(Re-) Constructing the Self

Matthew MacKenzie
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Colorado State University
DRAFT-Please do not quote
(See published version in Journal of Consciousness Studies 23/1-2, 2016)
Introduction
Diversity and disagreement about the very idea of the self is a persistent feature
of contemporary discussions of self and self-consciousness in philosophy, psychology,
and neuroscience. Is the self merely a metaphysical or theoretical posit? Or is it a
manifest feature of human consciousness? Perhaps it is a social construct or a convenient
fiction. Or maybe it is the content of a subconscious self-representation. Drawing on
contemplative discourses and practices, while undoubtedly enriching our understanding,
further complicates matters. Some contemplative and philosophical traditions of India,
for instance, would agree with A. H. Almaas that, the ordinary self, [i.e.] seeing oneself
as an entity with independent existence, agency and ownership, is the primary obstacle to
spiritual enlightenment, and is the repository of human suffering, misery and ignorance
(Almaas, this volume, p. 2). And yet, Hindu thinkers, while rejecting the ordinary self
(jva), vigorously defended the existence of the self (tman) as an enduring locus of
consciousness. In contrast, Buddhist thinkers argue that there is no self (antman) in
either the ordinary or the metaphysical sense.1
Given this diversity and disagreement, proper study of self and self-consciousness
must be interdisciplinary and multi-perspectival. It must be interdisciplinary in the
traditional sense of drawing on multiple academic fields and modes of inquiry. It must be
multi-perspectival in that the study of the self must draw on disciplined modes of third-,
second-, and first-person inquiry. I take these perspectives to be distinct and irreducible,
though hopefully complementary, modes of inquiry. In my view, both contemplative
traditions and philosophical phenomenology offer valuable modes of first-person (and
second-person) inquiry. Yet, in the case of the contemplative traditions, first-person
inquiry takes place with a larger context of self-transformation. Hence, contemplative
traditions take attention, awareness, emotion regulation, and so on, to be trainable aspects
of mind (Thompson, 2006) and take human self-experience to be multivalent, variable,
and transformable. Indeed, the investigation, transformation, and transcendence of
ordinary forms of self-experience2 is a central theme of Indian contemplative traditions.
In what follows I will take up the complex dialectic between self and selflessness
as raised in the target papers of this issue and in classical Buddhist thought. I will discuss
the classical Buddhist view that the recognition that the self is constructed can lead, in the
right theoretical and practical context, to (i) the deconstruction of fixed views of self, (ii)
the decentering of self-experience within a larger horizon of awareness, and (iii) the
reconstruction of a more fluid (sense of) self as a skillful means to cultivating and
embodying wisdom and compassion.
Self and Selflessness

1
2

I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on this article.
By self-experience here I mean both the various forms of self-consciousness and the sense of self.

Whether or not they affirm, in the final analysis, the existence of a self, the
authors of the target papers recognize that the relationships between experiences of self
and selflessness are complex and multivalent. Human modes of self-experience are
intertwined with the whole range of basic psychological processes, including bodily
experience, affect, emotion, perception, memory, motivation, and cognition. Further,
evidence from psychopathology, as well as from contemplative experience, shows that
several key aspects of self-experience (such as a ownership, agency, and sense of reality)
are dissociable (Parnas and Gallagher (in press), Lutz, Dunn, and Davidson, 2007). So, in
so far as contemplative training modifies or even radically transforms normal selfexperience, it is important to keep track of which aspects of self-experience are being
transformed and what the implications of the transformation might be for our more
general understanding of self and self-consciousness. The selflesness of a flow state, for
instance, may involve a diminishment of certain forms of reflective self-consciousness
combined with a heightened sense of agency. In contrast, the discovery of the true self
in an experience of pure consciousness may involve the radical modification of
ownership, agency, and reflective self-consciousness (Shear and Jevning 1999). And
finally, the selflessness of a Buddha, one hopes, is quite different from that of a person
suffering from a depersonalization disorder such as Cotards syndrome. What counts as
an experience of self or of selflessness, then, will depend on both ones background
account of the self and on what aspects of the experience are modified.
As for the background account of the self that Ill be working with here, I take
my lead both from the classical Buddhist tradition and from some contemporary
philosophical accounts. Galen Strawson provides a clear and plausible characterization of
our normal notion of a self. He writes,
I propose that the mental self is ordinarily conceived or experienced as:
(1) a thing, in some robust sense
(2) a mental thing, in some sense
(3,4) a single thing that is single both synchronically considered
and diachronically considered
(5) ontically distinct from all other things
(6) a subject of experience, a conscious feeler and thinker
(7) an agent
(8) a thing that has a certain character or personality. (Strawson,
1999, p. 3)
This view of the self fits well with the classical Buddhist account. As Miri Albahari puts
it:
A self is defined as a bounded, happiness-seeking/dukkha [suffering]avoiding (witnessing) subject that is a personal owner and controlling
agent, and which is unified and unconstructed, with unbroken and
invariable presence from one moment to the next, as well as with longerterm endurance and invariability. (Albahari, 2006, p. 73)
It is also similar to Almaas characterization of the ordinary self as involving a sense of
independent existence, ownership, and agency. In addition, the self in the above sense
would also serve to individuate the person or sentient being synchronically and

