Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again
placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo
(one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by,
the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three
(3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by
petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12
July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon,
Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the
stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before
the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as
well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried
out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its
resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food
under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also
averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the
Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed
on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in MetroManila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred
to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor
dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent
business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the
sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if
already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that
the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners
likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating
that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this
case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along
with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit
vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then
unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying
out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of
the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to
dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only
a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered)
a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life
and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by
respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and
children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a
violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently
reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary
restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 901580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his
comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon.
Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the
comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive
Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It
succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions
that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way
be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to
define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe.
In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the
Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you
understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society,
have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity.
They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England,
Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of
the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations
and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education,
employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the
sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not
granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They
are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those
that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems
to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along
with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating
an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the
country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the
inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among
those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper,
entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of
Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these
rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held
for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered
released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition

for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the
following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of
the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have
been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations
in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we
might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission
can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights
are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights.
Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So,
where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the
language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right
against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very
specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents
and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic
rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed
to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions,
and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its
wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to
define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by
the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the
particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which
we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we
are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those
rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human
rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the
Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I
would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of
human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of
fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is
that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised
by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the
rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on,
this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture
of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that
other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it
would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like
"convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these

articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights,
not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to
give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included,
without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there
was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether
the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil
right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and
political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision
freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and
public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings
and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to
protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and
therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no
longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with
the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific
article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as
we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction
between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant
and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the
rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I
cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few
lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more
abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and
the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in
the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be
independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and
cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no
place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious
persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-avis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to
the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned

such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and
the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings
and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration
has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that,
the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a
busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules
of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does
not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the
Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only
be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A
writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid
to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not
only is there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but,
more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to
initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has
become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already
been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition
is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition
has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human
Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from
implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued
by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.,"
G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January
1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on
Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the
CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a
case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe
necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents
to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as
posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil
rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion
(pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards
at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human
rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate
human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed
legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate
situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M.
ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
RESOLUTION

EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7),
dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos
died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and
order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following
major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny
them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the
protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus,
petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the
necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene
M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the
Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the
return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts
that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including
the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country,
a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of
merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the
movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision
of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the
Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant
a reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed
the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that
it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared
that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine
Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to
limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for

the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing
new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the
distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely
accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific
executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the
difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the
conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton
submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore
to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in
the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant
of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's
proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could
exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the
constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened
by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited
by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief
Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent
power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only
that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by
internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of
"executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly
limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual
powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained
analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused
with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment
No. 6 which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution
and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First
of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment
No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of thespecific power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath
of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of
Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had
hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from
the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an
unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already
moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been
reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is
not even regarded as a symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is
only a dead body waiting to be interred in this country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse
that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and
buried deep and let us be done with it forever.
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not
correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights.
For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased

individual. And even if we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what
about the human rights of his widow and the other members of his family?
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and
consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or
political and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is,
if we do not allow the remains to come, more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted.
To refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against the well-intentioned aim of
the administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the
oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare
once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of
government. Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not
abated can turn our country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man
has put it, the question will no longer be what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after decision in this
case had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original dissenting opinion. There
I said that the first cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is
a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add
a few statements to that dissenting opinion.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and
die in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late
hour is the right to be buried in this country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the
circle of denying the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in
my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The
answer should be in the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the
negative if we are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to
blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth.
Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that can be accorded
him now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this country would apply to
any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This
is the most irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the
fundamental assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply
to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as
he is a Filipino.

It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose a serious
threat to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my dissenting
opinion, the second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that respondents have not
presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have
are general conclusions of national security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific,
demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events
have, to my mind, served to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national security, the
situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to
be buried into mother earth, where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the
rule that reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the
graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten national security, his
supporters would pose that threat to national security. This argument is untenable as it is without
merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos
deprived of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are
brought to the country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly
entitled, Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argumentso conducive
to mass protests and even violencethat their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be
buried in his homeland.
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human rights, to speak
of. This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of
Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his
death. It was vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every
Filipino to be buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends
only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the right to lay
down conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these conditions
must, as a fundamental postulate, recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in
this country NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now. Without in any way
affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority, I am deeply
concerned and greatly disturbed that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in
this country, they have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble
assessment, threatens to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the
constitutional dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people
for respect and deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife,
among our people, of unending hatred, recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!

My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return and burial in
the Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such
conditions as the Philippine government may impose in the interest of peace and order.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet, as I stated
before, I can not allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened impartiality" and deny, as a
consequence, the rights of the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland,
and for them to return from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant
reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct grant or by
implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens from entering the
motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to
what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent
of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the
result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general
grant of executive power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed limitations on
specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power.
The Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law.
Had the fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would
have also completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the right.
No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against legislative
encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential intrusions. And
especially so, because the President is the caretaker of the military establishment that has,
several times over, been unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is the realm of
conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The military has shown no hard evidence that "the
return of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security. And apparently, the
majority itself is not convinced ("has been viewed...").

That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate President, does
not, so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization awaiting the nation. The
military has said over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of successful
destabilization effort. And only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances
given to foreign investors by no less than the President, of the political and economic stability of
the nation, as well as the Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of
EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions, however, are
beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos
relatives to bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let them get their just deserts here
too. And let the matter rest.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1573

March 29, 1948

KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.
Severino P. Izon for petitioner.
Romeo Perfecto for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas"
prays, for the reasons therein set forth, that we reverse and vacate the orders of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 23, 1946 (Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its
resolution of July 11, 1947 (Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the main case (case No. 31V of the Court of Industrial Relations) declared a strike on September 10, 1946, "which
suspended all the work in the respondent company"; that on September 19, 1946 (presumably
after the case had been brought to the Court of Industrial Relations) said court informed the
parties that the continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties, and that a
temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be found to put an end to it, at the same
time, urging both parties to be reasonable in their attitude towards each other; that ample
opportunity was given to both parties to iron out their differences until September 21, 1946,
when the court continued the conference at which, among other things, the leader of the
laborers informed the court that, although said laborers were not exactly satisfied with the
arrangement, in order to cooperate with the court and with the parties so that the laborers could
return to work and the company resume its operation, they had no objection to accepting a
temporary settlement of P3.50 without meal, as against the proposal of the company of P2.00
without meal; that after a series of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the date of the
order now under consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement of
the wage problem as proposed by management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to
all striking laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union, manifested that he would have
a hard time convincing the laborers, but in view of their desire to preserve that harmony which
used to exist between the parties, they were going to accede to this proposition, provided that
the management would permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of
lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated in an agreement by which the
laborers would return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, and the respondent company would resume its operation on said date under the
following conditions:
(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all increase of P2.00 daily,
without meal, over the wages received by them before the strike;

(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available,
small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; and
(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the return of the
workingmen to work until the final determination of the present controversy.
The same order then proceeds as follows:
Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable and
advantageous to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking laborers of
the respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946 at 7:00
o'clock in the morning, and the respondent company to resume its operation and admit
the striking laborers. The respondent company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or
dismiss any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the
temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or strike
during the pendency of the hearing.
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947, the respondent Gotamco
Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial relations an urgent motion asking that the petitioning
union be held for contempt of court for having staged a strike during the pendency of the main
case "in violation of the order of this court dated September 23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947,
petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other things, that a
representative of petitioner conferred with respondent regarding certain discriminations
obtaining in the respondent's saw mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances said
respondent in a haughty and arbitrary manner ordered the stoppage of the work and
consequently the workers did then and there stop working; and in the counter-petition said
petitioner asked the respondent be held for contempt for having employed four new Chinese
laborers during the pendency of the hearing of the main case, without express authority of the
court and in violation of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. It is also recited
in the said order of March 28, 1947, that on that same date, January 9, 1947, respondent filed
with the court another urgent motion for contempt against the petitioning union for picketing on
the premises of the respondent's saw mill and for grave threats which prevented the remaining
laborers from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence pertinent to the
incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the said order of March 28, 1947, was entered, and the court
stated therein the three questions to be determined as follows: first, if there was a violation by
the petitioning union of the order of said court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the facts and circumstances
attending the picketing constitute contempt of court; third, whether there was a violation by the
respondent of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, in taking four
Chinese laborers pending the hearing and without express authority of the court; and fourth,
whether the dismissal of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23, 1946, by the
petitioning union and thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of the court, to
take such action as may be warranted in the premises against the person or persons
responsible therefor for contempt:

(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to the strike which
had been found illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed by question No.
1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the question of respondent having
violated section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent was
thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with the alleged employment of four
Chinamen;
(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to work among his
fellow laborers, his petition for reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main
case was thereby denied.
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of Industrial Relations,
sitting in banc, and denied reconsideration of its order of March 28, 1947, as requested by the
petitioning union's contention is recited that the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, as amended, upon which order of September 23, 1946, was based, had not been
complied with; in other words, that the said order was not issued in conformity with the
requisites of said section, because, it was said, before its issuance there had been no proper
hearing and there was and there was no express finding by the court that public interest
required the return of the striking workers. The further contention is therein recited that, granting
that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with said section 19, said
provision is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary
servitude. Passing upon these contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:
The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the provisions of
section 19. Said order was proposed and issued on the basis of the agreement entered
into by the parties after the preliminary hearings and conferences. While it is true that the
order of the Court now in question did not make any express finding as to whether public
interest required the return of the striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until
the numerous incidents arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute promptly,
need not be stated in the said order because it is a fact which is borne out by the entire
record of the case. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of the order, it could have
objected right then and there and could have appealed said order within the period
prescribed by law, and nor to wait after it had become final, definite, and conclusive. The
record shows that the petitioner in its answer answer and counter-petition for contempt
based its complaint upon section 19 (incidental Case No. 31-V [4]). It is, indeed, strange
that after taking advantage of this order and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder,
the petitioner now comes to impugn and challenge the validity. The second motion for
reconsideration is the sad instance where the petitioner attacks the validity of an order
under which it once took shelter.
The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this section is presumed
to be constitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human
rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of
its paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by the
constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all the people. In order to attain this
object, section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to capital and
denies to labor what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the Court

to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which are conferred upon
it by the different provisions of the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and
4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all questions
matters, controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees", "to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
agricultural disputes" (International HardWood and Venser Co. vs The Pangil Federation
of Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in the case of Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus
Co. Employees' Association, 40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has been upheld in the case
aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court to execute its orders under section
19 is also the same power it possesses under section 4 of the same act, it inferentially
follows that section 19 is likewise valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine
Labor Union, G.R. No. 47796.)
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union, supra, this Court said:
In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of
Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power
to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this proposition, is too evident to require
argument. In the second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations under section 19 is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its orders under
section 19 is also the same power that it possesses under section 4. (40 Off. Gaz., [14th
Supp.], No. 23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order such as those now
under consideration as for contempt of court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is
constitutional. It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary
servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment said law went into
effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among
which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the
employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for
settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision
by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
joined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already
done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only
after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled ...". (Emphasis supplied.) The voluntariness of the employee's
entering into such a contract of employment he has a free choice between entering into it or
not with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.
The resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued after a
series of preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that these were "hearings"
within the meaning of the above mentioned section 19 of the law. The record certainly reveals
that what was done during and what resulted from said preliminary hearings or conferences
were reported to the court at a formal hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court enjoin
the strike or walk out, or the return of striking laborers, aside from the legal presumption that the
Court of Industrial Relations complied with the provisions of the law in this respect, we think
that, considering the universally known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a
result of the destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of the

country urgently demands the reconstruction work will inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or
slow down the country's program of rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons, the
government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work. And that order
was made after hearing, and, moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing
for an order of the court fro the return of striking workers, authorizes such order, among other
cases, "when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled". The provision
says: "... and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),that he shall forthwith return to it,
upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires
or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, (emphasis supplied).
In other words the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be
issued "only after hearing when public interest so requires", but if in the court's opinion the
dispute can not be promptly decided or settled, then it is also authorized after hearing to issue
the order: we construe the provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the reason that
the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of
industry. And, as well stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of
prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire record of the case
and did not need express statement in the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial
Relations (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559,
section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th
Supp. p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers'
Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our opinion on the
constitutionality of the above statutory and reglementary provisions should it, in the future,
become necessary to decide it.
For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations
assailed by the instant petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. So
ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
We concur in the result of the decision in this case, but we cannot agree with the
pronouncement depriving the Supreme Court the power to revise findings of facts made by the
Court of Industrial Relations.
We are of opinion that such curtailment of the powers of the Supreme Court is violative of the
spirit and purposes of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The power of revision granted by the

Supreme Court should not be limited so as to deny relief to any party that may foundedly feel
aggrieved by any substantial finding of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations center on
disputed facts, such as reasonable salaries, reasonable working conditions, periods of rest,
reasons for strikes or lockouts, injustice of the relations between employer and employees, etc.
The aggrieved party must not be denied his day in court in the highest tribunal.
Validity of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned on constitutional grounds,
upon the allegation that it is tantamount to authorizing involuntary servitude. We cannot agree
with the proposition. Under said section, the question of involuntary work is not involved, but
only the workability of the settlement of a labor dispute contemplated by Commonwealth Act No.
103. When workers on strike appear before the Court of Industrial Relations to seek remedy
under Commonwealth Act No. 103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in their
employment were and are agreeable to their conscience and dignity and, as a matter of fact,
they claim the right to continue performing the same work. Otherwise they would not have
resorted to strike, a means resorted to, to compel the employer and let them continue working,
but on conditions more agreeable to the workers. If the strikers should feel that their work is in
the nature of involuntary servitude, they would not resort to a strike nor recur to the Court of
Industrial Relations, but will simply resign and seek some other employment.
When the strikers are seeking remedy under the law from the Court of Industrial Relations, the
court may impose such reasonable conditions, one of them being that provided by section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, but because it is a reasonable implementation of the powers of the
court to effectively settle a labor controversy.
If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to perform something which
is repugnant to their conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek
judicial settlement of the controversy, as they can resign from their work and there is no power
that can compel them to continue therein.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat
him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human
waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted
on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later,
against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it did
not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the correction or handling
of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of
punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some
information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine
not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage caused.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People vs.
Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to
extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the
practice persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the general
rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco
Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow,
was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a
result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the
herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal,
on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the
alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was
brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos
Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave
evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit
voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He
implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime.5 As a result, he was
charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban,
province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Juling
Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and three of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent
of gain and by means of force, intimidation and violence upon the person of one
Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad
Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad
Fernando, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an
undetermined amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for
purpose of enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash
money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the
success of their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad
Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on
the head and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the total amount
of the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the
presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court,
finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the
present recourse.

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early
morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad Fernando,
widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the
accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused
Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in connection with the robbery
and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977,
accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling"
accidentally met each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the
three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed among them
to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard by climbing over the
fence; that once inside the premises, they will search every room, especially the
aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking for cash money and
other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay
and Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place where they
formerly saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a
jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they
stopped and they waited at the side of the road until the hour of midnight; that at
about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three repaired to the premises of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said premises through the back wall of
the house; that while entering the premises of said house, Juling Dulay saw a
bolo, lying near the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy
the back portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first
entered the house through the hole that they made, followed by the accused
Galit and next to him was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23,
1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as
the three could not find anything valuable inside the first room that they entered,
Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the victim, Natividad Fernando;
that upon entering the room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first
the victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that
Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim, who was
then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim; that
after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching the room for
valuables; that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the
room of the victim, where they found some money; that when the three accused
left the room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and pictures
which they threw outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the three
accused went out of the premises of the house, using the same way by which
they gained entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall; that the
three accused walked towards the river bank where they divided the loot that
they got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares amount to
P70.00 for each of them; and that after receiving their shares of the loot, the
three accused left and went home.

When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of
accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling
about the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he
further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two
companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than
seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of
death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal
Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased
victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime. He
claimed that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in
Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted
from him through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of
counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does
not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the
accused are not supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness,
Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were living together in one house
in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of his wife is the wife of the
accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police
station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard
that the accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling
Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused
was imploring him not to leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a
bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that
upon learning of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and
reported to the police chief about what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban
policemen went to their house and arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for
peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and
which We reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if
possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,

whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in

evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses,
and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against
the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The
statement begins as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga

karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung
inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at
pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman
ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban
sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang
hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito
ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung
sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay
maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang
mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang kusang-loob
na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar
and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his
sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation
and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his
rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as
evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of
any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one.
Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may
deem proper to take against the investigating officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and
another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him
be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.
GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE,
CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA,
REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B.
MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON
S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and
ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his
life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to
resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally,
as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and
could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil,
and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of
the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of
this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding
centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973,
the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to
"formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from
the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include
a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall

respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the
above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No.
27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics
for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The
different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be
explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands
by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution,
for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to
Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke
the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the
form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives
the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause
is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the
owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the
owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so
violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even
the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of
just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in
behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination
of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed
in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner
of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant
on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the
allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of
1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree
that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could
do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming
that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian
Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the
estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall
be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and
Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts
collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the
purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The
money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and
cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that
the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be
established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair
market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and
promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid
fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with
interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed
upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to
make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar
areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters
have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate
group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over
the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by
Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted
by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and
that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount
appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an
initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the
maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not
been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the
expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the
land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is
unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the
uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for
the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that,
contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a
general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show
that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also
suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition
would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment
of public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money
already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty

billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually
the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may
be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf,
assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the
title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did
not originate from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of
Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986,
his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the
transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the
1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of
law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation
for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21,
1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion
of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of
seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion
for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the
validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to
Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he
was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered
amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was
resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with
the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by
tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be

ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights
of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in
accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the
petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by
Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No.
11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No.
18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985
(Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For
failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners
are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise
of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if
this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless
not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason
that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the
acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the
fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of

separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their
functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the
legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and
caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was
enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en
banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we
hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although
they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The
Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then
applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to
"make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of
these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must
categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify
or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress
of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued
on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both
issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid
when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does
not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that
enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be
suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some
portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No.
131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the
CARP Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to
the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc.

No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for
that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is
only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section
25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously
could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives,
which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been
convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in
the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4
of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own
or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of
which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such
as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no
case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)
hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed
to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only
one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of
the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by
whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President
Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R.
No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a
letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word
was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply
with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless
published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not
have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that
case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to
one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie
to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty
imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will
require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a
particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court
should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it
jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the
second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts
may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain
that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In
the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all
municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value,
the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse,
which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable,
unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of
just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the
police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be

regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of
structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining
rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court
held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a
lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that
sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or
morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the
possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with
paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be
noxious as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions
the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy
his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and
the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the
power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long
been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of
Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365,
which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and
eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed
eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the
police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of
preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance
on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as
suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some
legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no
compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's
involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted
considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably
with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved
in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the
reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's
standard of "public purpose." 27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in
the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain
in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through
the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the
owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office
building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the
landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that
the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although
other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that
there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights
accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused
by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in
this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was
authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the
site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal.
Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically
enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to
others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This
is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention
limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they
excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the
retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these
petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed
violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just
compensation as required under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint
that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by
the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of
their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all
these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only
if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests
of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference
of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the

Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it
is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.
Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a,
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even
as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9,
which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation
to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an
ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the
time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of
the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State
should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of
immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event,
the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was

made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not
justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in
the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a
license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide
with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP
the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is
first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate
laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we
believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire
St. Mary's river between the American bank and the international line, as well as
all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was
"necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters
connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation
proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room
for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason
why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No.
6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable
farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss.40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a
mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual
taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation
mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites
are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its
taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the
good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be
employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed
is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific
reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by
the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the

above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide
the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of
justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v.
Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing
that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of
the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was
lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it
for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still
have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value
of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be
said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the
strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of
a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to
the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is
concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of
whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on
just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority
to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and
to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property,
after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all
factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly
provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate
the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the
DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and
17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the
court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of
the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as
the excess hectarage is concerned Twenty-five
percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and

up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty percent (30%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below
Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be
paid in government financial instruments negotiable
at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance
with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day
treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from the
date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to
forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he
shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP
bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the
amount of their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed
by government financial institutions in the same
province or region where the lands for which the
bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of governmentowned or controlled corporations or shares of stock
owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the
provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial

institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall
be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in
a small and medium- scale industry, in the same
province or region as the land for which the bonds
are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to
government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the
financial instruments; Provided, further, That the
PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned
above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family
of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the
original bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time
to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In
support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent
of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just
and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated
has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything
short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the

just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the

market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the
weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is
payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The
condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the
owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the
value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to,
there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the
law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be
regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent
in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking,
and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment
future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in
the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of
the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific
and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community
or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only
the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully
only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow
through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the
Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"

among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now
become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of
P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that
when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed
of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose
that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27,
which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even
as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be
made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such
innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be
expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions
we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and
manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced
our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after

the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades.
We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention
of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands
expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land,
the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more
than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No
less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment
are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at
his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds,
other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small,
not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is
devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for
their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like
the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not
seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded
by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the
earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to
register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for
tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be
ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided
for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle
of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates

back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's
report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of
entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In
fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v.
McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the
appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said
that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was
complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the
rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is
actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass
from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted
in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land
can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation
is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
(Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of
full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation.
Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending

transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance
payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27,
as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This
should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we
have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude
immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners
have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they
are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the
whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be
scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian
reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to
use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn
as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection
although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing
the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to
the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse
the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the
past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be
ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the
Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more
fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark
resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon
full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D.
No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the
conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-40639 November 23, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO (BOY) BUSCATO and NESTOR DALUD defendants-appellants.
Jose M. de la Cruz for appellant Isidro (Boy) Buscato.

