1. MARY ROSE A. BOTO v.

SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR

VILLENA, ET AL.
A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013
FACTS:
An Information for libel was filed against complainant Boto before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City and a warrant of arrest was issued on the same
day against her. After posting bail and before the scheduled arraignment, she filed a
Motion to Quash Information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since libel is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing the case, the
trial judge required the trial prosecutor, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena to file
his comment within 10 days, but the latter did not file his comment nor moved for
extension of time to file the same, resulting in the resetting of the case, delaying the
process by 5 months and violating her constitutional right to a speedy trial. In his
Comment, Prosecutor Villena opposed the motion to quash, contending that the court had
already determined probable cause, and mooted any question about jurisdiction, venue
and sufficiency of evidence against the complainant.
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Boto charged respondents Villena, Manabat and De
Dios with gross ignorance of the law for filing the information for libel before the MeTC
and for opposing the motion to quash despite the knowledge that the said first level court
had no jurisdiction over the case.
In their separate comments, the respondents denied liability. The trial prosecutor,
Villena, countered that the filing of the information was not within his discretion as he
was not the investigating prosecutor and that it was not his duty to review the resolution
of the investigating prosecutor as he had no authority to approve or disapprove an
information or its filing in court. His participation commenced only after it was filed with
the MeTC. Manabat, the City Prosecutor who approved the Information, stated that the
information was filed inadvertently with the MeTC and that there was no ignorance of the
law or malice involved as they had previously filed cases of libel with the RTC.
Moreover, the inadvertent filing was already corrected when the information was later on
filed with the RTC and that after the filing of the information with the RTC, the said court
issued an order finding that probable cause existed to hold Boto for trial. De Dios, the
investigating prosecutor, averred that the information for libel against complainant was
filed before the MeTC due to inadvertence and that no malice or gross ignorance of the
law attended it. He added that the information was later on filed with the RTC-Pasig after
the case filed before the MeTC was quashed.
The records disclose that on October 17, 2012, the Information was properly filed
with the RTC, Taguig City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents should be held administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that jurisdiction over libel cases
are lodged with the RTC. The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or

city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
De Dios admitted that inadvertence attended the filing of the information for libel
with the MeTC. He did not, however, proffer any justification or explanation for the error.
He did not claim that the mistake was either typographical or was a result of the
application of a default form or template. In the Court's view, it was plain carelessness.
As no malice can be attributed, he merely deserves a reprimand.
Manabat, on the other hand, should have been more cautious and careful in
reviewing the report and recommendation of his subordinate. He should not have
approved the information and its filing in the wrong court considering that his office was
very knowledgeable of the law that jurisdiction in libel cases lies with the RTC. In fact,
he cited several libel cases which his office filed with the proper court. As the head of
office, he should be admonished to be more careful as his office is in the forefront in the
administration of criminal justice.
While De Dios and Manabat can validly claim inadvertence, Villena cannot
invoke the same defense in his handling of the case. Indeed, he did not file the
information with the MeTC as he was not the investigating prosecutor, but merely the
trial prosecutor. He, however, mishandled the case which prejudiced the complainant.
Villena should have even initiated the move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Instead of taking the initiative, he even opposed the motion to quash
the information. At any rate, respondents are not barred from refiling the case before the
proper court if probable cause to hold the complainant liable really exists. His dismal
failure to apply the basic rule on jurisdiction amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects
his lack of prudence, if not his incompetence, in the performance of his duties.
Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the
courts, let alone the parties themselves, to determine or conveniently set aside. It cannot
be waived except for those judicially recognizable grounds like estoppel. And it is not
mooted by an action of a court in an erroneously filed case.

2. HECTOR TRENAS v. PEOPLE,

G.R. NO. 195002, January 25, 2012
FACTS:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house-and-lot in
Iloilo City. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager recommended the
appellant Hector Treas to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece
of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name. To cover
the expenses, Elizabeth gave P150, 000 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt and
prepared a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Hector gave Elizabeth a revenue
official receipt for P24, 000. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was
informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the P120, 000 for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, Hector issued in favor of
Elizabeth a check in the amount of P120, 000, deducting from P150, 000 the P30, 000 as
attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Despite repeated
demands, appellant failed to pay.
An Information was then filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of Estafa.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is required to present evidence to prove lack of

jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.
RULING:
No.
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases,
venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. The Affidavit of Complaint
executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was
committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the
prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A
review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place
where the offense was allegedly committed.
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered
motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court
by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law.
Petition granted.

3. PEOPLE v. MARIANO
G.R. No. L-40527, June 30, 1976
FACTS:
Mariano was appointed as a Liaison Officer by the Municipal Mayor Nolasco of
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. He was authorized to receive and be receipted for US
excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said municipality. The said
accused Mariano once in possession of the said items and far from complying with his
obligation and in spite of repeated demands, misappropriated and converted to his own
personal use and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35
On December 18, 1974, the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an
Information accusing private respondent Mariano of estafa.
On February 19, 1975, Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information on the
grounds that the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction and that the criminal action has
been extinguished. In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the
subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor
Nolasco of San Jose was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of
malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had been found guilty, and
that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been decided by the
Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the
case against him.

On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods valued at not more than P6,000 and
allegedly committed by a civilian.
RULING:
No.
By reason of the penalty imposed on the offense of Estafa which exceeds 6
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. This
is not disputed by respondent Judge. What he claims in his Order is that his court
exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military commission and because the latter
tribunal was the first to take cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court lost
jurisdiction over it .That statement of respondent court is incorrect.
Respondent court gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the
estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against
Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two
separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before the Court the accused in one is
different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that in the
present case, there is no situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent
jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which
first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other. The
Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular
offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent jurisdiction
between it and respondent court to speak of. Estafa as described in the Information falls
within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

4. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE

156, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. VENTURA
G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
FACTS:
The Special Presidential Task Force 156 conducted an investigation against some
public officials of the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center of the Department of Finance. The said public officials were the evaluators and
examiners of the Center who were investigated for possible grave misconduct in
connection with the anomalous issuance of 34 Tax Credit Certificates amounting to at
least 110,194,158.
SPTF 156 was created by former President Joseph Estrada in October 1999 to
review, investigate and gather evidence necessary to prosecute the commission of
irregularities in the various offices and agencies of the DOF. The life of SPTF 156 was
extended by former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in October 2001. SPTF 156 was
further mandated to investigate the irregularities committed at the Center and to recover
and collect lost revenues. Pursuant to this mandate, Atty. Reyes, SPTF 156 lawyerconsultant, conducted an independent investigation on the alleged anomalous issuances
of TCCs to Evergreen Weaving Mills, Inc.
By virtue of its BOI registration, Evergreen was entitled to a package of
incentives such as tax credits on capital equipment purchased and on raw materials used
in the manufacture, processing or production of export products and access to bonded

manufacturing/trading warehouse system. Evergreen represented that it made local

purchases for the purpose of manufacturing spun yarn and woven fabrics, which were
allegedly sold to direct exporters through a common bonded warehouse, namely, Filipino
Hand Common Bonded Corporation. It submitted proofs of local purchases in the form of
sales invoices and delivery receipts of the 8 supposed suppliers. Evergreen also submitted
certificates of delivery and receipts attesting to the sales made to direct exporters. These
certificates represented the bases of Evergreens claims under the Advanced Tax Credit
Scheme or the Constructive Exportation.
Later, Evergreens application or claims for tax credit were examined at 3 levels,
performed and conducted by the evaluator, reviewer and recommending officer from the
Center. From January 1994 to June 1998, a total of 34 TCCs worth at least P110, 194,158
were issued to Evergreen. These TCCs were utilized either through own use or transfer
to other companies.
Based on the Investigation Report submitted by Atty. Reyes, it appeared that
Evergreens existence was questionable. The suppliers and buyers were in existent or
could no longer be found. The sales invoices and delivery receipts which were used as
bases of the tax credit claims of Evergreen were fake and the TCC transfers were
fictitious.
For said reason, SPTF 156 Executive Director Atty. Ventura filed criminal charges
for Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents, against those involved in the anomalous transactions, and likewise
administrative charges for grave misconduct against the public officials involved.
On July 10, 2006, the Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau of the Ombudsman rendered a
decision finding the involved public officials guilty of grave misconduct with the penalty
of dismissal from the service including all its accessory penalties and without prejudice to
criminal prosecution.
Eijansantos filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the decision and
order of the Ombudsman. He argued, among others, that he could not be held guilty of
grave misconduct as he dutifully performed his responsibilities as evaluator; that his
duties and responsibilities basically involved the preparation of an evaluation report
submitted to his immediate superior, Aranas; that he was not privy to the process by
which the TCC was issued because its approval and release were an altogether different
duty which he did not exercise; that he performed his duties based on the directives and
manner taught to him in the Center; and that the documents submitted by Evergreen
appeared to be authentic without any hint of falsity which he had no reason to doubt.
On May 18, 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of the
Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in its discretion when it
affirmed the assailed decision of the office of the ombudsman which amounts to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction.
RULING:
No.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman. While the
Ombudsmans findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not reviewable
by the Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsmans
act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Courts own constitutional power and duty
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The petitioner failed to show the existence of grave abuse of discretion in this
case. In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that there was no error committed by
the Ombudsman. The record shows that there is enough evidence on record warranting
the finding of guilt for grave misconduct against the petitioner.
5. a) DIMAYUGA et al. v. FERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. L-18913, April 15, 1922
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are Chiropractic Doctors who practice their profession in Manila.
Dimayuga appeared before the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, the Honorable
Director Health and the Board of Medical Examiners for the purpose of submitting to,
and taking, an examination, if any was required. He was advised that he could practice
his profession so long as there is no express provision against it. The Board of Medical
Examiners informed plaintiff that it could not give him any examination, because no one
of its members had any knowledge of chiropractics. The Director of Health held that he
did not have any objection to the plaintiff's practicing chiropractics in the Philippines so
long as there is no complaint against his treatment. Defendants are about to arrest and
persecute them in the exercise of their profession.
The defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the acts alleged do
not constitute a cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction.
On September, 1921, a complaint was filed against Dimayuga in the Court of First
Instance of Manila charging him with the illegal practice of medicine, and that the charge
is still pending in that court.
At the time the petition was presented before the Court, a temporary restraining
order was granted against the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants acted with malicious motives when they were about to
arrest plaintiffs.
RULING:
No.
Defendants are acting upon the written advice of the city attorney as to the
construction of the law. The records show that the defendants are seeking to discharge
their official duties as they understand them, and there is no evidence that either they are
acting from malicious or dishonest motives. Neither is there any evidence that the
defendants are threatening plaintiffs with daily arrest or a number of oppressive
prosecutions, or that they are disposed to involve them in expensive litigation. There is no
allegation that Fiscal Torres was not acting in good faith in the giving of his advice, or
that he is not honest in his opinion. The very most that is charged against him is that he is
mistaken in the construction of a law, which has never been judicially construed and
which can be construed in the case now pending, to which one of the plaintiffs is a party.
The fact that the criminal charge was filed in September 1921, and that up to date
only one complaint had been filed, and that from one cause of another the case had not
yet been decided, is a strong evidence that there had not been any disposition on the part
of the defendants to make numerous arrests and involve the plaintiffs in oppressive
litigation.
For such reasons, The Court declined to pass upon the constitutional questions
presented and hold that the temporary injunction should be dissolved and the demurrer
sustained, with leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.
b. HERNANDEZ v. ALBANO

