GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR.

, EMERLINDA S TALENTO, AND

RODOLFO H. DE MESA, PETITIONERS, VS. LEO RUBEN C. MANRIQUE, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from an article in Luzon Tribune, wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor,
which allegedly contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court. The petitioners alleged that the
subject article undermines the peoples faith in the Supreme Court due to the blunt allusion that they employed
bribery in order to obtain relief from the court, particularly in obtaining a TRO in a certain case. Manrique alleged that
there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he only started the facts or circumstances which
attended the issuance of the TRO.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not court decisions are beyond criticism and public opinion; and (2) whether Manriques invocation of
freedom of speech in his criticism tenable.
Ruling:
(1) No. The Court held that every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers and
such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial authority. It is, however, crucial that such
criticism be decent and proper.
(2) No, Manriques article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an independent attempt to malign
the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of the Court. Malicious publication cannot seek
the protection of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.

Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case against him on
the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed
against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas power to modify the rally permit without consulting with the IBP.
HELD:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case. Under
the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first
file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a
prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in
an appeal from the civil action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place different from that
applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the
applicant some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial
remedies) Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MAYOR JOSE ATIENZA

613 SCRA 518 POLITICAL LAW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TEST MODIFICATION OF A RALLY PERMIT
REMEDIAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 111 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the office of Manila
Mayor Jose Lito Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit
but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately
went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was
alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the
Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or
specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his power; that freedom
of expression is not absolute.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and
whimsically changed the venue without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of
the freedom of expression.

LEONORA A. GESITE, FE LAMOSTE, ADELAIDA MACALINDOG, and GUIA C. AGATON, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro Manila had a mass action,
assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances and did not held classes. DECS Secretary Isidro
Cario, brushed aside their complaints, warning them they would lose their jobs for taking illegal mass actions. He
then ordered the teachers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours, otherwise they will be dismissed from the
service, directed the DECS officials to initiate immediate administrative proceedings against those found disobedient.
Petitioners Gesite, Lamoste, Macalindog and Agaton were included to those who did not report for work on
September 19-21, 1990. Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints against them for defying his
return-to-work order. They were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil
Service Law and Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and absence without official leave.
Despite receipt of notice to file their answer within seventy-two (72) hours but not more than five (5) days,
petitioners failed to do so. Consequently, they were deemed to have waived their right to controvert the charges.
They were found guilty as charged and ordered dismissed from the service. Subsequently, this penalty was reduced

to nine (9) months suspension for petitioners Adelaida Macalindong and Guia Agaton and six (6) months suspension
for petitioners Leonora Gesite and Fe Lamoste.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, but it was denied. On appeal to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the same was also denied for lack of merit. They are found liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service on the ground that they acted without due regard to the adverse consequences of their
action which necessarily resulted in the suspension and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice of the pupils/students
to whom (they) were responsible. The CSC imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension without
pay. Their respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all
the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have
to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words
opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the
content of the expression in the rally.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the mass action launched by the Public school teachers from Sept. up to the first half of Oct.
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from performing the duty as teachers due to
economic reasons is valid.
RULING:
The issue in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of their students while the
petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances, however they should have exercised such
right in a lawful manner.It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to
realize their demands by withholding their services.
Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution, employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formations of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike. (Bangalisan vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is
that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
BAYAN, ET AL., VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 169838
APRIL 25, 2006

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving
of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the
public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance,
is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the
requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right
as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their
petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6,
12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of

RANDOLF S. DAVID V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. NO. 171396, MAY 3, 2006 (AND OTHER
CONSOLIDATED CASES)
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I.

THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-inChief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents
of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without
warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the
Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and
seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her
constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

Vicente Sotto for appellant.

City Fiscal Felix for appellee.

II.

THE ISSUE

OSTRAND, J.:

1.
2.

Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1.

NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT

valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids
warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust
Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the
Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner
David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant
to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction
may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.

CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TOMAS EARNSHAW, Mayor of the City of Manila, defendant-appellee.

