Liberia Gender Case Study

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED
SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

LESSONS, CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
A Case Study
LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED
SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:
LESSONS, CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
A Case Study
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................IV
Introduction........................................................................................................................ 1
I. SGBV and Access to Justice in the Liberian Context............................................2

A. BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................................................... 2
B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN LIBERIA............................................................................................................................. 3
II. Criminal Court E and the Legal Response to SGBV in Liberia...............................7

A. THE GENERAL RESPONSE TO SGBV....................................................................................................................... 7
B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK........................................................................................................................................ 7
C. THE IMPETUS FOR SPECIALIZED STRUCTURES........................................................................................................ 8
D. FEATURES OF CRIMINAL COURT E......................................................................................................................... 9
III. Successes and Challenges..................................................................................12

A. VICTIM-CENTERED PROCESS................................................................................................................................ 13
B. EFFICIENCY............................................................................................................................................................. 16
C. SUSTAINABILITY AND LEGITIMACY...................................................................................................................... 20
D. VISIBILITY................................................................................................................................................................. 22
IV. Lessons and Recommendations..........................................................................23

A. LESSONS FROM THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE....................................................................................................... 23
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRIMINAL COURT E AND THE WIDER JUSTICE SYSTEM...........................................25
Reference List..................................................................................................................27
III
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared under the World Bank Institute (WBI) project entitled Lessons on Gender Inclusion in
Fragile and Conflict Affected States Womens Access to Rights, Resources and Voice. It is part of a library of
case studies that aim to document key issues relating to womens access to rights, resources, and voice in fragile
and conflict-affected states. This paper focuses on rights, targeting the ambitious project designed to improve
the legal response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Liberia: the establishment of a specialized
sexual offenses court known as Criminal Court E. It describes and explains the experience with this court and
draws lessons from the Liberian context that may be instructive for other fragile and conflict-affected situations.
The report was prepared by Finlay Young (Consultant) under the supervision of A. Waafas Ofosu-Amaah (Task
Team Leader). The task team consisted of Rea Abada Chiongson, Camilla Gandini, Lwanzo Amani, and Sanam
Naraghi Anderlini (Consultants).
The team expresses its thanks to the representatives of the government, civil society, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), as well as the international development partners and individuals in Liberia who provided
valuable information for this case study: Ministry of Gender and Development (Deddeh Kwekwe, GBV Unit
Coordinator); Specialized Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit (Cllr. Felicia Coleman, Lead Prosecutor); the judiciary
(Judge Evelina QuaQua, former judge, Criminal Court E; Judge Eva Mappy Morgan, judge, Commercial
Court; and John Sackor, Financial Comptroller); National Council of Chiefs and Elders (Ma Musu E. Coleman,
Vice Chair of Internal Affairs, Peace and Reconciliation); African Network for the Prevention and Protection
against Child Abuse and Neglect - Liberia (ANPPCAN) (Alvin Winford, Program Manager); Servants of All
Prayers Assembly (SOAP) (Rev. Stephen D. Tour); UN Government SGBV Joint Program (Madhumita Sarkar,
Program Advisor); U.S. Department of State Justice Sector Support Program (Damare Theriot, SGBV Advisor);
United Nations Mission in Liberia (Catherine Barley, Senior Policy Advisor to the D/SRSG Rule of Law; Sophie
Frediani, Human Rights Advisor); UN Women (Martine Villeneuve, Program Officer); Carter Center (Amanda
Rawls, Program Advisor; Timothy Meyer, Legal Associate; and Alfred Hill, Monitoring and Reporting Officer);
the Liberian Government SGBV Taskforce membership (for permitting the authors participation and assisting with contacts and information), and members of Monrovias Jallah Town Community (various individuals
who together served as an informal focus group).
The team also acknowledges the following World Bank Group colleagues for their technical guidance and
collaboration: Bernard Harborne, Lead Social Development Specialist; Jared Matthew Schott, Justice and
Conflict Advisor; Jeni Klugman, Director, Gender and Development; Heike Gramckow, Lead Counsel; and LouisAlexandre Berg, Justice and Conflict Advisor. Peter Forster Chapman, Program Officer for Legal Empowerment
(Open Society Justice Initiative), also provided valuable insights. Finally, the team is very appreciative of the
inputs, critiques, and suggestions from the members of the Gender Issues in Fragile Situations Community
of Practice (GFCoP) (https://collaboration.worldbank.org/groups/gender-issues-in-fragile-situations). Special
thanks go to GFCoP members, Crystal Corman, Peace Medie, Wren Chadwick, Lillian Dang, and Janine Moussa.
The report was made possible by the generous support of the Government of the Netherlands, under the World
Bank-Netherlands Partnerships Program (BNPP) Trust Fund.
IV
LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:
Introduction
Among the many complex development challenges presented by the country of Liberia, perhaps none is as
emotive as its enduring problem of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Following the cessation of a
brutal and prolonged civil conflict infamous for its disproportionate victimization of women, the election of Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf as President in 2005 presented new and exciting opportunities for gender-sensitive reform.
With strong support from international donors, the new administration made addressing the problem of SGBV
a key priority.
As eight years have passed since the commencement of these reform efforts, Liberias experience represents
a potentially valuable case study on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at addressing the issue of SGBV
in fragile and conflict situations (FCS). The high prevalence of SGBV and the general impunity enjoyed by
the perpetrators remain significant issues in many such contexts, and while the implementation of effective
responses is well established globally as a priority area of concern, information about the effectiveness of justice
system interventions designed to strengthen the legal response in FCS remains limited. This case study situates
itself within this developing global discourse.
The study focuses on perhaps the most ambitious project designed to improve the legal response to SGBV in
Liberia: the opening of specialized sexual offenses court known as Criminal Court E. It is necessarily limited in
scope, intended as a concise and accessible stand-alone case study to inform and stimulate discussion among
development practitioners and policy makers interested in examining, analyzing, and identifying possible
solutions to the problem of SGBV in the context of fragility. It also seeks to outline the experience, provide a
number of recommendations for reform, and derive lessons from the Liberian context that may be instructive
for other FCS.
The case study is based on a review of the relevant literature and data, as well as interviews with key government,
civil society, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and United Nations (UN) actors conducted by the author in
Liberia between October 2012 and March 2013. Due to the sensitive nature of some interviewee observations,
their specific identities have been withheld where requested.
The views expressed in this report are those of the author.
LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES
I. SGBV and Access to Justice

in the Liberian Context
Before the war we had the issue, but it was
not known to us as gender-based violence. It
was just the way of life.
GBV Coordinator, Ministry of Gender and
Development
A. BACKGROUND
Efforts to rationalize the extent and severity of
Liberias current SGBV issue have frequently focused
on the impact of the devastating civil conflict
the country suffered between 1989 and 2003. In
this period, all armed parties perpetrated acts of
gender-based violence with impunity, using it as a
method of instilling fear and exerting control over
civilian populations (TRC 2009, 4). A 2003 study of
Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone camps found that
74 percent of women surveyed had been sexually
abused before displacement (Liberia and UN Joint
Programme 2011, 31), while other assessments
put this figure even higher.1 Yet, bald figures such
as these fail to show the exceptionally traumatic
modalities of the crimes committed.2
Although the horrors of the Liberian war can tell
us much of the horrific potential of institutionalized
violence against women in the country, they explain
little of the origins of this violence and its enduring
manifestation in peacetime Liberia. As one scholar
writing on SGBV in Liberia put it: The prevalence of
gender based violence is almost always reflective of
gender inequalities and power imbalances that have
been in existence before the conflict (UNMIL 2008,
17). Most observers agree that the Liberian conflict
served only to exacerbate latent social divisions
and patriarchal structural inequalities, including
ingrained patterns of violence against women
1
2
existent long prior to the war. These norms endure,

with the disempowerment of women embedded
in socio-cultural institutions, value systems, norms
and practices (Liberia and UN Joint Programme
2011, 8).
Over a decade has passed since the cessation of
conflict, but the specter of SGBV has not receded.
Numerous studies have consistently revealed a
peacetime reality of extremely high prevalence
of SGBV.3 According to Liberias Ministry of
Gender and Development statistics, 6,277 cases
were reported from 2010 to 2012 (see figure 1).4
In 2012, rape accounted for 55 percent of cases, with
68 percent involving victims between the ages of 3
months to 14 years. As was stated in Liberias Poverty
Reduction Strategy, young female citizens suffer
the brunt of Liberias epidemic of gender based
violence (Liberia 2008, 90). Further, perpetrators are
generally known to the victims, with statistics from
2011 showing that 76 percent of perpetrators were
relatives, friends, neighbors, or intimate partners of
the survivors (Liberia 2011).
Reported cases represent only the tip of the iceberg,
however. It is estimated that over two-thirds of SGBV
cases never enter the justice system at all, let alone
gain access to legal aid or the courts (Dziewanski
2011, 19). To fully understand this reality, an analysis
of Liberias access to justice context is required.
This refers to a 2004 World Health Organization study, cited in Liberia and UN Joint Programme (2011, 31).
Liberian women reported being raped with objects including bananas, pieces of wood, metal, guns, hot water, mud, dried batteries, and
hot peppers. See Omanyondo (2005, 26).
These studies include those from the NGOs Human Rights Watch in 2011 and Save the Children in 2009. See also Liberia and UN Joint
Programme (2011).
For these and similar figures, see the Annual Reports of Liberias Ministry of Gender and Development for 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012,
which are available at http://mogd.gov.lr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&Itemid=125.
FIGURE 1. SGBV CASES REPORTED TO THE MINISTRY OF GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

