Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
l'wentieth
in the
Ce~ratury
Georg G. Iggers
n./
~/T
~V" ~w~
Chapter 8
In 1979 there appeared m Past and Fresem, whtch had been since
tts founding in 1952 the most tmportant forum m Great Britain
for discussions in history and the soctal sctences, Lawrence
Stone's essay "The Revtval of Narra tive: Reftecttons on a New
Old History."t In this now famous prece, Stone notes that n the
1970s a baste transformation took place n the way history was
viewed and written. 1)e belief central to social sctence hstory,
that "a coherent scient!ncexplanation ofch.,!gejrhe past"2 rs
possible, was widely rejecfed. Iri .its J:l~i.tllt;}J&Q.f!1.r'gt;da re,
newed interest in the most \'m:t.ed aspects of human exrstence,
~ccompanied l)y"iliecovi"tion ;;th~t ie ctiliure. f tfte group,
and even the will of the individual, are potentrally at least as
imprtant. causal agents o f change as the impersonal forces f
material output and demographc growth. "3 Ths renewed emphasis on the expenences of concrete human bengs ushered in
a retum to narra tive forms of htstory.
The tum to experience involved a criticai reexammatiOn of
scientific ratonality. Social science-oriented hstory had presupposed a postive relationshp to a modem, expanding industrial
world m which sctence and technology contributed to growth
and development. But this faith m progress and in the ctvilzaton
of the modem world has undergone a serous test since the
screntists still
I g6os. In the r gsos Amenc an htstonans and soctal
of a truly
and
spoke complacently of a national "consensus"
97
t
98
1
i
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\
classless soctety, free from deeper social conflicts, wluch distinguished Amenca, past and present, from Europc:. John Kenm:th
Galbrath 111 1958 publshed The Aff/uew Sooely. _,As we alrc"dy
menttoned, Damel Bell's The Ell(/ of ldeology appeared m
rg6o,5 followed in 1962 by Michacl Harnngton's The Otiter
Amenca. whtch focused on those segments of the Americ:an
populatton, the poor, Whte and Black, who had been exclucled
from the aflluence and did not share m the consensus. In the
United States the previously hdden tenstons in the socety carne
to the fore m full force wtth the civil disobeclience movemen: of
the early 196os and the bloody upnsngs m the ghettos 111 the
second half of that decade. The Yietnam War then divtded
Americans as profoundly as the Algerian War had divtded the
French a few years earlier. But the opposttion to the war went
beyond purely polittcai tssues. The conllicts of the sccond half of
the rq6os, tnggered m the United States by the confltcts about
civil ~ghts and about the Vietnam War, [ocused not only on
cnttctsm of existmg poltica! and socml condillons, but also on
the quality o[ life m a highly mdustnalized society. The fatth m
progress and sctence, wluch was basic not only to the quamttatve New Economtc history but also to Marxtsm, became mcr,asmgly problematic in vtew of the dangers and the brutality wLth
which tcchnology transformed the mdustnal countnes and affected the developmg nattons.
lt 1s important to realize that the student movement o f the late
rg6os m Berkeley, Pans, Berlin, and Prague turned agamsi l>oth
caoitalism in the West anel the Sovtet form of Marxtsm. Thts ts
m{portant for the developments within historiography if one ts to
understand why netther the usual social-sctetllific models nor
historical materialism could continue to be Oonvmcmg. Both
start from macrohistorcal and macrosocietal conceptiOn~ for
which the st: te, the market, or for Marxtsm the class, are central
concepts. In )oth, the firm belief in the possibility and ~estrabil
tty o f sctentit:oally steered growth ts taken for granted. 1 hc focus
on soctal stn. 'tures and social processes, shared by orthodox
soctal science c nd orthodox Marxism, left litlle roam for tl10se
segments of the populatton who had prev10usly been negkcted
and who now clatmed an tdentity and a history of thetr Jwn.
Moreover, both soctal sctence and Marxist htstoriognphy
99
showed little interest m the exstenttal aspects of everyday lifetts matenal, but also its emottonal side, Its hopes and fears.