This is an action of mandamus brought against the defendant mayor of the City of Manila. The plaintiff alleges that
he is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands, a political group seeking the speedy granting of
independence in these Islands and the redemption of the proletariat, numbering over 300,000 men and woman in its
ranks; that on the 2d of March, 1931, by means of a letter to the defendant mayor of the city, the plaintiff requested
the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the afternoon of March 12,
1931, to be followed by a parade through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General
Solano in order to deliver to the Governor-General a message from the laboring class; that on the 3d of March, 1931,
the mayor of the city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of
meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and licenses; that
consequently, the Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public meetings in the city since the 6th
day of March, 1931; that in refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party within the
city, the defendant deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional right. The plaintiff further prays "that a writ
of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of meetings
and parades by the Communist Party in Manila."

The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of the above-mentioned
permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said
Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association, or organization, which having for its principal object to
incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws, states as follows:

The Philippines, as a subject nation, in order to establish an independent government, has to revolt under
the leadership of the laborers.

. . . It is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses (Nacionalista-Consolidado, Democrata,
etc.) are no different from another. They have but one aim; to rise into power and exploit, with
independence or not; to enrich themselves and strengthen the control of a government which is
procapitalist and proimperialist.
Because of these, we need a Communist Party, one that is not reformist but revolutionary. Only by
revolutionary means can we demolish the slavery of man by another and of one nation by another nation. .
.

The principal ideal of the C. P. P. (Communist Party of the Philippines) in the desire to head the Philippine
Government is different from that of the burgees political parties. Its aim is not to strengthen the capitalist
government but to engender as it cannot be avoided the war of the classes and to bring about its
downfall.
Therefore, the aims of the C. P. P. are the following:

For the prompt overthrow of the institutions of capitalism and for the purpose of opening the eyes of the
people that the imperialists are not really in earnest about giving subject peoples their independence
because independence is an enemy of oppression and exploitation unless their downfall is brought
about, it is necessary to struggle, not only during elections.

1. To lead the movement for the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines.
2. To fight and bring about the downfall of American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines;
3. To stop the exploitation of the laborers and defend their rights and interests;
4. To establish in the Philippines a Soviet Government under the laborers.
5. To bring about the downfall of capitalism.
6. Under the dictatorship of the laborers, to emancipate and redeem the laborers and farm hands, to
embrace communism.

The difference of the revolutionary movement advocated by the C. P. P. is not found only in its principal
ideal but in the steps that it will take. While the reformists advocate understanding and cooperation with
the burgesses or capitalists, the movement of the laborers is based on the principle of class struggle.
Instead of cooperating with the enemy we should master our own strength and fight our enemies. And in
order to achieve this union, strong and powerful, it is necessary that we should counteract every move that
will tend to prejudice the laborers.
In view of the revolutionary campaign of the C. P. P. for the sake of the laborers and farm workers, the
capitalists and imperialists will become more violent and antagonistic toward them. And inasmuch as the
capitalists and imperialists have control of the government, it is not impossible that they will use their
power to more violently oppress us; in such a case they will make it clear that their ideals are inconsistent
with those of the laborers. When that day comes, the class struggle and the revolution will redouble their
force, for they will be forced to defend themselves by rising in revolt against the oppression they are being
subject to by means of the power of the state.

With these high ideals the Communist Party of the Philippines will be established. And inasmuch as these
ideals are the same as those of the C. I. (Communist International), the C. P. P. will extend its full help for
the redemption and welfare of the laborers.

. . . Here in the Philippines, American Imperialism is being fought also. The reluctance of the Moros in
paying taxes to the Government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the farmers resisting the owners
and the Constabulary, the strike of the high-school students, the uprising of the Colorums, and the
oppression of the imperialists and capitalists of the laborers, are symptoms of a movement, which if carried
on with unity, will perforce bring about the downfall of American imperialism and the obtaining of Philippine
independence.

Before achieving this ultimate ideal of the C. P. P. we will have you take other steps. First, to overthrow
American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; second, to overthrow capitalism and feudalism;
third, to seize the power in the government; fourth, the establishment of labor dictatorship; fifth, the
bringing about of class consciousness and class struggle and the prompt establishment of communism.

Under this state of affairs, a struggle is indespensable. This struggle may be peaceful or violent, but just
the same it will be a bitter struggle, where life and death will be staked.