3000
2500
2000
Number of SGBV Cases Reported

to MoGD by year
1500
1000
500
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: Ministry of Gender and Development Annual Reports, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.
B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN LIBERIA
Olivias perpetrator was never caught,

because her perpetrator was her uncle.
This is the difficulty. We relocated Olivias
mother because everyone in the village went
against her. She had shamed the uncle. She
wasnt meant to say those things. In their
community, the best person to side with
was the perpetrator, the one who raped her
so badly. He was arrested and taken to the
magisterial court, but somehow he has never
been put in prison. When Olivia died (of her
injuries) nobody from the village came to
attend the funeral.
SGBV Coordinator, Ministry of Gender and
Development
The case above attracted international opprobrium
in 2012 after the tragic death of Olivia, a young rape
victim. The circumstances of Olivias case serve to
highlight many of the cultural and contextual factors
that militate against access to justice for SGBV
survivors.
i) The weakness of the formal justice system

Perhaps the most important consideration is that in
Liberia overall, the formal justice system of police,
prosecution, and courts, a common law system
drawn largely from a U.S. template, is chronically
weak. Even if a case is taken to the police, Arrest
is no guarantee that cases will be forwarded through
the criminal justice system, creating a situation where
a survivor may have identified a perpetratorwho
may be known to the survivorwithout the police
having the means to investigate the crime or provide
security for the survivor (Nagelhus Schia and de
Carvalho 2009, 3).
Should the case enter the court system, magistrate
and circuit courts are highly inefficient, with too few
lawyers to serve the needs of the population. A 2011
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report found
that there were only 250 lawyers in Liberia, serving a
population of 4 million people (UNODC 2011, 12).
Further, despite the appearance of improvement
through the renovation of courts and the provision of
hardware and vehicles, the enhancements made have
not generally translated into better service delivery
at the court level. Dockets in the most utilized urban
courts have generally grown more crowded each
year,5 while citizens in rural areas operate largely
Detailed figures can be found in two document produced by UNMILs Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division. See UNMIL
(2010 and 2011).
absent formal justice options and prefer alternative

means of resolving disputes.6 Moreover, allegations
of corruption are rife at all levels,7 and there is a
general lack of affordable legal aid.
Further, the system has very limited effective reach
beyond urbanized areas, and the Liberian citizenry
generally and historically does not trust it. Public
perceptions of a system few understand remain
overwhelmingly negative.8 In common with all
government entities in Liberia, the justice system
has traditionally served elite interests, largely as a
conduit for extraction. As one commentator has
noted, throughout much of Liberias history, the
formal justice system has been subject to executive
intervention and is deeply corrupt. Prior to the war,
the formal judicial services did not reach many of the
counties and where available, were ineffective (Ebo
2005, 22).
As such, impunity for SGBV must be considered
against a general backdrop, historical and current, of
impunity for crimes in general. For victims of SGBV,
the repercussions of this pervasive impunity are that
they must carry the physical and emotional trauma
of their injuries indefinitely, frequently within view
of the perpetrators, with little prospect that formal
structures will provide protection from or recourse
for their suffering.
ii) The reality of legal pluralism in Liberia
As a consequence, the formal justice system is
not generally the structure chosen to resolve most
disputes in Liberia. Instead, processes broadly
tagged informal or traditional processes,
normally emanating from existing hierarchies at
the community level but also including formally
sanctioned tribal governor courts, are preferred.
According to an extensive study undertaken in 2009
by the Centre for African Economies at Oxford
University, only 3 percent of civil cases in Liberia
6
7
went to court during that year, and only 2 percent of

criminal cases. For criminal matters, this compares to
45 percent of cases that went to an informal forum,
and 53 percent to no forum at all (Isser, Lubkemann,
and NTow 2009, 4).
Of particular import here is the fact that the formal and
informal processes, although both justice systems
in the widest sense, are actually qualitatively at odds.
The formal justice system of courts emphasizes
identifying a victim and perpetrator(s), determining
wrongdoing, and meting out retribution. It is not
focused on reconciliation, and hence not only
frequently fails to resolve underlying tensions, but
can serve to exacerbate adversarial relations (Isser,
Lubkemann, and NTow 2009, 4). This stands in
stark contrast to informal processes in Liberia, which
emphasize the wider goals of social harmony and
reconciliation. In many instances, the process of
reconciliation will involve wider family members,
and entail an admission of wrongdoing, a public
apology, and in many instances, the imposition of a
fine. This form of process, most frequently utilized
by Liberians, produces outcomes that are generally
accepted by citizens but are often inimical to the
concept of justice as defined by the courts.
iii) Rape and Liberias informal justice processes
The general norms and usage of the Liberian justice
landscape seem to apply equally to rape cases. As
Isser, Lubkemann, and NTow write:
[I]n the resolution of most types of rape most
rural Liberians continue to emphasize restorative
and socially reconciliatory objectives as more
important than punitive ones. The objective of
reconciliation remains particularly important in
a context in which the kinship relations that are
so vital to all aspects of subsistence and social
order itself are likely to socially link perpetrators
and victims and their families. (Isser, Lubkemann,
and NTow 2009)
For the most complete analysis of access to justice in rural areas, see Isser, Lubkemann, and NTow (2009).
According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, Judges were susceptible to bribes for awarding damages in civil cases.
Judges sometimes requested bribes to try cases, release detainees from prison, or find defendants not guilty in criminal cases. See U.S.
Department of State (2011, 12).
The most recent detailed analysis was conducted in June 2011 by the Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley. In particular, it noted that Most agreed with the claim that going to court is too expensive (75 %), and just a minority agreed that judgments
are the same for everyone (23%), or that judges treat everyone equally (28%). The results suggest an overall lack of trust in judges, and
more broadly in the justice system. See Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer (2011).
This different way is what Liberians will refer to

as compromising a rape case, often using chiefs,
elders, or tribal governors. When a complaint is
brought to the chief, he will often deal with the case
discreetly so as not to shame the parties involved or
their families. Frequently, if the perpetrator is young,
the chief will instead deal with the parents as those
responsible for the perpetrator.
These social or kinship links are often decisive in

whether a victim will enter the formal justice system.
As a female member of the National Traditional
Council, the body representing traditional people
(the collective term generally used to describe those
living under traditional authority structures) of Liberia,
explained: Most of the time, even here in Monrovia,
everlasting enemy-ship is created between families
in a community if you put the boy (accused rapist) in
prisonthis makes most people believe its better to
handle it a different way.
TABLE 1. INFORMAL VS INFORMAL JUSTICE FROM VICTIM PERSPECTIVE

FACTOR
INFORMAL
FORMAL
Reconciliatory
Punitive
High
Low
Social Stigma
Lower
High
Likelihood of Remedy
Higher
Low
Financial Cost
Low
Higher
Time Cost
Low
High
Guiding Logic
Accessibility of Remedy
Source: Authors summary.
While there is an increasing awareness among traditional leaders that the government wants rape
cases to go through the formal system, there is a corresponding dissatisfaction with how the courts deal
with these cases. This is likely linked to a large extent
with the overall ineffectiveness of courts, which leads
to impunity and disharmony at the community level.
However, importantly, there is also a widespread
feeling that the formal adjudication of rape fails to
reflect Liberias social and cultural values. In essence,
the informal processes are viewed as acting in harmony with prevailing social norms, whereas formal
processes and courts are viewed as acting contrary
to them.
iv) The costs of formal justice for rape victims
From a survivors perspective, accessing the formal
system in response to SGBV is a high cost endeavor in three main respects. First, financially, the
process of going to court is, relative to the wealth of
most Liberian citizens, hugely expensive. In the first
instance, it will often involve paying for the police
to come and investigate, particularly if the persons

involved are situated outside the capital Monrovia
(Nagelhus Schia and de Carvalho 2009, 3). Should
the case proceed to court, this will often necessitate
that the survivor (frequently also a guardian, considering the high percentage of cases that involve
children) leave behind family responsibilities and
wage earning activities to travel to Monrovia or the
regional capital where circuit courts are situated.
The unpredictability and delays of court procedures
exacerbate the loss of earnings and costs incurred.
Second, socially, there remains a powerful and
pervasive cultural stigma surrounding rape and the
reporting of sexual offenses in Liberia. It is generally
considered a family or community matter, and
not a matter suitable for the courts. In particular,
the Ministry of Genders statistics show that adult
women victims very rarely report cases of rape, a fact
generally attributed to perceived shame or other
social factors. This reality is intertwined with the fact
that in most cases, the perpetrator is known to the
victimhe is from the same community or is even
a family member. As it was for Olivia, by entering

the criminal justice system, the victim risks being
ostracized by the community or even her family.
Third, psychologically, the process of a victim of rape
pursuing access to justice through formal channels
in any national context is fraught with high risk of
secondary trauma. This is particularly so in Liberia, where man-woman business remains a largely
taboo issue in public, and where the professionalism
and capacity of practitioners in the justice system is
often suspect. A situation in which a survivor must
go through invasive medical inspections and recount
her ordeal on numerous occasions to different, unfamiliar actors in positions of authority, and where confidentiality is not ensured, is highly intimidating. This
is especially pronounced for the many victims who
are still children.
Fashioning an effective legal response to the problem of SGBV against this complex socio-legal
and cultural landscape, in a context still in disarray
from recent war, was the stark challenge facing the
government, UN, and NGO policy makers. To be
successful, their response had to address these high
costs associated with access to justice for women,
creating a process that was victim friendly and more
efficient and that would combat the prevalent culture
of impunity for crimes of SGBV.
II. Criminal Court E and the Legal Response

to SGBV in Liberia
A. THE GENERAL RESPONSE TO SGBV
Few countries have taken as many steps, or as many
visible steps, to combat the issue of SGBV as has
Liberia in the years since the war. Indeed, a plethora
of progressive gender-focused policy initiatives have
been implemented. Notably, Liberia became one
of only six African countries to develop a national
action plan for the implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1325.9 The countrys developmental roadmap, the 20082011 Poverty Reduction
Strategy, prioritized the issue of womens rights and
SGBV in particular, and a National Plan of Action
for SGBV was drafted and approved. In addition to
these policy initiatives, permanent new institutions
were formed; most notably, a Ministry of Gender and
Development was instituted, complete with a GBV
Unit mandated to coordinate activities and develop
SGBV responsive policies.
Within this broad-based policy framework, formulating an effective legal response was a key component. To combat impunity for acts of SGBV, a Women
and Children Protection Service (WACPS) within the
Liberia National Police was formed, along with an
SGBV Crimes Prosecution Unit within the Ministry of
Justice. In addition, a new specialized sexual offenses

court, Criminal Court E, was established. The international donor community provided strong funding
and technical support to all of these initiatives, and
the UN agencies also implemented a corresponding UN Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond
to Sexual and Gender Based Violence, which was
signed in June 2008. This series of legal responses
was a central tenet of all the efforts made to combat
SGBV in Liberia.
B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
At that time, however, the legal remedies to SGBV
lacked a solid underpinning in law, as Liberias legal
framework around SGBV was archaic. Advocacy
efforts by womens rights groups sought improvement
through several legal and judicial reform proposals.
Their first success was reform of the legal framework
on rape, substantially amending chapter 14 of
the Penal Code. The new law came into effect on
January 17, 2006. Among other reforms (see table
2), the new law included harsher penalties for the
crime of rape, made rape a non-bailable offense, and
stipulated that specified sexual violence cases must
be held in camera (or in private).
TABLE 2. FEATURES OF THE NEW LEGALFRAMEWORKON RAPE

SIX KEY FEATURES OF AMENDMENT OF CHAPTER 14 OF THE PENAL CODE
1. The legal age of consent is raised to 18 years old.