A pesstmtsttc vtew regarding the course and quality of modem Western civilizatton occupted a central place in muc'1 of the
"New Cultural History." This new history mamtamed a paradoxtcal relationshtp to Ivlarxtsm. It shared the Marxtst vtew regarding the emancipatory functiOn of htstonography; but tt
understood the constramts from wluch men and women were to
be emanctpated quite differently from classcal Marxtsts. The
sources of explmtatton and dommation were not to be found
primarily n nsttutwnalized structures, m polit1cs or in the
eonomy, but more tmportantly in the many mterpersonal relatons m whtch human bemgs exert power over others. Gender
thus also assumed a new anel stgnificant role. Foucault in an
tmportant sense replaced Marx as the analyst of power and of its
relation to knowledge.
One key questton ratsed by Stone was whether and m what
way history could or should understand 1tself as a sctence. Not
only social sctence-oriented htstonography, but also the older
traditon of criticai histoncal research as tt had developed Wtth
Ranke in the mneteenth-cenrury umvers!les viewed h1story as a
science, However, for the latter sctence had had a different
meamng. lt involved the repudiatton of the postttvism of the
analytical socal sciences and emphaszed the distinction between the human or cultural scences (Gewesw1ssenschaften)
and the natural sciences. It nevertheless adhered to a concept of
science and vtewed history as a scentfic disctpline. Hence m
Germany the term Gesc/uchwwssenschaft (historical sctence)
replaced the term Geschtclllsschreibung (the wntmg of history)
to describe what professtonal htstonans were doing. The concept
science here involved the centrality of a logtc of inqury that set
rigorous methodologtcal guidelines for obtaming obJective
knowledge. While stressng the role of empathy in htstoncal
understanding, wh1ch mvolvecl the subjectivity o f the historiao,
this school of htstoncal scholarship nevertheless had postted a
clear line o f distmction between htstorical scholarship and imagina tive literature. lt should, however, be stressed that this distinction between analysts and narration was frequently not adhered
to. Georges Duby in The Legend of Bouvtnes' and Jacques Le
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The
ChO:~enge
of Postmodernism
Chapter 9
lncreasmgly m the 1970s and rg8os histon ans not only m the
es,
West, but in some cases also in the Eastern Europ ean countn
The
.
history
e
began to quest1on lhe assumptons of social scienc
its
key to the worldview o f socwl science h1story, as seen by
1ts
In
force.
e
cntics, was the belief in modernization as a positiv
's
rnost radical form this belief was voiced in Francis Fukuyama
a
that
1989 essay "The End of History,"I wh1ch proclmmed
t
modem technologJcal society based on capitalist free rnarke
institu
principies accompanied by representa tive parliarnentary
tions signified the achievement of a ratJOnal arder o f things as the
e,
outcom e of histoncal development. A good dealle ss sangum
,
other social scienc e-onen ted historians such as J rgen Kocka
heaware of the destructive aspects of rnodern societies, nevert
ter
lcss expressed their confidence m the overall posttive charac
dehighly
a
and
y
econom
t
rnarke
a
by
where
n,
of modermzatio
al
veloped technology would be coupled w1th democral!c polil!c
culand
,
justice
socwl
s,
libertie
civil
teemg
mstltutions guaran
of
tural pluralism.2 For Kocka the collapse both of Nazism and
the Marxist-Lemnist systems m Easter n Europ e and the Sov1et
l
Uruon seemed 10 confirm ti11S pomt. A key function of a cntica
tc
htstorical socml sctcnce was, m hts vtew, to pomt at the atavtst
aspects of socwl orders m the twenu eth century that stood m the
in
way of a truly modem socwty, as Wehler and he had dane
their analysis of Germa n society before I945
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For Carla Ginzburg and Carlo Pom, two of the most rmpor
tant representalives of mrcrohrstory m ltaly, the key rcason for
the decline of macrohistoncal conceptrons and with them o:
social scrence approaches to hrstory was to be found m the loS<.
of faith m JUSt this optrmrstrc vrew of the beneficral soem! anel
politrcal fruits of technological progress.J The arguments madt:
agamst macrohistorical socral scence approaches, whrch m
cluded Marx1sm, were based on poliucal and ethrcal grounds
even more than on methodologrcal ones, although, as we shall
see, the Italian school in part1cular subJCCted the baste assump
t1ons of socal sc1ence history to a searchmg methodolog!cal
critique. A key objeclion to lhe sacra! scenco conceptron ofa
world hrstorcal process characterized by modernzalion was, m
therr view. the human cost. Th1s process, they argued, has un
leashed not only rmmense productve forces but also devastating
destruclive energies that are inseparably linked with them.
