ANCHETA VS.

GUERSEY-DALAYGON
GR NO. 139868 JUNE 8, 2006
FACTS: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey
died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audreys
conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of
stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey -Dalaygon. Four years
thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his
shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion
to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The motion and
project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richards will also
filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the
ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated and (2) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
HELD:
(1) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since
the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national
law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature
of the property and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's
properties may be found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are
governed by the national law of the testator.
(2) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect
is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will
and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

HEIRS OF CASTILLO V. GABRIEL

GR NO. 162934 / NOVEMBER 11, 2005
FACTS: Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving
behind a sizable inheritance. A little over a month after Crisantas death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda.
de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding before the RTC. She alleged, among others, that to her
knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an estate being managed by her wastrel and incompetent
son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration
be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the de ceased, and that she be awarded her
share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing. However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being
bigamous. The RTC then removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.
Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention.
Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a
petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He alleged that
he discovered his mothers will in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as
alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had
predeceased the latter sometime.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died. The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. The probate
court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mothers estate.
The heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed
a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda, who died.
Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation and Motion" where she informed
the probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in place of her late
husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
The heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta
Gabriels next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto.
The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The probate court
merely noted
the motion for substitution filed by
the heirs
of Belinda,
stating that they were "mere strangers to the case" and that their cause could better be ventilated in a
separate proceeding. The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Belindas heirs in its
Order.
ISSUE: The propriety of the appointment of respondent as special administratrix of the estate left by Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel.
HELD: The petition is without merit. In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA
ratiocinated as follows:

The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion o f the court. The order of preference
in the appointment of a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply
to the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the
administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, We hold that the preference of private respondent
Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless, private
respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir of her
husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta.
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special administrator
lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent
appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator
is appointed.
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or
reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is
being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding
on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special
administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.

In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
GR NO. 183053; June 15, 2010
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), the decedent, married to Dr.Federico Suntay (Federico), died
intestate in 1990. In 1979, however, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I),predeceased both
Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was suevvived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner, Emilio A.M.Suntay III (EmilioIII) and respondent, Isabel CojuangcoSuntay. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco and had three children, respondent Isabel,Margarita and
Emilio II. Emilio Is marriage was subsequently annulled and EmilioI had two children out of wedlock, Emilio
III, the herein petitioner and Nenita Suntay. Consuquently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio
II live with their mother, separately from their father and paternal grandparents. After the death of Emilio I,
Federico filed petition for visitation rights over his grandchildrr but was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent, Isabel articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents. After her spouses death, Federico legally adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Nenita and
Emilio III. Respondent later filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over decedents
property but was opposed by Federico, alleging that being the spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her state and he should be the one to appoint an administrator, in the person of Emilio II and
that as part owner of the mass of the conjugal properties, he must be accorded legal prefere nce in the
administration. In the course of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court rendered a decision appointing
petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate. The Court believes that to
appoint Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised Emilio III from
infancy as her own child and would likewise go against the wishes of Federico, who nominated Emilio III for
appointment as administrator. On appeal, the Court of Appeals revers edand set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The Court of Appeals
focused on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and therefore barred from representing his
deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother and that he cannot be appointed as
administrator because the appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition; that between the
legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate one (petitioner), respondent is preferred, being the next of
kin referred by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and jurisprudence has consistently held that Art. 992
of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestado from the legitimate children and relative
of his father or mother.
ISSUES:
A. In the appointment of an administrator of the estate under Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, whether
Art. 992 of the Civil Code applies.
B. Who, as between Emilio III and respondent Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedents estate?
HELD: The basis for Art. 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is opposite to the
scenario in the facts obtaining the actual relationship betwee n Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationshio of legitimate relatives.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest of the estate of the one to
be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co -administrators, especially in
cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties of factions be represented in the management
of the estates.
In the case at bar, Emilio III and Nenite were legally adopted by Federico, putting them in equal footing with
that of legitimate children and were treated by the decedent and her husband as their own, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their business, while the relationship of the re spondent was strained. The
factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, love first descends, for
the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did
her husband, Federico, who legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a
legitimate child. The law of intestacy is founded on the presumed will of the deceased. Love, it is said, first
descends, then ascends, and finally, spreads sideways.
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo -Suntay shall be issued to both the
petitioner, Emilio III and the respondent, Isabel Cojuangco -Suntay.

MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS, GR 129505 JANUARY 31, 2000

MALOLES VS. GOROSPE, GR 133359 JANUARY 31, 2000
FACTS: On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he had no
compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00;
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips.
On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and
allowing the will, the court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.
Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died. Petitio ner (testators nephew) claiming to be the only son
of the deceaseds sister Alicia de Santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a
creditor of the deceased.
Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati Branch 61, but then withdrew the
same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65.
Petitioner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full blooded nephew
and that a case already related to the subject matter was pending in Branch 61. Judge Abad Santos, referred
the case to Branch 61.
Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioners motion to intervene, and denied taking
cognizance of the case forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate ofDecent
Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive and
had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.
Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and again took cognizance of the case to
expedite proceedings.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its
issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos. 2) Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction
over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent. 3) Whether or not the petitioner,
being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent.

