Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines

on criminal law and procedure:

1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to
constitute estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient
cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain
money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the
check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show
that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his
money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. The
essential elements of this crime are the following: (a) a check is postdated or
issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b)
lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee
thereof. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943,
September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes
is fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the
Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because
of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was
dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In
every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused
Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray
expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did
not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had
made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the
telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash
this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that
Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada,
his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed

that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and
thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Caada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of
estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the
complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance
of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because
he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still
clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification
of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. People of the
Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.

Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be

appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has
clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient lapse of time between such a
determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. In this case, the courts below based their finding of
evident premeditation on the entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged
pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that they were going to conduct a
police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call made by the
victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind,
however, these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of
outward acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are
indicative only of conspiracy among the accused. Settled is the rule that when it
is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had
elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It
must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the
moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation,
calculation, reflection or persistent attempt. Notably, even the Office of the
Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from the moment the victim was
fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for appellant to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo
Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.

Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim.
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the
commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death.
However, such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since
a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this
case, appellants knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape was properly alleged in the Amended
Information. As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of AAA.
Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her
and her relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he
regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding house was also a few minutes away
from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that AAA was known to be
mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily
noticeable to the trial court from the answers she gave to the questions
propounded to her in the course of her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court
stressed that from the filing of this case until its appeal, appellant did not assail
AAAs mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual
inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs mental disability at the time
of the commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore
guilty of the crime of qualified rape. People of the Philippines v. Jojie Suansing,
G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.
Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to
secure his exoneration from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the
records were bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations.
The Supreme Court held that the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina,
however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if
considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is
not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the
context used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting arguendo that
AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was
clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any
rate, it has been repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not

indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative

in character and not essential to a conviction. People of the Philippines v.
Christopher Rivera y Royo, G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.
Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of
Appeals (CA) when it imposed on him the burden of proving the elements of selfdefense. He claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense and,
therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to establish such fact. He avers that
his defense is denial as found by the trial court. Obviously, appellant was
confused. It must be noted that he was the only witness who testified on the
circumstances surrounding the tragic death of the victim. It was he who supplied
the necessary evidence showing that there was unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that there are
more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the
victim, appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However,
neither PO3 Ventinilla nor the victim could be resurrected from their graves to
controvert appellants version of the story. Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of
SPO4 Miraples, appellants co-accused, he stated therein that appellant acted in
self-defense when the victim allegedly went berserk. More important, in his
Answer to the administrative complaint filed by the victims widow, appellant
interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack
through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA committed no error in imposing upon
him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. People of the Philippines
v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain
of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the
Supreme Court found reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an
unbroken chain of custody. First, it is not clear from the evidence that the
marking, which was done in the police station, was made in the presence of the
accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in determining
whether the specimens that entered into the chain were actually the ones
examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to duly

accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items
pursuant to the law. There is nothing in the records that would show at least an
attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither was there any justifiable
reason propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found
conflicting testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the
integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The material inconsistency of who
actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt
as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to
whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same specimens
brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without
adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. People of the
Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y Afiado, G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Arraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to

court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the imputed crime. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is
amended. The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended
information or complaint. This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments
and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an
offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not
alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line
of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused,
such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense. Further, an
amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules,
does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The
purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was

arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably
come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not
charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution. Applying these rules
and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that
the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a
difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on
amendments, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide
is a formal amendment it does not change the nature of the crime, does not
affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the
defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in
fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. Letecia I. Kummer v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the
public prosecutor. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with
the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the
rule is that the Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence
presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts
were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary
exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear
evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its
March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the
public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the complaint for
attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the
other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that they were weak and not
adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting
the prosecutors discretion with its own. Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by

the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari.

Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions,
this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of
law or fact is an abuse of discretion. Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and
Rainier Punzalan v. Michael Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata, G.R. No.
160316, September 2, 2013.
Here are select August 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

Revised Penal Code

Crime of Open Disobedience; elements. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) did not
gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of
probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly
disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open
Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or
executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Frias position as Branch Clerk of Court,
the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting. To
elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is
a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its
jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that
all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void
due to Branch 203s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, since it is
explicitly required that the subject issuance be made within the scope of a
superior authoritys jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted that the second
element of the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist. Proceeding from this
discussion, the third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal
justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision, or order,
which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any
jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or,
conversely, disobey. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and Aseoche, et al v. Atty.
Josejina C. Fria, G.R. No. 183014, August 7, 2013.
Extinguishment of criminal liability by the death of the accused prior to final
judgment; effect of death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction on his

civil liability ex delicto. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states
that, Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex
delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case. Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the
promulgation by the Supreme Court (SC) of its Decision on January 9, 2013.
When Amistoso died, his appeal before the SC was still pending and unresolved.
The SC ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately
informed of his death. Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the SCs
Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and
the SC still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. People of the Philippines v.
Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013.

Rape; the absence of laceration and semen; complete or full penetration of the
complainants private parts not necessary. With regard to the results of the
medical examination, the Supreme Court ruled that the absence of laceration and
semen does not preclude the fact that rape has been committed. In the crime of
rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants private part is not at all
necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is
that the entry or at the very least the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the
labia majora of the complainants vagina, consummates the crime. Likewise, the
absence of semen in AAAs vaginal area would not preclude a finding of rape.
The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial because the presence of
spermatozoa is not an element of rape. Moreover, it has been held that the
absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could be due to a number of factors, such
as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina or
the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse. People of the
Philippines v. Apolinario Manalili y Jose, G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013.

2.

Special Penal Laws

Ill-gotten Wealth; E.O. No. 1, Series of 1986; the mere holding of a position in the
Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate of
Marcos. There are two concurring elements that must be present before assets
or properties can be considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have
originated from the government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by
illegal means. As can be gleaned from the above, evidentiary substantiation of
the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was
necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos
administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the
context of E.O. No.1. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that
one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation
with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served
during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or
employee. In this case, the Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa
served as the Social Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady
Marcos, and mentions several other circumstances that indicated her close
relationship with the Marcoses. However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was
not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary, but a mere member of the staff of the
Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned
and acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses. Thus, the
Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the evidence of the
Republic was able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an
employee in Malacaang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not
establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused
her position or employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case.
Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or
subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Luz Reyes Bakunawa, et al, G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. The Supreme Court here held
that while there were indeed five sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseurbuyer, there were still more broken links in the chain of custody. In this case, one
broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from the buy-bust team to

the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after he placed the
marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over to SPO1
Doria and the specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination.
However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before the trial court so as to shed light on
this matter. Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug
specimens from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified
that the request for laboratory examination and drug specimens were first
received by PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to
physically receive the same. However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not
actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She merely
relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan was not
presented in court to prove that it was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug
specimens to the crime laboratory. In view of the evident breaks in the chain of
custody, very serious doubts arise as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in
this case. Apparently, there can be no absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu
seized from the informant were the very same drugs handed by accusedappellant, or, later on, the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and
eventually presented before the trial court. Accused-appellant was thus acquitted
of the crime charged. People of the Philippines v. Rogelia Jardinel PepinoConsulta, G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013.
Illegal Sale Of Dangerous Drugs; elements. For the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction
actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti. The prosecution duly
established the identity of accused-appellant as a drug seller or pusher, through
the testimonies of PO2 Ibaez, the poseur-buyer, and PO3 Allauigan, as back-up
officer. PO2 Ibaez testified that it was to accused-appellant that he handed the
marked Php100.00 bill for the shabu that he bought on March 23, 2007; and that
accused-appellant was the one who took out of his coin purse a plastic sachet
containing shabu. Both PO2 Ibaez and PO3 Allauigan identified accusedappellant as the one they arrested during the buy-bust operation. Indeed in the
instant case, all the elements constituting the illegal sale of dangerous drug are
present. The sale of shabu was consummated. The alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are mere minor matters, which do not

detract from the fact that a buy-bust operation was conducted. People of the
Philippines v. Ryan Blanco y Sangkula, G.R. No. 193661, August 14, 2013.
RA 3019, Sec. 3(e); elements. The elements of the crime charged under section
3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: 1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3.
His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan
correctly found the concurrence of the three elements. First, petitioner, being the
city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public officer. Second, the failure of
petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be built
because of his unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross
inexcusable negligence. In his own testimony, petitioner impliedly admitted that it
fell squarely under his duties to check the ownership of the land with the Register
of Deeds. Yet he concluded that it was public land based solely on his evaluation
of its appearance, i.e. that it looked swampy. Moreover, the undue injury to
private complainant was established. The cutting down of her palm trees and the
construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a
result, she lost income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and
use of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with the
canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the
canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste disposal site.
Antonio B. Sanchez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187340, August 14,
2013.
3.

Criminal Procedure

Consolidation of Criminal Cases; when consolidation of cases is not advisable.

As can be gleaned from the summary of charges in the Neri case and the Abalos
case, the inculpatory acts complained of, the particulars and specifications for
each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in
connection with the negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project.
Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-trial order in the
Neri case are also different from the list of the peoples witnesses lined up to
testify in the Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders.

This can be easily seen by a simple comparison of the list of witnesses to be

presented in the cases consolidated. A consolidation of the Neri case to that of
Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation
whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute
thereby delaying the resolution of his case. What is more, there is a significant
difference in the number of witnesses to be presented in the two cases. In fact,
the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that in Abalos.
Awaiting the completion in due course of the presentation of the witnesses in
Abalos would doubtless stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as
there are more or less 35 prosecution witnesses listed in People v. Abalos who
are not so listed in People v. Neri. In the concrete, this means, in the minimum,
awaiting the completion of the testimonies of 35 additional witnesses, whose
testimonies are unrelated to the charges against him, before the case against
petitioner may finally be disposed of, one way or another. Also, petitioner will be
exposed to an extra 35 irrelevant testimonies which even exceed those relating to
his case, since the prosecution only has roughly about 26 witnesses for his case.
Further still, any delay in the presentation of any of the witnesses in People v.
Abalos would certainly affect the speedy disposition of the case against
petitioner. At the end of the day, the assailed consolidation, instead of
contributing to the swift dispensation of justice and affording the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases, would achieve the exact
opposite. Romulo L. Neri v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 202243, August 7, 2013.
Intervention of Private Prosecutor In Perjury Case. Even assuming that no civil
liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), it is nonetheless erroneous for the trial court to consider the
intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance.
Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the
offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil
liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. In the light of the foregoing, the MTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as
private prosecutor. Lee Pue Liong a.k.a. Paul Lee v. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R.
No. 181658, August 7, 2013.

Probable Cause; concept. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In order to arrive at
probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present. Masayuki
Hasegawa v. Leila F. Giron, G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.
Preliminary Investigation; only evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
not a conviction, needed for preliminary investigation. All elements of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case and were
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been
committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker,
claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly
boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more than 24 hours. Whether or
not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for
purposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Investigating
Prosecutor, however, ruled that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention
charge is a mere fabrication. The Supreme Court said that the Investigating
Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt
mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in
a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in
according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built
pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the
preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of
prosecutions evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a
partys defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level. Masayuki Hasegawa v. Leila F. Giron, G.R. No. 184536,
August 14, 2013.
Here are select April 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:

1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants

before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a
joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. Spouses Betty and
Monico were among the ten accused convicted by the trial court for kidnapping a
certain Albert Yam for ransom. Although Betty and Monico did not participate in
actually abducting Albert, it was in their abandoned house where Albert was
brought to by the eight other accused. Also, Betty and Monico twice visited the
safehouse where Albert was brought, with Betty serving food for Albert and
Monico assisting the latter in climbing up and down the stairs. The Supreme
Court considered them as co-conspirators. In a conspiracy to commit the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is logically a
primary consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, it can be reasonably
inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. Alberts detention
was accomplished not solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the
presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a
place where escape became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico
were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and
purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The spouses ownership of the
safehouse, Monicos presence therein during Alberts arrival on the evening of
April 7, 2002 and Bettys visits to bring food reasonably indicate that they were
among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and
participated in the execution of the criminal design. The conviction of Betty and
Monico was affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Betty Salvador y Tabios, et al,
G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013.