G.R. No. L-19272, January 25, 1967

FACTS:
Respondent Albano, Congressman of Isabela, lodged a complaint with the Office
of the City Fiscal of Manila against petitioner Hernandez, then the Secretary of Finance
and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for violation of Article
216 of the RPC, CA 626 and RA 265. The complaint revolves around petitioner's alleged
shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva
Caceres, DMG Inc, and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations
obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof.
At the joint investigation of the charges before respondent Fiscal Gonzales, the
complainant moved to exclude the alleged violation of Article 216 of the RPC because it
was already resolved by the Court in a case which was adverse to Hernandez. Fiscal
Gonzales granted the motion.
Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the averment
that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution, punishable
under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private
enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13 of RA 265 is not
criminal in nature. Dismissal was denied; reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation, petitioner
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for preliminary injunction. The Court dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained
from proceeding with the investigation of the charges levelled against petitioner.
RULING:
No.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place. Thus, where an offense is wholly committed outside the
territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.
Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants may not investigate a crime
committed within the exclusive confines of, say, Camarines Norte. This proposition offers
no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting officers would then be overreaching the
territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, in the process, step on the shoes of those who,
by statute, are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They cannot unlawfully
encroach upon powers and prerogatives of the Fiscals of the province aforesaid.
Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the constitutional
violation charged. His claim is that the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him.
His reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in
corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva
Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG Inc.); and that the
place where the crime is to be prosecuted is the situs of such shares.

In effect, petitioner asks us to carve out an exception to the rule that said Fiscals
may not be enjoined from conducting the inquiry aforesaid. We would not hesitate to
state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential ingredient thereof was
committed outside the boundaries of the City of Manila, petitioner's argument should
merit serious consideration. For, orderly administration of justice so demands;
multiplicity of criminal actions is to be obviated; the long arm of the law cannot be used
in an oppressive or vindictive manner.
In the case at bar, the charges are not directed against the corporations. Not mere
ownership of or title to shares is involved. Possession of prohibited interests is but one of
the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that
petitioner was the Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department
and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the
corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in
his dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or
an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under
the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of.

c. FORTUN vs. LABANG, et al.

L-38383, May 27, 1981
FACTS:
Petitioner Judge Fortun was accused by a member of the bar and a former
employee in a letter complaint of a possible irregularity in his claim for gasoline
allowance, originally considered by them sufficing to hold him liable administratively.
After 4 months, the letter-complaint was endorsed to the respondent city Fiscal who then
gave due course to said complaint by issuing a subpoena. The petitioner contested the
legality of the issuance of said subpoena and asked for the dismissal of the complaint but
was unsuccessful. It appeared that the complaint was only filed by a disgruntled member
of the bar who lost 6 out of 9 cases in the petitioners sala. No effort was made either by
the respondent or any of the private respondents to dispel in any way the doubts raised as
to the bona fides in filing of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents acted in accordance with law.
RULING:
No.
The petition made reference to an Executive Order outlining the procedure on
complaints charging government officials and employees with commission of
irregularities. It is therein provided that complaints against presidential appointees, and
judges are included among them, shall be filed with the Office of the President or the
Department Head having direct supervision or control over the official involved. At
present, the department head is the Supreme Court, the Constitution having expressly
vested the power of supervision over all courts to this Tribunal. The removal of such
power in the Department of Justice in 1973, now the Ministry of Justice, is a recognition
of the need to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches. Many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded.
When such a case occurs, this Court must act and promptly to set matters right. This is

what the Court did in its resolution immediately issuing a temporary restraining order
upon the petition being filed. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a judge of an
inferior court is deserving of the full protection of this Tribunal against any form of
vexation, inconvenience, or harassment, the more so when, as is quite evident, haste and
recklessness marked the conduct of respondent City Fiscal. The power of administrative
supervision precisely has been granted to the Court to assure that malefactors on the
bench suffer for their misdeeds. Conversely, however, when a complaint was utilized to
embarrass and humiliate a member of the judiciary, it is broad enough to include such
remedial action in aid of a judge, who, to all the appearances is the victim of a deliberate
attempt to impugn his good name and reputation. The judicial power constitutionally
granted to the Court, independently of the grant of supervisory authority, justifies the
intervention of the Court.

6. DE LEON v. MABANAG
70 Phil 202
In Spanish text.
7. PLANAS v. GIL
G.R. No. L-46440, January 18, 1939
FACTS:
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila,
published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres.
Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge
Vargas, Secretary to the President directing her to report before the Civil Service
Commission CSC. She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over
the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to
her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal
laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which
petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was
made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political
questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation; that the
issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe
any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked
by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief
Executive which are of purely administrative in character.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.
RULING:
Yes.
The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are
his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases.

The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow
that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of
his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The
classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is
a relative theory of government.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and
the theory is advanced by the SolGen that because an investigation undertaken by him is
directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over
the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that
a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive
may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court.
Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from
judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate
official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere
invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, the SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas
was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against
the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right
to elicit the truth.

8. a. YOUNG vs. RAFFERTY

G.R. No. 10951, February 14, 1916.
FACTS:
On December 29, 1914, the lower court issued a preliminary injunction against
the defendant, his agents, etc., "ordering them and every one of them absolutely to desist
and refrain from in any manner whatsoever enforcing or attempting to enforce the
provisions of the regulation contained in Internal Revenue Circular Letter No. 467, in so
far as it refers to the language in which any day book shall be kept, and from arresting,
procuring the arrest or prosecuting criminally or administratively any person who fails to
make the entries required by said circular." After the termination of the trial of the case
upon its merits, the preliminary injunction was made permanent. The defendant has
appealed.
The circular letter above mentioned requires, among other things, every merchant
and manufacturer, with certain specified exceptions, subject to the tax imposed by section
40 of Act No. 2339, to keep a record of their daily sales either in the English or the
Spanish language, and provides that any violation of or failure to comply with the
provisions of the circular will subject the guilty person to prosecution under the
provisions of section 185 of Act No. 2339.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regulation is a proper case for injunction.
RULING:
Yes.
While courts of equity have no jurisdiction over the prosecution and punishment
of crimes and misdemeanors and in ordinary criminal cases, such courts will not restrain
criminal prosecutions even under a void law or municipal ordinance, yet courts or equity

may enjoin the enforcement of an invalid law or municipal ordinance where irreparable
injury to property rights would result or where persons would be subject to a municipality
of suits incurred by reason of the penalty attached to a recurring act or omission.

b. YU CONG ENG v. TRINIDAD

G.R. No. L-20479, February 6, 1925
FACTS:
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept,
and to establish penalties for its violation), also known as the Chinese Bookkeeping
Act, was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in 1921. It provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or
corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit
in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in
any language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not
more than two years, or both.
Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber
business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand English, Spanish, or any
local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his books were seized.
Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam
(on behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed a petition against the
fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding judge.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the temporary injunction issued by the court be stayed if proven
that Act No. 2972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court is granted both concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with
Courts of First Instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over
Courts of First Instance when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction. It is a jurisdiction, however, which must be exercised circumspectly, for
otherwise, the court would usurp the powers of judges of First Instance. The law having
given to judges of First Instance jurisdiction to try criminal cases, the appellate court
should not meddle with the initiation or trial of such cases, except for good reasons, and
should not permit the substitution of extraordinary proceedings for appeal.
As before held by the Court, and by the Federal courts, equity has power, to be
exercised in power cases, to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional
statutes, and to grant preliminary injunctions where the constitutionality of a given penal
law is doubtful and fairly debatable, and permanent injunctions where the laws are held
invalid. The remedy by injunction to restrain the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes
or abuse of authority under a valid statute, seems to be limited to cases where property
rights are threatened with irreparable injury or where persons would be subjected to a
multiplicity of suits.

9. SANGALANG vs. PEOPLE AND AVENIDA,

G.R. No. L-16160, October 31, 1960
FACTS:
On April 18,1952, an information was filed by the assistant city fiscal with the
CFI of Manila against Magdalena Sangalang et al., wherein it was alleged that she and
her cohorts committed theft by taking and carrying away 15,000 empty jute bags
belonging to the NARIC. The case was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. More
than 4years later, the same assistant city fiscal again charged petitioner and one Leandro
Castelo, this time with the crime of Estafa alleged to have been committed by them by
inducing one Enriqueta Pascoquin to buy certain NARIC invoices for 15,000 empty
sacks, which invoices turned out to be fictitious and falsified. A third information was
filed for the same and identical offense of Estafa charged in the second case in spite of
the order of dismissal therein which had long become final and conclusive. Again
invoking double jeopardy, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, but the
respondent judge denied the motion and ordered petitioners arraignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judges action is in accordance with law.
RULING:
No.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy
constitutes a bar to another prosecution for the same cause. The record clearly shows that
in the second criminal charge petitioners motion to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy was sustained and the case dismissed as against her. In not therefore dismissing
the information in the third proceedings charging the petitioner with the same offense, the
responding Judge committed grave abuse of his discretion.

10. Lopez vs. City Judge

L-2579S, October 29, 1966
FACTS:
In the month of February 1964, petitioner Roy Villasor, as administrator of the
intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria, together with his copetitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for the development
and subdivision of 3 parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently
Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development Corporation.
Months later, petitioners and the other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful
violation of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in
turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners
for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those of Article 171,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary examination, the
City Fiscal of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging
petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that
they made it appear in the contract that Aurora Villasor was the "guardian" of the minor
George Mejia and that Angelina Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the minor
Alexander Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of
said minors on the date of the execution of the document.

Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles
reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to give them an opportunity to present
exculpatory evidence, and after the conclusion of the reinvestigation the parties charged
moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles
had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the
alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said
city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the meantime the City
Court had set the Criminal Case for arraignment, the defendants secured from said court
several postponements of the arraignment.
In view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the
case, petitioners filed on November 26, 1965 with the City Court a motion to quash upon
the ground that said court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complainants
in the case, with the conformity of the City Fiscal, filed an opposition thereto, and on
February 3, 1966 the respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset the
arraignment of all the defendants on March 5 of the same year. Petitioners filed the
present action for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide
the Criminal Case for alleged falsification of a private document by the parties named in
the information.
RULING:
No.
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was
committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction. Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of
Angeles over the criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to
compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment
and mental anguish that go with it.
11. RUSTIA v. OCAMPO
CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960
FACTS:
On September 30, 1935, petitioner Rustia filed a criminal complaint for
dereliction of duty against respondent Ocampo.
On October 7, 1935, the respondent Judge Villareal, having been designated to
receive the preliminary evidence in support of the petitioner's complaint, prior to the
issuance of the warrant for the arrest of the accused, proceeded in open court to receive
said evidence, oral and documentary, and an affidavit of the clerk of the court, Vicente
Albert.
On October 15, 1935 said respondent judge entered a resolution denying the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and dismissing the complaint.
Petitioner filed an appeal but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal lies from the resolution of the respondent judge
refusing to issue a warrant of arrest and dismissing the complaint.
RULING:
No.
In the case at bar, the complaint was not filed in the justice of the peace court but
in the Court of First Instance, under the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 1627, from
whose decision, in preliminary investigations of crimes denounced to it, no appeal to this
court is provided. The appeal provided for in section 14 is from resolutions of justices of
the peace ordering the release of an accused after conducting the corresponding
preliminary investigation, but not from resolutions of Courts of First Instance ordering
said release. Inasmuch as the right to appeal is not inherent in every accused, but granted
by the constitution of law, appeal does not lie from a resolution of a Court of First
Instance refusing to issue a warrant of arrest and dismissing a complaint.

12. BORLONGAN, JR. ET AL. v. PEA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010
FACTS:
Urban Bank, Inc. was a domestic Philippine corporation, engaged in the business
of banking. The 8 individual respondents were officers and members of the Banks board
of directors, who were sued in their official and personal capacities. Meanwhile,
petitioner Atty. Pea was formerly a stockholder, director and corporate secretary of
Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), which owned a parcel of land located in Pasay and it
leased its property for a period of 10 years in 1984. The lessee subleased the land to
several tenants who put up 23 establishments, mostly beer houses and night clubs inside
the compound. Before the expiration of the 10-year period, ISCI informed the lessee and
his tenants that the lease would no longer be renewed and that it intended to take over the
Pasay property for the purpose of selling it to Urban Bank, Inc. Two weeks before the
lease over the Pasay property was to expire, ISCI and Urban Bank executed a contract to
sell, whereby the latter would pay ISCI the amount of P241.612 million in installments
for the Pasay property. Both parties agreed that the final installment of P25 million would
be released by the bank upon ISCIs delivery of full and actual possession of the land,
free from any tenants.
ISCI sent Urban Bank a letter, which acknowledged ISCIs engagement of Pea
and commitment to pay for any expenses that may be incurred in the course of his
services. Pea made efforts to settle the issue of possession of the Pasay property with the
sub-tenants. On March 1995, the bank subsequently took actual possession of the
property and installed its own guards at the premises. Pea formally demanded from
Urban Bank the payment of the 10% compensation and attorneys fees allegedly
promised to him during his telephone conversation with Borlongan for securing and
maintaining peaceful possession of the property. When Urban Bank refused to pay for his
services, Pea filed a complaint for recovery of agents compensation and expenses,
damages and attorneys fees in RTC Bago City. Urban Bank declared a bank holiday on
April 2000 and was placed under receivership of the PDIC while its motion for
reconsideration was pending. The appellate court found that the bank holiday declared by
the BSP after the promulgation of its earlier decision, PDICs receivership of Urban Bank
and the imminent insolvency thereof constituted changes in the banks conditions that
would justify execution pending appeal. The rehabilitation plan of Urban Bank was

approved by the Monetary Board of the BSP. Thus, the Monetary Board subsequently
lifted PDICs statutory receivership of the bank.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
RULING:
None.
Based on the documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City
Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On
the strength of the same documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest. The
Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of
probable cause.
The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied
considering that herein petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the
complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of
the public prosecutors function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or
manifest error in his findings. Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a
quo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, the Court therefore
annuls their findings.

13. Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No.
30720-R, October 8, 1962
RULING:
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with the
Court. The Courts duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the
executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want
of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not
be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions
to this rule, one of which is where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance.
14. GUINGONA, et al. v. CITY FISCAL
L-60033, April 4, 1984
FACTS:
Clemente David invested with the Nation Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(NSLA) from March 20, 1979 to March 1981. However, On March 21, 1981, NSLA was
placed under receivership by the Central Bank. Hence, David filed claims for his
investments and those of his sister. On July 22, 1981, David received a report from the
Central Bank that only P305,821.92 of those investments were entered in the records of
NSLA. Thereafter, David demanded for the remaining balances of his investments but
Guingona Jr., who was then NSLA President, paid only P200,000. On December
23,1981, private respondent David filed an action charging the directors and officers of
NSLA with Estafa for misappropriating the balance of the investments, at the same time

violating Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related Central Bank regulations on foreign
exchange transactions.
At the inception of the preliminary investigation, The NSLO officers moved to
dismiss the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction because David's claims allegedly
comprised a purely civil obligation which was itself novated, but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transactions between David and NSLA were simple loans
which are civil in nature, and not Estafa.
RULING:
There was simple loan and not Estafa.
There is merit in the contention of the petitioners that their liability is civil in nature and
therefore, public respondents have no jurisdiction over the charge of estafa. It must be
pointed out that when private respondent David invested his money with the bank, the
contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of
deposit. Thus, Article 1980 of the New Civil Code provides that fixed, savings, and
current deposits of-money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan.
The relationship between the private respondent and the NSLA is that of creditor
and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the
Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for
its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While
the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation
to return or deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to
return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation
punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give
rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no- jurisdiction.
In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in
nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange
transactions, the Court held that the public respondents acted without jurisdiction when
they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public respondents
should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case
to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice, would
work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper
administration of justice.

15. SALONGA vs. PAO, et al.

L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438
FACTS:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner
asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law
to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila
area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr,
one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice
of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included
petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the aboveentitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that petitioner
was given 10 days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within
which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law
was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received
any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by
Gen. Prospero Olivas charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended. On October 15, 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to
dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On December 2, 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano denied the
motion. On January 4, 1982, he Pano issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated December 2, 1981 and
January 4, 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of
Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution
despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in
the Philippines today.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the above case still falls under an actual case.
2. Whether or not the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a
decision from the Supreme Court.
RULING:
1. No.
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and
separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case
against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures
and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further deliberations. Insofar
as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is
concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.
2. Yes.

Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and academic
nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where
mootness was clearly apparent. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
16. RODRIGUEZ vs. CASTELO
L-6374, August 1, 1953
RULING:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality
as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same
way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when the Court
will intervene in the prosecution of cases, one of which is when the preliminary
injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners.

17. ROBERTS, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever
promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of the 4 cases
filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor
only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything
accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutors Joint Resolution was
forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found
in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners filed a petition for review to the Department of
Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in
abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public
prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the
final disposition of the appeal to the DOJ.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1)
denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by
the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of
arrest after June 1993 and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent
judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial,

following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would
undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated: In order therefor to avoid such a
situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the CA, arguing that the respondent judge had not the slightest
basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutors Joint Resolution had in fact
been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied
petitioners application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint
Resolution was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in
convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest and that the mere silence of the records or the absence
of any express declaration in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does
not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought
reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on
the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for
review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation.
3. Whether or not the Supreme Court may determine in this proceeding the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for
their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
RULING:
1. Yes. Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of
Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.
Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter
of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the
motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds.
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing
of the aforementioned motions at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing
the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss
or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of
subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
2. Yes. Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that
the investigating prosecutors certification in an information or his resolution which is
made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this
Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page
resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they made personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with
the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial
court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent judges
clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the
course thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when
respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among
other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or
evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he
made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes
a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for
the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.
3.
No. the Supreme Court may not determine in this proceeding the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for
their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed
by injunction, preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to reevaluate
the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause
exists, and if he did he did not have the basis therefor. Moreover, the records of the
preliminary investigation in this case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's
1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to
perform their duty.

18. ZALDIVIA vs. REYES

G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of an Ordinance of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of
the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30,
1990. The corresponding information was filed with the MTC of Rodriguez on October
2, 1990.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the RTC of Rizal, the denial was
sustained by the respondent judge.
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the
information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the
alleged commission of the offense, hence the charge against her should have been
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscals office constituting a
violation of a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.
RULING:
No.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two
months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983.
On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with
the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not
prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that.
If there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.

It is the Courts conclusion that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was
not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.

19. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. PETER SHERMAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011
FACTS:
Respondents company, Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. imported from Australia
255, 870,000 pieces of finished bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers
from June 2005 to January 2007. The shipment was released from the Clark Special
Economic Zone, and was brought to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for its
lotto operations in Luzon. However, MSPI did not pay duties or taxes prompting the
Bureau of Customs to file a criminal complaint before the DOJ against the respondents.
State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano found probable cause against respondents
and recommended the filing of Information against them.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice during the
pendency of which the Information was filed on April 11, 2009 before the Court of Tax
Appeals.
Only respondents Cajigal and Lingan were served warrants of arrest following
which they posted cash bail bonds.
On March 20, 2009, the Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutors
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied, it elevated the case by
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to
Withdraw Information with Leave of Court to which petitioner filed an Opposition.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the Information.
The CTA granted the withdrawal of the Information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a public prosecutor has the power of direction and control over
prosecution of criminal cases.
RULING:
Yes.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of
the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are
faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted
under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws,

the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors
from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The designation does
not, however, detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the
case. The participation in the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to
that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.
As petitioners motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA Resolution did
not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution
of the case belongs, the present petition fails.

20. PEOPLE vs. PADICA

G.R. No. 102645, April 7, 1993
FACTS:
The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr. (appellant), Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans,
Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas were
originally charged in the latter part of 1978 with kidnapping for ransom with murder of
Francis Banaga and illegal possession of firearms before Military Commission No. 27.
However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused Leon Marajas, Jr. prayed for the
transfer of the case to the civil courts.
On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed an
information for kidnapping for ransom with murder against the accused, but with the
exception of appellant whose name was inadvertently not included therein. A separate
charge for illegal possession of firearms was lodged but the case was later placed in the
archives some time in 1985.
Accused Romeo Padica and appellant were both arraigned on January 15, 1982
and, with the assistance of their respective counsel, both pleaded not guilty. It appears,
however, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of
"Leonardo Marajas."
However, upon discovery of the omission of appellant's name in the original
information, the prosecution filed a motion on November 16, 1984 for the admission of
an amended information including appellant's name as one of the accused. The appellant
entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned on the amended information. Accused
Padica was discharged from the information to be utilized as a state witness.
After more than 8 years of trial, the trial court rendered its assailed decision
pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga,
father of Francis Banaga, the sum of P30,000 as indemnity for the death of the child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to charge appellant as an accused in
the original information is a fatal defect.
RULING:
No.
The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege the name
of the accused, failing which the complaint or information would be rendered invalid.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under the
original information and that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the name of
"Leonardo Marajas." At that juncture, appellant should have raised the error as to his
identity by filing a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person.
But appellant did not do so but instead voluntarily appeared at the arraignment
and pleaded not guilty under a different name. Consequently, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over his person and it could have rendered a valid judgment of conviction
based on the original information even without need of an amendatory information to
correct appellant's name.
The subsequent amendment to insert in the information Leon Marajas, Jr.'s real
name involved merely a matter of form as it did not, in any way, deprive appellant of a
fair opportunity to present his defense. Moreover, the amendment neither affected nor
altered the nature of the offense charged since the basic theory of the prosecution was not
changed nor did it introduce new and material facts. Such an amendment is explicitly
allowed under the second paragraph of Section 7, in relation to Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that the information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the accused. At any rate, whatever irregularity may have attended the
inclusion of appellant's name as an accused in the amended information has been waived
by his subsequent appearance and entry of plea at his arraignment under said amendatory
information.