HELD: Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioners contention that that the proceedings must continue until the estate
is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
is without merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. This was already done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr.
De Santos will during his lifetime.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch
61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, which states: Where
estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is
one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over
P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts.
The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent
of and incompatible with each other.
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will
of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death.
Lastly, regarding petitioners claim as heir and creditor the Court said that The private respondent herein is
not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the
latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of
intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's
estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having
been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the
records show, not supported by evidence.
The Petition was denied.

SEDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo
married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no c hildren with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time
of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this
was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial courtissued
an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998
ISSUES: Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case. Whether or not respondent Felicidad has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration?
HELD: The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was
validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through thei r work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co -ownership. In a co-ownership, it is
not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The case
therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the e vidence to prove the validity of the
divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.

OCAMPO VS. OCAMPO

GR NO. 187879 JULY 5, 2010
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate with no debts, leaving several properties,
mostly situated in Bian, Laguna. Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda
M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of said spouses. Leonardo used to received
one third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate but was discontinued after his
death. The respondents then took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of
the Leonardos heirs, herein petitioners.
The RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased
spouses, and required them to post a bond of P200,000.00 each. Said appointment was later revoked by the
RTC, substituting Dalisay with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the
nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Respondents filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond,
praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an
administrators bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount.
After eight months, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and
to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. Petitioners contended that the
special administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the
estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of
special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of
special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them and cited an
alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property and misrepresentation that petitioners owed the
estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, July 5, 2010 were not yet
paid.
The RTC granted petitioners Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and
Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the
posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as s pecial administrators. The RTC
also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of
P200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income statement of the
subject estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion of the RTC for appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such?
HELD: No. The Court takes into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13,
2008, already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of
Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the Prope rties of the
Estate dated April 15, 2008. These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of
the decedents estate, but her appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending
the proceedings for regular administration.

VILMA C. TAN VS HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.

G.R. No. 1665 , March 14, 2008
FACTS: On 4 October 2000, Gerardo Tan died intestate. Private respondents who claim to be the children
of Gerardo Tan filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. On the other hand,
petitioners who claimed to be the heirs of Tan opposed the respondents petition. Private respondents then
moved for the appointment of a special administrator and prayed that their attorney -in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim
be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents Motion for
Appointment arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator
since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same
familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co -petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de
facto administratrix of his estate since his death. However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to
account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.
Petiioners filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by respondent Judge Gedori o. Later on,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and the same was denied, hence the petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a special
administrator.
HELD: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter
lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves
of the order of preference, they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end
the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The appointment of a special
administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent
leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition
at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit
of creditors and heirs. In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment
of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still
appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her
defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials

DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA
G.R. NO. 120575 DECEMBER 16, 1998
FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 and was survived by (1) his widow, Doa
Adela Soldevilla Pascual; (2) the children of his full blood brother. Wenceslao Pascual Sr. Esperanza C.
Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose C. Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Guerrero, Erlinda C. Pascual
and Wenceslao C. Pascual Jr.; (3) the children of his half blood brother Pedro Pascual Avelino Pascual,
Isosceles Pascual, Leida Pascual-Martinez, Virginia Pascual-Ner, Nona Pascual-Fernando, Octavio Pascual
and Geranaia Pascual-Dubert; (4) the intestate estate of his full blood brother Eleuterio T. Pascual
represented by Mamerta P. Fugoso, Abraham S. Sarmiento III, Dominga M. Pascual, Regina SarmientoMacaibay, Dominga P. San Diego, Nelia P. Marquez, Silvestre M. Pascual and Eleuterio M. Pascual; and (4)
the acknowledged natural children of his full blood brother Eligio Pascual Hermes S. Pascual and Olivia
S. Pascual (herein petitioner).
Doa Adela (the surviving spouse) filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasig, Rizal, a petition
for letters of administration over the estate of her husband. 3 After due notice and hearing, the CFI appointed
her special administratrix. 4 To assist her with said proceedings, Doa Adela hired, on February 24, 1974,
Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of
the gross estate of the decedent.
When Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 took effect, the petition was reassigned to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig, Branch 162, presided by Judge Manual Padolina. On November 4, 1985, the heirs of the decedent
moved for the approval of their Compromise Agreement, stipulating that three fourths (3/4) of the estate
would go to Doa Adela and one fourth (1/4) to the other heirs. The intestate court approved said Agreement
on December 10, 1985. On August 18, 1987, while the settlement was still pending, Doa Adela died, leaving
a will which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. The latter filed at the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 72, a petition for the probate of said will. RTC of Pasig denied the motion to reiterate
hereditary rights, which was filed by petitioner and her brother. The Court reasoned that, as illegitimate
children of the brother of the decedent, they were barred from acquiring any hereditary right to her intestate
estate under Article 992 of the Civil Code. 5 On December 17, 1987, it ordered that the private res pondent's
lien in the hereditary share of Doa Adela be entered into the records.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to make the questioned award of attorney's fees.
HELD: Petitioner insistently argues that the January 19, 1994 RTC De cision, insofar as it awarded attorney's
fees, was void from the beginning because the intestate court had lost jurisdiction over the person of Doa
Adela due to her death. The argument is untenable. The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of
the rules on the extinction of a civil action 19 in special proceeding. The death of Doa Adela did not ipso
facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with the court
hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had her filed the claim against Doa Adela personally, the rule
would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres. Thus, where an appointed
administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
appointment of a new administrator, viz.:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation or removal . . . When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letter to someone to act with
him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.