For the obtaining of the partial demands to be made by the C. P. P., it is necessary that all the laborers and
farm hands, now divided by their different industrial organization, be united. . . . If the factory laborers and
farm hands organizations are already established and ready for the struggle, and if their movement is
already under the leadership of the proletariat thru the C. P. P., it will endeavor to make the movement
more vigorous for the purpose of obtaining its partial demands until the time comes when the factory
laborers and farm hands are able to wrest the control of the Government from the capitalists and
imperialists and place it in the hands of the sons of the sweat;

By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant mayor to the said Communist Party of the Philippines,
several public meetings were held under the auspices of the aforesaid association in different parts of the City of
Manila, in which seditious speeches were made urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist
Party of the Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the present government, and stirring up enmity against the
insular and local police forces by branding the members thereof as the enemies of the laborers and as tools of the
capitalists and imperialists for oppressing the said laborers.
The communists further insisted that it was the duty of the laborers to bring the government into their hands and to
run it by themselves and for themselves, like the laboring class in Russia; that when the laborers were united, neither
the Constabulary nor the United States Army nor the imperialist Governor-General could stop them when they rose
up as one body in order to free themselves from slavery by the capitalists; that America was cunning and a coward,
as evidenced by the fact that when she entered the World War, her enemies were already weak; that the

Constabulary and the police were the ones who made trouble for the laborers because they were the agents of the
American imperialists in the Islands and they were used as instruments by the American Imperialist Government;
that united together, the laborers could down the American Imperialist Government; and other terms and expression
of similar tenor and import.

It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the constitution and by-laws of the
said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the
public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebellious
conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty.

Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident that he cannot expect that the
defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or parades in the manner herein described.
Furthermore, it may be noted that the complaint of the case is written merely in general terms and calls only for a
judicial declaration upon a question which is not at present an issue between the parties to this case. But be that as it
may, it must be considered that the respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur
which would tend to provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government," did only the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit
previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law "To grant and
refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which
they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of
such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for
any other good reason of general interest." (Act No. 2774, sec. 4, amending sec. 2434, par [m], Administrative
Code.)

Instead of being condemned or criticised, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended for having taken
a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do
more damage by its revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of its members. In the
case of Gitlow vs. New York (268 U. S., 652), the Supreme Court of the United States said:

Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the state.
They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less
real and substantial because the effect of the given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state
cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a
jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily on
unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public
peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed
into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own
peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or
imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress

the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E., 505)., it was aptly said:
"Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to
overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of
the plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then
its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when
there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law."

At any rate, the right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. In the case of People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599,
605), this court said:

. . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press
and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (Citing III Wharton's
Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto [1922], 43 Phil., 887.)

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [L-18000. JAN 27, 1948]

Doctrine:
Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the Coalesced Minority
Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public
meeting.
However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.
Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom of assembly.
HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute. They can be regulated under the states police power
that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the
community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of

Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view
to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction
since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our
democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public
places and not for the assembly itself. The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to
free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground
to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. PETITION IS GRANTED.
[G.R. NO. L-6858. MAY 31, 1956.]
FERNANDO IGNACIO AND SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. THE HONORABLE
NORBERTO ELA, MAYOR OF STA. CRUZ, ZAMBALES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other Jehovahs Witnesses in the province of Zambales, brought this
action to compel Respondent to grant them a permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz,
Zambales, together with the kiosk, on such date and time as may be applied for by them.
Respondent in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of Petitioners to hold a religious meeting at the
public plaza as in fact he grave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on July 27, 1952, but they
declined to avail of it. He prayed that the action be dismissed.
The questions of fact raised in the pleadings being not controverted, and Petitioners having submitted a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which was concurred in by Respondent, the court rendered a decision dismissing the
case without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.
It appears that Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as Jehovahs
Witnesses, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization. In its
publication FACE THE FACTS, that society branded the latter as a religious organization which is a part of the
monstrosity now appearing in and claiming the right to rule the earth. Desiring to hold a meeting in furtherance of its
objectives, Petitioners asked Respondent to give them permission to use the public plaza together with the kiosk,
but, instead of granting the permission, Respondent allowed them to hold their meeting on the northwestern part
corner of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious
denomination as it is his belief that said Kiosk should only be used for legal purposes. And when their request for
reconsideration was denied, Petitioners instituted the present action for mandamus.
It is now contended by Petitioners that the action taken by Respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the
freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our Constitution. The issue raised involves a little
digression on the extent to which the right to peacefully assemble guaranteed by the Constitution may be invoked.
Fortunately, this issue has already been passed upon by this Court in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 45 Official Gazette,
3280, wherein this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances,
are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic
countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of
those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This

sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws
regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies celled municipal and city councils to enact
ordinances for the purpose.
It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our
Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society, and this power may be exercised
under the police power of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance
which expressly confers upon Respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its kiosk,
for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief
executive in connection with his specific duty to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety within the
municipality (section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above
regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property
to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23, Article VI of the
Constitution).
The power exercised by Respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar
circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from
the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the
authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it
necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This
was the policy adopted by Respondent for sometime previous to the request made by Petitioners. Respondent never
denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northwestern part of the public
plaza. It cannot therefore be said that Petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assemble for, as was said,
such right is subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the
tenets of Petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which
Respondent must have considered in denying their request.
It is true that the foregoing conclusion is predicated on facts which do not appear in the pleadings nor are supported
by any evidence because none was presented for the reason that the case was submitted on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, but those facts like the situation of the kiosko and the occurrence of religious controversies which
disturbed the peace and order in the municipality of Sta. Cruz are matters which may be deemed to come within the
judicial knowledge of the court as in fact they were so considered by the trial judge in his decision. This is what he
said on this point: The presiding judge, through information, personal experience and through the papers, has
known of unfortunate events which caused the disturbance of peace and order in the community. If
the Petitioners should be allowed to use the kiosko which is within the hearing distance of the catholic church, this
may give rise to disturbance of other religious ceremonies performed in the church.
(Italics supplied.) This action of the judge may be justified under section 5, Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is
elaborated by this Court in the following wise:
There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of subjects
legislative, political, historical, geographical, commercial, scientific, and artificial in addition to a wide range of
matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of human events. The matter of judicial notice
is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with the advance of the science and the arts. But, a matter to be
judicially cognizable must be well-established or authoritatively settled, or of common or general knowledge.
Obviously, courts should take notice of whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be
more ignorant than the rest of mankind. (The Municipal Board of the City of Manila, et al. vs. Segundo Agustin, 65
Phil., 144.) (Italics supplied.)
The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of the road in
the northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence is untenable, for it appears that portion is part of the plaza and
has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people. In fact, during the past celebrations of the traditional
town fiesta of the municipality, said portion has been utilized by the authorities as a place for staging dramas,
zarzuelas, and cinematograph shows. Verily, the pretense of Petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of
that portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to be contrary to the
policy of the municipality. 1 The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Petitioners.

That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear
and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and
transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public:

G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970

NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.

That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society;
The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application
for permit unconditionally;

The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.
GENTLEMEN:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even date:
Separate Opinions
"In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of the
parties, issued the following Resolution:
VILLAMOR, J., concurring:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following considerations:
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine
or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by
others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and
order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza
Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the
normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the
site of the demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;

That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving
respondent Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he
suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and
even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of
preventing such disorders;

The right to freedom of assembly is not denied; but this right is neither unlimited nor absolute. It is not correct to say
that the Mayor has refused to grant the permit applied for; he offered an alternative which, in my opinion, is not
unreasonable. There being no arbitrary refusal to grant permit, petitioner is not entitled to the writ.
CASTRO and FERNANDO, JJ., dissenting:

Two members of the Court, Castro and Fernando, find themselves unable to concur with their brethren and would
vote to grant the petition. The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. If respondent Mayor premised his refusal to grant the permit as sought by petitioner on a
clear showing that he was so empowered under the criteria supplied by Primicias W. Fugoso, then this petition
should not prosper as petitioner himself did invoke such authority. The grounds for his refusal are however, set forth
thus in his letter of February 24, 1970 addressed to petitioner: "In the greater interest of the general public, and in
order not to unduly disturb the life of the community, this Office, guided by a lesson gained from the events of the
past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies
or demonstrations during week days."1 They do not, in the opinion of the above two justices, meet the standard of
the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior restraint of a constitutional right. This is not
allowable. An excerpt from a 1969 American Supreme Court decision is persuasive. Thus: "For in deciding whether

or not to withhold a permit, the members of the Commission were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public
welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.' This ordinance as it was written,
therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and
definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."2 This is without prejudice to a more extended
opinion being written later.

