Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
174056
[Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
February
27,
2007
Atty. Cagaanan:
You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and
raped her and stabbed her, were you the one alone [sic]?
xxxx
Objection
Pros. Edmilao:
Court:
Sustained.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of
age[.] Since you have admitted this in what particular place
wherein [sic] you raped and slew [AAA]?
A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.
Atty. Anonat:
Court:
Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your
penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, Your Honor.
Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?
Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from
her house?
Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?
A Banana skin.
A Outside.
A In front of her.
Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?
Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her?
A A long bolo.
Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?
Atty. Anonat:
Objection
Court:
Sustained.
Pros. Edmilao:
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
Atty. Cagaanan:
Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion,
because you said we?
A Ronie Abapo.
xxxx
A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of
[AAA].
Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina
of [AAA]?
Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA]
was climbing, was she still up there at the orange tree?
A She already came down.
A I removed my t-shirt.
Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her
hand?
Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand
was held by Ronie Abapo?
Atty. Anonat:
Objection, leading.
A Ronie.
Pros. Edmilao:
Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do
then when he was on [sic] the act of raping her?
Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did
you do it?
A Both of us.
Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did
you do next?
Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did
you place her?
A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place.
A We killed her.
Q Why?
A We raped her.
Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse,
was he able to insert his penis into the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A We stabbed her.
A Yes, sir.
A A long bolo.
Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because
[AAA] is [sic] still a small girl?
A Yes, sir.
Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did
you do to [AAA]?
A I walked away, but he called me.
Q Who called you?
A Ronie Abapo.
Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA]
first hit?
A In the stomach.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of
that bolo?
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of
[AAA] also hit?
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to
[AAA]?
A Only one.
A At the stomach.
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the
hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
A I was alone.
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping
with Ronie Abapo?
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed
[sic] on her?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.
xxxx
Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?
A No, sir.
Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?
A In our place.
Q It [sic] it there in your home?
A Already taken.
Q Who got?
A The barangay captain.
Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and
killing of [AAA] aside from here in Court?
A I have already told.
Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?
A My neighbor.
Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?
A Emilio Magallano.
Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?
A Sofronio Aranas.
Q Who else?
A Rico Magallano.
Q Who else?
home. They spotted the victim picking oranges with her three
(3)-year old brother at the back of their house and together
approached her from behind, tied her hands with banana skin
and dragged her to a grassy place.38 Abapo raped the victim
first.39 Thereafter, appellant followed suit.40 Once they had
finished with their dastardly acts, they stabbed and killed the
victim with a long bolo which belonged to appellant.41
Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the
autopsy on AAA's body, it was established that the victim had 6
and 12 o'clock lacerations on her external genital organ. Thus,
it is clear that the rape was consummated.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses
Magallano and Araas on what appellant had confessed to or
told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The
testimonies, it should be conceded, cannot serve as a proof of
extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to
be in writing, among others, to be admissible in evidence. 42
That is why the testimonies are of use in the case as
corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be
defeated by the hearsay rule. The testimonies covered are
independently relevant statements which are not barred by the
hearsay rule.1awphi1.net
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the
truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not
apply. The statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence
as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.43
Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution
witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given
full faith and credit.44
Next, we address appellant's contention that he can only be
convicted of simple rape, as this is the only crime to which he
has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been
dead after his co-accused had allegedly hacked her first,
appellant theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an
impossible crime.
Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that
appellant could have known positively that the victim was
already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only
completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also
speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular
circumstances of the event, appellant's mere conjecture that
AAA had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot be
sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. An
examination of the testimony is again called for, thus:
Pros. Edmilao:
Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was
[AAA] first hit?
A In the stomach.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of
that bolo?
A I cannot remember anymore.
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of
[AAA] also hit?
A At the left side.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to
[AAA]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q How many times?
A Only one.
Q What part of her body was she hit?
A At the stomach.
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the
hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed AAA?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed
[sic] on her?
