JMM Promotions vs.

CA
Police Power
FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment
of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the
introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan
to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the
validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts
and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the
cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common
good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the
burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban
against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which
would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Lutz vs. Araneta
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was
promulgated in 1940 to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality
of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of
export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of
Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the
Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and
support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by
the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that
the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and
it has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry,
since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are
also in need of similar protection; but the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to a policy of all or none.
ASLP vs. Sec of Dar
Equal Protection
FACTS: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the
AgrarianReform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
theadoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,undertake
an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regularfarmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, inthe case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August
8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, whichwas
promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for thecompulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and tospecify
maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providingfor the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the mannerof their
payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting acomprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing themechanics for its
implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657,Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. Thislaw, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, neverthelessgives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.In considering the rentals as
advance payment on the land, the executive order alsodeprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process. Theequal protection clause is also violated
because the order places the burden ofsolving the agrarian problems on the owners only
of agricultural lands. No similarobligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be
theowners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and
soviolated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because
even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the
equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a

different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the
possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
prohibition would be premature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers thatthey have
been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limitshas also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have notquestioned the area of
such limits. There is also the complaint that they should notbe made to share the burden
of agrarian reform, an objection also made by thesugar planters on the ground that they
belong to a particular class with particularinterests of their own. However, no evidence
has been submitted to the Court thatthe requisites of a valid classification have been
violated.Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
eachother in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.To
be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:(1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the
class.The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures
herechallenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.Equal protection simply means that all
persons or things similarly situated must betreated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Thepetitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to adifferent treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of otherproperties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must berejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
thatis clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate onthis
matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for avalid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill ofRights.

Lozano vs. Martinez

146 SCRA 323 Commercial Law Negotiable Instruments Law Constitutionality of
BP 22
FACTS: This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of
the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila declared the law unconstitutional.

Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the
constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom of
contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law
on estafa was not sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks;
that in estafa, it only punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior
or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing obligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice
is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to public interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The
debt contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu).
No one is going to prison for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is
precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22
was enacted by Congress. It is a valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the
following acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.
And
any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a
huge problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter
of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance
to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and
confidence is the primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial
undertakings. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore
tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the
Congress, through their exercise of police power, declared that the making and issuance
of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition
of penal sanctions.

The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation
on ex delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP
22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.

Ynot vs. IAC

Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to
the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under
certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant
case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.

City gov't of QC vs. Ericta

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.
The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of
all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
Whitelight vs. City of Manila
FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short timeadmission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.White Light Corp is an operator
of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a
valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there
for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights

may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
City of Manila vs. Chinese community
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension
of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as
such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same
should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has
the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in
such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court
nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or
ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers
of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed
by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to
inquire into.

Pp vs fajardo
Facts

Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term
the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or
repair of any building without a written permit from the mayor prior to construction
or repairing.
1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private land, separated from
public plaza by a creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.

o
o

Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they
claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous
place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for
violating Ordinance no. 7
CFI Affirmed
CA forwarded the case to the SC because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the
ordinance in question.
Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of
property.
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is
therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

Ratio:

The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control
the discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING
IN THIS CASE.
Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny
construction/repair permits

Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare

Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, the state may not under the guise
of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that
they are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance appellants constrained
would be constrained to leave their land to idle without receiving just compensation for
the virtual confiscation of their private land

Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code

Sec. 2243 C that municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary
powers regarding establishing fire limits in populous centers empowers municipal
government to require construction/repair permits, to charge fees for such permits

IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council
promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely
constructed in the public plaza.
Republic vs castelvi
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued
that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements
of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4)
devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
Philippine press institute vs comelec
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free
print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in
which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to
make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization
of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does
not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the
newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the

procurement of Comelec space. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would

nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space
amounts to taking of private personal property for public use or purposes without the
requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial;
this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. The monetary value of the compulsory donation, measured by the advertising
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas,
may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the
necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of
necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been
suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either
by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that
power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be
shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of just compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for Comelec space is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission.

Sumulong vs. Guerrero

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint
for expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to
provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately
twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo
Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to

be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting
the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.
The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing
the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which
defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation.
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerreroissued a writ of
possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their
property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1224, as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public
use, just compensation, and due process.
Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of
people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power
of eminent domain.
(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be
expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed
by government assessors.
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were
immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by
the respondent judge.
Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the
middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is
accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls
within the confines of public use.

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much
thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of
discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and
leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to
use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the
demands of the common good.
(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224,
1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which
were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just
compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be
absolute substitute for just compensation.
(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and
disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.

EPZA vs. Dulay

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed.
Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in
which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the
compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that
the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which
was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market valuedeclared by the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such
objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was
set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to

judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may
only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but
it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree,
orexecutive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the
decreed compensation.

