1

Personal Details

Principal Investigator:
Paper Coordinator

Content Writer
Content Reviewer
Language Editor

A. Raghuramaraju

Department of Philosophy,
University of Hyderabad
Ranjan
Mukhopadhyay, (1)Visva-Bharati, Shantiniketan
Pradeep Gokhale
(2) Central University of Tibetan Studies,
Sarnath (Varanasi)
Arvind Kumar Rai
Department of Philosophy and Religion,
Banaras Hindu University (Varanasi)
Heeraman Tiwari
Israel Institute of Advanced Studies
Raghavendra Rao Harnoor
Freelancer, Hyderabad

Description of Module

Subject Name

Philosophy

Paper Name

Logic-2

Module Name/Title Navya-nyya definition of Vypti (Siddhnta-vypti)

Module Id

7.31

Prerequisites

Awareness of the Navya-nyya tradition

Objectives

To study the Conclusive Definition of vypti

Key words

vypti, pratiyogit, hetu, sdhya, smndhikarayamavacchedakat

Navya-nyya definition of Vypti (Siddhnta-vypti)

1.1. Introduction

Volcanic eruption at Mount St. Helens, 1980

Perception and inference are integral parts of any rational human behavior and understanding. Perception
is generally considered to be preferable to inference. But there are certain critical moments in life where we
are bound to prefer inference to perception. Suppose we were living with our family in the US at escaping
distance from a volcanic eruption that occurred at Mount St. Helens in 1980. After perceiving the huge
amount of rising gases from an escaping distance, our normal rational behavior demanded that we would
take steps to run away from there with our family. In such predicaments, we have to rely mostly on
inferential knowledge rather than on perceptual evidence.

The notion of pervasion (vypti) is the heart of inference. It is very simple and given at intuitive
level to human beings and many other higher species of animals who are capable of modifying their reflexes
in the light of experiences. We always use this notion without being aware of it. To say that yesterday was
Sunday because today is Monday is to use the notion of vypti. Such a simple notion caught the attention
of the great medieval philosophers of India like Dinnaga, Kumrila, Dharmakrti, Udayancrya, and
Gagea. This resulted in a fruitful discussion and dialogue among philosophers regarding the formulation
of the definitions of vypti. We have a large number of definitions of vypti from the medieval period.
Gageas formulation of the conclusive definition of vypti is one of the brilliant attempts to resolve this
issue. A definition is called siddhnta because it will be able to put down all controversies regarding it
siddhaantayenasasiddhnta1-

The present module has three major parts. In the first part we will deal with the background of the
Conclusive Definition of vypti. In the second part we will translate into English Gageas Conclusive
Definition and its interpretation by the great commentator Raghuntha iromai. In the third part we will
explain Gageas definition.

1.2. History of the Conclusive Definition (Vypti-siddhnta-lakaam)

---------------------------------------------------

Kindly decipher the footnote

--------------------------------------------------The second chapter of the Tattvacintmai deals with the problems of inference, its elaboration and
discussion. Before advancing his proposal of conclusive definition, Gagea states and examines 21
definitions of vypti and finds them unsatisfactory. The modern scholars are not in favor of giving full
credit to Gagea for its formulation. Matilal remarks, The siddhnta laksana, i.e., the Definition
1

fl)% vUr% ;su l% fl)kUr% A------

4
acceptable to Gagea, is only a modified version of Maikahas definition.2 Whatever may be the truth,
it is evident that without the modified version of Gagea, this definition would not have been the centre of
attraction for the commentators of Gagea. It is one thing to choose the members of Parliament, quite
another to choose the Prime Minister among them. Merely assent to this definition by Gagea is itself a
major event in the history of navya-nyya. This will become more transparent when we find a sort of
disagreement between Gagea and Raghuntha regarding this issue. 3

