Review of International Studies

(1993),

19, 321-347

Printed in Great Britain

state formation and Third World

Dependent
militarization*
ALEXANDER

WENDT

AND

MICHAEL

BARNETT

in the West has been

and state formation
between militarization
The relationship
to
and there is thus some temptation
the subject of considerable
scholarship,1
to
the study of Third
from that domain
simply transfer concepts and arguments
in the two contexts were and
Yet state formation
World militarization.
dynamics
are quite different, with important
for the nature of national
security
implications
threats tended to be external, rooted in anarchical competition
threats. In the West
that
domestic
between
legitimacy, which meant
relatively equal states possessing
in terms of the political
realist focus
militarization
could be understood
primarily
state
on security dilemmas and action-reaction
In contrast, Third World
dynamics.
context
relative external
in which
in a largely dependent
formation
has occurred
insecurity.2 In this case the external environment,
security contrasts with domestic
for elites
rather than being a source of threat, becomes a source of opportunities
In
internal
threats.
to
domestic
support
against
security
gain
legitimacy
lacking
in
First
and
Third
Worlds
look
different
the
very
short, national
security problems
and contexts
of state formation.
because
of different
Very different
trajectories
the need for
account
for militarization,
therefore
mechanisms
may
suggesting
in the
studies
than
those
that
dominate
theories
different
and
security
concepts
West.3

Brian
to thank Simon Dalby,
David Dessler, William
authors wish
Foltz, Naeem
Inayatullah,
Andrew
Richard
Aaron Karp,
Ross,
Little, Craig Murphy,
Job, Ethan Kapstein,
Stephen Krasner,
and
referees for their helpful comments,
Jan Thomson,
and several anonymous
Bruce Russett,
for research assistance.
Janice Bially and Nancy
Neiman
1
in Felix
and the Organization
of the State',
See, for example, Otto Hintze,
'Military Organization
Gilbert
(Oxford,
1975), pp. 178-215; Charles Tilly (ed.),
Essays
(ed.), The Historical
of Otto Hintze
in Western Europe
States
The Formation
(Princeton,
1975); and Charles Tilly, Coercion,
of National
The

and European
States
1990).
(Oxford,
Capital,
see Barry Buzan,
threats in the Third World,
of domestic
On the prevalence
security
'People,
in Edward Azar and
in the Third World',
States, and Fear: The National
Security Problem
in the Third World
Moon
1988), pp. 14-43, and
(Aldershot,
(eds.), National
Security
Chung-In
of the Third World',
World Politics,
43 (1991),
'The Security Problematic
Mohammed
Ayoob,

pp.
On

257-83.

see Jack Levy and Michael

in Third World
for new concepts
Barnett,
security studies,
Journal of
Domestic
Political
and Third World
Jerusalem
Formation,
Security',
Economy,
in the
'International
and War
14 (1992), pp. 19^40, and Kal Holsti,
International
Relations,
Theory
National
in Brian Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma:
Third World',
Security
of Third World States
of the difficulties
of building
theory when different
(Boulder,
1992), pp. 37-60. A useful discussion
is Benjamin Most
and Harvey
lead to similar outcomes
causal processes
Starr, 'International
the need

'Alliance

Relations
Theory,
pp. 383-406.

Foreign

Policy

Substitutability,

and

321

"Nice

Laws'",

World

Politics,

36 (1984),

322

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

to keep in mind as one explores Third World militarization,

This is important
which otherwise
exhibits many of the same qualities as militarization
in the West.
as
most
a
in
states
the
Third
World
have
West,
Specifically,
adopted
capital- rather
or
than labour-intensive
conventional
'technocratic'
is,
military
posture?that
on
in which military
armies
is
based
and human
capability
primarily
physical
skilled soldiers) rather than on
systems and highly
'capital' (advanced weapons
in
armies'
which
is based more on 'labour' (as
unconventional,
'people's
capability
in the mass mobilization
of militias).4
in this paper is to offer a
Our objective
for the relative predominance
of capital- over labour-intensive
partial explanation
in the Third World.
militarization
than the other?

Why

this path

of military

development

rather

to the quantitative
While
scholars have directed considerable
attention
side of
Third World militarization,
they have tended to neglect the issue of its qualitative
armies are inherently superior
form. This may reflect a belief that capital-intensive
to labour-intensive
from a military
ones, and that it is therefore natural
standpoint
states to develop
for Third World
the former rather than latter. On this view, the
of Third World militaries
is not particularly noteworthy;
there
high capital-intensity
is only one viable form of militarization
in the modern world, and so no interesting
counterfactual
scenario to address. However,
it is not obvious
that labour-intensive
In the 1980s military
is inherently inferior to its counterpart.
militarization
analysts
some forms of
in the West
the merits
of 'alternative defence',
seriously debated
In the Third World,
which would have relied on the mass mobilization
of militias.
a few states have implemented
to varying degrees?Vietnam,
such policies
China,
so
or
states
and
on?with
which
deterred
defeated
Iran,
Cuba,
Nicaragua,
they
with more

armies. Finally, whatever

virtues capital-intensive
technological
costs
to
have must
be weighed
its
against
developmental
costs
to
and
its
when
it
leads
external
economies,
capital-poor
political
dependency.
These considerations
suggest that the rationality of different forms of militarization
as policy means are relative to national
security ends.
The ends of national
the process of state
security policy are bound up with
formation.
'State formation'
refers to both the building of institutions for territorial
of societal interests achieves
control, and to the process by which one constellation

militarization

'modern'
does

state power and international

rather than another. Adapting
arguments
recognition
we
in
other
made
scholars
examine
the impact of three systemic
domains,
by
structures on Third World
state formation. The first two affect security
dominance
on the
In brief, we argue that: (1) dependency
ends, the third preferred means.
are a security
world economy
tends to create weak regimes to which
the masses
on security assistance
threat rather than an asset; (2) dependency
in geopolitical
of security are
empire tends to create elites whose definitions
on the global
rather
than
the
masses;
patrons
(3) dependency
a 'modern'
culture
Third
World
elites'
ideas
about
what
constitutes
military
shapes
structures
All
three
demand
army.
generate distinct,
though typically articulated,
side motivations
for capital-intensive
different
mechanisms
militarization?quite
than those that may account for such militarization
in the West.
as follows:
Our overall argument might be represented
schematically
structures
those

of informal

of external

in the Periphery
The distinction
is due to Herbert Wulf,
'Dependent Militarism
Neuman
in Stephanie
and Robert
Alternative
Harkavy
(eds.), Arms
Concepts',
World (New York,
Modern
1979), pp. 246-63.

and Possible
in the

Transfers

state formation

Dependent
(1) systemic
'->

dominance

(2) Third World

^(3)

Figure

1. Schematic

323

structures
state formation
of national

definitions
'-^(4)

and Third World militarization

capital-intensive

representation

of

security
militarization.

the processes

leading

to Third World militarization

theorists of Third World

economic development,
then, we argue
dependency
structure of the world
the hierarchical
conditions
the
form of Third
system
on
state
via
its
formation.
As
World
such, our
military
impact
development
seen
one
as
or
as
one
state
be
of
in
which
reversed',
argument might
'second-image
structures
identities and interests are constituted
the
of
the
international
by
system.5
Like

that

This is not to say that strictly domestic

factors or action-reaction
in the
processes
on the contrary,
states system play no role in Third World militarization;
they
a complete
cannot develop
undoubtedly
play a crucial role. We
theory here,
because of their salience in
however, and choose to focus on systemic mechanisms
even in
context and because they have been relatively neglected,
the Third World
order'.6
studies focusing on the 'world military
to Third World militarization
It should be emphasized
that this approach
is a
one that asks 'why this reality and not another?',
rather than the
counterfactual
one that asks 'what accounts for the variance in the Third
traditional behavioural
World
in the latter,
experience?'. Our empirical analysis does reveal some variance
we
are
more
but
here
interested
and
particularly
impressed by,
along regional lines,
in explaining,
in Third World
the qualitative
similarities
militarization.
This
a
one
to
in
which
counterfactual
research
tries
suggests
design,
identify and
in the absence of which the phenomenon
describe the causal mechanisms
would not
have occurred.7 Although
counterfactual
and actual case methods
have important
in the latter one tests causal claims by expanding
the number of
commonalities,
one
in
the
former
observable
whereas
about
'what
instances,
arguments
develops
would

have happened'
in the absence of hypothesized
mechanisms.
Our goals,
are
more
to
to
modest:
attention
call
differences
between
however,
(1)
considerably
some
on the
and
militarization
and
offer
labour-intensive
data
capitalsuggestive
dominance
of the former; (2) to situate this observation
in terms of state formation
some hypotheses
in the Third World;
and (3) to develop
about three
dynamics
that may help account
systemic mechanisms
various points we suggest that in the absence

for those dynamics.

of these mechanisms

at
Although
contemporary

'The Second
The International
Peter Gourevitch,
of
Sources
See, respectively,
Image Reversed:
32 (1978), pp. 881-912,
Domestic
International
and Alexander
Polities',
Wendt,
Organization,
isWhat
of It: The Social Construction
of Power Polities',
States Make
International
'Anarchy
46 (1992), pp. 391^25.
Organization,
6
Studies with which we otherwise
in common;
share much
and
see, for example, Mary Kaldor
Eide (eds.), The World Military
Order (London,
Eide and Marek
Thee
Asbjorn
1979), and Asbjorn
Militarism
(eds.), Problems
(London,
1980).
of Contemporary
7
see James Fearon,
For good discussions
of counterfactual
'Counterfactuals
and
analysis,
in Political
43 (1991), pp. 169-95, and Stephen
Science', World Politics,
Hypothesis
Testing
Jay
Shale and the Nature
Gould,
Wonderful
Life: The Burgess
(New York,
of History
1989), especially
5.
chapter

324

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

Third World militarization

would
look quite different, we do not test, even by the
to counterfactual
the explanatory
criteria appropriate
arguments,
strength of our
a
some
claims. We merely
and
directions
for
suggest
explore
neglected
problem
future

research.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we differentiate capital
some empirical evidence
militarization
and adduce
and labour-intensive
that the
Third World
has tended heavily
toward the former. In the core of the paper we
structures in the inter
focus on how economic,
and cultural dominance
political,
state
in
national
condition
Third
World
formation
for
ways consequential
system
we consider
some implications
In conclusion
of our argument
for
militarization.
on
of
the
about
the
Third
World
militarization
world
system.
impact
thinking

Types

of militarization

to the accumulation
to a
of capacity for organized violence,
which refers to a
'military build-up'.8 This should not be confused with militarism,
or externally. Militarily
to use organized
either internally
violence,
disposition
states can be democratic
and pacific, while militarily
weak ones can be
powerful
in some cases by
and bellicose. Militarization
and militarism
may
repressive
The output of a militarization
causally related, but the link is not definitional.
'Militarization'

refers

is 'military capacity', based on an organizational

process
apparatus
charged with
of security through the threat or use of organized
the maintenance
violence
(we
the question of security 'for whom'). As such, militarization
defer for the moment
but the training of personnel,
accumulation
construction
includes not only weapons
infrastructure.
of fortifications,
and logistical and productive
not infinitely sub
All militaries
make use of both capital and labour. While
in different proportions.9
The 'intensity' of
stitutable, these factors can be combined
refers to their
factor proportions
violence. Factor-intensities
organized
are doctrinally
and organizationally
of two ideal types.10

to the capacity
contributions
for
respective
lie on a continuum,
but since its endpoints
this idea in terms
quite distinct, we elaborate

the typical 'modern' or 'conventional'

militarization
generates
Capital-intensive
derive most of their capability from the physical and human
army. Such militaries
in advanced weapons
systems like armoured fighting vehicles and
capital embodied
Because of the significant expenditure
combat aircraft and their skilled operators.
to create and sustain such a force, even when filled out
and organization
necessary
this sort of military
tends to be an instrument of the state and
through conscription
its security,
8

rather

than of (or indifferent

to) the people.