2. The crime of gang rape is established as a first-degree felony.
3. First-degree rape will be a capital offense attracting up to life imprisonment.
4. First-degree felony where victim is younger than 18 years old (and perpetrator is older than 18).
5. Other rapes are second-degree crimes, with sentences of up to 10 years.
6. All cases of sexual violence to be held in camera.
Source: Chapter 14, Liberian Penal Code.
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 represented the first time the Security Council addressed the impact of armed conflict on women
and girls and the importance of womens participation at all decision-making levels in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace
processes. It was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on October 31, 2000.
The effect of the legislation alone seems to have

been limited. As a United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) report for May July 2008 stated Despite
widespread publicity surrounding the legislations
contents and the personal commitment of the
president to tackling this issue, the response of law
enforcement and judicial authorities has been disappointing (UNMIL 2008). While there is no comprehensive data, and not enough time had passed to
properly gauge performance improvements, anecdotal evidence from those working in Liberia at the
time suggests that there was no discernible improvement in the reporting and progression of SGBV cases
through the justice system following the passing of
the new law.
C. THE IMPETUS FOR SPECIALIZED STRUCTURES
We sat with too many cases, and partners

were coming and complaining that rape
cases were not heard because all cases were
together. Judges had conservative attitudes
and didnt want to hear about rape. They
put cases at the back of the queue. When
cases were heard, the process was terrible
for survivors.
Liberian womens rights activist
As the above quote from a long-time womens rights
advocate in Liberia highlights, the apparent limited
effects of law reform seemed to implicate either the
inability or the conscious reluctance of the judiciary to
address rape cases through normal court processes.
Even with a newly protective legal framework, the
institutional capacity or inclination was not sufficient
to secure access to justice for most survivors.
With increasing focus on SGBV from international
donors and the Liberian government, and with the
true extent of the issue ever more visible to health
care providers and law enforcement personnel, the
demand for improved judicial remedies had a clear
basis. The justice system, however, dysfunctional
even before the war and decimated after, was not
equipped or coordinated to respond to the complex

challenge. Cognizant of these unfavorable institutional factors, local and international organizations
advocated for a specialized prosecution unit and
sexual offenses court.10
These groups encountered strong resistance from
some sectors of the legal community. For example,
against substantial available evidence, former Chief
Justice Johnnie N. Lewis stated in October 2006
that: There is no need for such a court right now as
our court systems can handle those cases.11 Many
lawyers were also not supportive of the idea of a specialized prosecution unit or court, or even the new
law. Indeed, various members of the legal community advocated for its overturn, claiming it was unfair
to and wicked against defendants.12 Nonetheless,
a trio of interlinked and mutually reinforcing specialized structures was instituted, encompassing the
police, prosecution, and courts.
Criminal Court E was eventually established by an
amendment of the Judiciary Law of 1972, Chapter
25, which was published in handbill on September
23, 2008. The court opened in December 2008,
with the Danish government (through the PeaceBuilding Fund and managed by the United Nations
Population Fund [UNFPA]) providing substantial
financial support. Over US$200,000 went toward
refurbishment of the court itself, including television
sets for in-camera proceedings, as specified in the
amendment to chapter 14 of the Penal Code.13
Other elements of support to the court included
specialized training and study abroad programs.
Following this development, an SGBV Crimes Prosecution Unit, under the Ministry of Justice, was formally opened in February 2009. Its intention was to
enhance prosecution services for these crimes,
providing a concentrated prosecution unit, specially trained in the prosecution of these crimes, and
in providing support for victims (Liberia 2009, 7).
As noted above, the WACPS special investigative
unit was also formed at this time within the Liberia
National Police, designed to deal with SGBV cases
10
Liberia has a number of long-established specialized courts. The Judiciary Law of 1972 specifies the existence of labour, debt, monthly
and probate, juvenile, tax, traffic, and civil courts. Subsequent to the opening of Criminal Court E, in September 2008, the countrys first
commercial court was opened, on which three judges handle the backlog of cases on financial and commercial disputes.
11
See Liberia: Rapists go Free, IRIN, October 19, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/61369/LIBERIA-Rapists-go-free.
12
Peter N. Toby, Liberia: Lawyers Denounce Rape Laws As Unjust, AllAfrica, August 31, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201008310721.html.
13
Liberian Leader Dedicates Criminal Court E, Press release (Monrovia: Executive Mansion, December 3, 2008),
http://www.emansion.gov.lr/2press.php?news_id=972&related=7&pg=sp.
FIGURE 2. CRIMINAL COURT E IN CONTEXT OF OTHER SGBV REFORMS
STAGE 1:
LNP Women
and Children
Protection Services
STAGE 2:
Specialized
SGBV Crimes
Prosecution Unit
STAGE 3:
Specialized Sexual
Offenses Criminal
Court E
at the police level in tandem with the SGBV Crimes

Unit. Since its inception, approximately 245 investigators have been trained. Referrals to these institutions come from a variety of service providers,
notably the Ministry of Gender GBV unit, which was
started up to provide counseling and legal and referral services to survivors, as well as to monitor data,
raise awareness, and provide education.14
other counties are dealt with by conventional, nonspecialized circuit courts, and are not prioritized over
other forms of cases. One circuit court exists in each
of these other 14 counties.
FIGURE 3. POLITICAL MAP OF LIBERIA
D. FEATURES OF CRIMINAL COURT E

Criminal Court E was designed to deal exclusively
with sexual offenses. To that end, it has original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of rape, sodomy,
corruption of minors, sexual abuse, and sexual assault
that take place in Montserrado County, where the
capital Monrovia is located. This precludes any other
court in Montserrado County, whether magistrate or
circuit court, from hearing any sexual offense cases.
If a sexual offense is reported to a magistrate court in
Montserrado County, that court has no jurisdiction,
cannot issue a writ, or determine probable cause,
and must instead pass it on to Criminal Court E.
While the law envisages divisions of Criminal Court
E in other counties, the Monrovia court remains the
only specialized sexual offenses court established
thus far in Liberia. It is important to note the limited
geographical scope of Criminal Court E, although
approximately one-third of Liberias citizens live
in Montserrado County, the most urbanized of
Liberias counties. Sexual offenses reported in the 14
Source: Open source map.
14
United Nations, Gender Based Violence Unit of the Ministry of Gender and Development, Liberia (2008), UN Secretary-Generals Database
on Violence against Women,
http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/searchDetail.action?measureId=33910&baseHREF=country&baseHREFId=766.
In Montserrado, due to the large number of SGBV

cases, Criminal Court E is placed in a unique position in Liberia in terms of the load it must bear. This
is because for other types of cases, magistrates may
undertake a preliminary examination to determine
probable cause even where they do not have jurisdiction to hear the case at the subordinate level. This
process of preliminary examination is able, in theory,
to serve as a filter, eliminating cases where there is
no probable cause for the state to prosecute before
they are transferred to the circuit court. There is no
such filter for Criminal Court E, however, and without
this preliminary step, it is not until the grand jury has
been arraigned for the case that a determination of
whether the state has sufficient cause to proceed to
trial is made. In the eventual trial, a 15-person jury
will sit, unless this right is waived by the accused.
The law establishing Criminal Court E also provides

for two judges to be assigned to share the caseload.
This distinguishes the court from conventional circuit courts, which only have one assigned judge.15
However, despite this provision, Criminal Court E has
only ever operated with a single judge, for reasons
that are not clear. The first judge assigned, a female
former Deputy Minister of Justice and Law Professor who was instrumental in supporting the courts
formation while operating in the Executive Branch,
moved to the United States to undertake graduate
study not long after her appointment. In the interim
period, the court was presided over by another
female judge. In early 2013, the initially appointed
judge finally took up her position on the court, with
the second judge returning to normal circuit court
duty rather than continuing at Criminal Court E.
TABLE 3. THE MODEL SOUTH AFRICAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURTS

THE MODEL SOUTH AFRICAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURTS
Background
South Africas first specialized sexual offenses court was established in March 1993 at
the Wynberg Magistrates Court.
By the end of 2005, 74 specialized courts had been established nationwide.
The courts were intended to address very high rape figures, and in particular, mitigate
the problem of secondary victimization.
Key Aspects
of the Process
Unlike in Criminal Court E, the Wynberg Court had in-camera rooms where children
could give evidence with a social worker acting as intermediary. This option had to be
requested and justified by the prosecutor.
Successes
Conviction rates were generally higher than in non-specialized courts, and there was a
decrease in case timelines from report to finalization.
Challenges
Courts were underfunded, carried high caseloads, and suffered from high staff turnover,
particularly for prosecutors.
Secondary victimization remained an issue due to the adversarial nature of trial,
particularly in cross examination.
Courts did not have a specific establishing framework, and had poor visibility in remote
areas and a lack of well-trained, experienced court personnel.
There was no monitoring and evaluation mechanism developed to continually assess the
courts.
The program was subsequently discontinued, and there are now only nine sexual
offenses courts remaining South Africa.
The Future
In 2013, with sexual violence a continuing issue, the South African government
announced that it would be reintroducing the sexual offenses courts; 22 will be in use by
the end of 201314.
Source: Cossins (2009); Altbeker (2003).