1.3. Causes of dissatisfaction with other definitions

In the second chapter on inference in Tattvacintmai the question is raised about the nature of pervasion
which is a component in the cognition of pervasion as a cause of inferential cognition. Before giving his
conclusive definition Gagea has expressed his dissatisfaction with 21 definitions. Some definitions are
very poor. They are the result of carelessness. Let us take the example of 20 th definition which says that
pervasion is simply a relation-(sambandhamtravypti)4This is a very poor definition because relation
persists in the case of deviation (vyabhicra) too. But many definitions are powerful. What are the causes
of dissatisfaction with them? Geokoop observes, Gagea condemns the whole series of definitions under
criticism by noticing that they all use, explicitly or implicitly, the terms probans and probandum; the
use of these terms, he says, involves circularity, since the notion of probans and probandum can be
understood only with the help of the notion of pervasion.5
We feel that the basic cause of dissatisfaction with other formulations is the ontological structure
of Navya-nyya. The ontological structure of a system should not be seen as a cause of the poverty of the
system. Just as the factual structure of sciences provides another opportunity for the application of
mathematical formulas, in the same way, ontological structures may be viewed as providing a separate
domain for the realization of logical and epistemological tools. There are two views regarding new
categories introduced in navya-nyya. There were some scholars who were favouring separate ontological
status to new categories.6 But the majority were in favour of reducing new categories like avcchedakt, and
pratiyogit, etc. to the already existing categories of the Vaieika system. The Navya-nyya extended his
logic to cover the universally present (kevalvayin) properties. In such a case it is not possible to take the
complement of an ever-present-properties like knowability and expressibility. Let us take a concrete
example of fire. Fire is present to some loci and absent from other loci. So it is possible to take a
complementary property of fire. But such a move is not permissible in the case of nameability. This can be
represented with the help of the following diagrams:
True Representation

False Representation

Matilal, B.K., Logic, Language and Reality, Delhi: Motilal Banarasi Das 1985 (First Edition), P. 144.
Mishra, Sachidananda, NyyaDarshan Me Anumna,Varanasi :Bhartiya Vidya Prakashan 2006, P. 6972.
4
lEcU/k&ek=a O;kfIr% ---This line needs to be deciphered.
3

Also see page 4 bottom and page 6 bottom

Geokoop, C., The logic of Invariable concomitance in Tattvacintmai :Dordecht : D. Reidal
Publishing Co. 1967, P. 18.
6
Shastri, Guru Prasad, ed. Siddhnta-Lakaa-Jgad, with the commentaries, Didhiti, Jagadishi,
Vivriti&Dipika (Second Edition), Varanasi: Vani Vilas Prakashan, 1984, P. 239.
5

name
-

Fire

Fig. I

Fig. II

It is always dangerous to use a language alien to navya-nyya. But the logical estimation of navyanyya is more visible in a language intelligible to students of Logic. Most of the definitions of pervasion
demand that we take the absence of probandum (sdhya) in the process of defining vypti. But such
definition cannot be applied to cases where we are not allowed to take the absence of sdhya. For example,
It is a nameable, because it is knowable- is an example where we are not permitted to take the absence of
nameability according to the nyya system because everything is nameable. So we need the formulation of
the definition of pervasion which will define pervasion without taking recourse to the absence of
probandum. The Conclusive Definition given by Gangea tries to fulfil this demand.

2.1. Gageas Conclusive Definition

atrocyate,
pratiyogyasamndhikaraa-yatsamndhikaratyantbhvapratiyogitvacchedakvacchinna yannabhavati, tenasamatasyasmndhikarayavypti.7
English translationIt is stated here-- Pervasion is co-location of that with that which is not bounded by the bounder of
the negatumness of absolute absence sharing locus with that but not sharing locus with negatum.
Or
Pervasion is co-location that (tasya) with that (tena) which (yat) is not bounded (avacchinnam) by
the bounder (avcchedaka) of the negatumness (pratiyogit) of absolute-absence sharing locus with that
(yat) but not sharing locus with negatum (pratiyogi).
In order to have a better understanding of the definition we can break up the definition into three
parts so that it will be easy to follow the translation.
I

tenasamatasyasmndhikarayavypti

v=ksP;rs&izfr;ksX;lekukf/kdj.k;Rk~lekukf/kdj.kkR;UrkHkkoizfr;ksfxrkoPNsndkofPNUua ;UuHkofrrsu lea rL; lkekukf/kdj.;a

O;kfIr%AShastri, Guru Prasad, ed. Siddhnta-Lakaa-Jgad, with the commentaries, Ddhiti, Jagadishi,
Vivriti&Dipika (Second Edition), Varanasi : Vani Vilas Prakashan, 1984, P. 1-3.

6
4

Pervasion is co-location of that (hetu) with that (sdhya)

II

1 5 6

pratiyogit-avacchedaka-avacchinnayatnabhavati
1

6 5

Which (sdhya) is not bounded by bounder of negatumness.

III

pratiyogi-asmndhikaraa-yat-samndhikaraa1
atyantbhva
1

Absolute-absence sharing-locus with that (hetu)4

but unsharing-locus with negatum.