Rape; the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim. The accused was charged and convicted for raping his 13-year old
daughter. On appeal, the accused reiterated his defense that the testimony of the
victim was highly incredible and illogical. The Supreme Court disagreed with the
contention of the accused. The victim was able to describe in detail how accused
mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her will,
one night in April 1998. The testimony being frank, probable, logical and
conclusive, the Court gave credence to it. There is a plethora of cases which tend
to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares

that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the
accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has
repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a
young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest
of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family, including herself, to a lifetime
of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward
and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.
Hence, the Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the accused. People of
the Philippines v. Edmundo Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013.
Robbery with homicide; all felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery are integrated into felony of robbery with homicide. The accused
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, after accosting sisters AA
and BB along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the bag of AA which
contained money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused argued that
robbery was not sufficiently proved and that they should only be convicted for
homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that in robbery with homicide, the original
criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as
to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission
of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. The actions of the three
accused, from the deprivation of the AA of her personal belongings by one of the
accused to the stabbing of the victim BB by the other two accused are clear and
indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive AA and BB of their personal
belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, stabbed
and killed victim BB. People of the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al.,
G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013.
Self-defense; no self-defense where there is no unlawful aggression. The
accused alleged that he stabbed the victim out of self-defense, i.e., after the latter
took hold of a soldering iron, but was nonetheless convicted for the crime of
homicide. That the victim indeed attempted to attack him using the soldering iron
was however belied by two witnesses of the prosecution. The Supreme Court did
not give credence to the allegation of self-defense and affirmed his conviction.

For the first element of unlawful aggression to be present, jurisprudence dictates

that there must be an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present
only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. Having
failed to prove that the victim attacked him with the soldering iron, the accused
cannot be said to have acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. Sergio
Sombol v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194564, April 10, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

P.D. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law); presentation of sales invoice or receipt provides

proof of a legitimate transaction which is disputable. The accused was charged
with violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, after he
was found, in a buy-bust operation, to have possessed 13 of the 38 Firestone
tires stolen from the owner AA. In his defense, accused alleged that he bought
the tires from a certain store named Gold Link, as evidenced by a sales invoice
issued in his name. The Supreme Court ruled that the defense of legitimate
transaction is disputable and has in fact been disputed in this case. The validity
of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to
prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to overcome the
evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under
section 5 of P.D. 1612. Jaime Ong y Ong v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
190475, April 10, 2013.
R. A. 6426; Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; the crime of unlawful sale of
marijuana necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. The
accused invoked on appeal his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him because the trial court convicted him for
the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana under section 8 of R.A. 6426,
although the information had charged him for unlawful sale of marijuana under
section 4 of R.A. 6426. The Supreme Court held that the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana implied prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal
sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with

selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. Thus, he had been sufficiently given notice that he was also to
be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves. People of the Philippines v. Chad Manansala y Lagman, G.R. No.
175939, April 3, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; chain of custody must be proved for a charge
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to succeed. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of the accused where the prosecution failed to prove the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs alleged to have been sold by the accused to the
poseur buyer. Although the police officer testified that he had marked the sachet
of shabu with his own initials following arrest of the accused, he did not explain,
either in his court testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking
had been done in the presence of the accused, or done immediately upon the
arrest of the accused. Nor did he show by testimony or otherwise who had taken
custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who had
subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on,
to the laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of
shabu to the laboratory for examination, there is now no assurance that the
quantity presented here as evidence was the same article that had been the
subject of the sale by the accused. The indeterminateness of the identities of the
individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after the police officers
marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu
ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. People of the Philippines v.
Alberto Gonzales y Santos aka Takyo, G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013.
R.A. No. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; presence of the barangay captain or any
elected official not required during the buy-bust operation, but only during the
physical inventory conducted immediately thereafter. The accused argued on
appeal that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws committed by the
arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among others, accused alleged that the
barangay captain, was not present during the alleged buy-bust operation. He was
only asked to sign the inventory of the seized items shortly after his arrival at the
scene of the buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal knowledge as to
whether the drugs allegedly seized from the accused were indeed recovered from
them. The Supreme Court ruled that it is enough that the barangay captain is

present during the physical inventory immediately conducted after the seizure
and confiscation of the drugs and he signs the copies of the inventory and is
given a copy thereof. Also, the barangay captain, not only positively identified
both accused, but also identified the items contained in the inventory receipt.
Such testimony clearly established compliance with the requirement of Section
21with regard to the presence and participation of the elected public official.
People of the Philippines v. Gerry Octavio y Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y
Martir, G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where noncompliance of the chain of custody
rule is justified. The accused argued that the chain of custody of the illegal drug,
which was confiscated upon her arrest, was not strictly followed. Specifically, the
illegal drug was marked only in the police station, not in the place where the buybust operation took place. The prosecution explained that the police officers did
not have the opportunity to mark the illegal drug in the place where accused was
arrested because the latter had become hysterical and had caused a commotion.
The Supreme Court ruled that while the procedural guidelines laid out in section
21(1), Article II of R.A. 9165 were not strictly complied with, the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were duly
preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule. The arresting officer was
justified in marking the seized plastic sachet of shabu at the police station,
instead of at the scene of the buy-bust operation because he had no choice but
to immediately extricate himself and the accused from the crime scene in order to
forestall a potentially dangerous situation. Thereafter, the arresting officer turned
the illegal drug over to the investigating officer, who then had it tested in the
Crime Laboratory Office of the Manila Police District. Substantial compliance with
the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render
the seized drug items inadmissible. The conviction of the accused was affirmed.
People of the Philippines v. Lolita Quesido y Badarang, G.R. No. 189351, April
10, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where seized items deemed admissible in
evidence despite failure of arresting officers to comply strictly with the procedural
requirements relative to the seizure and custody of the drugs. The accused
argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws
committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as
embodied in section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among others,

accused allege that no photograph was taken of the items seized from them. In
dismissing the appeal of the accused, the Supreme Court held that even if the
arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required,
such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized
inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. For as long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural
requirements provided for in section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully
observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. People of the Philippines v.
Gerry Octavio y Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y Martir, G.R. No. 199219, April
3, 2013.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Appellate review; the trial courts factual findings are accorded great respect and
even conclusive effect; these factual findings and conclusions assume greater
weight if they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The accused were charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide, after accosting sisters AA and BB along
a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the bag of AA which contained
money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused attacked the credibility of
AA as a witness by citing the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. In finding
against the accused, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that findings of
the trial court on such matters involving the credibility of witnesses cannot be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case. AA is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving
victim of the crime. Her testimony, as described by the RTC, was categorical and
straightforward. AA had positively identified all the accused. There is therefore
no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. People of the
Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al., G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. In this
case, accused was convicted by the trial court for carnapping with homicide,
aggravated by the circumstance that the offense was committed by a member of
an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the Revised Peanal
Code, as amended by RA 7659, although the said aggravating circumstance was

not alleged in the information. As a result, on appeal, the Supreme Court held
that since there is no allegation in the information that accused was a member of
a syndicate or that he and his companions had formed part of a group organized
for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a
syndicated or organized crime group, the same cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against him. The Supreme Court thus modified the
judgment by not considering the said aggravating circumstance. People of the
Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. Under
Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying
circumstances must be alleged in the information. This new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is favorable
to the appellant. People of the Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al, G.R. No.
179041, April 1, 2013.
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act; requirements under R.A. No. 6981.
A certain Kenny Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) under R.A. 6981, otherwise known as The
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, in connection with the prosecution
of the crime of murder filed against 196 accused in what became aptly known as
the Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner, one of the accused, wrote to respondent
Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard
Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. After the DOJ denied his request,
petitioner filed a case for mandamus seeking to compel respondents to include
Dalandag in the informations. The RTC denied the petition. In affirming the
decision of the RTC, the Supreme Court held that there is no requirement under
R.A. 6981 for the prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the
accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection
Program. The admission as a state witness under R.A. 6981 also operates as an
acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal
information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state
witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be
meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon
presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection

Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court
shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the
information. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. v. Sec. Leila De Lima, as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013.
The Recognizance Act of 2012: Giving the Poor More in Law
Posted on April 12, 2013 by Ricardo Ma. P.G. Ongkiko Posted in Criminal Law,
Philippines - Law, Remedial Law
In our criminal justice system, one kind of injustice, that victimizes only the poor,
happens every day whenever an accused, who has the right to post bail to attain
liberty during the course of the trial of his criminal case, is not able to enjoy such
right because he cannot afford to post bail for his release. This reality tramples
upon the social justice mandate of our Constitution and has caused great
injustice to the poor, especially those who are wrongly accused of the crime for
which they have been charged and arrested.
There is a recent legislation that seeks to address this problem: Republic Act
10389 or the Recognizance Act of 2012 (RA 10389 or the Act), which was
signed into law by President Benigno S. Aquino III on March 14, 2013, and which
is intended to promote restorative justice amid problems confronting the criminal
justice system such as protracted trials, prolonged resolution of cases, inability to
post bail bond, and congestion in jails.

Right to Bail and to Be Released on Recognizance

The right to bail emanates from the constitutional right of an accused to be
presumed innocent until proven by an independent, competent, and unbiased
court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. However, for a person accused of a
crime, who is poor and belongs to the marginalized and depressed sector of
society, this right more often than not is too costly, thereby making it practically
futile. The right to recognizance, under RA 10389, seeks to address this.
Recognizance, as an alternative to posting bail, is defined under the Act as: a
mode of securing the release of a person in custody or detention for the
commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty. The

court where the case of such person has been filed shall allow the release of the
accused on recognizance as provided herein, to the custody of a qualified
member of the barangay, city or municipality where the accused resides.
The term used is release on recognizance. The reputable person entrusted with
the accuseds custody will then have the burden of bringing the accused to court
when his presence is required by such court.
Recognizance as a Matter of Right
In its statement of policy, the Act provides that the right of persons to be released
on recognizance is affirmed except those charged with death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment.
Section 5 the Act states that to be released on recognizance is a matter of right
when the offense is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, and the application for such is filed before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. For criminal proceedings before the Regional
Trial Court, the application should be filed only before conviction.
Moreover, Section 12 of the Act provides that the release on recognizance shall
not be allowed in favor of the accused after the judgment has become final or
when the accused has started serving sentence.
Requirements
Among the requirements for recognizance are: (a) a sworn declaration by the
person in custody of his or her indigency or incapacity to post bail; (b) a
certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office of
the municipality or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is
indigent; (c) the person in custody should have already been arraigned; (d)
notification by the court of the application for recognizance on the city or
municipal sanggunian where the accused resides; (e) proper documentation of
the accused through photos of all sides of the face and fingerprinting; and (f)
notification by the court on the public prosecutor of the date of hearing on the
application within 24 hours from the filing of the application.

Disqualification
An accused can be disqualified from availing of release on recognizance on any
of the following grounds:
1. the accused has made untruthful statements in his or her affidavit;
2. the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has
committed a crime aggravated by reiteration;
3. the accused had previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence
or has violated the conditions of bail or release on recognizance without valid
justification;
4. the accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole, or
under conditional pardon;
5. the accused is a flight risk;
6. there is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the
pendency of the case; or
7. the accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher
penalty to the new crime he/she is being accused of.
The court may also order the arrest of an accused released on recognizance (1)
if he fails to appear at the trial whenever required by the court; (2) if there is a
manifestation under oath by any person, which found meritorious by the court
after a summary hearing and after giving the accused the opportunity to be
heard; (3) if the accused has been sued for the commission of another offense
involving moral turpitude and the mayor or public prosecutor recommends his
arrest; or (4) if he commits an act of harassment against private complainant,
prosecutor or witnesses in the case pending against him.
The Act took effect on April 6, 2013, fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette and two national newspapers.

March 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure
Posted on April 1, 2013 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal
Law, Philippines - Cases
Here are select March 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Rape; medical examination of victim not indispensable to prove rape. An

inconclusive medical report does not negate the finding that the accused (Penilla)
raped AAA. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is
merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in
proving the commission of rape. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y
Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; moral character of the victim is immaterial. Accused Penillas insistence
that he was then a virile young man of twenty-three years, lusted after by a
separated and older woman, loses significance in light of the dictum that in rape
cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Rape may be committed
not only against single women and children but also against those who are
married, middle-aged, separated, or pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim
of rape. Correlatively and more importantly, the libidinousness of the victim here,
AAA, which is not accepted as a common attribute, should have been proven
outside of the incident on the midnight of 22 October 1999. People of the
Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as a defense. Accusedappellant makes much of the fact that AAA did not cry for help given that the area
where they lived was densely populated, the houses thereat were literally only
divided by thin walls, and any commotion could easily be heard. Penilla likewise
points out that AAA did not put up a fight. In this regard, Penilla asseverates that
the prosecutions story was silent on any physical struggle suggestive of rape.