15
10
By contrast, the specialized commercial court, which opened in 2011, has three judges assigned to it.
Criminal Court E, located in the judiciary headquarters (the Temple of Justice) in Monrovia, was based
largely on the template of South Africas specialized
sexual offenses courts. Along with its original and
exclusive jurisdiction, it is distinguished from other
courts through its emphasis on victim-friendly processes. In particular, as noted above, witness testimony is given in camera, which means the victim
gives evidence into a microphone from within a
witness room closed to observers, with television
screens in court showing only the back of the victims
head. This feature is designed to make court a less
harrowing experience for the survivor, as she need
not confront the accused face to face in the court,
nor face an intimidating gallery of onlookers while
recounting events and delivering testimony. This
aspect is compulsory; the law does not allow for a
waiver of the in-camera element by the survivor, nor
at the judges discretion. Further, only the lawyers
and a limited number of family members generally
witness proceedings in Criminal Court E.
Except for these features, Criminal Court E remains

a conventional adversarial common law style court
in designand layout. Since 201011, it has benefited
from the piloting of a new court reporter program, in
which a limited number of practitioners are trained to
use advanced recording and voice recognition software. When the equipment is operational, this allows
for far more efficient and accurate court reporting
than is the norm in Liberia, where the task is generally undertaken on a typewriter, and also limits the
frequent need for lawyers and witnesses to repeat
statements for the benefit of the typist. However, in
common with the wider Temple of Justice building,
Criminal Court E is hampered by intermittent electricity outages. In terms of operational budget, the
courts costs are incorporated fully into the judiciarys
budget. According to the financial comptroller, its
running costs are the same as for other non-specialized courts, and it has the same working set-up of
clerks, marshals, and so on, who are conventional
judiciary employees.
FIGURE 4. JUSTICE SYSTEM ENTRY POINTS
Via Medical
Service
Provider
Via Liberia
National
Police
Report to
and
Investigation
by WACPS
Via NGO or
INGO
Via MoGD
GBV unit
Via SGBV
Crimes
Prosecution
Unit
Source: Authors summary.16

16
INGO refers to international nongovernmental organization.
11
III. Successes and Challenges
There were three main interrelated motivating factors that drove the institution of Criminal Court E and
the other specialized SGBV-focused justice sector
structures, the WACPS and SGBV Crimes Unit. These
motivations emanated primarily from a clear understanding of prevailing deficiencies in the wider conventional justice system. First and foremost, the creation of the new court and special investigative units
was intended to make the process more victim centered, assuaging as much as possible the different
costsfinancial, social, and psychologicalwhich
frequently dissuaded the victim from pursuing the
case through the formal justice system. Second, it
was intended to be a more efficient process, eliminating the delays pervasive in the conventional courts so
that a larger number of survivors would have timely
access to justice, with a corresponding dent in the
prevailing culture of impunity. Third, it was hoped
that the court would increase the visibility of the
issue, and serve as a deterrent to potential offenders.
In addition to consideration of the courts success in
pursuit of these goals, this section will also consider
two other wider factors: the sustainability of Criminal
Court E in the long run, and its continued legitimacy.
These five key concepts (victim centeredness, efficiency, visibility, sustainability, and legitimacy) provide a viable, logical structure in which to assess the
successes and challenges of Criminal Court E. The
special requirement for a particularly victim-centered
approach for sexual offenses is coupled with the fundamental rule of law principles of a timely trial (efficiency), where justice is seen to be done (visibility),
by a court whose authority is clear and respected
(legitimacy). However, it should be noted that these
elements are, in reality, largely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. For instance, from a victims perspective, if the process is not efficient, it cannot be truly
victim centered, as these delays will result in accrued
costsfinancial, social, or psychological. Similarly,
a process that is not visible and efficient will not
be viewed as legitimate from a wider societal perspective. As such, quantitative questions (does the
court hear enough cases?) and qualitative indicators
(how victim friendly are the courts procedures and
outcomes?) cannot be considered divorced from
each other.
FIGURE 5. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL SPECIALIZED COURT IN FCS
Visible
Efficient
Victim-Centered
process
Legitimate
Successful
Specialized
Sexual Offenses
Court
12
Sustainable
A. VICTIM-CENTERED PROCESS
The lawyer is looking down at her. The

little girl says nothing. It was in open court,
it was embarrassing, the child couldnt talk.
Everyone was there sitting looking at her.
The man who raped her too.
Womens Rights NGO Program Officer
i) Court procedures
The above memory of observing a rape trial involving
a minor in open court prior to the opening of Criminal
Court E, recounted by a member of a womens
rights NGO, shows why many felt the existing
judicial process was not considerate to the needs
of the victim. Criminal Court E was an opportunity
to address this within the context of the court itself.
Ensuring court procedures are victim centered is of
particular importance, as a court appearance can
represent perhaps the most visible and exposing
aspect of the process for a victim. It is here that the
social and psychological costs highlighted earlier can
be especially pronounced.
The law addressed this concern through its requirement that the trials be held in camera. As described
above, this means that the victim gives testimony
from a closed witness booth in sight only of the
judge, and testimony is broadcast via microphone
and video screen, with a video camera relaying to
a screen only the back of the victims head. The aim
was to reduce the secondary trauma for the survivor,
shielding her from having to confront the perpetrator face to face, and also to protect the identity of
the victim from observers and the press (who are not
permitted in court without special dispensation).
This aspect of Criminal Court E proceedings has been
exceedingly controversial. Generally, the administration of justice must be public, with members of the
public and the media having the right to attend all
court hearings and report fully on trials. This open
justice principle is central to the rule of law, providing scrutiny of the trial process. Also critical to the
rule of law is the constitutional right of the accused
to confront his or her accuser.
17
The in-camera element of Criminal Court E trials

seems to run counter to these general principles,
and as such, has been subject to much criticism
within Liberia. A UNFPA report on the SGBV Crimes
Unit referred to the resentment of the Liberian legal
community: This procedural by-pass has attracted
ferocious criticism from practicing defense lawyers, as
well as other legal luminaries. Some of the criticisms
are genuine and includes denying defendant the
fundamental due process of the law, firstly. It violates
constitutional requirement where the adversarial
system is practice of how a trial should be run in the
Republic of Liberia, secondly (Saffa Abdulai 2010,
20). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Liberia
in 2012 ruled that the in-camera element did not
violate the Liberian Constitution.17 This decision,
while binding, remains highly controversial.
It remains extremely difficult to properly assess the
victims role and experience without reference to
user/perception surveys or other qualitative data.
However, the in-camera element was generally
viewed as positive by interviewees engaged with the
process from a victims perspective, who perceived
that it made the court itself a less harrowing
experience for victims, particularly with regard to
the recounting of traumatic testimony. However,
from the perspective of a prosecutor charged with
securing a guilty verdict from the jury, the impact
of the in-camera element is less clear-cut. While in
theory it should enable the victim to feel more secure
and comfortable and therefore assist in the eliciting
of effective testimony, one U.S.-trained former sex
crimes prosecutor noted one disadvantage. As she
put it: Bad as it sounds, when you are trying to get
a conviction in front of a jury, that moment where
the witness points out the perpetrator in court, that
is golden. You need a victim to look at her accuser
and cry.
It may well be that the utility of the in-camera trials
depends on the particular case and the situation
of the victim. Under the current law, however, the
procedure is compulsory. This may make sense in the
context of Criminal Court E, where the vast majority
of cases have concerned the rape of children. In the
August 2012 term of the court, 20 out of 23 cases on
the docket were statutory rape cases, which place
Case of Musa Soloman Fallah v. Republic of Liberia, July 2011, available on www.liberlii.org.
13
the need for a secure, non-intimidating process

in particularly stark relief. However, the apparent
prioritization of child cases by the prosecution, while
understandable, has perhaps not helped in securing
convictions. Cases involving children are notoriously
hard to prosecute in any country. In Liberia, where
culturally young children (particularly girls) are not
generally used to communicating vocally to adults
(especially those outside the family), eliciting the
necessary descriptive detail is very challenging.
Further, along with making it more difficult to secure
convictions, there is a danger that in prioritizing
cases involving child victims (which are more widely
accepted as criminal acts suitable for the court), the
court could serve to legitimate the ingrained cultural
perception that rape of adult women is less serious,
and therefore not a matter for the courts.
Along with the in-camera element, interviewees
also highlighted the leadership of a female judge as
important in ensuring a victim-centered court process, pointing to the reality that the vast majority of
cases concern female victims. As mentioned earlier,
since the courts inception, two female judges have
served. The previous judge selected was not, however, able to address important issues affecting the
functioning of the court, such as deficient court management, the maintenance of discipline in the courtroom, and the need for the consistent, predictable
sentencing of offenders. It was suggested by a prominent Liberian lawyer that the nomination of a
male judge to Criminal Court E at some future point
would help to address the perception among many
men, even in the legal community, that the court is a
sort of special interest womens court.18
ii) Wider considerations for a victim-centered process
Regardless of their impact, it is important to set the
efforts within Criminal Court E in perspective against
the wider process of accessing justice. A few points
are especially important. First, to minimize social
and psychological costs, confidentiality and discretion must be maintained for the victim at all stages
of the process, as the victim interacts with medical,
14
law enforcement, and prosecution personnel. A victims safety and security must also be ensured. Few
of those interviewed were confident that this was
the case, however, due to disparities in capacity and
approach, the lack of effective coordination, and the
non-uniformand frequently ad hocreferral pathways. Second, financial cost is a key factor in whether
many Liberians can pursue justice, including in cases
of SGBV. Currently, as for other court cases, bringing
a case to Criminal Court E remains an expensive process, due to factors such as work time lost and even
travel costs to attend court. The formal justice system
institutions have tried to address this financial reality
by means of two separate endowment funds, one
operated by the Ministry of Gender and the other
associated with the SGBV Crimes Unit. However, as
was highlighted at an SGBV taskforce meeting, these
resources are generally acknowledged as insufficient
and inconsistently administered.19
iii) Utilizing informal processes
There is a deeper, difficult question that must be
asked about the requirements of a victim-centered
process as it intersects with the best interests of
the victim and the concept of victim autonomy. As
alluded to above, the formal systems focus on combating impunity is oftentimes at odds with the goal
of reconciliation that underpins indigenous Liberian
dispute-resolution processes. This seems to create a
tension between the goal of creating a victim-centered process and the fact that this process within
the formal system is not one that most victims are
familiar with or would ordinarily choose to enter.
As one UN representative put it: The Ministry of
Gender and those who support them are obsessed
with fighting impunity, which leads to a focus on the
flawed formal judicial process which often doesnt
respect the true will or best interests of the victim.
The idea that entering the formal justice process to
pursue justice could be against the best interests
of the victim seems counterintuitive and contradicts the conventional wisdom that dominates the
SGBV discourse in Liberia. Yet, as it has been noted,
from a victims perspective, the financial, social, and
18
It is important to note that even by Liberias low standards, representation of women in the judiciary remains chronically low at 8 percent,
according to the Ministry of Gender.
19
This was the consensus view of members when the issue was raised at a meeting of the Governments SGBV taskforce.
psychological costs necessarily involved in going