2.1.1. Interpretation of Gageas Conclusive Definition by Raghuntha iromai in his commentary

Ddhiti

Raghuntha interprets Gageas definition as follows:

pratiyogyasamndhikaraeti- pratiyogyasamndhikaraayadrpa-viiasamndhikaraaatyantbhva-pratiyogitnavacchedako
yo
dharmastaddharmvacchinnenayenakenpisamasmndhikaraya,
tadrpaviiasyataddharmvacchinnayvannirpitvyptirityartha.8

Translation

The meaning of (Gageas text beginning with phrases) negatumunsharinglocus etc. is Pervasion of thatform-havertadrpaviiasya) with that-property-havertaddharmvacchinna) is completely described
yvannirpit (when) the (hetu) is co-located even with any arbitrary entity yena kenpi sama which
8

izfr;ksX;lekukf/kdj.ksfr&izfr;ksX;lekukf/kdj.k;nzwifof'k"Vlekukf/kdj.k&vR;UrkHkko&izfr;ksfxrkuoPNsndks ;ks /kEeZLr)EekZofPNUusu

;sudsukfi lea lkekukf/kdj.;a] rnzwifof'k"VL; r)EekZofPNUu;kofUu:firkO;kfIrfjR;FkZ%AShastri, Guru Prasad, ed.
Siddhnta-Lakaa-Jgads, with the commentaries, Didhiti, Jagadishi, Vivriti&Dipika (Second
Edition), Varanasi : Vani Vilas Prakashan, 1984, P. 3-14.

7
(sdhya)is bounded by the property, not the bounder property of negatumness of absolute absence having
locus of that-form-haveryadrpaviia(but) unsharring locus with negatum.

2.1.1.1. Observation

This interpretation clearly specifies definendum (lakya) and defining attribute (lakaa) so that defining
attribute is not the repetition of definendum which is considered to be a great defect. The definendum is-tadrpaviasyataddharmvacchinna-yvannirpitvypti9.It means that pervasion of that-form-haver
with that-property-haver is completely described. The remaining part is definition.tadrpaviiasya stands
for that which is bounded by the bounder of reasonnesshetutvacchedakvacchinnasya10) and
taddharmvacchinnena stands for that which is bounded by the bounder of probandumness. In the body
of definition- yadrpaviiasya stands for that which is bounded by the bounder of reasonness
hetutvacchedak-vacchinnasya). The remaining parts of terminology are the same as in the definition of
Gagea.
In the body of definition we have been asked to take co-location of hetu with any instance of
sdhyayena kena api-But in the definendum we have been asked to understand pervasion of all instances
of sdhya (yvannirpitvypti)11
The students of symbolic logic must be aware of the distinction between any, some and all
terms. Any is not all12. The examples are selected arbitrarily. In order to emphasize this point
Raghuntha has used the term any yena kenaapiin the body of the definition. But if a property is
established for that any it is to be understood a property of all such things. So he has used the term
allyvat~in the body of definendum.
Another important feature of Raghunthas interpretation is that he proposes to qualify the bounder
of probandumness with the difference of the bounder of the negatumness whereas in Gageas definition,
probandum is qualified by the difference of negatum sdhye pratiyogibhedamupekya
sdhyatvacchedake pratiyogitvacchedakabheda niveayati13-So the resulting formula, according to
Gagea, will be pratiyogi-vyadhikaraa- hetu-samndhikraa-atyantbhva-pratiyogitvacchedakaavacchinna-bhinna-sdhya-smn-dhikaraya vypti14While the resulting formula, according to
Ddhitikra,
will
be
pratiyogivyadhikaraa-hetvadhikaraavtti-atyantbhva-pratiyogitanavacchedaka yat sdhyatvacchedaka tadavacchinna-sdhya-smndhikaraya vypti.15

rnzwifof'k"VL;r)EekZofPNUu;kofUu:firkO;kfIr%
gsrqrkoPNsndkofPNUuL;
11
;kor~&fu:firkO;kfIr%
12
See Copi, I.M., Symbolic Logic, New York, Macmillan Publishing co. Ins., P. 72.
13
lk/;s izfr;ksfxHksneqis{; lk/;rkoPNsndsizfr;ksfxrkoPNsndHksnafuos'k;frA- str, Pt. Dhuirja, Sidhnta-Lakaam by
JagadaTarklakra with Gag Commentary of ivadattaMira, Varanasi : Chaukhambha Sanskrit
Sansthan (Second Edition), 1984, P. 05.
14
izfr;ksfxO;f/kdj.kgsrq&lekukf/kdj.k&vR;UrkHkkoizfr;ksfxrkoPNsndkofPNUu&fHkUu&lk/;lkekukf/kdj.;a O;kfIr%A Cf. P. 1.
15
izfr;ksfxO;f/kdj.k&gsRof/kdj.ko`R;R;UrkHkkoizfr;ksfxrkuoPNsnda ;Rlk/;rkoPNsndarnofPNUulk/;-lkekukf/kdj.;a O;kfIr%A
10

