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I. INTRODUCTION
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
At present, the main Acts governing the securities markets are:
The Reserve Bank of India;
the SEBI Act, 1992;
the Companies Act, 1956,(which sets the code of conduct for the
corporate sector in relation to issuance, allotment and transfer of
securities, and disclosures to be made in public issues);
the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, (which provides for
regulation of transactions in securities through control over stock
exchanges)
Page | 2
Whereas it is expedient to constitute a Reserve Bank for India to regulate the issue of bank
notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and
generally to operate the currency and the credit system of the country to its advantage.1
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is governed by the Reserve Bank of India
Act, 1934. The RBI is responsible for implementing monetary and credit
policies, issuing currency notes, being banker to the government, regulator
of the banking system, manager of foreign exchange, and regulator of
payment & settlement systems while continuously working towards the
development of Indian financial markets. The RBI regulates financial markets
and systems through different legislations. It regulates the foreign exchange
markets through the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.
The control and supervisory roles of the Reserve Bank of India is done
through the following:
Issue Of Licence: Under the Banking Regulation Act 1949, the RBI
has been given powers to grant licenses to commence new banking
operations. The RBI also grants licenses to open new branches for
existing banks. Under the licensing policy, the RBI provides banking
services in areas that do not have this facility.
Prudential Norms: The RBI issues guidelines for credit control and
management. The RBI is a member of the Banking Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS). As such, they are responsible for
implementation of international standards of capital adequacy norms
and asset classification.
Corporate
Governance: The
RBI
has
power
to
control
the
Page | 3
KYC Norms: To curb money laundering and prevent the use of the
banking system for financial crimes, The RBI has Know Your Customer
guidelines. Every bank has to ensure KYC norms are applied before
allowing someone to open an account.
transactions.
It
does
due
diligence
on
every
foreign
2 1[54. Rural Credit and Development.The Bank may maintain expert staff to study various
aspects of rural credit and development and in particular it may:(a) tender expert
guidance and assistance to the National Bank;
(b) conduct special studies in such areas as it may consider necessary to do so for
promoting integrated rural development.]
Page | 4
3 For more detailed reading of the RBIs early functions, see RBI: Functions and
Working, Bombay, 1983.
Page | 5
The role of the RBI is to regulate and supervise the functioning of banks,
promote development of financial infrastructure of markets, and, maintain a
stable payments system and monetary stability so that financial transactions
can be safely and efficiently executed.
The supervisory powers of the Reserve Bank of India are located in Section
35-A (1)4 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.
A. RBI as Regulator and Supervisor of Payment and Settlement
Systems :
The Payment and Settlement Systems Act of 2007 (PSS Act)
gives the Reserve Bank oversight authority, including regulation
and supervision, for the payment and settlement systems in the
country.
In this role, RBI focus on the development and functioning of
safe, secure and efficient payment and settlement mechanisms.
The Reserve Bank has a two-tiered structure. The first tier
provides the basic framework for our payment systems. The
second tier focuses on supervision of this framework.
B. RBI as a Regulator of Credit:
4 [ 35A Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions. (1) Where the Reserve Bank is
satisfied that
(a) in the 178 [public interest]; or
179
[(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or]
(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental
to the interests of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the banking
company; or
(c) to secure the proper management of any banking company generally,
it is necessary to issue directions to banking companies generally or to any banking
company in particular, it may, from time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and
the banking companies or the banking company, as the case may be, shall be bound to
comply with such directions.
(2) The Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or on its own motion, modify or
cancel any direction issued under sub-section (1), and in so modifying or cancelling any
direction may impose such conditions as it thinks fit, subject to which the modification or
cancellation shall have effect.]
Page | 6
Page | 7
in
the
Indian
securities
markets
are
governed
by
SEBI
Page | 8
Harshad Mehta (1992), The first stock market scam was one
which involved both the government of India bond and equity
markets in India.
The manipulation was based on inefficiencies in the settlement
Rs.54 crore.
The scam can be categorized as Capital Market scam in which it
is done by manipulating the facts in order to attain enormous
profits.
Two major instruments used in this scam is:
1. READY FORWARD (RF) MODUS OPERANDI
The Ready Forward Deal (RF) is in essence a secured short term
(typically 15 day) loan from one bank to another bank. The lending
is
done
against
Government
Securities
exactly
the
way
Page | 9
collectively
known
as
SLR
securities.