through the formal process (even where victim-sensitive steps like in-camera proceedings exist) means
that this is often the case. A truly victim-centered
approach therefore also requires an understanding
and acceptance of why a victim, making a rational
choice based on financial and cultural costs, may
not want to pursue his/her case in the formal justice
system at all. Further, without extremely effective
mechanisms to assuage these costs as much as possible, there is still less incentive for someone to enter
the system, given the fact that even a determination
of guilt gives no tangible recompense to the victim.
What is more, in a situation where the perpetrator is
known to the victim, the victim will likely suffer social
sanction. Dealing with the case outside of the formal
system is thus more likely to produce a favorable outcome, where financial recompense is paid. There is
simply no corporeal payback for the investment of
taking a case through the extremely lengthy formal
criminal justice process.
The latter reality has led to the current situation

in which traditional processes play no formal role
in combating SGBV. As a representative of the
National Council of Chiefs and Elders, Ma Musu E.
Coleman, describes the situation, Police and Courts
tell chiefs and tribal governors when they come to
the system that they shouldnt have looked into it
that it wasnt their business.
This state of affairs raises an important question

about the singular focus of support upon a formal
justice mechanism like Criminal Court E for victims of
SGBV. Bearing in mind its much higher case volumes
and higher trust and acceptance among citizens, is
there a potential role for informal justice mechanisms
in combating SGBV? One recent study addressed
this notion:
The main issues with this perspective are twofold.

First, it can be argued that these formal justice
approaches do not seem to have yielded significant
gains for women in Liberia thus far. Second, there
is little evidence that traditional leaders do not take
women into account. Studies show few complaints
against traditional processes, while formal court
criticisms are rife.20 However, as there has been no
specific research work done on this issue relating to
SGBV, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions
on victim preferences. Regardless, there is a danger
that a singular focus on Criminal Court E and other
formal system processes to address SGBV is an inadequate solution to the magnitude of the problem.
The customary justice mechanisms continue to

be useful in Liberia for a number of reasons.
They are quick, accessible, cost-effective, and
remain socially and culturally relevant in the lives
of most communities in Liberia. However, their
jurisdiction over sexual and gender based violence cases cannot be understood in isolation
from the traditional beliefs, values, and practices that legitimise and, therefore, perpetuate
violence against women. (Liberia and UN Joint
Programme 2011, 51)
20
For most international donors and other supporters,

too, there is a strong aversion to the participation of
traditional leaders. As a senior advisor to the Liberian
government on SGBV stated, There should be no
sexual offenses dealt with by traditional leaders. The
system is too patriarchal. We must instead focus
on making the formal system more accessible.
The perceived barriers to informal processes dealing
with SGBV cases have resulted in the current unique
emphasis on the Liberian formal criminal justice
system overall, and as such, puts a spotlight on its
shortcomings.
See, among others, Isser, Lubkemann, and NTow (2009).
15
B. EFFICIENCY
i) Numbers
than other non-specialized circuit courts. UNMIL

statistics from the most recent completed court year,
2012, are highly instructive,21 showing that only five
trials were completed in that year. The vast majority
of cases the court considered, rather than brought
to trial, were dropped or dismissed under section
18 of the Criminal Procedure Law. This provision
of the law is designed to protect the constitutional
rights of pretrial detainees to a speedy trial and the
presumption of innocence, and to not be deprived of
liberty except in accordance with due process of law.
This, in essence, means that the systems inefficiency
in bringing cases through to trial results in many of
those accused of rape going free (in accordance with
the law). Indeed, fully 93 percent of cases disposed
of by Criminal Court E in 2012 ended in this way. In
this situation, the ends of justice are not served for
the victims, or for those accused, who spend long
periods in pretrial detention.
Criminal Court E completed just 18 trials in the four

years from 2009 to 2012. Detailed analysis undertaken
by UNMIL in 2011 shows that Criminal Court E has
not heard significantly more sexual offense cases
The key question is: why has Criminal Court E been

unable to complete more trials? In order to answer
this, we must first consider briefly the requirements
for the effective disposition of a case by this court.
The undue delay in prosecuting such cases

will now be a thing of the past.
UNMIL Independent Human Rights Expert, 2008
The above quote, reported in a local newspaper as
Criminal Court E was launched in 2008, reveals a central hope associated with the court. It should address
the delay in hearing SGBV cases, thereby increasing
access to justice for survivors, improving the victimfriendliness of the process through decreasing timeframes, and countering the prevailing impunity for
most perpetrators. It is for perceived failings in these
respects that Criminal Court E has been called most
often into question.
FIGURE 6. NUMBER OF TRIALS COMPLETED BY CRIMINAL COURT E
6
5
4
3
Number of Trials Completed by

Criminal Court E (per year)
2
1
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: UNMIL Legal and Judicial Support Services.

21
16
The author is grateful to UNMIL for releasing to him a summary document 2012 Criminal Court E Data in advance of the formal publishing
of this data.
FIGURE 7. CRIMINAL COURT E: HOW CASES WERE DISPOSED OF IN 2012
4%
2%
1%
Completed Trial - 5 cases
5%
Guilty Plea - 2 cases
88%
Plea Bargain - 1 case

Dropped/Dismissed under s18
(docketed) - 6 cases
Dropped/Dismissed under s18
(non-docketed) - 99 cases
Source: UNMIL, 2012 Criminal Court E Data (forthcoming).
ii) Prerequisites
iii) Issues involving the police and prosecutors office
It is important to consider that the court does not

operate in a vacuum. No one element of the justice
system can be considered in isolation from the other
interdependent links in the chain. Criminal Court E
relies heavily upon the quality and efficiency of the
SGBV Crimes Unit in effectively bringing, preparing,
and presenting viable cases in a timely manner. The
victim and the accused, as well as their witnesses,
must be prepared and present when required. The
prosecution in turn depends upon the effective
investigative work of the police, frequently the
WACPS, in the first instance. When this is deficient,
the rest of the process is compromised. In Liberia,
cases within the jurisdiction of the circuit court
must go through the grand jury process, whereby
it is determined the state has sufficient cause to
proceed. For the trial itself, a jury must be selected
and present for the trial.
The court, for its part, has to manage these different
constituent parts of the process effectively. This
places a heavy emphasis on basic administration and
court management. Judges must also move cases
forward expeditiously, not allowing parties to delay
the process interminably.
From interviews conducted by the author, it is

clear that Criminal Court E suffers not only from its
own deficiencies, but also from those of the other
institutions involved. Indeed, the inefficiency of the
SGBV Crimes Unit was a major reason cited for the
low number of cases disposed of. As one former
international advisor put it: The SGBV Crimes
Unit is just incredibly disorganized. There is a lack
of coordination and appreciation of who exactly
should do what. There is really low capacity beyond
the two lead prosecutors, and with workshops and
travel, even they dont spend the necessary time.
The prosecution of rape, like other offenses, is not
systematized and does not follow bureaucratic
procedures. The prosecutors in turn cite the
ineffective investigation by police as obstructing
their work.
The police, of course, generally function as initial
gatekeepers to the whole justice system. Petty corruption at a low level is rife. The demand for payment
to facilitate investigation/arrest is frequently cited as
an issue, particularly in rural areas where police transportation is especially difficult. Even more importantly, interviews indicated a perception among the
17
police that their role is to arrest the accused rather

than to investigate the crime. This fits with the prevailing norm whereby establishing actual proof of
guilt is seldom the central element of the process.
Specifically to SGBV, the lack of forensic capability is
a constant refrain from Liberian justice practitioners
when asked why prosecutions are so hard to secure.
There is currently a donor-supported pilot program
of swabs testing, and while swabs cannot identify a
specific perpetrator, they can, if used properly, show

definitively that, in rape cases, for example, intercourse took place. The Swedish government is also
funding the development of a mobile forensics lab.
These efforts may yield improvements, but there is
currently an inadequate foundation from the police
through to the prosecution, which greatly hinders
the ability of Criminal Court E to dispose of cases
effectively.
FIGURE 8. PROGRESSION OF SGBV CASE THROUGH CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
No
Arrest
CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY
1
Crime
Reported
2
Investigation
3
Arrest
No
Cause
Not
Guilty
4
Grand
Jury
5
Trial
PRISON
KEY
Stage in
Exit
Criminal Criminal
Justice Justice
Process Process
iv) Issues involving the grand jury and jury systems