Despite

some variation

of Militarization
in the Third World',
Armed Forces
'Dimensions
and Society,
Ross,
(1987), p. 564.
see Ron Smith, Anthony
Humm
On the problems
and Jacques
of measuring
this substitutability,
in Defense
in Sadat Deger
and Robert West
Substitution
Fontanel,
Provision',
'Capital-Labor
and Development
1987), pp. 69-80.
(New York,
(eds.), Defense,
Security,
10
in Arms: The Theory and Practice
draws on Adam Roberts,
Nations
The following
discussion
of
in the Periphery',
Territorial
and Barry
(New York,
1976), Wulf,
'Dependent Militarism
Defense
in John Ruggie
for Dissociation',
Buzan,
(ed.), Antimonies
of Interdependence
'Security Strategies
See Andrew

(New York,

1983), pp.

369-420.

in

13

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

325

most armies in the modern world are organized

the actual level of capital-intensity,
sense from the standpoint of factor
In
West
this makes
the
these
basic
lines.
along
in capital. Nevertheless,
because of the
which are relatively abundant
endowments,
costs
in
and
modern
the
difficulties of
involved
weapons
start-up
developing
high
states have tended
of scale, even the largest industrialized
economies
achieving
and functionally
of this
toward collaborative
specialized militarization
increasingly
type.11

states
is difficult for industrialized
If 'auto-centric'
militarization
capital-intensive
states of the Third World,
to achieve,
for the capital-poor
it is almost impossible
on a dependent basis,
to militarize
which has led many
arms, arms
importing
from
external
This
and
training
suppliers.
military
production
technology,
depen
studied,12 but in doing so the literature tends to take as
dency has been widely
states desire capital-intensive
armies in the first place. This
given that Third World
a
to
bracket
the
reflect
decision
may
simply
origins of this desire ('preference
if you will), but the fact that so few scholars address the issue suggests
formation'
the possibility
of an alternative.
that most have not seriously considered
terms of factor proportions,
labour-intensive militariz
our
fact
which
(a
complicates
story). The first is the
characteristic
of
late
'cadre-conscript'
Europe and some
army,13
nineteenth-century
or
states
Third
World
like
which
consists
of masses of
contemporary
Iraq
Nigeria,
In the strictly quantitative
comes in two varieties

ation

core of professionals
poorly trained conscripts organized around a capital-intensive
Trained to fight like a conventional
and advanced weapons.
army and organized by
and for the state, it has many of the powers and liabilities of more capital-intensive
armies, and we treat it as a mixed case below.
or people's army, the
The second, more
interesting, case is the 'unconventional'
is generated
of which
of
primarily by the mass mobilization
capability
on
a
more
decentralized
basis, the 'nation in
lightly armed militias.
Organized
arms' makes
for territorial
up for its lack of advanced weapons
by organizing
defence and guerrilla warfare, and cultivating
ideology to create a highly motivated
force.14 Guerrilla
armies typically start out in this fashion; a few have maintained
state power.
this structure after achieving
The two types of labour-intensive
militarization
differ in the extent to which
core
labour is the real
of their capability,
but both rely on mass mobilization,
a
which presupposes
that
need not, namely
something
capital-intensive
military

military

that the state have a relatively

created and protected
coercively

high degree of political

legitimacy. This may
like Iraq's Republican
Guard
by an institution

11
On

be
or

this trend, see Pauline Creasey

and S. May,
The European
Armaments Market
and Procurement
'The Globalization
of America's
Defense
Moran,
1988), Theodore
Cooperation
(New York,
International
15 (1990), pp. 57-99, and Ethan Kapstein
Industries',
(ed.), Global Arms
Security,
Production
(Lanham,
1992).
12
'International
Stratification
and Third World Military
See, for example,
Stephanie Neuman,
International
38 (1984), pp. 167-97, Andrew
'Arms Acquisition
and
Industries',
Ross,
Organization,
in Edward Azar and Chung-In
National
Moon
Security: The Irony of Military
(eds.),
Strength',
in the Third World
National
Barnett
and
Security
1988), pp. 152-87, and Michael
(Aldershot,
Alexander

of Dependent
in Brian Job (ed.), The
Wendt,
Militarization',
'Systemic Sources
National
(Boulder,
1992), pp. 97-120.
Insecurity Dilemma:
Security
of Third World States
13
in Arms.
The term is Roberts'
in Nation
14
in Arms; Buzan,
Nations
for Dissociation',
See, for example: Roberts,
'Security Strategies
especially
'Total
pp. 410-11; Gene
Stein,
1985); and George
Europe Unconquerable
(London,
Sharp, Making
A Comparative
Defense:
Overview
of the Security Policies
of Switzerland
and Austria',
Defense
Analysis,

6 (1990),

pp.

17-33.

Alexander

326

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

as in China or North Korea,15 but any state that arms

indoctrination
by ideological
of
numbers
people requires a certain degree of political consent (however
significant
without
since
it the armed masses might revolt.16 And this, in turn,
manufactured),
masses
cut in rather than out of the social contract. The
have
that
the
been
implies
mass
or
causal
of
absence
presence
support is a crucial element in our subsequent
content
'threats'
and
'assets'.
of
national
determine
the
it
security
story, since
helps
a theoretical
and militia
technocratic
armies provides
between
The distinction
a
Third
World
militarization:
there is in
of
counterfactual
for
rationale
analysis
now
to opera
an
turn
to
model. We
the conventional
alternative
principle
an
basis for such an
in order to provide
the distinction
empirical
tionalizing
militarization
tends in fact to be quite
to show that Third World
analysis,
so than one would
expect on the basis of factor
certainly more
capital-intensive,
endowments

alone.

factor basis of Third World

The

militarization

of capital
refers to the relative contribution
of militarization
factor-'intensity'
measurement
Two
labour to overall military
suggest
strategies
capability.
themselves, both rooted in the literature on arms races. The first is to examine the

The

and

on weapons
of defence expenditure
procurement
(capital), training and
proportion
and
maintenance
and
salaries (mostly
(most capital). Disa
labour),
operations
on
a
Third
World
but only a few,
do
exist
few
data
states,
expenditure
ggregated
or hide portions
since many states under-report
and in general these are unreliable,
a
in other parts of the budget.17 SIPRI has devised
of their defence
spending
the
of
'value'
these problems
for avoiding
method
weapons
major
by calculating
of 'labour' costs.
systems,18 but this still does not address the measurement
led us to adopt the second measurement
These problems
strategy of focusing on
we computed
on
1985
data
all
themselves.
countries,
using
Specifically,
capabilities
in the
to total active-duty
and reserve20 manpower
of major weapons19
amount
to
'carried'
in
the
of
effect
by a
capture
physical
capital
trying
military,
a
measure
with
has
the
virtue
of
This
unit of labour (see appendix
dealing
1).
more
thus
has
than
observed
greater
(and
expenditure
probably
easily
phenomenon
of lacking a 'common currency' for
but has the important drawback
reliability),
the ratio

15
in China
and
and Security:
Self-Reliance
On the latter case, see H. Park and K. Park,
'Ideology
in the Third World, pp. 102-35.
in Azar and Moon
North
Korea',
(eds.), National
Security
16
see Michael
and mass mobilization,
between
of the relationship
For discussion
legitimacy
political
in Civil Disobedience
in Obligations:
and Military
'Political Alienation
Service',
Walzer,
Essays
and Violence
The Nation-State
Giddens,
1985),
(Berkeley,
1970), pp. 153-70, Anthony
(Cambridge,
the Costs of War (Princeton,
Barnett,
233^1, and Michael
1992), pp. 29-30.
Confronting
of Third World military
the reliability
data, see Nicole
Ball, Security
expenditure
problems
3.
in the Third World
1988), chapter
(Princeton,
Economy
18
in the Third World
Ohlson
Brzoska
and Thomas
See Michael
(London,
(eds.), Arms Production
pp.
17
On

1986).

19
We

as main battle
reconnaissance
such weapons
tanks, light tanks, armoured
combat
vehicles with at least a 20mm cannon,
aircraft,
infantry combat
surface warships.
Our primary data source on these weapons
and major
helicopters,
1986 and
Balance
is Institute of Strategic
Studies, The Military
(London,
manpower
20
in
element
it may be an essential
because
needs to be counted
'Reserve' manpower
labour-intensive
strategy.
military

and

define

combat
and on

mechanized

1987).
a

and

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

327

25

20

15

fc

10

in

JL
n

r~i

JL r~i n 1 n
r~i

nn

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Weapons

to Personnel

Ratio

Figure 2. Frequency distribution of Weapons

(see appendix 1, for disaggregated data)

to Personnel Ratio

units of capital (and thus may have less validity). While

expressing
aggregating
different
is problematic,
however,
types of weapons
imposing an inevitably arbi
scheme
seemed even less desirable,
some less
trary weighting
especially when
and light armour, may in fact be more useful
systems, like helicopters
capitalized
than jet aircraft or submarines
for dealing with
the primarily
internal security
states. The validity
issue is real, however,
and
problems
facing most Third World
as such our empirical analysis of the factor-basis
of Third World militarization
should be seen as merely
but our purpose
in presenting
these data is
suggestive,
more
to establish
the initial plausibility
of a 'stylized fact' that Third World
ones than to establish a firm data base for the analysis
militaries
look like Western
of variance in Third World
experience.
At least two patterns
emerge from our data. First, there are some significant
ratios are highest
in the
regional variations
(see appendix
2). Weapons/personnel
US-USSR
and
fall
in
the
Middle
Southern
East,
dyad,
Africa, other
progressively
NATO-Warsaw
Pact countries, Central and East Africa,
South America,
neutral
are
not
Asia.
We
and
in
interested
variations
these
Europe,
here, but a
explaining
causes suggest themselves:
number of potential
the existence of action-reaction
to Great Power suppliers, factor
regional conflict dynamics,
strategic importance
endowments,
terrain, and so on. The causal force of some of these mechanisms,
interest in capital-intensive
were
however, depends on a preexisting
militarization;
such an interest not present a state might offset an adversary's
arms
conventional
more
as
with
'alternative'
it
be
less
to
vulnerable
defences,
build-up
just
might
Great Powers purveying
their high-tech wares in regions of strategic importance.
one we are interested
This brings us to a second pattern,
in explaining:
the
in levels of capital-intensity
across
the population.
the 137
While
similarity
are
to
observations
from
0
118
below 8.00, and fully 100 are between
range
32.00,
0.00 and 5.00 (see figure 2), including many Western
states. Particularly
noteworthy