21. and 22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELICIANO, JR., et al.

G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, 7 members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the UP Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against the accused who are members of the
Scintilla Juris fraternity. Separate informations were also filed against them for attempted
murder and frustrated murder of the other Sigma Rho fraternity members. Only 11 of the
accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the
court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that
he was not identified by the prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any
of the documentary evidence of the prosecution.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the finding that
Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla,
and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted
murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert
Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. The case against Benedict Guerrero
was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was
brought to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of

the Rules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the CA which affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The decision of the CA was then brought to the SC for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Information is sufficient as to fully apprise the accusedappellants of the charge against them.
RULING:
Yes.
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were presenting
testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell
off.
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor
against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1,
paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their
constitutional rights.
Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.
Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the
trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime,
it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove
that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not
wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes
that "the act of one is the act of all." This would mean all the accused had been one in
their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some
of them might not have done so.

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is
that the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to
the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.

23. and 24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAMARUNCAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012
FACTS:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito
Gepayo and a certain Nito were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoons auto
repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues
while his 2 companions wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao
showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was serving it against
Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palaos group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard
Batoon to stop their work and observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the
matter after he finishes tuning-up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victims stomach and pointing a .45 caliber
pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palaos gun, causing the 2 of them to
grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang
Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind Batoons right thigh
with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also standing behind
Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoons left arm pit with a .45 cal.
homemade pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished him off
with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire
scene, stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantage points 3 to four 4 meters
away, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the
Iligan City PNP Mobile Force Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway,
heading towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied by his driver, SPO3 William
Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair
shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop the car. They
alighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw 3 men
in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground.
Inspector Mijares group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were
doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired
back. During the exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while
Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car.
Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit
Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were then
captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao but he escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for
treatment and they were eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was brought
to the hospital by his wife but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The Regional Trial Court held them guilty as principals by direct participation in
the killing of Baudelio Batoon. It gave full faith and credence to the evidence of the

prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and rendered
a verdict of conviction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. Said court
ruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies pointed out by the
appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative
weight of said testimonies. Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuans
name in the Information, the court held that such error was only a formal defect and the
proper correction was duly made without any objection on the part of the defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed before the trial court was substantially
defective.
RULING:
No.
Appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial court was substantially
defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person
when in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to
comprehend the Information read to him.
Appellants failed to raise the issue of the defective Information before the trial
court through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to quash the information. Their
failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to
a waiver of the defect in the Information. Objections as to matters of form or substance
in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Records even show that
the Information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but
appellants did not comment thereon.
25. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOMAQUE
G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Appellant was charged under separate Informations for 13 counts of Rape by
Sexual Intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter "AAA", a minor. Except
as to the dates of occurrence and the age of "AAA" at the time of the commission of the
crimes, the accusatory portions in the Informations are similarly worded as the
Information in the criminal case. In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of
Lasciviousness committed against his stepdaughter AAA..
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the Informations. Soon
the cases were set for Pre-Trial where only the minority of "AAA" was stipulated upon.
Accordingly, the joint trial on the merits ensued.
After trial, the RTC found "AAA" to be a credible witness and rejected the
defense of denial and alibi proffered by the appellant. It rendered a decision declaring
appellant guilty of 7 counts of rape by sexual intercourse.
Appellant thus assailed his conviction before the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was properly
alleged in the Information and proved during the trial.
RULING:

No.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code , rape is qualified and the penalty
of death is imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. To justify the
imposition of the death penalty, however, it is required that the special qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant be properly
alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial. These two circumstances
must concur.
The Court held that the court a quo erred in finding appellant guilty of rape in its
qualified form. Indeed, the subject Information clearly avers the special qualifying
circumstances of minority of "AAA" and her filiation to the appellant. While the
prosecution was able to sufficiently prove "AAAs" minority through the latters
testimony during the trial and by the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth showing
that she was born on September 15, 1985, it however, failed to prove the fact of
relationship between her and the appellant. Notably, said alleged relationship was not
even made the subject of stipulation of facts during the pre-trial. The allegation that
"AAA" is the stepdaughter of appellant requires competent proof and should not be easily
accepted as factually true. The bare testimony of appellant that he was married to "BBB"
is not enough. Neither does "AAAs" reference to appellant as her stepfather during her
testimony would suffice. As ruled in People v. Agustin, "the relationship of the accused to
the victim cannot be established by mere testimony or even by the accuseds very own
admission of such relationship." In this case, save for the testimony of appellant that he
was married to "BBB," the record is bereft of any evidence to show that appellant and
"BBB" were indeed legally married. The prosecution could have presented the marriage
contract, the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage but it did not.
Thus, "AAA" cannot be considered as appellants stepdaughter and conversely,
appellant as "AAAs" stepfather. Appellant, therefore, should only be convicted of simple
rape.
26. BUHAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119601, December 17, 1996
FACTS:
On March 25, 1993, an information for Homicide was filed against petitioner
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe for the death of Ramon George Yu.
The prosecution moved for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that
the private complainant, Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the information for homicide. Petitioner
however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was
arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty
Yus appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor to amend the information by
upgrading the offense charged to Murder and implead additional accused Herminia
Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat.
On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to
amend information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.
The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.
The RTC denied the motion for leave to amend information. The denial was
premised on (1) an invocation of the trial courts discretion in disregarding the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs. Mogul and (2) a conclusion
reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest prosecutor is more persuasive

than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having actually conducted the preliminary
investigation where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigated.
The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He
filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for leave to amend
information. Finding the proposed amendment as non-prejudicial to petitioners rights,
respondent court granted the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to murder is a
substantial amendment that it is prohibited if made after the accused had pleaded not
guilty to the crime of homicide.
RULING:
No.
Abuse of superior strength having already been alleged in the original information
charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere
formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo, the Court ruled that the amendment of the
information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made
even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
The provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 [now Sec. 14
under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure] of the Rules of Court which stipulates that
the information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the defendants pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
However, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional
allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were
being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. If the killing
is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then there is murder.
26. BUHAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119601, December 17, 1996
FACTS:
On March 25, 1993, an information for Homicide was filed against petitioner
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe for the death of Ramon George Yu.
The prosecution moved for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that
the private complainant, Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the information for homicide. Petitioner
however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was
arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty
Yus appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor to amend the information by
upgrading the offense charged to Murder and implead additional accused Herminia
Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat.
On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to
amend information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.

The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to amend information. The denial was
premised on (1) an invocation of the trial courts discretion in disregarding the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs. Mogul and (2) a conclusion
reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest prosecutor is more persuasive
than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having actually conducted the preliminary
investigation where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigated.
The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He
filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for leave to amend
information. Finding the proposed amendment as non-prejudicial to petitioners rights,
respondent court granted the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to murder is a
substantial amendment that it is prohibited if made after the accused had pleaded not
guilty to the crime of homicide.
RULING:
No.
Abuse of superior strength having already been alleged in the original information
charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere
formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo, the Court ruled that the amendment of the
information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made
even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
The provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 [now Sec. 14
under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure] of the Rules of Court which stipulates that
the information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the defendants pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
However, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional
allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were
being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. If the killing
is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then there is murder.
27. U.S. v. PANLILIO
G.R. No. L-9876, December 8, 1914
FACTS:
On February 22, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the accused having been
exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in
accordance with an order of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in
Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga. While the quarantine was still in force, accused illegally
ordered the carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and
drove them from one place to another in his hacienda for the purpose of working them.
The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and
proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the facts alleged in the Information constitutes a violation of Act
No. 1760.
RULING:
No.
The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of
Act No. 1760. An amended information was filed but it failed to specify that section of
Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by
the court on the trial.
The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them
unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the
case at bar does not fall within any of them. There is no question here of importation and
there is no charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a dangerous
communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration
provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said animals from one
island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged that it
had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that they had been placed in
a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the
quarantine, had taken them from the corral and worked them upon the lands adjoining.
They had not been in highway nor moved from one municipality or settlement to another.
They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there
worked by the servants of the accused.
It was contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information
and proved upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act
No. 1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
Hence, the accused was convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P14 and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
28. LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE,
G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated
with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company
Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate
disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin
Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioners siblings including respondent and some
unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory
owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory
premises.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI filed before the RTC of Manila a
verified Petition for the Issuance of an Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT which covers a
property owned by CHI. Petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Loss stating that the owners
copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he
discovered such loss in May 1999. The RTC granted the petition and directed the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of
the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying,
that the RTCs Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent
was in possession of the said Owners Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate

Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner
merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the same
with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled
and set aside its Order.
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit to clarify that she
was accusing petitioner of perjury.
The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in
the Review Resolution issued by the First Assistant City Prosecutor, the recommendation
to dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the Information
for perjury against petitioner before the MeTC of Manila.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as
private prosecutor with the consent and under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor. After the prosecutions presentation of its first witness in the person of Atty.
Ronaldo Viesca, Jr., a lawyer from the Land Registration Authority, petitioners counsel
moved in open court that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from
participating in the case since perjury is a public offense. Said motion was opposed by
Atty. Macam. Petitioner asserts that in the crime of perjury there is no mention of any
private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution
in this case. On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of
the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that
she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI
and the private complainant.
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The CA
ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the presence of the private prosecutor who was
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal
proceedings of the two perjury cases is not prohibited by the rules. The CA ratiocinated
that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the private complainant
therein, hence, an aggrieved party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it upheld
the resolution of the trial court that there is a private offended party in the crime of
perjury, a crime against public interest;
RULING:
No.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Underlying
this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he
offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity,
called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a
private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110.