Justice JBL Reyes filed a petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition to compel the issuance of a permit for a rally
to be held at the Luneta and a subsequent march to the U.S. Embassy on Roxas Boulevard. The petition was filed
the day before the scheduled assembly as no action had apparently been taken on the application, although it turned
out later that it had been rejected in a letter sent earlier by ordinary mail. The reasons for the denial was the mayors
fear that the assemblage might be infiltrated by subversive elements to the prejudice of the public order, and thus the
intended rally would violate a city ordinance implementing the provisions of the Diplomatic Convention requiring the
receiving state to afford adequate protection to foreign embassies; hence his suggestion that the rally be held at an
enclosed place like Rizal Coliseum for better security.
Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance and modification of the permit is meritorious and is guaranteed under
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Held:

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS. PBM, 51 SCRA 189

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that thedemonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibilitythat the workers would
lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would
be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were
eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being
filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter theirexercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.
J.B.L. REYES VS. BAGATSING
125 SCRA 553
Facts:

The court set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the respondent official to grant it.
The choice of Luneta and U.S. Embassy for a public rally cannot legally objected to in the absence of clear and
present danger to life or property of the embassy. The Philippines, being a signatory of Vienna Conventions which
calls for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land as cited in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

RUIZ V GORDON G.R. NO. L-65695 DECEMBER 19, 1983

C. J. Fernando
Facts:
Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, filed a petition for mandamus
against Richard Gordon to be allowed to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at
1:00 P.M.
The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by stating the request for a prayer rally was
received in the Office of the Mayor and that respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular program on Sunday
over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees that
he would grant the request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly.
When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned the fact that he had granted
the permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper.
Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was complied with.
Issue: Can the petition be granted?
Held No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the role of the judiciary in petitions for
permits to hold peaceable assembles.
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned toappraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision must be transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. They can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more
so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference
to such preferred rights.
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only
petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of

exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a
request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on
the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do
so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner.
Teehankee concurring:
The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent danger that would justify an adverse action lies on the
mayor as the licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution of October 25, 1983 in the J. B. L.
Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship
that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may
require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present
danger test. The possibility that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly is not to be 4
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the
city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to peaceable assembly and
freedom of expression" (at paragraph 7).
J. Conception concurring opinion
In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in
the granting or denying of such permits, the following guidelines are deemed necessary:

prohibition, is whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of respondent
Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment. The answer is
supplied by our decision in Malabanan v. Ramento, 1 where it was held that respect for the constitutional rights of
peaceable assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer. If that were an then, the petitioners 2 are entitled to
the remedy prayed for. There is, however, this other circumstance to be taken into consideration. In the opposition to
the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, reference was made to the academic records of petitioners. Two of
the petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., 3 and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., 4 had only one failing grade each, with the first
having failed in only one subject in either semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear and the second having failed in only
one subject, having passed in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Venecio Villar failed in two
subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984. 5 Petitioner Inocencio F.
Recitis 6 passed all his subjects in the first semester of 19831984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during its
second semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Noverto
Barreto, 7 had five failing grades in the first semester of schoolyear 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second
semester of the same schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner
Edgardo de Leon, Jr., 8 had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of
schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana 9 had five failing grades with no passing grade in the first
semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in
view of such failing grades. Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming
academic year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies
such refusal. 10

(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the
place is necessary. No permit from the government or any public officer is required.
(b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to make use of public places like parks,
plazas, and streets, the public authority charged with the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider
the convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities.

Petitioners Venecio Villar, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr. and Inocencio F. Recites are entitled to the
writs of certiorari and prohibition.

(c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered and precautionary steps taken to
prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should
be a peaceful demonstration,
1.

In the aforementioned Malabanan v. Ramento decision, this Court held: "As is quite clear from the opinion
inReyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept
of freedom of expression, which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of
public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent." 11 An equally relevant excerpt from the opinion therein follows: "Petitioners invoke their rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the
freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings
such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas inTinker v. Des
Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.'" 12 Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from
respondent College.

2.

What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural
rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college
level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary
education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public

VENECIO VILLAR, INOCENCIO F. RECITIS, NOVERTO BARRETO, RUFINO G. SALCON, JR., EDGARDO DE
LEON, JR., REGLOBEN LAXAMANA, AND ROMEO GUILATCO, JR., PETITIONERS,
VS.
TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIP), DEMETRIO A. QUIRINO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TIP, TERESITA U. QUIRINO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF TIP, AND
OSCAR M. SOLIVEN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS VICE-PRESIDENT/DEAN FOR STUDENTS AND ALUMNI AFFAIRS
OF TIP, RESPONDENTS.
Daniel M. Malabonga and Edgardo R. Abaya for petitioners.
Magno & Salita Law Office for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question in this petition, inappropriately entitled "extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction," which this Court considered as a special civil action for certiorari and

3.

education" 13 up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and
universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory
in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the
effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible
to all on the basis of merit." 14

permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should
not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramen to found petitioners guilty of the charge of
illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes
and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.