A He [sic] was already dead.
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still
alive.45
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals should be sustained. However, with the
passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty of
death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty
imposed upon appellant is reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.46
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the
award in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Accordingly,
appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the
amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.47
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CR-HC No. 00193 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the
victim, AAA, in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.
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xxxx
Q. And then?
A. And after Beverly placed the things inside the
compartment, she had with her the key, she
proceeded to a key duplicator in Virra Mall and
had the key duplicated.
A. Sunday, Ma'm.
Q. What kind of kind [sic] was duplicated?
A. The key in the new car of Rene the Honda
Accord.
Court:
COURT:
Q. What does it looked [sic] like?
Who is Butch?
A. Mr. Malibiran, your Honor.
COURT
A. Botong, sir.
18
Who is Botong?
A. Rolando Malibiran, Your Honor.
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
xxxx
Q. Where did they ride on Feb. 5, 1995?
A. In Katipunan, sir.
Q. What did they ride?
19
20
COURT
Luna in Katipunan?
A. V. Luna is going to Katipunan, your Honor. It was
Labor Hospital, your Honor and not V. Luna. Then
Botong told me that on the day he placed the
grenade, he was seeing a guard roving and so
what he did since he was already perspiring at
that time he hurriedly tied the wire in the grenade.
Atty. Rondain:
Iqoute na lang natin.
COURT
Dinali-dali niyang ibinuhol ang alambre. That's her
term.39 (Emphasis Supplied)
What sealed appellant's fate was that, as observed by the
RTC, there were already outstanding warrants of arrest against
appellant and Rolando as early as September 11, 1997; yet
they evaded arrest and were only arrested on December 4,
1998.40 It is well settled that flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.
"The wicked flee, even when no man pursueth; but the
righteous are as bold as a lion."41 Appellant did not even proffer
the slightest explanation for her flight.
All told, this Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant is guilty of the crime as charged. Moreover,
considering the manner in which appellant and Rolando
planned and executed the crime, the RTC was correct in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, and use of explosives. Thus, appellant
is guilty of the crime of Parricide as provided in the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
Article 246. Parricide- Any person who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Moreover, the Revised Penal Code provides for death as the
proper penalty:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
xxxx
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed
in the application thereof:
When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
However, as observed by the CA, with the effectivity of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" on June 24,
21
December 3, 2009
LINTANG
BEDOL,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
22
after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was
given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report was
ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged
loss.1avvphi1
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present
in the next scheduled investigative proceedings set for June
14, 2007 as the Task Force wanted to delve deeper into the
alleged loss by propounding additional questions to Atty. Bedol
during the next scheduled proceedings, such as why he still
had in his possession said documents which should have
already been turned over to the Commission, why he did not
report to the COMELEC or to the police authorities the
purported theft, and other pertinent questions. However,
despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol failed to
appear, giving the impression that respondent [petitioner] Bedol
does not give importance to this whole exercise and ignores
the negative impact his attitude has on this Commission.
Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a
written explanation of his absences which he undertook to
submit on June 13, 2007, but was only received by this
Commission belatedly on July 03, 2007.
On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national
newspapers, in an exclusive interview with the Inquirer and
GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to his side,
and in clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge
by saying that those that are saying that there was cheating in
Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day.
They should file a case now and I will answer their
accusations.(Words in brackets ours)
On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force
Maguindanao head, Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, issued
a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order3 against petitioner
citing various violations of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
viz:
You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this
Commission for having committed during the period between
May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007, acts in violation of specific
paragraphs of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as follows:
1. (a) Your (PES Bedols) failure to attend the
scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he (sic) is
(sic) the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22,
2007; (b) your failure to attend the reset schedule of
the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge
thereof when you attended the previously scheduled
but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on May 25,
2007; (c) your failure to attend the continuation of
hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14,
2007, despite notice to him in open session in the
hearing held on June 11, 2007, and personal service
to you of a subpoena which you duly signed on the
same date; and your failure/refusal to submit your
written explanation of your said absences which you
undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 all of these
failures on your part are violations of paragraphs (b)
and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
23
24
when it was performing its administrative and not its quasijudicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC
may only punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasijudicial functions.