The Supreme Court found no credence in Penillas arguments. People of the

Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as a defense. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. Failure
to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victims
submission to the perpetrators lust. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole
test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused; it is not an essential element of rape. Rape victims react differently.
Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive of
force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife, much more
poking it at her, as in this case, is sufficient to bring her into submission. Thus,
the law does not impose upon the private complainant the burden of proving
resistance. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No.
189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when the delay of the victim in reporting the commission of rape unavailing
as a defense. Relying on a tired defense, Penilla insists that AAA belatedly
reported to the barangay authorities that she had been raped. For Penilla, this
delay belies her cry of rape. The Supreme Court disagreed. Indeed,
jurisprudence is replete with holdings that delay in revealing the commission of a
crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief.
This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable
or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. People of the Philippines
v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Qualified Theft; determination of imposable penalty. Perusal of the records of this
case would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article
310 (Qualified Theft) which is two degrees higher than those specified in Article
309 (Penalties for Theft). The Supreme Court held that this is erroneous
considering that the penalty prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft
was committed under any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant,
or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the

plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken on

the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is
present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that
which is prescribed under Article 309. In this case, the amount of the timber
involved is P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in its
maximum period plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000
pesos in excess of P22,000.00 or three more years. Thus, the correct imposable
maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower than
that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which is anywhere between
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Efren S. Almuete
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be issued for an indefinite

period. The Court of Appeals (CA), via its September 20, 2005 resolution,
extended the freeze order over the Ligots various bank accounts and personal
properties until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations being
conducted are terminated. By its very terms, the CA resolution effectively bars
the Ligots from using any of the property covered by the freeze order until after
an eventual civil forfeiture proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they
shall have been adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of
committing. These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes
of a freeze order which is intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and
criminal trial courts can very well handle the disposition of properties related to a
forfeiture case or to a crime charged and need not rely on the interim relief that
the appellate court issued as a guarantee against loss of property while the
government is preparing its full case. The term of the CAs extension, too, borders
on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots in violation of their constitutionally
protected right to be presumed innocent because the unreasonable denial of their
property comes before final conviction. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v.

Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council,

G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be made effective for more than
six months unless extended by the court upon motion of the Republic. A freeze
order is both a preservatory and preemptive remedy and meant to have a
temporary effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture
cases where the provisional remedy which means, the remedy is an adjunct of
or an incident to the main action of asking for the issuance of an asset
preservation order from the court where the petition is filed is precisely available.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a
period not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally,
the Republic should have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the
property owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset
preservation order or it should have filed the necessary information. Otherwise,
the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy his property without any
legal process affecting it. However, should it become completely necessary for
the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file the
necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the
reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the period
of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to the
resolution by the CA, which must resolve this kind of motion for extension with
reasonable dispatch. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944,
March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. Based on
section 10 of R.A. 9160, as amended by R.A. 9194, there are only two requisites
for the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) and (2) the determination of probable cause by the
Court of Appeals (CA). Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944,
March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. The probable
cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man

to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to

be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to
said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense. In other words, in
resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CAs statutorily-guided
determinations focus is not on the probable commission of an unlawful activity
(or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has already determined
to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments
sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities
enumerated under R.A. 9160, as amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause
refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and the
property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of section 10 of RA No.
9160, as amended. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944,
March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. From AMLCs
verified allegations in its ex parte application and the Ombudsmans complaint, it
can be gleaned that Lt. Gen. Ligot himself admitted that his income came from
his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the Ombudsmans investigation revealed
that the bank accounts, investments and properties in the name of Lt. Gen. Ligot
and his family amount to more than P54,000,000.00. Since these assets are
grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligots income, as well as the lack of any
evidence that the Ligots have other sources of income, the CA properly found
that probable cause exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. Ret. Lt.
Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the AntiMoney Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu; elements. To secure a conviction for
illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must prove the presence of the following
essential elements: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. It is necessary to establish that the transaction or sale
actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence. PO1
Bernardo gave a detailed account of the transaction commencing from the
introduction made by the confidential informant between him, as the poseurbuyer, and accused-appellants to the time the sale was consummated until the

latter were arrested and several additional plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances, which later tested for shabu, were found in their
possession six from Zenaida and one from Myrna. That the sale actually took
place and that several sachets were recovered from the accused-appellants were
clear from the testimony of PO1 Bernardo in court. The credibility of PO1
Bernardo was put to test on cross-examination but his statements were
consistent all throughout that the Supreme Court was convinced that his
testimony, supported by evidence, was reliable. People of the Philippines v.
Zenaida Soriano y Usi, and Myrna Samonte y Hiolen, G.R. No. 189843, March
20, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. The only
elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is proof that
the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In buy-bust operations, the delivery of
the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the sellers receipt of the marked money
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not
properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve faith
and credit. The Supreme Court has held that when police officers have no motive
to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the
presumption of regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official
duties. People of the Philippines v. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No.
184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. In the present
case, there is no contention that the members of AIDSOTF who conducted the
buy-bust operation were motivated by ill will or malice. Neither was there
evidence adduced to show that they neglected to perform their duties properly.
Hence, their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserve full
faith and credence. Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who
had personal knowledge of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to purchase
the ecstasy pills, and the subsequent acceptance of the offer. It is clear from the
testimonies of PO2 Frando and the other arresting officers that they conducted
the buy-bust operation based on the information from the CI. However, the arrest
was made, not on the basis of that information, but of the actual buy-bust

operation, in which respondents were caught in flagrante delicto engaged in the

illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Due to the investigative work of the AIDSOTF
members, the illegal sale was consummated in their presence, and the elements
of the sale the identity of the sellers, the delivery of the drugs, and the payment
therefor were confirmed. That the CI initially provided this information or tip
does not negate the subsequent consummation of the illegal sale. People of the
Philippines v. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; presentation of an informant not required for the
prosecution of drug cases. Respondent Judge Lagos erred in requiring the
testimony of the CI. Respondent judge based his ruling on a 2004 case, People v.
Ong, the facts of which purportedly mirror those of the present case. However,
the Supreme Court (SC) held that there is no basis for this conclusion, as Ong
involved a conviction based on the lone testimony of one apprehending officer,
Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Gonzales. The SC found then that SPO1 Gonzales
was merely the deliveryman, while the CI was the one who acted as the poseurbuyer. In this case, one of the witnesses, PO2 Frando, was a buy-bust team
member who also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the actual sale
transaction. His testimony was a first-hand account of what transpired during the
buy-bust and thus stemmed from his personal knowledge of the arrest in
flagrante delicto. Requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs
contrary to jurisprudential doctrine, since the SC has long established that the
presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug cases.
The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it would be merely
corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented
in court, and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery
of the prohibited drug. Informants are usually not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police. Except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and
there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or
there are reasons to believe that the officers had motives to falsely testify against
the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer, the
informants testimony may be dispensed with, as it will merely be corroborative of
the apprehending officers eyewitness accounts. In the present case, the fact of
the illegal sale has already been established by testimonies of the members of
the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos need not have characterized the CIs testimony

as indispensable to the prosecutions case. People of the Philippines v. Judge

Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; failure of the police to strictly comply with chain of custody
rule excused where integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized are
preserved. As regards the failure of the police to strictly comply with the
provisions on chain of custody under section 21 of R.A. 9165, it is settled that the
failure to strictly follow the directives of this section is not fatal and will not
necessarily render the items confiscated from an accused inadmissible. What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. In the present case, the succession of events
established by evidence shows that the items seized were the same items tested
and subsequently identified and testified to in court. Thus, the Supreme Court
held that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the
petitioner were not compromised. Moreover, the police officers explained during
trial the reason for their failure to strictly comply with section 21 of R.A. 9165.
Benedicto Marquez y Rayos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197207,
March 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; liberal application of chain of custody rule observed where
school personnel took initial custody of dangerous drugs. The antecedents of this
case involve a unique feature in the sense that the person who had initial custody
of the dangerous drugs was not a police officer or agent, but a guidance
counselor a person who was not expected to be familiar with the niceties of the
procedures required of law enforcers in the initial handling of the confiscated
evidence. Contrary to the petitioners claim, Bagongons failure to mark the
seized sachets should not in any way weaken the prosecutions case, more so
since she was able to prove that she was also the person who handed the seized
sachets to the police when the latter arrived. Drug peddling in schools is
prevalent; the scenario attending this case is likely to be repeated many times. To
impose on teachers and other school personnel the observance of the same
procedure required of law enforcers (like marking) processes that are unfamiliar
to them is to set a dangerous precedent that may eventually lead to the acquittal
of many drug peddlers. The evidentiary value of the seized specimen remains
intact as long as the school personnel who had initial contact with the drug/s was
able to establish that the evidence had not been tampered with when he handed

it to the police, as in this case. Benedicto Marquez y Rayos v. People of the

Philippines, G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Circumstantial evidence; when circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction.

Under section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction when the concurrence of the following factors obtain: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances
and facts must be absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis
propounding the innocence of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Gerald
Soriano alias Pedro, G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013.
Circumstantial evidence; when circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction. In
the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish the existence of an unbroken
chain of circumstances that lead to no other logical conclusion but the guilt of the
accused. The only circumstances cited to implicate the accused in the crime are
the following: (a) he passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on 31
December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m.
to 5:00 p.m. on that day; and (c) the soiled garments confiscated from him were
identified to have been the same ones he was wearing then. To an unprejudiced
mind, the fact that Soriano was the only one whom Vicky saw pass through the
shortcut to Wao from 3:00p.m. to 5:00 p.m. does not logically lead to any
conclusion regarding his participation in the raping and killing of AAA. It is a mere
conjecture that can be refuted by other equally conceivable and rational
inferences. The circumstances presented by the prosecution do not form a solid
and cohesive narrative that proves with moral certainty its contention that
accused perpetrated said heinous acts. People of the Philippines v. Gerald
Soriano alias Pedro, G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013.
Credibility of Witness; factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight
and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The Supreme Court (SC) in this
case found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the lower courts. It
is well-settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed

on appeal. After a careful review, the SC was convinced that the testimony of
AAA positively identifying Pielago as the one who molested her is worthy of
belief. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly
established that Pielago inserted his right hands forefinger into her vagina and
anus while she and her younger brother, CCC, were in his custody. Being a child
of tender years, her failure to resist or struggle while Pielago molested her would
all the more prove how she felt intimidated by her Kuya. Mike Alvin Pielago y
Ros v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013
Criminal Information; what controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. It is wellsettled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the
designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly. In the instant case, the designation of the offense in the
information against Pielago was changed from the crime of acts of lasciviousness
in relation to section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault
penalized under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. The information
was worded as follows: x x x commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of
[AAA], a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of
his fingers to the vagina of AAA, x x x. Indeed, in order to obtain a conviction for
rape by sexual assault, it is essential for the prosecution to establish the
elements that constitute such crime. Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code
explicitly provides that the gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault which
is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice. In the instant
case, this element is clearly present when AAA straightforwardly testified in court
that Pielago inserted his forefinger in her vagina and anus. Jurisprudence has it
that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a
woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Thus, AAAs unrelenting
narration of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of
Pielago as the malefactor, established the case for the prosecution. Mike Alvin
Pielago y Ros v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013

February 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and

Procedure
Posted on March 13, 2013 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Here are select February 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy; joint purpose and design. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode, method, and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; orinferred from
the acts of the accused when those acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interests.Proof of a previous agreement and
decision to commit the crime is not essential, but the fact that the malefactors
acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices. In this case, the
prosecution decisively established a community of criminal design among
Alvarico, Reyes, and appellant Pondivida. While there is no evidence of any
previous agreement among the assailants to commit the crime, their concerted
acts before, during and after the incident establish a joint purpose and intent to
kill. As attested to by accused-appellant, they all went to the intended victims
house bearing firearms. Accused-appellant himself knocked on the door. After
failing to locate Udoy and Bagsik, and discovering that Gener was the latters
brother, they then engaged in a lengthy conversation, as they circled around a
nearby well outside the house.Accused even admitted to shouting the name
Bagsik over and over.They all asked Gener to step outside and speak withthem.
Upon his refusal, appellant Pondivida, together with Alvarico, entered the house
through an upstairs window. Alvarico fired at George who was at the stairs.
Reyes, from his vantage point at the front door, also shot at George.After fleeing
the scene, appellant Pondivida admitted that he met with Alvarico in Novaliches.
Alvarico gave him money, and the latter thereafter boarded a bus headed to
Olongapo City. Their acts together were indicative of a common purpose, which
was murder. People of the Philippines v. John Alvin Pondivida, G.R. No. 188969,
February 27, 2013.

