
Where there is lack of effective competition for services, or on specific routes, or for the transport of
particular commodities, maximum mandatory freight rates or passenger fares shall be set temporarily by
the government pending actions to increase the level of competition.
For unserved or single operator routes, the government shall contract such services in the most
advantageous terms to the public and the government, following public bids for the services. The
advisability of bidding out the services or using other kinds of incentives on such routes shall be studied
by the government.
3. Special Incentives and Financing for Fleet Acquisition. As a matter of policy, the government shall not
engage in special financing and incentive programs, including direct subsidies for fleet acquisition and
expansion. Only when the market situation warrants government intervention shall programs of this type
be considered. Existing programs shall be phased out gradually.
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Maritime
Industry Authority are hereby directed to submit to the Office of the Secretary, within forty-five (45) days
of this Order, the detailed rules and procedures for the Implementation of the policies herein set forth. In
the formulation of such rules, the concerned agencies shall be guided by the most recent studies on the
subjects, such as the Provincial Road Passenger Transport Study, the Civil Aviation Master Plan, the
Presidential Task Force on the Inter-island Shipping Industry, and the Inter-island Liner Shipping Rate
Rationalization Study.
For the compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis ours)
On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Jesus B.
Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules
and procedures to implement above-quoted Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and other
liberalization policies for the transport sector. Attached to the said memorandum was a revised draft of the required rules
and procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry and (ii) Rate and Fare Setting, with comments and
suggestions from the World Bank incorporated therein. Likewise, resplendent from the said memorandum is the statement

of the DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules and procedures is a pre-requisite to the approval of the Economic
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Integration Loan from the World Bank.
On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. The Circular
provides, among others, the following challenged portions:
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Policy Guidelines on the Issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience.
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of
public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of proving that there is
no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor'(s).
xxx xxx xxx
V. Rate and Fare Setting
The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the quality of
service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without
public hearing.
A. On the General Structure of Rates
1. The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an
indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.
2. Fare systems for aircon buses are liberalized to cover first class and premier services.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours).
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing
provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for
the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing
fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.
On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive
portion reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the arguments of the parties, hereby
DISMISSES FOR LACK OF MERIT the petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition in this case
was resolved with dispatch at the request of petitioner to enable it to immediately avail of the legal
remedies or options it is entitled under existing laws.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from
implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that
provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium
was likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.

Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus
operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus
twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for
a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act
and the Rules of Court.
In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the issues raised by the petitioner,
questions the wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the petitioner has no legal
standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for.
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and
the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it
is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in
applications for certificates of public convenience.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi must be struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
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In Lamb v. Phipps, we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who
have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party
litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the
standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and
8
to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf.
In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and
damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear
legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars
and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the
riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren
procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the
issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this
Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al.
9
v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., we ruled in the same lines and enumerated some of the cases where the same policy
was adopted, viz:
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta
v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v.
Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368
(1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are
concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be

entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it "enjoys an open discretion to
entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)].
xxx xxx xxx
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and
even association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question
the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies
or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836
insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress (Philippine Constitution Association,
Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]); (b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations Act
(Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 [1991]; (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized
elections (Osmea v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 750 [1991]); (e) P.D. No. 1869 (the charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public
policy, and order (Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A.
No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
[1992]).
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking the
validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by
R.A. No. 3452 (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]; (b) P.D.
Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar
as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16
October 1976 (Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [1990]);
(d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of the amended application of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such
transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (Garcia v.
Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374 [1989]; Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]); (e)
the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board
exempting the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties (Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA
771 [1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that
the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the petitioner
substantial cross-examination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA 454 [1991]); (g)
Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil products (Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h) resolutions of the Commission on Elections concerning
the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians (De Guia vs.
Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]); and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor
affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA
662 [1980]).
In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite its
unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless
to pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no less
in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear to
have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the procedural
infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of
qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of
the Constitution by respondent."
Now on the merits of the case.
On the fare range scheme.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:

Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to
the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as
well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and
followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve
rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a
hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the
territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is used
principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business
shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
(Emphasis ours).
xxx xxx xxx
Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with
the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes
LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other
related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles."
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing
complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the
laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and
delicate matters as
route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of
subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to
provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above
the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
10
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of
such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to
11
discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would
result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them
12
or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so. In Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co., where respondent
Philippine Railway Co. was granted by the Public Service Commission the authority to change its freight rates at will, this
Court categorically declared that:
In our opinion, the Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine
Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so in order to
meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates at will, or to regard its
present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the opinion of the Philippine Railway
Co. it would be to its advantage to do so.
The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show that it
is untenable. The Legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the
rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to delegate that power to
a common carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co. have
been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission, and any change in such rates must be
authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and
reasonable. The public service may, of course, propose new rates, as the Philippine Railway Co. did in

case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new rates effective without the approval of the Public
Service Commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to
enforce new rates without the prior approval of said rates by the commission. The commission must
approve new rates when they are submitted to it, if the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable,
otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the commission cannot determine in advance whether or not
the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co. will be just and reasonable, because it does not know what
those rates will be.
In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight rates at
will. It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so in order to
meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a procedure would create
a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of the public service
13
law. (Emphasis ours).
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will be
authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a
period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner
similar to those of compounded bank interest rates.
Picture this situation. On December 14, 1990, the LTFRB authorized provincial bus operators to collect a thirty-seven
(P0.37) centavo per kilometer fare for ordinary buses. At the same time, they were allowed to impose and collect a fare
range of plus or minus 15% over the authorized rate. Thus P0.37 centavo per kilometer authorized fare plus P0.05
centavos (which is 15% of P0.37 centavos) is equivalent to P0.42 centavos, the allowed rate in 1990. Supposing the
LTFRB grants another five (P0.05) centavo increase per kilometer in 1994, then, the base or reference for computation
would have to be P0.47 centavos (which is P0.42 + P0.05 centavos). If bus operators will exercise their authority to
impose an additional 20% over and above the authorized fare, then the fare to be collected shall amount to P0.56 (that is,
P0.47 authorized LTFRB rate plus 20% of P0.47 which is P0.29). In effect, commuters will be continuously subjected, not
only to a double fare adjustment but to a compounding fare as well. On their part, transport operators shall enjoy a bigger
chunk of the pie. Aside from fare increase applied for, they can still collect an additional amount by virtue of the authorized
fare range. Mathematically, the situation translates into the following:
Year** LTFRB authorized Fare Range Fare to be
rate*** collected per
kilometer
1990 P0.37 15% (P0.05) P0.42
1994 P0.42 + 0.05 = 0.47 20% (P0.09) P0.56
1998 P0.56 + 0.05 = 0.61 20% (P0.12) P0.73
2002 P0.73 + 0.05 = 0.78 20% (P0.16) P0.94
Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government function that requires
dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both
the public utility and the public. Several factors, in fact, have to be taken into consideration before a balance could be
achieved. A rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation where he will continue to operate at
a loss. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide
reasonable return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate which is too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to
public interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the
services.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters,
government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the industry.
Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. The people, represented by reputable oppositors,
deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any fare increase.
14

The present administrative procedure, to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement for all
parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what
the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to
15
determine what a just and reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural and constitutional right is certainly inimical to
our fundamental law and to public interest.

On the presumption of public need.

A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation
services for public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the following
requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a
corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock company constituted and organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its stock or paid-up capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii) the
applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to its
operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do
business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. It is understood that there must be proper notice
and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC.
While adopting in toto the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part
IV, provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. The guidelines states:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of
public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there
is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. (Emphasis ours).
The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which
requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the
public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline
states that the presumption of public need for a public service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
16

By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. As one of
the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or
service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply.
The existence or
non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence,
real and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public hearing conducted for that
purpose. The object and purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and protect, the interests of
both the public and the existing transport operators.
Verily, the power of a regulatory body to issue a CPC is founded on the condition that after full-dress hearing and
17
investigation, it shall find, as a fact, that the proposed operation is for the convenience of the public. Basic convenience
is the primary consideration for which a CPC is issued, and that fact alone must be consistently borne in mind. Also,
existing operators in subject routes must be given an opportunity to offer proof and oppose the application. Therefore, an
applicant must, at all times, be required to prove his capacity and capability to furnish the service which he has
undertaken to
18
render. And all this will be possible only if a public hearing were conducted for that purpose.
Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses well-settled and institutionalized
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the proceedings to prove, by mere
application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover, the offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular in question
would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding another disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37
presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be
19
countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Deregulation, while it may be ideal in certain situations, may not be ideal at all in our country given the present
circumstances. Advocacy of liberalized franchising and regulatory process is tantamount to an abdication by the
government of its inherent right to exercise police power, that is, the right of government to regulate public utilities for
protection of the public and the utilities themselves.
While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the transport
sector, we find that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order
No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No.
92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said administrative
issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Consequently, we rule that
the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a

petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. No grave abuse of discretion however was
committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, the
same being merely internal communications between administrative officers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged administrative
issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law
and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to
increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service
in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for
the proposed service to the oppositor.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus
fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders
declared invalid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as
Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters
(PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the
DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized
by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including
domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong
Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE
itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily
suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound
for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional
offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective
domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10,
1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong
and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to
Hong Kong.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary
government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the
temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the
following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.
I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)
An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA
shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:

The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities
concerned:
1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
2. Manpower Pooling
3. Worker Training and Briefing
4. Processing and Deployment
5. Welfare Programs
II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment
Agencies or Principals
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with
the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.
xxx xxx xxx
X. Interim Arrangement
All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July
1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed
with the HWPU.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list
of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be
July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion
of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing
of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong
Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and
deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have
been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the
POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit
under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache,
Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who
failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household
Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall
be allowed.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off
period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed
processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.

