Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
HELD:
The SC ruled that respondent cannot be found liable for violation of rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service". Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he
committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
The SC also ruled that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713 is a general law which applies to all
public officials and employees. Thus, it is not applicable to the case at bar. However,
Section 90 of R.A. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1992) governs the practice of
profession of elective local government officials. This is a special law with definite
scope, it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713. Accordingly, the
respondent as punong barangay was not forbidden to practice his profession. However,
he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by the civil service regulations as stated in Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing a written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules
which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Vicente Rellosa is therefore suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6
months and sternly warned that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
B.
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
10
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as
the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of
votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
Petition dismissed.
11
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
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FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Tys
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that:
Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.
When Ty filed his COC he falsely represented therein that he was a resident
of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (Barangay 6), for one
year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship,
he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding
the date of election as required under Section 39 of LGC
Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at
Barangay 6.
He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003
Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized
as a US citizen. However, he alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully
reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of
Allegiance to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had
also complied with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following:
CTC from Barangay 6 (March 2006)
Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005)
Registered voter at Brgy 6 (July 2006)
Pending this case, Ty won the elections.
COMELEC 1st Division ruled for Ty.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code.
HELD:
YES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is,
"the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
12
domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an
individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA.
Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must
have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the
USA, as his domicile of choice.
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact
or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he
did not necessarily regain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence
therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall
not retroact to the time of his birth.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when,
immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied
for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines
was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the
local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying
community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address
as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006
in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.
13
14
American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the
form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in
an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an
oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to
the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be
read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered
person or thing, that ones statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The
person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the
promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for
perjury if the testimony is false. To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is
to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere
qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and
the legislature clearly demand otherwise.
15
16
17
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there
18
19
RULES ON SUCCESSION
11. Talaga v. Comelec (G.R. No. 196804, 09 October 2012)
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 19951998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before
Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga
ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule.
Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for
reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two
full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
HELD:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law.
20
21
and constituting a quorum shall elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer.
Therefore, the vice governor who became an acting governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the office, since the nature of it calls for a full-time
occupant to discharge them
22
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
Cases:
13. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 271)
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him
on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of
the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is
because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied
her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600-day
suspension.
23
24
the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The
power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining
Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the
power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Josons claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the
Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head
of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers
to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of
Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required
by law to exercise authority.
25
26
OP Case 5469
This refers to the administrative complaint filed against petitioners relative to the retainer
contract for legal services entered into between the Province of Albay, on the one hand,
and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the
disbursement of public fund in payment thereof to handle the case against NPC filed
with the sc. The contract provided an acceptance fee and of 50k and a contingent fee of
18% of the value of the property which is 214M.
The Committee holds that respondents committed abuse of authority under Sec. 60(e)
of the Local Government Code for the following:
1. Hiring private lawyers, in violation of Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code, to
handle the case of the Province of Albay before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479;
2. Disbursing public money in violation of COA rules and regulations;
3. Paying the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm public money although it was only Atty.
Cornago who was the counsel of record of the Province of Albay in the Supreme Court
case;
4. Authorizing an unconscionable and grossly disadvantageous attorneys fees of P38.5
million; and
5. Additionally, as to respondent Governor, entering into a retainer agreement not only
with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Cornago, thus exceeding his
authority under Resolution No. 0 1-90 passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
After taking all the attendant circumstances into consideration, the Committee
recommends that the following penalties of suspensions without pay be meted out:
a. Respondents Salalima and Azaa six (6) months each; and
b. All the other respondents four (4) months each.
OP Case 5471
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by the Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral for
abuse of authority and oppression under Sec. 60 (c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160. Mayor
Corral and 7 Kagawads of Tiwi filed against respondents for abuse of authority,
misconduct in office and oppression. This administrative complaint arose from the
refusal of said respondents to remit Tiwis share in the P40,724,47 1.74 tax delinquency
payments made by NPC. Subsequently, Mayor Corral became the subject of 15
administrative and criminal complaints filed by certain individuals. The proceedings
reveal that the same were marked by haste and arbitrariness. This was evident from the
start when Mayor Corral was preventively suspended (in Adm. Case No. 05-92) even
before she could file her answer. In the other cases, respondent-members of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled that Mayor Corral had waived her right to adduce
evidence in her defense.