Within the courts control, the grand jury and jury systems are a major factor in the slow progression of
cases (Gongloe 2010). The chief prosecutor of the
SGBV Crimes Unit highlighted that there is insufficient grand jury in Montserrado County to indict all
22
18
the cases that come to the grand jury during the 42

days it sits during a term of court. As for the jury
itself, the process is disorganized and subject to
abuse. Evidence collected by UNMIL Legal and Judicial Support Services suggests that the Liberian jury
system substantially reduces the numbers of cases
that can be tried during any one circuit court term.22
By way of example, in its August 2010 end-of-term analysis report on the circuit courts, LJSSD noted that seven trials were conducted by
Criminal Court A during the August term alone, six of which were non-jury trials in which defendants had waived the right to a jury trial. By
contrast, in the February and May 2010 terms, in which jury trial was not waived in any case, only one case was tried at Criminal Court A
during the respective terms.
v) General inefficiency
Finally, Criminal Court E is dogged by various continuing issues such as poor court administration,
logistical problems, personnel tardiness and nonappearance, poor preparation by lawyers, unnecessary adjournments, and delaying tactics by defense
lawyers who know that the longer the case runs, the
smaller the chance that a conviction can be secured.
An UNMIL observer noted that lawyers will frequently
ask for time to read the transcripts before they cross
examine. As one civil society actor said: By the time
case gets to court it is losing weight all the time. The
slow pace of justice is the main issue. For victims of
SGBV, the slower the pace, the smaller the chance of
the perpetrator being convicted and the more costly
the process financially, psychologically, and socially
(as outlined above).
It is important to note that these issues are not
specific to Criminal Court E, but rather reflect the
general malaise of the Liberian justice system as a

whole. Liberias courts generally dispose of few cases
and complete very few trials. According to UNMILs
court statistics, in 2011, there were 2,118 cases on
the 12 circuit court dockets for which records were
available.23 Only 44 trials were completed in that
period,24 meaning that on average, a circuit court
completed just four trials in the legal year.25 This
is strikingly similar to the trial completion figures
from Criminal Court E, and is despite judiciary-wide
efficiency-focused initiatives such as the implementation of a new recordkeeping system in 2010 11.
The court and SGBV Crimes Unit were, in essence,
an attempt to circumvent the chronic deficiencies
of Liberias anemic criminal justice system, insulating SGBV cases from its problems. They have clearly
failed to do so, since in addition to having to deal
with the inherently greater complexities of SGBV
cases, Criminal Court E also demonstrates all of the
judiciarys wider institutional weaknesses.
FIGURE 9. INTER-LINKED NATURE OF THE JUSTICE PROCESS
GRAND JURY, to
ADJUDICATION
Criminal Court E
PROSECUTION
SGBV
Crimes Unit
INVESTIGATION
Liberia National Police

23
This figure includes cases carried over from previous court terms.
24
Trials completed include all those ending in conviction, acquittal, or hung jury. Cases otherwise disposed of include guilty pleas and plea
agreements; nolle prosequoi pursuant to Section 18.1 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL); and failure to proceed pursuant to Section 18.2 CPL,
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal S.20.10 CPL.
25
Figures taken from UNMIL (2011).
19
C. SUSTAINABILITY AND LEGITIMACY
It [Criminal Court E] is something of a white

elephant introduced by the international
community, and the government needs to
properly embrace it.
Senior UN Advisor on SGBV
Sustainability and legitimacy are interlinked concepts. Many of the factors that contribute to sustainability are also prerequisites to legitimacy. These
concepts can be considered from the point of view of
three different Liberian constituencies with a stake in
the SGBV court: the Liberian government, the Liberian legal community, and the general population.
i) Buy-in of the Liberian government
It is generally acknowledged that the international
community played a driving role in pushing for and
supporting action on SGBV, including the launch of
Criminal Court E. Some who were involved in the
formation of the court went so far as to label it a
demand of the international community. This, in
itself, is not necessarily a negative phenomenon;
indeed, the same could be said for many development-focused initiatives in Liberia. However, in the
long run, for an initiative to be successful, a transition
must take place from this internationally supported
founding to the meaningful local ownership that is
a prerequisite to the sustainability and legitimacy
of any development initiative. Ownership demands
that responsibility is taken for an initiatives continuing success, for financial investment in the project,
and for a commitment to its long-term goals. In the
case of Criminal Court E, the challenge is complex;
the court must seek to avoid the problems of the
system, yet for sustainability and legitimacy, it must
be considered as part of the system.
Respondents in this study all had keen awareness of
SGBV as a magnet for donor funds. As one representative of the UN correctly stated, Rape is a political tool par excellence for money and international
recognition. As a result, some expressed concern
about the role of the Liberian government in Criminal
Court E and other SGBV initiatives, and whether this
was more indicative of government acquiescence in
pursuit of donor funds than meaningful participa-
26
20
tion based on true commitment to the issue. This

is a significant concern in a country such as Liberia,
where donor funds represent such a high proportion
of available financial resources amid general scarcity.
In terms of Criminal Court E, while actors complained
of underfunding, the court is fully incorporated into
the financial budget of the judiciary and treated the
same as any other of our courts, according to the judiciarys financial controller. This is a very positive sign.
However, financial support does not necessarily mean
strong institutional support. Generally, interviewees
seemed to feel there was surface level appearance
and limited genuine investment.26 A representative
of the UN said: Criminal Court E is still viewed as a
project, not a component of the Liberian system.
One donor report from 2010 stated that: Within the
MOJ [Ministry of Justice] itself, and the entirety of
the judiciary, there is a lack of willingness and owner
ship of the new dynamics that unfolded with the creation of Criminal Court E and the establishment of
the (SGBV) Crimes Unit (Saffa Abdulai 2010, 14).
One prominent adjudicator felt that the appointment
of less experienced judges to sit on Criminal Court
E has made it difficult for the court, and reflected a
judiciary that is placating donors and key voices in
the Executive without demonstrating real buy-in.
ii) The support of the Liberian legal community
Another important sphere of ownership is the
Liberian legal community. Poor understanding of
context and cultural norms can yield unintended and
highly counterproductive consequences. The court,
and SGBV initiatives in general, initially attracted
some resentment, for a number of reasons. First, the
legal community remains dominated by men, many
of whom, in common with prevailing social norms,
did not consider rape a matter for the court. As one
magistrate noted, Thats family business in Liberia,
not court business. Others resented the focus of
finances and interest on what was viewed as a boutique womens program. One lawyer commented
on the fact that the SGBV Crimes Chief Prosecutor,
part of the Ministry of Justice, was getting paid more
than the Solicitor-General, the Chief Prosecutor in
Liberia. Such attitudes made the embedding process for the court more difficult, though they seem
to have subsided somewhat as the initiatives have
become established.
Quote from a former international adviser to the SGBV Crimes Unit.
iii) The general population: prison conditions and

pretrial detention
In general in Liberia, the perceived legitimacy of the
formal justice system, to the extent it exists, stems
not from its playing an effective, respected role in
the life of citizens, but rather from the states ability
to deprive liberty. At the same time, excessive
arbitrary detention, like corruption, can also have a
deleterious impact on the states legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizens. To be seen as fully legitimate,
courts such as Criminal Court E must be viewed as
fair and just, and the justice meted out must apply to
both the victim and the accused.
Those accused of crimes in Liberia, particularly if poor
and unrepresented, frequently face long periods of
pretrial detention in overcrowded prisons. As many
as 79 percent of those currently detained nationwide
have not been brought to trial.27 The average length
of pretrial detention is 169 days.28 This problem,
which involves those accused awaiting trial in prison
conditions that have been described as appalling,29
is the result of pervasive and broad underlying
systemic weaknesses. The largest prison, Monrovia
Central Prison, continues to operate at between
two and three times over its intended capacity30 and
under extremely poor conditions.31 As of September
2012, there were 1,782 people in prison nationwide.
Of those, 1,411 were pretrial detainees (the figure of
79 percent mentioned above). In Monrovia Central
Prison, the pretrial detainee rate as of September
2012 was 87 percent.32 Overall, strong efforts to
address the issue over the past three years have not
yet resulted in a significant improvement in Liberias
pretrial detainee statistics. Moreover, despite this
prison overcrowding and high rate of detention,
victims rarely see convictions.33
Criminal Court E mirrors the poor state of the wider

