Tabaag, Ivy Noreen F.

3 TERM LIMIT ISSUES

Socrates vs COMELEC 391 SCRA 456 (RECALL ELECTIONS)
FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for
three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 19982001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle,Hagedorn opted not
to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which
Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term,
Socrates faced recall
proceedings
and
in
the
recall
election
held, Hagedornrun for the formers unexpired term as mayor. Socrates
sought Hagedornsdisqualification under the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE:
WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule
HELD:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity
of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate reelection for a fourth term, the prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the same office following the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a
recall election, is no longer animmediate reelection after the three
consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private

citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018
votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002,
the mayor ofPuerto
Princesa was
Socrates.
During
the
same
period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because
of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO G.R. NO. 184863, Dec. 23, 2009
(EFFECT OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION)
FACTS:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of
his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended
public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such
term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms,
respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been

elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term
therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in
Asilosfavor in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the
three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service
for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had
ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption
of the three-term limit rule; and. Whether preventive suspension is
considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA
7160
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8,
Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three
years during which an official has title to office and can serve
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time
which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.preventive
suspension is not a qualified interruption
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether
the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election
of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of
the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in
a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the
application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of

execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance

from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term
limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length
of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be
the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to
no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows
an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The
best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of
a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since
no vacancy exists.
Adormeo vs COMELEC [76 SCRA 90; GR 147927; February 4, 2002]

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only
candidates who filed their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001
elections.

Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full
term. Again, he was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full
term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only the
unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the 1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the

respondent in the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city
mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term of
office is considered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not
consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during
Tagaraos incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a
mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office
of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that no local

elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Issue:
WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of
Lucena City.

Held:
No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2
years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary

renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term
limit.

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495 (September 3, 1998)

(APPLIES TO THE TERM WHICH ONE IS ELECTED)

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon
the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was
elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On
May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for another term of three years ending
July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would already have served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be
ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in favor of
Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code,
the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local
official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which
he was not elected. Capco won in the elections against Borja.

Issue:

Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of

law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for
which the official concerned was elected. If he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member

of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns,

becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds
to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative
is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such representative
serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served
the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of
Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would
be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people
to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the petition was
dismissed.

Latasa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829 Dec 10, 2003)

(FROM MUNICIPAL MAYOR TO CITY MAYOR)
FACTS:
Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del
Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term,
the Municipality of Digos was became a component city. On February 28,
2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May
14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and
likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga
alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner
had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor
from 1992 to 2001. On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer,
arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of
candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that
this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May

14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for
the post of city mayor.

Issue:
WON Latasa is barred from running as mayor of the newly created city of
Digos being the mayor of Digos for 3 consecutive term when it was still a
municipality.

Held: Yes, Latasa is barred from running. An elective local official, therefore,
is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless
two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner
argued that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be
accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local
Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has already served for
three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when
Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government
post. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for
the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years. The delineation of the metes and
bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. The framers of the
Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction
as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa
to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive
terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be
possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction

and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

ONG VS ALEGRE GR NO 16395

(CONSIDERED FULL TERM)
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was
predicated on the three-consecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995,
May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as
mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor,
with Ong was proclaimed winner. Alegre filed an election protest. In it, the
RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty
contest, but the decision came out only when Francis had fully served the
1998-2001 mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elect.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of
candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC
rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said petition of
Alegre.
Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a
resolution6 reversing the resolution of the COMELECs First Division and
thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor in the May 10,
2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of
candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not
to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is
past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his
own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute
candidate for his brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the
substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong should be denied due
course and the election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of
candidates.

ISSUE:
a) whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office for the mayoralty
term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the
three-term limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to
run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied due course to Rommels certificate of candidacy in the same
mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.
HELD:
a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The threeterm limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring
petitioner Francis from running for mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule.
b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en
banc when it disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections
for the mayoralty post cannot be sustained.
c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any
certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en
banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048
AFFIRMED.