Consequently, respondents did not also fully evaluate the evidences presented to
support the charges made. As such, all the decisions of respondents suspending Mayor
Corral were ordered lifted suspended by the DILG and OP. Thus, even the cases filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman, which were based on the same incidents
complained of in the said administrative cases, were subsequently dismissed.
27
Moreover, Section 63(d) of R.A. No. 7 160 expressly states that, [a]ny abuse of the
exercise of the powers of preventive suspension shall be penalized as abuse of
authority.
All the other respondents herein are found guilty of oppression and abuse of authority
under Section 60(c) and (e) of R.A. No. 7160. Accordingly, it is recommended that each
of them be meted the penalty of four (4) months suspension without pay.
OP Case 5450
This refers to the administrative charges filed by Tabaco Mayor Antonio Demetriou
against Governor Romeo Salalima for violation of - Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the
Local Government Code, Section 3, par. (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the
provisions of PD No. 1594.
Tabaco Public Market was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the Province represented by
respondent Salalima and RYU Construction entered into a contract for P6,783,737.59
for said repair and rehabilitation after a public bidding. Among others, the contract
stipulated that the contracted work should be completed in 150 days. Despite the delay
on the first contract of repair, Province represented by respondent Salalima entered into
another contract (Exh. 1) for P4,304,474.00 with RYU Construction for additional repair
and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market.
since RYU Construction incurred negative slippage with respect to the repair works
under the 29 May 1991 contract as found by COA, it was anomalous for the Province
through respondent Salalima to enter into a negotiated contract with said contractor for
additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public market. Failing to comply
with the requirements of law, the 6 March 1992 contract is clearly irregular, if not illegal.
Premises considered, this Committee finds the respondent guilty of abuse of authority
and gross negligence. Accordingly, it is recommended that the penalty of suspension
without pay be meted out on respondent Salalima for five (5) months.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Office of the President act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioners for periods ranging from twelve to
twenty months?
2. Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the
petitioners guilty of abuse of authority in denying the Municipality of Tiwi of its rightful
share in the P40,724,471.74 which the Province of Albay had received from the NPC
under the Memorandum of Agreement?
3. Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending in
O.P. Cases Nos. 5469 and 5450 petitioner Salalima, who was reelected on 11 May
1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed during his first term; and in
suspending in O.P. Case No. 5469 the other petitioners, some of whom were elected
and others reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed
in 1989?
28
HELD:
1. NO, The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense
did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive
service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office
of the petitioners.
2.NO, Governor Salalima specifically included the amounts due to the municipalities of
Tiwi and Daraga in asking NPC to settle its obligations. They should have held the
shares of Tiwi and Daraga in trust pursuant to Section 309(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and not treated the P40,724,471.74 NPC payments as surplus
adjustment.
3. Yes, This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual vs.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and Aguinaldo vs. Santos. The underlying theory is that
each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor.
29
30
31
32
On August 26, 2005, respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against
petitioner with the trial court.
October 20, 2005, the trial court declared the decision of the Sangguninang Bayan,
removing respondent from office, and the memorandum implementing such decision by
mayor of Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts and not the petitioner, ar
empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Sec. 60 of
the Local Government Code.
Hence, this petition to the SC.
Petitioner contended that, the administrative cases involving the elective barangay
officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panglungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned, whch can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from
office and that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguinang Panglungsod or Sangguiang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is
warranted.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove an elective local official from
office.
2. Whether it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD:
1. No. Under Sec. 60 of the LGC, provides that an elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated by order of the proper court. The legislative
body, during the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, intended to
confine to the courts such power of removal.
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official
from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether
or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of
the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the
petitioners interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.
Petitionoers contention that the courts are merely task of issuing an order of decision
by the Sangguniang Panglungso or Sangguniang Bayan, clearly demotes the courts to
nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on
separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies
of local governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their
discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be
exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the
33
local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it
enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
2. No. The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it
should be applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal
from office of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to
defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more
impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of
the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal.