It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural
rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used
being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the
basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned
petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they
speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it
has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does
so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection
clause 15 being disregarded.

Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an
infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily,
their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil
that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from
its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such
permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage
of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violationsof its terms, the penalty incurred should
not be disproportionate to the offense.

5. While the dispositive portion refers only to petitioners of record, the doctrine announced in this case should apply
to all other students similarly situated. That way, there should not be any need for a party to apply to this Court for
the necessary redress.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio Villar, Inocencio F. Recitis, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr.
and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted to such petitioners to enjoin respondents from acts of surveillance, black-listing,
suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the coming academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is
dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgardo de Leon, Jr. and Regloben Laxamana. No costs.

MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.
Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and
Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein
stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day,
they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their

J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO and GRACE VINZONS-MAGANA, Petitioners, v. LT. COL. EDGAR GUEVARA, as
Camp Commandant, Camp Bagong Ibalon, Regional Command V, Respondent.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Joker P. Arroyo and Jose W. Diokno, for Petitioners.Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor Roberto A. Abad for Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners, detained at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, assailed the validity of the warrants of arrest issued
against them for violation of Article 138 of the Revised Penal Code dealing with incitement to rebellion, P.D. No. 885,
the amended Anti-Subversion Law, and P.D. No. 33 on the possession and distribution of subversive materials.
The Supreme Court issued a writ. of habeas corpus and set the case for hearing. In the return of the writ, the validity
of the commitment order was invoked but the Solicitor General manifested that the President had ordered the
petitioners temporary release.
Thereafter, the Constabulary Judge Advocate wrote that petitioners have been released from military custody. In view
of this development, the Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition, for being moot and academic.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY; NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ON THE
EXERCISE THEREOF WITH THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW. With the lifting of martial law, the people have a
right to expect that reliance on the constitutional right to peaceable assembly would not be visited with adverse
consequences. It should be safeguarded and respected not only by courts but by other public officials, especially
those entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and order. The danger to public security that could conceivably

arise by people gathering en masse is certainly much less. It is quite true that turbulence may mark such an event.
One who is responsible certainly can be held accountable if the assembly is utilized for illegal purposes. The guilty
parties can be duly proceeded against. In the absence of such a showing, it is of the essence in a constitutional
government that no encroachment on the rights of an individual is permissible.
2. ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE PROSCRIBED. What was said by Chief
Justice Hughes with force and eloquence in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936) possesses relevance: ". . .
The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such
meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as
to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which
the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are
engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other
violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State instead of prosecuting them for such offenses seizes
upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DISMISSAL THEREOF WHERE THERE IS NO LONGER
ANY DETENTION. Where, as in the case at bar, the petitioners have been released from military custody the
petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.
DECISION
FERNANDO, C.J.:
It is the claim of petitioners J. Antonio M. Carpio and Grace Vinzons-Magana in this application for the writ of habeas
corpus filed on July 20, 1981, that their detention at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City is illegal, there being no valid
authority for the warrants of arrest respectively issued against them on July 2 and 3, 1981. The Presidential Order of
Arrest was allegedly signed on June 26, 1981 for the violation of Art. 138 of the Revised Penal Code dealing with
incitement to rebellion, Presidential Decree No. 885, the amended Anti-Subversion Law, and Presidential Decree No.
33 on the possession and distribution of subversive materials. It was further alleged that petitioners were only shown
a copy of what appeared to be a radiogram, no signed copy of the order having been furnished them. It was then
alleged that there was no justification for their detention, that martial law having been terminated on January 17,
1981 and President Marcos himself having "banned the use of military processes of arrest and issued a letter of
instruction ordering that, thenceforth, all arrests, even for alleged crimes involving national security, must undergo
normal judicial processes." 1
The next day, on July 21, 1981, this Court issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring respondent to make a return not
later than Tuesday, July 28, 1981 and setting the case for hearing on July 30, 1981. In the return of the writ, the
detention of petitioners was characterized as "lawful and valid, having been done by virtue of a presidential
commitment order, issued pursuant to the reservation of power under Presidential Proclamation 2045, exercised by
the President on the strength of the evidence before him." 2 Nonetheless, at the hearing on July 30, 1981, to quote
from the language of the resolution of this Court of that date: "The Solicitor General manifested that President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued an order yesterday directing the temporary release of detainees-petitioners J. Antonio
M. Carpio and Grace Vinzons-Magana on recognizance of Assemblyman Marcial Pimentel. On his part, Senator
Diokno (a) manifested that yesterday morning, after he met the petitioners at the airport, they all reported to the
military authorities and in such conference, Deputy Minister Carmelo Barbero turned over the custody of petitionersdetainees to Senator Diokno for which he signed a receipt to produce them in todays hearing, and (b) requested that
the hearing of this case be postponed until further orders of the Court, with the petitioners-detainees in the meantime
to stay in his custody." 3
The Court then resolved to:" (1) postpone the hearing of this case until further notice; (2) declare that pending the full
implementation of the order of release and on the authority of this Court, aforesaid detainees-petitioners shall remain
in the custody of Senator Diokno on his recognizance; and (3) grant the Solicitor General until 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon of Monday, August 3, 1981 within which to submit a manifestation as to whether or not said release has
been implemented, with the certificate of release therein included." 4 Thereafter, on August 3, 1981 this
manifestation and motion was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza: 5 "1. That he received today, August 3,
1981, a letter from the Constabulary Judge Advocate, a copy of which is attached herewith as Annex 1, informing
him that petitioners J. Antonio M. Carpio and Grace Vinzons-Magana have been ordered released by the Chief of the