RF
helps
in
securities and not in PSU bonds or units. As far as companies and individuals
were concerned, the RBI's prohibitions did not apply. However, some
provisions of the Securities Contract Regulation Act (1956) particularly
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sections 135, 166 and 207, prohibited forward contracts and options other
than the settlement trading allowed in the stock exchanges. Legal opinion
has been that this ban does not apply to securities which are not listed in the
stock exchanges. Since units and most PSU bonds are not listed.
Fig.2.Modus Operandi
5 Contracts in notified areas illegal in certain circumstances. 13. If the Central Government
is satisfied, having regard to the nature or the volume of transactions in securities in any
[State or States or area] that it is necessary so to do, it may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declared this section to apply to such [State or States or area], and thereupon
every contract in such 44 [State or States or area] which is entered into after the date of the
notification otherwise than 45 [between the members of a recognised stock exchange or
recognised stock exchanges] in such 46[State or States or area] or through or with such
member shall be illegal:
[Provided that any contract entered into between members of two or more recognised stock
exchanges in such State or States or area, shall
(i)
be subject to such terms and conditions as may be stipulated by the respective stock
exchanges with prior approval of Securities and Exchange Board of India;
(ii)
require prior permission from the respective stock exchanges if so stipulated by the
stock exchanges with prior approval of Securities and Exchange Board of India.]
6 16. (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable
speculation in specified securities in any State or area, it may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declare that no person in the State or area specified in the notification shall, save
with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or
purchase of any security specified in the notification except to the extent and in the manner,
if any, specified therein. (2) All contracts in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1)
entered into after the date of notification issued thereunder shall be illegal.
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SETTLEMENT PROCESS
P a g e | 12
over the securities to the broker who passes them on to the buyer. Similarly,
the buyer gives the cheque to the broker who then hands it over to the
seller. This settlement process is similar to what obtains in the stock market
where in fact the buyer and the seller may not even know whom they have
traded with: both know only the broker. There were two important reasons
why the broker intermediated settlement began to be used in the
government securities markets:
a. The brokers instead of merely bringing buyers and sellers together
started taking positions in the market. In other words, they started
trading on their own account, and in a sense became market makers in
some securities. Brokers taking positions has its advantages: it adds
liquidity to the market. But the fact that brokers were doing so was not
openly recognized, and brokers adopted the subterfuge of pretending
to act on behalf of a bank. Some banks allowed their name to be used
in this manner where a transaction 7 which is actually on the broker's
personal account is routed through the bank.
b. When a bank wanted to conceal the fact that it is doing an RF, the
broker came in handy. The second leg of the RF would be made out to
be with a different bank so that at first glance it does not appear as if
a RF has been done. On paper, it appears as if an independent
purchase and an independent sale transaction have been dome with
two different parties. The broker provided contract notes for this
purpose with fictitious counterparties, but arranged for the actual
settlement to take place with the correct counterparty.
1.2 PAYMENT CHEQUES:
1. A broker intermediated settlement allowed the broker to lay his hands
on the cheque as it went from one bank to another through him. The
hurdle now was to find a way of crediting the cheque to his account
though it was drawn in favor of a bank and was crossed account
payee.
P a g e | 13
itself!
There are three routes adopted for this purpose
P a g e | 14
1. Some banks (or rather their officials) were persuaded to part with
cheques without actually receiving securities in return. A simple
explanation of this is that the officials concerned were bribed and/or
negligent. A more intriguing possibility is that the banks senior/top
management were aware of this and turned a Nelsons eye to it to
benefit from higher returns the brokers could offer by diverting the
funds to the stock market. One must recognize that as long as the
scam lasted, the banks benefited from such an arrangement. The
management of banks might have been sorely tempted to adopt this
route to higher profitability.
2. The second route was to replace the actual securities by a worthless
piece of paper a fake Bank Receipt (BR). This is discussed in greater
detail in the next section.
3. The third method was simply to forge the securities themselves. In
many cases, PSU bonds were represented only by allotment letters
rather than certificates on security paper. And it is easier to forge an
allotment letter for Rs. 100 crores worth of securities than it is to forge
a 100 rupee note! Outright forgery of this kind however accounted for
only a very small part of the total funds misappropriated.
Normally in this system, the issuing bank
writes a covering letter to the payee bank instructing the latter to
credit the account of the customer. In the case of the brokers during
the scam, this precaution was also dispensed with. Since everybody
knew that 8 brokers were taking positions on their own account, it was
but natural that they would receive payments on their own account,
and the banks asked no questions about the enormous sums that were
credited and debited into the brokers' personal accounts.
