Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission Et Al
No. 10-553, Supreme Court of the United States

1. Reference Details
Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of the United States
Date of decision: 11 January 2012
Link to full court judgment:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf

2. Facts of the Case

The petitioner in the case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (HosannaTabor), runs a small school offering Christ-centred education. Its school teachers are classified
into two categories: called and lay. Called teachers are regarded as having been called to
their vocation by God and must have completed certain academic requirements, including a
course of theological study. Once called, a teacher receives the formal title Minister of Religion,
Commissioned. Lay teachers, by contrast, are not even required to be Lutheran. Although lay
and called teachers at Hosanna-Tabor generally performed the same duties, lay teachers were
hired only when called teachers were unavailable.
The respondent, Cheryl Perich (Perich), was a called teacher. In addition to teaching secular
subjects, she taught a religion class and led the children in prayer and devotional exercises each
day, attended a weekly chapel service and led the service twice a year.
Perich became ill with narcolepsy in June 2004 and, as a result, she began the 20042005 school
year on disability leave. In January 2005, she notified the school principal that she would be able
to report to work in February. The principal responded that the school had already contracted
with a lay teacher to fill Perichs position for the remainder of the school year. Perich was later
notified that the congregation had voted to offer her a peaceful release from her call, whereby
a portion of her health insurance premiums would be paid in exchange for her resignation. She
refused the offer. When she arrived at the school in February, the principal asked her to leave.
She refused to do so until she received written documentation that she had reported to work.
Following this incident, the principal advised Perich that she would likely be dismissed, to
which she responded that she intended to initiate a lawsuit.
On April 10, the congregation voted to rescind Perichs call and Hosanna-Tabor sent her a letter
of termination. The grounds for termination were stated to be insubordination and disruptive
behaviour and the damage she had done to her working relationship with the school by
threatening to take legal action.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a case against Hosanna Tabor,
alleging that Perich had been dismissed because she had threatened to assert her rights under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in breach of section 12203(a) of that Act, which
prohibits employers from retaliating against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under [the ADA]. Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
Constitution creates a ministerial exception, which precludes the application of discrimination
legislation to the employment relationship between a religious group and its ministers.
The Trial Court agreed that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception and therefore
granted summary judgment in Hosanna-Tabors favour. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Perich did not qualify as a minister under the exception and therefore vacated
the judgment and remanded the case.
3. Law
Americans with Disabilities Act, 104 Stat. 327, 42 USC sections 12101 et seq. (1990).
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution (the Religion Clauses).
4. Legal Arguments
Hosanna-Tabors Arguments
Courts of Appeal have recognised that the First Amendment, which provides, in part, that
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, precludes the application of employment discrimination laws to the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. Hosanna-Tabor
invoked this ministerial exception in arguing that the suit brought against it was barred. It
argued that Perich was a minister and that she had been dismissed for a religious reason namely, that her threat to sue the Church violated their belief that Christians should resolve
their disputes internally.
EEOC and Perichs Arguments
The EEOC and Perich argued that there was no need, and no basis, for a special ministerial
exception grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves, since religious organisations were
adequately protected by the constitutional right to freedom of association. They further argued
that Perich was not a minister and that while Hosanna-Tabor asserted it had had a religious
reason for dismissing Perich, this was pretextual.

5. Decision
The Supreme Court held that there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment. The ministerial exception bars an employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of a minister. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that to
require a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or to punish a church for failing to do
so, would interfere with its internal governance and deprive the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs. The Free Exercise Clause protects a religious
groups right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.
The Supreme Court refrained from adopting a rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister, but it was clear that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of
a religious congregation. The Court stated that Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a minister: she
was given a distinct role; accorded the title Minister of Religion, Commissioned, which implied
a significant amount of religious training; and her ministerial responsibilities were subject to
periodic review. Further the Court found that Perich held herself out as a minister of the Church
by accepting the formal call to religious service, claiming special housing allowance available
only to ministers and expressly referring to herself as a minister. Finally, the nature of Perichs
job duties reflected a role in conveying the Churchs message and carrying out its mission. She
was expressly charged with lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity, and her role in leading
pupils in prayer and devotional exercises, taking them to chapel services and occasionally
leading such services, meant that she performed an important role in transmitting the
Lutheran faith to the next generation. In light of these considerations the Court held that Perich
was a minister and as such covered by the ministerial exception.
The Supreme Court found that, in reaching the contrary decision, the Court of Appeals had been
wrong to consider Perichs title irrelevant. While the Court considered that a title alone cannot
ensure coverage by the ministerial exception, the fact that a person has been ordained or
commissioned is relevant. The Court also considered that the Court of Appeals had attached too
much weight to Perichs secular duties and to the fact that lay teachers at the school performed
the same religious duties as Perich. The Court rejected the EEOCs argument that any ministerial
exception should be limited to those employees who perform exclusively religious functions.
The Supreme Court was clear that the ministerial exception is not limited to safeguarding a
churchs decision to dismiss a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. Rather, the
exception ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful, a
matter which is strictly ecclesiastical, rests with the church alone.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that:
The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is
undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing
who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a
minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must
be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was reversed.