Conspiracy; elements. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the
felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Here, accused
PO2 Valdez cannot avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by coaccused Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly
shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their
unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only
from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but
also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive
shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and
Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board
the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose. To be
a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution;
neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy
between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their
acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
People of the Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, G.R. No.
175602, February 13, 2013.
Murder; elements. To hold the accused liable for murder, the prosecution must
prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. All
elements were established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution in the
present case. First, it is undisputed that Emmanuel died from a gunshot wound
sustained on October 10, 2005. Second, Jaymart was positively identified by
eyewitness Edwin as the one who shot and killed Emmanuel. Although Jaymart
attempts to attack Edwins credibility, it was not lost upon the Supreme Court that
the lower courts gave full faith and credence to Edwins testimony. Third, the
killing of Emmanuel was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the
attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden that he had clearly no inkling of
what the assailant was about to do. In this case, Emmanuel was sitting down
before a table, busily writing, when Jaymart came up behind him and, without
warning, shot him at the back of the head. Evidently, Emmanuel, who was
unarmed and unaware, had no opportunity at all to defend himself. And finally,

the killing of Emmanuel constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide. All told, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Jaymart was responsible for
the murder of Emmanuel. People of the Philippines v. Mark Joseph R. Zapuiz,
G.R. No. 199713, February 20, 2013.
Estafa; syndicated estafa; elements. The elements of syndicated estafa are: (a)
estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. In other words,
only those who formed and manage associations that receive contributions from
the general public who misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated
estafa. Gilbert Guy, et al, however, are not in any way related either by
employment or ownership to Asia United Bank (AUB). They are outsiders who, by
their cunning moves were able to defraud an association, which is the AUB. They
had not been managers or owners of AUB who used the bank to defraud the
public depositors. The present petition involves an estafa case filed by a
commercialbank as the offended party against the accused who, as clients,
defrauded the bank. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused should
only be charged for simple estafa. Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia
United Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al v. Asia Untied
Bank, G.R. Nos. 187919/G.R. No. 187979/G.R. No. 188030, February 20, 2013.
Homicide; intent to kill. The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at
whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. The
evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct
of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the
victim. Accuseds intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries.
Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a bloodied right upper torso,
the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. Nonetheless,
accused continued to shoot at the victim three more times, albeit unsuccessfully.
These belie the absence of petitioners intent to kill the victim. Edmundo
Escamilla y Jugo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188551, February 27,
2013.

Rape; elements of statutory rape; carnal knowledge of a female without her

consent is the essence of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are that:
(a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat
or intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation of reason or being
otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape.
People of the Philippines v. Tomas Teodoro y Angeles, G.R. No. 175876,
February 20, 2013
Rape; elements of statutory rape; full penile penetration of the females genitalia
is not required. Full penile penetration of the females genitalia is not likewise
required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman. The Supreme Court here declared that the
findings of the lower courts on the commission of the two counts of statutory rape
by Teodoro were well founded. AAAs recollections given in court when she was
only eight years old disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration of her
ordeals at his hands. She revealed details that no child of her very tender age
could have invented or concocted. The only rational and natural conclusion to be
made by any objective arbiter is to accord the fullest credence to her. People of
the Philippines v. Tomas Teodoro y Angeles, G.R. No. 175876, February 20,
2013
Self-defense; elements. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must
satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under Article
11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or
rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following
circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.The most important among all the
elements is unlawful aggression. There can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense. Simon A. Flores v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.

Self-defense; elements; burden of evidence is shifted to the accused. Generally,

the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. If
the accused, however, admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense,the
burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his
part. In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus
by shooting him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he
invoked self-defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the
authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the killing
was legally justified under the circumstances. Simon A. Flores v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
Self-Defense; elements; number of gunshot wounds on victim negative unlawful
aggression. In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden. The Supreme
Court agreed with the Sandiganbayans assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative value of evidence on record. As noted by the
Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence, both testimonial and documentary, were
crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as to its credibility. Furthermore,
granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by
Jesus, the same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and
fell to the ground. At that point, the perceived threat to Flores life was no longer
attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on Jesus abdomen
and buttocks. Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted
upon Jesus further negate the claim of self-defense by the accused. Records
show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the different parts of his
body. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the victim,
the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the
liver. If there was any truth to Flores claim that he merely acted in self-defense,
his first shot on Jesus shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on the
ground, would have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly initiated by the
latter. But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot
wounds sustained by the victim, the Supreme Court found it difficult to believe
that Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his own life. Simon A. Flores v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Alibi; physical impossibility must be proved. For Jaymarts alibi to prosper, he

must prove that not only was he somewhere else when Emmanuel was killed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the
appellant was when the rime transpired and the place where it was committed, as
well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least
chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi
must fail. Although Jaymart claimed that he was in Divisoria from 7:00 a.m. to
9:00 p.m. on October 10, 2005, Jaymart himself admitted that it would only take a
five-minute tricycle ride to get from Divisoria to Parola, where Emmanuel was
shot. People of the Philippines v. Mark Joseph R. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713,
February 20, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; offenses under section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Braza challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the second information
because there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered by
the government. He then argues that the facts under the second information are
inadequate to support a valid indictment for violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that there are two (2)
ways by which a public official violates section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference.The accused may be charged under either
mode or under both. The disjunctive term or connotes that either act qualifies as
a violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.In other words, the presence of one would
suffice for conviction. It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation
of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 under the second mode. To be found guilty under
the second mode,it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit
to another, in the exercise of his official,administrative and judicial functions. The
element of damage is not required for violation of section 3(e) under the second
mode.In the case at bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that
accused public officers and employees, discharging official or administrative
function, together with Braza, confederated and conspired to give FABMIK
Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. unwarranted benefit or
preference by awarding to it Contract J.D. No. 06H00050 through manifest
partiality or evident bad faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and

compliance with the requirement for qualification contrary to the provisions of

R.A. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act. Settled is the rule that
private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under section 3 of R.A.
3019. Considering that all the elements of the offense of violation of section 3(e)
were alleged in the second information, the SC found the same to be sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction. Isabelo A. Braza v. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan (1st Division), G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013.
Appeals; an appeal taken by one or more of several accused applicable to those
who did not appeal if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable to them.
Based on section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, accused Edwin cannot
be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes
committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his
convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The
downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth
pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal
responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that the Supreme Court had
found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the
victims, warranting their equal liability under the principle of conspiracy.
Moreover, the benefits of the said provision extended to all the accused,
regardless of whether they appealed or not. People of the Philippines v. PO2
Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; buy-bust operations; distinction between entrapment and
instigation. A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a
legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit. It is distinct from instigation, in that
the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is enticed or
lured or talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is
not. In entrapment, prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust
operation legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the
target area by the informant. Also, the presentation of an informant as a witness
is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drugdealing accused in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of
the culprit arrested through his efforts. Only when the testimony of the informant
is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should
the need to protect his security be disregarded. Here, the police officer, who

acted as a poseur-buyer, asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter,
in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the marked bill from the
police officer and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The
accused was shown to have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding
from the police officer. There is no question that the idea to commit the crime
originated from the mind of the accused. Also, the informants testimony as a
witness against the accused would only be corroborative of the sufficient
testimony of the police officer as the poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony was
unnecessary. People of the Philippines v. Noel Bartolome y Bajo, G.R. No.
191726, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; buy-bust operations. The chain of
custody of the seized drugs in a buy-bust operation is sufficiently established
when there is proof of the following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,
of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court. The failure of the police officers to make an inventory report and to
photograph the drugs seized from Linda and Elizabeth, as required by Article II,
section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. 9165, are not automatically fatal to the
prosecutions case, as it was able to trace and prove the chain of custody of the
same. People of the Philippines v. Linda Alviz y Yatco and Elizabeth Dela Vega y
Bautista, G.R. No. 177158, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; procedure. The buy-bust team in this
case did not observe the procedures laid down in section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165. They did not conduct a
physical inventory and no photograph of the confiscated item was taken in the
presence of the accused-appellant, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official. In fact, the prosecution failed to present an accomplished
Certificate of Inventory. Further, the circumstances obtaining from the time the
buy-bust team was organized until the chain of custody commenced were riddled
with procedural lapses and inconsistencies between the testimony and the
documents presented as evidence in court so much so that even assuming, that

the physical inventory contemplated in R.A. 9165 subsumes the marking of the
items itself, the belated marking of the seized items at the police station sans the
required presence of the accused and the witnesses enumerated under section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165, and absent a
justifiable ground to stand on, cannot be considered a minor deviation from the
procedures prescribed by the law. There being a gross, systematic, or deliberate
disregard of the procedural safeguards the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties is overturned. People of the Philippines v. Jose Alex
Secreto y Villanueva, G.R. No. 198115, February 27, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain and custody; requirements; cases where nonobservance may be excused. Although it appears that the buy-bust team did not
literally observe all the requirements under section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, like
photographing the confiscated drugs in the presence of the accused, of a
representative from the media and from the Department of Justice, and of any
elected public official who should be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy of it, the same may be excused because the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized shabu was preserved. Immediately upon the
arrest of the accused, Police Officer Paras marked the plastic sachet containing
the shabu with the accuseds initials of NBB. Thereafter, Paras brought the
sachet and the contents to the ADSOU, where his superior officer, Insp. Cruz,
prepared and signed the request for the laboratory examination of the contents of
the marked sachet. P02 De Ocampo handcarried the request and the evidence to
the PNP Crime Laboratory. SPO 1 Bugabuga of that office recorded the delivery
of the request and the marked sachet, which were all received by Chemist Dela
Rosa. In turn, Chemist Dela Rosa examined the contents of the marked sachet,
and executed Physical Sciences Report No. D-1 03 8-03 confirming that the
marked sachet contained 0.06 gram of shabu. In this regard, the accused did not
deny that Paras and Chemist Dela Rosa affirmed the sequence of custody of the
shabu during the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this chain of custody of the
shabu was firm and unbroken. People of the Philippines v. Noel Bartolome y
Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; substantial compliance may be
sanctioned. Defense suggests that the non-marking of the seized illegal drug at
the place where the same was confiscated is enough to exonerate the accusedappellant. The reason is that this allegedly places in doubt the authenticity of the

drug delivered to the crime laboratory for examination. However, the Supreme
Court found that the prosecution has properly established the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least from the time it came into possession of the
police officers, during its testing in the laboratory to determine its composition
and up to the time it was offered in evidence. The function of the chain of custody
requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the
evidence are removed. As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers,
substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of custody is
sanctioned. People of the Philippines v. Saiben Langcua y Daimla, G.R. No.
190343, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items should be preserved. Failure to strictly comply with section 21 of
R.A. 9165, which outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of confiscated,
seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, will not render an arrest illegal or the
items seized from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is crucial is that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will
be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case
at bar, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution was able to establish that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs had been
maintained. P/Insp. Salazar, who was one of the apprehending officers, marked
the seized items in front of accused Manalao and the other apprehending
officers. P/Insp. Salazar, who was also the investigating officer, thereafter signed
a request for the laboratory examination of the seized drugs, which was received
by Forensic Chemist Mag-abo, together with the items enumerated therein. She
then testified in open court on how her examination confirmed that the seized
items, which she submitted in court, tested positive for shabu. Besides, unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered or meddled with, the presumptions that the integrity of such evidence
had been preserved and that the police officers who handled the seized drugs
had discharged their duties properly and with regularity remain. The burden to
overcome such presumptions lies on Manalao, and the Supreme Court found that
he failed to do so. People of the Philippines v. Malik Manalao y Alauya, G.R. No.
187496, February 6, 2013.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements. When

prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug. Mere possession of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable
under R.A. 9165. Since accused Manalao failed to adduce any evidence showing
that he had legal authority to possess the seized drugs, then he was correctly
charged with its illegal possession. The Supreme Court has time and again
looked upon the defense of denial with disfavor for being easily fabricated. Since
accused failed to give anything more than his bare assertions, his defense of
denial must necessarily be rejected. People of the Philippines v. Malik Manalao y
Alauya, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements. In
prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. The above elements were all duly established by the
prosecution. After De Jesus was validly arrested for the illegal sale of drugs, he
was searched and frisked, pursuant to section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
or the provision on searches incident to lawful arrest. Upon such search, De
Jesus was found to be in possession of eight heat-sealed sachets of shabu, an
item identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug. De Jesus failed to show that
he had authority to possess them. Moreover, mere possession of a prohibited
drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of satisfactory explanation.People
of the Philippines v. Victor De Jesus y Garcia, G.R. No. 198794, February 6,
2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements. To
prosecute illegal possession of dangerous drugs, there must be a showing that
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. As an incident to the
arrest, Galido was ordered to empty his pockets which led to the confiscation of

another plastic sachet containing illegal drugs. The defense presented no

evidence to prove that the possession was authorized by law, the defense being
non-possession or denial of possession. However, such denial cannot prevail
over the positive identification made by the police officials.For the defense
position to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties
ina regular and proper manner. Galido failed to present any evidence that the
police officials were distrustful in their performance of duties. He even testified
that prior to the arrest; he did not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with the
police officers nor was he acquainted with any reason that they carried a grudge
against him. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the lower courts
convicting Galido of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. People of the
Philippines v. James Galido y Noble, G.R. No. 192231, February 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements;
admissibility of evidence. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the
accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. Accused concedes that frisking
passengers at the airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct of
Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out
his arms and empty his pockets. He believes such meticulous search was
unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound
when petitioner walked past through the metal detector and hence nothing
suspicious was indicated by that initial security check. In this case, the Supreme
Court ruled that prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security
officers found in the person of accused the marijuana fruiting tops, an illegal
substance, contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the
airports pre-departure area. Accuseds reluctance to show the contents of his
short pants pocket after the friskers hand felt the rolled papers containing
marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting
officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by
the said authorities. The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets
being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal
substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence.

Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191023,
February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. The elements
necessary to successfully prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The prosecution must
establish that the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs actually took place together
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized
in evidence. In this case, the prosecution was able to establish the above
elements. Accused Manalao was positively identified by PO1 Solarta, who knew
him even before the operation, as the one who sold the seized shabu subject of
this case to the poseur-buyer. Manalao was caught in flagrante delicto in the
entrapment operation conducted by the PNP of Tubod, Lanao del Norte.
Moreover, the corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and
conclusiveness. People of the Philippines v. Malik Manalao y Alauya, G.R. No.
187496, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; illegal possession of
dangerous drugs; elements. As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (1) the
accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another and (2) knew that what
was sold and delivered was a prohibited drug;and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drugs. Manifest on
record is thatthe buy-bust transaction between the police operatives and Diwa
was unequivocally established by the prosecution, and it was so found by both
lower courts. After being identified by the informant, Diwa was approached by
PO3 Galvez for the purchase of marijuana.Diwa, after ascertaining the quantity to
be purchased and accepting the marked money from PO3 Galvez, handed him a
portion of marijuana from the bunch wrapped in newspaper, contained in the
yellow SM Supermarket plastic bag. The contents thereof were sent to the
Physical Sciences Division, and after examination, confirmed to be marijuana, a
dangerous drug. People of the Philippines v. Magsalin Diwa y Gutierrez, G.R. No.
194253, February 27,2013.

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu. To establish the crime of illegal sale
of shabu, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the
sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. It
simply requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at
the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. If a police officer goes
through the operation as a buyer, the crime is consummated when the police
officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the accused, and there is an
ensuing exchange between them involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to
the police officer. Should the accused raise the defense of frame-up and
extortion, the same must be established with clear and convincing evidence
because the fact that frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders
such defenses hard to believe. In this case, the accused merely put up selfserving denials. If indeed the accused was merely a victim of frame-up and
extortion, there was no reason for him and his brother not to have formally
charged the police officers with the severely penalized offense of planting of
evidence under section 2915 of R.A. 9165 and extortion. Therefore, the Supreme
Court rendered the defenses of frame-up and extortion implausible. People of the
Philippines v. Noel Bartolome y Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. What is material is proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The commission of illegal sale merely
consummates the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the
operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by seller, followed by the delivery
of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In this
case, the prosecution has adequately proven all the elements constituting sale of
illegal drug. This is evident from the testimony of PO1 Domingo, who identified in
open court the white crystalline substance contained in the plastic sachet as the
one handed by Langcua to him during the buy-bust operation. The substance
yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as
evidenced by the Chemistry Report given by PSI Cayabyab. People of the
Philippines v. SaibenLangcua y Daimla, G.R. No. 190343, February 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165 provides the
procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs. This

procedure underscores the value of preserving the integrity of the confiscated,

seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and
laboratory equipment. It puts into focus the essentiality of the confiscated articles
as the corpus delicti that the State must establish during the trial, as a means of
avoiding the commission of abuses by the lawmen in their enforcement of the
laws against illegal drug trade. In this case, the members of the buy-bust team
substantially complied with the requirements. To shield the operation from
suspicion, they first saw to the certification of the buy-bust bill by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City pursuant to their then standard operating procedure.
After arresting Tapere, they lost no time in bringing him and the confiscated
sachets (marked and identified as AT-1 to AT-4, inclusive) to the PDEA office,
where Team Leader SPO2 Englatiera immediately prepared and signed the
request for laboratory examination. Due to the lateness of the hour, PO1 Margaja,
another member of the team, brought the request and the sachets to the PNP
Crime Laboratory on the next day, and the request and the sachets were received
in due course. Sr. Police Insp. Jabonillo of the PNP Crime Laboratory subjected
the sachets to examination, and confirmed the presence in all of them of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. She also gave the weights
of the contents of the four sachets in her Chemistry Report No. D-083-02 dated
September 4, 2002. Her report was approved by her superior, Police Supt.
Sabong of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. Based on all the foregoing, there
was a conscious effort exerted by the buy-bust team to ensure the proper
incrimination of Tapere. People of the Philippines v. Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R.
No. 178065, February 20, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. To establish the
crime of illegal sale of shabu as defined and punished under section 5, Article II
of R.A. 9165, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following:
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the
consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the
payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction,
which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In
short, the Prosecution must show that the transaction or sale actually took place,
and present in court the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. People of the
Philippines v. Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R. No. 178065, February 20, 2013

Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. In the case at
bar, the State has conclusively established the concurrence of the foregoing
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Firstly, the members of the buy-bust
team identified Tapere as the person with whom Salgado had contracted on the
purchase of the shabu. Secondly, the subject of the sale was one plastic sachet
of shabu that the PNP Crime Laboratory later on confirmed in due course to
contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. It is of no
consequence that three other sachets of shabu recovered from Taperes
possession at the time of his arrest were also presented as evidence during the
trial, or that the Prosecution failed to specify which of the four sachets was the
sachet involved in the transaction between him and Salgado because what is
decisive is that one of the four sachets was definitely the subject of the
transaction between Tapere and the poseur buyer. Thirdly, the consideration of
the sale was P100.00, and the actual payment of that amount through the
P100.00 bill bearing serial number YU859011 covered by the public prosecutors
certification ensured the identification of it as the consideration. And, fourthly, the
Prosecutions witnesses fully described the details of the consummated sale of
shabu between Tapere as seller and Salgado as buyer. People of the Philippines
v. Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R. No. 178065, February 20, 2013
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situscriminis at the time the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed. Since alibi is a weak defensefor being
easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive
identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime. In this
case, the accused did not introduce any evidence other than his own testimony
where he presented an alibi, i.e., that he was in another place, with his cousin,
when the incident happened. But the accused did not even present his cousin to
buttress this claim. Moreover, he in fact admitted that he had visited the dwelling
of the victim in the morning on the day the crime was committed. Hence, the
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction for the crime of rape. People of the

Philippines v. Jonathan Uto Veloso y Rama, G.R. No. 188849, February 13,
2013.
Alibi; requisites; when it can succeed as a defense over positive identification. In
order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, first, he was in another place at the time of the offense; and,
second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. The
alibi of the accused was that he was at home asleep with his wife when the victim
was shot. However, his wifes testimony did not show that he was indeed at home
when the crime happened. At the most, it only establishes that he was at home
before and after the shooting. Accused also failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the time in question. His
alibi that he was at home actually bolsters the prosecutions claim that he was the
shooter, because it placed him just a few steps away from the scene of the crime,
which was in front of his house, when the victim was shot. Physical impossibility
refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access
between the two places. Edmundo Escamilla y Jugo v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013.
Circumstantial evidence; when sufficient for conviction. Circumstantial evidence
is defined asthat evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an
inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.It is sufficient
for conviction if: [a] there is more than one (1) circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.To
uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not
the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that
the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and
that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and
inconsistent with the accuseds innocence. Contrary to Abulencias contention in
his brief,there are numerous circumstances sufficient to prove his participation in
the crime, to wit: [a] it was established that Lamsen was an active participant to
the crime; [b] Lamsen and Abulencia both admitted they were together in the

vicinity of the crime scene when it happened;[c] his car with plate number PEW
781 was subjected to a flash alarm in connection with the crime;[d] Abulencia
admitted he was driving his car when the flash alarm was raised;and [e] the dents
and bluish green streaks of paint found on Sys jeep matched the dents and
scratches found on Abulencias car.The combination of the aforementioned
circumstances forms an unbroken chain which irrefragably points to Abulencia as
among the perpetrators of the crime.People of the Philippines v. P/Supt. Artemio
E. Lamsen, et al, G.R. No. 198338, February 20, 2013.
Credibility of witnesses; positive identification of the accused prevails over denial.
The Supreme Court held that a categorical and consistently positive identification
of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses,
prevails over denial. In this case, the identity of the assailant was proved with
moral certainty by the prosecution, which presented three witnesses the victim
Mendol, Velasco, and Garcelazo who all positively identified Escamilla as the
shooter. All the three witnesses were unswerving in their testimonies and none of
them had any ulterior motive to testify against him. Edmundo Escamilla y Jugo v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013.
Credibility of witnesses; inconsistencies on minor matters strengthen the
credibility of witnesses. Accused Elizabeth harps on the purported contradictions
and improbabilities in the testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and SPO4 Reburiano,
specifically, as to: (1) the composition of the buy-bust team; (2) the existence of a
preoperation report and coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA); and (3) the markings made by PO2 Ibasco on the sachet of
shabu. The Supreme Court (SC) was not swayed and thus ruled that the
inconsistencies adverted to by Elizabeth are trivial and insignificant and refer only
to minor details. Time and again, the SC has ruled that inconsistencies on minor
and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of
witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Furthermore, the
SC cannot expect the testimonies of different witnesses to be completely identical
and to coincide with each other since they have different impressions and
recollections of the incident. Hence, it is only natural that their testimonies are at
variance on some minor details. Indeed, in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, what is material is the proof that the accused peddled illicit
drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, both of which
were satisfactorily complied with by the prosecution in this case. People of the

Philippines v. Linda Alviz y Yatco and Elizabeth Dela Vega y Bautista, G.R. No.
177158, February 6, 2013.
Credibility of witnesses; minor inconsistencies do not negate eyewitnesses
positive identification. Minor inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not
detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is
coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the
witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not
expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total
recall. The witnesses testimonies need only to corroborate one another on
material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime.In this case, the
inconsistencies in the recollection of facts of PO1 Domingo, PO3 Nicolas and P/I
Rosqueta regarding the street where the accused came from, the position of the
motorcycle as well as the operational condition of the cellular phone, are not
material elements in establishing an illegal sale of dangerous drug. It is not
irregular for police officers to have inconsistent statements in the narration of
details of the buy-bust operation, as indeed the inconsistency can indicate
truthfulness. What is important is for them to recount the material facts
constituting sale of dangerous drug such as the exchange of the illegal drug for
buy-bust money and identification of the buyer, seller and illegal drug in court as
the object of the sale. The three witnesses corroborated each other on material
points which added to the confidence placed on their testimonies. People of the
Philippines v. SaibenLangcua y Daimla, G.R. No. 190343, February 6, 2013.
Credibility of witnesses; trial courts assessment accorded great respect. The
trial judge is the one who hears the testimony of the witnesses presented
firsthand and sees their demeanor and body language. The trial judge, therefore,
can better determine if the witnesses are telling the truth being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Here, the accused raised on appeal the
trivial inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim. However, the Supreme
Court (SC) gave weight to the trial courts observation of the demeanor of the
victim when she testified. The SC affirmed the Regional Trial Court in specifically
noting that the testimony of the victim during the trial was straightforward, candid,
clear and consistent; that she was not moved nor cowed by the peroration of the
cross-examiner; that her answers were direct and concise; that she was unmoved
by the slings and arrows of her misfortune; that she was bold, determined and
credible; and that the defense never broke her, in fact her answers enhanced her