34
35
On Appeal on April 4, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued its resolution reversing the
resolution of the First Division. It contended that the provision no longer applies for
Sulong, having won the May 1992 and 1995, despite the Sangguinang Panlalawigans
decision which was promulgated on February 4, 1992, rendered the the decision moot
and academic by virtue of SC ruling the Agunaldo v. Santos case. In effect, the reelection of respondent Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount to a
codonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision by the people of Lapuyan who
have expressed their will when they cast their votes.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner, contended that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC case in holding that it condoned respondent Sulong acts.
Petitioner further cited Reyes v. COMELEC, in which the SC held that an elective local
officer, who is removed before th expiration of the term for which he was elected, is
disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under 40(b) of the LGC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sulong is disqualified from running.
HELD:
No. The Reyes case cannot be applied. The petitioner (in the Reyes case) after being
served with decision failed to appeal, thus he was validly removed from office and
pursuant to 40(b) of the LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection. In the
case at bar, the respondents filing of a mortion for reconsideration prevented the
decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final.
Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondents
motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent
Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on
May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly
10 years ago.
Petition is denied.
36
20. Hon. Juan M. Hagad v. Hon. Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, Presiding Judge, Branch
XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor Alfredo M.
Ouano, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor Paterno Canete and Mancuae City Sangguniang
Panglungsod Member Rafael Mayol
G.R. no. 108072
December 12, 1995
FACTS:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor
Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by
Counsilors, and all of Mandaue City by councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.
Bercede with the Office of the Deputy of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. The
respondents were charged for having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), as amended, Articles 170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code and R.A.
6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting
inconspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by
increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00
without authority from the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaue City.
Councilors Dionson and Bercede also moved for the preventive suspension of the
respondent officials in a separately docketed administrative case.
On August 5, 1992, respondents opposed the motion for preventive suspension and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman
supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed
against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power
to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as
to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President.
In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local
Government Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified
the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to
investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained
unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Mayor Ouano reiterated in his memorandum that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any
elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city
and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there
was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman
superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.
37
On Spetember 10, 1992, Deputy Ombudsman issued an order denying the motion to
dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of the respondent officials,
thereby formally placing them under preventive suspension.
On September 25, 1992, respondent officials filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer
of for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the RTC of
Mandaue City. RTC affirmed the petition and issued an order directed at petitioner and
enjoining him from enforcing him and/or implementing the questioned order of the
preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 has been divested of his authority to
conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent
enactment of RA 7160.
HELD:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not
removed by LGC of 1991. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate
that it has been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisionsof the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to comple us to only uphold one and strike
down the other. Well is settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not
favored, and the courts must generally assume congruent application. The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, every statue must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known
the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in
order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive
suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent
of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did
not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.
38
33.
39
40
21. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010)
41
22. Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008)
FACTS:
Elan Recreation, Inc. filed criminal and administrative complaints against Mayor Ramon
Talaga Jr. The complaints "alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the City of
Lucena, had unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of
bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants".
The administrative case was dismissed but the criminal charges were retained and filed
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Three informations were filed against Talaga Jr.
in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or R.A. 3019. Later, only one of
the informations was retained which alleges that Talaga Jr. gave "unwarranted benefits
to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting to Sy Bang a local franchise to
operate bingo games in the city". The prosecution moved for the petitioner's preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion. The petitioner, then, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari with an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends, among other things, that the information do not constitute
an offense. He claims that under R.A. No. 3019, the law which he allegedly violated, the
information must allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the
government or private party."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed against the petitioner is complete and constitutes
the offense to which he is being charged of.
HELD:
Yes. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is charged, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the information
must allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the
government or private party." The presence of the word "or" clearly shows that there are
two acts which can be prosecuted under Section 3: First, causing any undue injury to
any party, including the government, and, Second, giving any private party any
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DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION
23. Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992)
Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89
dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been
elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a
term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for
disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the
municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts
the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to
the complaint. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup
or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic
to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the complaint
of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary
suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome
of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted
on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even crossexamined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent
Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter,
respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty
as charged and ordering his removal from office.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way
for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to
the Republic.