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238
covering CHIs property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is,
without doubt, injurious to respondents personal credibility and reputation insofar as her
faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer
of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the courtordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by
respondents timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case
being tried in the MeTC, the Court declared that whether public or private crimes are
involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended
party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has
asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of
enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of
the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of
the public prosecutor.
29. SAPIERA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999
FACTS:
Remedios Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several occasions, purchased from
Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly cigarettes and paid for them with checks issued by
one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed by Sapiera on the back. When they
were presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account
was already closed. Respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner
but both failed to pay. Hence, 4 charges of Estafa were filed against Sapiera while 2
counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against Arturo de Guzman. These cases were
consolidated.
The RTC of Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera of all charges of Estafa but did not
rule on the civil aspect of the case. Arturo de Guzman was held liable for violation of BP
22 on 2 counts and was ordered to pay Sua P167, 150 as civil indemnity and was
sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day. Respondent Sua appealed regarding
the civil aspect of Sapieras case but the court denied it saying that the acquittal of
petitioner was absolute. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of
Appeals praying that the appeal be given due course which was granted.
The CA rendered a decision ordering Sapiera to pay P335,000 to Sua. Sapiera
filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court noted that private respondent was
the same offended party in the criminal cases against petitioner and against de Guzman.
Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent could not recover twice on the
same checks. Since he had collected P125,000 from de Guzman, this amount should be
deducted from the sum total of the civil indemnity due him arising from the estafa cases
against petitioner. The appellate court then corrected its previous award, which was
erroneously placed at P335,000, to P335,150 as the sum total of the amounts of the 4
checks involved. Deducting the amount of P125,000 already collected by private
respondent, petitioner was adjudged to pay P210,150 as civil liability to private
respondent. Hence, this petition alleging that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her acquittal by the trial
court from charges of estafa was absolute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the
criminal charges against her.

RULING:
Yes.
Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that the extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil
liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.
Based on the findings of the trial court, the exoneration of petitioner of the
charges of estafa was based on the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
evidence showing conspiracy between her and the other accused Arturo de Guzman in
defrauding private respondent. However, by her own testimony, petitioner admitted
having signed the 4 checks in question on the reverse side. The evidence of the
prosecution shows that petitioner purchased goods from the grocery store of private
respondent as shown by the sales invoices issued by private respondent; that these
purchases were paid with the 4 subject checks issued by de Guzman; that petitioner
signed the same checks on the reverse side; and when presented for payment, the checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank due to the closure of the drawers account; and,
petitioner was informed of the dishonor.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil
liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a
declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not
exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the
facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for
the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
30. RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various loans
totaling P18, 000,000 from Unicapital. The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance
with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase onehalf of the property for a total consideration of P21, 22,500. Payment was effected by offsetting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and
Consing in the amount of P18,000,000 and paying an additional amount of
P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, a joint
venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that
the title to the property was really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the
parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. The title held
by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter
ignored the demands.
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed a civil action in the Pasig City RTC (Pasig civil
case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against
him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere
agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa

through falsification of public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati
City Prosecutors Office.
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital filed a civil action against Consing in the RTC in
Makati City for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a
writ of preliminary attachment. (Makati civil case)
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed
against Consing and De la Cruz information for estafa through falsification of public
document in the RTC in Makati City. (Makati criminal case)
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of
the Pasig and Makati civil cases. The Prosecution opposed the motion.
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in
the Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on
March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecutions motion for reconsideration.
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati
criminal case via petition for certiorari.
On May 20, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and uphold the
RTCs questioned orders.
Meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for
damages against Consing in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite.(Cavite
criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases.
On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied
Consings motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter,
Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin his arraignment
and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and
later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consings petition for certiorari
and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the
RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil
cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in the praying for the
reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted
the petition for review and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a
prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati
criminal case.
RULING:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does
not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution
of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
Consing has deliberately chosen to ignore the firm ruling that the proceedings in the
criminal case could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent
civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for

him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between
his case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action
was predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its
complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a
property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title. As such, the
action was one that could proceed independently of the criminal case pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows: Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical
injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and
does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal
case.
In the instant case, the civil case for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is
an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling
of the SC to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases
involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus
Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar
mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the
Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the
resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consings being a mere
agent of his mother who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the
property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in the Pasig civil
case for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an
agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in the Manila civil case, for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages
and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale
of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in the civil case for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to
the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.
31. GANDIONCO v. PEARANDA
G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
On May 29, 1986, private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint
against petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage.
She also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She later filed
an application for the provisional remedy of support pendente elite which was approved
and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendente elite, in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil

action for legal separation is closely tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings
related to legal separation should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution
of the criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
Yes.
In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for
legal separation would be proper if an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied
solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal
procedure, to wit: xxx (c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered .
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the
civil action to be suspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is
"to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense". In other words, in view of the
amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or
are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others.
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as
contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is
specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action
arising from the offense."
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon
proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has
been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was
then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New
Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant
spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement
has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the
omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco
v. Tayao.
32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO DADAO, et al.
G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014
FACTS:
On July 16, 1993, an Information was filed against appellants for the crime of
murder.

On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All 4 accused pleaded "not
guilty" to the charge against them.
After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin.
Appellants elevated their case to the CA. During the pendency of the appeal, the
appellate court acted on a Manifestation filed by Rogelio Tampil, bondsman for Eddie
Malogsi, who sought the cancellation of the memorandum of encumbrance that was
reflected in his land title for the reason that Eddie Malogsi had already died on August
25, 2003. On February 11, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting
Tampils request. The CA issued its decision dismissing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength should
have been appreciated even if it was not alleged in the criminal information.
RULING:
No.
Contrary to appellants claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength was used by the trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by
appellants to murder despite it not having been alleged in the criminal information filed
against them, the text of the assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of the trial court clearly
shows that, even though abuse of superior strength was discussed as present in the
commission of the crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying or generic
aggravating circumstance.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated
treachery, which was alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which
qualified the offense to murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior
strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate
the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.
33. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES v. SEC. PEREZ
GR. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF
Homes), then represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the SEC, 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes
Paraaque, for the price of P106,248,000. The transactions were embodied in 3 separate
deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were
fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of
land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale,
executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
P39,122,627, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for
parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased
to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile
replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an
order from the SEC.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15,
2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Las Pias City charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes
with non-delivery of titles in violation of PD No. 957.
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance
in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend
proceedings in the OCP Las Pias, citing the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in
the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the
meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes receivership on September 12, 2000,
prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of
proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership.
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Pias dismissed San Miguel Properties
criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB case does not present a prejudicial question to the
subject criminal case since the former involves an issue separate and distinct from the
issue involved in the latter.
RULING:
There is prejudicial question.
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the
buyer of residential subdivision lots in the HLURB to compel the seller to deliver the
TCTs of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal
prosecution for violation of Section 25 of PD 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal
charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or
not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining
20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former
must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not
have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been
terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25
of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal
case.
Worthy to note is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test
the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to
have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet
presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A
challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

34. REYES v. ETTORE ROSSI,

G.R. No. 159823 Feb. 18, 2013
FACTS:
On October 31, 1997, petitioner and Advanced Foundation, represented by its
Executive Project Director, respondent Rossi, executed a deed of conditional sale
involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump
HY 300A worth P10,000,000 The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of
P3,000,000 as downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000 through 4 post-dated checks.
Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation
under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the 4post-dated checks with 9 postdated
checks that would include interest at the rate of P25,000/month accruing on the unpaid
portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30,
1998 and October 31, 1998. Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes request, and
returned the 4 checks. In turn, Reyes issued and delivered 9 postdated checks in the
aggregate sum of P7, 125,000 drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank.
Rossi deposited 3 of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No.
72808) on their maturity dates in Advanced Foundations bank account at the PCI Bank
in Makati. 2 of the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes instructions to
stop their payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. Rossi likewise deposited 2 more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in
Advanced Foundations account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned
with the notation Account Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the 3
remaining checks on the assumption that they would be similarly dishonored.
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of
contract and damages in the RTC Quezon City. His complaint sought judgment declaring
the deed of conditional sale rescinded and of no further force and effect, and ordering
Advanced Foundation to return the P3,000,000 downpayment with legal interest from
June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorneys fees, and various kinds and
amounts of damages.
On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with 5 counts of estafa and 5 counts
of violation of BP Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor
of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125. Another
criminal charge for violation of BP Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802.
On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati, claiming that the checks had not been issued for any valuable
consideration; that he had discovered from the start of using the dredging pump involved
in the conditional sale that the Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been
rated at only 560 horsepower instead of the 1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had
represented to him; that welding works on the pump had neatly concealed several cracks;
that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced Foundation complaining about the
misrepresentations on the specifications of the pump and demanding documentary proof
of Advanced Foundations ownership of the pump; that he had caused the order to stop
the payment of 3 checks (i.e., No. 72806, No. 72807 and No. 79125); that Advanced
Foundation had replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that the pump had been
sold to him on an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent another letter to Advanced
Foundation on May 18, 1998 to reiterate his complaints and the request for proper
documentation of ownership; that he had subsequently discovered other hidden defects,
prompting him to write another letter; and that instead of attending to his complaints and
request, Advanced Foundations lawyers had threatened him with legal action.
At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had
issued the checks in Quezon City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the

civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal
proceedings.
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary
investigation recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of
the proceedings relating to the violation of BP Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question.
On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation
of the handling Assistant City Prosecutor hence, it dismissed the complaint for Estafa.
Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice
which was denied.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi
challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.
In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
upholding the suspension of the criminal proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati
on account of the existence of a prejudicial question, and in sustaining the dismissal of
the complaints for estafa.
On May 30, 2003, the CA granted the petition in so far as the issue of the
existence of prejudicial question is concerned. Accordingly, the order suspending the
preliminary investigation is reversed and set aside, and the dismissal of the complaint for
estafa is affirmed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a
prejudicial question that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
RULING:
No.
Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial
question, Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of
whether or not he was criminally liable for the violations of BP Blg. 22. He states that if
the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale
would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the
criminal proceedings for the violations of BP Blg. 22.
The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced
Foundation did not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative
remedies available to a contracting party under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. The
injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he
has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the
rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is
understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the
thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition
in reciprocal obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no
corresponding agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that in
reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part
of the contract; hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform
may rescind the obligation if the other does not perform, or is not ready and willing to
perform.

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the

obligatory relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive
effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving
things in their status before the celebration of the contract. However, until the contract is
rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension
of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The
violation of BP Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. The issue in the criminal
actions upon the violations of BP Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the
dishonored checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment.
On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the
breach in the fulfillment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the rescission of
the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation
would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the
contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the
criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned
elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that
he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties.
His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank
should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the
contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under BP Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a
worthless check was already the offense in itself.
Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of BP Blg.
22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional
sale.
35. GENERAL vs. HON. CLARAVALL
G.R. No. 96724, March 22, 1991
FACTS:
Benneth Thelmo filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Rizal a sworn
complaint accusing Honesto General and another person of libel, and alleged that by
reason of the offense he had suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in the total
sum of P100 million. The information for libel filed with the RTC at Pasig did not
however contain any allegation respecting the damages due the offended party. At the
trial, the defense raised the issue of non-payment of the docket fees corresponding to the
claim of damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to
Thelmo's pursuing his civil action therefor. The trial Court overruled the objection. It also
denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration and motion for suspension of
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be deemed
to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due course.
RULING:
No.