will to correct a wrong, her quest for the protective mantle of the law and her
passion to punish the accused. The SC thus affirmed his conviction for the crime
of rape. People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Uto Veloso y Rama, G.R. No.
188849, February 13, 2013.
Extrajudicial confession; binding only on the confessant; exceptions. A review of
the records show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin is the
confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not
the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated
in the commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary
of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the
principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Clearly thus, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.The
exception provided under section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule
allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. In this case, there is a dearth
of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a
bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of
the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that
Salapuddin was involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds.
Instead, the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddins
association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the
conspiracy. The Supreme Court, however, has previously stressed that mere
association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not
suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.
Salapuddins complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on
his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place
where they allegedly stayed while in Manila. It must be shown that the person
concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without
the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.
Gerry A. Salapuddin v. The Court of Appeals, Gov. Jum Akbar, and Nor-Rhama
J. Indanan, G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013.
Information; sufficiency of allegations in the information. The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information,

or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is
to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. People of the
Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602,
February 13, 2013.
Information; sufficiency of allegations in the information. The averments of the
informations to the effect that the two accused with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon the victims by then and there
shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them] on various parts of their bodies which
[were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s] did not sufficiently set
forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. The use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for
there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the
use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing
alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. People of
the Philippines v. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, G.R. No. 175602,
February 13, 2013.
Lawful warrantless arrests; evidence gathered in flagrante delicto admissible.
There is little credence in accused Elizabeths assertion that she and co-accused
Linda were mere victims of a frame-up. There is absolute lack of evidence that
the members of the buy-bust team were stirred by illicit motive or had improperly
performed their duties in arresting Linda and Elizabeth. Both Linda and Elizabeth
admitted that they did not know the police officers prior to their arrest. Hence,
there could not have been any bad blood between them and said police officers.
As a result of the finding that a buy-bust operation actually took place and that
Linda and Elizabeth were apprehended in flagrante delicto, the evidence
gathered and presented by the prosecution on the occasion of their lawful arrest
without warrant cannot be deemed as the fruits of a poisonous tree, but are

admissible and competent proof of their guilt. People of the Philippines v. Linda
Alviz y Yatco and Elizabeth Dela Vega y Bautista, G.R. No. 177158, February 6,
2013.
Motion to re-open case for reception of further evidence; motion for new trial.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be
granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent
of the accused [a]t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final. In
this case, petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and executory
on 26 July 2007 the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court denying
the petition and affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial
court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained. The rationale
for this rule is that fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
necessitate that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts
should attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be
no end to litigation. Reynante Tadeja, et al v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
145336, February 20, 2013.
Newly-discovered evidence. Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is
discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. The most important requisite is that
the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
reasonable diligence; hence, the term newly discovered. In this case, the
confession of Plaridel, the witness whose testimony was sought to be introduced
as newly discovered evidence, does not meet this requisite. He participated in the
trial before the Regional Trial Court and even gave testimony as to his defense. It
was only after he and the petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he
absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been
obtained during trial does not hold water. ReynanteTadeja, et al v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013.
Prejudicial questions; violations of B.P. 22. The rescission of a contract of sale is
not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing

Checks Law (B.P. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in
connection with the sale. The violation of B.P. 22 requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuerthat at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.The issue in the criminal actions
upon the violations of B.P. 22 is therefore whether or not Reyes issued the
dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach
in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the rescission of
the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced
Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the
rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes
would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks
because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the
violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the
conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the
checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be
tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract
of sale through rescission. Indeed, under B.P. 22, the mere issuance of a
worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the
criminal proceedings for the violation of B.P. 22 could proceed despite the
pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale. Teodoro A.
Reyes v. Ettore Rossi, G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; probable cause; courts cannot directly decide matters
over which discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive
department. The Supreme Court (SC) in this case cited Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III, where it stressed that a preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is
not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or
the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged.There is no definitive standard by which
probable cause is determinedexcept to consider the attendant conditions; the

existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor
conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts
presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear
dictates of reason. Here, the SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Court of Appeals when it rendered its Decision dated January 11, 2011.
There is ample evidence on record to support the said decision. To name one,
the accountants who were part of the Inspection Team sent by Tan to Coastal
Highpoint Ventures, Inc. (CHVI), executed a Joint Affidavit stating that the
documents made available to them for inspection were limited. Further, they
claimed that on the day of the inspection, they brought a portable photocopying
machine to CHVIs premises but they were not allowed to use the same. The
offense punishable under section 74, in relation to section 144 of the Corporation
Code, for which Chiu was indicted, requires the unjustified disallowance or
refusal by a suspect, of a stockholders written request to examine or copy
excerpts of a corporations books or minutes. The absence of any ascribed ill
motives on the part of the aforementioned accountants to make statements
adverse or unfavorable to Chiu lends credibility to their declarations. Besides, as
the SC ruled in Metrobank, in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is bound
to determine merely the existence of probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the accused has committed the same. The rules do not
require that a prosecutor has moral certainty of the guilt of a person for the latter
to be indicted for an offense after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Further, the SC has repeatedly ruled that the determination of probable cause, for
purposes of preliminary investigation, is an executive function. Such
determination should be free from the courts interference save only in
exceptional cases where the Department of Justice gravely abuses its discretion
in the issuance of its orders or resolutions. Loreli Lim Po v. Department of the
Justice, et al/Antonio ng Chiu v. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. Nos. 195198 & G.R.
No. 197098, February 11, 2013.
Sandiganbayan; original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. P.D.
1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249,vests the Sandiganbayan with
original exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to
and in connection with Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 by
then President Corazon C. Aquino. Executive Order 1 refers to cases of recovery
and sequestration of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses, their relatives,
subordinates, and close associates, directly or through nominees, by taking

undue advantage of their public office and/or by using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationships. Executive Order 2 states that the illgotten wealth includes assets and properties in the form of estates and real
properties in the Philippines and abroad. Executive Orders 14 and 14-A pertain
to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases relative to the illgotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies. The amended complaint filed by
the Republic to implead Asian Bank prays for reversion, reconveyance,
reconstitution, accounting and damages. In other words, the Republic would
recover ill-gotten wealth, by virtue of which the properties in question cameunder
sequestration and are now, for that reason, in custodia legis. Although the
Republic has not imputed any responsibility to Asian Bank for the illegal
accumulation of wealth by the original defendants, or has not averred that Asian
Bank was a business associate, dummy, nominee, or agent of the Marcoses, the
allegation in its amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 that Asian Bank acted
with bad faith for ignoring the sequestration of the properties as ill-gotten wealth
has made the cause of action against Asian Bank incidental or necessarily
connected to the cause of action against the original defendants. Consequently,
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against
Asian Bank, for the Supreme Court has ruled in Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, that the Sandiganbayan has original and
exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to
such cases. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of
Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et al, G.R. No. 169677,
February 18, 2013.
Warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto arrest; standard of probable cause. A valid
warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out
under the parameters of section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable
cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term
probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. Records show that PO2 Soque arrested accused Ramon for
allegedly violating section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance regarding Breaches
of the Peace. The Supreme Court (SC) held that the act of shouting in a thickly-

populated place, with many people conversing with each other on the street,
would not constitute any of the acts punishable under section 844 of the Manila
City Ordinance. Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder,
disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using
personal violence upon another; and, the words he allegedly shouted Putang
ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito? are not slanderous, threatening or abusive,
and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering
that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and
alive with activity. Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of
arrest ever complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the public. On the
contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a certain Rosemarie
Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the store of a
certain MangRomy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque,
approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed and took him away. In its totality,
the SC observed that these facts and circumstances could not have engendered
a well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by
Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. All told, no probable
cause existed to justify Ramons warrantless arrest. Ramon Martinez y
Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198694,
February 13, 2013.
January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Law and
Procedure
Posted on February 8, 2013 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo
Posted in
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Tagged conspiracy,
dangerous drugs, evidence, evident premeditation, information, murder, probable
cause, rape, search 1 Comment
Here are select January 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Conspiracy. Appellant questions the lower courts finding of conspiracy between

her and co-accused. She claims that she merely accompanied Espiritu in going
to the RFC Food Court and had nothing to do with the transaction. As a matter of
fact, the shabu was not even found in or recovered from her possession. It just so

happened that she was in the area during the delivery of the drugs. The
argument did not persuade the Supreme Court. There is conspiracy if two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must
be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the
agreement of the parties. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before,
during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose. The existence of conspiracy in this case was clearly established not
only by the prosecutions evidence but also by appellants very own testimony. As
can be gleaned from appellants testimony as well as from the testimony of Carla
as to what transpired during the actual buy-bust operation, appellant acted in
common concert with her co-accused in the illegal sale of shabu. She cannot
therefore isolate her act of merely accompanying Espiritu to the RFC Food Court
or carrying the shabu since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. People of the Philippines v.
Simpresueta M. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
Extinction of criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto upon death of accused.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. It is also settled that upon the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. While appellant Florencio died
way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was not timely relayed to the
Supreme Court (SC), such that the SC was unaware of the same when it
rendered its December 14, 2011 Decision. It was only later that the SC was
informed of Florencios death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the Officer-inCharge of the New Bilibid Prison. Due to this development, it therefore became
necessary for the SC to declare Florencios criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto, to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.
The judgment of conviction is thus set aside insofar as Florencio is concerned.

People of the Philippines v. Florencio Agacer, et al, G.R. No. 177751, January 7,
2013.

Instigation; distinguished from entrapment. Appellant raises the defense of

instigation to gain her acquittal. She argues that the government, through the
PAOCTF operatives, induced her to commit the offense when they repeatedly
approached and asked her to sell them shabu. The Supreme Court was
unswayed. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise,
had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. It differs from entrapment
which is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a
criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to commit an offense originates from
the inducer and not from the accused who had no intention to commit and would
not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In entrapment,
the criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers
merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes.
Instigation results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to
prosecution and conviction. Here, the evidence clearly established that the police
operatives employed entrapment, not instigation, to capture appellant and her
cohorts in the act of selling shabu. It must be recalled that it was only upon
receipt of a report of the drug trafficking activities of Espiritu from the confidential
informant that a buy-bust team was formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu
were made. Also, appellant testified that she agreed to the transaction of her own
free will when she saw the same as an opportunity to earn money. Notably too,
appellant was able to quickly produce a sample. This confirms that she had a
ready supply of the illegal drugs. Clearly, she was never forced, coerced or
induced through incessant entreaties to source the prohibited drug for Carla and
PO3 Cario and this she even categorically admitted during her testimony.
People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta M. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January
9, 2013.
Mitigating circumstances; minority of accused may be proved on appeal.
Appellant Franklin is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Franklins Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20,
1981; hence, he was merely 16 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It

provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused
but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such
leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to
have acted with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority
was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly
presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect
the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs. People of the Philippines v.
Florencio Agacer, et al, G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013.
Murder; elements. To be convicted of murder, the following must be established:
(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the
attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo,
G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Murder; evident premeditation. The SC, however held that, the prosecution failed
to establish the presence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
Such could only be appreciated if there was evidence to show the following: (1)
the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time
to reflect upon the consequences of his act. None, for any such circumstance,
was offered in the instant case. The testimony of Romeo, save from the
statement that the appellants were whispering to each other before they placed
their arms on Pablos shoulder, was confined to the acts that caused the death of
the victim. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo,
G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Murder; treachery. Appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not attendant in the commission of the crime considering that there
was no element of surprise when Pablo was attacked. Pablo had the opportunity
to defend himself. Appellant Benjamin, in his Supplemental Brief, further argued
that even if there was suddenness of the attack, Pablo could have chosen to
retreat. The Supreme Court (SC) was not convinced. The SC has time and again
declared that the essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack,

affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to

escape, and that it may still exist even if the attack is frontal so long as the same
is sudden and unexpected. In this case, it was clear that the elderly victim had no
inkling of the impending danger against him. The attack was sudden
notwithstanding the prior act of placing the assailants arms on the shoulder of
the victim because such was done in a friendly manner. Records would show that
Pablo was fifty-seven (57) years old at the time of his death. Admittedly, ones
thought processes and reflexes slow with age that Pablo did not readily
understand the intentions of the appellants. The attack was, therefore, clearly
sudden and unexpected. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and
Abundio Binondo, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Penalty; Information must allege qualifying circumstance of victims mental
retardation; privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of accused. Under
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape
is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the victims mental
retardation, the penalty is increased to death. But this circumstance must be
alleged in the information being a qualifying circumstance which increases the
penalty to death and changes the nature of the offense from simple to qualified
rape. In the case at bench, while appellant categorically admitted that he knew
AAA to be suffering from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege
this fact in the information. As such, even if it was proved, it cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, appellants conviction is only for
simple rape for which he should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People of the Philippines v. Rey Monticalvo y Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January
30, 2013.
Penalty; privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of accused considered.
Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the
modification of the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower courts
upon the appellant. The Supreme Court found merit in appellants assertion that
he was a minor during the commission of the crime charged. During trial, upon
order of the trial court, the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar,
brought before it their office records, particularly appellants Certificate of Live
Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellants Certificate of Live Birth
shows that he was born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of the

commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only 17

years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. People of the
Philippines v. Rey Monticalvo y Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.
Rape; absence of injuries on genitalia of victim not a defense. The accused
argues that the findings of old healed vaginal lacerations during the physical
examinations disproved the charges against him, stressing that the old healed
lacerations, being indicative of the lapse of three months from the time of the
alleged sexual assault to the time of the medical examination, belied AAAs claim
of being raped on April 13, 1999, which was but only two months prior to the
medical examination. He insists that the finding that her genitalia showed no
fresh laceration or hymenal injury suffered in the previous seven days was
inconsistent with BBBs claim about being raped nine hours prior to her physical
examination. The Supreme Court held that the arguments of the accused are
unwarranted. The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either
against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the
female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of
age, or is demented). Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having
bodily connections with a female. As such, the presence or absence of injury or
laceration in the genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape has been
committed or not. Such injury or laceration is material only if force or intimidation
is an element of the rape charged; otherwise, it is merely circumstantial evidence
of the commission of the rape. Verily, a medical examination and a medical
certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable
to a successful prosecution for rape. The accused may then be convicted solely
on the basis of the victims credible, natural and convincing testimony. This is no
less true when the rape victim testifies against her own father; unquestionably,
there would be reason to give her testimony greater weight than usual. People of
the Philippines v. Pedro Buado Jr., y Cipriano, G.R. No. 170634, January 8,
2013.
Rape; assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the victims testimony
respected. Ultimately and frequently, the resolution of the charge of rape hinges
on the credibility of the victims testimony. The Supreme Court has consistently
relied on the assessment of such credibility by the trial court, because the factual
findings of the trial court, particularly those bearing on such assessment, are the

product of the trial judges peculiar opportunity to observe the deportment and
demeanor of the witnesses while they personally appear and testify during the
trial, as contrasted with the dependence by the appellate courts on the mute
pages of the records of the trial. This consistent reliance proceeds from the reality
that the trial judge is in the best position to detect that frequently thin line between
truth and prevarication that determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Thus, an appellate court will not disturb the credence the trial court accorded to
the testimonies of the witnesses unless the trial court is shown to have
overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance in
the correct resolution of the case. Here, the Regional Trial Court as the trial court
and the Court of Appeals as the intermediately reviewing tribunal did not overlook
or disregard any fact or circumstance of significance. Instead, they correctly
appreciated the evidence, and rightly concluded that the accused committed the
rapes of his own daughters.They regarded and accepted AAA and BBB as
credible witnesses whose recollections about their fathers lecherous acts
deserved the fullest faith and credence. The trial records entirely supported the
lower courts findings in favor of the credibility of AAA and BBBs recollections.
Indeed, AAA and BBB deserved the credence accorded to them, for they were
reliable in their recollection of their ordeals at the hands of the accused. People
of the Philippines v. Pedro Buado, Jr., y Cipriano, G.R. No. 170634, January 8,
2013.
Rape; delay of victim in reporting of rape not a defense. Accused-appellant tries
to undermine the credibility of AAA as a rape victim. He contends that the
belated filing of the Complaint, AAAs act of still returning to their house even
after she was allegedly raped therein by the appellant, her failure to shout and
offer resistance during the rape, and the several material inconsistencies
between her affidavit and her open court testimony, tainted her credibility. The
Supreme Court (SC) disagreed. Indeed, there was no prompt revelation of what
befell AAA. But this is, according to the SC, not enough reason to discredit her.
A delay in reporting a rape case for two months or longer, as in this case, cannot
be taken against the rape victim. Long silence and delay in reporting the crime of
rape have not always been construed as indications of a false accusation. A rape
charge becomes doubtful only when the delay or inaction in revealing its
commission is unreasonable and unexplained. In this case. AAAs delay in filing
the Complaint is not without a valid reason. She was cowed by appellants threats
which hindered her from immediately reporting her painful ordeal to the

authorities. People of the Philippines v. Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355,

January 23, 2013.
Rape; elements; lone testimony of victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a
conviction. BBB positively identified the appellant as the person who grabbed her
and removed her short pants and panty while she was in her room, and who
thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina. The Supreme Court then stressed
the lower courts observation that BBB, who was just nine years old when she
testified, spoke in a clear, spontaneous and straightforward manner. She never
wavered in identifying the appellant despite the defenses gruelling crossexamination. The SC thus found her testimony credible. A young girl would not
concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own
father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma
and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire
to seek justice. The SC further held that where no evidence exists to show any
convincing reason or improper motive for a witness to falsely testify against an
accused, the testimony deserves faith and credit. Moreover, the lone testimony of
the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction. People of
the Philippines v. Patricio Rayon Sr., G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013.
Rape; lack of resistance of victim. Neither does AAAs alleged failure to shout
and offer resistance during the incident deserve credence. Contrary to appellants
assertion, the records show that AAA tried to resist his advances but was not
successful because he is bigger and stronger than her. In any event, the law
does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance especially
when, as in this case, intimidation is exercised upon the victim who submitted
herself to the advances of her assailant because of fear for her life. People of the
Philippines v. Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013.
Rape; minor inconsistencies in testimony of rape victim. Anent the
inconsistencies between AAAs affidavit and her testimony in open court as
pointed out by the appellant, the SC found that the same are not material and
refer only to minor details. The alleged contradictions as to whether appellant is
her uncle or step-father and whether it was she or her friend who revealed her
ordeal to her mother are inconsequential matters that will not affect the
determination of whether appellant is innocent of the crime charged or not.

People of the Philippines v. Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23,
2013.
Rape; principles guiding appellate courts in review of rape convictions. In
reviewing rape convictions, the Court has been guided by three principles,
namely: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for
the complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving
only two persons, the rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the Prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. People of the Philippines v. Pedro
Buado, Jr., y Cipriano, G.R. No. 170634, January 8, 2013.
Rape; special qualifying relationship of victim with the accused should be proved.
The crime committed in this case is simple rape only in view of the failure of the
prosecution to prove with clarity the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship. While the information alleges that AAA is the step-daughter of the
appellant, there is nothing on record to support the same. The step-father stepdaughter relationship as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victims
mother and the accused are married to each other which, however, is not
obtaining in this case. Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmance of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as imposed upon appellant by the Regional Trial Court is
proper. People of the Philippines v. Rolando Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355,
January 23, 2013.
Treachery; definition. The Supreme Court (SC) here held that appellants act of
suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along Sampaguita
Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constitutes the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Treachery is present when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
this case, appellant surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked
and stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless
to protect himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own
person. Thus, the SC sustained the findings of the trial court and the Court of

Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of

the crime. People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya, G.R.
No. 188603, January 16, 2013.
2.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Dangerous Drugs Act; sale or possession of dangerous drugs; narcotics

substance constitutes corpus delicti. Sale or possession of a dangerous drug can
never be proven without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug. In
prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo Nacua, et al, accused; Reynaldo Nacua, accused-appellant, G.R. No.
200165, January 30, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; sale or possession of dangerous drugs; strict compliance
with rules on chain of custody required. Given the unique characteristic of
dangerous and illegal drugs which are indistinct, not readily identifiable, and
easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by accident or
otherwise, there must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be
observed during and after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related
paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer thereof for examination, and at all
times up to their presentation in court. Such measures are described with
particularity under section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and section 21(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165.
Moreover, in People v. Coreche, the Supreme Court emphasized that the marking
of the seized drugs must be done immediately after they are seized from the
accused and failure to do so suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties and raises reasonable doubt as to the authenticity
of the corpus delicti. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Nacua, et al, accused;
Reynaldo Nacua, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 200165, January 30, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; sale or possession of dangerous drugs; strict compliance
with rules on chain of custody required. In this case, there was a total disregard
of the requirements of law and jurisprudence. The prosecution even admits that
the police officers acquired the sachet of shabu presented in court against
accused-appellant in a mere test-buy operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3

Luague, and PO1 Anion. The police officers, after supposedly buying the sachet
of shabu from the Nacua couple for Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), left the
residence of the Nacua couple, without recovering the marked money or effecting
the couples arrest. The police officers brought the sachet of suspected shabu all
the way back to their police station, and only there marked the said item, without
the presence of the accused and/or other disinterested witnesses. While the
Supreme Court (SC) allows for relaxation of the rules in some cases, there must
be compelling and justifiable grounds for the same and it must be shown that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly preserved.
However, such conditions are not present in the instant case. Firstly, the
prosecution did not offer any explanation as to why the police officers failed to
strictly comply with the established procedure for the custody of the suspected
shabu. The SC thus surmised that the operation on September 2, 2005 was only
meant to be a test-buy, so that the police officers could secure a search warrant
for the house of the Nacua couple. There was no original intention to arrest and
charge the Nacua couple for the shabu purchase that day. Surprisingly and
inexplicably, however, the prosecution chose to indict the Nacua couple for the
test-buy conducted on September 2, 2005, rather than for the result of the
search conducted on September 21, 2005 at the house of the Nacua couple
which purportedly yielded more shabu and related paraphernalia and led to the
arrest of the couple. Secondly, the prosecution failed to show that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the sachet of suspected shabu allegedly bought from the
Nacua couple during the test-buy operation has been properly preserved from
the time said item was transmitted to the crime laboratory up to its presentation in
court. No evidence was offered to show as to how the said specimen was kept
and by whom after its forensic examination throughout its presentation in court.
With reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti, the acquittal of
accused-appellant of the crime charged is in order. People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo Nacua, et al, accused; Reynaldo Nacua, accused-appellant, G.R. No.
200165, January 30, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody rule. The accused argues that the NBI
operatives failed to observe the chain of custody rule in dangerous drugs cases.
The Supreme Court did not agree. The alleged failure of the apprehending team
to inventory and photograph the confiscated items immediately after the
operation is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as

the same would be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Here, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs had been
preserved as there is evidence to account for the crucial links in the chain of
custody of the seized shabu, starting from its confiscation to its presentation as
evidence in the Regional Trial Court. People of the Philippines v. Hong Yen E and
Tsien Tsien Chua, G.R. No. 181826, January 9, 2013.
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; elements. The elements of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of
an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the prohibited drug. The evidence on record clearly established that appellant
Chua was in possession of the plastic bags containing prohibited drugs without
the requisite authority. Applying section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a
disputable presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag and its contents. It
may be rebutted by contrary proof that the accused did not in fact exercise power
and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of
evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus
possidendi. Here, Chua failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption.
People of the Philippines v. Hong Yen E and Tsien Tsien Chua, G.R. No. 181826,
January 9, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; buy-bust operations or decoy solicitations are
valid. A police officers act of soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the decoy solicitation, is not prohibited by law
and does not invalidate the buy-bust operation. In People v. Legaspi, the
Supreme Court pronounced that in a prosecution for sale of illicit drugs, any of
the following will not exculpate the accused: (1) that facilities for the commission
of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act was
done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to expose his
criminal act; or (3) that the police authorities feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisted in its commission. Hence, even assuming that
the PAOCTF operatives repeatedly asked her to sell them shabu, appellants
defense of instigation will not prosper. This is especially true in that class of
cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually committed, and the
solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by
the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was committed by

him free from the influence or instigation of the police officer. People of the
Philippines v. Simpresueta M. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; elements. In the prosecution of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the two essential elements are: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. Hence, evidence that establishes both elements by the
required quantum of proof, i.e., guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must be
presented. Here, the said elements were duly proved by the prosecution. Carla
and P/Chief Insp. Dandan positively identified appellant and her co-accused as
the sellers of the contraband who sold the same in exchange for the marked
money. The item was seized, marked and upon examination was identified as
shabu, a dangerous drug. The same was subsequently presented in evidence.
Moreover, Carla provided a detailed testimony as to the delivery and sale of
shabu. Thus, the Supreme Court (SC) found no reason to doubt the above
testimony of Carla. Aside from the fundamental rule that findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses are accorded respect
considering that it is the trial court that had the opportunity to observe their
conduct and demeanor, the SC noted that appellant herself corroborated the
prosecutions account of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta M.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
RA 7832; 48-hour prior notice of disconnection of electricity required; damages
awarded for improper disconnection of electricity. The Court of Appeals here held
that petitioner abused its right when it disconnected the electricity of Permanent
Light. The appellate court upheld the validity of the provision in petitioners
service contract which allows the utility company to disconnect service upon a
customers failure to pay the differential billing. It however stressed that under
section 97 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the right of
a public utility to discontinue its service to a customer is subject to the
requirement of a 48-hour written notice of disconnection. Petitioners failure in this
regard, according to the appellate court, justifies the award of moral and
exemplary damages to respondents. The Supreme Court (SC) took note of
Resolution No. 95-21, or the Standard Rules and Regulations Governing the
Operation of Electrical Power Services, of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
which superseded and revoked Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service
Commission adopted on November 27, 1941. Section 48 of ERB Resolution No.