328

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

in this respect is the absence of association

between
level of economic development
and military
One might
since
expect to find such a relationship,
capitalization.
is correlated with a falling relative price of capital to labour,
economic
growth
militarization
making
capital-intensive
'cheaper' from a societal standpoint. Yet, in
order by income group,
the ranking of weapons/personnel
ratios is
descending
and upper-middle
income
low-income, middle-income,
oil-exporting,
high-income,
countries. A regression of per capita GNP
(as a proxy for relative factor prices)21
on our dependent
variable produced
results. In short, despite a high
insignificant
states have
Third World
sustained
levels of military
price of capital, most
to
most
all
but
the
militarized
advanced
indus
capitalization
comparable
heavily
states. Third World
states may make
or
trialized
greater use of second-hand
obsolete weapons
in
systems to avoid some costs, but the form of militarization
which they are engaged seems remarkably
similar to that of the West.
In the rest of this paper we suggest some mechanisms
In other words,
in view of
qualitative
similarity.

that may help explain this

the tremendous
economic,
and cultural
between North
and South, why does
their
political,
disparities
seem to exhibit a single logic, rather than multiple
a
militarization
ones? Why
than
world of military
rather
homogeneity
heterogeneity?

The

international

system

and dependent

state formation

standard answer to this question

is that the relevant context for militarization
a
a 'technological
in
is
world
order
which
determinism'
favours
policy
military
conventional
armies. On
this view,
the security dilemmas
that proliferate
in
of
armament
anarchic
in
which
A's
mili
systems generate dynamics
competitive
tarization makes B insecure, inducing it to arm, making A more
insecure, and so
on. In response to threats, states in principle have a choice of adopting
a similar
or
one
to
offset
the
other's
strategy (a 'symmetrical'
response),
designed
advantage

The

states
factors, however,
encourage
(a 'counter' response).22 Various
counters
former: the effectiveness
of a counter may be uncertain,
counter-counter

measures,

symmetrical

responses

make

calculations

to favour the
lead to
may
of

'balance'

easier, and so on. As a result of this dynamic, militarization

paths converge toward
as
states
Waltz
Kenneth
imitate the military
puts it, '[Contending
homogeneity;
contrived by the country of the greatest capability and ingenuity. And
innovations
so the weapons
of major contenders,
and even their strategies, begin to look the
same all over the world.'23
We do not dismiss the power of this competitive
in highly
dynamic,
especially
East. Yet, two considerations
conflictual
suggest it is only
regions like the Middle
to
there are alternatives
part of the story. First, as Robert O'Connell
emphasizes,
to threat. Decision-makers
responses
may not like them, but this may
symmetrical

21
in Defence
This assumption
is also made
Substitution
Provision'.
by Smith et al., in 'Capital-Labour
22
The following
draws on Robert O'Connell,
discussion
Of Arms and Men
(New York,
1989), pp. 7-8.
23
Politics
Kenneth Waltz,
from Matthew
(Reading,
1979), p. 127; quoted
Theory of International
Innovation
and the Arms Race
(Ithaca,
1988), p. 7.
Evangelista,

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

329

to their cultural ideas about what a military

be due as much
should look like, as
as it is to the technological
costs of alternatives,
well as to the perceived political
armies. After all, labour-intensive
militarization
virtues of capital-intensive
also has
ones
even
its
different
than
This
that
albeit
virtues,
suggests
military
counterpart.24
in cases of high external threat we need to address the ends and preferred means of
calculate
the costs and
national
security policy in terms of which decision-makers
benefits

of different strategies.
Second, the primary security

states is internal rather

threat to most Third World
to
who
from
the
'masses'
the constellation
of
external,
try
change
might
state power rather than from other states. In these
societal interests that controls
cases capital-intensive
does not stem from action
militarization
presumably
in the states system but from its superior ability to control
reaction dynamics
a
which presupposes
restive publics
relative to a strategy of mass mobilization,
than

This
the ability of
that, whatever
suggests
higher degree of state legitimacy.
a different
to explain military
in
the
inter-state competition
North,
capitalization
one
not
in
it
the
Third
that
mechanism
exist but for the
World,
may explain
might
the nature, and thus security interests, of the Third World
factors conditioning
state.

in which we are interested is the process by which

The aspect of state formation
secure
state
certain societal interests
power rather than others. This reflects our
concern with the constitution
of 'security' in countries where the primary threat is
internal. Security is always for someone or some social order. In a world of purely
be the polity as a whole,
in which case one
external security threats this might
In a world
of internal security
security.
might
legitimately
speak of 'national'
the question of who controls state power is crucial to the content
threats, however,
of security 'threats'. The Sandanistas were a threat to 'Nicaraguan'
security during
to power; similarly,
the Somoza
the United
States
regime, but not after coming
not
threatened
Sandanista
but
since.
The
rule,
security
during
'Nicaraguan'
definition
of security, in other words,
is always relative to particular
interests, the
dominance
is a function of the state formation
of which
process. Our counter
factual claim about Third World militarization,
then, rests on one about Third
see
state formation: were state-society
World
compacts better solidified, one might
of security and thus different patterns of militarization.25
very different definitions
is typically conditioned
State formation
and systemic factors.
by both domestic
The relative significance
of these varies across
time and space, and they may
state formation
interact. We do not address domestic determinants
of Third World
in this paper, however,
and as such what
follows
should be seen as a set of
about one set of relatively neglected mechanisms
rather than as a
hypotheses
theory of militarization.
complete
In particular, we argue that Third World
a dependent basis, conditioned
by relations

24

25

state-formation
of economic,

on
has often proceeded
cultural
political,
and/or

a useful comparison,
see Buzan,
for Dissociation',
'Security Strategies
see George
limits of deterministic
for high-technology
arguments
strategies,
The Measurement
of Technological
Determinism
'War-Winning Weapons:

For

Journal of Military
54 (1990).
History,
Cf. Joel Migdal,
and Weak
Strong Societies

States

(Princeton,

1988).

pp. 412-13.
Raudzens,
in Military

On

the

History',

330

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

as a whole.26 The
to individual Great Powers or to the world-system
Subordination
first two of these structures enable certain societal interests to achieve and hold
state power by virtue of the external resources they make available
to those willing
to accept dependency,
interests which might otherwise be forced to make significant
with other societal groups or even forced from power altogether;
to
compromises
structures
these dominance
condition
the 'ends' of Third World
In
structure
the
cultural
dominance
conditions
elites' ideas
contrast,
security.27
a 'modern' army, and as such affects their 'preferred means'
about what constitutes
is part of state formation, which
for achieving
includes
security. It too, however,
that

extent

efforts

to gain

The world

legitimacy

economy

and status

in the society

and the Third World

of states.

state

as an analysis of Third World

more
economic
development
a
to
continue
offer
inspired by dependency
theory
systematic
generally,
analyses
on Third World
for thinking about the impact of the world-economy
framework
state formation.28 This
certain elite groups at the
impact is one of empowering

Whatever

its limits

'weak' states29 to which

of others,
of the
elements
creating
significant
are
a
a
to
create
and
demand
for
security threat,
thereby helping
population
our
most
militarization.
Since
here
is
the
traditional
of
argument
capital-intensive
we
we
will
be
with
the
the three
colonial period.
brief, beginning
offer,
or not explicitly motivated
Whether
gain, colonial
by the prospect of economic
ism almost always had important effects on the development
of local economies.
expense

for our purposes was the development

of certain
and their integration
into the metropolitan
economy
(and
or
This often created a situation
of disarticulation
economy.
indirectly world)
a
in which
the local economy
dualism
became
divided
into
modern
and a
on
traditional
sides to the world
sector, the former linked
supply and demand
and producing
economy
largely for export, the latter lacking such linkages and
producing
largely for local needs.

The most
sectors of

important
the local

of

these

26
We

to one
because
the three do not seem easily reducible
typology
adopt this conventional
structure. We doubt
is possible,
it could occur it seems that
such a reduction
but before
underlying
on the assumption
to identify distinct mechanisms
that they are relatively
theory should first work
to this effect,
coherence.
For similar arguments
and then try to assess their underlying
autonomous,
see David
and Material
'The Inadequacy
of a Single Logic:
Political
Rapkin,
Integrating
to World
to the World
inWilliam
System',
(ed.), Contending
Approaches
Approaches
Thompson

System
Greece

(Beverly Hills,
Analysis
Toward
and Argentina:

in
and Nicos Mouzelis,
'Political Transitions
1983), pp. 241-68,
a Reorientation
of Marxist
Political
Political
Theory',
Comparative

21 (1989), pp. 443-66.

Studies,
is nicely
The basic logic of this argument
laid out in Tilly, Coercion,
and European
States,
Capital,
chapter 7.
especially
28
our own, somewhat
of dependency
There are various
traditions
eclectic, discussion
scholarship;
'A Structural
of Imperialism',
Journal of Peace Research,
8
draws on Johan Galtung,
Theory
in Latin
and Development
Fernando
Cardoso
and Enzo Faletto,
(1971), pp. 81-109,
Dependency
27

America
The Rise

1979), Peter Evans, Dependent

Development
(Princeton,
1979), Clive Thomas,
(Berkeley,
in Peripheral
State
Societies
(New York,
1984), and Ronald
of the Authoritarian
'The Excentric
with or without
inWolfgang
Mommsen
Idea of Imperialism,
Robinson,
Empire',
and After: Continuities
and Discontinuities
and J?rgen Osterhammel
(London,
(eds.), Imperialism
1986), pp. 267-87.
29
between
On the distinction
states, see Buzan,
strong and weak
'People, States, and Fear', and
and Weak States.
Strong Societies
Migdal,

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

331

This process of disarticulating

the colonial
economy was intimately related to
processes of colonial state formation.30 An important function of the colonial state
was to facilitate
the penetration
of foreign capital into the colonial economy. At
the same time, most
to maintain
wanted
their empires
'on the
powers
imperial
that colonial states had to be as self-sufficient as possible within
cheap'. This meant
the constraints
of their mission,
which meant
collecting
most
with
local
elites.
The
tiating
important of these elites
the modern
sector, since it was these which enabled that
source of capital for the centre and of taxes for the colonial

taxes
were

locally and nego

those with ties to
sector to function as a
state. This arrangement

local elites materially

and in so doing created ties to the colonial
state
to
centre
thus
the
and
mass
while
to
down
ties
the
(and
world-economy),
breaking
In contrast,
other social classes, especially
in the traditional
sector
population.
were
landed
less
from
the
of
(except
elites),
important
standpoint
administering
benefited

colonial rule and thus less able to exploit the relative weakness
of colonial
states.
a result they did not develop
interests in ties to the centre and, indeed, typically
became victims of the alliance of local elites, foreign capital, and the colonial state.
The formation of disarticulated
economies
and weak states created a situation in
which the primary security threat was internal. Colonial military
and bureaucratic