diachronically, in what I take to be Roberts (this volume) notion of individuation. It is

distinct, however, from Adyashantis notion of self as witness. The view of the self a pure
witness (skin) distinct from the body, changing mental contents, and even the
personality has its roots in the contemplative traditions of classical Yoga and Advaita
Vednta.
Classical Buddhist thinkers, of course, were proponents of antmavda, the view
of no-self. That is, they denied (and vigorously argued against) the existence of the self
in the above sense. While there are complex psychophysical systems with a sense of self,
there is notand never has beenany such entity as a self.3 There are three paradigmatic
features of Buddhist anti-realism about the self. First is the rejection the existence of the
self as a substance or enduring entity. There are causally and functionally integrated
psychological processes, but there is no self at the center. Second is the denial that the
sense of self is a necessary and invariant feature of experience. The sense of self is rather
a variable construct. Third is the view that the sense of self, no matter how natural it
seems, necessarily involves some kind of error, illusion, or distortion. That is, the sense
of self leads to mistaking the ontologically selfless flow of experience for the existence of
a self. Hence, the anti-realist about the self must develop an ontology and
phenomenology of experienceincluding self-experiencethat does not rely on the
existence of the self. Below I will discuss one such Buddhist model, drawn from the
Yogcra school.
Deconstructing the self
While Buddhist philosophers argue deftly against the existence of the self on
ontological and epistemological grounds, the fundamental motivation for anti-realism
about the self is deeper. On the Buddhist analysis, our innate tendencies toward affective
and conative distortions such as craving and attachment drive a vicious cycle of
frustration, suffering, and alienation (sasra). The root cause of these distortions is the
innate tendency to reify self (tmadi) and world. This deep-seated self-grasping
(tmagraha) seems to be what Adyashanti (this volume) is referring to as egoic
consciousness. The eighth century Buddhist philosopher, ntideva, gives a striking and
memorable characterization of the sasric predicament of sentient beings: Hoping to
escape suffering, it is to suffering that they run. In the desire for happiness, out of
delusion, they destroy their own happiness, like an enemy (ntideva, 1996, p. 7).
Sasra here is a kind of existential catch-22, a mode of psychological functioning
wherein our attempts to attain happiness and avoid suffering are self-defeating. The three
poisons of craving, aversion, and delusion are dysfunctional forms of our basic impulses
of attraction, aversion, and indifference, on the basis of which we respond to changing
circumstances, seeking happiness and avoiding suffering. Because these basic forms of
reaction are distorted or dysfunctional, as long as we are bound to them, our attempts to
secure the lasting happiness we desire are doomed to fail.
On the Buddhist account, then, the most fundamental form of cognitive distortion
is the sense that one is a fixed, enduring self and the self-centeredness and self-cherishing

3

Indeed, one source of conceptual and terminological confusion about the existence of the self is that many
in the contemporary discussion hold a thin conception of self, whereby the existence of a self just consists
in the existence of a relatively stable sense of self. The Buddhists, of course, dont deny this. What they
deny is that there is any stable, enduring entity that is the self.