For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)

On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and
POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair
and oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register
were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement
activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on
May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board,
and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the
power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private
sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . .
." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on
a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may
dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping
companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best
possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance
therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable
and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's
ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment
of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances
discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication
conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by
Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To

"restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect,
foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or
area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic
helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for
Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against
excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by
private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are
reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment
and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is
merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from
the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong
by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to
Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong
resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous
practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for
Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of
Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of
the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections
3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with
the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15)
daysafter announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied,
Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with
this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above

provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who
may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of
1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby
SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws
of the land.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The
1
2
1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent and the main sponsor of the proposed Article on
3
Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". Indeed it is, for both under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
4
convention. For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
5
(hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
6

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, a group of citizens
desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and
other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established
all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by
individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time
and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC.
7

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4
8
9
of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative
10
on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC,
11
through its Chairman, issued an Order (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and
the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not
later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator
Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
12
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
13
oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An
Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the
law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law
which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending
or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national
treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional
pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to
the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
14
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. Besides,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period
of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto
and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
that:

15

on the petition. They argue therein

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND
HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER
26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING
THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP.
ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R.
NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO
NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR
BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC.
12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS
ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION
OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE
ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS,
S.J.).
16

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment which starts off with an assertion
that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not
formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally
necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under
COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
ofinitiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the
day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those
which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable,
for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997
Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be
for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment
contends that:

17

for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentionsinitiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed
that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned
Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well
as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and
the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by
Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case
for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their
Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
18
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear
to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the
State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
19
dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and
local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as
many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
20
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance.
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
people'sinitiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file
the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the
petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters
nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity
of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of
the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard
for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
21
Intervention. He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional
amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill
and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent
Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said
petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a
petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a
constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the
required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of
the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following
arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to
amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or
22
a constitutional convention.
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI
and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in
Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the
respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in
Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from
notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in
the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within
twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main
Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient
cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on
the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989
on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
23
24
Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.

I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is
proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin.
This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction
with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent
necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of
the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for
judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of
man, only the Supreme Court
25
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that
26
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently
because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required
27
them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 December
1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for
hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because
the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the
required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in
28
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,
stated:

29

Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by
the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report
30
No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
31
Constitution.
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of
the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of
the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section
2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.

32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are
no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we
are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature
does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially
with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature.
The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of
initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise
of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that
five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing
the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how this is to be
carried out is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself
as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to
muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and
submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to
vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of
Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values,
the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal
of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have
a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the
modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to
again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of
the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics
33
that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations.

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND not to
REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
34
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage
of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process
of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which
the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2
with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking
into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable
Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The
modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows:
"SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION
OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective
of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept
36
the proposed amendment.
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the

legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this
particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for
submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words,
none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the
right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
38
"revision."
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be more
rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is
an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a
proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a
constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import
being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than
probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the
National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by
the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent.
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on
39
plenary sessions.
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT
OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
40
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
41
1986. Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on
42
Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to"per
centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph
43
44
reads: The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This amendment was approved
and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission
to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress

45

shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the
46
exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out."
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to
47
it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
48
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative
49
provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely dealt with initiative and referendum
concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
50
51
Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17,
which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases
52
"propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part."
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the
other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section
5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended
R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and
Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not
based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to
be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed

to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
53
Constitution.
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for
the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
54
misplaced, since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of
initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather
intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to
whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval,
which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.

56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional
requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the
approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735
thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a
57
reluctant lip service.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are
fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
58
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
59
delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
61
his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
62
effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy
both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution
is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3
of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING
THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right
to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation
and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is
primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC
63
or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its
64
Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3)
65
to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in
66
the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No.
2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as

UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national
and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to
have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to
dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that
the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:

I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution
thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of the intent of our
lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its
1
2
interpretation. Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was a
3
4
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the
Local Legislative Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to
5
the Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 expressly included people's initiative to amend the
6
Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional basis of the proposed
measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced by the 1935
Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, the
1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang
Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between the Legislature and
the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration
in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the
people and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress; however, to
institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the people, through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers since
reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same Article mandates Congress to
pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers
with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of
the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed on Congress to
implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the
beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the
Local Government Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes,
decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations
of the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and
referendum are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the subject which he will
later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his sponsorship speech.

He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the instant Bill among
which are the constitutions of states in the United States which recognize the right of registered voters to
initiate the enactment of any statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum
apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures, which are likewise incorporated in House
Bill No. 21505. He added that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the
requirements of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to electors
are substantially similar to the provisions in American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners
saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be used should the
legislature show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why
now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws
which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as advocated in House Bill
No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of
the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once
every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by Congress; and the initiative to amend local
ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on measures that they have
approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by
presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the signing of said petition by at least
10 percent of the total of registered voters at which every legislative district is represented by at least
three percent of the registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC
shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within
45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required number of votes, it shall
become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot ignore the people's
call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech together with the footnotes
be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed
7
by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO

Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever
since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial segment of the population feels,
he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution, and requested
that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be
made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited Constitutional
provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition among cause-oriented and
sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming
an enlightened public opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill will also
give street parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially
used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House Bill No. 21505 will show that the
Members can set aside their personal and political consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral
8
9
Conference Committee. In the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989, the members agreed that the two (2)
bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated version should include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution as contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because this is new in our
political system, the Senate decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to
the local government units because even with that stage where . . . at least this has been
quite popular, ano? It has been attempted on a national basis. Alright. There has not
been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And, second, we consider also that it
is only fair that the local legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the legislation
bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect system of initiative. If after all, the local
legislative assembly or body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any
reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that there should be some
limitation on the frequency with which it should be applied. Number 4, na the people, thru
initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that is beyond the scope of authority of the local
legislative body, otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng power that is broader and
greater than the grant of legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5, because
of that, then a proposition which has been the result of a successful initiative can only
carry the force and effect of an ordinance and therefore that should not deprive the court
of its jurisdiction to declare it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is
beyond powers of local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence namin, so we
concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo naman includes iyon sa
Constitution, amendment to the Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist
on that, alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute. Alright, and we
can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, and magiging basic nito, let us not
discuss anymore kung alin and magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or
whether it is the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It
is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17,
eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at
saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill No. so and so.

10

When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman Roco upon interpellation
by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
11
The record of the House Representative states:
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions
between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House
versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for
local initiative and referendum and the House Representatives correctly provided for
initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in
the Senate version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the
House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local initiative and referendum,
whereas in the House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the
constitutional amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of
the Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we
shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments in the 1987
Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and referenda.

MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial difference between the two
versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I said earlier,
ironically was about local, provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No.
17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature. We have ruled that
once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and
this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, that interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be
12
adopted.
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to reach the conclusion that it
implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the
people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the constitution or to propose
and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an
initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a)
petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%)
of the registered voters therein." It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an initiative
on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it
itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the
word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not
accurate. These lapses are to be expected for laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution
does not require our legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or

in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law
13
on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco reminds us: "Many laws contain words
which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if
the legislative intention can be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or
ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the legislature
intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory
construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation,
but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting
14
clauses.
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735
to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that the
15
letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul.
II
16

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting
Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in accord
with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The
Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez
17
v. Auditor General, this Court, thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether
there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) to fix standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's
implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of
the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements
of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to
canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law
18
states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is
19
20
commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is
21
22
23
approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the amendment takes effect and what matters may not be the
24
subject of any initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of
the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued

and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the
25
lawmaking body to the delegate." In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its
power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will
show that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to
26
amend the Constitution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to
enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is possible for the
legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this
particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words,
none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the
right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
27

In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to
questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the legislature over the process:
it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could
authorize another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the
authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right
to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair
the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair the substantive right of
the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating the procedure
to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating administrative rules on the
ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz,
"even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same
28
elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." He cited the ruling inHirabayashi v. United
29
States, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders of the military
commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to any order. But the
Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They
were parts of a single program and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption
by Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations themselves followed a
standard authorized by the Executive Order the necessity of protecting military resources in the
designated areas against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot
miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards can also be found in
no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to

hold that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as
30
31
adequate more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," "public interest," "public
32
33
34
35
welfare," "interest of law and order," "justice and equity," "adequate and efficient instruction," "public
36
37
38
safety," "public policy", "greater national interest", "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
39
40
domestic pump rates", and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government." A due regard and
respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain
from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the
Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone
and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by
People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed
to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case
at bar was filed by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is that
they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then
prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for
people's initiative to amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against
the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in
black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in
section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of the voice of the
people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged.
The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision
of the 1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the
Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says
their right cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise of their freedom
of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for redress of grievances. We have memorialized this
universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and
reiterated in our rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people.
Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the
Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution
does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can
chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable
Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the
truism that the only constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On October 5,
41
1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of faith in our Constitution. On September 30,

1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the
42
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected. On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a
43
matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." Just a few
44
days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City involving the
mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the people. Thus far, we
have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to
encourage people empowerment to blossom in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the
Constitution without setting back the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of
people who are pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into a
sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any
infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:

The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the
issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this time would only be to resolve whether or not the
petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the Movement
for People's Initiative" and seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution, can properly
be regarded and given its due course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is
explicit. Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional imperatives, the petition would
rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to schedule
"signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and
local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under
theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed themselves. The postulate is no
longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of government
lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the consent of those who are led. The role of free speech is
pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves the Court, I most
respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and
sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to directly propose constitutional amendments.
Any opinion or view formulated by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeitpossibly
persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not
prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
1
them. Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has given more significance to this declaration of
principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose, enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress
2
or by the local legislative body, but to propose amendments to the constitution as well. To implement these constitutional
edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This
law, to my mind, amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is based
principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. [And] [t]his
indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not constitutional amendments, because
3
constitutional amendments take effect upon ratification not after publication.
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
4
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Thus,
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be
5
extracted from the statute as a whole.
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose amendments to
6
the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose". The same section, in
enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing
7
amendments to the constitution" Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which
an initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative
on the Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of the registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the implementation of the
right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has
previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the
8
sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". That this is the legislative intent is
further shown by the deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it was noted:
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions
between Senate Bill No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to
the system providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we
consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the
bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and the House of
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum an the Constitution and
on national legislation.

I move that we approve the consolidated bill.

MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in
the Senate version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the
House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and
referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided purely for national and
constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the
constitutional amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of
the Constitution to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be
done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987
Constitution, it is every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA
279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and as approved and enacted into law, the
9
proposal included initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws.
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other construction as what
petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as
those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its
having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time the
petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.

Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is
without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily
shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents' proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is
premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate"
legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence
with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for initiative before public respondent Commission on
Elections until the same be supported by proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the "initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through initiative," there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures in
this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds
may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec
cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two
other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through
a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting
together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right to
change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to
pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it
bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the
whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of

initiativecorrectly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban
against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient
to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended by the legislature to cover
1
and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree
with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA
6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution.
Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en
2
banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to
be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
3
granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to
be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely
4
empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of
Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama
and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a
cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec.
2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our
people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18 December
1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I
believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I
agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them gather
signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to
propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it
would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs.
As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."
After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we
5
hate."
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new
and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired
EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are
sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction,
oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and
faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on
the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission
on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the

majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the
Constitution.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 17122

February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly
and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and
sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules
and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of
State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or
have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the production or milling of
palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in
section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but
does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in
accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for
not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or
corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall consider that the
public interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any
provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws
temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the
prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an
offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho,
voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80),
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines,
dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from
which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any
force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of
August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General
to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue
and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause"
to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is
also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the
Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such
temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement
and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out
the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing
the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a
criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is
sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law;
and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive
has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the
Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say
when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the
power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally
delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the
Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make
laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law.
There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a
law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the GovernorGeneral, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first
laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under the decision in
Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by
their charters.

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of
freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the State
had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in
enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and
reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned
and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281),
in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the
determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for
the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings
by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be
raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus given to the commission to
determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a
delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be equal and
reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and
determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the
commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to require either
argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or
to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It had the
undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be, which would
not be allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the
execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has
passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or
discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely charged
with the administration of the law, and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92
Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it
could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and

without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were
required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed.,
563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land
in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such
rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or
such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated ways, the
Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land which it
owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power;
but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person having no right in the
land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power
to make rules and regulations, not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws
which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated
power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such
general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the
violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by
Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their sheep
upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the government's property.
In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is
required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the
occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and
occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted that in
the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility,
and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and
passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to
ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission
with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the court held
that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be
put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined.
As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall
become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on the
following morning, unless by special permission of the president.
1

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100, the Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an
executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations
among persons similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested
in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative
officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its
operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the present
case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be
sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by
the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit
a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is
to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the
defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the
Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a
crime.
2

The Executive order provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as follows:
In Manila
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price less the cost of
transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined
by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum price shall be the
authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from
the place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial
treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions
emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the
above regulations in their respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand."
The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different
provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and
a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate
with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and
proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the
Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of
rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands
under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in
the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again,
it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with
different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and
quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which
the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63
centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted
that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut,
chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous
other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same
principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut,
hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be
general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be
equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the
Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or
quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was
and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix
the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be
issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because
the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades
or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in
his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice,
and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe hardship
on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a
particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property rights of
the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The
fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a
republican form of government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of
government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to
any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of
government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government property. It
was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be
sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix
the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product
at any other or different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be
suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while
that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in
times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at
which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at the
time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same
act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and
the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case.
Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The
government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale,
it was the personal, private property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but
the members of this court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be
construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican
form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a
price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by
analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question.
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question
here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in
the manner power in violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-General, upon the
terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which
holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of
the remaining portions of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the first place, as to the facts, one cannot
be convicted ex post facto of a violation of a law and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged
violation thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was not published until August
13, 1919, and the order was not published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to the law, one cannot be

convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company [1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal
Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended, invalid.)
In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would respectfully invite attention to the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389), concerning the legislative
regulation of the prices charged by business affected with a public interest, and to another decision of the United States
Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which adopts as its own the principles laid
down in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491), namely; "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make
a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things
upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is
this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with
respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive
Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
2
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* which upheld the trial court, ** and he has
now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
4
1973 Constitution.
5

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this
Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
6
highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
7
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in
fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will
8
be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts
should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On
the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
9
jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that
the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language
to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a
proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was
sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty.
The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the

clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due
process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea
of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark
of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of
the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before
an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation
of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in
leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the
vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of
officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these
requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for
a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants
may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained
by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described
as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects
him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not
only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema
lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the
greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset
the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on

these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect
and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattlerustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as
these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably
and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial
and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was

ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
20
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In
the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused
being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held inPesigan v.
21
Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine
of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that
time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent
of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would
never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become
a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have
ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever
they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned
to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC),Petitioner
vs.
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow
and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government,
1
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under
the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
2

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court ruled that lands
devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian
reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
3
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and
found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the
4
supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored their request.
5

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits,viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio
(i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the
6
withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.
7

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted
8
9
exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied. They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President
assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and
livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian
reform.

10

On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O.
No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a
certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O.
was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being
contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of
the government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and
void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of
Agrarian Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

11

Hence, this petition.

The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the
area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private
agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports
that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their
coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations.
They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity
and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they
12
are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not
violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body
concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by
13
authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an
administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it
be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative
14
agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit
for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in
the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is
an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution
equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
15
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution
from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

16

The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the
17
Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL. We stressed anew that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term
"agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still
undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already
classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine
have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues
that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous
landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform.
Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent
with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as
early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle18
breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that
respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the
CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the
CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the
CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without
substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a
19
new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL,
20
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed
the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands
21
that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification,
Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They
cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In
22
case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed
A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform
beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July
13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among
the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the
conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed
that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it
allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted.
The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments
on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged
traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who
should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their
driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the
confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his
driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer,
who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic
Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police
Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988,
of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27,
1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such
sanction under certain conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his
office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed
full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of
Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and
not the confiscation of driver's licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach
the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila
Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow
and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187
SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only
under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against
the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is,
according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court
resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10)
days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its
governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination,
andexercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to
supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also
pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD
1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of
examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned
sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual
case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only
in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be
relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists
about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal,
being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that
one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would

not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a
formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive
of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as
categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its
inaction, allow them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to
suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate
rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or
suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified
the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9,
1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved
and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other
dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive,
they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or
sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the
question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be
gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the
petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling
authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
(Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N.
Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are
hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are
duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough
as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the
failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of
resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by
EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the
Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of
the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic
rules.

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the
requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation;
and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the
delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to
determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the
case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of
which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This
requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and
passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the
validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.
Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts
in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted
principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not
be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is
nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the
Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise
discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed.
For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation
under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the
Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of
driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its
representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's
license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to
the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their
records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month
period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as
follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, aone-year
suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth
offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may
deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads,
streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver
shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission
which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that
he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the

Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of
issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila
Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for
appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or
municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's
license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was
allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or
at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of
traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are
able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the
power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect
of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself,
which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being
violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the
enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with
Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be
submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and
verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as
provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes
the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03
per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the
ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law
does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of
Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance
impose a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other
words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional
conditions.
xxx xxx xxx

The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the
surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated
above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held
valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a
general law subordinated to a local ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating
national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to
minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the
means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree
does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal
the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish
violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the
rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and
enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public
misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in
detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a
statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their
merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila.
Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles
(except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles
(except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92174 December 10, 1993

BOIE-TAKEDA CHEMICALS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. DIONISIO DE LA SERNA, Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, respondent.
G.R. No. L-102552 December 10, 1993
PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX CORP., petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and PHILIPPINE FUJI
XEROX EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.
Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. and Phil Xerox Corp.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
What items or items of employee remuneration should go into the computation of thirteenth month pay is the basic issue
presented in these consolidated petitions. Otherwise stated, the question is whether or not the respondent labor officials in
computing said benefit, committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction," by giving effect to Section
5 of the Revised Guidelines on the implementation of the Thirteenth Month Pay (Presidential Decree No. 851)
promulgated by then Secretary of Labor and Employment, Hon. Franklin Drilon, and overruling petitioner's contention that
said provision constituted a usurpation of legislative power because not justified by or within the authority of the law
sought to be implemented besides being violative of the equal protection of the law clause of the Constitution.
Resolution of the issue entails, first, a review of the pertinent provisions of the laws and implementing regulations.
Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 851, the Thirteenth Month Pay Law, read as follows:
Sec 1. All employees are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more
than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later than
December 24 of every year.
Sec. 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by
this Decree.
The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 promulgated by then Labor Minister Blas Ople on December 22, 1975
contained the following relevant provisions relative to the concept of "thirteenth month pay" and the employers exempted
from giving it, to wit:
Sec. 2. Definition of certain terms. . . .
a) "Thirteenth month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within a
calendar year;
b) "Basic Salary" shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for
services rendered but may not include cost of living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. 174, profit sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary of the employee at
the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.
Sec. 3. Employers covered. . . . (The law applies) to all employers except to:
xxx xxx xxx

c) Employers already paying their employers a 13-month pay or more in calendar year or is equivalent at
the time of this issuance;
xxx xxx xxx
e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis, and those who are
paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance
thereof, except where the workers are paid on piece-rate basis in which case the employer shall be
covered by this issuance insofar as such workers are concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
The term "its equivalent" as used in paragraph (c) shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profitsharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall
not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed
by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the
employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference.
Supplementary Rules and Regulations implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople whichinter
alia set out items of compensation not included in the computation of the 13th month pay, viz.:
Sec. 4. Overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not
be included in the computation of the 13th month pay.
On August 13, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Memorandum Order No. 28, which contained a single
provision modifying Presidential Decree No. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month set by the latter, as
follows:
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modified to the extent that all employers are hereby
required to pay all their rank-and-file employees a 13th month pay not later than December 24, of every
year.
Slightly more than a year later, on November 16, 1987, Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay
Law were promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon which, among other things, defined with particularity what
remunerative items were and were not embraced in the concept of 13th month pay, and specifically dealt with employees
who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission. The relevant provisions read:
4. Amount and payment of 13th Month Pay.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic salary of an employee for the purpose of computing the 13th month pay shall include all
remunerations or earnings paid by the employer for services rendered but does not include allowances
and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary, such
as the cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave credits, overtime, premium, night differential
and holiday pay, and cost-of-living allowances. However, these salary-related benefits should be included
as part of the basic salary in the computation of the 13th month pay if by individual or collective
agreement, company practice or policy, the same are treated as part of the basic salary of the
employees.
xxx xxx xxx
5. 13th Month Pay for Certain Types of Employees.
(a) Employees Paid by Results. Employees who are paid on piece work basis are by law entitled to the
13th month pay.

Employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission are also entitled to the mandated
13th month pay based on their total earnings during the calendar year, i.e., on both their fixed or
guaranteed wage and commission.
This was the state of the law when the controversies at bar arose out of the following antecedents:
(RE G.R. No. 92174) A routine inspection was conducted on May 2, 1989 in the premises of petitioner Boie-Takeda
Chemicals, Inc. by Labor
and Development Officer Reynaldo B. Ramos under Inspection Authority
No. 4-209-89. Finding that Boie-Takeda had not been including the commissions earned by its medical representatives in
1
the computation of their 13th month pay, Ramos served a Notice of Inspection Results on Boie-Takeda through its
president, Mr. Benito Araneta, requiring Boie-Takeda within ten (10) calendar days from notice to effect restitution or
correction of "the underpayment of 13th month pay for the year(s) 1986, 1987 and 1988 of Med Rep (Revised Guidelines
on the Implementation of 13th month pay # 5) in the total amount of P558,810.89."
Boie-Takeda wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results, and expressing the view "that the
commission paid to our medical representatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13th month pay . . .
(since the) law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary and therefore exclude all other
remunerations which are not part of the REGULAR salary." It pointed out that, "if no sales is (sic) made under the effort of
a particular representative, there is no commission during the period when no sale was transacted, so that commissions
2
are not and cannot be legally defined as regular in nature.
Regional Director Luna C. Piezas directed Boie-Takeda to appear before his Office on June 9 and 16, 1989. On the
appointed dates, however, and despite due notice, no one appeared for Boie-Takeda, and the matter had perforce to be
3
resolved on the basis of the evidence at hand. On July 24, 1989, Director Piezas issued an Order directing Boie-Takeda:
. . . to pay . . . (its) medical representatives and its managers the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX AND FORTY SEVEN CENTAVOS (P565,746.47)
representing underpayment of thirteenth (13th) month pay for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, inclusive,
pursuant to the . . . revised guidelines within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
4

A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by Boie-Takeda under date of August 3, 1989. Treated as an appeal,
it was resolved on
January 17, 1990 by then Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna, who affirmed the July 24, 1989 Order with
modification that the sales commissions earned by Boie-Takeda's medical representatives before August 13, 1989, the
effectivity date of Memorandum Order No. 28 and its Implementing Guidelines, shall be excluded in the computation of
5
their 13th month pay.
Hence the petition docketed as G.R. No. 92174.
(RE G.R. No. 102552) A similar Routine Inspection was conducted in the premises of Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. on
September 7, 1989 pursuant to Routine Inspection Authority No. NCR-LSED-RI-494-89. In his Notice of Inspection
6
Results, addressed to the Manager, Mr. Nicolas O. Katigbak, Senior Labor and Employment Officer Nicanor M. Torres
noted the following violation committed by Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp., to wit:
Underpayment of 13th month pay of 62 employees, more or less pursuant to Revised Guidelines on
the Implementation of the 13th month pay law for the period covering 1986, 1987 and 1988.
Philippine Fuji Xerox was requested to effect rectification and/or restitution of the noted violation within five (5) working
days from notice.
No action having been taken thereon by Philippine Fuji Xerox,
Mr. Eduardo G. Gonzales, President of the Philxerox Employee Union, wrote then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
requesting a follow-up of the inspection findings. Messrs. Nicolas and Gonzales were summoned to appear before Labor
Employment and Development Officer Mario F. Santos, NCR Office, Department of Labor for a conciliation conference.
When no amicable settlement was reached, the parties were required to file their position papers.
7

Subsequently, Regional Director Luna C. Piezas issued an Order dated August 23, 1990, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Respondent PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX is hereby ordered to

restitute to its salesmen the portion of the 13th month pay which arose out of the non-implementation of
the said revised guidelines, ten (10) days from receipt hereof, otherwise,
MR. NICANOR TORRES, the SR. LABOR EMPLOYMENT OFFICER is hereby Ordered to proceed to the
premises of the Respondent for the purpose of computing the said deficiency (sic) should respondent fail
to heed his Order.
Philippine Fuji Xerox appealed the aforequoted Order to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. In an Order dated October
120, 1991, Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano denied the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, the petition in G.R. No.
102552, which was ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 92174 as involving the same issue.
In their almost identically-worded petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attribute grave abuse of discretion to
respondent labor officials
Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano in issuing the questioned Orders of January 17,
1990 and October 10, 1991, respectively. They maintain that under P.D. 851, the 13th month pay is based solely on basic
salary. As defined by the law itself and clarified by the implementing and Supplementary Rules as well as by the Supreme
Court in a long line of decisions, remunerations which do not form part of the basic or regular salary of an employee, such
as commissions, should not be considered in the computation of the 13th month pay. This being the case, the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of
commissions in the 13th month pay, were issued in excess of the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851. According to
petitioners, this conclusion becomes even more evident when considered in light of the opinion rendered by Labor
Secretary Drilon himself in "In Re: Labor Dispute at the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company" which affirmed the
contemporaneous interpretation by then Secretary Ople that commissions are excluded from the basic salary. Petitioners
further contend that assuming that Secretary Drilon did not exceed the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851, still the
Revised Guidelines are null and void as they violate the equal protection of the law clause.
Respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General question the propriety of petitioners' attack on the constitutionality
of the Revised Guidelines in a petition for certiorari which, they contend, should be confined purely to the correction of
errors and/or defects of jurisdiction, including matters of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and not extend to a collateral attack on the validity and/or constitutionality of a law or statute. They aver that
the petitions do not advance any cogent reason or state any valid ground to sustain the allegation of grave abuse of
discretion, and that at any rate, P.D. No. 851, otherwise known as the 13th Month Pay Law has already been amended by
Memorandum Order No. 28 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 13, 1986 so that commissions are now
imputed into the computation of the 13th Month Pay. They add that the Revised Guidelines issued by then Labor
Secretary Drilon merely clarified a gray area occasioned by the silence of the law as to the nature of commissions; and
worked no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, said Guidelines being based on reasonable
classification. Respondents point to the case of Songco vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 610,
wherein the Court declared that Article 97(f) of the Labor Code is explicit that commission is included in the definition of
the term "wage".
We rule for the petitioners.
Contrary to respondents' contention, Memorandum Order No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may
be gleaned from the language of the Memorandum Order No. 28, it merely "modified" Section 1 of the decree by removing
the P1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month Pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851
remained unaltered, and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic
salary of not more than P1,000.00, said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basic salary of the employeerecipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851
applies equally to "basic salary" under Memorandum Order No. 28.
In the case of San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139, this Court delineated the coverage of the term "basic salary"
as used in P.D. 851. We said at some length:
Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing rules, the basic salary of an employee is used as the
basis in the determination of his 13th month pay. Any compensations or remunerations which are
deemed not part of the basic pay is excluded as basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus.
Under the Rules and Regulations implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations are
deemed not part of the basic salary:

a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of

Instructions No. 174;
b) Profit-sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of
the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on
December 16, 1975.
Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851
Presidential Decree 851 issued by then Labor Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and other
remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in the computation of the 13th month pay.
The exclusion of the cost-of-living allowances under Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions
No. 174, and profit-sharing payments indicate the intention to strip basic salary of other payments which
are properly considered as "fringe" benefits. Likewise, the catch-all exclusionary phrase "all allowances
and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the basic salary" shows also the
intention to strip basic salary of any and all additions which may be in the form of allowances or "fringe"
benefits.
Moreover, the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more
emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall
not be included in the computation of the 13th-month pay.
While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an
employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations
which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by
an employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto
been the subject of a broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and
Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and earnings
within the definition of basic salary.
The all embracing phrase "earnings and other remunerations" which are deemed not part of the basic
salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works
performed on rest days and special holidays, pays for regular holidays and night differentials. As such
they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered in the computation of the 13thmonth pay. If they were not excluded, it is hard to find any "earnings and other remunerations" expressly
excluded in the computation of the 13th month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be
idle and with no purpose.
This conclusion finds strong support under the Labor Code of the Philippines. To cite a few provisions:
Art. 87. Overtime Work. Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the
employee is paid for the overtime work, additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at
least twenty-five (25%) percent thereof.
It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular wage or
basic salary, for reason of which such is categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary under
the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851.
In Article 93 of the same Code, paragraph
c) work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty
percent (30%) of the regular wage of the employee.
It is likewise clear the premiums for special holiday which is at least 30% of the regular wage is
anadditional pay other than and added to the regular wage or basic salary. For similar reason, it shall not
be considered in the computation of the 13th month pay.

Quite obvious from the foregoing is that the term "basic salary" is to be understood in its common, generally-accepted
meaning, i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments as bonuses and
8
overtime. This is how the term was also understood in the case of Pless v. Franks, 308 S.W. 2nd. 402, 403, 202 Tenn.
630, which held that in statutes providing that pension should not less than 50 percent of "basic salary" at the time of
retirement, the quoted words meant the salary that an employee (e.g., a policeman) was receiving at the time he retired
9
without taking into consideration any extra compensation to which he might be entitled for extra work.
In remunerative schemes consisting of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is
patently the "basic salary" for this is what the employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for
extra efforts exerted in consummating sales or other related transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which this
Court has made clear do not form part of the "basic salary."
Respondents would do well to distinguish this case from Songco vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, upon
which they rely so heavily. What was involved therein was the term "salary" without the restrictive adjective "basic". Thus,
in said case, we construed the term in its generic sense to refer to all types of "direct remunerations for services
rendered," including commissions. In the same case, we also took judicial notice of the fact "that some salesmen do not
receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an employeremployee relationship exists," which statement is quite significant in that it speaks of a "basic salary" apart and distinct
from "commissions" and "allowances". Instead of supporting respondents' stand, it would appear that Songco itself
recognizes that commissions are not part of "basic salary."
In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in
P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is
designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An
10
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
Having reached this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued on November 126, 1987 by then Labor Secretary
Franklin M. Drilon is declared null and void as being violative of the law said Guidelines were issued to implement, hence
issued with grave abuse of discretion correctible by the writ of prohibition and certiorari. The assailed Orders of January
17, 1990 and October 10, 1991 based thereon are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999

UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
BF HOMES, INC., respondents.