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations
as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions
of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to
give effect to the COMELECs constitutional mandate as
enunciated in Loong v. Commission on Elections,6 which held:
xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the
text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been
niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in
the conduct of our elections.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it
by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may
be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces
the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power,
the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc.
v. Esteva,8 described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other
hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate
the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
25
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27
CELESTINO
MARTURILLAS,
Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Well-rooted is the principle that factual findings of trial courts,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally
binding on the Supreme Court. In convicting the accused in the
present case, the Court not merely relied on this doctrine, but
also meticulously reviewed the evidence on record. It has
come to the inevitable conclusion that petitioner is indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the November 28, 2003
Decision2 and the March 10, 2004 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 25401. The CA affirmed, with
modifications as to the award of damages, the Decision 4 of
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The
RTC had found Celestino Marturillas guilty of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 42091-98. The assailed CA Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, subject to the modification thus indicated, the
judgment appealed from must be, as it hereby is, AFFIRMED.
With the costs of this instance to be assessed against the
accused-appellant."5
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.6
Petitioner was charged with homicide in an Information 7 dated
November 5, 1998, worded as follows:
"[T]hat on or about November 4 1998, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, armed with a gun, and with
intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot one
Artemio Pantinople, thereby inflicting fatal wound upon the
latter which caused his death."8
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the
Peoples version of the facts:
"4. The prosecution presented Lito Santos, Ernita Pantinople,
PO2 Mariano Operario, Alicia Pantinople and Dr. Danilo
Ledesma as its witnesses from whose testimonies, the
following facts were established.
"Lito Santos, a forty-three-year old farmer and resident of
Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City, testified
28
"While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios
body to be touched by anybody. After more than two (2) hours,
the police arrived, together with a photographer by the name of
Fe Mendez of Bunawan District, Davao City who took pictures
of the crime scene.
"PO2 Mariano Operario, Investigation Officer of the
Investigation Section of the Bunawan Police Station, Philippine
National Police, Davao City, testified that about 9:05 in the
evening of November 4, 1998, he received a report of an
alleged shooting incident at Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan
District in Davao City. Together with SPO1 Rodel C. Estrellan
and a member of the mobile police patrol on board their mobile
car, PO2 Operario proceeded immediately to the crime scene.
They reached the crime scene about 10:00 oclock in the
evening of the same date. They found the lifeless body of
Artemio sprawled on the ground. Ernita and Lito then
approached PO2 Operario and informed him that appellant
was the one responsible for the shooting.
"PO2 Operario stayed at the crime scene for about one (1)
hour and waited for the funeral vehicle to pick up the body of
Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2 Operario told
the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he
then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos.
"Armed with the information that appellant was the one
responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario
proceeded to the house of appellant and informed him that he
was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited
appellant to go with him to the police station and also to bring
along with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything.
He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police
station where he was detained the whole night of November 4,
1998. Appellant did not also give any statement to anybody
about the incident. The following day, appellant was transferred
by the police to Tibungco Police Station where he was
detained.
"Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, testified
that on the night of November 4, 1998, she was at home
watching television. She heard a gunshot but did not mind it
because she was already used to hearing the sound of guns
fired indiscriminately in their place.
29
P.
LEDESMA
30
31
CONCLUSION:
Both hands of Celestino Marturillas do not contain gunpowder
nitrates[.]