As

reflected this fact. Lacking

the colonial
state's
development
political
legitimacy,
was
or
use
underwritten
the
actual
threatened
of
force.
power
always
by
Significant
resources were typically not available from the centre, however, and since
military
mass mobilization
was not viable for an army of occupation,
colonial states tended
in
coopted groups or ethnic minorities.31 A similar process occurred
were
a
which
staffed
with
vested
interest in
bureaucracies,
by persons
the authority
of an alien state. The character of colonial military
and
upholding
bureaucratic
in other words, was shaped by the security needs of
development,
to militarize

colonial

clients rather than of the mass population.

foreign actors and their domestic
A few Third World
states achieved
the masses
for
independence
by mobilizing
armed revolt, and in these cases the constellation
of interests that had benefited
from the structures of colonial
rule was broken down.32 In most cases, however,
decolonization
merely handed the reins of power over to the local elites who had
been created by the colonial
and in these cases economic
economy,
political
disarticulation
and an external-orientation
to affect the definition of
have continued
'national'
to
effects tend
the type of economic
vary with
security ends. Theses
so let us briefly describe
two
strategy that elites pursue, however,
development
stylized cases.
30

state formation
'The State in Post-Colonial
Societies:
see, for example, Hamza
Alavi,
New Left Review,
and Bangladesh',
14 (1972), pp. 59-82, and Crawford
'The
Young,
State and the Post-Colonial
Colonial
in Donald
Rothchild
Chazan
and Naomi
Crisis',
(eds.), The
Precarious
State and Society
in Africa
Balance:
(Boulder,
1988), pp. 25-66.
31
See Cynthia
in Divided
State Security
Societies
Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers:
(Athens,
1980).
32
this by no means
the elimination
of internal security threats, since the
Although
guaranteed
On

colonial

Pakistan

boundaries
the states
World
Politics,
Security,
security
also be
Nicholas

inherited from colonial

often contained
ethnic groups. The role of
powers
antagonistic
can be seen as an external
these boundaries
of Third
system in upholding
empowerment
Jackson
and Carl Rosberg,
States Persist', World
states; see Robert
'Why Africa's Weak
35 (1982), pp. 1-24, and Jeffrey Herbst,
'War and the State in Africa',
International
14 (1990), pp. 117-39.
Insofar as this process
Third World
states against
the
empowers
of societal or ethnic groups under their control,
can
the institution
of sovereignty
however,
seen as a fourth,
'heteronomous'
structure
dominance
in the international
system; see
Onuf, World of Our Making
(Columbia,
1989).

332

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

is in many
industrialization
of colonial
respects a continuation
Export-oriented
and political development.
Multinational
have
corporations
strategies of economic
are no longer limited to those of the
replaced colonial venture capital, and markets
effect
is largely the same: the continued
centre, but the economic
imperial
sector
and its further
of the modern
into the world
integration
development
sector. This may be compatible
and relative neglect of the traditional
economy,
rather than self-sustaining
but it is a dependent
with
'development',
development,
its benefits are
strong linkages to the rest of the economy
in society.
typically poorly distributed
On
the one hand,
it
This has a dual effect on state formation
processes.
reproduces the colonial situation in which a large class of people have little stake in
'threat'. And,
the existing economic order, and thus to which they pose a potential
on the other, it enables economic
and political
elites to consolidate
their internal
on
revenues
that
threat
the
vis-?-vis
by
relying
provided
by external
security position
and

in the absence

of

as was characteristic
of
economic
ties, rather than by bargaining with the masses,
state formation
in the West.33 This combination
of redistributive
demand from the
bottom and lack of need to meet it from the top reproduces the illegitimate regimes
and induces local elites to follow
the colonial path
inherited from colonialism,
coercion
rather than consent.34 This
by capital-intensive
terms:
in the absence of the gains
in
counterfactual
also
be
stated
argument might
to renegotiate
elites might
have been forced
accrued
from the world market,
in
with
the
the
economic
and political
masses,
power
process
very
constituting
of security threat. This does not mean
that in the absence of
different definitions
we would see liberal democracy
in the Third World
industrialization
export-oriented
of

securing

themselves

in the twentieth century), but it does suggest that

(which only emerged in the West
the process of state formation would have had a broader popular basis.
in the case of states that have pursued policies
The situation
is more ambiguous
can lead to a
In principle
such policies
industrialization.
of import-substitution
more even distribution
of the benefits of development,
since insofar as they rely less
on external markets
they must cultivate demand and supply-side
linkages to the
a
more
turn
in
and
this
the
basis
for
domestic
inclusive
may
economy,
provide
In practice, however,
such policies have tended to focus on the
social contract.
of luxury goods that previously
had been imported for consumption
production
by
on
to do so, rather than on
local elites, often
relying
imported
technology
a truly self
in ways
national
income
that would make
redistributing
possible
mass
to expand
toward
economic
base
This
failure
demand.
geared
sustaining
led to the eventual
'exhaustion'
of import
typically
to
assertion
of
rule
deal
with
the
military-bureaucratic
policies
wave
for further redistribution.35
the
of
economic
threat of pressure
Indeed,
in Latin America
rule suggests that
liberalization
during and after years of military
the domestic
substitution

market

has

and

33

and European
See Tilly, Coercion,
States,
pp. 207-8.
Capital,
see John Saul,
to coercion,
states' lack of legitimacy
and recourse
On Third World
'The State in
et al. (eds.), States and Societies
in David Held
Post-Colonial
Societies',
(New York,
1983),
Third World Politics
'The
pp. 457-75,
(Madison,
1984), and Eboe Hutchful,
Clapham,
Christopher
The Peripheral
International
Journal of the Sociology
Modern
State and Violence:
Situation',
of

34

35

14 (1986), pp. 153-78.

Law,
see Guillermo
For this argument,
and Socio-Economic
Apparatus
32 (1980), pp. 717-29.

Historical
Formations
O'Donnell,
'Comparative
in the Third World',
International
Social

Change

of

the State

Science

Journal,

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

333

when faced with a choice between generating new revenues through a renegotiation
on external demand, Third
of the social contract or through a new dependency
to
to
World
elites tend
the former.
prefer the latter
In sum, the availability
from the world economy of external sources of revenue
state power to avoid or at least significantly moderate
has enabled elites controlling
the painful process of accommodation
in the First World
experienced.

with

interest groups
that
has helped
of
reproduce
problems
and thereby helped constitute
inherited from colonialism,
the
political
legitimacy
response. The
typical security threat as an internal one requiring a capital-intensive
states often face internal security problems,
fact that Third World
in other words,
should not be explained
is
simply in terms of their being 'weak'. Such weakness
itself an artifact of the narrow constellation
of societal interests that are often
in such states, and which
embodied
is in part created by a world economy
that
elites

certain

empowers

Informal

groups

at the expense

empire and the hegemonic

disenfranchised

This

of others.

constitution

of security

states in capital-intensive
interest of Third World
militarization
may also be
structures
in
states
conditioned
the
This
dominance
mechanism
differs
system.
by
from the first in that it concerns relations between states rather than between states
and the world economy,
but is similar to the first and different from the third in

The

of national
that it also affects the constitution
security ends by creating an external
base of support for local elites that distorts the state formation process.
structures
in the states system have received comparatively
Dominance
little
or neo-realist
from either radical theorists of Third World militarism
attention
theorists of international politics. Neglect
from the former may stem from an often
or at least
neo-Marxist
theoretical
which discounts
the importance
orientation,
ones. We
of political-military
to economic
relations compared
autonomy
such economism
is a mistake.
The institutional
of the states
separation
is not an ideological mystification
the dynamics of
system from the world-economy
which can be subsumed under the 'single logic' of the global mode of production:
it is a real feature of the contemporary
that generates a distinct logic
world-system
as a sui generis determinant
of interaction,
and which needs to be analyzed
of
Third World military
development.36
of course, would
endorse
this argument,
but in studying Third
Neo-realists,
World militarization
rather
they have tended to focus on the role of competition
stem from their commitment
than hierarchy
between
states.37 This may
to the
relative

believe

36

37

'Interstate System and Capitalist World-Economy:

Cf. Christopher
One Logic or
Chase-Dunn,
on the relative
International
Studies Quarterly,
25 (1981), pp. 19-42. Our own emphasis
Two?',
to Aristide
of the states system within
the world-system
is indebted
autonomy
Zolberg,
'Origins
A Missing
33 (1981), pp. 253-81,
the Modern
and Rapkin,
Link', World Politics,
World-System:
'The Inadequacy
of a Single Logic'.

of

and Modernization:
Edward Kolodziej,
'National
of
Drive Wheels
See, for example,
Security
Arms Control,
6 (1985), pp. 17-40, Robert
'The Security Dilemma
and
Militarization',
Rothstein,
the Poverty Trap in the Third World',
Journal of International
8 (1986), pp.
Jerusalem
Relations,
'Third World Militarization',
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
32 (1988), pp.
1-38, and Robert Rosh,
on neo-realism
see Waltz,
more
Politics.
For a
671-698;
Theory of International
generally,
see John Ikenberry
neo-realist
of systemic hierarchy much
closer to our own argument,
analysis
and Charles
pp. 283-316.

