Crime DA (cards need to be cut)

1- An illegal market
would immediately spring up due to low supply
Don B. Kates 82 bracketed for language Don B. Kates Jr (practices law with O'Brien and Hallisey in San Francisco), "Gun control
versus gun prohibition," American Bar Association Journal, September 1982 AZ

Nor is there any reason to think that even a national prohibition could prevent the development of an
illegal black market sufficient to serve both criminals and ordinary citizens. If, for instance, handguns
were smuggled into this* country at the rate at which federal officials estimate marijuana is, more
than 20 million guns of the size used to kill John Lennon could be imported illegally in any year. (There are only 60
million legally owned handguns at present.) Moreover, any competent machinist can build a revolver or
automatic pistol from pot metal for a fraction of what even the cheapest commercially produced
handgun costs. Can it be doubted that there would be thousands of "entrepreneurs" willing to build $15
junk .45s and .38s for a 500 per cent profit at illegal black market sale ? Of course, this type of gun would not fire
more than a few hundred rounds and would be accurate only at close range. But that is adequate for a buyer who wants a gun
only for murder, robbery, or self-defense.
2 - After a gun ban, the growth of the underground market will be so explosive that no legal
measure will stop it
Cook et al 06 summarize Terry
Philip J. Cook professor at Duke University and NBER; Jens Ludwig professor at Georgetown University and NBER ; Sudhir
Venkatesh - professor at Columbia University; Anthony A. Braga professor at Harvard University: Underground Gun Markets research was
supported by a grant from the Joyce
Foundation and written in part while Cook and Ludwig were resident fellows at the Rockefeller Foundations Bellagio Study and Research
Center; August 2, 2006

Don Terry staff reporter, How Criminals Get Their Guns: In Short, All Too Easily, The New York Times, March 11, 1992, p. A1IG
12/16/15

Underground gun markets have developed in America in response to regulations that seek to prohibit[ion]
[of] ownership and possession by that subset of the population deemed to be at unacceptably high risk of misusing guns primarily
youth and adults with serious prior criminal records while preserving easy access for everyone else. Whether 1 Most of what is
known about the underground gun market comes from interviews with incarcerated prisoners or
inner-city youth (for example Wright and Rossi, 1994, Webster et al., 2002, Sheley and Wright, 1993, Callahan and Rivara, 1992).
However such interviews can at best shed light on how a subset of the retail market operates, and are
not informative about other aspects of market structure or conduct. 3 the gun market can be
segmented in this way remains the topic of spirited debate in U.S. policy circles. In Section 1 we review this
regulatory system and note that a few jurisdictions, including Chicago, go further and essentially prohibit the
private possession of handguns, the type of gun most commonly used in crime and violence. The fact
that Chicago has unusually restrictive regulations makes the city an interesting case study.

Economists and other skeptics like to point out that government prohibitions on transactions are difficult
to enforce; the ingenuity of the marketplace, motivated by profit, will overcome whatever legal
obstacles are put in place. If true for handguns in Chicago, then we would expect to find that youths
and criminals are able to acquire them with little trouble (low transaction costs) at prices not that much
higher from those in the legal market.

As New

York University law professor James Jacobs observes in this regard, Some criminals claim that
it is as easy to buy a gun on the streets as it is to buy fast food. One Chicago gang member stated,
Its like going through the drive-through window. Give me some fries, a Coke, and a 9-millimeter
(2002, p. 150).2

3 - Underground gun markets hurt the economy, governmental legitimacy, create a state of panic,
and exacerbate conflicts in general
Cook et al 09
PHILIP J. COOK, WENDY CUKIER AND KEITH KRAUSE - Duke University, USA, Ryerson University,
Canada, and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland: The illicit firearms trade in North America Criminology
and Criminal Justice 2009; ISSN 17488958; Vol: 9(3): 265286 IG 12/16/15

In general, we know little about the specific impact and effects of illicitly trafficked firearms. Although we know that armed violence can ha[s]ve
a variety of deleterious effects on perceived and real insecurity, public health, economic development and political stability (Small Arms Survey,
2003), we do not know how much of this can be associated specifically with changes in the availability of firearms. The economic

consequences of armed violence are undeniable: one global model (using a willingness to pay approach and
reductions in life expectancy) estimated the social value of violence reduction (to zero) at 67 percent of GDP for
Mexico, the eighth-highest global value. Life expectancy is diminished by 0.6 years for all Mexicans as a
result of armed violence. The figures for the USA and Canada, for comparison, are 0.31 and 0.08,
respectively (Soares, 2006). A macro-economic study of direct and indirect costs of violence in Latin
America estimates these at 9.5 percent of GDP for Mexico; lower than the 20 percent for Colombia and El Salvador,
and around the same level as Brazil (Londono and Guerrero, 2000).
The negative effects of firearms are highly context dependent: they depend on the strength of demand factors, the types of weapons in circulation,
the groups in society with access to weapons and the purposes for which they possess them. In the case of Canada and Mexico,

illegally trafficked weapons are primarily used by criminal groups of varying degrees of
organization, and in Mexico there are some weapons also in the hands of armed groups challenging
state authority. The use of guns by criminal groups increases their relative power, and in the dramatic
circumstances we see in Mexico, contributes to subverting legitimate authority and creating such fear as
to have a substantial economic and political impact. In spite of the comparatively low rates of gun violence in
Canada, random shootings in public places and increasingly weaponized conflict between criminal
groups, however statistically rare, fuels a sense of insecurity. In addition, even a small number of illegal guns
in circulation can have a significant impact, particularly when a cycle of retaliatory violence begins.
Although data show gun homicide in Canada has declined significantly since 1991, public perceptions are that it has increased. When Toronto, a
city with 2.8 million people hit 52 gun homicides in 2005, it became the year of the gun (Regular, 2005) in spite of the fact that the city had one
of the lowest murder rates on the continent for a city of