"19. After preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and
her witnesses PO2 Mariano R. Operario Jr., the police officer
as[s]igned to investigate the shooting of the deceased,
prepared and transmitted, on November 5, 1998, a Complaint
to the City Prosecution Office recommending that Petitioner be
indicted for Murder, attaching therewith the Sworn Affidavits of
Ernita O. Pantinople (Complainant), Lito D. Santos (witness)
and the Sworn Joint Affidavit of SPO1 Rodel Estrellan and PO2
Mariano R. Operario Jr. of the PNP.
xxxxxxxxx
"23. The theory of the Defense was anchored on the testimony
of the following individuals:
23.1 Jimmy Balugo, was one of the Barangay Kagawads who
went to the house of Petitioner after receiving a radio message
from Brgy. Kagawad Glenda Lascua that a shooting incident
took place in their barangay. He also testified that together with
Kagawad Norberto Libre, he proceeded to the house of
Petitioner to inform him of the shooting incident involving a
certain Artemio Titing Pantinople. After informing Petitioner
about what happened, the latter instructed him and Norberto
Libre to gather the SCAAs and to accompany them to the
crime scene. He also narrated to the court that Petitioner and
their group were not able to render any assistance at the crime
scene since the widow and the relatives of deceased were
already belligerent. As a result of which, the group of Petitioner
including himself, went back to the formers house where he
asked Petitioner if it would be alright to contact the police and
request for assistance. He claimed that he was able to contact
the Bunawan PNP with the help of the Barangay Police of
Barangay San Isidro.
23.2) Norberto Libre testified that in the evening of November
4, 1998, he heard a gunburst which resembled a firecracker
and after a few minutes Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo
32
went to his house and informed him that their neighbor Titing
Pantinople was shot. Kagawad Balugo requested him to
accompany the former to go to the house of then Barangay
Captain Celestino Marturillas; that he and Kagawad Balugo
proceeded to the house of Petitioner and shouted to awaken
the latter; that Barangay Captain Marturillas went out rubbing
his eyes awakened from his sleep and was informed of the
killing of Artemio Pantinople; that Petitioner immediately
instructed them to fetch the SCAA and thereafter their group
went to the crime scene.
23.3) Ronito Bedero testified that he was in his house on the
night Artemio Pantinop[l]e was shot. The material point raised
by this witness in his testimony was the fact that he saw an
unidentified armed man flee from the crime scene who later
joined two other armed men near a nangka tree not far from
where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards
the direction of the Purok Center in Barangay Gatungan. This
witness noticed that one of the three men was armed with a
rifle but could not make out their identities since the area where
the three men converged was a very dark place. After the three
men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction
Petitioner, Barangay Kagawad Jimmy Balugo and three (3)
SCAA members going to the scene of the crime but they did
not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the group of
Petitioner return to where they came from.
23.4) Police C/Insp. Noemi Austero, Forensic Chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that she conducted a paraffin
test on both hands of Petitioner on November 5, 1999 at
around 10:30 a.m. She also testified that Petitioner tested
NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates indicating that he never
fired a weapon at any time between 7:30 p.m. of November 4,
1999 until the next day, November 5, 1999. She also testified
that as a matter of procedure at the PNP Crime Laboratory,
they do not conduct paraffin testing on a crime suspect seventy
two (72) hours after an alleged shooting incident. She also
testified that based on her experience she is not aware of any
chemical that could extract gunpowder nitrates from the hands
of a person who had just fired his weapon.
23.5) Dominador Lapiz testified that he lived on the land of the
victim, Artemio Pantinople for ten (10) years. He was one of the
first persons who went to the crime scene where he personally
saw the body of deceased lying at a very dark portion some
distance from the victims house and that those with him at that
time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could
clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were
many coconut and other trees and bananas in the crime scene.
He also testified that the house of Lito Santos was only about
four (4) meters from the crime scene, while the house of victimArtemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He
testified that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of
deceased at the time of the shooting. He was also the one who
informed Kagawad Glenda Lascuna about the shooting of
Artemio Pantinople. His testimony also revealed that when the
responding policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately
approached the policemen, volunteered himself as a witness
and even declared that he would testify that it was Petitioner
who shot Artemio Pantinople.