Kupchan,

'Socialization

and Hegemonic

Power',

International

Organization,

44

(1990),

334

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

of anarchy as the constitutive

basis of the states system and the resulting
to treat states as spatially differentiated
'billiard balls', which
tends to
an
as
a func
of
analysis
produce
exchange-theoretic
political-military
dependency
free actors with exogenously
tion of bargains
between
and independently
given
to which Great
ends. We
believe
this obscures
the extent
Power
authority
principle
tendency

penetrates,
structures

and

thereby

'informal

constitutes,

Third World

states. We

call these hierarchical

empires'.38

is a socially
structured
among
system of interaction
empire
states in which
one, the 'dominant'
state, has a significant
juridically
sovereign
over
of another,
of de facto political
the security policies
authority
degree
state. Sometimes
called spheres of influence or systems of patron
'subordinate',
states
client relations,39 the three principal
informal empires in the contemporary
and, to a lesser extent, South
system have been those of the US in the Caribbean
An

informal

in West
states; of France
East, and assorted Asian
parts of the Middle
in Eastern
1989 of the USSR
localized but
and until
Europe; more
are dominated
similar relationships
like
Powers
structurally
by Middle
(arguably)
and Brazil, and so on. Apart from the lack
South Africa, perhaps Nigeria
Vietnam,
of informal empires differ
the authority
relations characteristic
of legal recognition,
over subordinate
from those of formal empires in that the influence of dominant

America,
Africa;

actors

this may
include economic
primarily with security (although
as
not
such
does
involve
administrative
control.
and
day-to-day
arrangements),
roots
in
have
their
the
interests
and
of
Informal
dominant
practices
empires
to act on their behalf. Dominant
states are likely
states and the local actors willing
to have one or both of two basic motivations
in trying to create an informal
is concerned

in
empire: (1) a desire to create the political basis for economic expansion overseas,
case structures of informal empire will be articulated
not
with
which
(though
structures in the world-economy,
and (2) a desire to block
reducible to) dominance
sensitive areas. Apart from
of Great Power rivals into geopolitically
the penetration
overt military
the principal mechanism
intervention,
by which
they pursue these
as military
of
defined
and
is
assistance',
'security
broadly
objectives
provision
to
will
that
domestic
relevant
economic
aid,
pursue
groups
and/or foreign
security
policies
enables

38

that reflect dominant

these groups to acquire

state security interests.40 This

state power rather than others,

'arms for

influence'
thereby altering the

see Michael
'The Excentric
Idea
informal empire,
1986), and Robinson,
Doyle,
Empires
(Ithaca,
more
is elaborated
'The States
discussion
of Imperialism';
the following
Wendt,
fully in Alexander
PhD dissertation
1989).
System and Global Militarization',
unpublished
(Minneapolis,
39
see Paul Keal,
Rules and Superpower
Dominance
On spheres of influence,
(New York,
Unspoken
Powers
and Subordinate
States
(Durham,
1986); on
1983), and Jan Triska
(ed.), Dominant
On

see Michael
'Does the Dog Wag
the Tail or
Handel,
politics,
6 (1982), pp.
Jerusalem
Journal
Relations',
Relations,
of International
Multilateral
Shoemaker
and John Spanier, Patron-Client
and Christopher
24-35,
Relationships:
in the Nuclear
'informal
it emphasizes
Crises
1984). We prefer
Age (New York,
empire' because
in other formulations,
that is downplayed
is a central aspect of such systems
what we believe
states is one of authority
between
and subordinate
that the relationship
dominant
(see
namely
patron-client
Vice-Versa?

40

relations

in world

Patron-Client

below).
in this sense, despite
and economic
aid constitutes
that not all military
Note
'security assistance'
is defined by its relationship
have similar effects. Security
assistance
the fact that it may ultimately
arms sales to India
to Great Power
influence over state formation
and national
security; Swedish
our argument
are not part of such influence and thus fall outside
here.

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

335

definition of national
security ends in that state.41 The postwar regimes in much of
for example, were in important part created
Eastern
and
Latin America
Europe,
this
from
the United
States and Soviet Union;
assistance
sustained
and
by security
as a security threat to the former, and capitalism
communism
assistance constituted
in turn,
to the latter.42 The recent collapse of Soviet clients in Eastern Europe,
In the absence of external
claim implicit in this argument.
evokes the counterfactual
of societal interests represented
the constellation
by the sub
security assistance
come
to
not
in
the
first
state
dominance
either
have
would
ordinate
place or would
at least have been
of which

would

forced
have

bargains with other interest groups?either

state structures and thus definitions
of
different

into different

yielded

security.

It should be noted that the presence of such structural coercion

implies neither a
and subordinate
relation between dominant
simple force nor a simple exchange
states 'consent' to the hegemonic
subordinate
states. It is not the former because
state in defining their security. This consent may be created
role of the dominant
and backed up with the threat of intervention, but there remains a 'bargain' with a
its own interests. At the same
local actor pursuing
an exchange
between
exogenously
relationship
the powers and interests of dominant
constitutes
Informal empires, in other words, are constituted

the bargain is not

time, however,
since the bargain
given actors,
states as such.
and subordinate
by a fusion of power and social
states penetrates
the territorial space

in which the authority of dominant

purpose
states. In effect, we are suggesting
that the formal authority
of subordinate
which
is 'anarchic' in terms
of
structure of theWestphalian
states,
system
sovereign
overlaid
of
is
definition
of Weber's
authority,
by informal
bureaucratic-legal
more
to
like
'feudal'
structures
that
(and
authority
something
correspond
authority
in those terms are not 'anarchic').43
which
incentives
Structures of informal empire generate both supply- and demand-side
domi
in the Third World. On the supply-side,
militarization
for capital-intensive
their clients from becoming militarily
nant states have an interest in preventing
a capacity
to deter security threats, in
self-sufficient?that
is, from developing
resources.
own
with
their
from
rebuffed
those
They may also have
patrons,
cluding
an interest, however,
in defraying
their costs (and enlarging
to
'self-reliant'
become
their
clients
(e.g.
by encouraging
41

42

Aid and Counterrevolution

of various
Military
types to this effect include Miles Wolpin,
Arguments
Aid
'The Political
in the Third World
Impact of U.S. Military
1972), J. Samuel Fitch,
(Lexington,
5 (1979), pp. 360-86, Michael
Klare
and Cynthia
and Society,
to Latin America',
Armed Forces
in Latin America',
in Richard
for Authoritarianism
U.S.
Arnson,
Support
'Exporting Repression:
American
in U.S.-Latin
Relations
and the State
(Stanford,
1979), pp.
(ed.), Capitalism
Fagen
in Eide and Thee
with a Global
'Militarisation
Reach',
Eide,
138-68, Asbjorn
(eds.), Problems
of
as an Instrument
of
'The Military
and Condoleeza
Rice,
Militarism,
pp. 299-322,
Contemporary
Powers
and Subordinate
in Triska
Influence and Control',
States,
pp. 239-60.
(ed.), Dominant
see Alain
state formation,
influences on Latin American
and security
For overviews
of US military
in Latin America
and the State
The Military
(Berkeley,
1987), pp. 117-50, and David
Rouquie,
Armed
Hardand Softline Themes',
National
'Latin American
Pion-Berlin,
Security Doctrines:
between
this case and that of Eastern
for contrasts
15 (1989), pp. 411-29;
Forces and Society,
see Triska
Powers
and Subordinate
States,
and, on the French West African
(ed.) Dominant
Europe,

in Africa
French Power
case, John Chipman,
1989).
(Oxford,
and Nicholas
of Imperialism',
'A Structural
Theory
Compare
Galtung,
33 (1989),
Studies Quarterly,
International
Rule',
'Anarchy, Authority,
see Reinhard
Weber
Weber's
Bendix, Max
(Garden
types of authority,
on Weber's
American
Political
of Authority',
'Critical Remarks
Theory
pp. 305-16.

43

their export markets)

the Nixon
Doctrine).

Onuf

and Frank

Klink,
for discussion
of
City,
1962), and Peter Blau,
57 (1963),
Science Review,

pp.

149-73;

336

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

states typically, if not necessarily

follow a two-pronged
self-consciously,
to
access to weapons
for
with
this
tension.
The
first
is
limit
clients'
strategy
dealing
enable them to deter or defeat military
that might
intervention
by the patron,
mass
access
of
to
destruction.
The
second
is
to techno
particularly weapons
give

Dominant

in effect encouraging
the
encourage
militarization,
dependent
logies that will
means
to
of
certain
reinforce
In
ends.
the
development
security
hegemonic
security
case of the capital-poor
arms and
Third World
this means making
available
that will encourage
militarization.
Such access en
technology
capital-intensive
new
to
while
create
self-reliance
forms
of
courages
helping
dependency.44
On

the demand-side,
the creation of states that depend materially
and ideo
on
external
rather than on domestic
security assistance
logically
legitimacy helps
constitute
the societal interest groups that might oppose such bargains?usually
the
mass population?as
a security threat rather than asset. And as we have argued,
once the masses are defined as a security threat, a capital-intensive
is likely
military
to be preferred. The dependency
this involves may be quite prickly?a
'love-hate'
as it were?and
it may vary in strength even within a single informal
relationship
empire. But
Third World

informal

state formation
condition
in the
empires may nevertheless
in such a way that, despite its economic
and political
costs, capital
intensive militarization
becomes a rational solution to 'national' security problems.
when
these solutions
fail and client regimes are over
Conversely,
occasionally
the new leadership may shift quickly to a labour-intensive
whelmed,
policy of mass
as another rational solution to a new security problem?one
mobilization
in which
an erstwhile patron is now a security threat.45

Modernity

and the global military

culture

so far has focused on how systemic dominance

Our argument
structures affect the
distribution
of political power
in Third World
states and, through that process,
in which elites define security threats in primarily domestic
help create a situation
terms. Yet, state formation
is not only the acquisition
of state power by some
as a member
of
groups rather than others: it is also a matter of being recognized
the society of states. In any society the identity of the self is in important part
constituted
of others, and as such state formation
is also a
by the expectations
feel their identities lacking?because
process of identity formation.46 States which
is not respected by Great Powers, because they are unable to assert
their autonomy
are corrupt or
their control in all areas of the country, because their governments
inefficient, or simply
such 'incompleteness'

because

of

their relative

by acquiring

for
try to compensate
youth?may
the trappings of the modern
state by a process

44

see Andrew
On this latter point,
'Arms Acquisition
and National
Ross,
Security: The Irony of
in Azar and Moon
in the Third World, pp. 152-87.
Military
(eds.), National
Strength',
Security
45
are instructive
cases in point. The Batista
Cuba and Nicaragua
and Somoza
regimes had external
bases of support
that constituted
the principal
threat as internal, whereas
the Castro
and
security
Sandinista
and saw the US as the principal
threat;
regimes had greater popular
legitimacy
security
the former pair relied on conventional
to deal with
the latter on mass mobilization
these
armies,
46

threats.
differing
See Wendt,
'Anarchy

isWhat

States Make

of

It'.