that go along with this sense. The path to liberation must involve deconstructing and
overcoming the view of the self that is the lynchpin of sasra. The deconstruction of
the reified sense of self involves first-, second-, and third-person methods. Third-person
methods include contemplating and internalizing philosophical arguments against the
existence of the self, recognition of the impermanent and conditioned nature of
phenomena, and the analysis of the sentient being into the five complexes (skandhas) of
bodily form, affect, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. On my
interpretation, the function of these third-person methods is to gain insight into the nature
of phenomena. One comes to see sentient beings, not as enduring mental subjects, owners,
and agents, but as complex conditioned networks of mental and physical processes.
Second person methods of deconstructing the self include displacing reactive
attitudes such as blame and the attendant afflictive emotions such as anger, as well as
cultivating interpersonal empathy and compassion. For instance, in discussing the
cultivation of patience (knti), ntideva states, Whatever transgressions and evil deeds
of various kinds there are, all arise through the power of conditioning factors [saskras],
while there is nothing that arises independently. . . Therefore, even if one sees a friend or
an enemy behaving badly, one can reflect that there are specific conditioning factors that
determine this, and thereby remain happy (ntideva, 1996, p. 53). By shifting away
from the default interpersonal perspective of praise and blame one is able to see that the
other, just like oneself, is conditioned by craving, aversion, and delusion. Indeed, in this
same section, he deploys rather technical Buddhist arguments against the existence of the
self in order to further undermine the idea that the harmful action of another originated
from such a reified self. Thus, by adopting the impersonal, selfless causal-psychological
view on another, one may defuse the afflictive emotion of anger in oneself, allowing one
to respond instead from the skillful or wholesome (kuala) traits of patience and
compassion.
On the more positive side, second-person methods of deconstructing the self focus
on the basic moral equality of oneself and others. As ntideva forcefully states, When
happiness is liked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I strive after
happiness only for myself? When fear and suffering are disliked by me and others equally,
what is so special about me that I protect myself and not the other? (1996, p. 96). This
meditation on the equality of self and other has as its explicit goal overcoming the narrow
egoism of self-cherishingthat is, the deep-seated sense that ones own happiness and
suffering are the only things that are really importantand the extension of altruistic
concern for others. Those who fully realize the equality of self and other, are ones to
whom the suffering of others is as important as the things they themselves hold dear
(1996, p. 97).
Finally, the Buddhist tradition offers a rich variety of first-person methods for
overcoming self-grasping. Notably the contemplative methods associated with classical
mindfulness are central to deconstructing the sense of self. On the classical Abhidharma
view, the cultivation of mindfulness is closely linked with attention regulation or
mindfulness (smti-samprajanya), ethical vigilance (apramda), and insight (vipayana)
(Dunne, 2014). The basis of the first-person method of mindfulness is the development of
attention regulation through the cultivation of smti (focus or attentional stability) and
samprajanya (meta-awareness or introspective vigilance). Smti is the capacity to hold
ones attention on an object, such as the breath or bodily sensations. Samprajanya is the

capacity to monitor the quality of ones focus on the object of attention. Thus, noticing
that ones attention has wandered from the object, or that ones attention is dull rather
than clear are instances of samprajanya. In cultivating the joint operation of smti and
samprajanya, the practitioner is supposed to develop a calm, focused mind and the
increased level of attention to her mental life is supposed to bring a clearer
comprehension of her own mental processes. This leads to the cultivation of apramda
(ethical vigilance or heedfulness). Here the increased awareness of ones intentions and
positive and negative mental states allows one better to keep her actions of body, speech,
and mind in accord with her ethical commitments and spiritual goals. Lastly, one
develops penetrating insight (vipayana) into the impermanent, unsatisfactory, and
selfless nature of the phenomena constituting ones mind-body complex (nma-rpa).
That is, one realizes directly that the mental and bodily events that constitute this very
stream of experience are i) constantly changing; ii) that grasping after them cannot lead to
true happiness and satisfaction; and iii) that the phenomena are not related to a fixed,
enduring self. Thus, according to the classical Abhidharma, the cultivation of
mindfulness and the related qualities of heedfulness and insight, yield a profound
transformation in self-experience, from a sense of being a fixed self to a selfless flow of
experience.
Decentering Subject and Object
So far, the discussion of deconstructing the self in classical Buddhism is
commensurate with Almaas notion of seeing through the reified self and Adyashantis
notion of overcoming egoic consciousness. Yet for both thinkers a further stage of
contemplative insight involves the recognition of a kind of witness-consciousness that is
seen as more fundamental, closer to our true nature, than the reified egoic self. As
mentioned above, this appeal to a higher form of witness-consciousness or pure
subjectivity is most closely associated with the Advaita Vednta tradition, but a version
of the idea can also be found in the non-dual strands of Buddhist contemplative theory
and practice. What the Advaita and Buddhist non-dualist (broadly Yogcra) views have
in common is that both take consciousness to be a self-luminous (svapraka)
background awareness to which or within which both subjective and objective
phenomena are presented.
The metaphor of consciousness as light (praka) or luminosity (prakat) is at
the heart of Indian thinking about the nature of the mind going back as far as the
Upaniads. Like a light, consciousness has (or is) the capacity to shine forth and
illuminate its object. Indeed, just as, without illumination, no objects could be visible, so
without the light of consciousness, no object could be experienced. Thus luminosity
comes to denote the capacity to disclose, present, or make manifest. The luminosity of
consciousness, then, is that original capacity to make experientially present some
phenomena. To hold that consciousness is self-luminous is to hold that it is reflexive or
self-presenting. Consciousness presents itself in the process of presenting its object.
Moreover, just as light does not need a second light in order to be revealed, so
consciousness does not need a distinct state to present itselfit is self-intimating.
The Advaita Vednta school takes self-luminosity or reflexivity to be the very
essence of consciousness. Consciousness (cit) in its fundamental nature is pure reflexive
subjectivitya radical openness to what is presented. What we normally think of as the