Moreover, it has taken place, so to say, behnd the backs of
people, primarily "little people," who had been neglected as
much m social 'crence-oriented history as they had been in the
convenlional p<litical history that focused on lhe high and
mighty. History nust turn to the condit1ons of everyday life a;
they are experien:ed by common people. But the knd o f lustorJ
of everyday life th~t Fernand Braudel had offered in the 196o;
and 1970s m The Strucwres of Everyday Lif<?' for them 1mssed
the pomt by attending to matenal conditons v11thout exammmg
how these condittons were expenenced.
We have already pointed to the role that politlcal belief;
played not only m the scholarship of the older school of polittcal
historiography but also in more recent forms of o;ocal Iustor1
and, of course, in Marxism. They play the same role, and perhap;
a more readily apparent one n the new microhistoncal ,.tudie;
of everyday life. lt s not coincidental that in ltaly many histori
aos, like many of their Brtish colleagues, began as professed
Marxrsts and then moved in directtons that challenged the basi o
macrohistorical conceptions of Marxism. The subect matter of
h1storical studies moved, for the historians of everyday life, from
what they call the "center" of power to the "margrns," to th'
many, and the many are for them ovenvhelmingly the disadvan
taged and the exploited. This stress on disadvantage and expiai-
103
Ginzburg's Tlze Clzeese and the Worms: 11le Cosmos of a Sixteemh-Cemury Miller (1975),14 in all of wluch religion occupies
an important place, in Davis's case with a strong focus on gender.
There is no reason why a htstory dealing with broad soc1al
transfom1ations and one centeiing on mdividual extstences cannot cooex1st and supplement each other. lt should be the task of
lhe h1storian to explore the connecttons berween these two kvels
of hisloncal experience. Nevertheless a vigorous debate took
place m the 198os in Germany between advocates of a social
sctence history, who called for strct conceptual and analytical
guidelines, and lhe champ1ons of everyday h1story, for whom
these oouidelines meant the death lmell for lived experiences,
.
wh1ch they ardently believed should be the true subject matter
of historv.15 In a crucial arttcle, "Missionanes in the Row
Boat"(r9S4)I6 Hans Medick soughtto stake outthe baste positions of everyday history. For this history, cultural anthropology
as it was represented in the seventies antl etghties by Clifford
Geertz served as a model for histoncal research. This scnnotlc
approach is pursued in Geertz's conception of a "thu:k de"criptiOn, "17 which means an immediate confrontatlon wtth an other.
lOS
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11 O The Challenge of Postmodernism
tiOn that preceded that of professionalized histonography, nucrostorw mtroduces a narralive in which lhe histonan transmiiS
his/her findings but also hts/her procedure. "In nucrolustory ... the researcher's pomt of VieW becomes an mtrmsic
part of the account."J7 The narrative. becomes importanl for
the presentation of the histonan's findmgs beca use lt can communcate elements that cannot be conveyed m abstract Jorm
and beca use il shows the process by wluch the lustonan arrives
at his/her account.
Yet desplte these limtal!ons placed on obJeCtiVIly, m:croswna shares severa! basic assumptions With older social science
that serve to distmgmsh lt from Foucault's and Geenzs approaches. For Foucault, Edward M~1r notes, "theories cannot
be verified because standards of venficatwn come trom a modem scientific disctpline that makes the past conform to the present. Correctness means conformtly to an order of thmgs that
has been defined by a disctpline or an insntution." 35 For Gmzburg and Levi tlus iS "an evasion. Correctness must be determined by the concrete, phystcally real evidence the past
presents us. "39 !Vlicrostona does not reJect the empmcal soctal
sctences m toto, but stresses the methodological need of te;tmg
thetr con,tructs agamst existing reality on a small scale. lt quesuons Geertz's approach to culture on stmilar grounds. De;pite
Geertzs claim that he deals wtth a world on a small scale. he
adheres to a macrosoc1al concepHon of a culture as an mtegrated system, a whole. As Levi notes: "lt seems to me that
one of the main differences m perspecuve between mtcr-Jhistory and mterpretive anthropology ts that the latter sees " ho-
111
(1985). These books have much in common and yet are very
dtfferent m thetr conceptual and narrative approaches. Ginzburg's book has become a classtc, perhaps also because it reads so
well and confronts us Wtth a very rich individual. Levi's exorctst 1s
much more deeply embedded m social structures and the text 1s
more analytical. Both books share the general characteristtcs of
nucrostoria, the concentration on an mdivduaJ in a oiven localitv
and the attempt to stress the difference of thts ve.;'tocal settmg
from a larger norm. In both there IS a careful reconstruction of
the social and politcal setting, wtth the focus agan on the local
rather than on a broa der transregionallevel. And yet Ginzburg's
approach to hts protagomst, Menocchio, is much more hermeneutc than Levi's. The pnmary focus is on Menocch10's mental
world. And the way mto hts nund ts through the texts he reads.