Dependent

state formation

337

and Third World militarization

to conspicuous
The things acquired by such 'symbolic
consumption.
so
are
not
much
for their instrumental virtues as for what
valued
self-completion'47
case
status
in modernity.
this
and
membership
they symbolize?in

analogous

state is the 'modern' army,

One of the most
symbols of the modern
important
is constituted
and
which we argue
by two basic attributes,
'professionalism'
useful for dealing with
These
attributes may be instrumentally
'technologism'.
certain kinds of security threats, but often there is no threat requiring immediate
or sometimes when
there is a labour-intensive
attention,
policy might be able to
states' ideas about what counts as a 'modern' military
a
role in shaping military
ideas are
crucial
policies. These
play
organization
a
a
autonomous
is
that
determinant
culture'48
relatively
'global military
shaped by
a dominance
This culture constitutes
of Third World
military
development.49
are its centre, the reference
structure because Western
definitions
of modernity

offset

it. In these

cases,

may

elites, and these ideas fuel dependent

(because capital
point for Third World
of
militarization.
As such, it involves a cultural dependency or
intensive) patterns
in advanced
prevalent
imperialism 'through which symbols and systems of meaning
are
on
mean
not
This
Third
societies
other
does
societies'.50
capitalist
imposed
states are passive objects forced to accept Western military
ideas against
World
of them. But the
their will, or that there is nothing original in their appropriation
a mostly
is fundamentally
the global military
culture
asymmetric,
Third
in
World
different
than
ways
one-way process shaping
military
development
would be the case in its absence.
There is a large scholarly literature on military professionalism,
Professionalism.
in the 1960s on the role of the military
much
of which derives from work
in
This
role
is
much
but
mainstream
and
scholars
radical
debated,
development.51
is constitutive
of the 'modern' army:
alike share a belief that professionalism
structure

of

as military men first, a centralized

and promotion
command
based on
structure, high levels of internal differentiation,
are
in other words,
technical
and merit.
Such armies,
intensive with
expertise
to
armies are normally defined in opposition
respect to human capital. Professional
full-time

officers

the aristocratic
47

and NCOs

armies

who

see themselves

characteristic

of pre-industrial

societies?in

which

officers

Ottmar

Braun and Robert Wicklund,

Antecedents
of Conspicuous
'Psychological
Consumption',
10 (1989), pp. 161-87. For an excellent discussion
Journal of Economic
of the role of
Psychology,
see Helga Dittmar,
in sustaining
material
social identities,
The Social Psychology
goods
of Material
Possessions
1992).
(New York,
48
Our discussion
of the systemic cultural determinants
of militarization
draws on R. B. J. Walker,
of Dissent',
Militarism
and the Discourse
9 (1983), pp. 345-64,
and
Alternatives,
'Contemporary
11 (1986), pp. 485-504;
'Of
Robin
Walker,
Alternatives,
Luckham,
'Culture, Discourse,
Insecurity',
7 (1984), pp. 1-64; Kolodziej,
in Peace and Violence,
Arms
and Culture',
Current Research

'National
and Modernization';
and Mary Kaldor,
'The Atlantic
in
Culture',
Security
Technology
A New Foreign Policy Perspective
and Richard
Falk
(eds.), Dealignment:
Mary Kaldor
(Oxford,
sources of militarization,
see
the domestic
cultural
1987), pp. 143-62. For an argument
stressing
Arm (Oxford,
James Payne, Why Nations
1989).
49
On the relative autonomy
of cultural
The Sociology
Williams,
forms, see Raymond
(New
of Culture
of the role of ideas in social life is based on Emile Durkheim,
York,
1982). Our conception
'Individual

in D.

(Glencoe,

and Thomas

and Collective
Representations',
1953), pp. 1-34, and Peter Berger
(New York,
Reality
1966).
50
'Of Arms
and Culture',
Luckham,
p. 32.
51
J. Johnson
See, for example,
(ed.), The Role

Pocock

and Philosophy
(trans.), Sociology
The Social Construction
Luckmann,

of

in Underdeveloped
Societies
of theMilitary
(Princeton,
in Changing
Order
Political
Societies
1962), and Samuel Huntington,
(New Haven,
1968). For a
more
see Gwyn Harries-Jenkins,
recent discussion,
'The Concept
of Military
Professionalism',
6 (1990), pp. 117-30.
Defense
Analysis,

Alexander

338

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

men
first and military
the military
had low levels of
second,
came
from
to
and
ties
differentiation,
promotion
political
authority52?but
they
might also be contrasted with the decentralized,
part-time, militia army.
in the Third World
The evolution
of military
professionalism
began with the
of indigenous military
institutions and political
destruction
subjugation by Western
their rule, most colonial authorities
armies. After establishing
sought to make up
were

for

aristocrats

shortages

of white

of
composed
by Europeans.53 These auxiliaries
the goal of which was to create local

manpower
by creating
but officered and organized

military

auxiliaries

'labour'
indigenous
were put through training and socialization
this intention and given that their
privates and NCOs. Given
copies of European
own armies had been destroyed by European
ones, it is not surprising that through
internalized Western military
values as superior to
their training recruits quickly
of 'modernity'. The creation of native auxiliaries,
in
their own and constitutive
tradition54 in which the
other words, became the basis for a new, 'invented' military
were those of the colonial authorities.
to military
attached
organization
meanings
that resulted from this kind of socializ
The learning and behavioural modelling
'reference group theory'
ation were outlined by Robert Price in his work applying
In contrast
to studies emphasizing
to the Ghanaian
the organizational
military.55
structure
of the military,
Price
showed
that the behaviour
and attitudes
of
or the
influenced
in Britain
officers were heavily
Ghanaian
by their training
the standards of this external reference group
Once
Commonwealth.
internalized,
as
the basis for promotion
and
became
they became
locally self-perpetuating
a
The
of
external
created
domestic
then,
process
modelling,
leadership.
constituency
values and consumption
with a vested interest inWestern military
patterns, and as
that helped prevent a move
toward alternative
such initiated a 'path-dependency'
after independence.56 This initial reluctance has since
styles of military
organization
context.
in the post-colonial
been reinforced by two factors operating
states on the military
of most Third World
The first is the continuing dependence
to confront domestic
to maintain
able and willing
their rule. A military
security
threats is essential to the survival of most Third World
regimes, and a professional
these security threats are eliminated
army is ideally suited for this purpose. Until
most Third World
of
the
domestic
distribution
power
reconstituted),
(or
political
on an alternative basis.
states will not be interested in reorganizing
their militaries
In this respect,
and organizational
interests of the military
then, the cultural
interests of the state.
dovetail with the political
The second is the continuing military
training of Third World military personnel
to technical
In addition
in modern
these pro
in the West.
weapons,
training
are
to
intended
the
and
often
interests
grammes
promote
explicitly
political
military
52

in Politics:
Patterns
in Brazil
See Alfred
(Princeton,
Changing
1971), pp. 57-8.
Stepan, The Military
For a good discussion
of the African
'The Idea of a British
case, see David Killingray,
Imperial
20 (1979), pp. 421-36.
African
Journal of African History,
Army',
54
in Colonial
'The Invention
of Tradition
in Eric Hobsbawm
and
See Terence
Africa',
Ranger,
53

1983), pp. 211-62.

(eds.), The Invention
of Tradition
Ranger
(Cambridge,
to Military
in New
'A Theoretical
Rule
See Robert
States: Reference
Price,
Group
Approach
and the Ghanaian
23 (1971), pp. 399-429.
For a critique of the
Case', World Politics,
Theory
see Ali Mazrui,
to treat Third World military
elites as 'modernizers',
'Soldiers as
tendency
in Mazrui
Rule and the re-Africanization
of Africa',
Traditionalizers:
Military
(ed.), The Warrior
inModern
Tradition
1977), pp. 236-58.
(Leiden,
Africa
56
see A. F. Mullins,
to postcolonial
Born Arming
On the transition
from colonial
armies,
(Stanford,
Terence

55

1987).

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

339

of the host. One

of the explicit goals of the International Military

Education
and
to
for
is
US
of
programme,
(IMET)
example,
Training
help spread
conceptions
and
While
the
effectiveness
of
these
in
this
programmes
military
security
policy.57
the size and durability of US commitment
to IMET is
respect is hard to determine,
million
one-half
Third
World
have been
impressive. Nearly
personnel
military
trained under this programme
since the Korean War, and these have presumably
in 'modern' military
ideas?and
this does not
gone on to train more personnel
include

soldiers

(and police)

trained

by Britain,

France,

and

the former

Soviet

Union.

The

of Third World militaries,

then, has its roots in the
professionalization
colonial
authorities
of
the
armies
of which was the main
purpose
by
of internal security and the reproduction
of colonial power. This process
a 'modern' army
ideas about what
constitutes
that have become
implanted

creation
tenance

in the post-colonial
become
period, helping Third World militaries
self-perpetuating
an
of
'international
in
which
'the
similarities
between
part
profession'?one
of arms, the multiple
inter-connections
between
elites, the brotherhood
military
them created by training and service abroad might seem to suggest that they are an
element
in the new international
class structure'.58 And by the same
important
ensure
token
it has helped
to professionalism,
that alternatives
such as the
are
less
technocratic
ethos
in
embodied
militia
viewed by Third
armies,
part-time
or contempt.
World
A similar globalization
elites with
of Western
skepticism
in the case of technologism.
refers to the symbolic valuation of advanced over
Technologism.59 Technologism
seem inevitable given the instrumental virtues of
alternative
technology. This might
as
we
the former, but
may also be liabilities, and as
argued above instrumentalities
culture

military

is evident

such are relative

nuclear weapons

to the goals being pursued.

Jet aircraft, main battle tanks, and
are instrumental
if one is interested in a professional
and offensive

fear and respect from other professional

posture
capable of generating
military
defensive military posture.
armies, but less so if one is interested in a militia-based,
We want to suggest that the structure of the global military culture socializes Third
World
elites to attach symbolic value to advanced weapons
and in so
technology,
over others?ones
certain
'instrumentalities'
that Third World
doing advances
states

cannot

meet

on

their

own.60

Once
the colonial
is crucial. The first exposure
of most
again
experience
to 'modern' weapons
was the destruction
non-Western
of their military
peoples
institutions
and loss of political
It is not surprising
independence.
(but not
57

See Luckham,
the Philippines',

'Of Arms

and Culture',
Thailand
and
p. 241; Bj?rn Hagelin,
'Military Dependency:
25 (1988), p. 441; and Michael
Shafer, Deadly
of Peace Research,
The Failure
Paradigms:
of U.S. Counter insurgency Policy
(Princeton,
1988), pp. 93-5. Such
see Frederick Nunn,
have a long history;
Soldiers
programmes
(Lincoln,
Yesterday's
1983). For a
of their effects, see Miles Wolpin,
as a Source of
'External Political
Socialization
general discussion
Journal

Conservative

in the Third World;,

Behavior
in K. Fidel (ed.), Militarism
Military
Countries
(New Brunswick,
1975), pp. 259-82.
58
Robin
in Kaldor
'Militarism:
Luckham,
Force, Class, and International
Conflict',
The World Military
Order, p. 239.
59
we use it somewhat
The term is Robin
than he;
Luckham's,
although
differently
and Culture'.
60
on Luckham,
The following
discussion
draws particularly
'Of Arms and Culture',
Suchman

and Dana Eyre,

Construction
of Weapons

as Rational
'Military Procurement
Proliferation',
Forum,
Sociological

Myth: Notes
7 (1992), pp.

on

in Developing
and Eide
see his

'Of Arms

and Mark
the Social

137-61.