Under the 1988 Rules, it is only when "the amount of damages, other than actual,
is alleged in the complaint or information (that) the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial." In any other case, the
filing fees for the civil action "to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages shall merely constitute a first lien on
the judgment except in an award for actual damages."
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of
clarity and certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a
civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Courtbecause the offended party has NOT waived the civil
action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to
the criminal actionthe rule is as follows:
1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"
2) in any other case, howeveri.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged
in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be
paid and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for
actual damages.
36. PEOPLE v. WAGAS
GR No. 157943, September 4, 2013
FACTS:
On April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone
from Ligaray. Ligaray and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of
the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas assurance that he would not
disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business
and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order. Ligaray released the goods
to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received a check for P200,000 payable
to cash and postdated May 8, 1997. Ligaray later deposited the check with Solid Bank,
his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. He
called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return
to Cebu but despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas
because they transacted through telephone only and that he released the 200 bags of rice
directly to Robert Caada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt
upon receiving the rice.
The RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002. Wagas filed a motion for
new trial and/or reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime.
RULING:
No.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had
defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.

The Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to
definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the
telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he
had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from
him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas. During crossexamination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had determined
that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing. Ligarays
statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he
knows him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the
identification, and should not support a finding of Ligarays familiarity with Wagas as the
caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligarays answers that Wagas was not even an
acquaintance of Ligarays prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTCs conclusion that
Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the
RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be
Wagas.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a
consequence of the tenet that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a
means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the
dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct
identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the
weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the
Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.
Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her
shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to
prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be
established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, there can be no conviction.
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly
liable where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the
admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a
holder in due course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the
amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this decision.
37. UNITED STATES v. MARFORI
December 9, 1916
FACTS:
Marfori was convicted of the crime of aggravated slander and sentenced to six
months and one day of destierro. The complaint charged him of having spoken of the
complainant in a manner which reflected adversely upon her virtue and good name in the
presence of several witnesses. The complaint was originally filed in the court of a justice
of the peace who held a preliminary investigation and discharged the accused on the
ground that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged. A report of the
proceedings was forwarded to the provincial fiscal by the justice of the peace. The
complaining witness renewed the complaint in the CFI. An information was filed in that
court and Marfori was brought to trial without further proceedings. Upon arraignment,
when Marfori was called upon to plead, his counsel declined to proceed on the ground
that the court was without jurisdiction to bring Marfori to trial, no order remanding him
for trial having been issued by a competent magistrate as a result of a preliminary trial
held. The trial judge overruled the objections of counsel, and ordered the parties to
proceed with the trial on the ground that the report of the proceedings at the preliminary
trial held by the justice of the peace disclosed a reasonable probability that the crime

charged had been committed and that the accused had committed it; that the justice of the
peace had erred in discharging the accused; and that he should have remanded the
accused for trial. Marforis counsel then exempted to the ruling and insisted on the right
to a preliminary trial. Marfori refused to enter a plea so that the court was compelled to
direct the entry of a plea of not guilty in his behalf.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in bringing the accused to trial over his
objection, in the absence of an order remanding him for trial based upon a preliminary
trial held in accordance with the provisions of law.
RULING:
Yes.
The right of an accused not to be brought to trial except when remanded as the
result of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate or, within the city of
Manila, not to be brought to trial except in pursuance of like proceeding or the
proceeding substituted by law, is a substantial one. Its denial, over the objection of the
accused is a prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
The accused was brought to trial, over his objection without having been
committed or remanded for trial by an investigating magistrate. The justice of the peace
who held the preliminary investigation dismissed the original complaint against the
accused, being of opinion that there was no probable cause to believe him guilty of the
offense; and although a so-called report of the proceedings was forwarded to the fiscal
and doubtless submitted to the trial judge, original jurisdiction to commit the accused for
trial as result of those proceeding

38. ARTILLERO v. CASIMIRO

G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Chief of Police of the Municipal Station of the Philippine
National Police in Ajuy, Iloilo. According to him, on 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the
evening, successive gun fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo. Together
with Police Inspector Hermos and SPO Lanaque, immediately went to the area to
investigate. They spotted Aguillon and Padilla walking wobbling and visibly drunk.
Aguillon was openly carrying a Caliber 5.56 M16 without PTCFOR and that its barrel
touched the concrete road at times. They disarmed Aguillon and arrested them.
Petitioner executed a Joint Affidavit in support of the filing of a case for illegal
possession of firearm against Aguillon and endorsed it to the Provincial Prosecutor.
Aguillon also executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully arrested and
detained him for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former had every right to
carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to petitioner. Aguillon
further claims that he was duly authorized by law to carry his firearm within his
barangay.
In a Resolution the Overall Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, approved the
recommendation of Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban to dismiss the case. It ruled that the
evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal possession of
firearm since he has a license for his rifle. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution, but it was denied. Thus, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari via
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
A perusal of the records reveal that in both the Resolutions, the PNP Crime
Laboratory and petitioner were included in the list of those who were furnished copies of

the foregoing Resolutions. Even though his name was listed in the "copy furnished"
section, petitioner never signed to signify receipt thereof. Thus, none of herein
respondents raise this fact as a defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process when he was not sent a copy of
the of Aguillons Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutors Resolution, and the Resolution
of the Office of the Ombudsman and that public respondents act of dismissing the
criminal Complaint against Aguillon.
RULING:
No.
Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that no person shall be
held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law. It further provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. This is a right that cannot be invoked by petitioner, because he is
not the accused in this case.
A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a
Replythis right should be granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the
right to file a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit.
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban correctly claims that it is discretionary on his part
to require or allow the filing or submission of reply-affidavits. Furthermore, there was no
need to send a copy of the September 10, 2008 Resolution to petitioner, since it did not
attain finality until it was approved by the Office of the Ombudsman. It must be noted
that the rules do not state that petitioner, as complainant, was entitled to a copy of this
recommendation. The only obligation of the prosecutor, as detailed in Section 4 of Rule
112, was to forward the record of the case to the proper officer within five days from the
issuance of his Resolution.
Even though petitioner was indeed entitled to receive a copy of the Counteraffidavit filed by Aguillon, whatever procedural defects this case suffered from in its
initial stages were cured when the former filed an MR. In fact, all of the supposed
defenses of petitioner in this case have already been raised in his MR and adequately
considered and acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack
of opportunity to be heard." We have said that where a party has been given a chance to
be heard with respect to the latters motion for reconsideration there is sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process.
39. UY v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner George Uy was the Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy
designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez on matters relating the activities of the
Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for Estafa through falsification of official
documents and one information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices act were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Uy and 19
other accused. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit received
1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The Sandiganbayan
recommended that the informations be withdrawn against some of the accused after a
comprehensive investigation. Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the

Court Martial and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged
or the person of the accused. Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 which provides for
the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case since he was a regular officer
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of
War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D 1606.
As to the violations of RA 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank
requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction
over petitioner is vested in the regular courts as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states
that In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority
to file the corresponding information/s against Uy in the RTC. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In February 20,
2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, which was then
denied. The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman
Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated
February 22, 2000.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal
cases or the person of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
RULING:
1. None.
The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Thus, Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the petitioner at the time of the filing of the informations and as now
prescribed by law. RA 8249, the latest amendment of PD 1606 creating the
Sandiganbayan provides that such will have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of
members of the Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of
higher rank.
In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his
position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval
captains and all officers of higher rank. It must be noted that both the nature of the
offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before
Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, regular courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over the person of the accused as provided by the Sandiganbayan
Law which states that in case where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested
in the proper RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129. Consequently, it is
the RTC which has jurisdiction over the offense charged since under Section 9 of RA
3019, the commission of any violation of said law shall be punished with imprisonment
for not less than six years and one month to fifteen years. The indictment of the petitioner
therefore cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC.
2. No.

The power of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority between the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the
government in prosecution of cases.
The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation
and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only
those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA
6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him
a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman
then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent
thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested
with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
40. ALBERTO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 182132, June 19, 2013
FACTS:
The three criminal complaints filed by Iris and Benjamin against respondents
were disposed as follows: First, Iris charged Serious Illegal Detention and Rape against
Gil, Atty. Reyna, Jessebel and Grace. Iris, then 16 years old, was induced by Gil to take
the food and drinks which he bought. When Iris felt weak and dizzy and thus, tried to
return to her room. Gil assisted her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
He threatened that he would kill her.
As for the second set of incidents transpired when Iris, then 17 years old, thought
that Gil would fetch to church for volleyball practice; but instead, Gil, while poking a
knife at Iris side, told her that they were headed to a different destination. They reached
Marikina City where Jessebel and Grace led Gil and Iris to a tree house where Gil forced
her to enter a room and raped her holding her at knifepoint. The following day Atty.
Reyna arrived and instructed Iris to tell her relatives, who had been worriedly looking for
her, that she voluntarily went with Gil; that she was treated with kindness; and that
everything that happened was to her own liking because of her love for Gil. Because of
her refusal, she was released to her grandfather, petitioner Benjamin.
As for the third set of incidents, petitioners charged Forcible Abduction with Rape
and Obstruction of Justice against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo when Iris was abducted in
front of Assumption College. This time, Gil conspired with Atty. Reyna and Arturo, to
take her in order to prevent her from appearing at the preliminary investigation. The three
started their psychological manipulation of Iris. They brought Iris to Cagayan de Oro City
and there, held her captive and controlled her movements, such as when she would eat,
sleep, bathe or use the toilet. Gil raped her almost every day even during her menstrual
period and would beat her up whenever she resisted. Also, Gil often told Iris that he
would have her entire family killed by his Moslem relatives.
All three complaints were dismissed as there was no probable cause for the crimes
charged and for lack/insufficiency of evidence, and held that Iris was not a credible

witness because of her flip-flopping testimonies and the serious contradictions therein.
She went back to school and even got exemplary grades confirmed that she was of sound
mind and acted with volition when she went away with Gil on June 23, 2003. In the
presentation of the news program "Magkasintahan Pala" and Iris text messages to Gil as
evidence were suppressed meant that they were adverse to Iris cause.
DOJ Secretary resolved the consolidated petitions finding probable cause to
charge Gil for Rape; Gil, Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for Serious Illegal Detention
and Rape; and Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for Forcible Abduction with Rape. He
observed that Gil merely interposed the sweetheart defense, which in itself was doubtful
in view of Iris positive identification of him as the culprit of the incident. He further held
that it was error to have dismissed the charges against respondents on the basis of the
dismissal of the two habeas corpus cases considering that the causes of action therein
were different and that the CA did not make any finding on the criminal liability of the
respondents. Also, he noted that Iris family reported to the authorities that she had been
abducted. Moreover, he found that respondents conspired with one another in the
abduction and consequent raping of Iris.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in revoking the DOJ Resolutions based
on grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of
public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the
general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the
determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and
balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been
tasked by the present Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."
In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime
charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that
every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no
criminal offense.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds as follows:
First, the DOJ Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion in finding that probable
cause exists for the crime of Rape against Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo. Under Article 266A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the elements of Rape are: (a) that
the offender is a man; (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (c)
that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. Ruling on the matter, the
Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary, as the elements
of rape appear to be present.
Similarly, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJ Secretarys
finding of probable cause for Rape against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, but only insofar as the
June 23 to November 9, 2003 incidents are concerned. It is a standing rule that due to the
nature of the commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may be
sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Applying
the same, the Court deems it prudent to test the credibility of Iriss testimony during trial,
in which her demeanor and deportment would be properly observable, and likewise be
subject to cross-examination.