Reading is not an impersonal process by which meanngs are
commumcated: rather the wntings of elite mmds enter mto the
mind ofthe peasant miller through the pnsm of a popular culture.
In turn Ginzburg's own imagmation is Vital m the reconstructton
of Menocchio's thought processes. The narra tive ts mterrupted
by the presentation of the investiga tive strategies of the author.
Levi's concern is much more social sctentific, to test or correct
established hypotheses. There are frequent passages spelling out
hypotheses to be confirmed. A central concern is the pattern of
power relationshps in the village. These cannot be understood in
terms of economic factors or formal political mst1tut10ns. Levi
questions the extent to which tmpersonal forces of the market
and the development of a modem state machmery determmed
these power relationships. He argues that the dectsive element in
the understanding o f the peasant world was "the preservat10n o r
transrmss10n of mtangible or symbolic goods: power and prestige. "42 To establish his pomt, he resorts to the sources and methods used by more traditwnal socml history, a prosopography that
rehes on pansh registers, notarial acts, data from land-tax surveys, and other admmstrative documents to reconstruct the lives
of the persons exorc1sed by Chiesa and their social settmg. H e
also relates data on iand sales to data on the const1tut10n of
families und inhentance to demonstra te that m the place of the
blind market of classical economics there operated in the village
a complex market in wh1ch socwl and personal relallonships,
lI
-~
involving family strategies, played a determining raie in establishing the pnce IeveL The peasant commumty of the village of
Santena thus 1s not merely the pass1ve obJeCt of macrosocml
changes but has a dist111ctive npuL Finally the dyllc image o' a
highly cohesive peasant society free of conflicts collapses 111 tl1e
course of this analyss.
Thus wc see again in the work of the ltalian rnicrohistonans,
partcularly Levi, as we saw with the Gtting en group, rhat nucrohistory ts an extension and not a repudiation o f older soctal
science history, a rediscovery of culture and the mdvtduahty of
persons and small groups as agents of hi~torical change. Nevertheless the soc1eties and cultures to wh1ch 1111crohlstoncal a pproaches are applicable appear to have both spattal and
tempora llimns. The charge that mcrolustonans examme small
eommuntlles with Iittle or no reference to a broader context ts
not JUStificd, at least not in the works we have exam111cd. Thne
have been no comparable histoncal studies, however, of modem
urban communlles, although work in urban anthropology lcas
been dane. Ali of the works we have discussed deal with a
premdustral world or with the transttion of thts world in to the
early stages of industrialization. In part tt was posstble to deal
with villages like Neckarhausen4J or Santena because they wne
retativety self-comained and self-suffic1ent even if they could not
fully escape the tmpact of state admimstrat1on ando f the markeL
Todav Neckarhausen has become in large parta dormttory town
whos~ populat ion commutes to employment or busmess act!VIlies in large population centers.
.
.
There s an obvious conflict between cenam of the theoretH:al
statemerns of the mcrohistonam. and their actual research and
writing. They rightly stress the discontmutws wltlun luswry and
deduce from them that no grand narrauve IS possrble. But they
operate wth a Jargely negalive evaluation of modenu zarwn.
Although they find conflicts and divisons m the premod em
commumtres they study, they regard the1r pa;smg Wtth a certHm
degree of nostalgm. That 1s, they rurn to nucrohlstoncal communities not simply because the sources exist to study them nucrohtstoncally, but also beca use of acertam dislike for the modem
world. Manv Annales historians may have b~en sunilarly mcllvated to tur~ to the medieval or early modem world. In a num-
113
115
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Chapter 10
11'.
l!on Wtth the sources can, to be sure, discover facts, but any step
beyond thts toward the constructiOn of a historical account s
determined, for White, by aesthettc and ethtcal, not by scientific
considerations. Form and content, he argues, cannot be separated m histoncal wntmg. Historians, he contmues, have at thetr
disposal a limtted number of rhetonca l possibilittes that predetermme the form and to acertam extent also the content of ther
account so that, as we saw, "historical narratives are verbal
fictions, the contents of which are as much mvented asfound and
the forms ofwhich have morem common with thetr counterp arts
m literature than they have with those in the sciences. "3
Here White goes far beyond a traditon of historical thought
that, from Herodotu s to Natalie Davts, recogmzed both the literary aspects of htstoncal accounts and the role of imagmatiOn in
constructng them, but nevertheless maintaned a faith that these
accounts offered ins1ghts mto a real past mvolvmg real human
beings. Natalie Da vis frankly admttted that inventiOn occupies a
cructal place m the reconstructton of the past, but she also msisted
that this mvention 1s not the arbitrary creatton ofthe hstonan but
follows the "voices of the past" as they speak to us through the
sources.4 Ranke stmilarly recogmzed the role of tmagination m
reconstrucng the thought processes of his hstoncal actors.
There ts therefore a difference between a theory that demes
any clmm to reality in histoncai accounts and a histonography
that tS fully consctous of the complexity of htstoncal knowledge
but still assumes that real people had real thoughts and feelings
that ied to real acl!ons that, wtthm limtts, can be known and
reconstructed. To be sure, as Patnck Bahners put It, sctence smce
Kant has possessed no "matena l critera o f truth."5 But Kant and
subsequent scientific and social scentific thought, including that
of Max Weber, still assumed that there existed a logic of
sctentific nquiry, which could be commumcated and which,
while not providing material cntena, offered formal standards
for the exammatiOn of the world o f nature and of men. B ut even
these cntena have been questiOned by some contemp orary theorists o f science.
Among modem and contemporary theonsts of sctence who
have challenged the notion that scientific inqUiry leads to a progressive understanding of reality, one must distingush between
120
radical skepttcs such as Gaston Bachelard6 and Paul Fcy=rabend7 on the one hand. and historical relativists such as Thomas
Kuhn on the other. Bachelard and Feyerabend understand sctence as a poettc activity for which there is no bmding logt: or
method of inqmry. In The Structure of Sciemific Revo/w,ons
(rg6o)B Kuhn toa argued thatsctence cannot be under>tood as a
refiect!on of an objecttve world. He did no! regard it as fictton,
however, but as a htstorically and culturally conditioned discourse among people who are in agreement about the rules that
govern the1r discourse. For hm science is an instttutional'zed
form of scientfic inqmry, a way of dealing wtth reality tn a
scientific community, whose members agree in regard to strategies of invesl!gaton and explanaton. Thus Kuhn also quest1ons
the relatonslup of sctence to reality, but he does not, as do
Bachelard and Feyerabend, question the possibility of a ratwnal
scientific discourse.
The question of the relationship between knowiedge and reality also plays a central role in lingutste theory. Modem sCience
has understood language as a vehicle for the transmJssion of
meamngful knowiedge. Log1cal positivism, as 1t origmated in the
Vienna circle in the 1930s and then played an 1mportant role in
Anglo-Amencan analyt1cal philosophy, strove for a langLage
cleansed of ali contradictiOns and culturally condit10ned arnbiguities, capable of commumcatmg log1cal concepts and the results of scientific inquiry. Structuralism subsequently questtoned
preeisely this referential function of language.
For language theory as It was formulated by the Sw1ss lin&.mst
Ferdinand de Saussure in Course in General Linguistics,q w~1ich
appeared posthumously n rgr6. two related 1deas were bas1c:
Language forms a closed autonomous system that possess=s a
syntactc structure. Moreover. 1anguage is not a mean~ for com-
121
1950s and 196os in the "New Cnttcism" in the Umted States, and
separately in the discussions m France mitated by Roland
Barthes and leading to the deconstructiomst method of Jacques
Dernda.IO From the perspective of language theory, the text has
no reference to an externai reality, but is contained Withm Jtself.
This is true not only of literary but also o f htstoriographical texts.
Since texts do not refer to reality, Barthes argues, there IS no
difference between truth and fiction.ll The text, moreover, is
seen not only mdependently of its relat1on to the externai world,
but also independently of its author. What matters is exclusively
the text, not the context in which !l originated. The next step,
undertaken by Michel Foucault, s to elimmate the author as a
relevant factor in the production of texts. And as the author
disappears, ntentionality and meaning also disappear from the
text. For Foucault, history therefore !ases its significance. lt is a
late invention of Western man in what he calls the "classical"
phase of modem history, a phase that has already passed. lt
seems paradoxical that so much ofFoucault's writmgs, ch1efly h1s
works about msamty, the clinics, punishment, and sexualty, but
also his major theoretical presentations, The Archeoiogy of
Knowledge and The Order o{ Thmgs, nevertheless refiect a thoroughly hstorical perspective.
Foucault and Derrida's cntiCism JS directed agamst the Jdeological presuppos1tions that are hidden in every text. The text,
they argue, must therefore be Iiberated from its author. At the
same time they radicalize de Saussure's concept1on of Ianguage.
For de Saussure, language still possessed a structure; it constituted a system. There still existed a unity between the word
(signifier) and the thing to wh1ch 1! referred (s1gnified). For Derrida, this unity no tanger exists. Instead he sees an mfinite number of signifiers wthout clear meanmgs, because there IS no
Arch1medean point from which a clear meanmg can be ass1gned.
For historiography this means a world Without meanng, devoid
of human actors, human volitons or intentions, and totally lacking coherence.
Therefore, if history will be written in the future, it will have
to take on completely different forms. This theme s taken up
m Amercan discussiOns of the nature of historical prose. For
Hayden White, as we saw, hstonography must today be seen as
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124
Weberian noilon of the "ideal type" does not nega te but racher
presupposes the notion that there are real social structures and
processes that form the subject of social scientific mquir). It
recogmzes that a purely emprica! approach s not possi ble:
nevertheless It assumes that one can approach social reality
by tesung the "ideal types" against emprica! findings. For
Weber, moreover, social science studies the macrohistoncal and
macrosocal structures and processes that form societies. This
emphasis on clear concepts anel explict theones, as we saw,
forms the basis of a great deai of social science-oriented rhou >ht
including the German school of "Historcal Social Scienc'of
Hans-Ulnch Wehler and Jrgen Kocka, wluch cultural histonans mcreasmgly reJect as objectivistic.
Despte his invocation of Weber, Geertz thus goes in a totally
different directon. What anthropologists do, he tells us, 'is
not a matter of methods" but of "thck descnption." Thick clescnptwn as an alternatve to method rests on a conception of
culture that Geertz defines as "semiotic. "IS From this perspechve, a culture possesses the charactenstics of a language ar.d,
hke a Ianguage, cons!Itutes a "system." Ths makes interpretaton possible because each act and each expression has a syrnbolic value that retlects the culture as a whole. Thick descnptwn
mvolves the direct confrontation with the syrnbolic expressions
of the culture free of any theory-guided questions that, by
means of abstrac!Ions, threaten to depnve the manifestauons of
the culture of their vitality. On the surface there thus appears
to be a Similanty between the anthropological confrontaticn
wth the subject of study through thick description and the he.:meneutic approach of classical historicism, which seeks to "understand" Its subject free of abstractions. But this simildritv :s
deceptive. HermeneutJcs assumes there is a common gro~nj
between the c:bserver and the cbserved that makes understanding possib'e. Geertz on the contrary views the subject h~
observes as tota\ly different. To reduce the subjeet to terms w~
can understand }eans to distort It rather than grasp I! m Its
otherness.
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126
127
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131
reality :s 'merel y' a text, but rather that reality can only
be
attnmed through language. So social and poliucal stn.Ictures
aren t demeci, rather they must be studi.:d through thelf lingurs
uc aruculatron. And Derrid a rs useful for such a swdy. , .
""
Except for the recourse to Dernda tlus !S a perspecttve
not
essenttally differe nt from that of Stedm an Jones, whom sne cntrctzes. As a matter of fac!, in her studies of the role of teadin
g
women who represented a feminist vicwpomt m the revolu
tionary .movements rn France ,' 9 Scott assrgns a role to Janguage very
stmrlar to that assrgned by Sewell and Stedrnan Jones.
In conclusron: Lnguisnc theory, as rt has been dcvelo ped
m
Frcnch literary theory from Barthe s to Dernd a and Lyorar
d,
contains an elemen t that in my opuuon must be tah.n
verv
senously and that has applicat10ns to lusloncal thouoht and wntmg. The partcrpants in this discussion have nghtl~ ra";ed
the
point tha . hrstory taken as a whole conlam s no imman ent unity
o r coher< nce, that every concept10n o f hrstory is a constr
uct
constl tutd' through language, that human bemgs as subjec
ts
have no m.egra ted personality free of contradictlons and ambivalences, hld that every text can be reacl and mterpr;ted
m
dtffere nt ways because it expresses no unambrguous mtentlons.
Fouca ult and Dernd a have wrth good JUStification pomle d
out
the political implications of language and thc luerarchtcal relatrons of power mhere nt in rt. These contradictions, wluch perme
ate ali of human life, force lhe observ er to "decon struct" every
text, morde r to lay bare tts ideologtcal elements. Every reality
rs
not only comm umcat ed lhrough speech anel discourse bJt
rn a
very fundam ental way ts also constt tuted by them.
Never theless thts philosophy of Janguage lends rtself beller to
literary cnttcis m than to historcal wntmg . For illstorcal
accounts, even if they use forms of narrattve that are closely
patterned on lterar y models, still clmm to portra y o r reconstt uct
an
actual past to a greate r extent than rs the case in ficlron alliter
a-
'
I
Chapter I!
'
'I
''
i
i
I
I
lo
!
135
'-!
'
'
136
137
.
r
.
h'
J~
j
Januar y 1994 the JOurnal dropp ed lts subtltle Economws. Socits. Civilatwns, wh1ch it had used since the immediate postwar period, and rep!aced it by Hist01re, Sete/Ices Socwles. The
its
change in mune was the result of intense discuss1ons among
Januthe
111
a!
editors snce the late 198os. reftected m an editon
ary-February 1ssue of 1994 announcing the chang e.' An Important editorial in 1988 had a!ready suggested that h1story and the
of
social scences were entering nto a deep crs1s.s The change
a!
politic
name, however. demon strated an awareness that the
years.
and social conditions had changed fundamentally m recent
The subtitle Econonues. Socits. Civilisat/0/IS had consc10usly
11
elimnated politics as a prime concern of history and With
modowngraded the role o f narratves. Now m the face of the
mento us changes at the end of the rg8os, polil!cs was rediscovered and with t the role of personalites. The new title was
of
intend ed to mciude politics once more. And in the realm
politiCS, as FranoiS Furet' s reapprmsa! o f the Frend1 Revolutiou
mdicated, Ideas and persons again p!ayed a deciSIVe role. The
Annales in choosmg the new tltle by no means intended to exclude societv and cu!ture from lustoncal consideration, but
w1shed rath;.r lo reestablish the poltica! context in which they
\occurred. They now wished to pay greate r attenti on to presell
the
and
h1story
en
betwe
nslup
relatio
dose
day problems. The
social sc1ences was to remam, but econom1cs, ';ocw!ogy, anj
poltica! sc1ence were to regain the position they had los\ m the
to
post-Wor!d War li Annales, which did not mean a relurn
abwnh
g
workm
ics
econom
to
nor
hstory
oldtime diplomatic
stract models separa ted from a broade r poltica! anel social con.
text. The Annales 1ssues of the 1990s reOected th1s reonentatio:J
n
pl&yed
aiso
ti
tia
which
wor!d,
porary
Problems o f the contem
t
important role in the journal in lhe I930S, r~surfaced. Recen
139
lll
\'Yas
di :tcy o f historcal knowiedge was demed; this, however,
's
ncthing new but went back at least to Kant. Hayde n Whte
thus
and
form
Ve
narrati
a
ed
asserllon that h1story always assum
shared the qualities of literary texts, was generally accepted, but
140
Concluding Remarks
141
!i
li
!i
"n