Malamama M. Macapeges for appellant Nestor Dalud.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Luisito P. Escutin for appellee.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by Isidro (Boy) Buscato and Nestor Dalud from the decision dated August 22, 1974, of
the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, convicting the said appellants of the crime of Robbery
with Homecide and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, is view of all the foregoing, the Court is convinced beyond the
shadow of reasonable doubt that all the accused Jabib Tan, Nestor Dalud, and
Isidro Buscato are guilty of the offense of robbery with homicide, defined in
Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each
of the accused to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of Rodolfo Lim the sum of P1,400.00, the value of the
articles stolen; to indemnify also the heirs of Rodolfo Lim the sum of P12,000.00;
all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as rule in the case of
People vs. Doria, interpreting Republic Act No. 5465, and to pay the cost.
The foregoing is based on the following facts:
At about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of January 12, 1973, appellants Isidro (Boy) Buscato and
Nestor Dalud, together with Ricardo Romo, where drinking "tuba" at the residence of Nestor
Dalud located at the Philippine Trade Center, Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato (now Maguindanao),
After a while, Ricardo Romo excused from them, saying that he has to go home to take his
supper. They told him to come back so that they could continue their drinking spree. Thereafter,
Ricardo Romo, after eating his supper, proceeded to the house of Nestor Dalud. On the way, he
met Manuel Largo whom he invited to join them in their drinking spree. Before reaching the
house of Dalud the two met a group composed of appellants Isidro Buscato and Nestor Dalud,
together with Jabib Tan and Rodolfo Lim. All of them proceeded afterwards to the Samarano's
Store where they had a drinking spree. After they consumed about one (1) gallon of "tuba" they
decided to leave. Ricardo Romo and Manuel Largo went to the store of Bangoy opposite the
Samarano's Store. Appellants Isidro Buscato and Nestor Dalud, upon the other hand, walked
with Jabib Tan and Rodolfo Lim towards the direction of the Philippine Trade Center.
At around 7:00 o'clock the following morning (January 13, 1973), the cadaver of Rodolfo Lim
was found at the river bank by Enrique Tagle, navigator of a tugboat, "Atlas". The tugboat was
then moored at the wharf of the Philippine Trade Center.

Dr. Eduardo L. Mariano, Assistant Provincial Health Officer of Cotabato, conducted a postmortem examination of the body of the deceased. His post-mortem findings revealed a stab
wound in the body of Rodolfo Lim, 6" long, left lower abdomen, eviscerating, and a contusion at
the left side of the back of the neck. 1
On January 16, 1973, the Philippine Constabulary authorities in Cotabato City investigated the
persons who were reportedly with the deceased Rodolfo Lim the previous night, namely Isidro
Buscato, Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan. According to T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano, he investigated
appellant Isidro Buscato who allegedly readily admitted his participation in the crime as the one
who inflicted the stab wound on Rodolfo Lim. However, when his investigation was reduced into
writing, Buscato refused to sign the same. In view of Buscato's refusal, he requested S/Sgt.
Jorge Vargas to conduct a separate investigation of Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud.
On the other hand, S/Sgt. Jorge Vargas declared that he conducted the investigation of Jabib
Tan and Nestor Dalud with the aid of Pat. Julhussein G. Tagadaya, a policeman of Sultan
Kudarat, who acted as interpreter. Both Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud allegedly voluntarily
confessed their participation in the slaying of Rodolfo Lim. Jabib Tan allegedly confessed to him
that he participated in the planning of the killing and robbing of the victim. Nestor Dalud, on the
other hand, admitted having struck the victim with a piece of bamboo, while Boy Buscato
stabbed the victim with a Batangas knife and afterwards got the wallet and other valuables of
the victim. They then placed the victim inside a sack. These confessions were reduced to writing
and subsequently sworn to by Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud before the Clerk of Court, Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Cotabato. 2 Nestor Dalud also purportedly tape-recorded his
confession. 3
On January 18, 1973, Isidro Buscato, Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan were brought by the
investigators under the Quirino Bridge in Sultan Kudarat. At that place they were made to reenact the slaying of Rodolfo Lim.
Francisco Lim, brother of the deceased, related that in the afternoon of January 12, 1973, his
brother was intending to collect the account of MINRAPCO due to the Lim Auto Supply in the
amount of P1,400.00. However, when he examined the remains of his brother the next day
(January 13, 1973), he noticed that his brother's Rolex watch worth P500.00, a ring worth
P35.00, a gold necklace worth P70.00, as well as the money which he was supposed to have
collected, were missing.
All of the accused interposed the defense of alibi. During the hearing, both Nestor Dalud and
Jabib Tan testified that after Rodolfo Lim paid the bill in the Samarano's Store, they separated
ways, Nestor and Boy Buscato proceeding directly to the house of Nestor, where they slept,
leaving Lim with Jabib Tan. They also repudiated their extrajudicial confessions alleging that
they were compelled to sign the same by force, violence and intimidation. Isidro Buscato
recounted his maltreatment by, the PC soldiers from January 15 to18, 1973.
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION

The trial court, however, was persuaded that the extra-judicial confessions of Nestor Dalud and
Jabib Tan were voluntarily and freely given by them to the investigators. Thus, according to the
trial court:
Atty. Muasque, the Clerk of Court before (whom) the said confessions were
subscribed and sworn to testified that the said statements were freely and
voluntarily given by the affiants. Likewise the investigators testified that the same
were freely and voluntarily given by the affiants and they took the stand in
rebuttal just to deny the allegation of force and maltreatment.
Records will show that the affiants who alleged that they were maltreated have
not presented any medical certificate to show the alleged injuries they suffered.
They have not charged any one of those who allegedly maltreated them in court
or before any authority.
To show that they were maltreated the only evidence they have presented are
their own testimonies and the testimonies of their relatives, in-laws and friends.
The defense of the three accused is one merely of denial and alibi. Records will
show that the house of the victim and the place where the victim's body was
found to the place where the accused were on the night of January 12, 1973 is
just very near.
xxx xxx xxx
The confessions of accused Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan reveal spontaneity of
the declarations by the affiants and are replete with facts which could only be
possible supplied by the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the defense could not attribute any reason why the Clerk of
Court before whom the confession was sworn to would testify the way he did in
court and likewise no motive could be attributed to Sgts. Soriano and Vargas in
preparing or typing a false confession if such was the case.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar the Court is convinced that all the three accused are guilty of
the offense as charged not only by virtue of the confessions of the two which are
interlocking and implicating accused Boy Buscato who also made an oral
confession but also they all participated in the re-enactment of the crime and
accused Nestor Dalud also has a tape recorded statement admitting his
participation in the offense and the added fact, that when this case was

submitted for decision accused Jabib Tan escaped from the Provincial Jail, which
convinces the Court that he is really guilty otherwise why will he escape if he is
innocent.
The Court is convinced that there was also robbery in the case at bar as there is
sufficient evidence on record that on the very afternoon previous to the incident,
the deceased went to MINRAPCO to collect some amount and the following
morning when Francisco Lim, brother of the victim, saw the dead body of his
brother, he saw the watch, necklace and money worth around P1,400.00 were
gone, even his shoes were gone. There is no question that the prosecution has
proved the crime of robbery with homicide. 4
APPELLANTS ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
In their briefs, counsels for appellants contend that the lower court erred:
(1) In convicting the afore-mentioned appellants on the basis solely of the repudiated "extrajudicial confessions" of Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan; and
(2) In taking into account the alleged escape of one accused, Jabib Tan, long after the case was
submitted for decision, as a circumstance in convicting the appellants.
The basic issue determinative of the merits of the challenged judgment is the admissibility of the
confessions and their sufficiency to sustain the conviction.
THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
The Solicitor General agreed with the appellants and submitted, in lieu of of brief for the
appellee, a manifestation recommending acquittal of appellants Nestor Dalud and Isidro
Buscato. The thrust of the Solicitor General's contention is that the evidence of the prosecution
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support their conviction.
Thus, in support of the foregoing, Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. 5 made the
following manifestation:
xxx xxx xxx
Nestor Dalud's
extra-judicial
confession,
Exhibit "D".
The issue to be resolved at this instance resolves on the evaluation of the extrajudicial confession of appellant Nestor Dalud and his repudiation of the same at
the trial. Will a denial by appellant of his participation in the commission of the

crime of which he is charged be given more weight than his confession? Will
Nestor Dalud's defense of alibi be given weight despite his extra-judicial
confession?
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and dispassionate anlysis of the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution and for the defense, we have come to the conclusion that Nestor
Dalud's attack on the voluntary character of the confession finds support in the
evidence on record.
1. Nestor Dalud's recital of the means and methods employed by the
investigators in extracting his confession cited specific overt acts as would
preclude any notion that the same are merely products of his imagination.
Moreover, he enumerated the names of those who had exerted overbearing
pressure on him.
He testified that on January 13, 1973, he and his co-accused were arrested and
confined in the PC stockade in Cotabato City (tsn, pp. 79-80, Jan. 14, 1974); that
for two days, they were not allowed to go out of the stockade (tsn, p. 81, Ibid);
that while they were at the stockade, the guard on duty would sometime call
them one-by-one, and as soon as they reach the iron grills, the guard would pull
their hands and then box them (tsn, pp. 83, Ibid); that on the morning of January
15, 1973, he and his co-accused were brought to the Office of the 454th PC
Company (tsn, pp. 90-92, Ibid); that he was investigated in the presence of his
two-co-accused (tsn, p. 93, Ibid; that Sgt. Soriano was writing the answers given
by him (tsn, p. 94, Ibid); that at that time, Sgt. Soriano was drunk and in fact
made Dalud drink the Tanduay liquor he had with him (tsn, pp. 95-96, Ibid); that
everytime he would refuse to answer, Sgt. Soriano would box him, (tsn, p.
97, Ibid); that Sgt. Soriano was forcing him to admit that he and his companions
were the ones who killed Rodolfo Lim and when he refused, he was boxed and
pushed by Sgt. Soriano causing him to fall face flat on the cement floor (tsn, pp.
3-4, Jan. 14, 1974, afternoon session); that he became unconscious as a result
thereof.
The maltreatment which Nestor Dalud had to undergo on January 15, 1973 was
merely a prelude to more crusl and barbaric torture. Thus, he testified, to wit:
Q In what manner or in what way you were again
maltreated the following morning of January 16,
1973, up in that guardhouse?
A They made me lie down in the spring bed and
tied my both hands and feet to it. Then, they got a
block of ice, the size of the ice is like this (witness

demonstrated) and placed it on top of my face. And

after that they undressed me and they even
inserted a piece of broomstick into the uterus of my
penis.
Q How did they insert a piece of broomstick into
uretral part of your organ?
A When my pants was taken off, and I could still
remember the man who took off my pants Juansing
Legaspi. And after my penis was exposed, one of
the soldiers arrived by the name of Cristy. And then
he looked for a broomstick and he said, "It is better
that we play with him". Then he handled my penis
and after that he inserted that broomstick and when
the broomstick was already inserted into my penis,
he twisted the broomstick inside.
Q At that time, was Sgt. Soriano also present?
A Yes, sir, he stepped on my chest so that I could
not move.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And how long were you on that condition of
unbearable pain and sufferings in the hands of your
investigators who were PC soldiers and are
supposed to give you the law and justice they being
officer of the law?
A Quite a long time, sir, because they started from
9:00 o'clock up to the time the siren shounded for
12:00 o'clock because could still hear the siren
sounded.
Q And that ice which was being wrapped and
placed on top of your head was made to melt all the
way long?
A Yes, sir, until the block of ice became small and
when this this became small already, Sgt. Soriano
lifted it above my face and let it drip into my
forehead. (tsn, pp. 19-21, 22-24, Ibid).

Nestor Dalud, at this juncture, got a temporary reprieve when a soldier named
Hicotani, who happens to be his friend and who chanced to witness the
maltreatment, remarked: "Why are you doing this to this person when this person
is a good man? (tsn,
p. 26, Ibid). Sgt. Soriano had an altercation with with Hicotani but after they
talked in Ilocano, they seemed to have patched up their misunderstanding and
the latter embraced Dalud and asked him if he had, already eaten (tsn, pp. 25,
26, 27, 28, Ibid). Thereafter, Hicotani brought Dalud to the canteen and was
given food (tsn, pp. 29-30, Ibid).
At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 16, 1973, a drunk constable by
the name of Maniano arrived and ordered everybody at the stockade to to rise
(tsn, p. 33, Ibid). The inmates, including Nestor Dalud, were ordered to make fifty
push-ups with admonition from Maniano that anyone who cannot make the
required number of push-ups will be made to urinate and drink his own urine (tsn,
p. 33, Ibid). A Muslim who was not able to comply with Maniano's order
correspondingly meted the penalty (tsn, p. 36, Ibid).
On January 17, 1973, Nestor Dalud was taken out of detention cell by Sgt.
Vargas and brought to the office of the 454th PC Company (tsn, p. 43, Ibid).
Before he was interrogated, Dalud was brought to a room by Sgt. Vargas and the
latter was forcing the former to admit his participation in the slaying of Rodolfo
Lim and when he refused, Dalud was made to stand behind a wall and was made
a "punching bag" (tsn, p. 44, Ibid). At one instance, while Dalud was covering his
stomach with his hands, Sgt. Vargas suddenly hit him in his ears with open palms
causing him temporary deafness (tsn, pp. 47-48, Ibid). Thereafter, Nestor Dalud
was made to sit near a table and Sgt. Vargas started his interrogation in English
(tsn, pp. 49-50, Ibid). Sgt. Vargas then started typing the alleged confession,
Exhibit "D" in the presence of Juan C. Nas, Sgt. Anito and Sgt. Soriano (tsn. pp.
50, 51, 53, Ibid), Sgt. Vargas was at the same time trying to convince Nestor
Dalud to become a state witness in order that the latter can be exculpated of the
charges (tsn, p. 4, Jan. 15, 1974). After Sgt. Vargas had typed the question and
the corresponding answer, he would read the same to Nestor Dalud and if the
latter would not conform to the answer given, the former would again maltreat
him (tsn p. 6, January 15, 1974). After Sgt. Vargas had finished preparing Nestor
Dalud's confession, he ordered the latter to sign it but having refused to do so,
Sgt. Vargas pulled out his pistol, pulled out the magazine and took out the bullets
and inserted the same between Dalud's fingers (tsn, pp. 37-38, Ibid). Sgt. Vargas
then got two handkerchiefs and tied it around Dalud's fingers (tsn, p. 39, Ibid).
Sensing the determination of his interrogators to have him admit his participation
and accepting the futility of his resistance, Nestor Dalud capitulated and said, "It
is up to you, sir" (tsn, p. 40, Ibid).

Nestor Dalud was then brought to the Office of the Clerk of Court by Sgt. Vargas
and onother PC soldier by the name of Legaspi (tsn, pp. 40-41, Ibid). On their
way, Sgt. Vargas and Dalud had the following conversation:
Q Now, before you were brought to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, by Sgt. Vargas and PC soldier by
the name of Legaspi, what did Sgt. Vargas tell you,
if he told you anything?
A While we were still walking on the road towards
the Court, Sgt. Vargas told me "You just signed this
because this is good for you. This is the only way
you can be released or safe." But I told him, "Why
should I sign that when all that was written there is
not true". And Sgt. Vargas told me, "It is up to you."
Q When Sgt. Vargas told you it is up to you, what
did you understand of that statement?
A When he said it is up to you, I understood that as
soon as we returned to the PC stockade, he would
again subject me to punishment. So that is why I
was afraid. (tsn, pp. 42-44, Ibid; Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, forewarned, Nestor Dalud meekly signed his confession before the Clerk of
Court. He knew his fate depended upon how much he cooperated with the
authorities.
Two days after he signed his confession, Nestor Dalud was made to tape-record
his confesion by Sgt. Vargas (tsn, pp. 44-46, Ibid). Nestor Dalud was reading his
answers from a script given to him by Sgt. Vargas (tsn, pp. 46-47, Ibid). Although
Sgt. Vargas denied that Nestor Dalud was merely reading his answers from a
copy of the written investigation, the court a quo made the observation "that the
confession and the tape record dovetail with each other" (p. 147, July 26,
1973, Ibid).
On the other hand, examination of the testimony of Sgt. Jorge Vargas seems to
convey that Nestor Dalud had no qualms in admitting his participation in the
commission of the crime (tsn, pp. 10-11, July 25, 1973). Yet, it must be noted that
Nestor Dalud was initially investigated on January 15, 1973and it was only
on January 17, 1973 that he signed his confession. What turned Nestor Dalud
into a dove when for two days that he was in custodial interrogation, he refused
to admit participation in the crime? Was it not due to an overpowering pressure
which finally subdued his will?

Lourdes Dalud, sister of Nestor Dalud, testified that on January 13, 1973, she
went to PC Headquarters in Cotabato City to visit her brother but Sgts. Soriano
and Vargas refused to allow her to talk to her brother (tsn, pp. 27-29, Oct. 18,
1973). The following day, she again visited her brother and at this time she was
able to talk to him (tsn, pp. 33, 34, Ibid). She noticed that Nestor Dalud had
swelling on the lower portion of his left eye and on his lower lip (tsn, p. 35, Ibid).
Nestor Dalud als confided to her that his chest was painful and he had difficulty in
breathing and exhibited the swellings on his left breast (tsn, pp. 36-38, Ibid). He
also told her that everytime he was made to confess, bullets were inserted
between his fingers (tsn, p. 38, Ibid).
Ricardo Ocampo, who accompanied Lourdes Dalud to the PC Headquarters in
Cotabato City, corroborated her testimony, viz a viz, the external manifestations
of violence inflicted on Nestor Dalud.
Dick Dalud, father of Nestor Dalud, also testified that on January 18, 1973, he
was arrested by PC authorities and placed in the stockade at the PC
Headquarters in Cotabato City (tsn, pp. 41-42, Oct. 30, 1973). He saw his son
sporting a swollen face and everytime Nestor Dalud would cough, he (Nestor)
would vomit blood (tsn, p. 47, Ibid).
It is true that the said witnesses are related to Nestor Dalud (Ricardo Ocampo is
Nestor Dalud's brother-in-law) but mere relationship to the accused does not
destroy a witness' credibility. Their narration of fact bears no positive indication of
exaggeration or falsity. We find in the records no fact nor circumstance that
impels us to doubt or reject their testimonies. Moreover, the lower court did not
make any conclusion concerning their credibility, hence, there is no reason not to
accept their testimonies at face value.
The above circumstances notwithstanding, the lower court still looked upon the
confession as free of infirmity. Clearly, that was error. The constant course of
decisions of this Honorable Court forbids the admission of any confession
obtained under such circumstances. A conviction resting on such proof, and such
proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed to stand.
2. The failure of Nestor Dalud to complain to Clerk of Court Benjamin Muasque
of the torture he had undergone is not a guarantee of the voluntary character of
his confession. He was appraised beforehand by Sgt. Jorge Vargas of the
consequence of his failure to sign the confession before the Clerk of Court. ...
xxx xxx xxx
3. The extra-judicial confession suffers from an additional infirmity in that Nestor
Dalud signed the same upon the representation of Sgt. Jorge Vargas that he
would be utilized as a government witness. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Verily, Nestor Dalud could have signed the confession to obtain the promised
concession.
4. No less significant is the tape-recorded confession of Nestor Dalud. It is stated
therein that Isidro Buscato ordered Nestor Dalud to strike the deceased with
bamboo pole but the latter hesitated because the intended victim was his
boyhood friend (p. 15, Replay of Tape Record). Isidro Buscato thereafter poke his
knife at Dalud, thus leaving the latter no other choice but to follow the former's
command (pp. 15-16, Ibid).
The picture presented by Nestor Dalud has clearly in his favor the exempting
circumstance delineated under Article 12 (6) of the Revised Penal Code which
exempts from criminal liability "any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury." He could have stuck to his
confession and still be acquitted. He need not have repudiated his confession
since it recited facts which could exculpate him from criminal liability. This is a
further circumstance which militates against the voluntary character of Nestor
Dalud's confession.
5. Nestor Dalud's explanation as to why he did not avail of the services of a
doctor to treat him of injuries resulting from the torture he had undergone was
explained by, as follows:
Q But in spite of all those maltreatments, you were
never able to ask or request for the services of a
doctor to treat you?
A No more, sir, because no one would come there
and if I also report to the soldiers, I think it will not
be good because it was the soldiers who
apprehended me. (tsn p. 42, Jan. 29, 1974)
xxx xxx xxx
Alleged voluntary
re-enactment of the
crime
Heavy emphasis was given by the lower court on the participation of all the
accused in the re-enactment of the crime. This circumstance draws its strength
or weakness on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. Thus, in order that
the re-enactment may be given evidentiary weight, the validity and efficacy of the
confession must first be shown.