Office of Detainee Affairs on July 31, 1981. The copies of the release orders of petitioners are attached herewith as
Annexes 2 and 3. 2. While petitioners release is to be formally made by the Regional Command 5, Camp Bagong
Ibalon, Legaspi City as soon as they present themselves thereat, petitioners have in fact been released from military
custody as early as on July 30, 1981 per the letter of the Constabulary Judge Advocate. 3. In view of the temporary
release of petitioners, the present petition for habeas corpus should be considered moot and academic." 6
His prayer is for the dismissal of the case on the ground of its moot and academic character.
The plea is impressed with merit. With the release of petitioners, the prayer is justified. No further action need be
taken on the application for the writ of habeas corpus except to dismiss it for having become moot and academic. It
is reassuring to note that the President upon being informed of the circumstances of the case decided to set
petitioners at liberty. With the lifting of martial law, the people have a right to expect that reliance on the constitutional
right to peaceable assembly would not be visited with adverse consequences. It should be safeguarded and
respected not only by courts but by other public officials, especially those entrusted with the task of maintaining
peace and order. The danger to public security that could conceivably arise by people gathering en masse is
certainly much less. It is quite true that turbulence may mark such an event. One who is responsible certainly can be
held accountable if the assembly is utilized for illegal purposes. The guilty parties can be duly proceeded against. In
the absence of such a showing, it is of the essence in a constitutional government that no encroachment on the
rights of an individual is permissible.
What was said by Chief Justice Hughes with force and eloquence in De Jonge v. Oregon, 7 possesses relevance:
"These rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The
people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find
constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater
the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and
free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. It follows from these considerations
that, consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.
The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such
meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as
to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which
the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are
engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other
violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses,
seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge." 8
It is understandable for the members of the Armed Forces, duty bound to maintain public peace, to display a certain
degree of apprehension under conditions that could lead to the disruption of public order on a big scale. At the same
time, zeal in the performance of their duties cannot justify any erosion in the respect that must be accorded the
liberties of a citizen. At any rate, with the President ordering the release of petitioners, an untenable situation has
been resolved and the grant of the petition rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES VS. SANCHEZ
[GR 75209, 30 September 1987]; Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia
[GR 78791] En Banc, Per Curiam: 13 concur, 1 on leave

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R.
No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the
intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme

Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and
trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans,
and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan
as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of
Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease
immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for
as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said
unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San
Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in
the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr.
and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and
there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required
to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose
C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still
recuperating from an operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the abovedescribed acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he
had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such
penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering
that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not
by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is
usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its
role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they
wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a
written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted
by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the
earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et
al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment
of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in
future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the
Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through
the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to
the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such
right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained
for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice
or sympathies." 4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside
coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of
this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that
any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of
advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is
their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward
courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations
or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall
be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.