object-directed intentionality of consciousness itself actually arises from the association

of pure non-intentional consciousness with certain mental states (vtti).4 This pure
subjectivity is the witness (skin) and is identified with the true self (tman) in contrast
to the person (jva) or the ego (ahakra). Moreover, it is important to note that, for the
Advaitin, the tman is not an individuated, enduring entity. It is the witnessing
subjectivity that can never be objectified. The tman, as pure consciousness, is the selfluminous source of illumination for any phenomenon whatsoever, internal or external,
and cannot itself become an object of cognition. As the condition of the possibility of any
presentation of an object, consciousness is not one object among others, yet it is
indubitably present. Further, any object or content of consciousness, including those with
which the ego identifies as I or mine, is necessarily not the self. Experiential
recognition of the distinction between the pure (i.e., unobjectifiable) subjectivity of the
true self and the ever-changing contents of consciousness is key to the psychological
freedom of liberation (moka).
Buddhist philosophers such as Dignga, Dharmakrti, and ntarakita also hold
that the luminosity of consciousness consists in its being reflexive or self-presenting.
Here the term svasavedana (self-awareness) denotes this self-luminosity or prereflective self-awareness that is an invariant aspect of conscious experience. On this view,
individual conscious states simultaneously disclose both the object of consciousness and
(aspects of) the conscious state itself. This type of self-awareness, then, consists in
awareness being acquainted with itself, not the self. Thus, when a subject is aware of an
object, she is also (pre-reflectively) aware of her own experiencing (MacKenzie, 2007,
2008).
According to Dignga, Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance,
namely that of itself (svbhsa) and that of the object (viaybhsa) (Dignga, 1968, p.
28). The object-appearance or object-aspect is the presentation of the intentional object in
cognition. Yet a cognition is not exhausted by its presentation of an intentional object. It
also presents a subject-aspect (svbhsa), which for Dignga means the way the
cognition presents itself. When I have an experience as of a tree, on this view, the
experience presents both the tree (the object-aspect) and the experiencing of the tree (the
subject-aspect). And since I grasp both the object-appearance and the self-appearance of
the cognition in which the object is presented, the dual-aspect structure of cognition
implies pre-reflective self-awareness (svasavedana). Importantly, the viaybhsa,
svbhsa, and svasavedana are features of a single episode.5 Hence, a typical episode
of consciousness manifests a subject-object structure.
Finally, it is important to note that this subject-object structure in consciousness is
ultimately considered a deep form of cognitive distortion. The subject-appearance and
object-appearance are automatically reified into the experience as of an enduring self and
an enduring mind-independent object, neither of which are truly real, according to these

4

The notion of intentionality here is transitive object-directed intentionality. In the phenomenological

tradition, this form of intentionality is distinguished from the more fundamental form of intentionality a
sheer openness to phenomena. In that sense, it seems, even witness-consciousness would be intentional.
5 Note that the relation between svbhsa and svasavedana is controversial. On some interpretations of
Dignga, self-awareness just is the subject-aspects apprehension of the object-aspect. On my view, selfawareness is the apprehension of both faces. Yet, insofar as the subject-aspect is the presentation of the
cognition as that very cognition itself, there will be an intimate connection between the svbhsa and
svasavedana.