On the contrary, there appears to be no ample justification to support the finding

of probable cause against Atty. Reyna and Arturo, with respect to the rape incidents, as
well as against Jessebel and Grace for all 3 incidents. As may be gleaned from the
Amended Resolution, the DOJ Secretary indicted Atty. Reyna, Arturo, Jessebel and Grace
for these incidents only by reason of conspiracy. Yet, other than his general imputation
thereof, the DOJ Secretary never provided any rational explanation for his finding of
conspiracy against the aforementioned respondents. The rule is that conspiracy must be
proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. It can be
inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.86 In this
case, the Amended Resolution is bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of
the foregoing respondents figured into the common design of raping Iris and as such, the
Court finds no reason to charge them for the same.
Second, the Court further holds that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his
discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention.
The elements of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the RPC are:
(a) that the offender is a private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention is illegal, not
being ordered by any competent authority nor allowed by law; and (d) that any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) that the detention lasts for more than five days; or
(2) that it is committed by simulating public authority; or (3) that any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or threats to kill him shall have been
made; or (4) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
Aside from Iriss bare allegations, records are bereft of any evidence to support a
finding that Iris was illegally detained or restrained of her movement. On the contrary,
based on Pros. Lims Resolution dated November 8, 2004, several disinterested witnesses
had testified to the fact that Iris was seen freely roaming in public with Gil, negating the
quintessential element of deprivation of liberty. The Court equally observes that the
inherent inconsistencies in Iriss statements are too dire to ignore even only at the
prosecutors level. In Serious Illegal Detention, the victim is usually taken from one place
and transferred to another which is in fact what has been alleged in this case - making
the commission of the offense susceptible to public view. Unfortunately, petitioners never
presented any evidence to show that Iris was restrained of her liberty at any point in time
during the period of her alleged captivity.
Third, the DOJ Secretary also committed grave abuse of discretion in finding
probable cause for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. The elements of Forcible
Abduction under Article 342 of the RPC are: (a) that the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of her age or reputation; (b) that the abduction must be against her will; and (c)
that the abduction must be with lewd designs. As this crime is complexed with the crime
of Rape pursuant to Article 48 of the RPC, the elements of the latter offense must also
concur. Further, owing to its nature as a complex crime proper, the Forcible Abduction
must be shown to be a necessary means for committing the crime of Rape.
There lies no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty during the
period of her captivity from June 23 to November 9, 2003 thus, denying the element of
abduction. Even if it is assumed that there was some form of abduction, it has not been
shown nor even sufficiently alleged that the taking was done with lewd designs. Lust
or lewd design is an element that characterizes all crimes against chastity, apart from the
felonious or criminal intent of the offender.
41. P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE et al. v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 203605, April 23, 2014
FACTS:
Lilian De Vera filed a complaint before the DOJ charging with multiple murder
the PNP officers connected with the PNP Highway Patrol Group and Special Action
Force led by petitioners P/C Insp. Cajipe alleging that joint elements of the SAF and the
HPG conspired in carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso De Vera and their 7-

year-old daughter, Lia Allana. Lilian at around 9:30 p.m. on December 5, 2008, she was
to meet him and their daughter at Pasay City but the two did not show up. When she
arrived at the entrance of their subdivision, the police had blocked the area and did not
allow civilians to pass through. She got a call from her house helper who told-her that Jun
and Lia had been involved in the shootout. She was advised her to go to the hospital.
When she got there, she learned that Lia had died of gunshot wound on the head. Jun was
found dead near a passenger jeepney with a gunshot wound on his head.
Witnesses to the shootout said that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu Crosswind
van when police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at the van. Jun got
out, went to the passenger side, and tried to carry Lia out to safety as she had been
wounded. The police officers went after Jun, however, and shot him on the head.
RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause
against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of seeing anyone from the HPG
group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and his daughter. Instead, the RTC
found that the evidence tends to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested and
acted merely as blocking force in a legitimate police operation and Lilian had not refuted
this. On the other hand the RTC issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers,
having found probable cause against them.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part. The CA granted the petition ruling
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in failing to evaluate the sworn statements of
the witnesses on whom the DOJ relied on. The RTC based its finding of lack of probable
cause primarily on the absence of evidence directly linking the petitioner HPG officers to
the shooting of the victim and their physical presence at the crime scene.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, given that the RTC's order of dismissal is a final and appealable order.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC judge in holding that no probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers
and in dismissing the criminal charge against them.
RULING:
1. Yes.
The RTC judge has within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG
officers.1Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an appeal
may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order
dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final
order since it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with
nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. The People
may however refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation
will support the filing of a new information against them. For now, the CA clearly erred
in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
2. No.
The Court has taken a look into the merit of the RTC's order of dismissal since it
clashes with the findings of the DOJ investigating prosecutors. The OSG relies on the
affidavits of Indiana and Castillo in claiming that probable cause exists against petitioner
HPG officers. The HPG men belonged to another unit and there is no claim that they
wore another unit's vest. More telling is the crime laboratory report which revealed that
none of the HPG operatives discharged their firearms during the shootout. It did not also
help the prosecution's case that, per Indiana's testimony, the SAF police officers involved
in the shootout carried long firearms, specifically M16 rifle, M16 baby armalite, and

M14. But the National Police Commission issued two certifications dated January 14 and
19, 2010 to the effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not been issued long firearms
from 2007 up to 2010. The prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause against
petitioner HPG officers.

42. CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO et al. v. PEOPLE et al.

G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Ling Na Lau is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of
TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, a whitening papaya whitening soap. Her
representative ping wrote to NBI requesting assistance for an investigation on several
drugstores which were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps.
Agent Furing conducted his own investigation and were able to buy whitening
soaps bearing the trademark "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" with
corresponding receipts from a list of drugstores which included herein petitioners
Century Chinese Medicine Co., Min Seng Chinese Drugstore, Xiang Jiang Chinese Drug
Store, Tek San Chinese Drug Store, Sim Sim Chinese Drug Store, Ban Shiong Tay
Drugstore, Shuang Ying Chinese Drugstore, and Baclaran Chinese Drug Store;
confirming Ping's complaint. Consequently, he applied for search warrant. Respondents
moved for quashal of the search warrants on the ground that for the existence of was a
prejudicial question.
The CA did not agree with the RTC that there existed a prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search
warrants.
RULING:
No.
The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for
violations of Sections 155 and 168, both in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293 the
Intellectual Property Code. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark
infringement; while Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition.
The Court agreed with the CA that Rules on the Issuance of the Search and
Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, is not applicable
in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of
criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It was
established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and
search warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore owners
selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening
soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search
warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant
evidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.

43. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. ATILANO

G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012
FACTS:
MERALCO filed a complaint for estafa against Corporate Investments
Philippines Inc. alleging that in 1993, MERALCO started investing in commercial papers
through CIPI. MERALCO delivered funds to the respondents for investment in CPs and
government securities. In May 2000, respondent Atilano, the President of CIPI, conveyed
to Manuel Lopez, MERALCOs President, that CIPI was facing liquidity problems.
Lopez agreed to extend help to CIPI by placing investments through CIPI, on the
condition that CIPI would secure these investments with GS and CPs issued by the Lopez
Group of Companies.
MERALCO further alleged CIPI failed to deliver the securities to it within 24
hours after the transaction, despite repeated demands. CIPI instead diverted MERALCOs
funds by placing the investments in CIPIs own promissory and in CPs of companies that
are not members of the Lopez Group.
In a resolution Prosecutor Denis Pastrana dismissed MERALCOs complaint for
insufficiency of evidence there having no documentary evidence to show any specific
instruction for CIPI to invest the funds only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group.
MERALCO merely relied on the Minutes of the Meeting to prove that MERALCO
indeed made such an instruction. Prosecutor Pastrana concluded that the transaction
between MERALCO and CIPI was a money market transaction partaking of a loan
transaction whose nonpayment does not give rise to any criminal liability for estafa
through misappropriation or conversion.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where they ruled that the
relationship between MERALCO and CIPI is that of a Creditor and Debtor, thus the case
is not one for estafa, but a civil case for recovery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can disturb the determination of probable cause made by
the public prosecutor in the case.
RULING:
No.
The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an
executive function. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, courts are not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch the public
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause
in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave
abuse of discretion can be shown.
The records show that MERALCO failed to prove that the respondents indeed
misappropriated or converted its investments. As the handling prosecutor found, aside
from the Minutes of the June 8, 2000 Meeting, MERALCO did not present any evidence
that would prove that MERALCO indeed gave specific instructions for CIPI to invest
only in GS or CPs of the Lopez Group. Absent any proof of specific instructions, CIPI
cannot be said to have misappropriated or diverted MERALCOs investments. We take
note that in money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where
investments are to be placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor
to place the investments in specific securities. MERALCO argued that the respondents
are guilty of falsely pretending that they possess power, influence and qualifications to
buy GS and CPs of the Lopez Group, to induce MERALCO to part with its investment.
The Court held that the argument has no basis precisely because no evidence
exists showing that CIPI made false representations regarding its capacity to deal with

