ICOSH 2009: Epistemology

A DENIAL OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF LOGIC

JOMAR F. RABAJANTEa, MARIA DIORY F. RABAJANTEb

a
Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Physics, University of the Philippines Los Baños, Philippines /
jfr_jomar@yahoo.com
b
San Beda College, Manila, Philippines / dioryme@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

We normally view logic as a tool in distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning. The

Foundationalist’s notion that logical truths exist independently of human mind presumes that the

system of logic is anchored on self-evident principles that are necessary, i.e. true in all possible

worlds. This notion is the premise of the idea that logic is a set of indubitable truths. Hence, it is

considered normative or about “how we ought to reason.”

The Foundationalist’s notion on logic is, however, flawed. Examining the metaphysical

status of logic and our epistemic relation to it leads us to the conclusion that logic does not have

necessary truthfulness; and that an appeal to Foundationalism or axiomatization in logic is

untenable. A proof refutes that logic is a system of logical truths which are grounded on self-

evident principles. Logic does not exist independently of human mind; and the so-called self-

evident principles are not self-evident at all. The universality of logic is challenged by theorizing

that the system of logic is dependent on how the community of rational minds, which are of the

same species in a given world, interprets and understands reality, which makes logic essentially

descriptive and not just normative.

Title: 7 words
Abstract: 196 words