PARDO, J.:
1

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals granting
respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition, and ordering Atty. Roberto C. Abrajano, hearing officer of the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation, to refrain from hearing HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027 and to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner United BF Homeowners' Association, Inc. (UBFHAI) is the umbrella organization and sole representative of all
homeowners in the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, a seven hundred sixty five (765) hectare subdivision located in the
south of Manila. Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) is the owner-developer of the said subdivision, which first opened in
3
1968.
In 1988, because of financial difficulties, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BFHI under
receivership to undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program, and appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain receiver. The
program was composed of two stages: (1) payment of obligations to external creditors; and (2) payment of obligations to
4
Banco Filipino.
When Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI in 1988, several things were not in order in
5
the subdivision. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major
homeowners' associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF
Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative homeowners' association and the
setting up of an integrated security program that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the
subdivision. On December 20, 1988, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and
amended on March 1989.
Pursuant to these agreements, on May 18, 1989, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation
6
(HIGC), and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the
7
8
subdivision's clubhouse at #37 Pilar Banzon Street, and a strip of open space in Concha Cruz Garden Row, on June
23, 1989 and May, 1993, respectively.
On November 7, 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's
9
eleven (11) members of the board of directors was appointed.
On April 7, 1995, based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the
different homeowners' association in the subdivision informing them that as a basic requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation,
respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing
10
proliferation of squatters.
On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against
11
respondent BFHI. In substance, petitioner UBFHAI alleged that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their
security agreement with the previous receiver. They complained that even prior to said date, the new committee of
receivers committed the following acts: (1) deferred petitioner UBFHAI's purchase of additional pumps; (2) terminated the
collection agreement for the community assessment forged by the petitioner UBFHAI with the first receiver; (3) terminated
the administration and maintenance of the Concha Cruz Garden Row; (4) sent a letter to petitioner UBFHAI stating that it
12
recognized BFPHAI only, and that the subdivision's clubhouse was to be administered by it only; and (5) took over the
administration of security in the main avenues in the subdivision.1wphi1.nt

On April 11, 1995, the HIGC issued ex parte a temporary restraining order. Particularly, respondent BFHI was enjoined
from:
. . . taking over the Clubhouse located at 37 Pilar Banzon St., BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila, taking
over security in all the entry and exit points and main avenues of BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision,
impeding or preventing the execution and sale at auction of the properties of BF Paraaque Homeowners
Association, Inc., in HIGC HOA-90-138 and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or
agreement of petitioner with the former receiver/BFHI concerning funding or delivery of community
13
services to the homeowners represented by the latter.
On April 24, 1995, without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to
14
enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case.
On May 2, 1995, the HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for preliminary
injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved.
When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the temporary restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to
15
maintain the status quo.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
for prohibition, as follows:

16

granting respondent BFHI's petition

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, prohibiting the public respondent
Roberto C. Abrajano from proceeding with the hearing of HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027. Consequently,
the public respondent is hereby ordered to DISMISS HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027 for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

17

On April 24, 1996, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

18

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner UBFHAI raises two issues: (1) whether or not the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the HIGC, specifically
Section 1 (b), Rule II of the "Rules of Procedure in the Settlement of Homeowners' Disputes" is valid; (2) whether or not
19
the acts committed by the respondent constitute an attack on petitioner's corporate existence. Corollary to these,
petitioner questions the appellate court's jurisdiction over the subject case.
Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners' associations was vested by law with the Securities and Exchange
20
Commission. On May 3, 1979, pursuant to Executive Order 535, this function was delegated to the Home Insurance
21
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). Section 2 of Executive Order 535 provides:
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall
have among others, the following additional powers;
(a) To require submission of and register articles of incorporation of homeowners
associations and issue certificates of incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the
registering associations with the duly promulgated rules and regulations thereon;
maintain a registry thereof; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities
that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners
association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary
notwithstanding;
By virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over
homeowners' associations, but also the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and
among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or

associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and

22
the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity.
On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners' disputes. Section 1 (b),
Rule II enumerated the types of disputes over which the HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include:
Sec. 1. Types of Disputes The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or committee duly designated
or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among members of
the association, between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are
members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the
association and the state/general public or other entity. [emphasis supplied]
Therefore, in relation to Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the HIGC's jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes is
limited to controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the
association; (2) between any or all of them and the association of which they are members or associates; and (3) between
such association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Though it would seem that Section 1(b), Rule II of the HIGC's revised rules of procedure is just a reproduction of Section 5
(b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the rules deviated from the provisions of the latter. If the provisions of the law would be
followed to the letter, the third type of dispute over which the HIGC has jurisdiction should be limited only to a dispute
between the state and the association, insofar as it concerns the association's franchise or corporate existence. However,
23
under the HIGC's revised rules of procedure, the phrase "general public or other entity" was added.
It was on this third type of dispute, as provided in Section 1 (b), Rule II of the HIGC's revised rules of procedure that
petitioner UBFHAI anchors its claim that the HIGC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In the comment
filed by the HIGC with the appellate court, it maintained that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
pursuant to the power and authority granted it in the revised rules of procedure. Respondent BFHI disputes this,
contending that the rules of procedure relied upon by petitioner are not a valid implementation of Executive Order No.
535, as amended, in relation to Presidential Decree 902-A.
The question now is whether HIGC, in promulgating the above-mentioned rules of procedure, went beyond the authority
delegated to it and unduly expanded the provisions of the delegating law. In relation to this, the question is whether or not
the revised rule so of procedure are valid.
24

As early as 1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators (PVA), we ruled that the power to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
25
enactment. Its terms must be followed for an administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. "The rulemaking power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
26
covered by the statute." If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
27
former that prevails.
In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of
procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the
law, insofar as the association's franchise or corporate existence is involved, it is only the State, not the "general public or
other entity" that could question this. The appellate court correctly held that: "The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL
28
PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do . . . ." The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject
to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose
29
of a statute.

Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have
the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule30
making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not
31
be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution." It is axiomatic that
a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation
32
is to be valid.
Thus, we hold that Rule II, Section 1(b) of HIGC's "Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners' Disputes"
is void, without ruling on the validity of the rest of the rules.
Neither can the HIGC claim original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus under the two other types of
disputes enumerated in Presidential Decree 902-A and in the revised rules. The dispute is not one involving the members
of the homeowners' association nor is it one between any and/or all of the members and the association of which they are
members. The parties are the homeowners' association and the owner-developer, acting at the same time as the
corporation's committee of receivers.
To reiterate, the HIGC exercises a very limited jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes. The law confined this authority to
controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association;
(2) between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members; and (3) insofar as it concerns its right
to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or
33
diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter.
34
That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change.
In light of the foregoing, we do not see the need to discuss the second issue. Whether or not the acts committed or
threatened to be committed by the respondent against the petitioner would constitute an attack on the latter's corporate
existence would be immaterial. The HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear and resolve the dispute.
Having dispensed with the question of jurisdiction, there is no need for the HIGC to proceed with the hearing of HIGCHOA 95-027. It would just be an exercise in futility since it has no jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it was apparent that the board of directors of respondent BFHI, acting as the committee of receivers, was
only trying to find ways and means to rehabilitate the corporation so that it can pay off its creditors. The revocation of the
security agreements and the removal of administration and maintenance of certain property that are still under the name
of respondent BFHI, were acts done in pursuance of the rehabilitation program. All the security agreements and
undertakings were contractual in nature, which respondent BFHI, acting as a committee of receivers and being the
successor of the former receiver, could very well alter or modify.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, for lack of merit. The decision and resolution
appealed from in CA-G.R. SP. NO. 37072 are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P.
CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN,
KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon
the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending
review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses
are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs.
Professional Regulation Commission."
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105
as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive
any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination
day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of
1
the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a
writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it
had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated
October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further
directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof. No cost in this instance.

SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to
enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation
Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional
Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with
3
each other's acts.
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs.
4
5
6
Mendoza, which cites Pineda vs. Lantin and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, where this Court held that a
Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being coequal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the
Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was
so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an
order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since
under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth
the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a
petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it was stressed that if an order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself,
then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and
Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all
other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation
Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the
other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no
provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of
the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 8637950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation
Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the
7
Regional Trial Court.
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of
8
the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the
Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs.
9
Sayo, this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be no
question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this
conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize
the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers
into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each
supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is
challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive

is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under
judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is
above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an
employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light
and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as
10
govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers.
11

Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the
Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of
Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public
school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend,
reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive
Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held:
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8)
because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal
right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements
not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of
Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain
exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the
payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of
this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of
a government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as
12
amended). (Emphasis supplied.)
13

In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide
on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an
opinion thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of
Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of
B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body
involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties
14
resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . This does not cover rules and regulations of general

applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution
No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
15

The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. In this case, the issue presented
was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on
Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about
because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is
the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions,
orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election
16
laws."
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid
comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on
certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is
not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings
and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the
commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In
short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct
of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari
by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the
COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such
order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
17
courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
18

One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. Here, petitioner
Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the
Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is
among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the
19
Monetary Board's resolutions.
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or orders of
20
the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC.
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and
enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of
Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional
infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot evenattend any review
class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or

university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
21
aforementioned or similar institutions . ...
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable
how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the
examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance
of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view.
If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held
22
to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure
the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal
rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings
and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest
23
enjoyment.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable
their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or
methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers
may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement
24
in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, regarding academic freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means
of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they
have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itselfwould be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out
the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss,
then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up
and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the
respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for
being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126594 September 5, 1997

