Ichong vs Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180,
An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of
the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom
and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on

the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL

OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs CITY MAYOR
OF MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # l-24693 July 31, 1967 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Ordinance)

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Manila Ordinance No. 4760 regulating the operation of hotels,
motels and lodging houses on the ground that it is unreasonable and hence violative to the due process clause,
wherein it requires establishments to provide guest registration forms on the lobby open for public view at all times.
RespondentCityMayor contends that the challenged ordinance was a valid and proper exercise of police power
measure for the proper purpose of curbing immorality. An explanatory note for the challenged ordinance made
mention of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication inManilatraceable in great part to
the existence of motels and the like.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of the due process clause.
HELD: No, the challenged ordinance as an exercise of police power was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. As a due process requirement, an ordinance must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression for it to be valid. Thus it would be unreasonable to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely for the well-being of the people, specially if there is no factual foundation being laid to prove its
alleged violation of due process and offset the ordinances presumed validity.

NAMIL VS. COMELEC [414 SCRA 553; G.R. NO. 150540; 28

OCT 2003]
Facts:

On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang,

Sultan Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their

Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents were
proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that they should be
recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter,
the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law Department, the
Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections Supervisor to submit
their reports on the matter. All of them found the second proclamation valid.
Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate installation of
the private respondents as the newly elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and have
assumed office. Petitioners contend that such Resolution is null and void
because they were not accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a
violation
of
the
due
process
principle.

Issue:

Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a

proclamation

Held:

or

the

effects

thereof

without

notice

and

hearing.

No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a

proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and

hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of

law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires

due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning candidate
cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Farias vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs. COMELEC
and Gallardo vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without
notice and hearing.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of

Mindoro GR L-14078 07
March 1919
Facts: Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No 25 selected Tigbao as site for
settlement of Mnagyanes in Mindoro. The same has been approved by Secretary of Interior. The
provincial governor then issues EO 2 directing all Mangyans to relocate and that those who
refuse will be imprisoned. Petitioners did not relocate and challenged the validity of AO 1919
Section 2145 and 2759. They filed for application of habeas corpus for being held in Tigbao
against their will.
Issue: Whether or not AO 1919 Section 2145 and 2759 violate due process of law?
Decision: Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
not issued.
The liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

KWONG SING, vs.THE CITY OF MANILA,

.HELD : The Court sees that the ordinance invades no

fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. This
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights.
The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in
its operation. It applies to all public laundries without
distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos,
Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception,
must comply with the ordinance. Equally and uniformly the
ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business,
and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon
them. The oppressiveness of the ordinance may have been
somewhat exaggerated. The printing of the laundry
receipts need not be expensive. The names of the several
kinds of clothing may be printed in English and Spanish
with the equivalent in Chinese below. It may be conceded
that an additional burden will be imposed on the business
and occupation affected by the ordinance. Yet, even if
private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the

enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground

for failing to uphold the hands of the legislative body.

Ang Tibay vs CIR GR 46496 27 February 1940

Facts: Toribio Teodoro laid off 89 workers due to shortage of leather soles. The said workers are
all members of National Labor Union and filed complaints against Toribio with the Court of
Industrial Relations. They contend that Toribio is guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against NLU members. CIR decided in favour of NLU. SC reversed the decision finding no merit
to NLUs contention. SocGen filed motion for reconsideration while NLU filed a motion for a new
trial.
Issue: Whether or not CIR prescribed the special requirements of due process in administrative
cases?
Decision: CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires
it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as
it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:

The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof

the tribunal must consider the evidence presented

While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached. the decision must have something to support itself

Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be substantial

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected

The court or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision

The court should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR. [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily
closed on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite
people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There
was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of
the radio stationviolates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a
decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a
motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the stationwere sold to a new owner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case
becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the
dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrativetribunals in matters
as this case

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due

process

was exercised in the case of DYRE.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void.
The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed
before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence
presented.

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and
not simply accept subordinates views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various
issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due
Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A.
No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a
10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that
the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the
House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or
unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.