44
HELD:
NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case pending before the Court moot and academic. It appears that
after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed
from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with
a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under
Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in
view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts
of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89,
dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby REVERSED.
45
24. Salumbines, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 180917, 23 April 2010)
FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13, 2002,
herein respondentsRicardo Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and
Agnes Fabian,all members of theSangguniang Bayanof Tagkawayan, filed withthe
Office of the Ombudsman a complaintagainst Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter
petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino. The administrative aspect of the case
charged petitionerset al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission
on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. The Office of the Ombudsman
denied the prayer to place petitionerset al. under preventive suspension pending
investigation. By Order datedFebruary 1, 2005, approved onApril 11, 2005, it denied the
motion for reconsideration butdropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as
respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case. The
Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005 Memorandumabsolving
Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.
HELD:
Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of condonation
The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never
remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any.It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people. Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the nonapplication of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to
equal protection of the law. The electorates condonation of the previous administrative
infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the
people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the
sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of
reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one
person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an
administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full
knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the
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47
48
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of
the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily,
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building
project.
In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong,
maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of
his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable
right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections,
and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain
the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into
office.
On March 16, 2015, Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive
suspension order through Director Brion, who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the
Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of
entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor
of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Pea, Jr. (Pea, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution (dated March 16, 2015), granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor earlier that day. Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, the CA found that it
was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that
the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged. The CA then directed the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested that the TRO did not state what act
was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been
served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, accusing Secretary Roxas,
Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately
refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice. The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila
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50
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos. Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly
impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous
activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013. In this
regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed
by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4,
and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay,
Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr., and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica wherein the condonation doctrine was still
applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election,
reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election. To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of
Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015
Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition before this Court, arguing that
the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman
also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative
proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's
memoranda. Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of
Comment, simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the
Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its
"institutional position." In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum,
the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation
doctrine. In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
ISSUES:
W 1) Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was the Ombudsmans plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
W 2) Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition;
W
W 3) Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;
W
W 4) Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI;
and
W 5) Whether the CAs directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.s petition for
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53
Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second
Paragraph was declared unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now deemed
ineffective. As such, the CA was held to have correctly issued the injunctive relief in
enjoining the preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
**IN FAVOR OF BINAY
The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. The SC abandoned
the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the WPI, as it did so based on good case law, considering that the abandonment
is prospective in nature.
In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a
jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was decided
under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal precedent on the issue
at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated what appears
the sole basis for the condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to
remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.
As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the condonation
doctrine, except that it seems to incline towards American authorities. On this regard,
the SC made its own investigation, and found that there was really no established
weight of authorities in the United States (US). In fact, 17 States in the US have
already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The
SC went on to adopt the findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the
caveat that said cases are merely guides of interpretation.
Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to
convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine
jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are far-reaching, since we
now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective case laws. For
this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case, viz:
Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against
prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this
Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare
decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations
against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only
when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the
Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society
within which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, [w]hat we
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The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the
Ombudsman was illegal, was refused to be resolved on the ground there are no
contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the Ombudsman that since she was an
impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due course has
been given to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsmans claim was premature.
56
C.
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59
60
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respective offices which are authorized to be filled, and to transmit a copy of such list
and the corresponding qualification standards to the Civil Service Commission not later
than the tenth day of every month. Vacant positions shall not be filled until after
publication: Provided, however, that vacant and unfilled positions that are: a) primarily
confidential;b) policy-determining;c) highly technical;d) co-terminous with that of the
appointing authority; or e) limited to the duration of a particular project, shall be
excluded from the list required by law.