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable Judge GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., the Presiding Judge of Branch
26 of the RTC at Manila; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
In a petition for review on certiorari filed on November 5, 1996, petitioner Imelda R. Marcos prays this Court to set aside
the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 on May 23, 1996, as well as its
1
resolution of September 27, 1996 denying her motion for the reconsideration of the judgment in said case.
Preliminarily, her motion for extension of time to file this petition was denied for non-compliance with Revised Circular No.
1-88 and Circular No. 19-91 because the affidavit of service, although otherwise sufficient in form and substance, was not
signed by the affiant, and the registry receipt proving service of a copy of said motion to the Solicitor General was not
attached thereto. Hence, the petition subsequently filed by her was dismissed for having been filed out of time in this
2
Court's resolution of November 27, 1996.
Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, explaining the cause for the procedural lapses and contending that, on the
merits, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; that no offenses were actually charged or that the
facts alleged do not constitute the imputed offenses; and, consequently, that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion
in denying the motion to quash.
Considering the number of criminal cases filed against petitioner, relief from which is sought in the petition at bar and the
issues wherein may possibly be raised again in other cases of a similar nature, the Court resolved on February 24, 1997
to require the Solicitor General to comment thereon, in order that the adjudication of petitioner's plaints may not go off
only on procedural points. In due time, such comment was filed, albeit in abbreviated form, the Solicitor General correctly
pointing out that all the substantive issues now being raised before us had also been extensively argued in and resolved
by respondent appellate court.
Indeed, an overall review of the allegations in the present petition reveals that the same are merely a rehash of those
already submitted to respondent court and that this petition is apparently a reprise of the certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 35719 filed in the Court of Appeals.
For facility of presentation, therefore, we need merely to reproduce herein the findings in the assailed decision of
respondent appellate court, which are fully sustained by the records, excluding therefrom those cases pertaining to CAG.R. SP No. 35928 (except when involved in the narration of the antecedents of this case) which was jointly resolved by it
but from which no appeal or other recourse was taken by the petitioners therein.
We accordingly give credit to respondent court and adopt its recital of the antecedents of the instant petition, to wit:
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, petitioner Marcos assails the Order dated June 9, 1994 which denied her Motion to
Quash the eight (8) informations filed against her in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 91-101739
and the other fourteen (14) informations filed against her, Benedicto and Rivera in the consolidated Criminal Case
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101892, and Order dated August 30, 1994 which denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 21, 1983, pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution Nos. 1632 and 1718 dated September 30, 1983
and October 21, 1983, respectively, the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
issued Circular No. 960. The circular, which consolidated the various rules and regulations promulgated by the
CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions including those on gold and silver, prohibits in its Section
4 residents, firms, associations, or corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior
authorization from the CB or without being permitted by CB regulations; and requires in Section 10 thereof all

residents who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports
of such earnings or receipts in prescribed form with the proper CB department and to register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the CB within 90 days from October 21, 1983. Violation of the provisions of the circular
is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of R.A. No. 265, as amended (the Central Bank Act).
On December 20, 1991 or nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime,
Marcos was, for allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad on various dates from
1968 to 1991 without prior authorization from the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations, charged with
violating Section 4 of CB Circular 960 before the RTC of Manila in eight (8) essentially identically worded
informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 101739, one of which reads as follows:
That from 1968 to June 6, 1991, both dates inclusive, the above-named accused, in conspiracy
with her late husband, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while both residing in Malacaang
Palace in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously open and maintain foreign exchange accounts
abroad, particularly in Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) in Geneva, Switzerland, in the name of
Maler Establishment, later transformed into Maler Foundation, which was organized by their
dummies, nominees, fronts, agents or duly appointed administrators among them Jean Louis
Sunier who received instructions from the accused and her husband who signed with
their alias"JOHN LEWIS" in order to maintain two accounts, one of which is Account No. 98929
NY under Maler II with a balance of SF 16,195,258.00, without prior permission from the Central
Bank of the Philippines, and such act of maintaining foreign account abroad was not permitted
under Central Bank regulations.
(Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, pp. 45-46)
The wordings of the other seven (7) informations differed only in the dates of commission of the offense charged,
the name/s of the dummy/dummies, the balance of the foreign exchange accounts maintained abroad and the
name/s of the foreign bank/s where such accounts were maintained.
Likewise, for allegedly failing to submit a report of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or to register
with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated by Section 10 of CB Circular No.
960, Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera were similarly indicted on December 27, 1991 for violation of Section 10, CB
Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act in five (5) informations filed with the RTC of
Manila which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 91-101883. On the same date, nine (9) more
informations essentially charging the same offense were filed with the RTC of Manila, but this time only against
Marcos and Benedicto, which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. One of the
informations reads:
That from September 21, 1983 up to December 26, 1985, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, all accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and with the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residing and/or doing business in Manila, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and assisted by their foreign agent or attorney-in-fact
Stephen G. Cattaui, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in
the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank
within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily
earning, acquiring/receiving foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or
from abroad, despite the fact that they actually earned interests regularly for their investment of
FIFTEEN MILLION ($15-million) DOLLARS, U.S. Currency, in Philippine-issued dollardenominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Banque de
Paris et des Pays-Bas (also known as Banque Paribas) in Geneva, Switzerland but which was
transferred on May 17, 1984 to Lombard, Odier et Cie, a bank also in Geneva, for the account of
COGES 00777 being managed by Mr. Stephane Cattaui for the Marcoses who also arranged the
said investment of $15-million through respondents Roberto S. Benedicto and Hector T. Rivera
by using the Royal Traders Bank in Manila as the custodian of the said dollar-denominated
treasury notes, which earned, acquired or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos
and her late husband an interest of $13,229.16 for delay (December 16-19, 1995) plus
redemption of $15-Million which was remitted to Lombard, Odier et Cie through Chicago
International Banking Corporation in New York, United States of America, for the credit of said
Account COGES 00777 of the Marcoses for further investment outside the Philippines without
first complying with the reporting/registering requirements of the Central Bank.

 (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, pp. 45-46)

On January 3, 1992, eleven (11) more informations for alleged violation of the aforesaid Section 10, CB Circular
960 were filed against Marcos and Benedicto with the same court which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
92-101959 to 92-101969.
xxx xxx xxx
All these thirty-three (33) cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila presided by herein
public respondent Judge Loja, Sr.
Marcos was arraigned on February 12, 1992 while Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned on February 28, 1994.
During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular No. 1318 (Revised Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing
Non-Trade Foreign Exchange Transactions) dated January 3, 1992 and CB Circular No. 1353 (Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) dated August 24, 1992 were issued by the CB. CB Circular No. 1318
repeals insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing provisions of CB Circular No. 960, among other circulars,
while CB Circular No. 1353 repeals all the provisions of Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 only insofar as they
are inconsistent therewith. Both circulars, however, contain a saving clause excepting from the circular pending
criminal actions involving violations of CB Circular No. 960 and CB Circular No. 1318. (Emphasis supplied)
Invoking the abovementioned repeal as one of her grounds, Marcos filed a Motion to Quash on May 23, 1994
seeking the dismissal of the cases or the quashal of the in formations filed against her in Criminal Case Nos. 91101732 to 91-101739 and 91-101879 to 91-101892. Respondent People of the Philippines opposed the same on
3
June 2, 1994.
Petitioner Marcos' aforesaid motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated June 9, 1994 and her motion for
reconsideration was likewise repudiated in an order of August 30, 1994. She then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals ascribing abuse of discretion on the part of respondent trial judge. What
transpired there is best taken from the account thereof in the following portion of the impugned decision of respondent
appellate court.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, Marcos relied on two grounds in taking respondent court to task, to wit: (1) respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; and (2) respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Quash.
Anent the first ground, Marcos argues that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the cases as the informations
clearly allege that the acts complained of were committed outside Philippine territory, and that her constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws was violated, the saving clause contained in CB Circular No. 1318 which
repealed CB Circular No. 960 being patently discriminatory as it was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal
cases lodged against her and her co-accused.
As to the second ground, Marcos argues that the facts alleged in the informations, even if true, do not constitute
offenses and that in any event the offenses charged have "disappeared" due to repeal.
Marcos asseverates that the saving clause (Section 111, Chapter X) of CB Circular No. 1318 is invalid since the
Monetary Board has no authority to except therefrom pending criminal prosecutions, the power being purely
legislative and is not expressly granted in its charter; that even assuming ad arguendo that the Monetary Board
has the power, the same is still invalid for being an encroachment and an invalid delegation thereof, the power to
declare what constitutes a crime and how it should be punished being vested solely and exclusively in the
legislature; that even further assuming that there is no invalid delegation of power to incorporate the saving
clause, it is still invalid for being ultra vires as it is not germane to the object and purpose of the Central Bank Act
which is to stabilize the monetary system; and in any event, even if the power is unquestioned, the clause is still
invalid for being violative of the equal protection of (t)he law clause of the Constitution, it having been designed
solely for the purpose of preserving the criminal cases against her and her co-accused.
As regards the assertion that the facts alleged in the informations do not constitute an offense, Marcos contends
that since the allegations unequivocally state that foreign foundations or trusts, not the Marcoses, opened and
maintained the subject Swiss accounts and earned and received the interests therefrom, she has no duty to

report any earnings and if at all, she was a mere beneficiary of the foreign foundations or trusts; and that the acts
having been committed abroad, they are beyond the jurisdiction of respondent court.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners do not dispute the validity of CB Circular No. 960, the law under which they are being prosecuted, and
of CB Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 which they allege repealed CB Circular No. 960, nor do they challenge the
authority of the Monetary Board to issue them.
Petitioners likewise do not dispute that violation of Section 4 of CB Circular No. 960, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 4. Foreign exchange retention abroad. No person shall promote, finance, enter into or
participate in any foreign exchange transactions where the foreign exchange involved is paid,
retained, delivered or transferred abroad while the corresponding pesos are paid for or are
received in the Philippines, except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or otherwise
allowed under Central Bank regulations.
Residents, firms, associations, or corporations unless otherwise permitted under CB regulations
are prohibited from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad.
or of Section 10 thereof, the pertinent portions of which provide:
Sec. 10. Reports of foreign exchange earners. All resident persons who habitually/customarily
earn, acquire, or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad, shall submit
reports in the prescribed form of such earnings, acquisition or receipts with the appropriate CB
department. Those required to submit reports under this section shall include, but need not
necessarily be limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Residents, firms or establishments habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign
exchange from sales of merchandise, services or from whatever source shall register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within ninety (90) days from the date of this
Circular.
is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act the pertinent portion of which
provides:
Sec. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. Whenever any person or entity
wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board,
the person or persons responsible for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than
4
twenty thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five years.
In respondent Court of Appeals, however, it was petitioner's insistent position that violations of CB Circular No. 960,
specifically Sections 4 and 10 thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the issuance in 1992 of CB Circular Nos. 1318 and
1353, on the theory that the latter circulars completely repealed the former, and that the reservations made in each of the
repealing clauses of the latter circulars are invalid. She now reiterates the same contentions before us. Respondent
appellate court rejected her thesis on this score; we are sufficiently persuaded to do likewise.
The saving clause in CB Circular No. 1318, which petitioner questions, provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing Clause. All existing provisions of Circulars 363, 960 and 1028, including
amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028,
as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending
actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending action or
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or

investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall
govern(Emphasis ours).
The assailed saving clause in CB Circular No. 1353 is as follows:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar
as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and
effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been
repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned,
it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time of the
cause of action accrued shall govern (Emphasis also supplied).
We agree with respondent appellate court that such amendments and saving clauses are valid and were authorized
enactments under a delegated power of the Monetary Board. Section 14 of the Central Bank Act expressly grants the
Monetary Board the power to "prepare and issue rules and regulations necessary for the effective discharge of the
responsibilities and exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank under this Act," and
to report the same thereafter to the President and Congress. In fact, this power of subordinate legislation and its validity
5
was admitted by petitioner in the respondent appellate court.
It cannot be plausibly, claimed that there was undue delegation of legislative power in this particular instance since it was
the Central Bank itself which defined the offense and provided the penalty therefor. As respondent Court of Appeals
points out, administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the
6
law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. This is still the rule
on the matter and, in the instant case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned
circular merely spelled out the details of the offense. Ironically, petitioner concedes the greater power of the Board to
repeal CB Circular No. 960 through CB Circular No. 1318, yet she inexplicably questions the lesser and incidental power
to provide for saving clauses therein.
Petitioner's argument that the saving clauses are not germane to the purposes of the Central Bank Act, and
consequently ultra vires, has been roundly confuted by respondent Court of Appeals. If, as she claims, one of the
objectives of that law is to stabilize the monetary system, that is precisely why Congress punished as criminal offenses
the violations of the issuances of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharge of its responsibilities, and to
carry out which the Board deemed it necessary to provide for the challenged saving clauses. Obviously, these saving
clauses were dictated by the need to continue the prosecution of those who had already committed acts of monetary
destabilization. The opposite view posited by petitioner would result in an absurdity.
Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her coaccused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of
the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove
petitioner's claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to
pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper
stage therefor, and not at their present posture.
Lastly, there is no need for us to tarry on petitioner's hypothesis that the acts charged in the questioned informations were
committed by foreign agents or juridical persons outside Philippine territory and that, she being supposedly a mere
beneficiary, this scenario divests the trial court of jurisdiction over her insofar as the violations resulting from such acts
abroad are concerned. This is too simplistic an argument because it would have the Court assume that she only had a
passive participation thereon or, if she is to be believed, none at all.
That is why respondent Court of Appeals decided to just graciously quote, in refutation of such imposition on judicial
credulity, the perceptively, succinct observation of respondent trial judge, to wit:
. . . In no uncertain terms, the corresponding informations clearly state that the accused, in conspiracy with the
late president . . . opened and maintained foreign accounts abroad in the name of foundations organized by their
dummies. The same observation holds true in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879-92 where the accused and her coaccused are charged (with) violation of Section 10, CB Circular 960. As easily gleaned therefrom, (the) criminal
informations are not only sufficient but clear in alleging that the accused earned foreign exchange without proper
reporting thereof although camouflaged in the name of foundations.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . accused's contention that the acts charged were committed by persons or agents who managed said
foundation outside the country and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this court is misplaced argument. As
already stated and discussed, it is the accused who (was alleged to have) maintained foreign accounts and
earned foreign exchange abroad camouflaged in the name of foreign agents and/or foundations but neither
7
obtained authority to do so nor reported the earnings to the Central Bank. (Words in emphasis supplied).
All the way from the trial court, through the Court of Appeals, and now before this Court, petitioner has insistently repeated
the selfsame issues and arguments for the quashal of the charges against her, with the result that the same have been
deep-frozen since 1991. Inevitably, the three-tiered adjudicature to which they have been subjected has merely resulted in
reiterations by the parties of their set issues, congealed arguments and invariable conclusions.
It is time then to thaw those cases from the frigidity of their present status so that petitioner may have the opportunity to
prove her defenses on the merits, instead of having those cases indefinitely sidelined by legal strategy contingent on
expectancies. For, in the present posture thereof, it does not appear that respondent Court of Appeals has committed any
abuse of discretion, much less of a grave or arbitrary nature, as would call for the extraordinary writ of certiorari. We
accordingly uphold the denial of petitioner's motion to quash so that the interlocutory proceedings may now move on to
trial wherein she can present such evidence as may possibly place her protestations in another light as she claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., separate opinion:

I concur in the result. I reserve my opinion, however, on the various constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. Some of
these issues require a factual foundation before they can be resolved with definiteness. Without the necessary evidence,
the issues are merely hypothetical. The necessary evidence can only be presented in the trial court during the trial on the
merits. Off-hand, I believe that some of the constitutional issues raised by petitioner are serious enough to merit the
attention by this Court at the proper stage of the case.

G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN
REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:t.hqw
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and
the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the
waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator
colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored
with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was
attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which
destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No.
5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First
Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal
by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor
more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries,
promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The
order is quoted below: +.wph!1
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS +.wph!1
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations
regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance
of all concerned.+.wph!1

SECTION 1. Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows:
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of
December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the
purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
(b) Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment
used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and available
source of electric current.
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish
by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and
scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources which shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the
offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6)
months or both at the discretion of the Court.
SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.
SEC. 5. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in
the Office Gazette.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries
Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by
restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to
read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and
other bodies of fresh water."
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83
of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t
for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding
P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed
their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not
Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would
be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663,
September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is
punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of
First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d
rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec.
45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).

It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the
municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the
municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of
the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This
contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that
electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rulemaking power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of
Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the
rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of
fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve
our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any
other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the
court."
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro
fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in
deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to
report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does
not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty
for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances,
fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83
of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense.
It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs.
Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was
confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It
could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms
of electro fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot
be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation
of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269),
expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
That decree provides: +.wph!1

SEC. 33. Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall he
unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or
fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3
hereof: ...
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534
and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No.
704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or
silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to
penalize electro fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and
which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree
penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the
penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains
the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not
impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the
law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal
Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and
is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated
to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.
726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations,
of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it
his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs.
Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69
Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973,
51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the
Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent"
with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary
of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.

Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of
that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to
promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not
contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices
and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters
under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation
thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs.
Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30,
1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he
should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be
improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental
law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal
may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided
in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are
oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law."
The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114
Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails
because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil.
1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men in the
executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal
provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and
based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in
accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as
provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively
in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co.
vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under
which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned
section 4 of the Fisheries Law.

Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative
order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by
naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which
permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A
violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two
fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of
Corrigidor Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of
the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United
States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military
and naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that
provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be
delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the
regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and
therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry
into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An
administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to
carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power
but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the
scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State
vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or
repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of
game.
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward,
prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish
or any part thereof."
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the
largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of
the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If
the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the
administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is
similar to this case.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of
dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant.
Pedro Abad Santos for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga convicting the accused of a
violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases
and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the
trial.
The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the abovenamed accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in
accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio
of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio,
illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in
force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and
conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said
carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them."
The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime. The
demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not guilty.
From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the defendant was notified in
writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio
of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as
rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral
designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the
Director of Agriculture.
It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that,
according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to
remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken
from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work
animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined.
The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.
We are forced to agree with this contention.1awphil.net
The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the accused in
that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and
moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that
section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial.
The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not
fall within any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation knowingly
to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous
communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the
Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it shall be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation knowingly
to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport from one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to another any

domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseased or to expose such animal either alive or dead on
any public road or highway where it may come in contact with other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever
the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province,
municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by shipping, driving or otherwise
transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality, township, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it
shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified
from such locality except when accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the Director of Agriculture stating the
number and the kind of animals to be shipped, driven, taken or transported, their destination, manner in which they are
authorized to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their brands and distinguishing marks.
A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within any of them. There is no
question here of importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a dangerous
communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the
accused had driven or taken said animals from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It
was alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that they had been placed in a corral in
quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and
worked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one municipality or settlement to
another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there worked by the servants of
the accused.
The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable to the case at bar and
also admits that section 7 of said Act is not applicable. This section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall
order any animal placed in quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his
agent, shall deliver it at the place designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and
attendance. Should the owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish
supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance shall be collectible from the
owner or his agent."
We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section, as we are with his
opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of
section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The
section provides the means by which the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment,
if we may call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal
provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it
really punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be inflicted are so
phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by
the law.
The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar. Section 6 simply
authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are
suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place
and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law,
however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any
punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than
six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A violation of the
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly
not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a
violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and proved upon the trial does not
constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of
the Penal Code. It provides:
A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be imposed upon: . . .
2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with reference to any
epedemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar plague.1awphil.net

It alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had ordered a quarantine of the
carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed and completed and the animals
actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his
plantation. We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal Code as above quoted. The fact that the
information in its preamble charged a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a
violation of an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follows: "The undersigned accuses Adriano Panlilio of a
violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follows:" Then follows the body of the information already quoted in this opinion.
We would not permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the
change from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different
defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760 include those required under
article 581. The accused could have defended himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a
violation of article 581.
In the case of United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the facts upon which the charge was
founded terminated with his expression: "In violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect
on the 6th of February, 1902."
In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the information and proved on the trial did
not constitute a violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 as alleged in the information, but did constitute a violation of article
387 in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, and accordingly convicted the accused under those articles and
sentenced him to the corresponding penalty.
In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible witnesses who
heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as
defined in article 387, in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it
is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as
the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the
aforesaid articles of the Penal Code." (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep., 391; U. S. vs.
Guzman, 25 Phil. Rep., 22.)
The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and is sentenced to
pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this
appeal. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-44291