3.1. Explanation of Gageas Conclusive Definition of Vypti

The following are the chief features of Gageas definition:

3.1.1. The definition appears to be too difficult, but it is not so. It has several components and after
understanding these components it will be easy to understand the definition. One of the distinctive
characteristics of the definition is that it is using pronouns for sdhya and hetu in the main body of
definition. In the body of definition the first yat stands for hetu and the second yat for sdhya. Again
tena stands for sdhya and tasya for hetu. Since in the process of testing the definition we have to replace
these pronoun- terms by concrete hetu and sdhya, its different versions found in later works are using
sdhya and hetu terms in the main body of definition. The versions of siddhnta-lakaa given for students
in Nyya-siddhnta-muktval and Tarka-sagraha-dpik are examples of this trend. But rigour is lost.
The language of Gagea and his followers is very much similar to the language used by the
medieval logicians of the West.16 According to the medieval logicians any noun-term can be understood as
having an essence. For example Man means haver of manness. A thinker means haver of thinkerness.
In the same way we can understand terms of navya-nyya. hetu means haver of hetut and sdhya
means haver of sdhyat and so on. These logicians of the West change any verb into noun by adding a
suffix er. From think we can derive thinker. By using this technique we can construct many terms in
English to represent faithfully the terms used in navya-nyya. From bound we can derive bounder
(avacchedaka) and from occur we can derive occurrer (vtti) as well as from occurrer (vtti) we can
derive occurrerness (vttit) and so on.
3.1.2. Pervasion is co-location of that (hetu) with that (sdhya) (pratiyogyasamndhikaraa-yatsamndhikaratyantbhva-pratiyogit-avacchedaka-avacchinna yannabhavati)17The parts of the
formula put in the last bracket are putting some sort of restrictions directly or indirectly on sdhya to make
it pervade (vypaka). The idea behind it is very simple. In case of any sound examples (sad-hetuka-sthala)
three things must be available in any inferential locus (paka): (1) hetu; (2) absence of something and (3)
sdhya. What is absent there must be present in some other locus but not there. In other words, absoluteabsence must be pratiyogi-asamndhikaraa or pratiyogi-vyad,hikaraa. It is required that sdhya must
not be identical with pratiyogi, i.e., the thing absent there. If this condition is fulfilled, then the definition
of vypti is acceptable. This can be represented with the help of the following diagram:

bhedavat

pratiyogit

nirpit

sdhya-

smnHenry, D.P., Medieval logic and Metaphysics, London; Hutchinson University Library, 1972, P. 5-7.
17
dhikaraayam
izfr;ksX;lekukf/kdj.k;Rk~&lekukf/kdj.kkR;UrkHkkoizfr;ksfxrkoPNsndkofPNUua ;UuHkofr hetu
sdhya
pratiyogi
avcchedaka
t
16

prati.-vya.
abhva
1

Locus of
pratiyogi

Inferential locus of
atyantbhva, hetu, sdhya
Fig III

There are two qualifiers of atyantbhva: (1) It must not share locus with pratiyogi (pratiyogivyadhikaraa). (2) It must be present in the locus of hetu. The sdhya must be different from pratiyogiand
it must not be bounded by the bounder of negatumness of absolute absence. If this condition is satisfied,
sdhya will be pervader of hetu. By synthesizing this condition with the condition of co-location we can
get a simple form of The Conclusive Definition which is a given in so many popular books:
hetuvypakasdhya-smndhikarayavypti18It means that vypti is: co-location of (hetu) with
sdhya which is pervader of hetu.
(31.3.1.3) It is also necessary to analyse the concept of sdhyasmndhikarayam. Let us take the
classical example the hill is fiery because of smoke. Here the sdhya is fire, hetu is smoke and
inferential locus (paka) is hill. If there is co-location smndhikaraya~of smoke with fire in hill then
smoke should have occurrernessvttit) described (nirpit) by locus (hill) of fire. It can be represented
as follows:

gsrq&O;kid&lk/;lkekukf/kdj.;a O;kfIr% A -Jha, Hari Mohan, BhartiyaDaranaParichaya, PrathamKhadaNyya-darana, Patna : PustakBhandar, 1963, P. 76.
See also Sharma, Brajanarayan, Bhrtiya-darana me anumna, Varanasi: BhartiyaVidyaPrakashan
2006, P. 116.