MERALCO vs. Pineda

Facts: MERALCO filed a complaint for expropriation of the lots of the private
respondents. While the case was going on and before the appointment of the Board of
Commissioners to value the land, the private respondents filed a motion to withdraw a
portion of the deposit of MERALCO. This was granted by Judge Pineda; MERALCO
objected, contending that this cannot be done since the Board of Commissioners was not
yet constituted, and allowing such is a deprivation of its property without due process of
law. Judge Pineda maintained that he can dispense with the Board and adopt the
testimony of a credible real estate broker, or he could exercise himself the right to decide
the just compensation to be paid to the owners of the land.
Issue: Can the court order payment of just compensation before appraisal and valuation
of the property by a Board of Commissioners?
Ruling: Negative. Although it is true that the judge may disregard the findings of the
commissioners and substitute his own estimate of the value of the land, he may only do
so for a valid reason, e.g. where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of
evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. But the
composition of the Board of Commissioners is mandatory. A trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of

just compensation. The lot owners must prove the value of the land by evidence. On the
other hand, MERALCO must be given an opportunity to rebut any evidence presented by
lot owners.

Municipality of paraaque vs. VM Realty

FACTS:
Pursuant to a Sanggunian Bayan Resolution of the petitioner municipality, an
expropriation complaint against the property of herein respondent for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project. The RTC of Makati authorized petitioner
to take possession of subject property upon deposit to the court an amount of its fair
market value. Respondent filed a counter claim alleging that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution of the Municipal council is a substantial compliance of the
statutory requirement of Section 19, RA 7160 in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
RULING:
The power of eminent by LGUs may be affected only by ordinance not by a mere
resolution. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain.
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGUs to exercise the power of eminent domain to pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9, Article III of the
Constitution and other pertment.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not complied
with by the local chief executive. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, it possesses a general and permanent character while a resolution is
temporary in nature.
The petition is hereby denied without prejudice to petitioners proper exercise of its
power of eminent domain over subject property.

NPC vs. Benjamin ong

Facts:
Petitioner expropriated respondents property for its Lahar Project, a project for public
use
Petitioner established its claim on RA 6395, allowing it to exercise the right to eminent
domain.
Complaint was filed at the RTC on June 27, 2001. On 25 March 2002, petitioner obtained
a writ of possession and on 15 April 2002 it took possession of the property.
RTC ordered the compensation of the full market value of the land valued
at P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of
actual taking, until full payment. RA 8974 sets forth the payment of lands full market
value as distinguished to RA 6395 which entitles the land owner to only 10% of market
value.
Petitioner argues that compensation should only be an easement fee and not the total
value and that computation of compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint (Rule 67).
Issues:
Whether or not compensation will be governed by provisions on RA 6395 or RA 8974?
Who will determine?
Whether or not value of the property should be reckoned as of the filing of the complaint
or actual taking of the land?
Held:
Court held that with regard to compensation, provisions on RA 8974 should govern.
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly include power generation,
transmission and distribution projects among the national government projects covered
by the law. R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since
the Lahar Project is a national government project.
The Court also held that the function for determining just compensation remains judicial
in character. It held that the courts have the power to determine cases relative to the
violations on the guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights.

As to the amount to be given to respondent as compensation, the court agreed with

petitioner that compensation should be computed as of the filing of complaint (2001) win
compliance with Rule 67.
Manila memorial park vs sec of DSWD
Pascual vs sec of public works
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit,
derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular
enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief,
with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public
works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals.
Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to
the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta,
situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is
that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be
benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the
donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the
government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object
of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of
the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their
aid
by
the
use
public
money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve
the public.
Punzalan vs. Municipal board

Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together
with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The
ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions
in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance
empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on
persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation
tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest
as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and
affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation,
and authorize what amounts to double taxation.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and
in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others
untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be
empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National
Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument
against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the
other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is
reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Lladoc vs. CIR
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish
priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new
Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift
tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donees gift tax against
the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal
thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption
from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on
such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift
tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of
gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made
of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution.

The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.

Abra valley college vs. Aquino

Facts:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to
annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and
building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties
amounting to P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure by respondents Municipal Treasurer
and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said
taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in
its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second
floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the
ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial
establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational
purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by
filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue:
whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational
purposes
Held:
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution,
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has
always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school
building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern
Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental
to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property
for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from
the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the
second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the director).

Planters products vs. Fertiphil corp

FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated
under Philippinelaws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agriculturalchemicals.Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465,
imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levy was to
continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil
remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the
1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy.
Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused.
Fertiphil filed a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of
LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus
standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because itdoes not have a
"personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
because"incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves,
not on the sellerfertilizer company.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI
No. 1465.What is the power of taxation?
RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing
is a mereprocedural technicality which may be waived.The imposition of the levy was an
exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be
used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was
revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of
the real and substantialpurposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power
and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct
andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact
legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for
public purpose. The main purpose of police power isthe regulation of a behavior
or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and"lawful
means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power.
Thepower of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L75697; 18 Jun 1987]

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators

adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National
Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,
That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of
the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of
a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and
the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any
technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in
substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected
to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each
year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of
the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the
30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying
objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question
that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities
of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs