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The State of Development Cooperation,

CSO Enabling Environment and CSO Development Effectiveness

Maputo, December 2014

Report Commissioned by CPDE and written by GRUPO MOAMBICANO DA DVIDA (GMD), a Mozambican
CSO specialized on monitoring of Public Debt, Poverty Reduction and Aid Effectiveness.



Accra Agenda for Action


Budget Support


Civil Society


Civil Society Organizations


Development Cooperation


Development Effectiveness


Development Observatory


Enabling Environment


Frente de Libertao de Moambique (Mozambican Liberation Front)


Members of Parliament


Ministry of Planning and Development


Paris Declaration


Program Aid Partnership


Program Aid Partners


Poverty Reduction Strategy


Resistncia Nacional Moambicana (Mozambican National Resistence)


Official Development Assistance


Organizao da Juventude Moambicana (Mozambican Youth Organizat.)


Organizao da Mulher Moambicana (Mozambican Women Organizat.)


Grupo Moambicano da Divida


GMD is a coalition of around 104 Mozambican NGOs, Trade-Unions, Religious groups, Media
Organizations, small-holder farmers Associations as well as individual citizens (including University
Professors, researchers, Journalists), aimed at discussing, advocating and monitoring solutions on
issues ranging from Poverty Reduction to sustainable management of resources and Public External
Though it was established in 1996 in the context of the global movement for poor countries debt
cancelling - the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign, GMD also emerged as a result of a growing concern
with the debt issue at the time from domestic CSOs. GMD firmly partnered with the Government
in advocating for the ensuing debt cancelling initiatives namely HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor
Countries) and MDRI (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative).
Ever since the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in Mozambique in
the early 2000s, GMD has been a strong actor in monitoring progress in Poverty Reduction, which
has become its core business over the last few years. GMD is now affiliated to international
initiatives on Transparency and Good-Governance namely AFRODAD and EURODAD.

The collapse of the Party-State regime in the late 1980s and the establishment of a multi-party
Constitution in 1990 stands-out as the main landmark and legal reference for the emergence of a
vibrant Civil Society in Mozambique.
However, the pace of legal and political reforms that will allow a full and effective engagement both
for individual citizens and CSOs alike in the governance process have been markedly slow.
Therefore, CSOs are still constrained by a legal and regulatory environment in Mozambique by a
hesitant legislation on the one hand and Institutions somewhat reminiscent of the Party-State
operating logic on the other.
The sluggishness that has characterized the pace of the reforms in the legal and regulatory
framework is the best response of a conservative political Establishment standing between its
comfort zone and the pressures of an increasingly noisy Society.
The political environment and the policy debate is still a predominantly bipolarized winnertakes-all game between the two major Political Parties in the Parliament with little space for
other development actors to effectively engage. Yet, a few legislative victories and practical
lessons learnt have granted the CSOs some room for tactical maneuvers in the increasingly complex
and polarized Mozambican political arena.
The degree of consolidation and impetus of CSOs in Mozambique also reflects the still incipient
and slow development of a critical dimension of citizenship, which in part turns out to be a
by-product of a society that has been traditionally based on rigid hierarchy structures where open
bottom-up criticism if not discouraged was not stimulated.
Notwithstanding the apparent waning of the Budget Support Partnership, Development
Cooperation flows are still on the rise in Mozambique and the sources of financing are diversifying
reflecting the globally-felt transformations in the aid landscape.
However, in spite of the dwindling fiscal importance of Budget Support financial contributions, the
partnership instrument between the Government of Mozambique and the group of 19 donors
providing this modality (G-19/PAPs) is still from afar the most responsive to the aid/development
effectiveness agenda as well as the most prominent forum of policy dialogue between Government
and Donors.
Meanwhile, implementation of the Busan-adopted principle of Inclusive development partnerships
has proved challenging in the face of an apparent indifference among the several Development
actors (G-19 donors, the non-traditional donors, Private Sector, Civil Society and Parliament)
among whom initiatives for broad policy debate are still fragmented with hardly any regular allinclusive mechanism for multistakeholder dialogue established.
The Development Observatory (DO), which is a Government Civil Society dialogue forum
attended by G-19 donors as observers, seems to be the furthest Mozambique has been able to go in
terms of inclusiveness of its development partnerships. But, the initiative by CSOs to use the
DO has a forum of evidence-based discussion of selected government sectoral policies
(introduced in 2013), certainly represents a huge qualitative leap in terms of the
engagement of Civil Society in the Development Effectiveness efforts though it is still unclear
whether there has been any genuine buy-in of CSOs contributions by the Government of

Whereas with Donors and Private Sector Mozambican CSOs tend to be circumstantial allies,
relations with domestic political actors (Parliament, Government and Political Parties) take a rather
uneven shape described by Francisco et al (2008) as a convenient tutelage.
Also aligned to the Development Effectiveness principles, CSOs in Mozambique have been
intensifying the tone and focus on the widening social inequalities amidst the paradox of a
consistently brilliant macroeconomic performance and the disappointing human development
The looming risk of the Mozambican Public Debt derailing into unsustainable levels, has also led
some important CSOs to sound the alarm, given the potential implications of a debt crisis for the
social stability of the country.

The present Country Report was commissioned by the CSO Partnership for Development
Effectiveness (CPDE) and written by a CSO (Grupo Moambicano da Dvida GMD) as the
Mozambican contribution for the CPDE 2015 Global Synthesis Report on the State of
Development Cooperation, CSO Enabling Environment and CSO Development
Having been enlisted among 25 Countries world-wide and only 6 countries in Africa to feature in
the above mentioned report, Mozambique is herein privileged to share its renowned experience on
Development Cooperation and Development Effectiveness issues, from the perspective of a
national CSO.
After a short contextualization on the origins of Mozambican CSOs, the present report follows the
structure proposed in the Guidelines, with the three thematic areas on the following order: i) CSO
Enabling Environment; ii) The State of Development Cooperation, and; iii) CSO Development
In the first theme (CSO Enabling Environment), we discuss the: i) the legal and regulatory
framework; ii) the political Environment and: iii) the Socio-cultural context. In the following theme
(The State of Development Cooperation), we discuss in detail the Governance Context. The last
theme (CSO Development Effectiveness) is devoted to address the socio-economic context.
In order to comprehend how Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Mozambique interact and
engage with other actors and particularly the State, one has to understand their origins and how
they established and consolidated.
500 years of an infamously marginalizing Portuguese colonial rule, followed in 1975 by more than a
decade of a heavy-handed communist-Marxist single Party rule, belated the emergence of viable
alternative1 non-State actors or participative practices in Mozambique.

From the late 1970s up until the late 1980s, Mass Organizations serving the mobilization purposes for
the Party-State [e.g. Organizao da Juventude Moambicana (OJM), Organizao da Mulher

The Third Wave of Democratic Transitions swept through Mozambique in the early 1990s when
the cold-war driven 16-year civil strife that followed the proclamation of the countrys
independence in 1975, came to an end. Amidst an unprecedented advance of political and
economic liberalization measures, a multi-party Constitution came into force in 1990, opening the
ground not only for the first General Elections in 1994 but also institutionalizing among others, the
right to free association2, free assembly and free expression.
Under the new legislation and extensive support and incentives from the international donor
community, a flourishing associative movement found fertile conditions to define and empower
itself not only by assuming a critical role towards the State institutions and the political
establishment but also by its role in advocating for the core pluralistic values of local democracy,
participative development and citizen engagement (Biza, 2009; Loureno, 2009).
Other the hand, with the underfunded post-conflict Government still barely capable of providing
essential goods and services, significant external funding allowed a segment of the emerging CSOs
to alternatively intervene in different economic and social sectors, in a way, complementing the
State as a welfare provider.
Advocacy and Social Intervention simultaneously became the two expressions of the emerging
CSOs in the early 1990s and have since evolved to adjust to the changing reality of a country
awaking from a post-war reconstruction to rapid economic growth.


1. The Legal and Regulatory Framework in Mozambique
With the approval by the Parliament in August of the Access to Information Act, 2014 represents a
milestone in the efforts of Mozambican CSOs to push towards effective democratic participation
and citizen engagement in governance. Only now, Mozambicans can fully enjoy a guarantee (access
to public information) that was granted to them in both the Constitutions of 1990 and 2004.
Despite the persistent pressure from a Civil Society Coalition3, the project of the Access to
Information Act had been on the Parliament waiting list since 2005 and the lengthy delays in its
approval stands as a stark evidence of the incredibly slow pace of reforms in the CSOs EE.
In fact, notwithstanding recent progresses, the legal and regulatory infrastructure for CSOs in
Mozambique is still addled with a number of flaws and lacunas typical of a nascent system:
Hesitant legislation: the disposition and content of some of the legislation, raises
questions about their enforceability and effectiveness beyond the merely formal scope.

Moambicana (OMM),.], stood in the regimes rhetoric as CSOs though they couldnt fit into the
conceptual framework applied in Democracies.
The right to free association was introduced as a Constitutional guarantee in 1990 and regulated in the
so-called Associations Act a piece of legislation enacted in 1991 and applicable to all kind of
Faced with an apparently deliberate delay in the approval of the Access to Information Act, 9 CSOs
(individual organizations and platforms), decided to join efforts in a Coalition (Coligao DAI Coligao
do Direito de Acesso a Informao), in order to harmonize their actions and step-up the pressure.

E.g. 1: The newly enacted Public Probity Act is a glaring example. When it came into force in
November 2013, it was highly praised as a bold step towards the strengthening of public
transparency. However the initial triumphalism was muffled when, to the disappointment of many,
it immediately emerged that the Act still kept on a regime of confidentiality the declarations of
rights, incomes, bonds, shares or any other kind of property and assets of public servants, which
were supposed to be made public in the interest of effective public scrutiny4. In fact, some CSOs
claim, apart from being partly void of substance, the Act turns to be a direct contradiction with the
Press Act5.
E.g. 2: Amidst reiterated calls for public transparency in the on-going negotiations and Concessions
for Natural Resources exploration, a recent counter clockwise move by the Government caught
almost everyone by surprise. In August 2014, the Executive, backed by a qualified majority in the
Parliament, successfully requested a Parliamentary mandate to legislate by Decree on the
attribution of a special regime to the incoming LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) Industry.
However, decrees are by nature, government orders subject to neither Parliament debate nor
public Consultations meaning that their content is only publicly known after the legislation is
issued6. This effectively blocks the opportunity for CSOs to intervene in policy making on such critical issues.
Institutional reminiscence: the burden of the Mozambican recent history is still in a way
reflected in the character of the countrys institutions. Relations between the citizens and
the Public Administration are still strained in the context of a public bureaucracy that to
some extent mirrors the operating logic of the Party-State.
This is particularly true when it comes to Public Disclosure issues (openness, communication, and
accountability) and theres broad consensus that the further you get from the major cities (where
theres more consciousness to democratic values), the worse it gets. In other words, the forces
(more specifically the knowledgeable public) that hold the Public Administration in urban areas to
account and disclose, are still far more fragile and incipient in the rural Mozambique.
Despite the recent approval of the Right to Information Act which repealed some of the PartyState era anti-media legislation, journalists, CSOs and citizens in general, claim that there are still
considerable obstructions in access to or disclosure of public information7, limiting the space for
public advocacy initiatives and knowledgeable citizen engagement.
2. The Political Environment
Despite the recent governance reforms, the CSOs Enabling Environment (EE) in Mozambique still
resents the legacy of the over-centralized, authoritarian and profoundly alienating logic of the postindependence nation-building State the 1st Republic as described by Geffray (1990). For the
political establishment, the emergence of active CSOs understandably marks a move-away from its
comfort zone. Therefore, the markedly sluggish reforms in the CSOs EE, reflect the half4

Lei de probidade pblica com pontos que ferem a liberdade de imprensa. Available at
http://www.verdade.co.mz/destaques/democracia/34939-lei-de-probidade-publica-com-pontos-queferem-a-liberdade-de-imprensa . Accessed on 02 November 2014
CIP (2014). Concesses no mbito do LNG: Governo Insiste em Legislar sem Consulta Pblica e sem
Transparncia. Edition no. 6/2014. Maputo

hearted willingness of a conservative political Establishment to respond to the unavoidable

internal/external demands of an increasingly noisy Society8.
The still budding democratic institutions in Mozambique are struggling to take-off in a political
environment somewhat shadowed by the historic bipolarization imposed by the ruling FRELIMO
and the leading opposition party (ex-guerrilla movement) RENAMO, leading to claims that all too
often, the policy agenda debate tends to turn into an over-politicised zero-sum game between the
two former belligerents, allowing little if any room for other development actors to effectively
engage in the process. The fact that the Government, the State and the main Political Parties will
only turn or open up to CSOs when it suits them, led the 2007 CIVICUS Mozambique Country
Report, to categorically describe those relations as ones of convenient tutelage(Francisco et al,
Therefore, in the face of the challenges imposed by the political environment, the few conquests
of the Mozambican CSOs represent politically meaningful victories. That is the case for instance, of
the recent advocacy initiatives by CSOs which reaped surprisingly positive results, forcing at least
two controversial legislative projects from the Parliament to be reviewed:
In March 2014, 9 CSOs marched to the Parliament Building (Assembleia da Repblica),
demonstrating against what they denounced as blatant violations to Women and Childrens
rights in the Project of the new Mozambican Criminal Code which had been approved by
the Members of Parliament (MPs) in December 2013. At the end of the march, a Petition
listing the articles viewed by CSOs as violating Human Rights in the Project was handed to
the Parliaments Commission for Human Rights and Legal Affairs. A month later, all the
CSOs demands had been fully accommodated by the Parliament after a revision of the
In May 2014, CSOs took to the streets again to contest against the outrageously excessive
benefits/perks granted to the President and MPs in the newly enacted Presidents Rights and
Duties Act and Parliament Staff Regulation. In a country where widening social inequalities are
a growing concern, these contentious laws sparked widespread wrath and shock for
glaringly clashing not only with what is perceived as common-sense righteousness but
above all, with the fundamental principles of Justice, Equality and Equity set out by the
Constitution itself. Street Demonstrations and online campaigns called for the President
not to promulgate these law proposals. Under enormous pressure and in a last-ditch effort
to save his own and his Partys popularity ahead of Elections in October, the President
returned the law proposal to the Parliament arguing that he thought they had to be re-examined
taking into account their negative socioeconomic impact as well as their heavy financial and budgetary
Rather than mere occasional gains, for CSOs, these initiatives among others were also learning
opportunities on organizing for joint collaboration and solidarity in the context of a challenging
political environment. In fact, with the public policy debate becoming increasingly polarized, only

The latest Mozambique Civil Society Index (Mozambique CIVICUS Country Report), suggests that rather
than a genuine, effective partnership with the Civil Society, States concessions favouring CSOs EE were
all too often oriented at pleasing the international donor community or fulfilling certain conditionalities
imposed by them (Francisco et al, 2008: 25).

by mobilizing and advocating together can CSOs gain leverage in the development arena one
characterized by vested interests and powerful lobby groups, including that of the mining industry.
With the mighty extractive industry currently settling down and the debate around it just starting to
unfold, CSOs have been individually engaged on certain advocacy initiatives but theyve also been
working on a framework for joint activism. By the way, in 2010, 8 CSOs9, joined in a forum (Civil
Society Platform on Natural Resources and Extractive Industry), aimed at ensuring and promoting
a transparent, responsible and sustainable management of the countrys natural resources
envisaging the integrated well-being of the communities native to the exploration areas as well as
respect for their environment.
3. The Socio-cultural Context
Mozambican society has traditionally been characterized by rigid hierarchy structures where
questioning decisions from the top could be seen as a daring challenge to its authority. Therefore,
open bottom-up criticism if not discouraged was not stimulated in the traditional structure of our
In a way, such traditionally-grounded perceptions and power dynamics are transposed to the formal
relations between the citizens and the modern State institutions with non-alignment or
disagreement towards the official Government discourse being rather prone to be connoted to
political opposition.
This socio-cultural dimension of the Mozambican society can be pointed as a factor that has
hampered the consolidation of a critical dimension of citizenship in the country, with
straightforward implications on the robustness of CSOs.
Adding to that, a highly politicised and loyalist public media that tends to portray or explicitly
favour a one-sided perspective of the public debates, has prompted surging claims that those
[media] are hardly serving the national interest though funded through public funds. Certain
quarters of society (including opposition parties and the most outspoken CSOs and individuals), it
is claimed, stand little if any chances of exposure in the official media (AfriMAP, 2009: 15).
Nevertheless, though the national media is still overwhelmingly dominated by official channels,
independent media initiatives has emerged over the last few years, allowing the politically
uncompromised CSOs and socio-cultural institutions to also enjoy a significant publicity boost and
get their messages across.
As a result, public opinion is broadly positive about the independent media role and, more
importantly, it is increasingly informed and supportive of the advocacy initiatives of the CSOs.
Today more than ever, CSOs have the ability to mobilize people around their advocacies, as proved
in this years street demonstrations (please see relating examples in the Political Environment
However, the still flimsy adherence of CSOs to values of integrity as well internal democracy and
transparency has marred public perceptions around CSOs engagement and interventions. Theres a

IBIS, Centro de Integridade Pblica (CIP), Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Econmicos (IESE), WWF
Moambique, Observatrio sobre Meio Rural, KUWAJA JDA, Associao para Sanidade Ambiental and
Associao de Apoio e Assistncia Jurdica s Comunidades.

broad consensus within the CSOs themselves that their legitimacy depends extensively on their
performance on this front (Values - Impact)10 which is taking the most important ones to strongly
commit to transparency and accountability. GMD, MASC (Civil Society Support Mechanism) and
CIP (Public Integrity Centre)11 for instance, have clearly been an example on that regard, for
regularly making available to public access their respective Annual Reports and Accounts. With the
example set by the leading CSOs, the smaller ones are also trying to adopt such good practices of
transparency and accountability.
4. The Governance Context
Since the early 2000s and particularly following the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD), Mozambique has
been in the forefront of the implementation of the internationally-agreed aid effectiveness agenda
and consensuses. In 2004, one of the worlds largest partnerships for Budget Support provision
was set-up in Mozambique aimed at supporting the government in the implementation of the
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). By 2009, when this so-called Programme Aid Partnership (PAP) was going through its
heydays, the group comprised a total 19 Budget Support providers12. After the withdrawal of
Belgium, Spain and Netherlands, the group is now comprised of 16 Donors13, though the brand
G-19 is still widely used to refer to them.
Whereas the Eurozone financial crisis is ranked as the top reason for the exit of these 3 Donors
from G-19, fact is that their exit also comes at a time when the partnership around Budget Support
provision in Mozambique is showing signs of waning, as confirmed by a recent report
commissioned by the European Commission (EC)14.
Though the aggregate volume of Official Development Cooperation (ODA) has kept rising, Budget
Support, the aid modality that seemed to hold all the optimism and enthusiasm around the Aid
effectiveness agenda, is now falling into uncertainties. Budget Support as a share of total aid
delivered to the Government shrank from 39% in 2009 to 31% in 2013 (MPD, 2014). On the
other hand, the financial contribution of this aid modality in Mozambique is declining both as a
percentage of GDP (from a peak of 5% in 2007 to 3.1% in 2012) and share of total Public
Spending (from a soaring 18.8% in 2006 to 9.4% in 2012) (EC, 2014).
Whilst non-traditional Partners have always opted for the Project modality, G19 Partners are now
also switching-back to Projects, making it by far the most relevant modality in terms of ODA to
Mozambique. This pattern could portend a shift back to the flag-waving aid behaviour prior to the
Paris Declaration in 2005 when the bulk of aid went through donors Parallel Implementation Units


Interview Comments from individual CSOs members (07 November 2014).

A major CSO working on Anti-corruption issues.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Holland,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, Spain, Canada, the World Bank and the African
Development Bank [MPD (2013)]
These three donors are no longer full-members of the PAP but joined the USA and United Nations as
Associate Members of the group since they do not provide budget support, but they take part in
planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) processes.
European Commission (2014). Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique. Vol 1

(PIUs) that allowed for little government ownership over development initiatives and imposed
serious managerial constraints.
As the implementation deadline of the Busan Commitments in 2015 draws nearer, few indicators
are expected to make significant breakthrough (when compared to 2011), because the dwindling
share of Programme Aid (including General Budget Support) in the total volume of aid disbursed
to the Government, is likely to considerably affect the performance of other indicators, particularly
those related to the use of national Public Finance Management (PFM) systems and procedures.
Nevertheless, though the fiscal importance of Budget Support is falling, the group of Donors
providing this modality of aid (G-19/PAPs), form what is still from afar the most active and
prominent development cooperation platform in Mozambique and still hold substantial influence as
a relevant forum of policy dialogue with the Government.
Alignment of the PAP to the Paris and Busan Declarations is monitored and assessed through a
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) comprising a set of indicators for each of the key aid
effectiveness and effective development cooperation principles:
Ownership of development priorities by developing countries
Donors alignment to national priorities;
Harmonization of donor interventions;
Transparency and Mutual Accountability
However, though the Busan principles were readily embraced in Mozambique, ensuring an effective
implementation of the principle of Inclusive development partnerships is proving challenging in
face of an apparent indifference among the several Development actors (G-19 donors, the nontraditional donors, Private Sector, Civil Society and Parliament).
The most moderate analyses, describe CSOs and those other development actors as
circumstantial allies, a description that reflects the irregularity of their dialogue; with each one
them individually interacting with the Government from different platforms, none of which being
inclusive enough. Thus, with the development actors mostly focused at building exclusive bridges
with the Government, attempts at bringing them under the same Dialogue platform in the spirit of
the Busan Declaration are proving insufficient to pull some of them and particularly the nontraditional donors and Private Sector out of the sidelines15.
Good news is that Mozambican CSOs have actually been ahead of the international directives on
that regard. Though the PAP is formally an exclusive Government - G19 arrangement, a bi-annual
Government - Civil Society Dialogue forum the Development Observatory (DO), was
established within it in 2003 (before Paris and Accra), originally with the purpose of monitoring
progress in poverty reduction16. In 2008, when the world gathered in Accra to define the role of
Civil Society in the aid effectiveness agenda, the Development Observatory experience in
Mozambique had already been replicated from the Central to Provincial level (in 2005).
The Civil Society, has been tirelessly making the most of that opportunity and in 2013, it began to
use the DO as a forum of evidence-based discussion of selected government sectoral policies. Yet,
since the DO is a merely Consultive Forum and no binding mechanisms have been institutionalized

Interview to MPD Aid Coordination and Effectiveness staff (10 November 2014).
G19 attend the Development Observatory Sessions as Observers.

to ensure effective follow-up of the sessions, it is still unclear whether there has been any genuine
buy-in of those contributions by the Government of Mozambique17. In fact, the Government
stance towards criticism from SCOs (including independent think tanks) on policy issues has been
described by some as invariably defensive and unjustifiably stiff, bypassing the burgeoning public
debate of policy alternatives.
Whilst the traditional development cooperation arrangement between the Government and
[Northern/traditional] Donors (G-19) tends to be reasonably responsive to the internationallyagreed commitments on country ownership principles, sustainable development, gender equity, and
development effectiveness, the cooperation mechanisms with non-traditional Donors and Private
Sector actors are still lagging behind in spite of the Busan consensuses.
Emerging non-traditional donors have undoubtedly added value to the development cooperation
landscape in Mozambique. Yet, the perceived opacity of the lending Agreements between this
group of donors and the Government has given rise to some suspicion that certain
conditionalities associated to some of those loans could be detrimental for the national interests
in the medium and long run, including the consolidation of a culture of government transparency
and accountability. E.g., several SCOs and prominent individual activists in Mozambique have
openly expressed their discomfort at the apparently promiscuous symbioses between the local
political elite and Chinese business interests, fearing that they might actually stem from those bilateral intergovernmental agreements (Chichava, 2009).
Throughout the text, this Report presents some concrete evidence to show that development actors
in Mozambique and CSOs in particular, are individually engaged in advancing quite a number of
initiatives. However, engaging those individual actors (Government, Civil Society, G-19 Donors,
Emerging Donors, Private Sector and Parliamentarians) in a multi-stakeholder coordinated
action around common-ground issues is still a formidable challenge. Over the next few years, the
Mozambican political and policy spectrum is likely to become increasingly divisive, and that could
become an opportunity for Civil Society to take the lead in building such a platform of multistakeholder dialogue intermediation.


5. The Socioeconomic Context

GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current USA $)
Population, million a
% Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line
(% of population) a
Life Expectancy at Birth b
HDI (Score) b
HDI (Ranking) b

Literacy Rate a
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) a















* Where 2005 or 2014 data were not available, the most proximate year has been used.
Sources: a World Development Indicators 2014; b Human Development Report 2014

Interview to a leading CS representative (12 November 2014)


The average growth rate of the Mozambican economy between 2000 and 2012 was 7.5% according
to the World Bank Development Indicators 2014. Such robust growth rates compare favourably
both with the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) average (5.0%) and the Low-income Countries (LICs)
average (5.6%).
Yet, the progress was far less impressive on the poverty measures. The second generation of the
Mozambican Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARPA II) envisaged a reduction in absolute poverty
from 54% in 2005 to 45% in 2009. However, the final PARPA II assessment in 2010 revealed that
no progress had effectively been achieved and poverty incidence rate was stagnant at 54.7%.
A third generation PRS (PARP 2011 - 2014) was then introduced, aiming at cutting poverty from
54% in 2009 to 45% in 2014. With preparations for the final PARP assessment now underway,
Mozambique is still listed among the 10 poorest nations in the World (ranked as 178 among 185
countries in the 2014 HDI Report).
The paradox of a consistently brilliant macroeconomic performance and the disappointing human
development achievements have given rise to justified claims that social inequalities are on the rise,
though the HDI Reports indicate a stagnant income Gini Coefficient equalling an average of 45
from 2000 to 2012. In fact, theres actually a visibly widening gap between the increasingly opulent
elites and the poor majority which already looms as a latent threat to the social, economic and
environmental sustainability, as many experts, activists and CSOs have repeatedly warned.
The perception of widening inequalities is apparently augmented by the glaring contradiction
between the increasingly eye-catching consumption patterns of the elites and slow-changing
hardships of the poor. Now, with all the frenzy around the mining boom, popular expectations are
high [perhaps unrealistically high] and if they are not at least partially satisfied or duly managed in
the medium term, pockets of unrest could emerge particularly in urban areas.
Understandably, those fears that a large part of the population could end up sidelined and
marginalized in the mining boom, have led the focus and tone of CSOs (particularly independent
think tanks) on the issue of development inclusivity and sustainability to gain momentum.
But, Mozambique is also facing a looming macroeconomic threat that could have devastating
impacts down the line. Though the mineral resources will not bring significant domestic revenues
to Mozambique before 2020 when the first gas platforms enter full steam operations, the
Government, apparently [over] reliant on those future earnings is already making use of the
borrowing possibilities that have been opened up.
But, some CSOs are actively monitoring the debt stock progression and they have warned that
betting on nothing but [mining] prospects is a risky business. Thus, the recent moves by the
Government into the financial markets (including the relatively expensive borrowing of US$850
million invested in tuna fishing vessels and naval patrol vessels), have been at the heart of a growing
concern that the Public Debt burden could be heading onto unsustainable levels.
It is remarkable and worth noting that CSOs and particularly Grupo Moambicano da Dvida (GMD),
Instituto de Estudos Econmicos e Sociais (IESE) and Centro Terra Viva, were the first to sound the alarm
on the risk of public debt unsustainability a couple of years ago, though the alarm probably
sounded louder for the Authorities in November 2014 when the IMF Mission Assessing the


Mozambican performance under the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), called for a less
expansionary budget and a narrowing of the fiscal deficit18.



The present report concludes that amidst a challenging environment, CSOs in Mozambique have
since the early 1990s walked a long way, transforming themselves into relevant actors to be taken
into account in the development process. Though the Enabling Environment is far from perfect,
the evolving social and political conditions as well as the growing pressures of an increasingly
knowledgeable society, seems to indicate that the country will further pursue its track of reforms
oriented at allowing greater space to CSOs initiatives.
Ever since the debt cancelling initiatives in the early 2000s, Civil Society has been engaged in
Development Cooperation in Mozambique. However, the development cooperation framework in
Mozambique is still quite fragmented and interaction between CSOs and other development actors
lacks the necessary level of institutionalization tending to rather take ad-hoc shapes according to the
conveniences of the moment. If the Busan target of inclusive development partnerships is to be
met, political commitment at higher levels will be crucial.
Despite the growing complexity of the governance arena and the polarization of the policy debate,
CSOs engagement with the Mozambican effective Development agenda is showing signs of
strengthening particularly regarding policy advocacy. Over the last few years, and with the strong
support of independent media, CSOs have been strongly committed at generating an inclusive and
comprehensive public debate based on evidences. That is likely to play out positively on quality of
the public policies in the medium term.
But, if CSOs presence is keeps limited to Consultive Fora such as the Development Observatory, it
could take much longer for their proposals to be taken in (if ever effectively taken). Therefore,
CSOs have to find a way of stepping-up their leverage towards decision makers and Joint
Collaborative Action could be an important strategy on that direction since it could be able to
mobilize a wider support basis for advocacy initiatives.


IMF Press Release No. 14/502. November 05 2014. IMF Staff Concludes Review Mission to
Mozambique, Calls for Fiscal Prudence, More Inclusive Growth, and Greater Public Investment
Transparency. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14502.htm. Accessed on
November 10 2014


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