thinkers. What we are immediately aware of in conscious experience are not observerindependent features of the external world, but mental images (kra) caused by the
interaction between the world and our cognitive system. We are usually unaware of the
constructive activity of the mind in producing these images and we are unaware that they
are images, rather than external objects. The mind constructs a virtual world-model that
is transparent to us. More radically, like the observed objects, the observing self is also a
virtual construct of a cognitive system. The sense of self arises from the way the
cognitive system models itself and draws the self-other distinction. Indeed, the
Yogcrins hold that there is a deep interdependence between grasping an objective
world and grasping oneself as a persisting subject of experience. Its just that, on this
view, this goes to show that both are mental constructs. What we take to be the self is like
an avatar in the virtual world created by the mind (Metzinger, 2003). Yet, Dignga and
his fellow Yogcrins think it is possible to come to see both the experiential world and
the experiential self as cognition-only (vijptimtra)that is, as the contents of a virtual
world created by the cognitive system and not reality as it is in itself. The result is said to
be a radical transcendence of the subject-object framework of understanding experience.
As John Dunne (2011) has argued, this Yogcra view provides the necessary
theoretical framework for non-dual styles of contemplative practice such as mahmudr
and dzogchen. For instance, the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist contemplative practice of Open
Presence (rigpa chog-zhag), begins with the observation that intentional objects are only
given in and through experience and, further, that objects are not given apart from the
(non-objectified) givenness of the subject. Thus, rather than forming a dichotomy or
duality, subject and object are co-given in experience and are correlative and mutually
specifying. As Lutz, et al write:
Chag-zog practitioners are thus aiming to understand the nature of
experience - that which is essential to any instance of experience,
regardless of the accidental and changing features of the objects or
subjectivities involved. To do so, they employ a set of techniques that are
intended to make the practitioner aware of the invariable feature of all
experiences. They speak of this invariable feature using various
descriptions, including Rigpa, Awareness, or, using the metaphor of
light, Selwa (gsal ba), Luminosity or Clarity. But whether called
Awareness, Clarity, or some other synonym, the point is that the invariant
element in experience is that which, from a phenomenal standpoint, makes
it possible for the subject-object relation to be presented in experience.
(2007, pp. 513-514)
On this view, subject and object are co-given and correlative, but also variable across
different experiences. Moreover, in so far as subject and object are variable contents of
experience one may ask what makes it possible for these contents to be given. In this
tradition, the answer is luminosity, the reflexive awareness that constitutes the open space
or phenomenal field within which the subject-object correlation is presented.
The practice itself follows four stages. First, one must develop concentration or
stable attention on an object of meditation. Second, one de-emphasizes the object-pole of
experience and begins to attend to the subject-pole. That is, without shutting out the
object one becomes mindful of the subject-aspect (svkra, svbhsa) of experience. One

is then led to recognize that, while initially seeming quite independent of awareness,
experiential objects are constituted in and through experience and are not given apart
from subjectivity. One recognizes that appearances are not other than mind. Third, one
begins to de-emphasize subjectivity and in particular the sense of diachronic subjectivity,
the sense of an I that extends beyond the living present or experiential now. This leads
to a state in which, The experience's content does not appear as an object over against a
subject, and the experience also does not involve a sense of subjectivity that is articulated
by conceptual or linguistic structures, even if those structures are only implicit (Lutz, et
al, 2007, p. 517). Finally, in the fourth stage:
[D]e-emphasis of both object and subject moves, at least theoretically, to a
point where no elements of objectivity or subjectivity - whether in the
form of conceptual structures, categories of time and space, or some other
feature -remain in the experience. At this point, the invariant feature of
cognition is said to be realized fully by the meditator, and this is the fullblown state of Open Presence. . . [The] stability [of this state] consists of
one's ability to continue to experience phenomena without objectifying
them and, ideally, without having a sense of an agentive or narrative
subjectivity. The state thus seems to cultivate a type of ipseity or bare
awareness. (p. 517)
The point of this practice is not to shut out experiential content, but rather progressively
to undo the implicit and habitual reification of subject and object. Thus subject and object
are no longer seen as fixed realities, but rather come to be experienced as dynamically coemergent and correlative appearances (bhsa) within a pre-objective, pre-egoic field of
experience. This field is then identified as luminosity, a non-egological reflexive
awareness that is the space, the arena of presence within which subjective and objective
phenomena appear. In these types of non-dual practices, and the experiences they are
purported to evoke, we find prima facie evidence that even the minimal or thin self is not
an invariant structure of experience, both in the sense that it can drop away and in the
more subtle sense that one can potentially, through a kind gestalt shift, come to
experience it as an constructed phenomenon within a larger horizon of awareness.
At this point, one might wonder whether it is really accurate to claim that no
elements of objectivity or subjectivity . . . remain in experience.6 Granted that
reifications of subject and object have ceased, some form of subject-object structure may
remain even in these open presence experiences. In particular, if the larger horizon of
awareness is reflexive or self-presentingindeed, Lutz, et al characterize it as ipseity
then it seems that the minimal subjectivity of pre-reflective self-awareness remains. And
if anything is presented or given in the experience (even the experience itself) there must
be something it is presented or given toas the phenomenologists say, if there is a
genitive of manifestation, there must be a dative of manifestation. Moreover, a number
of phenomenologists have identified reflexive awareness, the first-person perspective,
and the minimal self (Zahavi 2008). On this view, the experiences still have a minimal
subject-object structure and are not even selfless.