CARMELO A. ARREZA, LONESTO G. OIDEM, JACOB F. MEIMBAN and EDGARDO S. FERNANDO,petitioners,

vs.
THE GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean for
Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, JOSE B. LALOY in his capacity as the
Officer-in-Charge of the Student Affairs (Evening) and RODOSENDO GALVANTE, in his capacity as the
Registrar of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, respondents.

FERNANDO, CJ:
Student militancy manifested through rallies and demonstrations characterized by condemnatory language in
speeches and leaflets led respondent Gregorio Araneta University 1 to refuse enrollment to petitioners. Hence, this
mandamus proceeding filed by Carmelo Arreza, Lonesto G. Oidem, Jacob F. Meimban, and Eduardo S. Fernando,
officers and members of the Supreme Student Council of said university. There was a plea by petitioners for a
preliminary mandatory injunction to allow them to enroll. This Court issued a temporary mandatory restraining order
against the enforcement of such ban imposed by respondent University. The fact that they were seniors
strengthened their plea.
As the principal issue involved, the respect to be accorded the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly, is likewise that raised in Malabanan v. Ramento, 2 not to mention the fact that the respondent is likewise
the same University, the Second Division of this Court transferred it to the Court en banc. There is this difference.
The principal respondent in Malabanan was Director Anastacio Ramento of the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports, who affirmed the action taken by respondent Araneta Foundation University finding petitioners guilty of illegal
assembly and suspending them for one academic year. Here the action is directed only against respondent
University. Nonetheless, insofar as the issue involved relates to the right of students to free speech and peaceable
assembly, such distinction is of no significance. As we ruled in Malabanan, so we rule now. Petitioners, as all other
students, may freely exercise such rights, "They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views
and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen" 3 in rallies and demonstrations.
According to the version of petitioners, they were either leaders or participants in what respondent University referred
to as a rally/demonstration held on September 28, 1982, in front of the Life Science Building of the respondent
University, but which for them, could be more accurately described as "a continuation of the General Assembly of the
student body held the day before one authorized by the School Administration." 4 Its purpose was to register the
opposition of the students to the abolition of the school's Institute of Animal Science, as those taking courses therein
would not be able to graduate. 5 Such exercise of their right to peaceable assembly was visited by respondent
University with a refusal to let them enroll after what for petitioners was a sham investigation of their alleged violation
of school rules and regulations. 6

Respondent University denied granting the authorization to hold such general assembly, or student rally on
September 28, 1982, alleging that the students on said date through the use of battery-operated megaphones
criticized and lambasted the school administration, specifically the decision of the Board of Trustees of respondent
University to merge its Institute of Animal Science with its Institute of Agriculture, ignoring the fact that the
aforementioned merger of the above-named Institutes - intended as a cost-saving measure - would not deprive the
students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal Science from earning their degrees. 7 Moreover, there were other
rallies, according to respondent, held on September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the purpose of sympathizing with the
suspension of five (5) student leaders who conducted an illegal assembly on August 27, 1982, causing additional
disturbance on the campus, not only by the disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of
classes. 8

There is, therefore, relevance to this excerpt from the decision in the companion case of Malabanan v.
Ramento:9 "Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there
would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with
the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a
move as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang malaking suliranin"). They believed that such a merger
would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng
ating mga magulang"). If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are
hardly the timid diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a
rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is
not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the
benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear
and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for
conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker I materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others. 10

There is no need, therefore, to inquire into the allegations of respondent University as to the non-peaceable
character of the rally or demonstration. As made clear from the above excerpt, infractions of University rules or
regulations by petitioner-students justify the filing of appropriate charges. What cannot be justified is the infliction of
the highly-disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate,
if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed
to them.

One last word. In the even more recent case of Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, 11 reference was
made to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to education. Education
shall be free, at 'least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory;
Technical and professional education shall be made generally accessible to all on the basis of merit," 12 Then came
this relevant paragraph: "It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social, economic,
and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used
being 'generally available' and higher education, while being equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit.'
To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their

marked academic deficiency." 13 It is quite clear then that an educational institution may drop a student with failing
grades, under standards set by it and made to apply to all similarly situated.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is granted The restraining order issued by this Court in the resolution of
November 15, 1982 is made permanent. No costs,