It is to be noted that all the accused were unanimous in denouncing the reenactment as "written, produced and directed" by their torturers. This is not an
empty assertion. They had already been subjected to cruel and painful
punishments occasioned by their earlier refusal to admit their participation in the
commission of the crime. In their determined quest to "solve" the crime, the
authorities had virtually reduced all the accused to mere robots, having sapped
their will of strength, by torture.
T/Sgts. Francisco Soriano and Jorge Vargas testified, on rebuttal that they never
laid their hands on any one of the accused, much less, torture them. However, it
is significant to note that Emilio Buscato, father of Isidro Buscato, denounced
T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano's maltreatment of his son in a letter-complaint sent to
no less than the President of the Philippines himself (tsn, p. 35, August 30, 1973;
Exhibit "2", p. 186, Rec.). Sgt. Soriano admitted that the letter complaint was
endorsed to the 454th PC Company to which he belongs (tsn, pp. 44-45, March
5, 1974). Surprisingly, the investigation was conducted by the unit of which Sgt.
Soriano was the head, with Sgt. Cang, a member of his team, conducting the
investigation (tsn, pp. 45-48, Ibid). Here is, therefore, a situation where a
subordinate was investigating his superior. Surely, Emilio Buscato cannot expect
an impartial investigation of his complaint. Thus it is that the investigation ended
with Emilio Buscato executing an affidavit of desistance (tsn, p. 25, Ibid).
Death Certificate
of Rodolfo Lim
Both the prosecution and the defense agree in one thing on this case; that
Rodolfo Lim is dead. Yet, a discussion of this case would not seem complete
without mentioning the death certificate of Rodolfo Lim which was accomplished
by Dr. Eduardo Mariano.
Dr. Mariano testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination of Rodolfo
Lim's body near the river where the same was found (tsn, pp. 6-7, May 29, 1973).
The result of his findings were handwritten by him and, subsequently, copied by
typewriter when he went back to his office (tsn, pp. 12-13, Ibid). However, it is
significant to note the entries on the handwritten and typewritten death
certificates (Exhibits "A" and "B", "1-Buscato", pp. 3, 185, Rec.) do not coincide
and in fact, the trustworthiness thereof is suspect, if we consider the following
circumstances:
1. The Certificate of Death, accomplished in Dr. Mariano's own handwriting,
stated that the cause of death is, to wit: wound, stab, 6", left lower abdomen
eviscerating, abrasions and contusions, arm and forearm bilateral, contusion,
back of the neck (Exhibit "B", "1-Buscato", p. 185, Rec.). All the entries therein
are handwritten except the "contusion at the back of the neck" which was

typewritten. On the other hand, the typewritten Certificate of Death did not
include "abrasions and contusions, arm and forearm bilateral" (Exhibit "A");
2. All the entries in the typewritten Certificate of Death (Exhibit "A") were made
on the same typewriter except the entry referring to "contusion, back to the
neck", which obviously, was entered through another typewriter;
3. The typewritten words "contusion, back of neck", as appearing both in Exhibits
"A" and "B" appears to have made through the same typewriter.
The explanation of Dr. Mariano on the discrepancies afore-mentioned does not
inspire belief. Thus, he testified on cross-examination, as follows:
Q Do you have that original certificate of death with
you now?
A Yes, I have it here.
Q In your findings here, there are two entries, one
is stab wound, 6" or 6 inches and the other is
contusion, is that correct?
A Correct.
Q When you made the entry, did you make it one at
the same time?
A Yes, sir.
Q It appears that the entry "Wound stab, 6" long,
left lower abdomen eviscerating" and the other
entry "contusion, left neck" are not the same in
type, what can you say about this?
A Probably when I found out that the typewriter
ribbon not functioning well, I think I transferred to
another typewriter, I do not exactly remember now.
Q And after transferring to the other typewriter just
to type down the following words "contusion, left
neck", you went back to the former typewriter to
type down the subsequent entries such as date
"Jan. 12, 1973" and others as it appears to be the
same from the above entries up to "EDUARDO L.
MARIANO, MD, CPH" which are lightly imprinted

than the words "Contusion, left neck", can you

explain this?
A Well, that is right, "I returned to the former
typewriter when the ribbon was already fixed." (tsn,
pp. 14-15, May 29, 1973: Emphasis supplied.)
It is well to remember that the finding that there was a contusion on the left neck
of the deceased would be vital in this case as this would corroborate Nestor
Dalud's "confession" that he struck the deceased on the neck with a bamboo.
Could it be that the inclusion of this particular item was a mere afterthought,
considering that in the Certificate of Death accomplished by Dr. Mariano at the
recovery site of the victim's body, there was no handwritten entry as regards the
contusion on the left neck? Moreover, the explanation of Dr. Mariano as to why
he had to use two typewriters in accomplishing Exhibit "A" taxes credulity. If it is
true that the ribbon of the first typewriter was not functioning well, then why did
he not type the rest of the entries on the second typewriter instead of merely the
entry "contusion, left neck"?
As earlier stated, the fact of death of Rodolfo Lim is uncontested. However, there
is serious doubt as to the existence of contusion on his left neck.
Oral confession
of Isidro Buscato
The law on evidence does not require that a confession be in writing. It is
sufficient that it be made in the presence of reliable and disinterested witnesses
(People vs. Castro, 89 Phil. 747).
T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano testified that on the afternoon of January 16, 1973, he
investigated Isidro Buscato and that the latter admitted to him that he had
stabbed Rodolfo Lim (tsn, p. 15, July 17, 1973). After he had reduced Buscato's
confession in writing. Soriano asked the latter to sign the same but Buscato
requested to have time to think it over (tsn, p, 16, Ibid), On the next day, when
Buscato was again asked to sign his confession, he refused to do so (Ibid).
Except for Soriano, no other witness was presented to testify on the substance of
Buscato's alleged confession.
Admittedly, an accused who had confessed voluntarily would have no objection
to reducing the confession to writing, to be signed by him, which, in this case,
Isidro Buscato refused to do. What could have spurred Buscato's decision not to
sign his "confession"? Or better still, did Isidro Buscato really make a
"confession"?

Isidro Buscato denied that he ever made a confession. In fact, all throughout the
investigation and despite the maltreatment he underwent, he stoutly maintained
his innocence. Like Nestor Dalud, he named names and recited specific overt
acts in his painful recollection of the methods employed to extract his confession.
Isidro Buscato's testimony, taken in relation to that of Nestor Dalud, show that the
PC investigators have an impressive array of third-degree methods in extracting
confessions. Without necessarily implying that Isidro Buscato was subjected to a
lesser degree of torture than Nestor Dalud, we beg to quote the more significant
portions of his testimony, viz a viz, the inhuman and barbaric methods employed
by the investigators, to wit:
Q What did they do to you that morning?
A They made me punching bag.
Q Who were they?
A Sgt. Soriano, Legaspi, Abobo and Visitacion.
Those are the only ones whom I know. There are
many others but I do not know them because they
are civilians.
Q You said you made a punching bag. Will you
please tell us how how you were made a punching
bag?
A First, they let me stand and tied me to a post. And
then, they undress me, took off my pants and my
shirt. They told me if I will confess, they would not
harm me. And because I would not confess, they
started hitting my body and even kicked my knees
with their combat shoes. By noontime, they stopped
and let me rest. So, they untied me and then they
returned me to the stockade. By one o'clock in the
afternoon, they again took me out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And while you were lying down on a small bench,
what happened?
A Sgt. Soriano got a towel. He wet this towel and
covered my face with this towel at the same time
they kept on hitting my body.

Q You mean you were being hit while lying down on

a bench?
A Yes sir, because I would not confess.
Q While the wet towel was place on your face?
A Yes, sir, it was pressed against my nose and I
could even hardly breath. (tsn, pp. 32-35, January
30, 1974; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Q What were the maltreatment inflicted on you that
evening of January 17, 1973?
A The same, sir. They again let me lie down on a
bench because they were drinking Tanduay, Sgt.
Soriano told me to confess because if I will not
confess they will pour Tanduay into my nose. And
because I would not confess, they poured Tanduay
into my nose. And after all the contents of the
Tanduay were consumed, they struck me on the
chest with the bottle. (tsn, pp. 41-42, Ibid)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What kind of maltreatment did they effect on you
from 2:30 of January 18 to one o'clock A.M. of
January 19?
A While they investigated me, I was sitting and
then they let my hand lay on the table with open
palm and made it as an ash tray. They put cigaretts
which are lighted and put out the lights of the
cigarettes on my palm used as ash tray and they
insisted me to confess but I did not confess. Some
of them hit me with the butt of the garand at my
back.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did they inflict any injuries on your body?

A They again inflicted harm on my body so that I

would confess but I said to them that I cannot
confess because I have not done anything wrong.
Because of that, Visitacion squeezed my testicle
and Sgt. Mariano who is now assigned in Ilocos
Sur poked a piece of wire from battery of the
telephone and connected that wiring to my testicle,
with electric current, and then I trembled when I
was electrocuted with the wire of the battery of the
telephone. So, I lost consciousness because at the
same time they kept on boxing me.
Q Who were the PC soldiers who were maltreating
you that evening, of January 18, 1973, if you know?
A Sgt. Soriano, Zapanta, Legaspi, Abobo, Visitacion
and others whom I did not know because they have
no nameplates on their shirts and they were only
wearing military undershirts. (tsn, pp. 45-48, Ibid).
Isidro Buscato's testimony on this point finds corroboration on the letter-complaint
sent by Buscato's father to the President of the Philippines denouncing the PC
investigators for maltreating his son (Exhibit "2", p. 186, Rec.).
Clearly the court a quo in giving weight to the alleged oral confession of Isidro
Buscato.
The following circumstances further puts grave doubt on Isidro Buscato's
participation in the commission of the crime:
1. The prosecution's version of the incident, as established in the repudiated
extra-judicial confession of Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan (Exhibits "C" and "D", pp.
7-12, Rec.), is that Isidro Buscato stabbed Rodolfo Lim and after Buscato had
divested the deceased of his money and watch, Buscato brought the body of the
deceased towards the middle of the river to be carried away by the current of the
river. After the arrest of Buscato, two blue denim pants belonging to him were
sent to the National Bureau of Investigation and upon request of Fiscal Aquiles
Navajos, was examined to determine the presence of human blood. As per the
Biology Report of the NBI, the examination yielded a negative result (Exhibit "3"
Buscato, p. 187, Rec.). Considering the wound of the deceased, there must have
been profused bleeding. Yet, despite the fact that Buscato allegedly brought the
body of the deceased to the middle of the river, there was no trace at all of
human blood in Buscato's pants;

2. The crime was supposed to have been committed betwen 10:00 o'clock to
12:00 o'clock in the evening of January 12, 1973. Isidro Buscato was alleged to
have taken the money, watch and necklace of the deceased. If further appears
that Buscato was apprehended at 9:00 o'clock in the morning of January 13,
1973 (tsn, p. 21 January 30, 1974). There was, therefore, no opportunity by him
from the deceased nor to dispose of the watch and the necklace. Yet the crack
PC investigators were not able to recover any of the stolen articles.
Rebuttal testimonies
of Sgt. Soriano and
Vargas do not destroy
appellants' claim of
maltreatment.
Appellants Nestor Dalud and Isidro Buscato mentioned by name nine member of
the Philippine Constabulary who maltreated them with the sole purpose of
extracting their confessions, namely: Sgt. Soriano, Sgt. Vargas, Juansing
Legaspi, Cristy, Maniano, Abobo, Zapanta and Visitacion (tsn, pp. 19-21, 33, Jan.
14, 1974, Dalud; tsn. pp. 45-18, Jan. 30, 1974, Buscato). However, only Soriano
and Vargas were presented to rebut the testimonies of herein appellants. They
denied the appellants' allegation of maltreatment.
Assuming, arguendo, that Soriano and Vargas did not inflict bodily harm on the
appellants, how about the others? Not only were they not presented on rebuttal,
there is nothing in the testimony of Soriano and Vargas that would indicate that
the said persons were not present during the interrogation conducted on the
appellants or that there is nobody in their unit carrying such names. The failure of
the prosecution to present the said persons certainly lends authenticity to the
appellants' claim of maltreatment.
Thus, notwithstanding the rebuttal testimony of Soriano and Vargas, the claim of
Nestor Dalud and Isidro Buscato that they were physically abused by the aforementioned persons still stand firm. ... 6
Moreover, as indicated by the counsel for the appellants, the extrajudicial confession of Nestor
Dalud contained statements that are so inherently improbable that they could not have reflected
the truth. Thus, according to the alleged extrajudicial confession, after placing the victim in the
sack under the Quirino Bridge, Boy Buscato then pulled the sack into the middle of the river and
left it to float with the current of the river. Counsel for the appellants, however, showed that the
depth of the Rio Grande River near the bank during low tide is about two (2) fathoms
Consequently, it was physically impossible for a man of the height of Boy Buscato to have
waded into the middle of the river with the body of the deceased in tow. This is especially true
considering that the Rio Grande River is a very wide navigable river and that at the bank near
the Philippine Trade Center where the incident was supposed to have happened, is quite deep

since it is used as a berthing place of motor launches to load and unload their cargoes.
Appellants have likewise shown the improbability that the body of the deceased could have
floated downstream during the interval of about nine (9) hours for a distance of about one
kilometer, considering that according to medico-legal authorities, a dead body does not
immediately float because of its natural tendency to sink under water and it is only after the
body undergoes bacterial decomposition and thus accumulates gases that it rises to the surface
of the water and floats. It has been observed that "bacterial decomposition makes its
appearance in the first two days after submersion during the summer months." 7 There is no
medical testimony, however, to the effect that the body of the deceased was found in a stage of
decomposition or in a bloated condition.
On the basis of the record, We, therefore, find that the position taken by the Solicitor General is
fully justified. As early as the case of U.S. v. Sgt. De Leon, 8 this Court emphasized that courts
"are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed, unless they
are corroborated by other testimony." Here, independent of the afore-mentioned extrajudicial
confessions, there is no other evidence which would directly link the herein appellants to the
crime. It appears, moreover, that such confessions were procured by force, violence or threats.
They are, therefore, inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence to prove the guilt of the
appellants.
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The constitutional right of a person against self-incrimination precludes the use of confessions
obtained from him thru force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate his
free will. 9
The doctrine that one accused of crime cannot be compelled to testify against himself is
predicated upon principles of humanity and civil liberty. The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare had its origin in the protests against the abuses and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons in the inquisitorial Court of the Star Chamber. It was erected as
an additional barrier for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power. As
observed in an early case: 10
... While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an
accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under
investigation, the case with which the questions put to him may assume an
inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat
him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into
fatal contradictions, ... made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for
its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general
and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however
adopted, it has become finally embedded in English as well as in American

jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress

themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their
fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence,
became clothed in this country with impregnability of a constitutional
amendment. 11
The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege against self-incrimination "is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a 'fair stateindividual balance', to require the government 'to shoulder the entire load, 12 to respect the
inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual procure the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth." 13
As explained in U.S. v. Navarro, 14 this provision against self-incrimination was established on
grounds of "public policy and humanity of policy, because if the party were required to testify,
it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity,
because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress."
As noted by the Wickersham Commission in its report in 1931, "not only does the use of the
third degree involve a flagrant violation of law, but it involves also the dangers of false
confession, and it tends to make police and prosecutors less zealous in the search for objective
evidence. ... The third degree brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner against society, and
lowers the esteem in which the administration of justice is held by the public." 15
THE CRITERIA OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY
The constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of the police officers in obtaining the
confession was shocking, but whether the confession was free and voluntary; that is, it must not
be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
nor by the exertion of improper influence. 16 It has been recognized that "coercion can be mental
as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition." 17 As stated by Justice Fernando in People v. Bagsala, 18 any form
of coercion whether physical, mental or emotional renders a confession inadmissible. "What is.
essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing," In other
words, the person must not have been compelled to incriminate himself. As early as the case
of U. S. v. De Santos, 19 this Court, speaking thru Justice Trent, explained the rationale for the
rule rejecting the admissibility of forced confessions, thus:
If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a
full comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as
evidence and it then becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by
the presumption a very strong one that no person of normal mind will

deliberate and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime,

especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
... But if the accused shows that the confession was involuntary, as that term is
used with reference to confessions, the confession cannot be considered as
evidence of the guilt of the accused. His conviction must depend upon other
evidence. Involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts by some on the
ground that a confession so obtained is unreliable; and by some on the grounds
of humanitarian principles which adhor all forms of torture or unfairness toward
the accused in criminal proceedings. But either theory arrives at the same goal.
Such a confession is not legal evidence and must be rejected. If the accused
satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the confession stands
discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed. ...
It may be relevant to reiterate here the admonition to police authorities emphatically expressed
by Justice Fernando, while speaking for the Court, in People v. Bagsala, supra:
It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that the imperative
requirements of truth and humanity condemn the utilization of force and violence
to extract confessions from unwilling victims. Crimes must be punished and the
guilty must not be allowed to escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be
attained by unconstitutional means. There should be less than full respect for the
law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed. ... (at p. 244.)
This right against self-incrimination guaranteed in the fundamental charter cannot be abridged.
"If the government becomes a lawbreaker", once observed Justice Brandeis, "it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring
terrible retribution." 20
There is no question that cruel or degrading treatment to secure confessions from one
suspected of a crime seriously violates his fundamental human rights, the protection of which is
basic in a regime of law and justice.
We thus conclude that without such extrajudicial confessions the evidence of the prosecution
has failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants. 21
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is reversed and appellants Isidro (Boy) Buscato and
Nestor Dalud are ACQUITTED. No costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for the
institution of appropriate action against the persons responsible for the maltreatment of
appellants.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr. JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer
of Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy
really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic
impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and
within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for
economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from
the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue
to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their

death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of
the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in
favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is
the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and
the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the
State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L.
ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the
Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection
with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can

the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process
test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis
for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State,
is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted
to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there
has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be
no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and
prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which
from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or
citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live
in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced.
Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and
diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer,

because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within
the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human
body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the
communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.
He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little
gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store
with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred
and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he
forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and
extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him.
In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law
is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not
an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control
virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and

control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail
trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets

Year and
Retailers
Nationality

No.Establishment
s

Pesos

Gross Sales

Per cent
Distributio
n

Pesos

Per cent
Distributio
n

1941
:

Filipino .
.........

106,671 200,323,13
8

55.82 174,181,92
4

51.74

Chinese
...........

15,356 118,348,69
2

32.98 148,813,23
9

44.21

Others ..
..........

1,646 40,187,090

11.20 13,630,239

4.05

Filipino .
.........

111,107 208,658,94
6

65.05 279,583,33
3

57.03

Chinese
...........

13,774 106,156,21
8

33.56 205,701,13
4

41.96

1947
:

Others ..
.........