18

10

sdhya

vttit

Fire

Smoke

hetu

Hill (paka)

Fig. IV
The arrow mark shows the direction of pervasion. If we symbolize pervasion by V, then vypti
can be represented by the formula- sVh or V (s, h) where s stands for sdhya and h for hetu. Vypti
resides in hetu which is vypya. Vypyatva is another name of pervasion. If it is not so, then it is

not possible to remember pervasion after perceiving hetu.Pervasion is such a relation between the pervader
and the pervaded that the pervaded becomes an unfailing mark of the pervader. 19
It is important to remember that sharing of locus smndhikaraya)a is not limited only to smoke
with fire. Suppose there is a donkey or a vehicle. They have co-location with fire (sdhya). Can we say that
fire is also pervader of them? The answer is no. There are co-locations of many entities in hill with fire.
The co-locations of entities like donkey are all irrelevant. They are relevant only when we are choosing
donkey as a reason or probans (liga) in the inference of fire, i.e, when there is co-location of donkey with
fire of which (donkey) fire is pervader. So, Vmcaraa Bhattacharya remarks in Vivti while commenting
on
Siddhnta-lakaa-jgadi,
vahnydau
rsabha-vypakatvbhvena
rsabhavypakavahnisamndhikaraarsabhavatt-nicayasya
tdnumitihetubhtasya
asambhavditi bhva. Niruktavahni-smndhikarayasya rsabhe sattvepi pattiviraht20
It means that what is a required is: hetu-vypaka-sdhya-smndhikaraya21 In the case of
classical example we can substitute here dhmavypakavahni-smndhikaraya22because we will be
Bhattacharya, Sibajiban, GagesasTheory of Indeterminate Perception Nirvikalpakavda, Part- I,
New Delhi : Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1996, Page 109.
20
^^o;~knkS jklHkO;kidRokHkkosu jklHkO;kidoflkekukf/kdj.kjklHkokkfu'p;L; rkn`'kkuqfefrgsrqHkwrL;klEHkokfnfr Hkko%A----fu#Droflkekukf/kdj.;L; jklHks losfi vkifkfojgkr~-------A**Shastri, Guru Prasad, ed. Siddhnta-LakaaJgads, with the commentaries, Didhiti, Jagadishi, Vivriti&Dipika (Second Edition), Varanasi : Vani
Vilas Prakashan, 1984, P. 39-40.
21
gsrq&O;kid&lk/;lkekukf/kdj.;e~A
22
/kwe&O;kidoflkekukf/kdj.;e~ A
19

11
able to infer fire on the basis of probans smoke. But we are not permitted to substitute here: rsabhavypakavahni-smndhikaraya.23Donkey (rsabha) will not act as probans in the process of inferring fire. Colocation is relevant only for an entity acting as a probans in the process of inference.
(31.3.2) Test of Definition (Lakaa-samanvaya)
A definition is satisfactory only when it is applicable in all sound cases (sad-hetuka-sthala) but not
applicable in any unsound cases (asad-hetuka-sthala). These classes are already fixed in accordance with
the ontology of the system. The definition may have three types of defects:
1. If it is applicable in a few cases but not in all sound cases, it has the defect of under pervasion (avypti).
2. If it is applicable in unsound cases too, it has the defect of over-pervasion (ati-vypti).
3. If it is not applicable in any sound case, then it has the defect of total failure (asambhava).
It has to be shown that the definition given by Gagea is free from the above defects. It is not
possible to take all the examples. Here we will take only one classical example to show its soundness.

Sound Example
The hill is fiery, because of smoke24.
Here -

(1) Probans(hetu)

(2) Probandum(sdhya)

(3) Locus (paka)

Fire
:

(4) Taken absolute absence

Smoke

Hill

Absence of pot ghao nsti

The ancients are taking the absence of pot because they think that it will be absent on the hill. But
we are free to take any entity if we are sure about the absence of that entity on the hill.