6

I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.

In response, the first thing to note is that, in the Buddhist philosophical and
contemplative context, terms like subject and object are often used to denote reified
phenomena. Hence, some of the disagreement will be simply terminological. More
substantively, I think we should deploy Wolfgang Faschings distinction between two
types of self-consciousness (including pre-reflective forms). The first type is the selfidentification with certain configurations of what one experiences. The second type is
the self-presence of experience itself (Fasching 2008, p. 464). In normal experience,
these two types of self-awareness are more or less seamlessly integrated. Indeed, a central
claim of a number of Indian contemplative traditions is that type-1 self-awareness may
occlude or make difficult to notice type-2 self-awareness. Yet, in some cases, whether
pathological or contemplative, these two types of self-awareness may become dissociated
(MacKenzie 2015). Indeed, we may understand non-dual styles of meditation such as
open presence or Zen just sitting (shikantaza) as disclosing the self-presence of
experience itself as distinct from self-identification, including the implicit selfidentification of bodily and affective forms of self-awareness.
With regard to non-dual awareness or consciousness itself, Fasching writes:
So, by consciousness, we mean here the event of phenomenal presence of
whatever is present. The distinction between real objects and those that
only exist in our mind is a subsequent one in comparison. So in a way
there are subjective and objective phenomena, but consciousness is
not a subjective phenomenon, it is not an inner world: It is the beingthere of whatever kind of phenomenawhether subjective or
objective. Consequently, consciousness is not a phenomenon among
phenomena but the taking place of the phenomenality of phenomena. The
fact of consciousness is not something in addition to what is otherwise
present, it is simply its being present. (Fasching 2008, p. 467)
So if non-dual awareness is the taking place of presence (i.e., luminosity as phenomenal
presence), then it is both the condition of the possibility of any appearance and it is
inseparable from what appears. Further, distinctions between inner and outer or
subject and object are constituted within the horizon (or as Buddhists would say, the
space or expanse) of non-dual awareness. To realize non-dual awareness, then, is to
come to experience the dynamic arising and passing away of the subjective,
intersubjective, and objective phenomena constituting the phenomenal field as the play
or expression (rtsal) of awareness itself.7
Now, According to the Advaitins (and, it seems, Adyashanti) the self-luminous
horizon of awareness is the self. So, while the Buddhists hold that episodes of experience
are impermanent occurrences within an ever-changing stream of consciousness
(cittasantna), the Advaitins maintain that self-luminous consciousness is changeless and
permanent. As the changeless background of all changing experience, this witnessconsciousness is taken to account for the diachronic unity of experience. According to
Advaita, the Buddhist view of experience as made up of causally connected moments of
experienceself-luminous or notcannot account for either the diachronic cognition of
objects or of the stream of consciousness itself.

7

This phenomenological point has been given both strongly metaphysically idealist and more deflationary
phenomenological readings within the Buddhist tradition.

The standard Buddhist response to this objection is to appeal to the causal and
functional connections between mental events within a single stream of consciousness.
Of course, the mere fact that one event causes another (even when those events are
mental) does not entail that the two events are experientially continuous. In order for the
Buddhist response to be plausible, the causal-functional connections must ground
phenomenal continuity. Phenomenally continuous mental events must not only be
causally connected, they must both be part of the same phenomenal point of view. In the
Advaita account this point of view is provided by witness-consciousness as an enduring
subject of experience over and above the various mental events (vttis) that constitute the
stream of experience. On the other hand, Buddhist philosophers will appeal to a
continuous, but not enduringly self-identical, point of view as a feature of the connection
mental events. For Buddhist reflexivists like Dignga, reflexive awareness
(svasavedana) can be pressed into service here. First, reflexive awareness constitutes
the synchronic phenomenal point of view in that it is that feature of awareness to which
the subject-aspect and object-aspect are present. Second, as Dignga argues, reflexive
awareness plays a central role in the diachronic relations of access-consciousness in
memory. That is, svasavedana allows for the apprehension of both aspects of
experience by a later experience and this later apprehension is from the inside (Ganeri,
2012). Hence, on this view, it is the recurrent self-luminosity of consciousness that
constitutes the synchronic and diachronic phenomenal point of view, not an enduring
subject.8 The Advaitins mistake, it might be said, is to slide from a continuous point of
view within a stream to an enduring subject above or behind the stream (MacKenzie
2012).
Re-constructing the self?
The Buddhist contemplative practices discussed above seem to be able both to
evoke experiences of selflessness and to cultivate selfless modes of psychological
functioning. An altered state of consciousness, such as one induced through specific
meditative practices, may dramatically alter self-experience either transiently or more
permanently and yield (purported) insight into the fundamentally selfless nature of all
mental and physical phenomena. Other practices may cultivate a shift from a selfcentered mode of psychological functioning characterized by an exaggerated sense of
ones own importance, to a selfless mode of functioning characterized by a sense of the
equality of self and other (ntideva, 1996, Dambrun and Ricard, 2011). As we have seen,
on the classical Buddhist view, there is thought to be a fundamental link between these
two kinds of selflessness. That is, the structure and content of ones sense of self is linked
to ones style of psychological functioning. Hence, given the right theoretical and
practical context (i.e., the Buddhist path), transformation in ones sense of self can yield a
transformation in ones mode of psychological function. Dambrun and Ricard have
postulated that a sense of self as independent and permanent (stably enduring) is