On cross-examination, this witness declared that the crime
scene was very dark and one cannot see the body of the victim
without light. On cross-examination, this witness also testified
that Lito Santos approached the service vehicle of the
responding policemen and volunteered to be a witness that
33
"II
The Court of Appeals was in serious error when it affirmed the
trial courts blunder in literally passing the blame on petitioner
for the lapses in the investigation conducted by the police
thereby shifting on him the burden of proving his innocence
"III
The Court of Appeals committed a serious and palpable error
when it failed to consider that the deceased was cut off by
death before he could convey a complete or sensible
communication to whoever heard such declaration assuming
there was any
"IV
Petit[i]oners alibi assumed significance considering that
evidence and testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses
arrayed against petitioner failed to prove that he was
responsible for the commission of the crime."12
In sum, petitioner raises two main issues: 1) whether the
prosecutions evidence is credible; and 2) whether it is
sufficient to convict him of homicide. Under the first main issue,
he questions the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses; the alleged inconsistencies between
their Affidavits and court testimonies; and the plausibility of the
allegation that the victim had uttered, "Tabangi ko pre, gipusil
ko ni kapitan" ("Help me pre, I was shot by the captain"), which
was considered by the two lower courts either as his dying
declaration or as part of res gestae.
Under the second main issue, petitioner contends that the
burden of proof was erroneously shifted to him; that there
should have been no finding of guilt because of the negative
results of the paraffin test; and that the prosecution miserably
failed to establish the type of gun used in the commission of
the crime.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Main Issue:
Credibility of the Prosecution Evidence
According to petitioner, the charge of homicide should be
dismissed, because the inherent weakness of the prosecutions
case against him was revealed by the evidence presented. He
submits that any doubt as to who really perpetrated the crime
should be resolved in his favor.
We do not agree. This Court has judiciously reviewed the
findings and records of this case and finds no reversible error
in the CAs ruling affirming petitioners conviction for homicide.
Basic is the rule that this Court accords great weight and a high
degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, as in the present case. 13 Here, the
RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed
with the power to review whether the trial courts conclusions
were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws. 14 Indeed,
the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal,
unless it has overlooked or misinterpreted some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance.15 Although there are
recognized exceptions16 to the conclusiveness of the findings
of fact of the trial and the appellate courts, petitioner has not
convinced this Court of the existence of any.
Having laid that basic premise, the Court disposes seriatim the
arguments proffered by petitioner under the first main issue.
Positive Identification
Petitioner contends that it was inconceivable for Prosecution
Witness Ernita Pantinople -- the victims wife -- to have
identified him as the assassin. According to him, her house
was "a good fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene," 17
which was "enveloped in pitch darkness." 18 Because of the
alleged improbability, he insists that her testimony materially
contradicted her Affidavit. The Affidavit supposedly proved that
she had not recognized her husband from where she was
standing during the shooting. If she had failed to identify the
victim, petitioner asks, "how was it possible for her to conclude
that it was [p]etitioner whom she claims she saw fleeing from
the scene?"19
All these doubts raised by petitioner are sufficiently addressed
by the clear, direct and convincing testimony of the witness.