QUASHA VS LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.

GR 174873 August 26, 2008
FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988, proceedings for the
settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 of the National Capital Region (NCR), docketed as Special
Proceedings Case No. M-1678. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of
the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were
appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988.
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation
expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office,
took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the
estate.
On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, 3 for their own behalf
and for their respective clients, been paid to either Administrator Syquia or his client, the widow Consuelo
Triviere; nor to the Quasha Law Offices or their clients, the children of the deceased Raymond Triviere;
LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its
Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC had
already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed
by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
expenses of the estate as required by the court.
On 12 June 2003, the RTC issued its Order taking note that "the widow and the heirs of the deceased Triviere,
after all the years, have not received their respective share in the Estate."
The RTC declared that there was no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate
considering that: There appears to be no need for an accounting as the estate has no more assets except
the money deposited with the Union Bank of the Philippines.
As to the payment of fees of Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, the RTC found as follows: Both the
Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceased are entitled to the payment for the services they have
rendered and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased as they have over a decade now
spent so much time, labor and skill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time the
administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.
Hence, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid, to wit:
On 11 May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN.
The appellate court, however, did not agree in the position of LCN that the administrators' claims against the
estate should have been presented and resolved in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 86 of the Revised

Rules of Court. Claims against the estate that require presentation under Rule 86 refer to "debts or demands
of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the decedent during his lifetime and which
could have been reduced to simple judgment and among which are those founded on contracts." The Court
of Appeals also found the failure of the administrators to render an accounting excusable on the basis of
Section 8, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 11 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Motion,
however, was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 22 September 2006.
ISSUE: Whether or not THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AWARD
IN FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RAYMOND TRIVIERE IS ALREADY A DISTRIBUTION OF THE
RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE and Whether or not the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NULLIFYING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF THE CO-ADMINISTRATORS
HELD: The Court of Appeals modified the 12 June 2003 Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of
P450,000.00 and P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively.
The appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which
was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the
residue of the estate.
Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond
Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court inapplicable.
A perusal of the 12 June 2003 RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the residue
of the estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the
petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received their
respective shares therefrom for more than a decade..
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was
not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate,
still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and
widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or
provided for.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the
estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of
them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said oblig ations within
such time as the court directs."
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations of the estate of
the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against
the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.
Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares
by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.

On the second assignment of error, petitioner Quasha Law Office contends that it is entitled to the award of
attorney's fees and that the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, is inapplicable
to it. The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction. Here, in
attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting
arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate . At one point, it alleges that the award of
attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would
later renounce that it was an administrator.
Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised
Rules of Court since it is not an appointed administrator of the estate. 23 When Atty. Quasha passed away in
1996, Atty. Syquia was left as the sole administrator of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere. The person
of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha
as administrator of the estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be
deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same would be in
violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule
82 of the Revised Rules of Court. 24 Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office merely
helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere.
In its Memorandum before this Court, however, petitioner Quasha Law Office argues that "what is being
charged are not professional fees for legal services rendered but payment for administration of the Estate
which has been under the care and management of the co -administrators for the past fourteen (14) years.
The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent
with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially asserted itself as co -administrator
of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on
denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion
for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party
cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. When a party adopts a certain theory
in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would
not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage. 28
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of
the appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal, only when the factual bas es thereofwould
not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet
the issue raised in the new theory.
On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it necessary to exercise leniency on the rul e against
changing of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules of fair play and in the interest of justice. Petitioner
Quasha Law Office presented conflicting arguments with respect to whether or not it was co -administrator of
the estate. Nothing in the records, however, reveals that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was

indeed a substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha upon his death.