2. BANK RECEIPT
P a g e | 15
P a g e | 16
guidelines.
The second reason is that the bank may simply want an
unsecured loan. It may then do an RF deal issuing a fake BR
which is a BR without any securities to back them. The lending
bank would be under a mistaken impression that it is making a
secured loan when it is actually advancing an unsecured loan.
Obviously, lenders should have taken measures to protect
themselves from such a possibility (This aspect will be examined
later when we discuss the banks control system in general and
of
securities
P a g e | 17
contend with the possibility that the BR received may not be backed
by any/adequate securities. In effect, therefore, it may be making
an unsecured loan, and it must do the RF only if it is prepared to
make
an
unsecured
loan.
This
requires
assessing
the
The immediate impact of the scam was a sharp fall in the share prices.
The index fell from 4500 to 2500 representing a loss of Rs. 100,000
crores in market capitalization.
Since the accused were active brokers in the stock markets, the
number of shares which had passed through their hands in the last
P a g e | 18
one year was colossal. All these shares became tainted shares, and
overnight they became worthless pieces of paper as they could not be
delivered in the market. Genuine investors who had bought these
shares well before the scam came to light and even got them
registered in their names found themselves being robbed by the
government. This resulted in a chaotic situation in the market since no
one was certain as to which shares were tainted and which were not.
LIBERALIZATION
Bowing to the political pressures and the bad press it received during
the scam, the liberalization policies were put on hold for a while by the
government. The Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) postponed
sanctioning of private sector mutual funds.
probably
delayed.
Some
question
marks
arose
regarding
P a g e | 19
duality of control over the banking system between the Reserve Bank of
India and the Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance should end and
that the Reserve Bank of India should be the primary agency for the
regulation of the banking system 9. This was implemented by the creation
of a separate Department of Supervision (DOS) in November 22, 1993.
Prior to 1993, the supervision and regulation of
commercial banks was handled by the Department of Banking Operations
& Development (DBOD). The DOS took over inspection of commercial
banks from the DBOD and from April, 1995 it has taken steps to extend
its area of supervision over the All-India financial institutions. 10 The DOS
was split into the Department of Banking Supervision (DBS) and
Department of Non-Banking Supervision (DNBS) on July 29, 1997, with
the latter being entrusted with the task of focussed regulatory and
supervisory attention towards the NBFC segment.11 The DBS deals with
financial sector frauds related to banks and serves as a secretariat for the
Board for Financial Supervision (BFS). The BFS was constituted on
November 16, 1994, with the RBI Governor as the Chairman and
functions under the RBI (BFS) Regulations, 1994 exclusively framed for
the purpose in consultation with the Government of India 12. The Board is
chaired by the RBI Governor and is constituted by co-opting four nonofficial Directors from the Central Board as members for a term of two
years and the Deputy Governors of the Bank act as ex-officio members.
9 See Narasimha Committee, Report of the Committee on the Financial System, Reserve
Bank of India,Mumbai, 1991, pp 130.
P a g e | 20
An
indigenous
scheme
was
devised
thereupon
to
allow
promoters to gain from keeping the share prices of the bank at a high level.
They were running basically an assured return scheme. In its pursuit of
higher margins, the bank became an aggressive lender by sometimes
stretching the source of funds.
P a g e | 21
months moratorium on Global Trust Bank (GTB), which will last till
October 23rd 2004 in the interest of public and depositors. The RBI also
set a withdrawal limit of Rs. 10,000 for the depositors. It created
chaos in the public because failure of each financial institution brings
doubt in the mind of common depositors who generally centralize all
The merger of UTI Bank and Global Trust Bank appears set to be
mired in more uncertainty. The swap ratio announced earlier
appears set for revision if the merger goes through. There is big
expectations.
However, the proposed merger soon ran into problems. Before
the merger was officially announced, the counters of UTI Bank
and GTB at the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) witnessed huge
volumes and a sizeable rise in prices.
PROBLEMS
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Problems of the bank stem mainly from its very large quantum of Non
Performing Assets (NPA, the assets which do not generate revenues)
accumulated over a period of time.
Consequently, higher provisioning for the same took atoll on its net
worth, thus adversely impacting the capital adequacy of the bank. The
bank had a large net loss in the financial year 2003 mainly due to
large provisioning for its NPAs.
FAILURE
The failure of GTB was result of unavailability of such system and the
down.
Two years back, Gelli was seen manipulating the stock markets in
league with rogue broker, Ketan Parekh. Ketan Parekh in 2001
lured the bank into the share market. That's when the bank lent
aggressively to brokers, diamond traders disregarding prudential
norms laid down by the RBI, to which every bank has to abide.