95-21, reads: SEC. 48. Refusal or Discontinuance of Service. Service may be

discontinued for the non-payment of bills as provided for in Section 43 hereof,
provided that a forty eight (48)-hour written notice of such disconnection has
been given the customer. True, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21
expressly provides for the application of the 48-hour notice rule to Section 43 on
Payment of Bills. However, petitioner Meralco, through its Revised Terms and
Conditions of Service, adopted said notice requirement in cases where
disconnection of service is warranted because (1) the consumer failed to pay the
adjusted bill after the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of
energy consumed, (2) or for failure to comply with any of the terms and
conditions, (3) or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Considering
the discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased Inspectors, petitioner
Meralco could have disconnected electricity to Permanent Light for no other
reason but to prevent fraud upon the Company. Therefore, under the Revised
Terms and Conditions of Service vis--vis Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 9521, petitioner is obliged to furnish respondents with a 48-hour notice of
disconnection. Having failed in this regard, the SC found basis for the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondents for the unceremonious
disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light. Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) v. Atty. P.M. Castillo, doing business under the trade name and style
of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises, et al, G.R. No. 182976. January
14, 2013.
RA 9262; violence against women and children; leniency in favor of accused due
to ambiguity of the law inapplicable. The Supreme Court held that it cannot
construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of leniency because there
is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the
degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal
Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty
for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe
sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom
they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end
in view of promoting the protection of women and children. Karlo Angelo Dabalos
y San Diego v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, etc., et al, G.R. No.
193960, January 7, 2013.

RA 9262; violence against women and children; crime of violence against

women; elements. Petitioner here insists that the act which resulted in physical
injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate
cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense
committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which
falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. The Supreme Court (SC)
did not give credence to this argument. In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the SC
enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment, to wit: (1) The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman; (2) The offender, by himself or through another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and (3) The
harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
her. Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Angeles City, etc., et al, G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013.
RA 9262; violence against women and children; crime of violence against women
need not be a consequence of an existing or present dating relationship. Notably,
while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable
that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the
law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts,
then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled
by the Regional Trial Court, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm
was committed. Consequently, the SC did not depart from the parallelism in Ang
and give credence to petitioners assertion that the act of violence should be due
to the sexual or dating relationship. Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego v.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, etc., et al, G.R. No. 193960,
January 7, 2013.
3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Alibi and Denial; alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. It is a timehonored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness

destroys the defense of alibi and denial. In this case, Romeo positively identified
the appellants, whom he both knew since he was a child, thereby rendering the
defenses of alibi and denial weak. Certainly, it was not physically impossible for
appellant Abundio to be at the hilly portion of Sitio Liki where Pablo was attacked,
the same being only a kilometer away from his own house and two (2) kilometers
away from the farm where he and his father allegedly were on that fateful day.
Appellant Benjamins bare denial, on the other hand, is definitely self-serving. It
cannot stand against the positive identification of an unbiased and credible
witness. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo,
G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Evidence; credibility of witnesses best evaluated by the trial court. XYZ positively
identified the appellant as the person who embraced AAA and spread her legs;
who held AAAs breast; and who placed his hand inside the latters underwear
sometime in 2002. XYZs testimony was corroborated by the testimony of her
daughter XXX who declared that the appellant would embrace AAA and touch
her vagina whenever the appellant came home from work. The lower courts
found XYZs and XXXs testimonies credible and convincing. In convicting the
accused, the Supreme Court emphasized the well-settled doctrine that the Court
will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, as it
was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness
stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under crossexamination. Its assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result
of the case. People of the Philippines v. Patricio Rayon Sr., G.R. No. 194236,
January 30, 2013.
Evidence; denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses. In light of the
straightforward and credible testimony of the victim, AAA, her positive
identification of appellant as her assailant and the lack of ill-motive on her part to
falsely testify against appellant, the latters defense of denial and alibi must
necessarily fail. Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been
viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be
concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of
the accused, as in this case. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and

convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given

greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who
testified on affirmative matters. Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by
the trial court. It also cannot prevail over witnesses positive identification of
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at another
place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that he show physical
impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti, which the appellant in this case
failed to do. Here, the houses of the offended party and the appellant are only
divided by a fence and the place of the incident is only at the back of the house of
the appellant. As such, despite the appellants allegation that he was having a
drinking spree and that he was dead drunk at around 6:00 p.m of that date, still,
given its apparent proximity, there is no impossibility for him to be physically
present at the scene of the incident. People of the Philippines v. Rey Monticalvo y
Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.
Evidence; dying declaration; requisites. The Rules of Court states that a dying
declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present:
(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is
under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is
offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants death.
People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 188603,
January 16, 2013.
Evidence; dying declaration; requisites. Here, the Supreme Court agreed with the
Court of Appeals that the statement of the victim, Florendo, made to his brother,
Renato, has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to
note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went
home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had
stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the cause and
the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of
impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was
incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is
enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness.
Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves

his death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability
of herein appellant. People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay
Bisaya, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013.
Information; designation of the crime charged not controlling; language of the
statute need not be used. Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information
with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d), of the Revised Penal
Code. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12 years old on July 10, 2000; thus,
Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it does not mean
that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other
circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, as long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information
and proved during trial. What is controlling in an Information should not be the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being by and large mere conclusions
of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. In addition, the Information need not use the
language of the statute in stating the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise
language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the
offense charged. People of the Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R.
No. 201447, January 9, 2013.
Information; designation of the crime charged not controlling; language of the
statute need not be used. In this case, a perusal of the Information against
Amistoso reveals that the allegations therein actually constitute a criminal charge
for qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Section
266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. But when the offender is the
victims father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation. Then to
raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and
her relationship to the offender must concur. The foregoing elements of qualified

rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B ,

paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, are sufficiently alleged in the
Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12
years old on the day of the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAAs father.
Amistoso cannot claim that he had been deprived of due process in any way. He
adequately understood from the Information that he was being charged with the
rape of his own daughter AAA to which he proffered the defense of denial and
alibi, totally refuting the fact of AAAs rape regardless of how it was purportedly
committed. People of the Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No.
201447, January 9, 2013.
Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari distinguished from Rule 45
petition for review on certiorari. The petitioner committed a serious procedural
faux pas by filing before the Supreme Court (SC) a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have been a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the SC by filing a
petition for review under Rule 45, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. The period to file a petition for review on
certiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed from or of the denial of
the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Here, the petitioner received a copy of
the CAs May 5, 2010 Resolution, which denied his second motion for
reconsideration, on May 20, 2010, thus, he only had until June 4, 2010 to file a
petition for review on certiorari with the SC. This he failed to do. The perfection
of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory.
Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and
executory and, hence, unappealable. Thus, the petitioners failure to file a
petition for review under Rule 45 within the reglementary period rendered the
CAs June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009 Resolution, final
and executory. Raul Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No.
192727, January 9, 2013.
Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari no substitute for a Rule 45
petition for review on certiorari. It is at once evident that the instant certiorari
action is merely being used by the petitioner to make up for his failure to promptly

interpose an appeal from the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009
Resolution. However, a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure petitioners
failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was
occasioned by ones own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. Raul
Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013.
Preliminary investigations; probable cause; courts may review probable-cause
findings of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals (CA) should not have taken
cognizance of the petitions for certiorari filed before it because criminal
proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been determined
and the corresponding information has been filed in courts. The Supreme Court,
invoking its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
held that, settled is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of
prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional
cases showing grave abuse of discretion. Although policy considerations call for
the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings, courts should not
shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine
whether prosecutors findings are supported by the facts or by the law. In so
doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial
rules to settle cases and controversies. Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura
and Carolina Tanjutco/Antonio L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 &
195816. January 9, 2013.
Preliminary investigations; probable cause; courts may review probable-cause
findings of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown. While
the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising their powers of
review with respect to the DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which grave
abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals
(CA) may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the
CA, the appellate courts exercise of its power to review was also the proper and

most prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively issued several
resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence
of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the Office of the City
Prosecutor that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such
circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear
issue on the Secretary of Justices appreciation of facts, which commanded a
review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the
discharge of his functions. Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura and
Carolina Tanjutco/Antonio L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 & 195816.
January 9, 2013.
Preliminary investigations; probable cause defined; determination of probable
cause is an essentially executive function. Probable cause, for purposes of filing
criminal information, pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere
probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction. The strict validity and merits of a partys
accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and pieces of
evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. The
determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in
the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on
the offended partys complaint. The prosecutors ruling is reviewable by the
Secretary of Justice (Secretary) who, as the final determinative authority on the
matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors determination.
As a rule, the Secretarys findings are not subject to interference by the courts,
save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; or when he grossly misapprehends facts; or acts in a
manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the
contemplation of law. Baron A. Villanueva, et al v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No.
190969, January 30, 2013.
Preliminary investigations; probable cause defined; determination of probable
cause is an essentially executive function. Here, the Supreme Court held that the
Secretary of Justice (Secretary) acted with grave abuse of discretion when he

reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge Villanueva

with homicide. The Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the
NBI opinion vis--vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis-vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went into the strict merits of
Villanuevas defenses. Whether the alternative scenario on the cause of Renatos
injuries and death (as supported by Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and
which Villanueva proposed by way of defense) is more credible and more likely
than the narrations of Edna in her complaint-affidavit, in the affidavit of her
witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best be left for the trial court to
determine after a full-blown trial on the merits. When the Secretary made a
determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and
against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the
evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
Baron A. Villanueva, et al v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January 30,
2013.
Searches and Seizures; conduct of house searches; presence of owner of house
during search not indispensable where witnesses present. The Supreme Court
held that there was nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioners
house. There were variations in the witnesses testimonies as to whether
petitioner was inside the house during the search. One witness testified that
petitioner was coming in and out of the house during the search while the other
witnesses claimed that petitioner was waiting just outside the house. Assuming
that petitioner was indeed outside the house, it does not taint the regularity of the
search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court allows the absence of the
lawful occupant provided that two witnesses are present. The presence of the two
barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner. As found by the trial court,
accused-appellant and his wife were not prevented from entering their house to
observe the search conducted therein. This is bolstered by the testimonies of
police officers. Thus, PO3 Villano testified on cross-examination that the wife of
the accused was inside, watching. Likewise. P/C Insp. Perfecto de Lima Jr.
testified that the accused-appellant and his wife went in and out of their house
while the team was conducting a search inside said house; that Valleno and his
wife stood outside and sometimes, came in while the search was being
conducted; and that before the search the Valleno spouses were requested not to
go inside the house, but during the search they kept going in and out of said
house. In addition, the search was conducted in the presence of two witnesses of

sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, in the persons of Brgy.
Kgd. Reynaldo Brito and Chief Tanod Wilfredo Brito. Resultantly, the seized items
cannot therefore, be considered as fruits of the poisonous tree. Nelson Valleno y
Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013.
Testimony of Police Officers; presumption of regularity in the performance of
functions; minor inconsistencies in testimonies not fatal. The Supreme Court (SC)
noted the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, particularly
that of barangay tanod Reynaldo Brito and PO3 Molina, relating to the place
where one of the plastic sachets was found and to the person who brought the
illegal drugs to the crime laboratory, respectively. The SC however brushed aside
these inconsistencies as inconsequential. Indeed, one can hardly expect their
testimonies to be in perfect agreement. As held in the past, it is perhaps too
much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times, testimonies that
are in all fours with the realities on the ground. Minor discrepancies in their
testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential integrity
of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of
witnesses. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050,
January 9, 2013.
Testimony of Police Officers; presumption of regularity in the performance of
functions; minor inconsistencies in testimonies not fatal. For a successful appeal,
the inconsistencies brought up should pertain to that crucial moment when the
accused was caught selling shabu, not to peripheral matters. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details
concerning the principal occurrence. The inconsistent testimony of Reynaldo
Brito deserves little weight in light of the consonant testimonies of all the police
officers who testified in court. It is well-settled that the testimonies of the police
officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with it the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Absent any clear showing that the arresting
officers had ill-motive to falsely testify against the petitioner, their testimonies
must be respected and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties must be upheld. Petitioner himself testified that he never had any personal
encounter with the police prior to his arrest, thus negating any ill-motive on the
part of the police officers. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013.