August 15, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
AUGUSTO A. SANTOS, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellant.
Arsenio Santos for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the prosecuting attorney from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite which reads as follows:
ORDER
When this case was called for trial for the arraignment, counsel for the accused appeared stating that in view of
the ruling laid down by this court in criminal case No. 6785 of this court, holding that the penalty applicable is
under section 83 of Act No. 4003 which falls within the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court he
requests that the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Cavite which conducted the preliminary
investigation, so that the latter may try it, being within its original jurisdiction.
We agree that it falls within the jurisdiction of the corresponding justice of the peace court, but it being alleged in
the information that the infraction was committed within the waters of the Island of Corregidor, the competent
justice of the peace court is that of Corregidor, not Cavite.
Wherefore, we decree the dismissal of this case, cancelling the bond filed by the accused, with costs de oficio,
without prejudice to the filing by the prosecuting attorney of a new information in the justice of the peace court of
Corregidor, if he so deems convenient. It is so ordered.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the sole alleged error committed by the court a quo its having dismissed
the case on the ground that it does not fall within its original jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed against the accused -appellee Augusta A. Santos an information
which reads as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Augusta A. Santos of violation of section 28 of Fish and Game
Administrative Order No. 2 and penalized by section 29 thereof committed as follows:
That on or about April 29, 1935, within 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point, Corregidor Island, Province of Cavite,
P.I., the said accused Augusta A. Santos, the registered owner of two fishing motor boats Malabon IIand Malabon
III, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have his said boats, manned and operated by his
fishermen, fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce within three
(3) kilometers from the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which the naval and military authorities of the
United States exercise jurisdiction.
Contrary to law.
Cavite, Cavite, June 18, 1935.
Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
provides as follows:
28. Prohibited fishing areas. No boats licensed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 4003 and this
order to catch, collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from Philippine waters shall be allowed
to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is
exercised by naval or military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El
Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north
side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said

entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas
mentioned above only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned.
A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
The above quoted provisions of Administrative, Order No. 2 were issued by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, now Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No.
4003 which reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall
from time to time issue such instructions, orders, rules and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under
such provisions.
The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and
operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three
kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities
of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above quoted, which reads as follows:
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned
above (within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by
naval and military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving written permission
therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation
of the military and naval authorities of concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of
the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the
United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military
and naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with
said Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings
arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions similar to those
contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in
question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not
been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law,
and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the
regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power
which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and void and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845;
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section 28 of
Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as
constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a
legislative power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged do not constitute a crime or
a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, with
the costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. 159149

June 26, 2006

The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Energy, Petitioner,
vs.
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, which nullified Circular No. 2000-06-010 of the Department of
Energy (DOE).
The facts are undisputed.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and
underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled
3
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000
4
and a maximum of P50,000.
On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33, thus:
SECTION 4. NO PRICE DISPLAY BOARD
LPG Marketer/LPG Dealer/LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Reprimand/warning letter
2nd Offense - Recommend suspension of business operation to the proper local government unit
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit and initiate criminal proceedings
SECTION 5. NO WEIGHING SCALE
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense - Fine of P5,000
2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000
2nd Offense - Fine of P7,000
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Reprimand
2nd Offense - Fine of P500.00

3rd Offense - Fine of P1,000.00

SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED
TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 7. NO APPROPRIATE OR AUTHORIZED LPG SEAL
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 8. NO TRADE NAME, UNBRANDED LPG CYLINDERS, NO SERIAL NUMBER, NO DISTINGUISHING

COLOR, NO EMBOSSED IDENTIFYING MARKINGS ON CYLINDER OR DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN
(REQUIREMENT ON SERIAL NUMBER AND DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2)
YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 9. UNDERFILLED LPG CYLINDERS
A. LPG REFILLER/MARKETER
1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P6,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. DEALER
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG RETAIL OUTLET
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 10. TAMPERING, ALTERING, OR MODIFYING OF LPG CYLINDER THRU ANY MEANS SUCH AS BUT
NOT LIMITED TO CHANGING THE VALVE, REPAINTING, AND RELABELLING BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY
OTHER THAN THE LEGITIMATE AND REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SAME. FOR THIS PURPOSE, LPG
REFILLER, MARKETER, DEALER, OR RETAIL OUTLET, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO HAS POSSESSION OF
SUCH ILLEGALLY TAMPERED, ALTERED, OR OTHERWISE MODIFIED LPG CYLINDER SHALL BE HELD LIABLE
FOR THIS OFFENSE
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Fine of P1,500 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 11. UNAUTHORIZED DECANTING OR REFILLING OF LPG CYLINDERS
1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 12. HOARDING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS INCLUDING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
1st Offense - Fine of P10,000 per cylinder
2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit plus the filing of appropriate
criminal action
SECTION 13. REFUSAL TO ALLOW OR COOPERATE WITH DULY AUTHORIZED INSPECTORS OF THE ENERGY
INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION BUREAU (EIAB) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR
INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION, WHETHER REGULAR AND ROUTINARY OR COMPLAINT-INITIATED
1st Offense - Fine of P10,000
2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 14. REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PAY FINE The Department of Energy shall recommend to the proper local
government unit the closure of business of a respondent who refuses or fails to pay any administrative fine without
5
prejudice to the filing of an appropriate criminal action if warranted.

Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary
to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit.
Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in
6
the law. The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might
exceed the maximum penalty under the law. The decretal part of its Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 null and void and
prohibits the respondent from implementing the same.
SO ORDERED.

The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition, raising the following
issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "A CLOSE SCRUTINY OF BP 33, PD
1865 AND R.A. NO. 8479 SHOWS THAT OFFENSES LIKE NO PRICE DISPLAY [BOARD], NO WEIGHING SCALE,
ETC. SET FORTH IN THE CIRCULAR ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR IN ANY OF THE THREE (3) LAWS".
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "A SCRUTINY OF THE NEW SET OF
PENALTIES PROVIDED BY THE CIRCULAR SHOWS THAT THE PENALTIES THIS TIME ARE BASED ON PER
CYLINDER BASIS"; THAT "BEING SUCH, NO CEILING WAS PROVIDED FOR AS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES";
THAT "AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE PETITIONER, FOR JUST ONE LPG CYLINDER FOUND VIOLATING AT LEAST
SEC[TIONS] 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE [CIRCULAR], A FINE OF P24,000.00 IS IMPOSED;" AND THAT "THIS WILL
CLEARLY BE BEYOND THE P10,000.00 PROVIDED BY THE LAWS."
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 16 OF PETITIONERS
CIRCULAR WHICH AUTHORIZES THE IMPOSITION OF PECUNIARY PENALTIES WITH THE TOTAL FINE NOT
EXCEEDING P20,000.00 FOR RETAIL OUTLETS VIOLATES THE PENALTY CEILING OF P10,000.00 SET UNDER BP
BLG. 33, AS AMENDED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE SECTION 5(g) OF R.A. 7638
FINDS NO REFERENCE IN DOE CIRCULAR NO. 2000-06-010, THE SAME SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "ON THE NEW OFFENSES
INTRODUCED IN THE CIRCULAR SUCH AS SECTIONS 4, 5, 10, 13 AND 14 AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE
GRADUATED PENALTIES ON A PER CYLINDER BASIS, THIS COURT FINDS [NO] REASON TO DISTURB ITS
FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT-MOVANT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY. X X X IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT
BP BLG. 33 AS AMENDED AND P.D. 1865 ARE CRIMINAL STATUTES AND MUST BE CONSTRUED WITH SUCH
STRICTNESS AS TO CAREFULLY SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT."
VI
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE ASSAILED CIRCULAR SETS NO
MAXIMUM LIMIT AS TO THE FINE THAT MAY BE IMPOSED ON AN ERRING PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHICH FACT

MOVANT CONCEDES. FOR ONE (1) CYLINDER ALONE, NOT ONLY DOES THE CIRCULAR MAKE THE FINE
EXCESSIVE TO THE EXTENT OF BEING CONFISCATORY, BUT IT EVEN IMPOSES A PENALTY WHICH MAY EVEN
GO BEYOND THAT MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE FINE OF P50,000.00 SET BY P.D. 1865 IN ITS SEC. 4 AFTER A
8
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING."
To our mind, the issue raised by petitioner may be reduced to the sole issue of whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular null and void, and prohibiting the Circulars implementation.
Petitioner argues that the penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by Sections
9
10
11
12
13
14
1 and 3-A of B.P. Blg. 33 and Section 23 of Republic Act No. 8479. Petitioner adds that Sections 5(g) and 21 of
15
Republic Act No. 7638 also authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular.
Respondent counters that the enabling laws, B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479, do not expressly penalize the acts and
omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638, respondent claims, since the
said law does not pertain to LPG traders. Respondent maintains that the Circular is not in conformity with the law it seeks
to implement.
We resolve to grant the petition.
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the
administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must
16
be provided by the statute itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling,
hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving
petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated,
namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG
seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying
markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious
practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the
monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a
17
maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within
the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum
monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit.
Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law
since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and
which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law,
albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular
contravenes the law.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with
increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as
well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this case
would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of
some unscrupulous LPG traders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of DOE is declared valid. The Decision
and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and
prohibiting its implementation are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6791

March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and
U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one
day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that
said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both
require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations
and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws,
resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no
force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence
of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in
the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true
that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina,
29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No.
20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof),
namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as
made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of
the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el
sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que
muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion
en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del
Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly
its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after

November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was
found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time
on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or
fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section
19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact
Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no
such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense,
and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding
whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1
1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,
303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486,
491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835,
836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180,
187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327,
343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 16941695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 18351836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,
1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 21472161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107,
120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
2
presidential issuances in question said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus

proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
3

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, this Court
held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party
in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason
'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason
for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people
in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government
officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
4
decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of

effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the lawmaking process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
5
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with
no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
6
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
7
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC :
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
8
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
9

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937
10
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
11
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette
for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely
to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My
point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do
so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such
a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what
to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that
the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
1
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. I am likewise
in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
2
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
3
in some form if it is to be enforced at all. It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
4
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that
parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential
decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
5
evident. In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be
6
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be,
in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances
and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is
an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people
1
who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive
notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
2
year [not 15 days] after such publication. To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date
3
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its
proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published.
What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree
but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity
if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in theOfficial Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that
each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus,
a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of
the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also
enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the

Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in
the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a
higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.