ROLE
P a g e | 23
Role of RBI: Reserve Bank of India announced the merger of GTB with
Oriental Bank of Commerce as a damage control measure and to
proposed
merger of GTB and UTI and froze the GTB shares hold by UTI and
Ketan Parekh. In mid March 2001, it became clear that the proposed
merger of UTI Bank with GTB might not come through, as the SEBI
preliminary investigation report found manipulation and rigging in the
share price of GTB prior to the merger announcement.
Another SEBI official hinted that the
investigation revealed that the manipulation in the GTB scrip was
motivated and done with the help of the bank's senior management
team. SEBI's findings had not only questioned the merger proposal but
also opened a Pandora's box that may put the management in a major
jam. Sources added that the final investigation was also looking at the
shareholding pattern of GTB and the major beneficiaries from the swap
ratio.
PROPOSAL TO MERGE GTB WITH OBC
of
employees.
At
the
announcement
of
the
P a g e | 24
would be unlikely.
As a part of the scheme, the entire amount of the paid up capital
and reserves of GTB would be treated as provision for bad and
doubtful debts and depreciation in other assets. Estimates
showed that GTB had a negative net worth of around INR 9,000
million. The capital of the bank as on 31 March 2003 was at INR
1213.5 million while reserves and surplus were at INR 1461.6
million.
The RBIs decision followed hectic activity in the corridors of the
Ministry of Finance to save the bank following negative reserves.
The RBI and SEBI were to oversee the merger so that it was
completed quickly.
OBC was to take over GTB, with all its assets, loans and NPAs.
The bank was to take over GTBs INR 15,000 million bad loans in
exchange for which it would get 104 branches of GTB and 8 lakh
customers.
The RBI sop of no swap ratio was the icing in the cake for OBC.
If any surplus remained after accommodating all appropriations,
only then would shareholders get the amount on a prorata basis.
P a g e | 25
advantages
Taking into account the interests of the millions of depositors of
GTB, as well as the bank strengths and weaknesses, the Reserve
Bank prepared following draft scheme of amalgamation of GTB
with OBC.
The Government of India has sanctioned the scheme for
amalgamation of the Global Trust Bank Ltd. With the Oriental
Bank of Commerce. The amalgamation came into force on
August 14, 2004.
13 45. Power of Reserve Bank to apply to Central Government for suspension of business by
a banking company and to prepare scheme of reconstitution of amalgamation.(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Part or in any other
law or 2[any agreement or other instrument], for the time being in force, where it appears to
the Reserve Bank that there is good reason so to do, the Reserve Bank may apply to the
Central Government for an order of moratorium in respect of 3[a banking company].
(2) The Central Government, after considering the application made by the Reserve Bank
under sub-section (1), may make an order of moratorium staying the commencement or
continuance of all actions and proceedings against the company for a fixed period of time on
such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and proper and may from time to time extend the
period so however that the total period of moratorium shall not exceed six months.
(3) Except as otherwise provided by any directions given by the Central Government in the
order made by it under sub-section (2) or at any time thereafter the banking company shall
not during the period of moratorium make any payment to any depositors or discharge any
liabilities or obligations to any other creditors. 4[(4) During the period of moratorium, if the
Reserve Bank is satisfied that
(a) in the public interest; or
(b) in the interests of the depositors; or
(c) in order to secure the proper management of the banking company; or
(d) in the interests of the banking system of the country as a whole, it is necessary so to do,
the Reserve Bank may prepare a scheme
(i) for the reconstruction of the banking company, or
(ii) for the amalgamation of the banking company with any other banking institution (in this
section referred to as the transferee bank).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
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V. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Websites
https://www.quora.com/What-was-the-Harshad-Mehta-scam accessed on
30th September 2015
http://indianeconomyataglance.blogspot.in/2009/03/harshad-mehtasscam.html accessed on 30th september 2015.
https://www.academia.edu/10925909/The_Ketan_Parekh_Fraud_and_Super
visory_Lapses_of_the_Reserve_Bank_of_India_RBI_A_Case-Study accessed
on 1st October 2015.
http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~jrvarma/papers/vik18-1.pdf accessed on 1st
October 2015.
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1829498/ accessed on 1st October 2015.
Books
P a g e | 28
Statutes
1. Reserve Bank of India, 1934.
2. Banking Regulation Act, 1949.
3. Payment and Settlement Systems Act of 2007.
4. Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956.