8

Note here that for these Buddhist reflexivist, the phenomenal point of view is parasitic on the moments of
consciousness that form the causal continuum, rather than belonging to an enduring subjectlike a series
of beads arranged so that the hole in each bead is aligned with others to form an opening through the whole
series. How compatible this view is with idea of non-dual awareness as developed in later contemplative
traditions is open to dispute. I have argued elsewhere (MacKenzie 2012) that the distinct tathgatagharba
(Buddha nature) tradition is also central to the non-dual contemplative tradition.

10

correlated with a self-centered mode of functioning, whereas a sense of self as

interdependent and impermanent is correlated with a weak sense of distinction between
self and others and the environment. They also hypothesize that an interdependent sense
of self is correlated with strong feelings of connection to others and pro-social attitudes
and behaviors (2011, p. 141). Further, following classical Buddhist thought, they
postulate that the experience of both the interdependence and the impermanence of the
body-mind continuum can yield as sense of self as a dynamic network of evanescent
relations that have causal coherence (i.e., the self as an interdependent and impermanent
dynamic network) (2011, p. 143). Here the sense of self as any kind of entity (even an
interdependent one) is absent and self is understood to be a convenient designation for
an impermanent and interdependent dynamic process. Corresponding to this radical
transformation of the sense of self (or no-self!) is a more radically altruistic mode of
psychological functioning.
It is important to see that the transformation from self-centeredness to selflessness
involves both the deconstruction and the reconstruction of self-experience or, in
Dambruns and Ricards terms, the sense of self. To see this more clearly we can
distinguish between the notions of self-experience and the sense of self. Self-experience
is the more general term that refers to the various ways a sentient being experiences itself
as itself, such as experiencing its own movements, hedonic states, or episodic memories.
Thus, one could experience oneself as a dynamic network of impermanent events, with
no enduring ontological selfa selfless form of self-experience. A sense of self, then,
involves the sense of being a self, a stable, enduring locus of ownership, agency, etc. On
the Buddhist view being considered here, we are selfless persons (pudgalanairtmya).
But a person is a sentient being that is typically capable of several rather sophisticated
forms of self-experience, including autobiographical memory and anticipation, selfreferential thinking, rational self-understanding, and so on. So being a selfless person will
still involve self-experience, even if it involves abandoning a thicker sense of self. The
Buddha may have perfectly realized the experiential truth of no-self, but there is no
indication that he would have failed the mirror self-recognition task or was incapable of
episodic memory. Rather, on my interpretation, his self-experience was free from all
experiential reification of even sophisticated, self-referential processes and capacities.
Yet, while a fully awakened Buddha might be, on the classical view, free of any
sense of self, even highly advanced practitioners are thought to maintain some sense of
self. In fact, in the famous eighth chapter of ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra, we find an
interesting example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of a sense of self. In a
section of the chapter dedicated to undermining egocentrism and cultivating the impartial
compassion of bodhicitta (the awakening mind), he first evokes the basic moral equality
of self and other: All equally experience suffering and happiness. I should look after
them as I do myself . . . When happiness is liked by me and others equally, what is so
special about me that I strive after happiness only for myself? When fear and suffering
are disliked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I protect myself
and not the other? (1996, p. 95). The obvious rejoinder here (and one given voice in the
text) is that my suffering and happiness are mine and I therefore have reason to be
concerned with them in a way that I dont with regard to suffering and happiness that are
not mine. It is at this point that ntideva appeals to the idea of no-self.