The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of administration to a
person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to serve as such, following the procedure laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted
Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of
letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of
Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it
rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's
death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of
administration.
However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from the time of
death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00 as prayed
for in the Motion for Payment dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June 2003
Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate,
in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as co administrator), representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children in the settlement of the
estate of their deceased father.
Finally, LCN prays that as the contractor of the house (which the decedent caused to be built and is now part
of the estate) with a preferred claim thereon, it should already be awarded P2,500,000.00, representing one
half (1/2) of the proceeds from the sale of said house. The Court shall not take cognizance of and rule on the
matter considering that, precisely, the merits of the claim of LCN against the estate are still pending the proper
determination by the RTC in the intestate proceedings.

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 118671
January 29, 1996
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision
dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming petitioner and private respondent as his heirs as
well as three grandchildren, all with the petitioner. When Hilario died, the cash component of the estate was
distributed among the heirs. Petitioner did not take any action for the probate of the will. Four years after the
death of Hilario, private respondents file a petition for probate which the petitioner opposed contending that
the will was made under undue influence.
Petitioner thereafter leased a property bequeathed to one of the private respondent to third persons. The
probate court then ordered petitioner to deposit the proceeds to the Clerk Of Court. Petitioner the moved for
the release of certain amounts for the payment of re al estate taxes which the court granted. Petitioner again
moved for the release of funds but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collati on and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles
to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator's grandchildren.
HELD: Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to
sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement
of his estate.

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. vs. NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE

G.R. No. 178933/ SEPTEMBER 16 2009
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio.
After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlementof
her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz D.
Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending before the Regional Trial Court(RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC). On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio,
Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November
22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. On J anuary 3, 2005, the RTC
issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while
appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio -Dee filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders. Ricardo
Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate
Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable
Court. Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[4] affirming its Order dated January 3,
2005 and denying private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC als o
authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator
of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio -Dee to vacate the property at No. 3,
Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD: In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interestin
the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order
of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. The implication of
such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has
now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

BERMUDO VS. TAYAG-ROXAS

G.R. NO. 172879/ FEBRUARY 2 2011
FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo (Atty. Bermudo), as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of Artemio Hilario (Hilario) and for the allowance and probate of the latters will
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City. The RTC rendered a decision, allowing the will and
recognizing Roxas as Hilarios sole heir.
When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also served as
counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute
a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered.
RTC granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the estates
property. Roxas appealed the order to the CA in CA-G.R. CV 53143, which adjusted the lawyers fees to 20%
of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently filed a motion with the RTC for
execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation would be based.
The RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as attorneys fees
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition for
certiorari.
On December 19, 2005, using a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay
Atty. Bermudo a reduced amount of P4,234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing Roxas special civil action of certiorari when her
remedy should have been an appeal from the settlement of his account as administrator. 2) Whether or not
the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorneys fees.
HELD: Petition lacks merit.
1) Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas remedy for contesting the RTC order of execution against her should
be an ordinary appeal to the CA. He invokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which
enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal. But the earlier
award in Atty. Bermudos favor did not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorneys fees
for the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1
(d) of Rule 109 does not apply.
The fixing of such value at P12,644,300.00 was not appealable since it did not constitute a new judgment but
an implementation of a final one. Being an order of execution, it is not appealable. Consequently, Roxas
remedy in contesting the RTCs exercise of discretion in ascertaining what constitutes 20% of the value of
the estates lands is a special civil action of certiorari. 2) Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to
attorneys fees but only to compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules
of Court. But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas
counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to

this Court to defend her rights to her uncles estate. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of
his duties as administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorneys fees. The
decision of CA is affirmed.

TAYAG-ROXAS vs. BERMUDO

G.R. No. 173364
FACTS: Atty. Ricardo Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate
of Artemio Hilario and for the allowance and probate of the latters will before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Angeles City. The testator instituted Fermina Tayag-Roxas (Roxas) as his only heir but several persons,
who claimed to be Hilarios relatives, opposed the petition RTC rendered a decision, allowing the will and
recognizing Roxas as Hilarios sole heir. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.
This Court sustained the CA decision. When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final,
Atty. Bermudo who also served as counsel for her in the actions concerning her inheritanc e filed a motion to
fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he rendered. RTC
granted him fees equivalent to 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien on the estates property.
Roxas appealed the order to the CA. CA rendered a decision that modified the RTC Order, limiting Atty.
Bermudos compensation as administrator to what Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides and
making his lawyers fees 20% of the value of the land belonging to the estate. Atty. Bermudo subsequently
filed a motion with the RTC for execution and appraisal of the estate on which his 20% compensation would
be based. RTC granted the motion and ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo P12,644,300.00 as attorneys
fees with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Roxas challenged the order before the CA through a petition
for certiorari. Uusing a different valuation of the land of the estate, the CA ordered Roxas to pay Atty. Bermudo
a reduced amount of P4, 234,770.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum. Atty. Bermudos
motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed a petition for review before this Court in G.R. 172879.
Roxas also filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the CA decision and when this was denied, she filed
a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. 173364.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing Roxas special civil action of certiorari when her remedy
should have been an appeal from the settlement of his account as administrator;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorneys
fees; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in reducing Atty. Bermudos attorneys fees from P12,644,300.00 to
P4,234,770.00.
HELD:
1. Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas remedy for contesting the RTC order of execution against her should
be an ordinary appeal to the CA. He invokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which
enumerates the orders or judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal. One of these is
an order or judgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator. The rationale behind this
multi-appeal mode is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a sep arate and distinct issue
is resolved by the court and held to be final. But the earlier award in Atty. Bermudos favor did not settle his
account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorneys fees for the legal services he rendered in the suit
contesting Roxas right as sole heir. Consequently, Section 1 (d) of Rule 109 does not apply.

2. Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorneys fees but only to compensation as
administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.But Atty. Bermudo did not only
serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas counsel in the suit that assailed her right as
sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncles
estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as
administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorneys fees.
3. Atty. Bermudo assails the CAs reduction of his attorneys fees from P12,644,300.00 to P4,234,770.00. In
fixing the higher amount, the RTC relied on the advice of an amicus curiae regarding the value of the lands
belonging to the estate. But the CA found such procedure unwarranted, set aside the RTCs valuation, and
used the values established by the Angeles City Assessor for computing the lawyers fees of Atty. Bermudo.
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the CAs ruling. Given their wide experience and the
official nature of their work, the city assessors opinions deserve great weight and reliability.4 The Court must
sustain the CAs computation based on the market values reflected on the schedule proposed by the Angeles
City Assessor.
Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals.

SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS PASCUAL
GR 127165/ MAY 2 2006
FACTS: The case actually centers on two estate proceedings, that of Doa Adela Pascual (Doa Adela)
and the other, her husband Don Andres Pascuals (Don Andres),who predeceased her. Don Andres died
intestate, while Doa Adela left behind a last will and testame nt.
On 1 December 1973, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Don Andres was
commenced by his widow Doa Adela before the then Court of First Instance. Apart from his wife, who bore
him no children, Don Andres was survived by several nephews and nieces from his full-blood and half-blood
brothers. This proceeding proved to be the source of many controversies, owing to the attempts of siblings
Olivia and Hermes Pascual, acknowledged natural children of Don Andress brother, Eligio, to be recognized
as heirs of Don Andres. Olivia and Hermes Pascual procured the initial support of Doa Adela to their claims.
However, on 16 October 1985, the other heirs of Don Andres entered into a Compromise Agreement over
the objections of Olivia and Hermes Pascual, whereby three-fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doa
Adela and one-fourth (1/4) to the other heirs of Don Andres, without prejudice to the final determination by
the court or another compromise agreement as regards the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.
Subsequently, the Intestate Court denied the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual. Said denial was
eventually affirmed by this Court in 1992 in Pascual v.Pascual-Bautista, applying Article 992 of the Civil
Code.
Doa Adela died on 18 August 1987, leaving behind a last will and testament executed in 1978, designating
Olivia Pascual as the executrix, as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate. The will also bequeathed
several legacies and devises to several individuals and institutions. Olivia Pascual then engaged the services
of petitioner in connection with the settlement of the estate of Doa Adela. Their agreement as to the
professional fees due to petitioner is contained in a letter dated 25 August 1987, signed by Atty. Esteban
Salonga in behalf of petitioner and Olivia Pascual. It is stipulated therein, among others, that the final
professional fee shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the courtapproved
inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned from the time of [Olivia Pascuals] appointment as executrix
of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the court of the agreement for the
distribution of the properties to the court designate d heirs of the estate.
On 26 August 1987, private respondent, represented by petitioner, commenced a petition for the probate of
the last will and testament of Doa Adela. The petition was opposed by a certain Miguel Cornejo, Jr. and his
siblings, who in turn presented a purported will executed in 1985 by Doa Adela in their favor. After due trial,
on 1 July1993, the Probate Court rendered a decision allowing probate of the 1978 Last Will and Testament
of Doa Adela and disallowing the purported 1985 Will. Letters testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual.
On 27 July 1993, petitioner filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of the total gross
estate of the late Doa Adela S. Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory
of the estate, pursuant to the retainer agreement signed by and between petitioner and Olivia S. Pascual, on
25 August1987. In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the Probate Court ruled that petitioners notice of
attorneys lien, being fully supported by a retainers contract not repudiated nor questioned by his clientOlivia
S. Pascual, is hereby noted as a lien that must be satisfied chargeable to the share of Olivia S. Pascual.