MERALCOs investments. In fact, the records will show that respondent Atilano
disclosed CIPIs liquidity problems to MERALCO even before MERALCO placed its
investment. We agree with the prosecutors finding that aside from its allegations,
MERALCO failed to present any evidence showing that any of the respondents made any
fraudulent misrepresentations or false statements prior to or simultaneously with the
delivery of MERALCOs funds to CIPI.
44. ROMEO P. BUSUEGO et al v.CA
G.R. No. 95326, March 11, 1999
FACTS:
The 16th regular examination of the books and records of the PAL Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. was conducted from March 14 to April 16, 1988 by a
team of CB examiners headed by Belinda Rodriguez. Several anomalies and irregularities
committed by the herein petitioners; PESALA's directors and officers, were uncovered,
questionable investment in a multi-million peso real estate project; conflict of interest in
the conduct of business; unwarranted declaration and payment of dividends; and
commission of unsound and unsafe business practices. On September 9, 1988, the
Monetary Board adopted and issued MB Resolution No. 805.
The RTC of Quezon City rendered declaring Monetary Board Resolution No. 805
as void and inexistent, and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunctions issued on
February 10, 1989 is deemed permanent.
The Monetary Board appealed the aforesaid Decision to the Court of Appeals
which came out with a Decision of reversal. Dissatisfied with the said Decision of the
Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Monetary Board is vested with the authority to disqualify
persons from occupying positions in institutions under the supervision of the Central
Bank without proper notice and hearing or vested with authority to file civil and criminal
cases against its officers/directors for suspected fraudulent acts.
RULING:
Yes.
It must be remembered that the Central Bank of the. Philippines, through the
Monetary Board, is the government agency charged with the responsibility of
administering the monetary, banking and credit system of the country and is granted the
power of supervision and examination over banks and non-bank financial institutions
performing quasi-banking functions, of which savings and loan associations, such as
PESALA, form part of.
The special law governing savings and loan association is Republic Act No. 3779,
as amended, otherwise known as the "Savings and Loan Association Act." Said law
authorizes the Monetary Board to conduct regular yearly examinations of the books and
records of savings and loan associations, to suspend, a savings and loan association for
violation of law, to decide any controversy over the obligations and duties of directors
and officers, and to take remedial measures, among others.
From Section 28 of Rep. Act No. 3779 the Central Bank, through the Monetary
Board, is empowered to conduct investigations and examine the records of savings and
loan associations. If any irregularity is discovered in the process, the Monetary Board
may impose appropriate sanctions, such as suspending the offender from holding office
or from being employed with the Central Bank, or placing the names of the offenders in a
watchlist.

The requirement of prior notice is also relaxed under Section 28 (c) of RA 3779 as
investigations or examinations may be conducted with or without prior notice "but
always with fairness and reasonable opportunity for the association or any of its officials
to give their side." As may be gathered from the records, the said requirement was
properly complied with by the respondent Monetary Board.
45. LIGAYA P. CRUZ et al v. GONZALEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 173844 April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Hermosa Savings and Loans Bank, Inc. availed of 40 loans from the Development
Bank of the Philippines pursuant to a Subsidiary Loan Agreement. In support of the loan
agreement and applications, HSLBI, through its bank officers and herein petitioners as its
legal counsel, submitted the required documents, i.e. project evaluation reports, financial
package approval, deeds of undertaking, certificates of registration, promissory notes,
supplemental deeds of assignment and Investment Enterprise/sub-borrowers consent.
These documents were submitted to assure DBP that the respective Investment
Enterprises were actually existing and duly registered with the government; that the
subsidiary loan will be exclusively used for relending to these Investment Enterprises and
for the purposes stated in the applications; and that the concerned Investment Enterprises
are amenable to the assignment of debt in favor of HSLBI.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas conducted an examination of HSLBIs loan
portfolio but found that HSLBIs loan documents were either forged or inexistent and the
credit accounts were in the names of non-existing Investment Enterprises. Thus, DBP
filed a complaint4 for 40 counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents
or for large scale fraud or violation of Articles 315, 316(4) as amended by PD 1689 and
318 of RPC against HSLBI officers and petitioner Atty. Cruz.
In a Resolution, Secretary Raul Gonzales partially granted their motion and
ordered the filing against all respondents of informations only for 40 counts of estafa
under Article 315 of the RPC and not for large scale fraud under P.D. 1689.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the Secretary of Justice in its ruling that
there is probable cause to indict petitioner Atty. Cruz.
RULING:
No.
Jurisprudence has established rules on the determination of probable cause. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
The Court affirms the CA decision in line with the principle of non-interference
with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public
prosecutor in the determination of the existence of probable cause. This Court, as a rule,
does not interfere with the prosecutors determination of probable cause for otherwise,
courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutors findings in such
investigations.21 In the absence of any showing that the Secretary of Justice committed
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice, courts will not disturb its findings.
Moreover, this Court will decline to interfere when records show that the findings of
probable cause is supported by evidence, law and jurisprudence.

In the instant case, the Secretary of Justice found sufficient evidence to indict
petitioner. It was adequately established by DBP and found by the Secretary of Justice
that the funds would not have been released pursuant to the subsidiary loan agreement if
HSLBI had no sub-borrowers/Investment Enterprises to speak of. As it turned out, not
only were the collaterals submitted inexistent, all the purported sub-borrowers/Investment
Enterprises were also fictitious and inexistent. In fact, the signatures of the sub-borrowers
and the supporting documents submitted to DBP by petitioner and her co-respondents
were all forged.
46. PUNZALAN et al. v. PLATA et al.
G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013
FACTS:
The Punzalan and Plata families were neighbors in Mandaluyong City.
Respondent Dela Pena was a house boarder of the Plata family. He was standing near the
Plata home on the night of 13 August 1997, when the group of Petitioners Punzalan
approached him and shouted Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili ang sombrero mo? Dela Pena
replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawan pa ninyo ako. Irked by Dela Penas response,
the Punzalan assaulted him by slapping his face, punching and kicking him. Dela Pena
escaped just as Toto Ofrin of Punzalans tried to stab Dela Pena with a balisong. The
Punzalans chased after Dela Pena. As Dela Pena was fleeing, he encountered Cagara, the
Platas family driver. Cagara was carrying a gun, which Dela Pena grabbed and pointed to
Punzalans to scare them off. Michael Plata who was nearby, intervened by wrestling the
gun away from Dela Pena, which caused it to accidentally fire, hitting Rainier Punzalan
on the thigh. Dela Pena, Plata and Cagara ran to the Platas house and locked themselves
in. From the outside of the house, Punzalans shouted, Lumabas kayo diyan, putang ina
ninyo! Papatayin naming kayo!
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted
Homicide and Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. The DOJ directed that
Dela Pena be likewise investigated for the charge of Attempted Homicide. Dela Pena then
filed countercharges, including Attempted Murder against Punzalans and one for Grave
Threats against Toto Ofrin. Subsequently, Cagara filed a criminal complaint for Grave
Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier Punzalan. Cagara alleged
that during a meeting at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, Rosalinda told
him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin
ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.
The case was elevated to CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate
informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Other Light Threats, Attempted Homicide,
Malicious Mischief and Theft based ruling on the existence of probable cause.
ISSUES:
Whether or not DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued Resolutions
ordering the withdrawal of the informations, hence, there is sufficient evidence to sustain
a finding of probable cause against Petitioners.
RULING:
No.
The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the
public prosecutor. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides: The
prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully
executed. "A necessary component of this power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators." Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a broad discretion to

determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime and should be held for trial.
Consequently, the Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders. The rule is based
not only upon the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the executive department but upon practicality as well.
In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the
July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it
characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by 2 other criminal
cases. As to the other complaints, the Court agrees with the DOJ that they were weak and
not adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the
prosecutors discretion by its own.

47. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO DADAO et al.

G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014
FACTS:
Respondents Dadao et al. were seen by Ronie and Edgar Dacion helping each
other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death Pionio Yacapin their house at
Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon. Bernandino Signawan, testified that at about 10pm
of July 11, 1993, witnesses reached his house and related to him that their stepfather was
killed by accused Dadao et.al. On the following morning, he and the other people in
Ticalaan including the barangay captain, at witness Ronie and Edgar Dacion returned to
the house of the victim and found the latter already dead and in the surrounding area of
the house were recovered empty shells of firearms.
SPO2 Nestor Aznar, testified that he was the one who prepared the sketch of the
hut where the incident happened and further testified that the four accused were in the
custody of the government and in the following morning of the incident, he was at the
scene of the crime and found in the yard of the hut 8 grand empty shells caliber 30mm.
However, Police Inspector Vicente Armada conducted an examination for paraffin
test on all four accused with the findings that they yielded negative results. The accused
contented that they did not own any gun nor had any grudge to the victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution,
specifically that of the two stepsons (Ronie and Edgar Dacion) and the widow (Nenita
Yacapin) of the deceased victim, Pionio Yacapin, are credible enough to be worthy of
belief. Court of Appeals erred in convicting appellants of the crime charged despite
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes.
The Court have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a
factual question is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that, absent any
misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the trial court shall
not be disturbed.
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of the witness,
which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such

question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude
under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which
witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed
on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and
their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.12 In the case at bar, no imputation of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants.
48. PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGDANGAL ELMA et al. v. REINER JACOBI et al.
G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012
FACTS:
Then PCGG Commissioner, and later Chairman, David M. Castro, acting for the
PCGG, agreed to pay Jacobi a fee of 10% of any amount actually recovered and legally
turned over to the Philippines from the ill-gotten wealth of Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or
his family, associates, subordinates and cronies, based on the information and evidence
that Jacobi would furnish the PCGG. Chairman Castro sent another letter to Jacobi
confirming "that actual recovery of the Kloten gold account managed by Union Bank of
Switzerland subject of Jacobis information and other efforts done will be properly
compensated as previously committed."
A few years later, a letter was sent by the new PCGG Chairman, Felix M. de
Guzman, to Jacobi, confirming the PCGGs promise to pay Jacobi and his intelligence
group a 10% fee for the US$13.2 billion ill-gotten wealth of Former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his family, trustee or fronts in UBS still/now being claimed and recovered by
the Philippine Government.
Respondent Jacobi filed before the Sandiganbayan thru his counsel Atty. Reyes a
petition for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari against PCGG for allegedly re-hiring
two trojan horse consultants preventing the enforcement of claims against the
Marcoses. Another similar thrust was filed before the Ombudsman against PCGG in
violation of R.A. No. 3019, with a later manifestation of withdrawing a letter because
Jacobi is allegedly part of said letter. PCGG claimed that said that the letter is a falsified
document there being nothing on their records that such ever existed. PCGG through
Chairman Elma filed before the DOJ criminal complaint under Art.171 par.2 and Art. 172
pars.1 and 3 of RPC against respondents. No summonses were issued to respondents.
DOJ found no probable cause on the complaint and the case was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no
probable cause for falsification and use of falsified document exists against the
respondents.
RULING:
No.
The necessary component of the Executives power to faithfully execute the laws
of the land is the States self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws.
This responsibility is primarily lodged with the DOJ, as the principal law agency of the
government. The prosecutor has the discretionary authority to determine whether facts
and circumstances exist meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime.
The question of whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint is necessarily dependent

on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of
Justice. Who to charge with what crime or none at all is basically the prosecutors call.
Accordingly, the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in
the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the prosecution of one against
whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too, cannot
substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive.
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in him by
law. This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act amenable to correction
and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into
what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that
the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the
petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may
be obtained. All these, the petitioner failed to establish.