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8. 101 The continuum of consciousness, like a queue, and the combination

of constituents, like an army, are not real. The person who experiences
suffering does not exist. To whom will that suffering belong?
8.102 Without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone. They should be
warded off simply because they are suffering. Why is any limitation put
on this?
8.103 If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one disputes that!
If it must be prevented, then all of it must be. If not, then this goes for
oneself as for everyone. (1996, p. 96)
Yet, in the above passages, ntideva does not simply deny the reified substantial
self, but goes further to say that the person who suffers does not exist and that suffering
belongs to no one. That is, he moves from the cultivation of an impartial perspective to
an impersonal perspective that affirms suffering but denies the sufferer. The proper
interpretation of these passages in the larger context of ntidevas thought is the subject
of a lively and on-going debate, to which I cannot enter here. In my view, ntidevas
deployment of the no-self doctrine to undermine egocentrism is part of a larger
movement to first deconstruct our default sense of self and then reconstruct a sense of
self that is consistent with the altruistic ethics of the bodhisattva. After deconstructing
both the reified notion of a substantial self and even the more moderate conventional
notion of persons as distinct and persisting, ntideva writes:
8. 110 Therefore, just as I protect myself to the last against criticism, let
me develop in this way an attitude of protectiveness and of generosity
towards others as well.
8.111 Through habituation there is the understanding of I regarding the
drops of sperm and blood of two other people, even though there is in fact
no such thing.
8.112 Why can I not also accept anothers body as my self in the same
way, since the otherness of my own body has been settled and is not hard
to accept?
8.114 In the same way that the hands and other limbs are loved because
they form part of the body, why are embodied creatures not likewise loved
because they form part of the universe?
8.115 In he same way that, with practice, the idea of a self arose toward
this, ones own body, though it is without self, with practice will not the
same idea of a self develop towards others too? (1996, p. 98)
Notice here that ntideva has returned from the impersonal perspective of
reductionism to the interpersonal perspective of self and others. But now, having fully

12

realized that it is a habitual construction based on type-1 self-consciousness, the self is

not abandoned in favor of seeing the moral landscape as simply an impersonal
distribution of suffering and happiness. Instead, the self, as an empty (i.e., insubstantial),
malleable construct is reconstructed non-egocentrically. Through practice, one comes to
extend ones sense of identity, and therefore ones moral concern, to all other sentient
beings as parts of an interdependent reality. Note also, that this reconstruction does not
simply erase the distinction between self and other, but rather situates the distinction
within the deeper insight into the impermanence and interdependence of selves and others.
Moreover, within this new perspective of thoroughgoing interdependence, the egocentric
view of self looks both alienating and absurd.
But why not simply abandon any notion of self, no matter how impermanent or
interdependent it is taken to be? In one sense, the reconstruction of a post-egological
sense of self is merely a skillful means (upya)other sentient beings are still trapped in
the delusion of self and the bodhisattva maintains a sense of self in order to benefit them.
On the other hand, it may be that a sense of self is not simply an optional tool for the
practitioner of the bodhisattva path. If the moral domain is constitutively interpersonal, if
it is the domain of empathy and empathic perception, then to abandon a sense of self (and
other) may be to abandon the moral domain itself. Some of the rhetoric of enlightenment
suggests this kind of transcendence of the moral. Be that as it may, for one struggling to
cultivate a wise and active altruism, abandoning self and other entirely does not seem to
be a viable option and it is not an option ntideva suggests here. Rather, recognition of
the utter non-existence of the substantial self and the emptiness of the conventional self
opens up the possibility of a reconstruction of self on the basis of universal compassion,
as opposed to the afflictions of delusion, craving, and aversion.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction, I believe proper study of self and selfconsciousness should be interdisciplinary and multi-perspectival. To gain better and
deeper understanding of these central phenomena of human experience, we must draw on
philosophy and other humanities, as well as the natural and social-behavioral sciences.
Moreover, we should draw from and try to integrate first-, second-, and third-person
perspectives on the phenomena. Finally, we ought to draw on a wide array of types of
experience and functioning. This includes, but is not limited to, pathologies of selfexperience, altered states, and contemplative transformations of self-experience. The
target articles offer rich resources and perspectives from contemplative traditions for this
on-going study and exploration. My aim here has been to contribute to the dialogue by
discussing the sophisticated approach to questions of self and selflessness in classical
Buddhist philosophy. Indeed, while I am partial to Buddhist thought, on my view
classical Indian philosophy in general offers a number of very powerful insights and
models of the mind that are ripe for contemporary exploration and engagement (Ganeri
2012, Siderits, Thompson, and Zahavi 2011, Thompson 2015). In the end, what is
needed to understand self and self-consciousness is a cosmopolitan, interdisciplinary, and
contemplative approach to studying the mind.

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