Demonstration

The locus of smoke is hill. Here we have taken the absence of pot which is un-locative with pot. Here the
bounder of negatumness (pratiyogit) is potness (ghaatva). Pot is bounded by potness. Fire is different
from pot and has co-location of smoke with it (fire). So definition is satisfactory.
Unsound Example
It has smoke, because it has fire. dhmavn vahne)25
Here,
(1) Probans
23

jklHk&O;kid&oflkekukf/kdj.;e~A
ioZrksofeku~] /kwekr~A
25
/kweoku~ os% A
24

Fire

12
(2) Probandum

(3) Locus
(3) Taken absolute absence:

Smoke
:

Hot iron ball

Absence of smoke itself ((dhmonsti)

Demonstration

In the red-hot iron ball fire (hetu) is present. There is absolute absence of smoke and this absence is also
unco-locative with its negatum (pratiyogi) smoke.Here the negatum (pratiyogi) is smoke itself which is
bounded by the bounder of negatumness (smokeness). But smoke is probandum (sdhya) also, and a sdhya
according to definition must be different from the negatum. But here the negatum as well as the probandum
is smoke. So sdhya is not different from the negatum. The definition here is not satisfactory.
It means that the Conclusive Definition given by Gagea has the capability to be satisfied in sound
examples but not in unsound examples. So the definition is acceptable.

3.3. Material Implication and the Conclusive Definition of Pervasion

Any good theory inference best on pervasion must allow us to infer sdhya from hetu and must be able to
exclude the cases of having hetu but not sdhya. It will be interesting to compare the concept of implication
involved here with the nature of implication proposed in Western logic. It is not safe to leave the language
of navya-nyya. But in order to appreciate the contribution of navya-nyya it is interesting to compare it
with the Western concept of implication. The material implicative function if P, then Q in Truthfunctional-logic is a very important function. It is a modern version of Philos view of conditional statement.
Sextus says:
So, according to him there are three ways in which a conditional may be true, and one in which it
may be false. For a conditional is true when it begins with a truth and ends with a truth, like If it is day, it
is light; and true also when it begins with a falsehood and ends with a falsehood, like If the earth flies,
the earth has wings; and similarly a conditional which begins with a falsehood and ends with a truth is
itself true, like If the earth flies, the earth exists. A conditional is false only when it begins with a truth
and ends with a falsehood, like If it is day, it is night.26
Writing P for antecedent and Q for consequent, we may represent Philos view by using the
truth table as follows:

P Q If P then Q
PQ

26

Quoted from Kneale. W. & Kneale. Martha, the Development of Logic, Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1962, P. 130.

13
t

We are not interested in the various forms of this theory or consequences of this theory. There is
one important feature which needs to be considered. Philo maintains that a conditional is false when it
begins with truth and ends with falsehood. This is the important characteristic of a false conditional in a
two-valued scheme. So a true conditional must be free from this defect. In the case of Indian Theory of
Inference, it must not be the case that hetu (H) is present and sdhya (S) is absent i.e. H &~ S. The
conclusive definition also puts a restriction similar to Philo in another language. It must not be the case that
in a desired locus hetu is present and sdhya is not different from pratiyogi. A pratiyogi is one which is
absent in the locus of hetu. If sdhya is not different from pratiyogi, then hetu will be present and sdhya
will be absent, i.e., H & ~ S. In order to block this phenomenon, it is stated in the body of the Conclusive
Definition that sdhya must be different from pratiyogi (Gagea) or the bounder (avacchedaka) of sdhya
must be different from the bounder of pratiyogi of absolute-absence (Raghuntha). This restriction is laid
down in order to make sdhya pervader of hetu. By adding this condition to the condition of sdhyasmndhikarayam we get the desired Conclusive Definition of vypti.

3.4. Summary

The comprehension of the nature of pervasion is essential in order to have an understanding of the structure
of inference. It is given at intuitive level to human beings and many other higher species of animals. But its
formulation is not so easy. Gangea formulation of it in the form of the Conclusive Definition of vypti in
Tattva-chintmai is one of the brilliant formulations of vypti. The essence of his formulation can be put
in a simple form: vypti is co-location of [hetu] with sdhya which is pervader of
hetu(hetuvypakasdhyasmndhikaraya vypti)27or vypti is co-location of (hetu) with sdhya
such that it is not the case that the presence of hetu is the mark of the absence of sdhyaor vypti is colocation of (hetu) with sdhya such that it is not the case that the presence of hetu implies that sdhya
belongs to the class of negatum of absolute-absence. Raghuntha iromai, the great commentator of
Tattva-chintmai, has considerably modified the definition given by Gagea, but he has also
strengthened this condition laid down by Gagea.

27

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