SEC. 3. Publication of Vacancies. The Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission shall publish once every quarter a complete list of all the existing vacant
positions in the Government throughout the country, including the qualification
standards required for each position and, thereafter, certify under oath to the completion
of publication. Copies of such publication shall be sold at cost to the public and
distributed free of charge to the various personnel office of the government where they
shall be available for inspection by the public:Provided, That said publication shall be
posted by the Chief Personnel or Administrative Officer of all local government units in
at least three (3) public and conspicuous places in their respective municipalities and
provinces: Provided, further, That any vacant position published therein shall be open to
any qualified person who does not necessarily belong to the same office with the
vacancy or who occupies a position next-in-rank to the vacancy: Provided, finally, That
the Civil Service Commission shall not act on any appointment to fill up a vacant
position unless the same has been reported to and published by the Commission. The
foregoing provisions are clear and need no interpretation. The CSC is required to
publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief
personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated
places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they
have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication. Here, the
publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became
vacant. Clearly, respondents action violated Section 2 of R.A. No. 7041 cited earlier.
Moreover, the CSC found that there was no first-level representative appointed to the
Personnel Selection Board, which deliberated on the appointments to first-level
positions. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988, as amended, provides
that the Personnel
Selection Board shall be composed of the following:
a. Official of department/agency directly responsible for personnel management;
b. Representative of management;
c.d. Representative of organizational unit which may be an office, department, or
division where the vacancy is;
Representative of rank-and-file employees, one (1) for the first-level and one (1) for the
second-level, who shall both be chosen by duly registered/accredited employees
association in the department or agency. The former shall sit during the screening of
candidates for vacancy in the first-level, while the latter shall participate in the screening
of candidates for vacancy in the second level. In case where there is no employees
association in the department or agency, the
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The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the
more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently filled up. A careful
evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in the issuance of the appointment of Quirog
shows the absence of the element of hurriedness on the part of former Governor
Relampagos which characterizes a midnight appointment. There is also wanting in the
records of the case the subversion by the former governor of the policies of the
incumbent Governor Erico Aumentado as a logical consequence of the issuance of
Quirogs appointment by the latter. Both elements are the primordial considerations by
the Supreme Court when it laid down its ruling in prohibiting midnight appointments in
the landmark case of Aytona vs Castillo, et. al. In any event, respondent Governor
Aumentado, in a Memorandum7[36] dated March 4, 2003, has reinstated Quirog to the
permanent position of PGDH-OPA. Such act of respondent bespeaks of his acceptance
of the validity of Quirogs appointment and recognition that indeed, the latter is qualified
for the subject position.
7
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67
this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact of the tribunals
below.Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence
allegedly given by the Sanggunian,as postulated by the petitioner, is not the
concurrence required and envisioned under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body,
acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence,the
appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section
443(a) and (d) ofR.A. No. 7160. Without a valid appointment, petitioner acquired no
legal title to the Office of MunicipalBudget Officer, even if she had served as such for ten
years. Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.
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V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
45. MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007)
FACTS:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA
in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic
by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC
gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They
alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their
terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs
power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public
Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court.
In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to
whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to
direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing
bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is
consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should
they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the
constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its
Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not
include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals;
and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the
E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter
or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan
to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government
property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation
created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials,
but not between third persons.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
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exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the
contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the
safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of
vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs
to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the
flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart
from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the LTFRB)was empowered to
"impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving
any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the LTFRB to require any public service to
establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing
facilities.
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Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, which created the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations?
HELD:
By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the case of Metro Manila Development Authority
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with
police power, let alone legislative power, and that all of its functions are administrative in
nature.Police power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Thus, as
held in the aforementioned case, . . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision
in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and
these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:..Although petitioner is not
precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as
the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs, it still needs a valid law, or
ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source. This is consistent with the
ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances. Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, is
an unauthorized exercise of police power.
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47. Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005)
FACTS:
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of
President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened. A temporary restraining order
was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that the project was not
consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent
closure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality
of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..
HELD:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the
provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10
October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a
program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the
Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Pao, Section 2 (c), requiring
consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national
government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular
community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary
restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at
the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop
dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would
oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact
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ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section
447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the
municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent
provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the
construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the
basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, ...providing for the establishment, maintenance,
protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ....and, subject to
existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source
of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of
hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water
supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one
hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption,
use or wastage of water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
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