This was followed by another Order, dated 11 November 1993, wherein it was directed that notice be x x x
given, requiring all persons having claims for money against the decedent, Doa Adela S. Vda. de Pascual,
arising from contracts, express orimplied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, for funeral
expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for money against her, to
file said claims with the Clerk of Court at Malabon.
It was at this stage, that the Intestate Court rendered a Decision in Sp. Proc. No. 7554, fi nally giving
judicial approval to the aforementioned 1985 Compromise Agreement, and partitioning the estate of Don
Andres by adjudicating one-fourth (1/4)thereof to the heirs of Don Andres and three -fourths (3/4) thereof to
the estate of Doa Adela. The Intestate Court also awarded attorneys fees to Atty. Jesus I.
Santos, equivalent to 15% of the three-fourths (3/4) share of the estate of Doa Adela. Olivia Pascual filed a
petition for annulment of the award of attorneys fees with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied,
first by the appellate court, then finally by this Court in its 1998 decision in Pascual v. Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioners
attorneys lien estimated at P1,198,097.02. The figure, characterized as tentative, was arrived at
based on a Motion to Submit Project Partition. This sum was in turn derived from the alleged value of the
total estate of Don Andres, three-fourths (3/4) of which had been adjudicated to Doa Adela. At the same
time, petitioner noted that the stated values must be considered as only pro visional, considering that they
were based on a July 1988 appraisal report; thus, the claim for execution was, according to petitioner, without
prejudice to an updated appraisal of the properties comprising the gross estate of Doa Adela.
On 29 April 1994, Olivia Pascual, through Atty. Antonio Ravelo, filed her comment and/or opposition to the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on attorneys fees. She argued that a lawyer of an administrator
or executor should charge the individual client, not the estate, for professional fees. On 2 June 1994, the
Probate Court issued the first assailed order denying the motion for writ of execution in view of the fact that
the bulk of the estate of the late Doa Adela S. V da. De Pascual is still tied -up with the estate of the late
Don Andres Pascual, the proceedings over which and the final disposition thereof with respect to the partition
and segregation of what is to form part of the estate of the late Doa Adela S. Vda. De Pascual is pending
with another court On 14 November 1994, Olivia Pascual, filed with the Probate Court a Motion to Declare
General Default and Distribution of Testamentary Dispositions with Cancellation of Administrators Bond. It
was noted therein that no creditor had filed a claim against the estate of Doa Adela despite due notice
published pursuant to Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Probate Court was also informed of the
fact that the proceedings before the Intestate Court had already been terminated by reason of the 14 January
1994Decision rendered by the latter court. In response, petitioner filed a Comment/Manifestation
praying that an order be issued:
(1) ordering the annotation of the attorneys lien on the properties comprising the estate of Doa
Adela Pascual;
(2) a writ of partial execution be issued for the satisfaction of the attorneys lien of the
undersigned counsel [herein petitioner] in relation to the Ongpin and Valenzuela properties for
the amount ofP635,368.14, without prejudice to the issuance of a writ of execution after the re appraisal of the present market value of the estate and the determination of the amount due to
[petitioner] as attorneys fees;

(3) ordering the appointment of a reputable appraisal company to re-appraise the present market
value of the estate of Doa Adela Pascual including the fruits thereof for the purpose of determining
the value of the attorneys fees of [petitioner]; and
(4) after the re-appraisal of the estate of Doa Adela Pascual a writ of execution be issued for the
full satisfaction and settlement of the attorneys lien of [petitioner].
On 17 March 1995, the Probate Court issued an order which denied petitioners motion for a re appraisal of the property and the issuance of a partial writ of execution for being prematurely filed as there
is no exact estate yet to be inventoried and re-appraised, assuming re-appraisal would be proper, because
the bulk of the estate subject of this case, as far as this court is concerned, has not yet been turned over to
the executrix or to the court itself. Likewise, petitioner filed an appeal at Court of Appeals. However, CA
affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not a lawyer who renders legal services to the executor or administrator of an estate can
claim attorney's fees against the estate instead of the executor or administrator.
HELD: As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorney's fees due to
the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of
the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums
paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate.
However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees, the lawyer has two modes of
recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his /her personal
capacity and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of administration. If the
second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to
enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment.
The character of such claim for attorney's it partakes the nature of an administration expense.
Administration expenses include attorney's fees incurred in connection with the administration of
the estate. It is an expense attending the accomplishment of the purpose of administration
growing out of the contract or obligation entered into by the personal representative of the estate, and
thus the claim for reimbursement must be superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.