(eds.),

340

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

as
valued access to such weapons
inevitable)61 that survivors of this experience
no
as
and
invention
elicited
much
of
indeed,
modernity;
'perhaps
symbols
strength
as European
and respect from Africans
firearms'.62 In most Third
astonishment
was
so rapid that
of cultural absorption
World
societies
the resulting process
. . . more
introduced
from
into
instrumentally
powerful
cultures[s]
'technologies
a
on
a
silken
fabric"
"burned
like
into
the
wholeness
traditional
societies]
cigarette
this was often the intention
that existed before'.63 Indeed,
cultural patterns
of new technology,
which Western
elites believed would
the introduction
in the civilizing mission,
'backward'
into modern
assist
societies
transforming
of

behind
ones.64

in attitudes
toward advanced
transformation
technology was reinforced by
are
in
colonial
and
armies.
socialization
Status groups
post-colonial
military
as
in part by their consumption
and
such
Third
elites'
defined
World
patterns,
efforts to acquire the technological
army may be an attempt
symbols of the modern
to maintain
of
their
in the West.
the consumption
peers (and teachers)
patterns
This has led to a symbiotic relationship
between professionalism
and technologism:
that creates a
the former defines a culturally valued end of 'software' development
a culturally
and
the
defines
for
modern
latter
domestic
weapons,
constituency
This

In noting
professionalism.
states
and
Morris
the similarities
developing
is relatively
Janowitz
that
similar, they have
technology
argued
in their systems of hierarchy,
features, particularly
relatively similar organizational
but he might just as well have reversed the emphasis.65
status, and authority',
attitudes
is nowhere
The globalization
toward military
of Western
technology
more evident than in the case of weapons
states attach
of mass destruction. Western
valued

end of

'hardware'

between

development
the militaries
'because their

that reinforces

of developed

to
the holders of such weapons
great symbolic value to nuclear weapons,
belonging
an exclusive
states are wary of the
'club'. This is one reason why many Third World
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty: not only because it is viewed as a further attempt
to control the policies of the Third World,
but because it might
by the First World
states do
deprive these states of one avenue towards status.66 In contrast, Western
not attach such status to chemical and biological weapons
and, interestingly, despite
and instrumental virtues of such weapons
the cost-effectiveness
only 'pariah' states
are
in the Third World
do not accept the Western
attitude that these technologies
no
or
chemical weapons
'club'.
'uncivilized'. There is
biological
a measure
of status and
Advanced
then, have become
technologies,
military
in the global military
culture above and beyond their instrumental value.
modernity
Third World
elites have been conditioned
by this culture to attach symbolic value
to such technologies,
to see them as a preferred means
for addressing
security

61

of such cultural
Perrin shows how
In a fascinating
study that belies the necessity
change, Noel
and eighteenth
centuries
after having had Western
Japanese
'gave up the gun' in the seventeenth
to the Sword,
1543-1'879
firearms
for 100 years. See his Giving Up the Gun: Japan's Reversion

the

(Boston,
1979).
62
as a Measure
and Ideologies
Michael
Science,
Adas, Machines
of Men:
Technology,
of Western
Dominance
(Ithaca,
1989), p. 160.
63
See Stephen Hill, The Tragedy
1988), p. 75.
(London,
of Technology
64
as a Measure
Adas, Machines
pp. 221-30.
of Men,
65
in the Political
Morris
The Military
Janowitz,
1964), p. 27.
Development
of New Nations
(Chicago,
66
or Growing
in the System of States: Acute
'The Third World
Mohammed
Ayoob,
Schizophrenia
Studies Quarterly,
33 (1989), p. 74.
International
Pains',

Dependent

state formation

and Third World militarization

341

states is that they are poorly endowed to

problems.67 The problem for Third World
And
the final result is over-determined,
modern
it is
weapons.
although
produce
some measure
of the hegemony
of the global military
culture that so many Third
states have tried to overcome
World
this problem?to
their identity as
complete
modern
advanced

rather than by settling

states?through
dependent militarization
to security problems.
but indigenously
solutions
produced

for

less

Conclusion

a case for considering

In this paper we have made
the effects of systemic
structures on Third World
state formation
dominance
and military
development.
structures may
These
be articulated,
and so their effects hard to separate
in
we
are
but
believe
the
mechanisms
distinct.
im
Their
practice,
they generate
varies from case to case, and may
sometimes
be nil; an
portance
undoubtedly
obvious next stage of research would be to try to assess how much of the variance
in Third World military
each can explain. We have not done this
capitalization
the
first
that
causal
here, however,
step is simply to describe potential
believing
on the distinction
This depends
between
mechanisms.68
and
labour
capitalintensive militarization,
order.
global military
as given,
militarization

which
If we

suggests

a counterfactual

alternative

to the current

this

alternative
by taking capital-intensive
ignore
natural, and/or subject to the same forces used to explain
on which we have focused vanish from
First World militarization,
the mechanisms
think
states pursue one form of
We
that
the
of
Third
World
why
question
sight.
an
militarization
than
another
is
issue
for future research, and
rather
important
that such research should use categories
and concepts more consistent with what
we already know about the Third World
state and security.
Besides the systemic mechanisms
upon which we have focused here, an essential
factors. State formation?the
element of such research should be domestic
key link
in our causal argument?has
both domestic and systemic determinants;
this follows
from the nature of the institution of sovereignty, which separates
'domestic' from
states to play 'two-level games'.69 We have
'foreign' policy and thereby encourages
in the systemic determinants
been
interested here only
of Third World
state
did some crude dependency
formation, but we in no way intend this to suggest?as
theories?that
factors can be 'read off' of systemic positions. Domestic
domestic
factors are relatively autonomous
causes, and as such the pattern of Third World
militarization
is under determined by systemic dominance
structures.
as a dependent
this paper we have treated military
Throughout
capitalization
67

of the power of such symbolic

attachments
is the Israeli effort to develop
the
good example
see
for which was its value as a symbol of military-industrial
Lavi, a key motivation
prowess;
as Symbols: The Israeli Case', Comparative
Gerald
Steinberg,
'Large-Scale National
Projects
19 (1987), pp. 331^6.
Politics,
68
This reflects a scientific
realist conception
of social inquiry; see David Dessler,
'Beyond
a Causal Theory
of War',
International
Studies Quarterly,
Correlations:
35 (1991), pp.
Toward
and Ian Shapiro
and Alexander
'The Difference
that Realism Makes:
Social Science
337-55,
Wendt,
and the Politics
Politics
and Society,
230 (1992), pp. 197-223.
of Consent',
69
See Robert
and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Putnam,
Games',
'Diplomacy
International
42 (1988), pp. 427-60.
Organization,
A

342

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

to conclude by reversing this emphasis and briefly considering

variable; we want
of our argument
for contemporary
the implications
debates about the 'effects' of
since it is ultimately
Third World militarization,
these that make
the issue of
capitalization
One debate

interesting.
concerns

to intervene
the tendency for Third World militaries
in
to
and
the
which
it
often
intervention,
leads, is
repression
politics. Military
a
as
an
treated
evil
necessary
required by
frequently
inevitably disruptive develop
ment
in contrast,
that the domestic
suggests
process.70 Our argument,
security
threats to which intervention
is a response are much more likely to arise in contexts
in which
local elites rely on external support in an effort to avoid redistributive
domestic

policies. This leads to the creation of particular

with this goal and intervene in politics when its
the more democratic nature of the militia army,
in a weak polity may become
of
something

kinds

of militaries
that will identify
is
threatened.
In contrast to
security
in other words, a conventional
army
a 'loose cannon',
the powers
and

in ways contrary to
of which may affect subsequent political development
In
the absence of the systemic dominance
structures
the interests of the masses.71
the emergence of such militaries, Third World
that encourage
elites might have been
the social contract.
forced long ago to renegotiate
A second area in which differences
among militarization
policies might matter
in resource
costs for
is in guns-butter
trade-offs
allocation.
The opportunity
of the diversion
of societal resources and foreign exchange
economic
development
are much greater if security requires a capital-intensive
its
since whatever
military,
interests

in the Third World.72 The 'price' of such

virtues it is 'factor inappropriate'
military
militarization
may be reduced by subsidies or grants from suppliers, or by starting
an arms export industry of one's own (the Brazilian route), but it will still be higher
were not
that created a 'demand' for conventional
than if structures
militaries
present in the first place.
This relates to the issue of dependent militarization
and the global arms market.
states are unable
to meet
Most
their demand
Third World
for modern weapons
or their production
and thus seek either the weapons
domestically,
technologies
on the nature of the demand
abroad. Depending
and the number of potential
this dependency
the autonomy
of Third World
may undermine
states,
suppliers,
structures on them. And in systemic terms,
and reinforce the impact of dominance
it has been a crucial factor in the rapid expansion of the global arms trade since the
demand
for capital-intensive
militarization
has
1960s; in effect Third World
combined with Western
supply side incentives to add a fifth layer to figure 1: the
arms market.
In a world
of weaker
in
structures,
systemic dominance
global
contrast, one would
expect the demand
of Third World
less, and the autonomy
70
71

for imported arms and technologies

states correspondingly
greater.

to be

in Changing
Samuel Huntington,
Political
Order
Societies
See, for example,
(New Haven,
1968).
in Developing
See Felipe Ag?ero,
'Social Effects: Military
10
Countries',
Alternatives,
Autonomy
J. Samuel Fitch,
and Democracy:
National
(1984), pp. 75-92,
'Military Professionalism,
Security
4 (1989), pp. 99-147,
from the Latin American
Lessons
J. Patrice
Pacific Focus,
Experience',

McSherry,
'Military Power,
Journal
Science,
of Political
Democracies
and Emerging
72
costs
On the developmental
and Glenn
and Brad Bullock
Economic
18 (1990),

and
pp.

and State-Society
in Latin America;,
Canadian
Change
Impunity,
25 (1992), pp. 463^188,
and David
Pion-Berlin,
'Military Autonomy
in South America',
25 (1992), pp. 83-102.
Politics,
Comparative
see Ball, Security
in the Third World,
of militarization,
and Economy

'Guns and Butter? The

Firebaugh,
in the Third World',
Social Development
Journal
231-66.