354

8,761,260

.49

4,927,168

1.01

1948 (Census
:
)

Filipino .
.........

113,631 213,342,26
4

67.30 467,161,66
7

60.51

Chinese
..........

12,087 93,155,459

29.38 294,894,22
7

38.20

Others ..
........

422 10,514,675

Filipino .
.........

3.32

9,995,402

1.29

113,659 213,451,60
2

60.89 462,532,90
1

53.47

Chinese
..........

16,248 125,223,33
6

35.72 392,414,87
5

45.36

Others ..
........

486 12,056,365

3.39 10,078,364

1.17

Filipino .
........

119,352 224,053,62
0

61.09 466,058,05
2

53.07

Chinese
..........

17,429 134,325,30
3

36.60 404,481,38
4

46.06

1949
:

1951
:

Others ..
........

347

8,614,025

2.31

7,645,327

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year and Retailer's

Nationality

Item
Assets
(Pesos)

Gross
Sales
(Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ...........................................
..

1,878

1,633

Chinese .........................................
.....

7,707

9,691

Others ............................................
...

24,415

8,281

Filipino ...........................................
..

1,878

2,516

1947:

87

1948:

Chinese .........................................
..

7,707

14,934

Others ............................................
..

24,749

13,919

Filipino ...........................................
..

1,878

4,111

Chinese .........................................
....

7,707

24,398

Others ............................................
..

24,916

23,686

Filipino ...........................................
..

1,878

4,069

Chinese .........................................
.....

7,707

24,152

Others ............................................
..

24,807

20,737

(Census)

1949:

1951:

Filipino ...........................................
..

1,877

3,905

Chinese .........................................
....

7,707

33,207

Others ............................................
...

24,824

22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through
their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very
many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests
more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official
report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks
that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by
respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance
and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail
trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution
were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien

interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern
of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but
of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of
the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom.
Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the
nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic
subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and
a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to
control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a
reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the
Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger
the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available
in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose
an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or
importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger
profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or
importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade
is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a

fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the
interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that
alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices,
the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they
have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial
scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded
essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the
Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public
from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control
laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a
law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for
price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control
prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to
boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful
restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax
laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export
prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also
believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful
diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the
existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do
not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among
nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution
of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no
allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or
emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution
is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay
here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or

purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that
spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes
his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and
countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found
necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's
economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient
and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function
of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which
they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise
of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike,
and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in
duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co.
(1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise
of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having

some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at
the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in
such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat.,
I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this
instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object
of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the
shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It
is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect
has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her
American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the
Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the
American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise,
that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of

hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has
declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with
"our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business
to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an
ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)
to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right
to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said
that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and
loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker,
pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs.
Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals,
the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game
Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial
fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with
Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of
ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the
discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the
persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights
have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82
Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreignborn unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court
found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from
the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States
hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in
this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or
capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059
(1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the

keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local
dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of
business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey
to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their
business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's
belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other
hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold
consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the
court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination
which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof
was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting
aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore
no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said,
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with
whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy,
except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national
owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many
occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than
borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without
the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So
it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our
fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign
born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part
of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so
that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was
without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate
discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78
L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must
not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the
police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the
first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a
sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men;
that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and

unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also
found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of
the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the
national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious
form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated
the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It
is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp.
1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test,
disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered
not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If
the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of
our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power
that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject
to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have
given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the
supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before
us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that
the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the
their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization
of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate
for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the
National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided
that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail
trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective
of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the
Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been
denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would
defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is
in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.

Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable.
These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown
out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there
is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be
general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in
page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly
included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308,
quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of
restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated.
While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute
reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in
connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves
suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the

more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also
contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the
principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of
the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have
been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition
provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of
the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It
cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The
objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the
Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations
Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade,
and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between

alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should
have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for
them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of
legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be
addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the
Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule
does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a
provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not
infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of
which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have
not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does
not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in
the Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they
did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it.
They assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act
allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business
or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is
not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the
existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The

prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes
first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such corporations is
subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent
legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and
partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence
as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business
is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or
administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their property without due process of law. To my mind,
the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of
the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the sixmonth period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to
liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the effect of the prohibition is
to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of
the business would be inadequate to reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of
the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail
business for the capital invested in it. The stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does
not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien
had built up during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such
business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law2 and that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws3 would
have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged
in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the end of the term of the existence of
the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners and within
six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the
ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain
constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and
prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands.4
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels
associations and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years
from the date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as
agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the
aliens engaged in the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the
business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
clauses of the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2128

May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF
CITY OF MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime
of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April
2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7,
1948, when the petition for habeas corpusfiled with this Court was heard, the petitioners were
still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of
Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in
division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official
information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the
Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if
there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question
involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not
the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of
manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of
our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding
arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in
said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to
order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a

public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by
law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal
Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial
officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to
deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was
no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice
empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention
of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by
law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code
provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed
upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the
provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest
or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon
which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can
not be construed as having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised
Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of
arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he
may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except
by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of
the complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a
public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is
authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested
pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the
detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the
duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal
ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, take the person arrested to the proper court orjudge for such action for they may deem
proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the
defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information
filed against him. He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence
presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his
favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to
writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any
person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived
of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the

custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or

order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario
sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be
released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed
to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant
of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the
detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40
Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off.
Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary
investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person
charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is
a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of
Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a
warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of
the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since
defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a
proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case
of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from
the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to
issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule
108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct
under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by
the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila,
because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper.
The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through
one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the
result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or
commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person
making the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the
person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or
judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17,
Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the
peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First
Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court
of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take
the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above

mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section
125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the
temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the
investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the
testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and
available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file
the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the
defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the
strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person
arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making
or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the
court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of
determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of
arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for
the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been
illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of
the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law.
What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of
Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he
finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person
charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though,
after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the
officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have
acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had
complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the
office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we
hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby
ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J.:, concurring:
Petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero were apprehended at 11:30 in the morning of
April 2, 1948, upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, for the crime of alleged robbery.
The fact is alleged expressly in respondent's answer supported by the affidavit of Benjamin
Dumlao (Exhibit 1), the patrolman who made the arrest. Therein it is also alleged that petitioners
were "finally" placed under arrest at 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. respectively, on the same day, April
2, l948.
The distinction between the two arrests, the apprehension made at 11:00 a.m. and the "final
arrest at 4:30 and 5:00 p.m., is purely academic or imaginary. There was but one arrest,
effected at 11:00 a.m., April 2, 1948, and continued without interruption until the petition had
been filed with us April 5, 1948, at the hearing on the next day. Until the moment we are writing
this opinion we have not heard that petitioners have been released at any time.
Respondents allege also that on April 3, 1948, at about 8:30 a.m., a criminal complaint was filed
with the fiscal's office of Manila, and that by said filing their duty to deliver arrested persons,
within six hours from their arrest, to a proper judicial authority has been duly complied with.
There is no dispute that no warrant of arrest has ever been issued for the apprehension of
petitioners.
Petitioners pray for their immediate release, alleging that, as the six-hour period provided in
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code had expired, their continued detention is illegal.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of arresto mayor or in its
maximum period toreclusion temporal, or from 4 months and 11 days to 20 years imprisonment,
for the crime of a public officer or employee who, after detaining a person, "shall fail to deliver
such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Both parties implying from the above provision that after six hours of said failure, petitioners
shall be entitled to be released, discussed the question whether there is such failure or not.
Upon the very facts alleged by respondents and supported by documentary evidence
accompanying it, there should not be any dispute that there is such failure.
(a) Respondents have not delivered the persons of petitioners to any authority, and much less to
any judicial authority.
(b) Their filing of a complaint with the office of the fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons
of petitioners. Said persons are not a complaint. A complaint, whether oral or written, can never
be elevated to the category of the person. No one is crazy enough to confuse or identify a
person with a complaint.

(c) Even in the false hypothesis that respondents, by filing the complaint, intended to make a
delivery of the persons of petitioners, if not actually, constructively, the fiscal's office is not a
judicial authority.
(d) Under our Constitution and laws, judicial authorities comprehend only courts of justice, such
as the Supreme Court and all other inferior Court, and justices and judges. The authority
possessed and exercised by judicial authorities is judicial, and the Constitution(section 1, Article
VIII) vests the judicial power exclusively "in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
may be established by law."
Respondents' pretension in making the fiscal of Manila a judicial authority is absolutely
groundless, upon the clear letter of the fundamental law. Counsel for respondents himself had to
admit that said officer belongs to the administrative or executive department. Under the tripartite
system of the government established by the Constitution, it is extreme absurdity to make an
administrative or executive officer, or any officer of the executive department or branch, a
judicial authority. Such will make of separation of powers a madman's illusion.
That a fiscal is not a judicial authority has been unmistakably declared in the decision in Lino vs.
Fugoso, L-1159, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214. The statement made therein that there was yet no purpose
of deciding whether a fiscal is a judicial authority or not, is just a rhetorical figure that is a judicial
authority or not, is just a rhetorical figure that should not deceive any one. All those who can
read, will that the decision has made the declaration. It is there stated in plain language that the
fiscal is "unlike" a judicial authority.
"Unlike" means, as an elementary school student knows, not like, dissimilar, diverse, different.
No warrant of arrest having been issued by any competent tribunal for the apprehension of
petitioners, said apprehension appears to be illegal.
At any rate, even under the hypothesis that it was legal and continued to be so for six hours, this
time having expired seven days ago, the continued detention and confinement of petitioners is
clearly illegal, and not only illegal but criminal, involving an offense committed by public officers
and heavily punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Regarding the question as to legality of the arrest, counsel for respondents has advanced the
shocking theory that police officers may arrest any person just for questioning or investigation,
without any warrant of arrest.
The theory is absolutely unconstitutional and could have been entertained only under the
"Kempei" system implanted by the brutal Japanese army occupation. Such theory represents an
ideology incompatible with human dignity. Reason revolts against it.
Respondents are ordered, upon notice of the decision, to immediately release the two
petitioners and to report to this Court the time when the release shall have been effected.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I dissent on the grounds stated in my dissent in Lino vs. Fugoso et al., Off. Gaz., 1214.

RESOLUTION

August 27, 1948

FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision which holds that the phrase "judicial
authority" used in the article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, to whom a person arrested without
warrant shall be delivered by the officer making the arrest within the period of six hours from the
arrest, means a competent court or judge, and the City Fiscal is not such a judicial authority.
We have already held, in the United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472,477-479, that the
provisions of the Provisional Law for the application of the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code
in the Philippines by Royal Decree of September 4, 1884, are in force of this Islands insofar as
they have not been repealed or amended by implication by the enactment of the body of laws
put in force in these Islands since the change from Spanish to American sovereignty. According
to the ruling of this court in said case, a person may be arrested without warrant in the cases
specified in Rules 27 and 28 of said provisional law and section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of
Manila). The provisions of said Rules 27 and 28 are substantially the same of those contained in
section 6 Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which superseded them; and the provisions of section
37 of Act No. 183 above reffered to have been incorporated in section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Both section 6 of Rule 109, and the pertinent provisions of said section
2463 of the Revised Administrative Code are now the laws in force on the subject.
Article 30 of said Provisional Law for the application of the Penal Law in the Philippines also
provides:
The executive authorities or the agents detaining a person shall release the same or
else turn him over to the judicial authorities within twenty four hours after the arrest if
made in the head town of the district, or within as brief a period as the distance and
transportation facilities permit.
And the next article 31 of the same law reads as follows:
Within twenty four hours after the person arrested has been surrendered to the
competent judge of Court of First Instance, the latter shall order the commitment or
release of the prisoner by warrant containing the grounds on which it is based (auto
motivado).
If it is impossible to do so because of the complexity of the facts, the number of
defendants or any other serious cause, which must be made of record, the time of

detention may be extended to three days. Upon the expiration of that period of time the
judge shall order the commitment or the release of the defendant. The warrant of
commitment shall be ratified after the defendant has been heard within the period of
sixty two hours from the time the defendant has been committed to prison.
Said Rule 30 has been modified by section 17, Rule 109, which provides that "Any person
making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay and within the time prescribed
in the Revised Peal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action
as they may deem proper to take," and by article 125 of the Revised Penal Code already
quoted.
But the provisions of Rule 31 above quoted are still in force because they may have not been
repealed, either expressly or by implication, by any law or the present Rules of Court, except the
last sentence, thereof which is no longer in force. The procedure of hearing the accused after he
has been committed to prison referred to in said last sentence, is a sort preliminary investigation
by the judge or justice of the peace according to the present procedure. Persons arrested or
accused in the City of Manila are not entitled to such investigation. In provinces the justice of the
peace or judge shall, according to section 2 of Act No. 194, "make the preliminary investigation
of the charge as speedily as may be consistent with the right and justice, but in any event he
must make the investigation within three days of the time the accused was brought before him,
unless the accused or complainant shall ask for delay in order that witnesses may be obtained,
or for other good and sufficient reason, in which event a continuance for a reasonable time may
be allowed." This provision of section 2 of Act No. 194 is still in force, because no law has been
enacted amending or repealing it. (Marcos vs. Cruz [May 13, 1939] 1st Supp., 40 Off. Gaz., 174,
182.) The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure do not undertake to dispose of all subjects of
preliminary investigation, and repeal all laws on the subject not incorporated therein; especially
those that, like the said provisions of section 2, Act No. 194, confer substantive rights upon
defendants which can not be diminished, increased or modified by the Rules of Court (section
13, Article VIII, of the Constitution).
In view of the provisions of section 17, Rule 109, Rule 31 of the Provisional Law, article 204 of
the old Penal Code, from which article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was taken, and section 1
(3) Article III of the Constitution, there can be no doubt that the judicial authority within the
meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code must be a judge who has authority to issue a
written warrant of commitment or release containing the ground on which it is based (auto
motivado). Because said section 17 of Rule 109 expressly provides that the officer making the
arrest without warrant shall, within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the
person arrested to acourt or judge for such action as the latter may deem proper to take; Rule
31 expressly states that, within twenty four hours or at most three days after the person arrested
has been delivered to the judge of Court of First Instance (and also the justice of the peace
now), the latter shall order the commitment or release of the prisoner by a warrant containing
the ground upon which the commitment or release is based (auto motivado); article 204 of the
Penal Code (not incorporated in the Revised Penal Code), penalize the judicial authority or
judge who fails to comply with the provisions of said Rule 31; and section 1(3) Article III of the
Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affidavit of the complainant and witnesses he may
produce," in order to safeguard "the right of the people to be secured in their person ... against
unreasonable seizure" or detention for a longer period than that fixed or considered by law as
reasonable (six hours according to section 125 of the Revised Penal Code).

It is obvious that the city fiscal is not a city judge, and has no power to issue order or
commitment or release by a written warrant containing the ground on which it is based. As a
matter of fact the city fiscal has never exercised such power since that office was created. In
justice to the city fiscal, we have to state that the latter did not and does not contend in his
motion for reconsideration that it has the power to issue such a warrant, as contended in the
dissenting opinion.
To consider a city fiscal as a judicial authority within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, would be to place a person arrested in provinces without warrant in a better
position than those arrested in the City of Manila. Because, as there is no law requiring the city
fiscal to act or file an information against such person within a limited period of time, after the
arresting officer has taken the prisoner to the city fiscal within six hours, the prisoner may be
held under detention without any warrant for days and weeks and possibly months until such
time as the city fiscal may take action, either by releasing the prisoner without filing any
information, or filing an information with the proper city court and obtain a warrant of
commitment. While a person arrested outside of the City of Manila has to be delivered by the
arresting person or peace officer to the competent judge within six hours after his arrest, and the
latter shall have to investigate the charge and issue a warrant of release or commitment of the
prisoner within the period of twenty four hours or at most three days prescribed in said article 31
of the Provisional Law.
It is obvious that the surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without
warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation
or charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or
judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of
the prisoner, because the arresting officer can not transfer to the judge and the latter does not
assume the physical custody of the person arrested. And in the City of Manila it does consist in
delivering physically the body of the prisoner to the city fiscal, for the latter will not assume the
responsibility of being the custodian of the prisoner; nor in making or lodging a complaint
against him with the said fiscal, because the latter has no power to order the commitment or
release of the prisoner by a warrant containing the ground on which it is based (auto motivado).
Such delivery is a legal one and consists in making a charge or filing a complaint against the
prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces, and
in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts after an
investigation if the evidence against said person so warrants. Upon the filing of such information
will the prisoner be deemed deliver to a judicial authority in the City of Manila within the meaning
of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
The city court or judge need not make an investigation of the facts alleged in the information,
which the judge or justices of the peace in provinces have to make before issuing the proper
warrant, because the law vest the power in the city fiscal, but said city judge shall determine
only the legal question whether said facts constitute an offense or violation of ordinances, and
issue a warrant of commitment if they do, or of release if they do not.
As a peace officer can not deliver directly the person arrested to the city courts, he shall deliver
him to said court through the city fiscal, and if the latter does not take the prisoner in time to the
latter so that the proper investigation may be made and information filed within six hours, he has
to release the prisoner in order to avoid criminal liabilty for violation of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. The city fiscal is not an agent of the arresting officer, but as prosecuting officer, he
will be recreant to his duty if he does not do his best to make the investigation and file the

corresponding information in time against the person arrested without warrant, in order to effect
the delivery of the prisoner to the city courts within the period of six hours prescribed by law, and
thus prevent his being released by the officer making the arrest. If the city fiscal does not file the
information within said period of time and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner
beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for violation of said article 125,
because he is not the one who arrested and illegally detained the person arrested, unless he
has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the
expiration of said period.
Section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code which specifies the powers and duties of chief
of police of the City of Manila, authorizes the latter "to take good and sufficient bail for the
appearance before the city court of any person arrested for violation of any city
ordinance: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise this power in cases of violation of any
penal law except when the fiscal of the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be required of
the person arrested." These provisions do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the
city fiscal to order the detention of the prisoner if bond is not given, not only because they refer
to the powers of the chief of police of Manila and not of the city fiscal, but because the only
incidental authority granted to the latter is to recommend the granting of the bail to be required
of the person arrested for violation of any penal law in order that the chief of police may release
the latter on bail. If no bail is given by the person arrested, neither the chief of police, who is
only authorized to release on bail, has power to detain the person arrested for more than six
hours; nor the city fiscal, who is only empowered to fix and recommend the bail to the chief of
police, has authority to order the detention of persons arrested for violation of a penal law.
The above-quoted provisions of section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code refers
evidently to persons arrested without warrant, for accused arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the courts may be released on bail only by order of the court or judge that issued the warrant
and has exclusive jurisdiction or control over the person arrested. The purpose of the law in
empowering the chief of police of Manila to release the prisoner if he sets up a bail, is to relieve
the officer making the arrest from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal, and the
latter from filing an information with the proper courts within the period of time prescribed by law.
The dissenting opinion calls a general principle of law an excerpt of the Corpus Juris Secundum
quoted therein which says that "the officer however need not necessarily have personal
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense in the sense of having seen or witnessed the
offense himself, but he may if there are no circumstances known to him by which materially
impeach his information, acquire his knowledge from information imparted to him by reliable and
credible third persons or by the information together with other suspicious circumstances" (6
C.J.S., 599, 600), and after the quotation adds: "This is a common law rule implanted in the
Philippines along with its present form of government, a rule which has been cited and applied
by this Court in a number of cases (U. S.vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil.,
46; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516).
The above-quoted excerpt is not a general principle of law or a common law rule implanted in
the Philippines. It is a summary of the ruling of several State courts based on statutory
exceptions of the general rule. "It is the general rule, although there are statutory exceptions
and variations, that a peace officer has no right to make an arrest without a warrant, upon a
mere information of a third person" (5 C.J., p. 404), because "statutes sometime authorize
peace officer to make arrest upon information" (4 Am. Jur., p. 17). In none of the cases cited in
the dissenting opinion has this Court quoted and applied it. In U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472,

this Court, after quoting Rules 27 and 28 of the "Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal
Law" and section 37, Act No. 183, as the law in force in force in these Islands providing for
cases in which a person may be arrested without a warrant, said:
These provisions quite clearly set out the powers usually conferred by American and
English law upon "peace officers" including "constables," in making arrests without
warrants; and since similar powers are clearly included in the powers conferred upon
"agents of authority" in the above cited articles of the "Provisional Law," there can be no
doubt that the Commission, in imposing the duty of maintaining order and preserving
and protecting life and property within their respective barrios upon municipal councilors
and their lieutenants of barrios, conferred upon such officials authority to make arrests
without warrant not less extensive than that conferred upon peace officers in Manila in
the above-cited provisions of the Manila Charter. (United States vs. Vallejo, No. 4367,
decided by this court on September 3, 1908; also United States vs. Burgueta, 10 Phil.,
188.) (Emphasis ours.)
The case of U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516, one of the cases cited in the last paragraph of the
dissenting opinion, does not contain anything about the implantation in these Islands of the socalled common law rule. In the case of U.S. vs. Battallones (not Ballesteros) 23 Phil., 46, cited
also therein, this Court, following the ruling in U.S. vs. Fortaleza, said:
In a former case we held that officials in these Islands, who, "by direct provisions of law
or by appointment of competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property," have authority to make arrests
without warrant substantially similar to the authority generally conferred upon "peace
officers" in the United States, and more especially that class of `peace officers' known to
American and English law as constables; and that "the provisions of section 37 of Act
No. 183" (the Charter of Manila) "quite clearly set forth the powers usually conferred by
American and English law upon "peace officers" including "constables" in making arrests
without warrants," and provide that they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender,
when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view".
(U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12, Phil., 472, 479.)
And in the case of U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, this Supreme Court has reiterated the ruling in
the previous cases and held:
The powers of peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as those
conferred upon constables under the Anglo-American Common Law. The extent of their
authority to make arrests without warrant and the limitations thereon, as held by the
Supreme Court, are as stated in the language of the Legislature in the Charter of the
City of Manila. (U.S. vs. Fortaleza [1909], 12 Phil., 472). The Administrative Code
(section 2204, edition of 1916; section 2258, edition of 1917) enjoins municipal
policemen to "exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses".
The provisions above quoted of section 37 of Act No. 183 have been incorporated in section
2463 of the Revised Administrative Code and those of Rules 27 and 28 were substantially

incorporated in section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court. Section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code reads as follows:
SEC. 2463. Police and other officers Their powers and duties. The mayor, the chief
and assistant chief of police, the chief of the secret service, and all officers and members
of the city police and detective force shall be peace officers. Such peace officers are
authorized ... to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious
places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person
has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace; to arrest or
cause to be arrested, without warrant, any offender when the offense is committed in the
presence of a peace officer or within his view;
And section 6 of Rule 109 provides:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant When lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
These are the only provisions of law in force these Islands which enumerate the cases in which
a peace officer may arrest a person without warrant, and the so called common law relating to
other cases of arrest without warrant cited in the dissenting opinion has no application in this
jurisdiction. Therefore, all the considerations set forth in the said opinion about the disastrous
consequences which this Court's interpretation of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code will
bring to a law enforcement, because "the entire six hours might be consumed by the police in
their investigation alone," or that "even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned
task at the beginning of the six hours period, this time can not insure proper and just
investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and
witnesses are not at hand to testify," since "the police is not authorized to round up the
witnesses and take them along with the prisoner to the city fiscal," are without any foundation.
Because they are premised on the wrong assumption that, under the laws in force in our
jurisdiction, a peace officer need not have personal knowledge but may arrest a person without
a warrant upon mere information from other person. "The right to make arrests without a
warrant is usually regulated by express statute, and except as authorized by such statutes, an
arrest without a warrant is illegal." (5 C.J., pp. 395, 396.) And statutory construction extending
the right to make arrest without a warrant beyond the cases provided by law is derogatory of the
right of the people to personal liberty (4 Am. Jur., p. 17).
The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding information in
cases of persons arrested without a warrant, does not require so much time as that made upon
a complaint of the offended parties for the purpose of securing a warrant of arrest of the

accused. In all cases above enumerated in which the law authorizes a peace officer to arrest
without warrant, the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge that the person
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence
or within his view, or of the time, place or circumstances which reasonably tend to show that
such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace. And the
testimony of such officer on the commission of the offense in his presence or within his view by
the person arrested, or on the facts and circumstances that tend reasonably to show that said
person has committed or is about to commit an offense, would be sufficient evidence or basis
for the city fiscal to file an information without prejudice to his presenting of their evidence or
witness, if any, during the trial to insure the conviction of the defendant. If the city fiscal does not
believe the testimony of the officer making the arrest or consider it sufficient, or has any doubt
as to the probability of the prisoner having committed the offense charged, and is not ready to
file an information against him on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, there
would be no legal reason or ground for him to wait until further evidence may be secured before
dismissing the case against the prisoner, or detaining the person arrested without warrant
without violating the precept of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
After the release of the prisoner, the city fiscal may make or continue the investigation and file
afterwards the proper information against him with the corresponding court, if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to secure a warrant of arrest of the same. Of course, as we
have said in our decision for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of a peace officer
detaining a person for a longer period of time than the six hours prescribed by article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, "the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make
the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration."
The period originally fixed by our Penal Code was twenty four (24) hours, and if the city fiscal
believes that the period now prescribed by article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is short, and
that the law must be amended so as to extend it, it would be proper for the interested parties to
take the case to Congress, since it can not be done by judicial legislation.
Motion for reconsideration is denied.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

PERFECTO, J.:
We agree with the above resolution except that which may be at variance with our concurring
opinion in this case and with our written opinion in the case of Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, 43 Off.
Gaz., 1214.

BRIONES, M., concurring:

Estoy enteramente conforme con la resolucion. En la opinion concurrente que dicte en el
asunto de Lino contraFuguso y otros (43 off. Gaz., 1235, 1244) donde se discutio por primera

vea el importante punto legal debatido en el presente asunto, dije lo siguiente y lo reafirmo en
esta ocasion, saber:
Sin discutir la responsabilidad de la Fiscalia por la demora si esta se puede o no
justificar administrativamente es cuestion que no nos compete considerar ni resolver
vamos a limitarnos a comentar y discutir la fase juridica legal. Esta en orden
naturalmente el hacer la siguiente pregunta: es correcta, es acertada la asercionde que
el "Promotor Fiscal de Manila es un funcionario judicial (judicial officer)," que, por tanto,
la entrega al mismo de la persona de undetenido dentro del periodo de 6 horas equivale
a la entrega a las autoridades judiciales correspondentes (proper judicial authorities) de
que habla el ariticulo 125 del codigo penal revisado? Creemos que no: no por su letra ni
por su espiritu puede aplicarse por extension la fraseologia de ese articulo al Fiscal de
la Ciudad de Manila o a cualquier otro Fiscal; ese articulo no puede referirse mas que a
un tribunal, a u juzgado, se municipal, sea de primera instancia. Asi que story de
perfecto acuerdo con la ponencia cuando positivamente sienta la doctrina de que "si
bien un arresto puede hacerse sin orden cuando hay motivos razonalbes apra ello (regla
109, articulo 6, reglamento de los tribunales), el detenido no puede ser recluido fuera del
periodo prescrito por la ley, a menos que una orden de arresto se obtenga antes de un
tribunal competente" (veanse las autoridades que se citan), y que "en el presente caso
el Fiscal de la Ciudad no tenia autoridad para expedir ordenes de arresto y carecia de
facultad para convalidar tal detencion ilegal con solo presentar las querellas, o con una
orden de su propia cuenta, ora tacita, ora expresa" (veanse asimismo las authoridades
que se citan).
De lo dicho se sigue que cuando la policia entrega a la Fiscalia de la ciudad despues del
periodo de 6 horas prescrito por la ley los papeles sobre un detenido arestado sin previa
orden al efecto, no por ello se cura la ilegalidad del arresto y detencion, sino que dicha
ilegalidad continua y persiste hasta que el Fiscal presenta la querella y obtiene una
orden de arresto del tribunal competente, o que, tratandose de delito, mediante la
prestacion de una fianza cuya cuantia se fijare y recommendare por dicho Fiscal, la
policia soltare al detenido, a tenor de lo previsto en el articulo 2460 del codigo
administrativo.
Puede ocurrir, sin embargo, que la policia entregue los papeles a la Fiscalia de la ciudad
dentro del periodo de 6 horas, pero que la Fiscalia no solo deja pasar dicho periodo, sin
que transcurren dias, hasta semanas sin actuar sobre el caso en uno u otro sentido. La
cuestion en orden naturalmente es la siguiente: es legal o ilegal la detencion del
arrestado en tal caso? En otras palabras: queda suspenidod el periodo de 6 horas
durante el tiempo que el Fiscal de la Ciudad tarda en actuar sobre el caso? La
contestacion tiene queser necesariamente negativa. La rigidez., la inflexibilidad del
periodo de 6 horas reza no solo para la policia, sinohast para cualquier otra agencia o
ramo oficial, sin excluir a la Fiscalia de la ciudad de Manila. Si por cualquier motivo la
Fiscalia dejare de actuar dentro de dicho periodo, el deber de la policia o del que tenga
la custodia del detenido es soltarle, quiera o no quiera el Fiscal, lo recomiende o no lo
recomiende. De otra manera, la restriccion que estatuye la ley a favor de los detenidos
sin previa orden de arresto restriccion que implementa las garantias de la libertad
establecidas en la Constitucion resultaria un mito. La filosofia de la ley es, a saber:
solamente se verifica un arresto sin previa orden cuando hay motivos razonalbes para
ello, v. gr., cuando un individuo es cogido in fraganti cometiendo un delito. La ley
presupone, por tanto, que el Estado tiene a mano todos los elementos necesarios para

decider que accion ha de tomar dentro del periodo de 6 horas, ya entregando la persona
del detenido a las autoridades judicales correspondientes mediante la querella
procedente, a tenor del articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado: ya poniendole en
libertad provisional bajo una fianza razonable, de acuerdo con el citado articulo 2460 del
Codigo Administrativo; o ya poniendole compoletamente en la calle por falta de meritos
en el caso. Si ninguna de estas cosas puede hacer el Estado en 6 horas no puede ser
mas que por dos motivos: o poor que se quiere cometer una arbitrariedad, o la
maquinaria oficial se halla en un deplorable estado de confusion, indeptitud of
impotencia.
Se arguye con enfasis que bajo esta interpretacion la prosecucion del crimen sufriria un
serio quebranto, sobre todo en la Ciudad de Manila; que materialmente la Fiscalia no
puede actuar adecuadamente sobre algunos casos en el plazo percentorio de 6 horas.
Si esto es verdad el remedio no es infringer la ley como cosa inevitable, rutinaria; el
remedio seria o recabar de la Legislatura que se reforme la ley en la forma que se
estime conveniente, o implementar ya perfeccionar la maquinaria de la prosecucion
criminal, colocandola a la altura de las circunstancias. No hay nada mas anarquico, mas
subversivo y fatal para el principio de la autoridad y del buen gobierno que el tener leyes
que no se cumplen, leyes que se infringen hasta por los llamados a ponerlas en vigor.
"To be or not to be, that is the question." O existe la ley y hay que cumplirla; o si la ley es
mala o impracticable, hay que reformarla o derogarla. Lo que no se debe permitir es el
disolvente espectaculo de la diaria inobservancia de la ley.
Se me ocurre ahora aadir otras observaciones en refuerzo de la arriba transcritas. Creo que ni
siquiera es necesario enmendar la ley en el sentido de alargar el periodo de 6 horas provisto en
el articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado. Creo que con un poco mas de esfuerzo y buena
voluntad la presente ley se podria cumplir en la Ciudad de Manila. La Fiscalia de la Ciudad
podria, por ejemplo, establecer turnos semanales o mensuales, segun como se estime
conveniente, destinando fiscales que se hagan cargo exclusivamente de los casos de
individuos detenidos sin previa orden de arresto, para los efectos de presentar la
correspondiente querella contra ellos, o de soltarlos si se viere que no existen meritos
suficientes para la prosecucion, sin perjuicio desde luego de ulteriores procedi mientos. Si para
realizar satisfactoriamente este trabajo fuese necesario aumentar el personal de la Fiscalia, yo
no creo que el gobierno escatimaria el dinero para una atencion tan importante.
Esincreible que dentro de 6 horas si hay voluntad de trabajar y sobre todo de hacer buena y
efectiva la ley la Fiscalia no pueda hacr su composicion de lugar en tales casos, bien para
proseguir, bien para no proseguir, de finitivamente o en el entretanto. Hay que tener en cuenta
que se trata de casos en que el individuo es detenido, ora porque ha sido sorprendido in
fraganti cometiendo una infraccion o un delito, ora poroque se le ha cogido " en lugares
sospechosos o bajo cirunstancias sospechosas, que tiendan razonablemente a demostrar que
el mismo ha cometido o esta para cometer cualquier crimen o atentado contra el orden y la
paz" (E. U. contrafortaleza, 12 Jur. 486). Que es lo que neceista entonces la Fiscalia en tales
casos? No esta alli el testimonio del policia, constabulario o agente del orden aprehensor? De
modo que la cuestion, en ultimo resultado, es que la Fiscalia tenga o no fe en la integridd y
verracidad del agente de la ley. Si la tiene que motivo hay para no formular inmediatamente la
querella y obtener asi del juzgado la correspondiente orden de arresto? Y si no la tiene que
razon hay para pisotear la libertad individual reteniendo la causa sin accion mas alla de las 6
horas y causando asi una inecesaria vejacion al ciudadano?

La cuestion se puede simplificar mas todavia. Todo se reduce, en ultimo termino, a que la
Fiscalia pueda contar con la ayda de una policia eficiente, integra y honrada sobre todo, que
persiga el crimen si cuartel, pero que tenga el maximo respeto a los derechos del ciudadano. Si
la Fiscalia puede tener un modus vivendi con una policcia de semejante tipo y de tales quilates,
no hay miedo de que una rigida observancia del requerimiento legal de 6 horas facilitie la
inmunidad de los tulisanes, bandidos, gangsters y criminales del bajo mundo, y se ponga en
grave peligro la eficaz prosecucion del crimen y la seguridad y sosiego del pueblo. Dentro de
las 6 horas hay tiempo mas que suficiente para meter en cintura a toda la canalla ... pero por
Dios que no se violen ni pisoteen las garantias consitucionales por miedo a los gansters!
Desde luego que se debe dar cierto margen de viabilidad a la ley. Por ejemplo, si se verifica
una detencion sin previa orden de arresto a medianoche, creo que la ley estaria cumplida si en
las primeras horas de la maana siguiente se tomara enseguida accion, aungque ello
rebassara un poquito el periodo de 6 horas.
Se deniega la mocion de reconsideracion.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
In my dissent from the decision of this Court I contended myself with citing my dissenting
opinion in Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1197, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214, 1246, as grounds for my disagreement.
As the present decision has gone farther than that decision and contains new statements and
conclusions, I deem it convenient to enlarge on my dissent.
The term "judicial officers" has been defined to be, in its popular sense, officers of a court
(Hitt vs. State, Miss. 181, So. 331) and in its strict sense, "judges and justices of all courts and
all persons exercising judicial powers by virtue of their office." (Settle vs. Van Evrea, 49 N.Y.,
280.) The city fiscal is a judicial officer in both senses. In the popular or larger sense, he is a
judicial officer because he is a part of the legal machinery created for the administration of
justice. A prosecuting attorney, charged with the administration of justice and invested with
important discretionary power in a motion for a nolle prosequi, is a judicial officer. (State ex rel.
Freed vs. Circuit Court of Martin Country, Ind., 14 N.E. 2d 910; State vs. Ellis, 112 N.E., 98, 100;
184 Ind., 307.)
In the strict legal sense, the city fiscal is a judicial officer when making preliminary examination
because he performs the function of a justice of the peace assuming, as the majority seem to
assume, that the conduct of preliminary examination is a judicial function. By express provision
of section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, the city fiscal "shall cause to be
investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the
necessary information or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." In
addition, section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court states that "every justice of the peace,
municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all
offenses alleged to have been committed, within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court
of First Instance."

The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of
arrest. The power to issue warrant of arrest is not essential ingredient of a judicial office. This is
especially so when, as in cases like the present, the accused is already under arrest when the
city fiscal intervenes and there is no need of issuing an order of arrest. As to power to commit a
detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are not exactly right when they
affirm that the city fiscal is not clothed with it. I shall come to this later.
However that may be, the city fiscal is a "judicial authority" within the contemplation of article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. This is the inevitable result from the fact that in the City of
Manila, the city fiscal under the existing scheme of the government is the only officer to whom
the person arrested without warrant may be presented. The majority opinion admits that the
municipal court and the Court of First Instance of Manila "do not make or conduct a preliminary
investigation proper," and criminal complaints are not filed with them but with the city fiscal.
Reasoning from another angle, we reach the same conclusion. We are to presume that in using
the generic term "judicial authorities" and in plural instead of more specific word "justice,"
"judge," or "court", the lawmaker intended to include in the operation of the article under
consideration all officers who are named to receive the prisoner from the arresting officer. We
have to adopt this construction if we are to give effect to the law and the rule of court I have
cited, and if we are to avoid what I might call, without meaning offense, an absurdity.
Under no canon of statutory construction is there justification for this Court's opinion that the
police and the city fiscal have to share the six hours fixed in article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. The language, the nature and the object of this provision unerringly point to the theory
that the six hours mentioned in the Revised Penal Code are meant exclusively for the police
officer who made the arrest. I can discern absolutely no indication of any intention to have the
city fiscal squeeze in his action within this brief period, a period which, in many cases, is not
even sufficient for the police. Read separately or in conjunction with the entire criminal
procedure, article 125 does not furnish the slightest indication of legislative intent to place the
city fiscal and the police under the same category. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was
devised for one purpose; section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 2, Rule
108, of the Rules of Court for another. Article 125 is a penal provision designed to prevent and
punish police abuses for which the police are noted. The investigation by the city fiscal is strictly
and essentially procedural. It is an integral part of the procedure for bringing the case to trial.
Little reflection will disclose the disastrous consequences which this Court's interpretation of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code will bring to law enforcement. It nullifies the role of the
fiscal in the administration of criminal law. For sheer lack of time, the release of the prisoner
arrested without warrant will, in a great number of cases, be inevitable, unless the city fiscal files
charges without sufficient and adequate investigation. The alternative will be for the city fiscal to
be on a 24-hour watch lest in his sleep the time for him to act might slip by.
But this is only a poor alternative. Regardless of any vigilance on his part the opportunity for the
city fiscal to make the required investigation cannot always be assured. The law gives the police
absolute power to detain a prisoner for six hours without incurring penal liability. There is no law
which obliges the police to take the prisoner to the city fiscal before the expiration of six hours
from the time of arrest. There can be cases where the entire six hours might be consumed by
the police in their investigation alone, or just in the chasing, collection and transportation to the
police station of the law breakers. This can happen in tumultuous and other mob offenses in
which many people are involved and there is necessity of screening the guilty ones.

Supposing then that the police should deliver the prisoner or prisoners to the city fiscal at the
last minute of the six hours through the negligence or by force of circumstances, what time is
there for this functionary to comply with his duty? And even if the city fiscal be given the chance
to start his assigned task at the beginning of the six hour period, can this time insure proper and
just investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous
and witnesses are not on hand to testify? It is well to remember that the police are not
authorized to round up witnesses and take them along with the prisoners to the city fiscal.
In the light of these consequences I can not imagine that the meaning which this Court attaches
to article 125 of the Revised Penal Code so much as entered the thought of the legislature. No
sound-minded legislature could have intended to create such situation, which is easy to
perceive unless we assume that the legislative purpose was to tie up the hands of the law and
give lawlessness full sway; unless the legislature wanted to coddle and pamper lawless
elements to a calamitous extreme. When the Court says that the prisoner, after being released
at the end of six hours from the time of his arrest may be rearrested should the city fiscal find
sufficient evidence and prefer charges against him, it takes for granted that underworld
characters and hardened criminals are honorable men who would keep themselves ready and
handy for a second arrest.
The Court says:
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for
a period longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient
ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after
the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a
court or judge.
What is that "proper process" referred to in the above quoted portion of the decision? Whatever
is meant by "proper process," we should note that there is no fundamental difference between
the proceeding before a justice of the peace and the procedure followed by the city fiscal. There
is nothing important the justice of the peace may do in the interest of the accused in the cases
triable before the Court of First Instance which the city fiscal may not do. If the city fiscal can not
issue an order of arrest, the justice of the peace himself does not do so to give the detention the
stamp of legality. At least, I am aware of no law which tells him to take this step, and I can see
no material advantage which an accused could derive from this ceremony. All the justice of the
peace does which matters to the accused is admit him to bail, if the crime be bailable, and
proceed to an investigation.
But the city fiscal does just that; and if the necessary to order the commitment of the prisoner
pending ascertainment of his guilt, the city fiscal no less than the justice of the peace or judge of
first instance has the authority also, as I propose to show later. In actual practice, a person
arrested without warrant in a regular municipality frequently suffers greater injustice and is
subject to, and frequently goes through, greater hardships than his counterpart in the City of
Manila. We are witness to the common spectacle of cases being dismissed on motion of the
provincial fiscal for want of sufficient evidence after the prisoner had been bound by the justice
of the peace over to the Court of First Instance for trial and after he had languished in jail for
months or years. Prisoner's detention in that case is not considered illegal.

This anomaly seldom takes place in cities where the preliminary investigation is entrusted to the
city fiscal. Rarely in the City of Manila is a case dropped for insufficiency of evidence after it has
been determined in a preliminary investigation that the prisoner should be held for trial. On the
whole, the method by which the preliminary investigation is conducted by the prosecuting
attorney is more conducive to efficiency, minimizes or eliminates conflicts of opinion in the
existence of probable cause, and better insures prompt dispatch of criminal cases to the lasting
benefit of the prisoner. Only physical impossibility, as I understand it, is in the way for the
adoption of this method throughout the country.
It is a mistake, in my humble judgment, to confuse a prisoner's detention during the six-hour
period fixed in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and his continued detention after he is
turned over to the city fiscal. As I have said, article 125 regulates the time within which a police
officer may hold the prisoner under his responsibilty, and it applies to the police alone. It will
hardly be contended that this article, or any other law, or the constitution limits the period within
which a prisoner may be detained after he is delivered to the justice of the peace. If that is so,
and since the city fiscal acts in lieu of a justice of the peace, there is no sound basis, legal or
practical, for denying to the former the same time and the same freedom of action that is
enjoyed by the latter.
By the same token, there is no sound reason for denying to the proceeding by the city fiscal the
same attributes which adhere to the proceeding before the justice of the peace. After the
arresting officer produced the prisoner before the city fiscal, the law takes its course in the same
manner that it does when the examining officer is the justice of the peace or judge of first
instance. From that time the arresting officer ceases to have any control over the prisoner save
to keep him in custody subject to the orders of the city fiscal. The police step out and the law
steps in and extends to the prisoner the mantle of protection against inquisitory examination by
the police. From that time on he enjoys the rights granted by law to all accused persons the
right to give bail and the right to testify freely uninfluenced by any fear of violence or other forms
of maltreatment. The danger envisioned by article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is past.
The proceeding before the city fiscal does not lose its character of due process of law by its
being conducted by the city fiscal instead of a judge. For one thing, preliminary investigation is
not a trial. It is a constitutional right. It is purely a matter of statutory regulation. (Potenciana
Dequito vs. Hugo O. Arellano et al., G.R. No. L-1336; 32 C.J.S., 456.) A judicial proceeding
which lies within the power of the legislature to provide or withhold without infringing the
fundamental law may be placed in the hands of any officer other than a judge.
The jurisdiction to make a preliminary examination or investigation is not even considered
judicial. Judges who perform this function do not do so as judicial officers. Municipal executives
here and in the United States are conferred this power. "The power to examine and to commit
persons charged with crime is not judicial, but is one of the duties of the conservators of the
peace, and it may be, and usually is, vested in persons other than courts, as, for instance,
justices of the peace or police magistrates, or persons exercising jurisdiction analogous to that
exercised by justices of the peace, or who are ex officio justices of the peace, such as mayors,
notaries public, or court commissioners. Power to hold preliminary examinations may be
exercised by the United States commissioners, and United States district judges who, while
making the preliminary examination, exercise the powers of commissioners only." (16 C.J., 319320.)

There is no basis for the fear that "the city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient
ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the
latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or
judge." This statement overlooks the consistent and general practice heretofore followed with
clear, express statutory sanction. Section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes
the chief of police of the City of Manila "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance
before the city court of any person arrested for violation of any city ordinance," while in cases of
violation of any penal law, according to the same article, the fiscal of the city may, and does,
recommend and fix the bail to be required of the person arrested. Power to fix bail necessarily
implies power to recommend or order the detention of the prisoner if bond is not given. This in
its working is no more nor less than the power to commit an accused to prison pending
investigation of this case, power which the majority erroneously say is not possessed by the city
fiscal.
The constitutional and statutory provisions and rules cited by the majority are of general
application which are good only in the absence of specific enactments. The controlling
provisions in the case at bar are sections 2460 and 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code
and section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court.
The decision further says:
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint
with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in
municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority, and he
has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having committed a public offense
even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to
arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party
or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with
the authority of a police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised
against the legality of the petitioners' arrest. Our problem concerns the time in which the city
fiscal may make his investigation and the scope of his power.
Assuming the above-quoted statement to be pertinent to the issues, the same can not, in my
humble view, pass unchallenged. Under certain, well-defined circumstances, an officer may and
constantly does make arrests without a court order, with or without complaint. An officer in good
faith may arrest without warrant when he believes that a person is guilty of a crime, and his
belief rests on such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the
circumstances, to believe likewise. (6 C.J.S., 596.) This practice is not derived from any express
authority but on the necessity of catching law violators before they disappear and hide. I have
not come across any law naming specific offenses for committing which the offenders shall be
arrested without court orders.
It is also a general principle of law that an officer need not necessarily have personal knowledge
of the facts constituting the offense himself, in the sense of having seen or witness the offense

himself, but he may, if there are no circumstances known to him which materially impeach his
information, acquire his knowledge from information imparted to him reliable and credible third
persons, or by information together with other suspicious circumstances. (Id., pp. 599, 600.)
This principle ought to serve as a qualification to the ruling laid down by this Court, that "a peace
officer has no power to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party
or any other person." Under the rule I have quoted, a police officer certainly may arrest a person
pointed to him as having committed a crime provided that the information or complaint comes
from a reliable source and under circumstances as to make an ordinary reasonable man to
believe it to be well-founded. When the victim of a robbery or aggression, for example, should
subsequently spot the criminal and request an officer to arrest him, the officer would not have to
seek or wait for a warrant of arrest before detaining the man, provided again that there was
good ground to believe the truth of the accusation.
This is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along with its present form of
government, a rule which has been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases.
(U.S. vs. Santos, 35 Phil., 853; U.S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil.,
516.)
Padilla, J., concurs.

SUPPLEMENTARY
TUASON, J., dissenting:
When I filed my dissent from the decision of the Court on the occasion of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, it was my understanding that there was going to be only a minute
resolution. I make this remark not as a complaint but as my explanation for writing my dissent in
advance of the reasoned resolution. Even then I would contend myself with resting my dissent
on what I have already stated did the resolution contain new propositions to be answered and
disclose misunderstanding of some of many statements to be cleared. As this is in the nature
and reply, topics will be treated without regard to continuity of thought.
The resolution says that article 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
in the Philippines has been repealed by section 17 of Rule 109, but that section 31 is still in
force except the last sentence. And so, according to the resolution, is section 2 of Act No. 194.
Without discussing the materiality of those laws, I disagree that they are still in effect. Like
article 30, article 31 of the Provisional Law and section 2 of Act No. 194 deal with procedure in
justice of the peace courts in general covered by the new Rules of Court. The Rules of Court, in
the words of their introductory section, concern "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of
the Philippines, and the admission to practice law therein." These Rules are complete revision
and a complete re-enactment of the entire field of procedure, and there is every reason to
believe that they were intended to replace, with some exceptions, all previous laws on the
subject, especially Spanish laws which had long been out of harmony with the new mode of
pleading and practice. If the last sentence of article 31 is repealed, as the resolution says, I see
no valid ground for not holding the other parts of that article repealed so. "Where a later act
covers the whole subject of earlier acts, embraces new provisions, and plainly shows that it was

intended, not only a substitute for the earlier acts, but to cover the whole subject then
considered by the legislature, and to prescribe the only rules in respect thereto, it operates as a
repeal of all former statutes relating to subject matter. The rule applies not only where the
former acts are inconsistent or in conflict with the new act, but also even where the former acts
are not necessarily repugnant in express terms, or in all respects, to the new act." (59 C.J., 919920.) "While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later act is not favored,
yet `if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier act and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier'." Posadas vs. National City Bank of
New York, 296 U.S., 497; 80 Law ed., 351.)
As the Rules of Court took effect on July 1, 1940, the case of Marcos vs. Cruz, decided on May
30, 1939, and cited in the resolution, is no authority for the opinion that no law has been
enacted amending or repealing section 2 of Act No. 192.
But this rule of implied repeal holds good only as regards laws of general application. Another
well known rule of the statutory construction tells us that preliminary investigations in Manila and
other chartered cities are to be excluded from the operation of the Rules of Court. Such
investigations are provided for the special enactments which, because of their special nature
and limited application, must be excepted from and prevail over the general provisions. "When
the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of
a previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such
general law does dot operate to repeal the special law, either in whole or in part, unless such
appeal is provided for by express words, or arises by necessary implication. An intention to
repeal local acts generally is not intolerable from the fact that the general acts specifically
excludes one locality from its operation." (59 C. J. . 934.) There is no apparent intention in the
Rules of Court to repeal the laws under which preliminary investigations in Manila have to be
conducted by the city fiscal. The contrary contention is evidenced by section 2 of the rule 108,
which provides that "Every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed
within his municipality or city, cognizable y the Court of First Instance," (Espiritu vs. De La Rosa
[July 31, 1947], L-1156, 45 Off. Gaz., 196; Hashim vs. Boncan [Nov. 22, 1941], 40 Off. Gaz.,
13th Supp., p. 13.) In the first of these cases, Mr. Justice Padilla, speaking for the court,
categorically held that the Rules of Court had not repealed and supplanted the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code regarding the power and authority of the City Fiscal to conduct
preliminary investigation." And in Hashim vs. Boncan, the Court, through Mr. Justice Laurel,
said:
The framers of the Rules could not have intended to brush aside these lessons of
experience and to tear down an institution recognized by law and decision and
sanctioned by years of settled practice. They could not have failed to keep intact in
effective machinery in the administration of criminal justice, as expeditious and simple as
any reform they have infused into the new Rules.
The term "proper court or judge" in section 17, Rule 109, of the Rules of Court1 should be
interpreted to mean, in the case of Manila, city fiscal, under the last mentioned canon of
interpretation. In Manila, the city fiscal performs the duties devolving on justices of the peace in
regular municipalities in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and all criminal charges by
the police and offended parties are filed with him. And it is admitted that prisoners arrested
without warrant in Manila may be taken only to the city fiscal by the arresting officer. Let it be

noted also in this connection that section 17 of Rule 109 regulates the taking of persons
arrested to the court or judge, not the filing of complaint.
In view of this circumstances; in view of the fact that neither the judges of first instance nor the
municipal judges of Manila are authorized to conduct preliminary hearings other than the
purpose of determining the amount of bail (section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code),
the result of applying section 17 of Rule 109 to Manila would be virtually to eliminate preliminary
investigation in this city of persons arrested without a warrant. The decision creates a vacuum, a
situation which this Court on another occasion refused to countenance in the forceful language
above quoted in Hashim vs. Boncan et. al. There, the Court continued:
To sustain the theory of repeal is to wipe out these advantages. Not only this. If neither
section 11 nor section 13 of Rule 108 is applicable to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the City Fiscal, as we have above shown, and if existing legislation
thereon is to be deemed repealed, then the matter would be left uncovered by rule or
law. There would thus be a void crying for urgent reform. There would be no such void if
the old and tried procedure is kept in being, untouched by the new Rules. Withal, our
own knowledge of the history of this portion of the Rules here involved does not warrant
an interpretation not contemplated when we drafted and deliberated upon these Rules.
And while, perhaps, the language could have been clearer and the arrangement made
more logical, consideration to expediency and the avowed purpose of preliminary
investigation point to the already trodden path hereinabove indicated.
The resolution has interpreted article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with meticulous
adherence, at best, to its latter, and open disregarded, at worst, of its spirit and of the pernicious
results that follow from such interpretation. The construction which the majority give to the term
"judicial authority" makes it impossible for the city fiscal to perform his assigned duties with the
consequence that for lack of time, malefactors will have to be turned loose before proper
investigation in conducted, or prosecution filed on insufficient evidence, in many cases.
Nevertheless, I am not pleading, in the case, for a departure from the letter of the law. I merely
submit that the city fiscal, as was emphasized in my dissent from the decision, is a judicial
officer or judicial authority both in the popular and the legal sense of the term, and that it is
unjust, unwarranted by any rule of interpretation, absolutely disastrous to the administration of
criminal law to identify the city fiscal with the police, forcing him to file an information or release
the prisoner within the six hours intended for the arresting officer alone. I do not contend that the
term "judicial authority" be expanded beyond its literal and legal meaning, although if necessary
this might be done to carry out the obvious purpose of the law, but I take exception to the
unjustified restriction and limitation placed on the meaning of "judicial authority" which not only
does violence to the letter and spirit of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code but leads to an
extremely anomalous, not to say impossible, situation. We do not have to look outside for the
meaning of "judicial authority," as a simple reading of article 125 of the Revised Pena Code and
section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code yields the clear intent of the legislature. This
intent, as manifested in laws that have been amended by section 2465 and section 2474 of the
Revised Administrative Code, crystalized in a system of practice that have received "the imprint
of judicial approval" in various decisions of this Court. (U. S. vs. McGoven, 6 Phil. 261; U. S. vs.
Ocampo, 18 Phil. 122;U. S. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553; Hashimvs. Boncan, ante; Espiritu vs. De la
Rosa, ante.)

The resolution, as a solution to the quandary in which it places the city fiscal, would have him go
to Congress. But, as I trust I have shown, the laws on the subject need no supplementation and
implementation. They have no gaps to be filled or ambiguities to be cleared. The loopholes exist
only as a direct result of this Court's new ruling. Section 2474 of the revised Administrative Code
and its predecessors have operated smoothly, without a hitch for nearly half a century. Not even
when the arresting officer had 24 hours to take arrested persons to a judicial authority was it
ever imagined, much less asserted, that the city fiscal had to borrow his time from the police.
The resolution in laying down the rule that the city fiscal has no power to issue warrant of arrest
or "an order or commitment of release by a written warrant containing the ground on which it is
based," thinks it is necessary to advert, "in justice to the city fiscal," that this official does not
pretend to possess such authority, since it is only in the dissenting opinion, it says, where the
claim is made.
At the outset I deny that I attributed to the city fiscal power to issue warrant of arrest; and did not
say in an unqualified manner that he has power to issue commitment. On the first point, what I
said was an implicit aknowledgment of the opposite. Let me quote from the second paragraph of
page 2 of my dissenting opinion what I did say:
The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue
warrant of arrest. The power to issue warrant of arrest is not essential ingredient of a
judicial office.
On the power to commit prisoners, the same paragraph of my opinion shows what I said.
As to the power to commit a detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority
are not exactly right when they affirm that the city fiscal is not clothed with it. It shall
come to this later.
And taking the matter up again on page 11, I said:
Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the chief of police of the
City of Manila "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of
any person arrested for violation of any city ordinance," while in cases of violation of any
penal law, according to the same article, the fiscal of the city may, and does,
recommended and fix the bail necessarily implies power to recommend or order the
detention of the prisoner if bond is not given. This i its working is no more nor less than
the power to commit an accused to prison pending investigation of his case, power
which the majority erroneously say is not possessed by the city fiscal.
There is nothing in this statement any outright affirmation that the city fiscal has power to issue
commitment papers. There is, on the contrary, an implied admission that the power, as it is
ordinarily exercised by a judge or court, does not exist. I merely submitted as my personal
opinion and interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, regardless of
what the city fiscal thinks, that it confers upon the latter official a power which, performed in
conjunction with the power of the chief of police, amounts in its practical operation to a power to
commit a man to prison. And I said this in answer to the sweeping assertion (which apparently
was made in the decision in complete oblivion of section 2460, supra), that to give the city fiscal
unlimited time might result in injustice, since, the decision says,

The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been
illegal detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
I intended to emphasize by citing section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, that a
prisoner could secure his released, pending investigation of his case, in the same manner and
with the same facilities that he could if the complaint or information had been filed with a court.
In citing and stating my interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, I
wished to show what I considered an erroneous ruling that
If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed
the offense charged, or is not ready to filed the information on the strength of the
testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested
for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code.
The majority come back with the assertion that the provisions of section 2460 of the Revised
Penal Administrative Code2
do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the detention
of the prisoner if the bond is not given, not only because they refer to the power of the
chief of police of Manila and not of the city fiscal, but because the only incidental
authority granted to the latter is to recommend the granting of the bail by the chief of
police may release the latter on bail.
I disagree again. I do not believe that a provision is rendered nugatory by the mere fact that it is
foreign to the subject of the main provision or to the title or caption of the section, if otherwise
the language is clear. The title or caption is important only in determining the meaning of laws
which are ambiguous and uncertain. The provision of section 2460 of the Revised
Administrative Code quoted in the resolution does not suffer from such infirmity.
In truth, the proviso in section 2460 is not alien to the enacting clause. The proviso relates to the
chief of police, conferring on him power of the same nature as does the enacting clause, with
the only difference that, in cases of violations of a municipal ordinance the chief of police acts
independently, on his own responsibility, while in cases of violations of a penal law, he acts with
the advice of the city fiscal and the latter fixes the amount of bail. The intervention of the city
fiscal was only inserted, in my opinion, in view of the gravity of the latter class of cases.
As to the other reason given in the resolution why, it says, continued detention of a prisoner
beyond six hours is not authorized namely, that the authority granted to the city fiscal to
recommend the granting of bail by the chief of police and to fix the amount of bail to be required
of the person arrested, is only incidental my comment is that, whether the power to take bail
or release prisoners belongs to the city fiscal or the chief of police, is inconsequential. To my
mind, the important point is that the accused, as the resolution admits, may be released on
bond. From this power, irrespective of who possess it, is implied the power to keep the prisoner
under detention if he does not file a bond.
When the resolution concludes that if no bond is given by the person arrested, "neither the chief
of police, who is only authorized to release on bail, has power to detain the person arrested for
more than six hours; not the city fiscal, who is empowered to fix and recommend the bail to the
chief of police has authority to release person arrested in violation of penal law," I can not follow.