BRIONES VS CA
GR NO. 159130 AUGUST 22, 2008
FACTS: Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J.
Henson, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceaseds daughters
and also a respondent in this petition, opposed Rubys petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the value
of their late mothers estate and acted with unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed
that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate of her late
mother, praying that the Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim Special
Administrator. The trial court granted the motion but designated Jose V. Ferro as the Special
Administrator. Ferro, however, declined the appointment.
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty.
Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate.
The trial court directed the heirs of Luz J. Henson to turn over the possession of all the properties of the
deceased to the Special Administrator. Atty. Briones moved that the trial court approve Special Administrators
fees of P75,000.00 per month. These fees were in addition to the commission referred to in Section 7, Rule
85 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Atty. Briones filed a Special Administrators Report No. 1 which contained an inventory of the properties in his
custody and a statement of the income received and the disbursements made for the estate. The trial court
issued an Order approving the report.
The heirs of Luz J. Henson submitted a project of partition of the estate for the trial courts approval.
Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrators Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed that
he be paid a commission representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.
But the respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an opportunity
to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentio ned in the statement of income and
disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones claim for commission and that
he be ordered to refund the sum ofP134,126.33 to the estate.
The respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting that
the audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of the estate. The trial court granted the request
for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.
The respondents moved for the reconsideration of Order for a special administrator. They also clarified that
they were not asking for an external audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts,
vouchers, bank statements, and other documents in support of the Special Administrators Final Report and
to examine the Special Administrator under oath.
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus assailing the Order which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the
Order which reiterated the appointment.

Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari , the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC
assailing the Order insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones commission. They subsequently filed
their record on appeal.
The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on May 23, 2002 on the
ground of forum shopping. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the appellate court, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 71844. They claimed that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial duty to
approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. They refuted the trial courts finding of forum shopping by
declaring that the issues in their appeal and in their petition for certiorari are not identical, although both
stemmed from the same Order of April 3, 2002. The appeal involved the payment of the special administrators
commission, while the petition for certiorari assailed the appointment of an a ccounting firm to conduct an
external audit.
On the other hand, the petitioner insisted that the respondents committed forum shopping when they assailed
the Order of April 3, 2002 twice, i.e., through a special civil action for certiorari and by ordinary appeal. Forum
shopping took place because of the identity of the reliefs prayed for in the two cases. The petitioner likewise
posited that the trial courts error, if any, in dismissing the appeal on the ground of forum shopping is an error
of judgment, not of jurisdiction, and hence is not correctible by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in not dismissing the respondents petition for mandamus on
the ground of forum shopping?
HELD:
No.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit as the discussions below will show.
An examination of the RTC Order shows that it resolved three matters, namely:
(1) the designation of the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to
conduct an audit of the administration of Atty. George S. Briones of
the estate of Luz J. Henson, at the expense of the estate;
(2) The payment of the petitioners commission as the estates Special
Administrator; and
(3) The directive to the petitioner to deliver the residue of the estate to
the heirs in their proportional shares. Of these, only the first
two are relevant to the present petition as the third is the ultimate
directive that will close the settlement of estate proceedings.
The first part of the Order (the auditors appointment) was the subject of the petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus that the respondents filed before the appellate court.The test to ascertain whether or not an
order is interlocutory or final is Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not it is final.

The terms of the trial courts order with respect to the appointment or designation of the accounting firm is
clear: to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of the
late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.
To audit, is to examine and verify (as the books of account of a company or a treasurers accounts). An audit
is the formal or official examination and verification of books of account (as for reporting on the financial
condition of a business at a given date or on the results of its operations for a given period). Blacks Law
Dictionary defines it no differently: a systematic inspection of accounting records involving analyses, tests
and confirmations; a formal or official examination and authentication of accounts, with witnesses,
vouchers, etc.
Given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones Final Report in the administration of the estate of
the decedent, its preparatory character is obvious; it is a prelude to the courts final settlement and distribution
of the properties of the decedent to the heirs. In the context of what the courts order accomplishes, the courts
designation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling on the pending estate proceeding on its merits
(i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net estate of the deceased and distributing it to the heirs)
or on the merits of any independently determinable aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for purposes of
confirming the accuracy of the Special Administrators Final Report, particularly of the reported charges
against the estate. In other words, the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special Proceedings No. 9992870 or any independently determinable issue therein, and left much to be done on the merits o f the
case. Thus, the Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so far as it designated an accounting firm to audit
the petitioners special administration of the estate.
In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditors appointment, the second part is limited to the
Special Administrators commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. To quote from the
Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the
payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. Under these terms, it is
immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently determinable issue the special
administrators commission is the courts definite and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a
higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the courts ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators commission is no less a claim againstthe
estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it
provides for Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate. Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the
action of the court on a claim against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases. Hence, by the express
terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrators commission effectively, a
claim by the special administrator against the estate is the lower courts last word on the matter and
one that is appealable.
While the petitioners position may be legally correct as a general rule, it is not true in the present case
considering the unique nature of the case that gave rise to the present petition. The petitioner is the special
administrator in a settlement of estate,
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In this
multi-appeal mode, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains

jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies
the parties may avail of.
Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for certiorari cannot be
allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of the
case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court. To reiterate, the matter appealed matter was
the special administrators commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate under
administration, while the matter covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who
would pass upon the special administrators final account. By their respective natures, these matters can
exist independently of one another and can proceed separately as envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109.
Forum shopping is further negated when the nature of, and the developments in, the proceedings are
taken into account i.e., an estate proceedings where the Rules expressly allow separate appeals and
where the respondents have meticulously distinguished what aspect of the RTCs single Order could
be appealed and what could not. Thus, the petitioner cannot take comfort in the cases it cited relating to
forum shopping; these cases, correct and proper in their own factual settings, simply do not apply to the
attendant circumstances and special nature of the present case where the issues, although pertaining to the
same settlement of estate proceedings and although covered by the same court order, differ in substance
and in stage of finality and can be treated independently of one another for the purposes of appellate review.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition and, accordingly, AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 11, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844. Costs against the petitioner.

BRAZA V. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR

G.R. NO. 181174 DEC. 4, 2009
FACTS: Ma. Cristina married Pablo in 1978. Out of their union, Pablo Josef, Janelle Ann, and Gian Carlo
were born. When Pablo died in 2002, and his remains were repatriated to the Philippines, Lucille began
introducing Patrick as a son of Pablo. Ma. Cristinas investigation revealed that Patricks Certificate of Live
Birth indicated he was acknowledged by the late Pablo as his child, and a notation in said Certificate of Live
birth states that he was subsequently legitimated by virtue of the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on April
22, 1998. She was also able to get a copy of the Certificate of Marriage between Pablo and Lucille. Hence,
Ma. Cristina filed an action under Rule 108 to correct the entries in the birth certificate of Patrick with respec t
to his alleged legitimation; the acknowledgment by Pablo; the use of the last name Braza; a directive for
Patricks guardians to submit him to DNA testing; the declaration of nullity of his legitimation, as well as the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille, averring that Patrcik could not have been legitimated because the
marriage of Pablo and Lucille was bigamous, hence void. On motion to dismiss by Patric k, the trial court
granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that in a petition for correction of entry,
the trial court, which had no Family Court, had no jurisdiction to annul the marriage between Pablo and
Lucille; impugn the legitimacy of Patrick; and subject him to DNA testing. Thus, her case should be ventilated
in an ordinary action. Her motion for reconsidertion denied, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the Supreme Court, arguing that the court may pass upon the issue of validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy even in petitions for corrections of entries, and correct substantial errors therein, citing the cases
of Carino vs Carino, Lee vs. Court of Appeals, and Republic vs. Kho.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy of
respondents child in a petition to correct entries in local civil register
HELD: The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry
in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein m ay generally be
used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical
error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may
be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks birth records and
that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governe d
not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one -half of the
death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage
with the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity
of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that
they are not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name
of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with Tiu Chuan who is their
biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding
contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their
respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is Filipino, not Chinese,
because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made
were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial
in
nature,
upheld
the
lower
courts
grant
of
the
petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

LEONOR VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 112597/APRIL 2, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Virginia A. Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr. in San Carlos
City on March 31, 1960 were they got three children namely Mauricio III, Ned and Don. Mauricio became
unfaithful when he resided in Switzerland studying and working while Virginia stayed in the Philippines
working as a nurse in Laguna. The herein petitioner instituted a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for
separation and alimony. Private respondent countersued for divorce.
On February 14, 1991, the lower Cantonal Civil Court of Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses
Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to
petitioner. Mauricios letter to the abovementioned Court raised the issue of the alleged non-existence of his
marriage to Virginia. Meanwhile, Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines failed to send
a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos. Hence, on July 11, 1991, Virginia applied
for the late registration of her marriage. The Civil Registrar, finding said application in order, granted the
same. Mauricio prompted to file a petition for the cancellatio n of the late registration of marriage in the civil
registry of San Carlos City with the RTC Branch 59 of the said town with the following grounds: (a) tardiness
of the registration and (b) nullity of his marriage with Virginia due to non-observance of the legal requirements
for valid marriage. Mauricios petition was filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: In disposing of a special proceeding under Rule 108, whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction
to declare the marriage null and void and to order the cancellation of its entry in the local civil registry.
HELD: The Rule on its face would appear that the cancellation of any entry regarding marriages in the civil
registry for any reason is authorized by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, in
doctrine, the only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors,
not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where the effect of a correction in
civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and his/her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the
same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding.
The substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry
Records, cannot be ordered by the Court unless threshed out in an appropriate action. Further, all parties
who may be affected by the entries should be notified or represented (Rule 108, Rules of Court), and that
the summary proceedings under 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical
errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding
or generally called clerical errors.
Wherefore, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the Civil Code,
cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginias civil status from married to single and of their three
children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to
declare their marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the
marriage entry in the civil registry.