justice system in terms of the minimal number of trials
it manages to complete (see section III B above).
However, the relevant legal framework exacerbates
this for cases of rape, due to two main factors. First,
as first-degree rape is a non-bailable offense, those
who are arrested must wait in detention for trial.
Second, as a magistrate court may not hold a preliminary examination, there is no assessment of whether
the state has cause to proceed until a grand jury can be
arraigned, a process that can take an extremely long
time. As such, on the strength of an accusation and
subsequent arrest, an accused individual will often
spend punitive periods in pretrial detention before
there is an opportunity for the grand jury to make a
determination of whether there is cause to proceed
at all. While the reasons for the non-bailable provision are clear in safeguarding the rights of the victim,
there is an argument to be made that this affects the
legitimacy of the court by serving to engender sympathy for those accused of this crime, and by encouraging spurious accusations, and that this also runs
counter to the fundamental principle of innocence
until proven guilty.
This issue is linked to the fact that in Liberia perceptions as to the criminal nature and seriousness of rape
vary greatly, particularly in cases where the victim has
reached sexual maturity (regardless of age). There
also seem to be few social sanctions for perpetrators
of rape and sexual violence. As elsewhere, where
laws seek to sanction in excess of societys norms
and expectations, judges and other justice sector
actors will often struggle to implement them effectively, and the systems legitimacy in the eyes of the
population will be affected.
27
Information derived from UNMIL Correction Advisory Units (CAU) nationwide prison records for September 2012.
28
As of September 2012, according to an analysis of the UNMIL CAUs prison records.
29
Amnesty International, Appalling Prison Conditions in Liberia Must Be Improved, (London, Amnesty International, September 21, 2011),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/appalling-prison-conditions-liberia-must-be-improved-2011-09-21.
30
Monrovia Central Prison is designed to hold a maximum of 374 detainees. In September 2012, records showed it contained 947 detainees.
31
According to the U.S. State Departments report: Inadequate provisions for food, sanitation, ventilation, temperature, lighting, basic and
emergency medical care, and potable water contributed to harsh and life-threatening conditions in the countrys 15 prisons and detention
centers. See U.S. Department of State (2011, 3). See also Amnesty International (2011).
32
In September 2012, of 947 detainees, only 121 were sentenced.
33
UNMIL LJSSD found that only 44 trials were completed in 2011 in the 12 circuit courts surveyed. Trials completed account for around half
of all cases disposed of at the circuit court level. See UNMIL (2011).
21
D. VISIBILITY
ii) Deterrence
High profile initiatives such as Criminal Court E, which
seek to address an issue that finds its roots, to a large
extent, in a lack of awareness and troublesome cultural norms, have a potentially valuable role to play
in raising the visibility of the issue among the general
population. Further, where impunity has been prevalent, could the visibility of the court provide a
deterrent effect in relation to potential perpetrators?
i) Increased awareness
Among interviewees, most cited visibility for the
issue and increased awareness as the one clear
success of Criminal Court E. The court, in common
with other specialist gender projects such as the
Ministry of Gender, the SGBV Crimes Unit, and the
WACPS, coupled with the issues inclusion in government rhetoric, has served to raise awareness of the
issue of SGBV and the rights of women generally.
Community-level interviews in Monrovia showed a
general understanding of the fact that there was a
womans court at the Temple of Justice. Many perceived it as linked with the Ministry of Gender and
Development. Younger respondents seemed better
informed, though male interviewees frequently
expressed negative emotions about initiatives perceived as specifically for women. From the admittedly small sample group, it seems that young urban
males perceive many reforms, particularly those
seen as stemming from the Ministry of Gender and
Development, as excluding them. It is likely this level
of negative awareness about the court is limited to
Monrovia and parts of Montserrado, since the reach
of the Criminal Court E and other gender initiatives
is geographically limited.
22
Perspectives from government, international, and

civil society organization (CSO) stakeholders on the
importance of increased visibility normally imbue the
court with a power of deterrence in relation to potential perpetrators. This perceptionthat the existence of sanctions such as judicial mechanisms and
stringent sentencing serve as a deterrent to criminal
behavioris a very conventional view worldwide. In
relation to SGBV in Liberia, one report even went so
far as to proclaim that, on the reason for the high
prevalence of SGBV: It is therefore safe to conclude,
inter alia, that the lack of strong law and state mechanism to deter people from practicing SGBV is the
cause (Saffa Abdulai 2010, 5).
Certainly, severe penalties for SGBV are provided
under the new rape legal framework, with the
assumption that the more severe the penalties, the
greater the deterrent effect. However, this view, while
intuitive, seems largely unsupported by research. In
general, most agree that: Punishment certainty is far
more consistently found to deter crime than punishment severity, and the extra-legal consequences of
crime seem at least as great a deterrent as the legal
consequences (Wright 2010, 5).
Applied to Criminal Court E, there is an almost negligible chance that a case, even if brought to the
system, will result in a conviction. If there is a deterrent effect, it exists in the long periods of pretrial
detention that those accused of SGBV face due to
overcrowded dockets. While this effect would be
welcome, it is not without cost for fundamental rule
of law principles.
IV. Lessons and Recommendations
The international response to the situation

of women in Liberia although touted
as one of the great success stories in
implementing the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 by the
United Nations (UN) and the Liberian
government has not achieved what it set
out to do.
(Nagelhus Schia and de Carvalho 2009, 38)
As shown in the foregoing analysis, Criminal Court E
has struggled to meet expectations initially placed
upon it. The purpose of this closing section is to first
identify basic general lessons learned from the Criminal Court E experience, which may prove instructive in other contexts considering initiatives to
improve legal responses to the issue of SGBV. Following these lessons, a number of specific constructive recommendations for Liberia are made, drawn
from Criminal Court Es successes and challenges.
A. LESSONS FROM THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE
i) On specialized structures generally
First and perhaps most obviously, the experience of
Criminal Court E shows that the existence of a specialized institution does not necessarily, in and of
itself, result in immediate tangible gains for those
seeking to expand access to justice for victims of
SGBV. Similarly, the existence of a detailed and progressive policy framework is only an expression of
intent, which must then be implemented effectively.
Second, where concrete improvements are hard to
identify, there is a tendency to have recourse to the
more abstract importance of symbolic messages
sent by initiatives like Criminal Court E. It is crucial
to recognize that while the initial message sent can
certainly be potent, this will erode if service delivery
is not improved as a result. The message cannot
alone justify the medium. In Liberia, the appearance
of surface-level progress and a focus on symbolic
importance have probably obscured to a certain
extent a lack of significant improvement in service
delivery for SGBV survivors.
ii) On the need for effective initial research on

best practices, pre-project piloting, and ongoing
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
It is not clear that the lessons of the South African
experience, the model upon which Criminal Court
E was based, were considered by those setting up
Criminal Court E. As part of gauging improvements
in service delivery, the vital processes of piloting
and then rigorous evaluation have not been consistently prioritized by those implementing and funding Liberias SGBV programs. A cost-benefit analysis may be useful at this point in time, as it could
provide insights into sustainability, particularly on
how to use resources more effectively. For ambitious projects such as Criminal Court E, especially
in challenging contexts like Liberia where there is
little semblance of a knowledge discourse to draw
on, the need for continuing analysis of the quality of
service delivery takes on even greater importance in
order that approaches may be reoriented in light of
lessons learned. The gathering of reliable information on both quantitative and qualitative indicators
is vital to this endeavor. In Liberia, the specialized
institutions to combat SGBV seem to have operated
free of effective monitoring and agreed benchmarks,
despite the substantial amount of funds invested in
their success. Many of those working alongside the
court have been baffled at the persistently low expectations of donors in terms of the performance of the
court, particularly in view of the high hopes that initially accompanied the project. As one international
advisor described it: Theres no clear output. Why
dont people care? Look at the numbers. The international community is too busy patting itself on the
back for doing something.
iii) On the impact of wider institutional norms
Expectations of specialized structures such as Criminal Court E should be tempered according to wider,
existent justice sector ills. If the experience of Criminal Court E shows anything with absolute certainty, it
is the impossibility of insulating a specialized struc-
23
ture from the deficiencies of the wider institutional

backdrop within which it must function, particularly
while seeking to secure the seemingly opposing
goal of institutional ownership and sustainability. As
such, Criminal Court E has come to mirror exactly the
capacity, administration, and accountability deficits
of the wider Liberian judiciary, while also coping with
the increased complexity of new victim-centered
processes and SGBV cases in general. Addressing
this situation requires corresponding work on core
institutional capacity as well as measures aimed at
improved accountability.
iv) On the capacity-building/accountability
dichotomy
As the main deficits of Criminal Court E reflect
the institutional deficiencies of the judiciary, so
too have the suggested remedies mirrored those
posited at the wider justice sector level. Donors
have focused on the need for capacity building
to improve justice sector performance, seemingly
diagnosing the sectors poor functioning as an issue
of lack of understanding of law or processes. This
approach leads to the funding of workshops and
trainings, where large numbers of justice sector
actors are brought together for onethree days to
receive instruction. This has been particularly so for
actors concerned with SGBV, such as magistrates,
the staff of Criminal Court E, and the SGBV Crimes
Unit. While there is definitely a need for targeted
training, there is little evidence that this approach
is the key element in stimulating improved justice
sector performance. Rather, consistent mentoring
and support is needed, with corresponding external
structures for encouraging accountability for poor
performance. CSO funding efforts must therefore
avoid creating situations where the CSOs are
coerced into cozy relationships with government
institutions because the government is the conduit
for their funding. Such a structure, prevalent in
Liberia, is not conducive to enabling these groups
to hold the government institutions accountable for
their performance.
involve the contemplation of less than perfect,

though improved, scenarios. It should also envisage
long-term approaches, rather than immediate fixes.
In Liberia, the international community has proposed
and supported an unrealistic framework of normative expectations in relation to addressing SGBV.
Resources have been channeled into projects, like
Criminal Court E, that perhaps reflect more donor
and elite Liberian perspectives on immediate needs
and aspirations than a pragmatic understanding
of the requirements of the context. Fragmenting
the issue of legal responses to SGBV, treating it as
a distinct boutique issue rather than an overall
issue of justice sector weakness, has led to the
prioritization of initiatives like Criminal Court E at the
expense of strengthening the needs of rule of law
institutions overall. Moreover, the process has ruled
out the contemplation of a place for informal actors,
who play a far more significant role in the lives of
most Liberian citizens.
vi) On the determinative role of prevailing cultural
norms
Pragmatic approaches also must understand prevailing cultural and social norms, and appreciate
their determinative role and influence. It is fair to say
that Criminal Court E, and wider SGBV initiatives,
have been based on a western, retributive image of
justice, which often runs at odds with prevailing Liberian cultural norms and practices when it comes to
the resolution of disputes and social problems such
as SGBV. Justice is viewed as an end in itself, a universal and necessary good for the victim and wider
community. Perpetrators must be apprehended. Victims require that justice be done. This perspective
can negate much of the cultural, social, and financial
reality for victims, who are generally extremely poor.
This must be understood if a truly victim-centered
approach is to be developed.
v) On the need for pragmatic approaches

The issue of SGBV is uniquely emotive, which, in the
end, helps attract much-needed funding to SGBV
initiatives. Yet the need to do something now to
help survivors must not negate the need, on the part
of both donors and government, for pragmatism
in devising approaches, a pragmatism that should
24
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRIMINAL

COURT E AND THE WIDER JUSTICE SYSTEM
i) A victim-centered process
Increase and systematize financial support for
victims who are taking cases to court. The financial
element is, according to most analyses, the key
determinant affecting access to justice through the
formal justice system, and is especially so for Criminal
Court E. There must be an increase in the financial
support for victims that considers the full financial
burden of taking a case forward. Correspondingly,
the SGBV Crimes Unit, in collaboration with the
Ministry of Gender and Development, must focus
this support on instances where there is sufficient
evidence for a strong case to be built.
Implement accountability and knowledge-gathering mechanisms. In order to better understand the
impact or otherwise of the court in improving victim
experiences, court user scorecards or post-process
interviews should be systematically implemented.
The data collected will be invaluable to any efforts
to refine the approaches of the court to ensure maximum gains to victims.
Consider modifying the in-camera element and
increasing the role of social workers. The South
African approach of having the option (on request
and with justification) of giving evidence in a separate room with the help of an intermediary social
worker seems to be a less rigid approach, and one
that can still be conducive to reducing secondary
trauma for the victim.
utilized: Instead of saying it should not be handled,

we should say that both will work together. That way
we can work with the chief to let him know that to
conceal the case is not good. Traditional leaders, if
adequately informed, could play a vital role, perhaps
via paralegals, in referring serious cases to the formal
system, including Criminal Court E.
Offer paralegal services for SGBV cases. Paralegals
could play an extremely important role in informing
victims of their options. In Monrovia, the SGBV
Crimes Unit case liaison officer plays a paralegaltype role already, assisting with witness identification
and preparation, following up, researching, and
coordinating with victims and witnesses. Paralegals
funded through civil society groups (such as the
current Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
program in Liberia) could, particularly in rural areas,
act as intermediaries between communities, chiefs,
and the formal system. These paralegals, with basic
training in the legal and psycho-social elements,
could support and inform victims as they decide
on whether to pursue their case through the formal
system.
Ensure integration of gender-sensitive approaches
into all justice actor curricula. It is important that
gender-sensitive approaches become a norm
within the justice sector, not just a special interest
approach for addressing SGBV cases. This requires
the mainstreaming and integration of pragmatic
gender-sensitive approaches in all core justice
sector curricula, not as a stand-alone topic, but as a
foundational element informing all processes.
ii) Efficiency
Open one-stop facilities for victims. The current

initiative of the UN Joint Programme on Sexual and
Gender Based Violence to open centers for victims
where medical, psychosocial, legal, and safe house
facilities are provided should be encouraged and
supported. The process of entering the criminal
justice system must be made as simple, safe, and
trauma-free as possible. The decision to proceed
must be the victims, made in full cognizance of the
process involved.
Consider a potential role for traditional leaders.
While there are clear concerns about the role of traditional leaders in dealing with cases of SGBV, the
fact remains that informal actors constitute the dominant power and dispute-resolution structures in most
of the country. Representatives of the National Traditional Council were adamant that a chief must be
Consider a change to the grand jury and jury systems. There are ongoing discussions in Liberia about
modifying the jury and grand jury systems. This
report advocates for an exploration of the potential
for and ramifications of modifying or even abolishing
the grand jury system for the indictment of sexual
offenses. In its place, a simple preliminary examination of probable cause could be undertaken by the
court.
Increase the number of sitting judges to two, as
specified in the statute. One simple step to aid
Criminal Court Es disposition of cases would be
increasing the number of sitting judges from one
to two. This could increase the amount of time the
court spends in session.
25
Increase the duration of court sessions. Terms

of court are extremely short in Liberia. Currently,
Criminal Court E is in session fewer than half the
days in the year, which is simply not enough time to
address the backlog of cases.
Focus training on basic court administration and
management. Criminal Court E suffers from the same
basic administrative and management deficiencies
as other courts in Liberia. While the specialized
elements of the process are important, also vital
is focusing on basic courtroom management,
discipline, and court reporting.
iii) Sustainability/legitimacy
Strengthen the legal involvement in support structures such as the SGBV taskforce. The judiciary in
particular must participate more fully in SGBV coordination processes such as the SGBV taskforce. The
legal pillar in general, which is part of the SGBV taskforce, has not been an active participant (according
to other participants). In particular, the judiciary generally never participated in the process as the court
was being instituted. This absence has continued to
the present.
26
Encourage the setting of benchmark case timelines and effective monitoring of the court in
adhering to a statutory time period for cases.
Where there is insufficient evidence to proceed, such
cases must be dropped. Where the accused has been
detained longer than the statutorily allowed period,
he or she should be released. Prosecutors must know
they have limited time to bring people to trial, and
Criminal Court E should play a more effective role in
monitoring this. If a case is not ready, it should be
dropped. While these are bitter pills to swallow, it is
only through adherence to the law that the accountability needed for improved performance can be
encouraged, from the police through the prosecution to within the court. Initiatives to monitor SGBV
projects through the UN Joint Programme are welcome. Further, the taskforce on SGBV is a valuable
body for the coordination of initiatives. However, the
weakness of civil society in these processes remains
hugely problematic. The justice system generally
needs to be held accountable by civil society for its
poor performance sectorwide, including Criminal
Court E. Currently there is very little incentive to dispose of cases quickly, and very few, if any, sanctions
where poor performance causes the delays. Accountability needs to involve the setting of benchmarks for
prosecution and the courts.
Reference List
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of the Specialised Commercial Crime Court. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
Amnesty International. 2011. Good Intentions Are Not Enough: the Struggle to Reform Liberias Prisons.
London, Amnesty International.
Cossins, Anne. 2009. Prosecuting Child Sexual Assault Cases: To Specialise or Not, That is the Question.
Judicial Commission of New South Wales,
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sexual_assault/cossins-to_specalise_or_not.html.
Dziewanski, Dariusz. 2011. Assessment of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Data in Liberia. Norwegian
Refugee Council, Oslo.
Ebo, Adedeji. 2005. The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia.
Occasional Paper 9. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
Gongloe, Tiawon. 2010. Jury Law Reform. Conference presentation. Unpublished.
Isser, Deborah H., Stephen C. Lubkemann, and Saah NTow. 2009. Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences
with and Perceptions of Local Justice Options. USIP Peaceworks, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.
Liberia, Government of. 2008. Poverty Reduction Strategy. Monrovia,
available at http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Final%20PRS.pdf.
. Ministry of Justice. 2009. Sexual Assault and Abuse Prosecution Handbook. For County Attorneys
and Prosecutors of the SGBV Crimes Unit. Ministry of Justice, Monrovia.
. Ministry of Gender And Development. 2011. Annual Report. Ministry of Gender and Development,
Monrovia.
Liberia, Government of, and UN Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender Based Violence. 2011.
In-depth Study on Reasons for High Incidence of Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Liberia
Recommendations of Prevention and Response. Government of Liberia, Monrovia.
Nagelhus Schia, Niels, and Benjamin de Carvalho. 2009. Nobody Gets Justice Here! Addressing Sexual and
Gender-Based Violence and the Rule of Law in Liberia. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs.
Omanyondo, Marie-Claire O. 2005. Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment.
World Health Organization, Geneva.
Saffa Abdulai, Emmanuel. 2010. Evaluation: Strengthening of Prosecution of SGBV Offences through Support
to the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit (SGBV CU). Government of Liberia and the
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Monrovia.
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TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia). 2009. Consolidated Final Report. Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Monrovia.
UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia). 2008. Research on Prevalence and Attitudes to Rape in Liberia,
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. 2010. LJSSD Report on Circuit Courts. Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division, UNMIL,
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Division, UNMIL, Monrovia.
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Monrovia.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2011. Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems
in Africa. Survey Report. United Nations, New York.
U.S. Department of State. 2011. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Liberia.
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
Vinck, Patrick, Phuong Pham, and Tino Kreutzer. 2011. Talking Peace A Population-Based Survey on
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28
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LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED

SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

I. SGBV and Access to Justice in the Liberian Context............................................2

II. Criminal Court E and the Legal Response to SGBV in Liberia...............................7

III. Successes and Challenges..................................................................................12

IV. Lessons and Recommendations..........................................................................23

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

I. SGBV and Access to Justice

existent long prior to the war. These norms endure,

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

FIGURE 1. SGBV CASES REPORTED TO THE MINISTRY OF GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

Number of SGBV Cases Reported

B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN LIBERIA

Olivias perpetrator was never caught,

i) The weakness of the formal justice system

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

absent formal justice options and prefer alternative

went to court during that year, and only 2 percent of

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

This different way is what Liberians will refer to

These social or kinship links are often decisive in

TABLE 1. INFORMAL VS INFORMAL JUSTICE FROM VICTIM PERSPECTIVE

Source: Authors summary.

to come and investigate, particularly if the persons

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

a family member. As it was for Olivia, by entering

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

II. Criminal Court E and the Legal Response

Justice. In addition, a new specialized sexual offenses

TABLE 2. FEATURES OF THE NEW LEGALFRAMEWORKON RAPE

1. The legal age of consent is raised to 18 years old.

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

The effect of the legislation alone seems to have

We sat with too many cases, and partners

equipped or coordinated to respond to the complex

See Liberia: Rapists go Free, IRIN, October 19, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/61369/LIBERIA-Rapists-go-free.

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

FIGURE 2. CRIMINAL COURT E IN CONTEXT OF OTHER SGBV REFORMS

Source: Authors summary.

at the police level in tandem with the SGBV Crimes

D. FEATURES OF CRIMINAL COURT E

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

In Montserrado, due to the large number of SGBV

The law establishing Criminal Court E also provides

TABLE 3. THE MODEL SOUTH AFRICAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURTS

Source: Cossins (2009); Altbeker (2003).

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

Except for these features, Criminal Court E remains

FIGURE 4. JUSTICE SYSTEM ENTRY POINTS

Source: Authors summary.16

INGO refers to international nongovernmental organization.

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

III. Successes and Challenges

FIGURE 5. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL SPECIALIZED COURT IN FCS

Source: Authors summary.

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

The lawyer is looking down at her. The

The in-camera element of Criminal Court E trials

LESSONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

the need for a secure, non-intimidating process

LIBERIAS SPECIALIZED SEXUAL OFFENSES COURT:

psychological costs necessarily involved in going

The latter reality has led to the current situation