In a nutshell, the majority's reasoning, as I understand it, is that the law authorizes the city fiscal
to recommend and fix the bail "in order that the chief of police may release the latter (prisoner)
on bail," but that if the prisoner does not put up a bond to be set at large just the same. The
filing of bail is not a meaningless gesture which may be taken advantage of by an accused at
pleasure with the same effect. The privilege to put a bond extended to an accused must be the
price or condition of his temporary release. The law does not have to say in so many words that
if he does not put a bond he would be kept in confinement in order that we may be warranted in
reaching this result.
The resolution says that "the purpose of the law in empowering the chief of police of Manila to
release the prisoner if he puts up a bail, is to relieve the officer making the arrest the necessity
of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal, and the latter from filing an information with the proper
courts within the period of time prescribed by law."
I have reflected closely on the meaning of this statement to be sure that I did not misunderstand
it. Unless I still fail to grasp the idea, I think the statement is self-annulling and self contradictory.
The filing of bail cannot relive the arresting officer from the necessity of taking the prisoner to
the city fiscal for the simple reason that such bail, in cases of violations of penal laws, can be
filed only on recommendation of, and its amount can be fixed by, the city fiscal. In other words,
the prisoners necessarily has to be taken to the city fiscal before any bond can be executed.
And it would be underestimating the intelligence of an accused to expect him to file a bond
within six hours from the time of his arrest if he is aware that, if at the end of those hours the city
fiscal had not preferred any charges against him and no order of commitment had been issued
by the proper judge, he (accused) had to be released. In the face of the latter theory, no
prisoner would, even if he could, perfect a bond within six hours knowing that if he did not, he
would be a free man, at leased temporarily, within what remains of six hours, while if he did, the
bond would enable the city fiscal to take his time to file case against him in court.
The gravamen of the court's argument seems to be that a commitment by a court or judge is
essential to validate the detention beyond the time specified in the Revised Penal Code. I do not
share this opinion. Neither such commitment by a judge nor a formal complaint is required by
the constitution in order that a person may lawfully be kept in jail pending investigation of his
case. An opportunity to file a bond in reasonable amount satisfies the constitutional demands.
Nor does the bail have to be fixed or granted by a court. Sheriffs and police officers have been
authorize by statutory enactments in other jurisdiction to take bail. At least one court has gone
so far as to uphold, "independently of statue, a practice of long standing on the part of the sheriff
to take bail in criminal cases of prisoners committed for not filing bail, and release them from
confinement." (Dickinson vs. Kingsbury, 2 Day [Com., 1.] Now then, under section 2460 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the chief of police of Manila, as already shown, is allowed to take
bail by himself in cases violation of a municipal ordinance and with the intervention of the city
fiscal in other cases. Under this provision and this practice, a detention prisoner arrested without
warrant is not deprived of any privilege of benefit guaranteed by the constitution. The lack of
formal complaint does not in the least prejudice him or deprive him of any benefit enjoined by
his counterparts in the provinces. On its legal aspect, let it be observed that all the proceedings
conducted by the city fiscal is a preliminary and summary inquiry which is purely a matter of
statutory regulation. Preliminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney when authorized by
law is due process no less than one conducted by a judge. It may be suppressed entirely, and if
it may be suppressed, it may be entrusted to any officer, provided only the constitutional right to
give bail is carefully safeguarded. As this Court has said in Hashim vs. Boncan, supra, and
U.S. vs. Ocampo, supra:

The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila is presumed to be as competent to

conduct a preliminary investigation as the average person designated by law to conduct
a "preliminary examination" under the provisions of General Orders No. 58. He is
a sworn officer of the court, and the law imposes upon him the duty of making such
investigations. For such purpose the legislature may designate whom it pleases within
the judicial department.
The resolution has taken pain to cite and explain in detail what it says are the laws on arrests in
the Philippines, and takes me to task for quoting from 6 Corpus Juris Secundum, 599-600 and
citing the decisions of this Court. We are told the effect that the excerpts from my dissenting
opinion, quoted on page 16 of the resolution are without any foundation because, it is said,
they are premised on the wrong assumption that, under the laws in force in our
jurisdiction, a place officer need not have personal knowledge but may arrest a person
without a warrant mere information from other person.
The resolution assumes that those excerpts are predicated on what I call the common law rule,
on Corpus Juris Secundum, and on decisions of the Supreme Court.
I commend a reading to my dissenting opinion. It will be seen that I did not base on those laws,
rules or decisions my statements, "The entire six hours might be consumed by the police in their
investigation alone;" "Even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the
beginning of the six hour period, this time can not insure proper and just investigation in
complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and witnesses are
not on hand to testify," and "The police is not authorized to round up witnesses and take them
along with the prisoner to the city fiscal." It will be seen that far from using as my premise those
laws, rules and decisions, which I said contain in brief outlines the powers of police officers to
make arrests, I said clearly on page 12 of my dissenting opinion:
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing
with the authority of the police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no
question raised against the legality of the prisoner's arrest. Our problem concerns the
time period within which the city fiscal may make his investigation, and the scope of his
power.
It was the majority decision which brought the question of the authority of the police to make
arrests into the discussion. I only met the decision on its own territory though I regarded that
territory as outside the legitimate circle of the present dispute. I cited Corpus Juris Secundum
and decisions of this Court, which I said are derived from common law, to refute the statement,
a fortiori, a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party or other person seven though after
investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
I especially wanted to express my disagreement with the thesis in the decision that
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law.

It was my humble opinion that the rules I cited and the rules on which the decisions of this Court
are predicated, were general provisions of law applicable to varying and changed
circumstances, and I wanted to deny the insinuation that there were, or there might be, arrests
without warrant "expressly authorized by law"; so I countered that "I have not come across any
law naming specific offenses for committing which the offenders shall be arrested without court
orders." This is my concept of express provisions authorizing arrests without a warrant.
Section 6 of Rule 109, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative code, and the provisional Law
on the subject of arrest, cited in the resolution in an attempt to show the error of my citations,
can not be a source of comfort to the majority. Rather, I should think, they reinforce my position,
for I believe that the rules and decisions I cited the rules and laws called to our attentions as the
real thing, are in substantial agreement. My mistake was in not citing, myself, Rule 109, section
6, of the Rules of Court, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the Provisional
Law. I might have found and cited them had I thought the matter worthy of more than a passing
notice.
Now that the resolution has gone into this subject at length, I shall devote a few more lines to it
at the peril of tiring the reader on what I believe an impertinent topic.
My citation from Corpus Juris and my comment that "this is a common law rule implanted in the
Philippines along with its present form of government, a rule which have been cited or applied
by this Court in a number of case," has met with decision. I am informed that my quotation is
"not a general principle of law or common law rule implanted in the Philippines"; that "it is the
summary of the ruling of several states courts based on statutory exceptions of the general
rule."
I do not think I wise wide off the mark when I said that the common law rule has been
transplanted to this country along with the present form of government and that the rules and
decisions I have quoted spring from the common law. And the majority are not closer to the
marked when they affirmed that my quotation from Corpus Juris Secundum, and section 2463 of
the Revised Administrative Code are purely statutory creation.
There was common law before there were statutes. Common law in England and in the U. S.
preceded statement statutes and constitutions. Statutes and constitutions in matters of arrest
came afterwards, restating, affirming, clarifying, restricting or modifying the common law.
The English common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the
states of the Union with the exception of Louisiana "where the civil law prevails in civil
matters." (11 Am. Jur., 157.) And
in England, under the common law, sheriffs, justices of the peace, coroners, constables
and watchmen were entrusted with special powers as conservators of the peace, with
authority to arrest felons and persons reasonably suspected of being felons. Whenever a
charge a felony was brought to their notice, supported by reasonable grounds of
suspicion, they were required to apprehend the offenders, or at the least to raise hue
and cry, under the penalty of being indicted for neglect of duty.
See the footnote on pp. 2512-2513, Vol. 2, of Jones Blackstone and the numerous cases
therein cited. It is a footnote appended o the statement of a common law principle which of the
same tenor as that just noted. Treatises on arrest not infrequently start with a statement of the

common law rule and speak of statute and constitutions in the sense I have mentioned. Moran's
Commentaries on the Rules of Court mention of the common law. (Vol. 2, p. 577) in connection
with the power to make arrest without a warrant.
The doctrine taken from 5 C. J., 395-396-that "the right to make arrest without a warrant is
usually regulated by express statute, and, except as authorize by such statutes, an arrest
without a warrant is illegal" is not at war with the proposition that the authority of peace
officers to make arrest originated at common law and that constitutions and statutes merely restated and defined that the authority with greater precision, naming the officers who may make
arrest, the grades of offenses for, and the circumstances under, which arrest may be effected,
etc. Arrests made by officers not designated or under circumstances not coming within the
terms of the statute or constitution are illegal.
Even then, broad constitutional or statutory inhibition against search and seizure of property or
persons without a warrant has exceptions, as can be inferred from the two sentences preceding
the above sentence quoted in the resolution. This exceptions are cases where the public
security has demanded the search and seizure.
Well established exceptions to this rule have been long recognized in cases of felony,
and of breaches of the peace committed in the presence of the party making the arrest.
(5 C. J., 395.)
Arrests under such circumstances are authorized in spite of statutes and constitutions. The
power to make such arrest is deeply rooted in the unwritten or common law, which "includes
those principles, usage and rules of action applicable to the government and security of person
and property which do not rest for their authority an any express or positive declaration of the
will of the legislature." Although acting at his peril, the powers to arrest on" probable cause of
suspicion" even by a private person are "principles of the common law, essential to the welfare
of society, and not intended to be altered or impaired by the Constitution." (Wakely vs. Hart, 6
Binn. [Pa.,], 316.)
I have remarked that there is no fundamental difference between my citations, on the other
hand, and section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, Cited by
the majority of the Court, on the other hand. There is only a difference in phraseology. The very
case of U. S. vs. Fortaleza relied upon in the resolution speaks of barrio lieutenant's power to
make arrest as not inferior to that usually conferred on peace officers known to American and
English law as constables.
The resolution quotes this from 5 C. J., 404:
It is a general rule, although there are statutory exceptions and variations that a peace
officer has no right to make an arrest without a warrant upon mere information of a third
person.
This is only a part of the sentence. The omitted portion is more important from my point of view
and contradicts the point of view and contradicts the point stressed by the majority. The
complete sentence in.
It is a general rule, although there are exceptions and variations, that a peace officer has
no right to make an arrest without a warrant, upon mere information of a third person or

mere information of committed, that right being limited to arrests for offenses of the
grade of felony, as elsewhere shown.
It will be noticed that the quoted portion relates to arrest for misdemeanor. For further proof, I
invite attention to the title of the Section on page 401, paragraph (a), which reads: "For
Misdemeanor aa. In General." Let it be noted that the power to arrest for misdemeanor is
different from, and more restricted than, the power to arrest for felony, as is further
demonstrated by the last clause of the full sentence above quoted. This clause refers us back to
section 30, p. 399, which says:
"At common law, (here again common law mentioned), and subject to the provisions of any
applicatory statute, and subject officer may arrest, without a warrant, one whom he has
reasonable or probable grounds to suspect of having committed of felony, even though the
person suspected is innocent, and generally, although no felony has in fact been committed by
any one, although, under some statutes a felony must have been actually committed, in which
case an may arrest, without a warrant, any person he has reasonable cause for believing to be
the person who committed it."
As is elsewhere stated, section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative
Code, like the authorities I have cited, do not limit the power of a police officer to make arrest
tho those cases where he saw with his own eyes or heard with his own ears the commission of
an offense. Section 6 of a Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code
empowers police officers.
to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed,
or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace,
and section 6 of Rule 109 authorizes a peace officer or a private person to make arrest when
an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it
Rule 28 of the Provincial Law itself empowers judicial and administrative authorities "to detain,
or cause to be detained person whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some
offense" or "when the authority or agent has reason to believe that unlawful act, amounting to a
crime had been committed."
To make arrest on suspicion or on information is not new; it is an everyday practice absolutely
necessary in the of public security and firmly enshrined in the jurisprudence of all civilized
societies. The power to arrest on suspicion or on reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed is authority to arrest on information. Information coming from reliable sources
maybe, and it often is, the basis reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
or of reasonable ground of suspicion that a person is guilty thereof. Suspicion reasonable
ground and information are interviewed within the same concept.
The necessary elements of the ground of suspicion are that the officer acts upon the
belief of the person's guilt, based either upon facts or circumtances within the officers
own knowledge, or information imparted by a reliable and credible third person provided
there are no circumstances known to the officer sufficient to materially impeach the

information received, It is not every idle and unreasonable charge which will justify an
arrest. An arrest without a warrant is illegal when it is made upon mere suspicion or
belief, unsupported by facts, circumstances, or credible information calculated to
produce such suspicion or belief.
Failure to take these principles into account has led to the belief that:
The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding
information in cases of persons arrested without a warrant, does not require so much
time as that made upon a complaint of the offended parties for the purpose of securing a
warrant of arrest of the accused. In all cases above enumerated in which the law
authorizes a peace officer to arrest without warrant, the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence or within his view, or of the
time, place or circumstances which reasonably tend to show that such person has
committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace. And the testimony of
such officer on the commission on the offense in his presence or within his view by the
person arrested, or on the facts and circumstances that tend reasonably to show that
said person has committed or is about to commit an offense, would be sufficient
evidence or basis for the city fiscal to file an information without prejudice to his
presenting of other evidence of the defendant. (Pp. 16-17 of the Resolution.).
Section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as well as the authorities I have quoted, show the fallacy of the idea that the arresting
officer knows, or should know, all the facts about the offense for the perpetration, or supposed
perpetration, of which he has made the arrest. The resolution fails to realize that in the great
majority of cases an officer makes arrest on information or suspicion; that "suspicion implies a
belief or opinion as to the guilt based upon facts or circumstances which DO NOT AMOUNT TO
PROOF," and that information and suspicion by their nature require verification and examination
of the informers and other persons and circumstances. While an officer may not act on
unsubstantial appearances and unreasonable stories to justify an arrest without a warrant,
obviously in the interest of security, an officer who has to act on the spot and cannot afford to
lose time, has to make arrest without satisfying himself beyond question that a crime has been
committed or that the person suspected is guilty of such crime. A police officer can seldom make
arrest with personal knowledge of the offense and of the identity of the person arrested sufficient
in itself to convict. To require him to make an arrest only when the evidence he himself can
furnish proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, would "endanger the safety of
society." It would cripple the forces of the law to the point of enabling criminals, against whom
there is only moral conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape. Yet persons arrested on
necessarily innocent so that the prosecuting attorney should release them. Further and closer
investigation not infrequently confirm the suspicion or information.
The majority of arrests are not as simple as a police officer catching a thief slipping his hand into
another's pocket or snatching someone else's bag, or suprising a merchant selling above the
ceiling price, or seizing a person carrying concealed weapons. Cases of frequent occurrence
which confront the police and the prosecution in a populous and crime-redden city are a great
deal more complicated. They are cases in which the needed evidence can only be supplied by
witnesses, whom the arresting officer or private persons has not the authority or the time to
round up and take to the city fiscal for examination with in what remains, if any, of six hours.

Let me give two examples.

1. A murder with robbery is reported to the police. An alarm is broadcasted giving a description
of the murderer. Later a police officer is told that the wanted man is in a store. He proceeds to
the store and. besides believing in good faith of his informant, detects in the man's physical
appearance some resemblance to the description given in the alarm. All this occurs at the holy
hours of night.
Should the officer refrain from making an arrest because he is not certain beyond reasonable
doubt of the identity of the suspected murderer? Should the city fiscal order the release of the
prisoner because of insufficiency of evidence and because the six hours are expiring, or should
he prefer formal charges (if that can be done at midnight) on the strength of evidence which, as
likely as not, may be due to a mistaken identify? Should not the prosecuting attorney be given,
as the law clearly intends, adequate time to summon those who witnessed the crime and who
can tell whether the prisoner was the fugitive?, allowing the prisoner to give bail, if he can.
2. A police officer is attracted by screams from a house where a robbery has been committed.
The officer rushed to the place, finds a man slain, is told that the murderers have filed. The
officer runs in the direction indicated and finds men with arms who, from appearances, seem to
be the perpetrators of the crime. The people who saw the criminals run off are not sure those
are the men they saw. The night was dark, for criminals like to ply their trade under cover of
darkness.
The officer does not, under these circumstances, have to seek an arrest warrant or wait for one
before detaining the suspected persons. To prevent their escape he brings them to the police
station. On the other hand, would the fiscal be justified in filing an information against such
persons on the sole testimony of the police officer? It is not his duty to wait for more proofs on
their probable connection with the crime? Should the city fiscal file an information on sufficient
evidence, or should he as the only alternative, order the release of the prisoners? Does either
course subserve the interest of justice and the interest of the public? If the arrested persons are
innocent, as they may be, is either interest be served by hasty filing of information against them,
or would they rather have a more thorough investigation of the case?
Cases like these with varying details can be multiplied ad infinitum. They form the bulk of
underworld activities with which the forces of law have to cope and with which the general public
is vitally concerned. The public would not be secure in their homes and in the pursuit of their
occupations if his Court, through unreasoning worship of formalism, throws down a method,
practice and procedure that have been used here and elsewhere from time immemorial to the
end of service and in the interest of public security. The public security. The public is not much
interested in such minor offenses as pick-pocketing, fist fights and misdemeanors or violations
of municipal ordinances for which arrests can be made by police officers only when committed
in their presence or within their hearing.
The decision of this Court leaves the city fiscal no alternative between releasing prisoners for
insufficiency of evidence due to lack of time to secure more, and filing information against
persons who may be innocent of the crimed charge. The latter course, defeats directly the very
aims of preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppresive prosecution and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, and from
the trouble, expense, anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions. (Hashim vs. Boncan, No. 47777, January 13, 1941; 40 Off. Gaz., 13th

Supp. p. 13; U.S.vs. Mendez, 4 Phil.; 124; U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 11 Phil. 122; U. S. vs.
Marfori, 35 Phil. 666; People vs. Colon, 47 Phil. 443.) Even more deplorable would be the
acquittal of guilty accused due to lack of proofs which the prosecution, if it had been afforded
sufficient time, could have gathered.
The foregoing goes, too, for the concurring opinion. There is only one more point to which we
wish to address ourselves briefly. The concurring opinion contains this passage:
Dentro de las 6 horas hay tiempo mas que suficiente para meter en cuenta atoda la
canalla ... Pero; por Dios que no se violen ni pisoteen lasgarantias constitucionales por
miedo a los gangsters!
No one can disagree with this though as an abstract proposition. The only trouble is that the
opinion does not cite any concrete constitutional provision or guaranty that is infringed by our
dissent. I take the suggestion in the resolution that "it would be proper for the interested
parties to take the case to Congress, since it can not be done by judicial legislation" to be a
tacit recognition that the matter is purely one of statute and that no constitutional impediment is
in the way of changing the law and enlarging the power of the city fiscal in the premises. And let
it be said that the objection in the concurring opinion to this suggestion is rested, not on
constitutional grounds but on the supposition that the law is good enough to be left alone. All
which tempts us to paraphrase the famous apostrophe of that equally famous woman in French
history, and exclaim, "Oh Constitution! what grievous mistakes are committed in thy name!"
The concurring opinion is in error when it sees shadows of fear gangster in our dissent. Society
no less than a natural person has the right to protect itself, and the arrest and punishment of
transgressors of its laws is one of its legitimate means of self-protection and self-preservation.
As far as the insinuation of fear may reflect on those who are duty bound to have part in such
arrest and punishment, the application of criminal laws without quarters to the end which they
are intended to serve, is not in strict logic a sign of apprehension. Such course, rather than
tolerance, leniency or indifference towards crimes and appeasement of lawless and other
elements and groups who wield the power of physical and verbal relations, calls for exactly the
opposite quality of fright.
Padilla, J., concurs.

HIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109287. April 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA,
STEVE PUA y CLOFAS alias STEPHEN P0 y UY or TOMMY SY and PAUL LEE y
WONG alias PAUL LEUNG, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LAWFUL ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT;
REQUIREMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. - Re-assessing the factual backdrop
of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the conclusion of the trial
court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto which would justify the search
without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of
its findings and conclusion: x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could
still be regarded as valid for being incidental to a lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused
Pua and Lee without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have
committed the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of the arresting officers from the
time they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they
brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under the
situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the arresting officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the ones who committed
it. x x x Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful
arrests without warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the
appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) on the
other hand requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer(s). These requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time
of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room, and
appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child inside his home. No
offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed or being attempted by
any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE 113, SECTION 5; PARAGRAPH (b) THEREOF; NOT APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. - Par. (b) of Rule 113, Section 5 is likewise inapplicable since its equally
exacting requirements have also not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed
it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the
other two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense of carrying and
transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there was no sufficient
probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and there
committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the

prosecutions version to be true, cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not
even an act performed under suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad
daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public. Furthermore,
it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers and/or their
welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of baggage, especially
considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for sending along
(pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot
determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden
beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with
luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen
were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning,
to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of
shabu. To quote from another decision of like import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information
(from the telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - We therefore
hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that there
was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had
committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were
made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5
of Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY;
CONSPIRACY; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - Because of the way the
operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and
Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and
convincing evidence that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport
were the very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the
Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely and positively
state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at
the airport; at best, they could only say that they looked like the ones they saw at the
airport. And even assuming them to be the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty
as to the actual ownership of the said bags at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they
were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of conspiracy
as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule
that conspiracy must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES; DEEMED WAIVED BY FAILURE TO CHALLENGE ITS VALIDITY;
CASE AT BAR. - What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua.
While the search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for not being
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that appellant Pua failed to
challenge the validity of his arrest and search, as well as the admission of the evidence
obtained thereby;he did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error before this

Court. Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is

deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional rights,
including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases such
as People vs. Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]) and De Garcia vs. Locsin (65 Phil. 689
[1938]).
6. ID.; ID.; THE JUDICIARY WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT TO EXPECT ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BE LAW
ABIDING IF WE DO NOT INSIST ON THE FULL PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHTS. - It is
evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and
in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal
searches and seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal drugs that the government
officers claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us and
struggled to apply the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration
of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist
on the full protection of their rights.
7. ID.; ID.; LAW ENFORCERS MUST ACT WITH DELIBERATE CARE AND WITHIN THE
PARAMETERS SET BY CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW. Some lawmen, prosecutors and
judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizures as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement.
Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the
eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by
the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office and The Law Firm of Ross B. Bautista for Antolin Cuizon.
Marcial P. Pe Benito for Steve Pua and Paul Lee.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal searches and
seizures, and the requirements for a valid warrantless search incident to a valid warrantless
arrest. While the Court appreciates and encourages pro-active law enforcement, it nonetheless
upholds the sacredness of constitutional rights and repeats the familiar maxim, the end never
justifies the means.