Effect

of Militarization

of Political

and Military

on
Sociology,

state formation

Dependent

and Third World militarization

343

The constitution
of the global arms market relates, finally, to the impact of Third
on the 'stability' of regional and global systems. Stability
World militarization
is
are particularly
threatened by the fact that many modern
useful in an
weapons
offensive
role. On a regional level, the proliferation
of such weapons may increase
or by making
the likelihood of war by aggravating
security dilemmas
aggression
more
on a global
feasible. And
also gradually
the
undermine
level, it may
system.73 In that sense the 'inter
to the internationalization
is
akin
of
systems
some
out
but
the
of
uneven,
capital: highly
prospect
holding
upward mobility.
this long-term threat to the existing world order, however, our argument
Despite
also suggests that capital-intensive
militarization
may, on a deeper level, actually
Western
of
dominance
the
international
the
help perpetuate
system by undermining
arms
to
and
will
of
Third
the
World
'resist'.
The
diffusion
of
modern
capacity

West's

military
nationalization'

dominance
of modern

of

the international

weapons

the internal security position

reinforces
of state-centric
elites in the Third World
that benefit from that dominance,
and weakens
the position of groups that might
benefit from alternative, more
definitions
of security and develop
society-centric
ment.

of state-society
relations, capa
By inhibiting the democratic
reorganization
more
diffusion
inhibits
of
and self-sufficient
bility
development
factor-appropriate
to
the ability of the Third World
military postures, and thereby ultimately weakens
resist

to 'its' security: systemic dominance

structures. The modern
a
in
other
has
become
words,
military,
key element in the 'chain of
domination'
that links the international
to
Third World peoples.74
system
In more general theoretical
terms we might
conclude
from this argument
that
arms and arms technologies
while
the diffusion
of modern
is gradually
changing
the distribution
of certain kinds of power
in ways
that undermine Western
so
in
of interest in which
dominance,
doing it is reinforcing a particular distribution
Third World
countries are coopted
into a hierarchical
international
system.75 This
the real threat

Third World

to deny the potential

for instability as military
capability becomes decon
a
centrated, which is real problem for ideologies of 'international'
security that seek
to incorporate
on a subordinate basis into the world system rather
the Third World
is not

or 'revolt'. What we have tried to suggest, however,

than have them withdraw
is
that the hierarchical
structure of that system itself conditions Third World political
and military
in ways which give Third World
to
states (as opposed
development
societies) a vested interest in such a notion of 'security', that is, in the priority of
order over justice.

73

see D. Devitt
of this concern,
and Global Security
examples
(ed.), Nuclear Non-Proliferation
'Arms Acquisition
and National
(New York,
1987), Ross,
Security', Klaus Knorr,
'Military Trends
and Future World
Jerusalem
Journal of International
11 (1989), pp. 68-95,
and
Order',
Relations,
Gerald
Transfer
and the Future
of the Center-Periphery
Steinberg,
'Technological
System: A
Realist
Jerusalem
Journal of International
11 (1989), pp. 96-117.
Relations,
Perspective',
74
as a Link in the Domination
See Luis Herrera,
'The Military
Chain of Latin America',
Instant
on Peace and Violence,
Research
5 (1975), pp. 197-206.
75 For a
see Mohammed
discussion
of the tensions
in this cooptation,
'The Third
thoughtful
Ayoob,
World
in the System of States'.
For

344
Appendix

Countries

Alexander

Wendt

and Michael

Barnett

Sub-Reg.

GNP P/C
(US$)

3
930
8
2,680
6
Angola600
5Argentina 2,390
10
Australia
11,100
3Austria 11,980
4Bahamas 10,320
8
Bahrain**
8,110
9
160
Bangladesh
2Belgium 11,480
4 Belize
1,250
7
Benin310
5
Bolivia 580
6Botswana 1,050
5 Brazil 2,020
10
Brunei**
10,970
2
6,800
Bulgaria**
7
190
Burkina Faso
10 Burma** 210
7
Burundi250
7 Cameroon970
2 Canada 15,160
7
Central African Republic
330
7
Chad 150
5 Chile 1,310
11 China
290
4 Colombia 1,240
7
Congo870
Costa
Rica 4
1,610
4 Cuba** 1,800
2 Cyprus* 5,200
2
Czechoslovakia**
9,280
2Denmark 14,930
7
1,067
Djibouti**
4
Dominican Republic
730
5 Ecuador 1,040
8
Egypt 680
4
El Salvador
860
7 Ethiopia 130
10Fiji*
1,570
3Finland 14,470
2 France 12,790
7
Gabon2,700
2
East**
11,300
Germany,
2
14,400
Germany, West
7
Ghana390
2 Greece 4,020
Albania**

Algeria**

Personnel

(1,000s)
209
319
207
500
98.8
296.7
1.2
5.1
186.5
515.7
1,050
8.35
48.6
4.25
1,659.2
6.8
546.8
55.45
259
7.2
11.6
108.3
6.5
22.9
228

Weapons/
Personnel

Weapons
298

96
1.426
25
6.574
4.367
2.410
2.702
63
0.650
126
23.137
0.777
109
2.443
0.000
126
5.150
2.160
27
6.353
0.607
3.235
60
5.975
30
1.605
90
0.355
3.889
3.707
6.611

2,097
904
1,205
267
193
0
0.000
118
145
1,260
0
43
105
27
1,007
22
3,267
89
92
28
43
716
14
2.154
67
424

Rank

47
69
116
3
68
36
76
117

123
52
56
24

77

2.926
1.860
83
1.095
16,400
17,965
297.2
220
0.740
14.9
127
8.523
9.5
0.000 0
126
0.749
1,779.5
1,333
76.7
132
1.721
608
10.354
6,295 11
169
360
2.130
78
4.2
37
168.810
42
21.8 1.927
82
40.2
99
2.463
2.625
1,428
3,749
79.6
110
1.382
97
484.8
2.407
1,167
8.5
0
0.000
126
739.6
269
0.364
900.3
4.877
4,391
7.8
79
10.128
654.5
8.078
5,287 19
6.048
8,224
1,359.7
37
15.6
2.372
648
4.668
3,025

61
99
113
18
111
86

67
64
70
122
40
13
28
72
41

Dependent
Appendix

state formation

and Third World militarization

345

1?continued

Countries

Sub-Reg.

Guatemala

Guinea**

Guinea-Bissau*

Guyana*

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary

India

9
10

Indonesia
Iran**
Iraq**

Ireland
Israel

Italy
Ivory Coast

Jamaica

Japan
Jordan

11
8
7

Kenya
Korea,

North**

11

Korea,

South

11

Kuwait
Laos

8
10

Liberia

Libya

Luxembourg**

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia
Mali

10
7

Malta*

Mauritania

Mexico
Mongolia**
Morocco

4
11
8

Mozambique

Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand

9
2
10

Nicaragua

Niger
Nigeria

Norway
Oman

Pakistan

Panama

GNP P/C
(US$)
950
250
160
380
360
810
2,240
300
450
1,756
2,400
6,120
6,800
10,350
740
940
15,760
1,560
330
910
2,690
14,610
170
450
5,460
12,570
210

160
1,810
210
4,020
440

Personnel

(1,000s)
72.6

89

9.2

40

11

16

73.7

124

302
2,257
1,199
3,511
1,654.8
29

649.5
1,374
34.7
3.3

303.4
140.3
24.8

6,420
8,632
20.3
55
57.8

114
1.3
28.5
7.3

356.3
15.1
1.9
17.4

11,860
7,750

290.1

350
2,240

7.6

558
239.5
238.5

17,190
5,810

50

19.5

1,830
880
610
170
160

830
260
370

Weapons/
Weapons

96.2
63

22.5

202
7.8

106.5
320
29
1,157.6
19.6

2,625
4,800
419
1,793
6,255
80
4,907
2,247
34
0
1,778
1,257
186
4,470
2,290
553
85
0
3,648
0
97
36
386
57
0
85
328
1,235
779
396
25
2,159
76
243
50
483

285
132
1,963
29

Personnel

0.689
4.564
4.348
0.000
2.105
1.682
8.692
2.127
0.349
0.511
3.780
2.759
7.555
1.635
0.980
0.000
5.860
8.959
7.500
0.696
0.265
27.241
1.545
0.000
32.000
0.000
3.404
4.932
1.083
3.775
0.000
4.885
0.588
5.157
3.266
4.116
0.397
7.442
3.378
1.203
6.410
4.535
0.891
4.552
1.696
1.480

Rank
115
43
49
126
80
88
17
79
124
120
53
62
21
89
102
126
33
15
22
114
125
2
92
126
1
126
57
38
100
54
126
39
118
35
59
51
121
23
58
98
26
45
106
44
87
94

346

Alexander

Appendix

Wendt

Sub-Reg.
New

Guinea

Paraguay
Peru

Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar**
Romania**
Rwanda

Saudi Arabia
Senegambia

Seychelles*
Sierra

Leone

Singapore
Somalia

South Africa
Soviet

Union**

Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname**
Sweden

Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan**
Tanzania

Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia

Turkey
Uganda

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam**
Yemen,
Yemen,

North
South

Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia

Zimbabwe

Barnett

1?continued

Countries

Papua

and Michael

10
5
5
10
2
2
8
2
7
8
7
6
7
10
7
6
1
2
9
7
5
3
3
8
11
7
10
7
4
8
2
7
8
2
1
5
4
10

GNP P/C
(US$)
700
990

Personnel

(1,000s)

Weapons/
Weapons

Personnel

0.000

7.8

59.8

88

1,370
590

377.6
240.5

662
195

1,930
2,830
15,723
6,030
300

1,362
306.2
7

5,925
288
105

1,025

2,540
14

6.4

6,200
520

92.3

3,170
300

6.3

10.7

3.9

7,940
290

337.1

1,890
8,735
6,010
400
330

613

2,290
15,550
21,330
1,640
3,750
180
850
290
4,210
1,180
1,210
260
15,830
10,420
18,530
2,190
3,230
200
590
420
2,480
150
250
580

94.5

5,096
2,829
68
60.7
3.9

776
628.5
678.3
2,088
151
879.7
5.9
6.7
47

1,711
35
43
636.5
2,163
27.1
69

4,812
81.6

117.5
713
101
17.4
85

*Source for GNP p/c isWorld Tables, 1988-89 (Baltimore).

**Source for GNP p/c is World Almanac.

1,290
82
14
4
537
414
3,688
93,168
2,104
66
358
6
1,561
1,122
7,498
1,587
138
774
79
0
251
4,060
0
405
2,682
31,735
124
354
2,490

887
699
2,677
233
178
214

1.472

1.753
0.811

4.350
0.941
15.000
2.478
2.188
13.976
7.664
2.222
1.026
1.593
4.381
6.016
18.283
0.744
0.971

5.898
1.538
2.012
1.785
11.054
0.760
0.914

0.880
13.390
0.000
5.340

2.373
0.000
9.419
4.214

14.672
4.576
5.130
0.517
10.870
5.949
3.755
2.307
10.230
2.518

Rank

126
95
85
108
48
104
5
66
75
7
20
74
101
91
46
29
4
112
103
32
93
81
84
9
110
105
107
8
126
34
71
126
14
50
6
42
37
119
10
31
55
73
12
65

Dependent
Appendix

2 Regional

state formation

breakdown

of weapons/personnel

W/P mean
Region
16.47
4.25
1.59

1. US-USSR
2. Other NATO-WTO
3. Neutral Europe
4. Caribbean Basin
5. South America
6.
1.

Southern Africa
Cent./East Africa

8. Middle East
9. South Asia
10. SEAsia&Aust.
11.
NE
Note:

Asia

and Third World militarization

1.30
1.22

4.91
4.36

4.37
3.89

2.44
3.19

7.56
8.76
0.70
0.97
1.17
0.88
0.76
2.51

See the regional code numbers of each country in Appendix

breakdown.

Stand, dev.

0.00
2.55
4.21
2.97
1.42
1.26
0.74
1.75

10.18
1.19
1.27
2.31

ratios

W/P median

1.11
1.88

347

1 for detailed