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated January 5, 1993 Criminal Case No. 92-0230) of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,2 Pasay City finding appellants guilty of violating Section 15
of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous rugs Act of 1972.
On March 10, 1992, an Information3 was filed against the appellants charging them as
follows:
That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without
lawful authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also
popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty. During the arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and Steve Pua, the latter translated the
Information into Chinese-Cantonese for the understanding of appellant Lee, who does not
speak nor understand English, Pilipino or any other Philippine dialect. Both of them, duly
assisted by their counsel, also pleaded not guilty.4 Trial ensued and on January 5, 1993, the
court a quo found appellants guilty as charged and rendered the following disposition:5
WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen Po y Uy or Tommy
Sy, and Paul Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting,
without legal authority, methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, as charged in the
aforequoted Information; and they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu involved in this case is declared forfeited in favor of the
government and is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drug Board for proper disposal.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor General, who added
the page references to the transcript of stenographic notes as indicated in brackets, are as
follows:6
In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) gathered an
information regarding the drug activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon.
A surveillance was conducted on them. The residence of the spouses was traced
to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18, 21).

In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its informant in Hong
Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on the same day at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with
him a big quantity of shabu. A team was organized to intercept the suspects. Heading the team was Jose
Yap, with Ernesto Dio, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as members. Some
belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the Reaction Group of the NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992,
pp. 4, 18).
Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Dio positioned himself at the
Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of the team posted themselves at the parking area of the
airport. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of the same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just
returned from Hong Kong, after passing through the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA,
proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to their boarding a car. While there, accused
Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) travelling bags to accused Steve Pua y Clofas and accused
Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area. Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a
taxicab which they boarded in leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle
(tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4-5, 8-9).
At this juncture, Dio, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the group of Yap at the
parking area, describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua and Lee so that Yap and his companions
could apprehend the two. However, the message of Dio was not completely received by his teammates as
the radio he was using ran short of battery power (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 25-26).
Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Dio proceeded to the place where his
companions were stationed for the purpose of giving assistance to them, believing that they were already
in the process of apprehending accused Pua and Lee. When he realized that the two accused were not
apprehended, Dio told the group of Yap to follow him as he was following the vehicle taken by Pua and
Lee which, according to an earlier tip he learned, was proceeding to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in
Makati, Metro Manila (tsn, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26; tsn, May 21, 1992 pp. 6, 15).
Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, in
whose premises the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and Lee entered, Dio and the other members of the
team coordinated with Cot. Regino Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of
apprehending the two accused. A verification made by the Chief Security Officer showed that accused
Pua and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel. The two accused allowed Dio and Yap, together with Col.
Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340 were four (4) travelling bags, which were similar to
the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having
introduced themselves as NBI agents, Dio and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and Lee to search their
bags in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing.(Exh. I). Three (3) of the four
(4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a considerable quantity of white crystalline substance
suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Each package was sandwiched between two
(2) pieces of board which appear to be lawanit placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags. The
suspected shabu contained in one bag weighed 2.571 kilos, that found in the other had a weight of 2.768
kilos, and the suspected shabu retrieved from the third bag weighed 2.970 kilos. Pua and Lee were then

apprehended by Dio and his companions (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9, Exh. F-2,
p. 75, Records).
Immediately thereafter, Dio and the other members of the team proceeded to the house of accused Cuizon
in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and the bags with their contents of suspected
dangerous drugs. They reached the place at about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of February 21,
1992. Retrieved from accused Cuizon in his residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline
substance weighing 2.695 kilos, likewise believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. In
addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken from accused Cuizon (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11).
Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI headquarters at Taft
Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They were subsequently referred to the Prosecution Division of
the Department of Justice for inquest. However, only the present three accused were charged in court
(tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).
In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito Soriano, roomboy of
the Manila Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed that a portion of the ceiling was
misaligned. While fixing it, he discovered in the ceiling a laundry bag containing suspected shabu of more
than five (5) kilos (Exh. X, p. 110). Informed of the discovery while they were already in their office in
the NBI, Yap and some companions returned to the hotel. The suspected shabu was turned over to them
(tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline substance taken from
the three (3) travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua and Lee in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the
white crystalline substance retrieved from the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon in his house in
Caloocan City, and the white crystalline substance hidden in the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were
confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. (Board Regulation No. 6,
dated December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 12).
The Defenses Version(s)
Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct examination, he
testified that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he and his co-appellant Lee
were in their room at the Manila Peninsula Hotel.7 His version of what happened on February
21, 1992 can be summarized as follows:
At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-in at the
Manila Peninsula Hotel for and in behalf of the latters personal friend named Leong Chong
Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to arrive that evening because of a delayed flight.
Appellant Pua was engaged by appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee does not know how to
speak English and the local language.8
While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the lobby informing
them of the arrival of Paul Leungs luggage. At Puas instructions, the said luggage were brought
to the room by a bellboy. Thereafter, two persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a

tomboy and a thin man with curly hair. The two men identified themselves as NBI agents and
asked appellant Pua to let them in. He declined since he did not know who they were. However,
when Col. Arellano, the Chief Security Officer of the hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI
agents, he and Lee relented and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by
the agents to sign a piece of paper. Made to understand that they were merely giving their
consent for the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed the same. Whereupon, the
agents told them that they will open Paul Leungs bags. Again appellant Pua refused, saying that
the bags did not belong to them. Just the same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lees
consent, opened the bags and found the shabu. Pua and Lee were then apprehended and
brought to the NBI headquarters.9
Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecutions version of the incident.
While admitting that on February 21, 1992, he and his wife Susan did arrive from Hong
Kongwith several pieces of luggage, he denied that he met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of
the airport, much less passed to them the four pieces of luggage. According to him, only his twoyear old son, accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them outside the airport. Ong
fetched them from the airport and brought them to their home in Caloocan City. They arrived at
their house around 3:00 in the afternoon.10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son on his bed, two
NBI agents suddenly barged in and poked a gun at him. They manhandled him in front of his
wife and son. His hands were tied with a necktie and he was forcibly brought out of their house
while the NBI agents ransacked the place without any warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his
cousin Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters in Manila and there
the NBI agents continued mauling him.11
Appellant Cuizons wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew Nestor Dalde,
testified in his favor basically reiterating or confirming his testimony.12
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or
Pilipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of
an interpreter who would translate his testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28,
1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the reception of Lees testimony, his counsel,
although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court deemed him and Pua
to have waived their right to present additional evidence,13 and the case was considered
submitted for decision after the filing of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask
for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only accused
Cuizon, who was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his memorandum.
The Issues
In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of errors:14
I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.

II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marcelino Amurao,
Jose Yap and Ernesto Dio despite contradictions made on material points.
III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his evidence in his
defense in violation of his constitutional right to due process.
Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two assignments of
errors above-quoted, and in addition challenges the legality and validity of his warrantless arrest
and the search and seizure incidental thereto.15
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the legality
of the arrest and search of herein appellants effected by the NBI operatives. Put differently, were
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless searches conducted by the NBI legal and
constitutional?
The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of the court
a quo will stand or fall. Consequently, there is a need to resolve first this issue before
endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by appellants.
A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests to have
been illegal, whether failure by appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly assign the same as errors
before this Court amounted to a waiver of their constitutional rights against such illegal searches
and arrests.
The Courts Ruling
General Rule on Warrantless
Arrests, Searches, & Seizures
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made
without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no
less than the fundamental law of the land16 ordains it:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. 17

However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not absolute. Thus,
under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, an arrest without a warrant may be
lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without warrant,
the person arrested may be subjected to a search of his body and of his personal effects or
belongings, for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, likewise without need of a search warrant.18
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other
than those justifying a warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion that he
has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime
has been committed by him, then the search made of such person as well as his arrest are
deemed illegal.19 Consequently, any evidence which may have been obtained during such
search, even if tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely
inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding, 20 the same being the fruit of the poisonous
tree.21 Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident toa
lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were
a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search,
both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and
accept the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delictowhich
would justify the search without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away
the baselessness of its findings and conclusion:
x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as valid for being
incidental to a lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee without a warrant of arrest was
lawful, as they could be considered to have committed the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of
the arresting officers from the time they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up

to the time they brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under
the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the ones who committed it. x x x 22
Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests
without warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not
being escapees from a penal institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) on the other hand requires
that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s). These
requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua
and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed
resting with his wife and child inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was
being actually committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the
lawmen.23
Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting
requirements have also not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the
arrest, anoffense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant Cuizon
could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants, be
considered to have committed the offense of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs. Under
the circumstances of the case, there was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers
to believe that the accused were then and there committing a crime. The act per se of handing
over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true, cannot in any way
be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under suspicious circumstances
as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full
view of the public.24 Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for
travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of baggage,
especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for sending
along (pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot
determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden
beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with
luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen
were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning, to
the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To
quote from another decision of like import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information (from the
telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed.25
In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,26 this Court laid down clear guidelines, as follows:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section 6(b)
using the test of reasonableness. He submits that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient
to induce a reasonable ground (for belief) that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok s verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. x x x
The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro,27 where this Court ruled
that x x x under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
havepersonal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of
People v. Burgos.
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay information (tips),
but they were completely uncertain that anything was really going down that day. That much is
undisputed, from a reading of the testimony of Agent Dio:
Q - Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the spouses
Cuizon were going to bring in or transport into the country shabu on February 21,
1992?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed would bring in
shabu, is it not? That was only the information relayed to your group?
A - Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q - But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they were
bringing in shabu?
A - Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)

In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Dio during the operation,
likewise admitted in substantially the same tenor their uncertainty regarding the commission of
the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992, pp. 29 & 34).
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to
establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that
appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were
made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5of
Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal. We might add that the search conducted on
Pua and Lee was not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, having preceded the same and
produced the justification therefor. On the other hand, the search on Cuizon s residence, without
the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly illegal and the shabu seized thereat cannot but be
considered inadmissible in evidence. More on these points later.
Comparison Between The Present Case
and Earlier Decisions of This Court
For claritys sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with previous decisions
by this Court in various drug cases, in which apparently different conclusions were reached, in
order to distinguish them from the instant case and avoid any potential misunderstanding of the
foregoing holding as well as the constitutional and legal principles on which it is based.
1. In People vs. Claudio,28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio City, was
arrested by a policeman on the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana
emanating from the plastic bag she was carrying. The Court held the warrantless arrest under
the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified and the evidence thus discovered admissible
in evidence.
2. In People vs. Tangliben,29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus terminal, was
noticed by lawmen to be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an informer as
carrying marijuana, and so he was accosted by policemen who happened to be on a
surveillance mission; the lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was found a package of
marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and search incident
thereto. The Court in effect considered the evidence on hand sufficient to have enabled the law
enforcers to secure a search warrant had there been time, but as the case presented urgency,
and there was actually no time to obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus,
and inasmuch as an informer had given information on the spot that the accused was carrying
marijuana, the search of his person and effects was thus considered valid.
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,30 the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and when
accosted by two members of the Davao INP who identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly
fled, but was pursued, subdued and placed in custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an
unlicensed revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This Court upheld his conviction
for illegal possession of firearms, holding that there was under the circumstances sufficient
probable cause for a warrantless search.

4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al.,31 agents of the Narcotics Command set up a
checkpoint on a highway in Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way
to Baguio Citydue to confidential reports from informers that Maspil and a certain Bagking would
be transporting a large quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1, 1986, the two
suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and were made to stop. The officers
noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks and tin cans, which, when opened, were
seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the search thus conducted as being
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., 32 the Court ruled that the search of the appellants
moving vehicles and the seizure of shabu therefrom was legal, in view of the intelligence
information, including notably, clandestine reports by a planted deep penetration agent or spy
who was even participating in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate, to the effect that
appellants were bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also held that it is not
practicable to secure a search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle to
transport contraband, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
6. In People vs. Malmstedt,33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa, Mountain
Province, set up a temporary checkpoint to check vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region,
due to persistent reports that vehicles from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
drugs, and because of particular information to the effect that a Caucasian would be travelling
from Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in which accused was riding was stopped
at the checkpoint. While conducting an inspection, one of the NARCOM men noticed that
accused, the only foreigner on board, had a bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun,
the officer sought accuseds passport or other identification papers. When the latter failed to
comply, the lawman directed him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging at his waist. It
was a pouch bag which, when opened by the accused, was found to contain packages of
hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Invited for questioning, the accused disembarked from the
bus and brought along with him two pieces of luggage; found inside were two teddy bears
stuffed with more hashish. The Court held that there was sufficient probable cause in the
premises for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime
and/or trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. Said probable cause arose not only
from the persistent reports of the transport of prohibited drugs from Sagada, and the tip received
by the NARCOM that same day that a Caucasian coming from Sagada would be bringing
prohibited drugs, but also from the failure of the accused to present his passport or other
identification papers when confronted by the lawmen, which only triggered suspicion on the part
of the law enforcers that accused was trying to hide his identity, it being the normal thing
expected of an innocent man with nothing to hide, that he readily present identification papers
when asked to do so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus justified.
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by the Court to
provide probable cause justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor of
marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive identification by informers, suspicious

behaviour, attempt to flee, failure to produce identification papers, and so on. Too, urgency
attended the arrests and searches because each of the above-mentioned cases involved the
use of motor vehicles and the great likelihood that the accused would get away long before a
warrant can be procured. And, lest it be overlooked, unlike in the case before us now, the law
enforcers in the aforementioned cases acted immediately on the information received,
suspicions raised, and probable causes established, and effected the arrests and searches
without any delay.
Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case
In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided against
arresting the accused-appellants inside the airport as they allegedly wanted to discover the
identities of the airport immigration, security or customs personnel who might be protecting the
accused or otherwise involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also in order to avoid the
possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which might result in injuries to innocent
bystanders. These excuses are simply unacceptable. They are obviously after-thoughts
concocted to justify their rank failure to effect the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the
NBI men failed to explain how come they did not apprehend the appellants at the moment
Cuizon handed over the baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in relative safety. Such
arrest would have been consistent with the settled constitutional, legal and jurisprudential
precedents earlier cited.
The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks allegedly with
their contraband cargo undetected in their luggage. Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as
indeed they did not testify that they saw) anyone from the airport immigration, security or
customs who could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and therefore, there was no danger
ofany live ammo encounter with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers had already made
their way outside the NAIA, had allegedly made contact with the accused Pua and Lee, and
were in the very act of handing over the luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in
and pounce on them at that very instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of
the agents, Dio, merely watched as Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab and took off
for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too much to think that at the most critical and
climactic moment, when agent Dio radioed his companions for help to close in on the suspects,
the most amazing and stupendous thing actually happened: Murphys Law kicked in - whatever
could go wrong, did, and at the worst possible time - the batteries in Agent Dios hand-held radio
supposedly went dead and his message was not transmitted. Thus the departing Pua and Lee
proceeded merrily and unimpeded to the Peninsula Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon
simultaneously sped off to their residence in Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed
and scampering madly to catch up. Such absolutely astounding and incredible happenstance
might find a place in a fourth-rate movie script, but expecting the courts to swallow it- hook, line
and sinker - is infinite naivete, if not downright malevolence.
Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the agents were not
thereby rendered helpless or without recourse. The NBI agents, numbering five in all, not

counting their so-called informant, claimed to have piled into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992)
and tailed the suspects Pua and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car distance behind (TSN,
May 20, 1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to explain why the agents did not
intercept the vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding, along the way, pull them over, arrest
them and search the luggage. And since the agents were in three (3) cars, they also could have
easily arranged to have agents in one vehicle follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while
the others went after Pua and Lee. All or any of these possible moves are mere ordinary,
common-sense steps, not requiring a great deal of intelligence. The NBI men who testified
claimed to have conducted or participated in previous drug busts or similar operations and
therefore must have been familiar with contingency planning, or at least should have known
what to do in this situation where their alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, what the
lawmen opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport, allegedly bringing the
drug cache to the hotel, and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the airport and reach his residence
with one of the luggage, increased significantly the risk of the suspects (and/or the drugs)
slipping through the lawmens fingers, and puts into question the regularity of performance of
their official functions. The agents alleged actions in this case compare poorly with the forthright
and decisive steps taken by lawmen in the cases earlier cited where this Court held the arrests
and seizures to be valid.
Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents intercepted and
collared the suspects on the way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very moment of
the hand-over, then there would not have been any question at all as to the legality of their
arrest and search, as they would presumably have been caught red-handed with the evidence,
and consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of commission of the
offense charged, there would have been no doubt also as to the existence of conspiracy among
the appellant to transport the drugs. However, because of the way the operation actually turned
out, there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and
Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence that the four (4)
bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the very same ones found in the
possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when
testifying could definitely and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very
same ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say that they looked like the
ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be the same bags, there remains
doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the said bags as at the alleged turnover visa-vis the time they were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding
of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is
the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt.34
Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely difficult to subscribe to
the trial courts finding as to the existence and sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one
major component of which would have been the alleged information or tip purportedly received
by the agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses Cuizon that fateful day with a large
cache of shabu. The question that defies resolution in our minds is why, if indeed the
information or tip was genuine and from a highly reliable source as claimed by the government

agents, did they not act on it? Throw in the alleged month-long surveillance supposedly
conducted by some of the NBI people on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens.
Even with the so-called tip and the results of surveillance, the government officers were still
seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to arrest and search the accused
appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went after Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel,
instead of outrightly cuffing and searching them, as they were supposed to, opted instead to
play it safe and meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search
their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If this is how confident the agents were
about their hot tips, reliable informers and undercover surveillance, then we cannot be blamed
for failing to appreciate the existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest
and search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this score, but we shall
leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of the accused-appellants
individually.
Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon
The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any warrant,
and not on the occasion or as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest, was indubitably illegal,
and the shabu seized thereat could not be admissible in evidence. That is why even the trial
judge did not make an effort to hold him liable under such seizure. He lamely argued: (A)t any
rate, accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in this case in connection with the bag
containing shabu confiscated from his residence. His responsibility is based on the bags
containing shabu which he handed to Pua and Lee at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag
and its contents of shabu taken from his house were not admitted in evidence, the remaining
proofs of the prosecution would still be sufficient to establish the charge against him. However,
contrary to the trial judges conclusion, we hold that insofar as Cuizon is concerned, all the
evidence seized are considered fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him,
and thus, he should be acquitted, since, as shown hereinabove, (i) the warrantless search
conducted on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not being incident to a valid warrantless
arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were not illegal, conspiracy as between
Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua and Lee on the other had not been established by
sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) appellant Cuizon had timely raised before this
Court the issue of the illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure conducted at his
residence, and questioned the admission of the seized shabu in evidence.
Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ Tommy Sy
What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search
and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for not being incident to a lawful
warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of
his arrest and search as well as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby; he did not
raise the issue or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any possible
challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld
and recognized waivers of constitutional rights, including, particularly, the right against

unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases such as People vs. Malasugui35 and De Garcia
vs. Locsin.36
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by virtue of the
handwritten consent (Exhibit I) secured by the arresting officers from appellants Pua and Lee,
the latter freely gave their consent to the search of their baggage, and thus, the drugs
discovered as a result of the consented search is admissible in evidence. The said written
permission is in English, and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to the search
of their luggage to be conducted by NBI agents to determine if Pua and Lee are carrying shabu.
It appears that appellant Pua understands both English and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino
mother, had resided in Vito Cruz, Manila, and gave his occupation as that of salesman. He
admitted that he was asked to sign the written consent, and that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May
28, 1992, pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during his direct and cross-examinations to the
effect that he did not really read the consent but signed it right away, and that by signing it he
only meant to give permission for the NBI agents to enter the room (and not to search) is hardly
worthy of belief, considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been extra careful
about who to let into the hotel room.
Thus, the full weight of the prosecutions testimonial evidence plus the large amount of
prohibited drugs found, must be given full force vis-a-vis Puas claim of innocent presence in the
hotel room, which is weak and not worthy of credence.
Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ Paul Leung
Appellant Lees situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the Solicitor General
when he noted that the trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make available compulsory
process and to see to it that accused appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is clear that
appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with one,
he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that, among
other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have
compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on
his behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to
present his testimony.37 In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the
case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial.
Epilogue
It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation
and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal
searches and seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal drugs that the government officers
claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply
the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have
no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of
their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search
and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of

the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the
name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of
justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages
the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society,
we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin Cuizon y
Ortega is hereby ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate release is ordered
unless he is detained for other valid causes. Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby
found GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Transport of Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15,
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant
Pua. Finally, the case as to appellant Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in
order that said accused may be given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also
AFFIRMED with respect to the disposition of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., concur in the result.