She positively identified him as the one "running away"
immediately after the sound of a gunshot. Certain that she had
seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the
firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he
was running. She also clarified that she had heard the
statement, "Help me pre, I was shot by the captain," uttered
after the shooting incident. Accepting her testimony, the CA
ruled thus:
"Ernitas testimony that she saw [petitioner] at the crime scene
is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only
30 meters away from her house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar
with [petitioner], who is her neighbor, and a long-time barangay
captain of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City
when the incident took place. Ernita was also able to see his
face while he was running away from the crime scene. The
identification of a person can be established through familiarity
with ones physical features. Once a person has gained
familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an
easy task even from a considerable distance. Judicial notice
can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities
generally know each other both by face and name, and can be
expected to know each others distinct and particular features
and characteristics."20
This holding confirms the findings of fact of the RTC. Settled is
the rule that on questions of the credibility of witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given
the highest degree of respect.21 It was the trial court that had
the opportunity to observe the manner in which the witnesses
had testified; as well as their furtive glances, calmness, sighs,
and scant or full realization of their oaths. 22 It had the better
opportunity to observe them firsthand; and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.23
Petitioner doubts whether Ernita could have accurately
identified him at the scene of the crime, considering that it was
34
dark at that time; that there were trees obstructing her view;
and that her house was fifty (50) meters away from where the
crime was committed.
These assertions are easily belied by the findings of the courts
below, as borne by the records. Ernita testified on the crime
scene conditions that had enabled her to make a positive
identification of petitioner. Her testimony was even
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, who bolstered
the truth and veracity of those declarations. Consequently, the
CA ruled as follows:
"x x x Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible
by the lighted two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the
full moon. x x x. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place
where the shooting occurred was bright.
35
36
37
--
Corpus Delicti
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the type of gun used in the shooting. Suffice it to say
that this contention hardly dents the latters case. As correctly
found by the appellate court, the prosecution was able to give
sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had
actually been committed. Ruled this Court in another case:
"[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that
may be proved by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal
sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the body of
the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide
with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized
contraband cigarettes."65
To undermine the case of the prosecution against him,
petitioner depends heavily on its failure to present the gun
used in the shooting and on the negative paraffin test result.
These pieces of evidence alone, according to him, should
exculpate him from the crime. His reliance on them is definitely
misplaced, however. In a similar case, this Court has ruled as
follows:
"Petitioner likewise harps on the prosecutions failure to
present the records from the Firearms and Explosives
Department of the Philippine National Police at Camp Crame of
the .45 caliber Remington pistol owned by petitioner for
comparison with the specimen found at the crime scene with
the hope that it would exculpate him from the trouble he is in.
Unfortunately for petitioner, we have previously held that the
choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a
38
39
P50,000.00
10,000.00
as moral damages;
Amado Ariate
/x/x/x/ /x/x/x/
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION
10,000.00
FINDINGS:
40,000.00
as actual damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and
son Arnel, among other persons, on being informed of the
shooting of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he
was, not far from his residence, and found him lying on his side
and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able to
utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel, that he
was shot by Badjing3 and Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and
"Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were
subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. In the PNP Chemistry
Report No. C-002-2002-SDS,4 the following data are reflected:
xxxx
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED
Paraffin casts taken from the left and the right hands
of the following named living persons:
40
xxxx
Q I am showing to you [Ariate] a copy of the result of
the paraffin test attached to the record of this case.
COURT
Is it covered in the Pre-trial Order? You
cannot do that. That is why I told you; lay
your cards on the table.
ATTY. AUZA
41
42
43
DANILO
L.
PAREL,
vs.
SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, Respondent.
Petitioner,
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Danilo
Parel (petitioner) which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated
March 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60,
Baguio, in Civil Case No. 2493-R, a case for recovery of
possession and damages. Also assailed is CA Resolution 2
dated November 28, 2000.
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of
a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park
National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS)
compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely
from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said
house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the
second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he
allowed petitioners parents, Florentino (now deceased) and
Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor
while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials;
when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975,
respondent allowed petitioners parents and children to transfer
and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer
magnanimity as petitioners parents have no house of their
own and since respondents wife is the older sister of
Florentino, petitioners father; in November 1985, respondent
wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as
the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to
which petitioners parents heeded when they migrated to U.S.
in 1986; however, without respondents knowledge, petitioner
and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of respondents house; petitioners refusal to
vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted
respondent to file the instant action for recovery of possession.
Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of
P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the
latter vacates the said premises and surrender possession
thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and cost of suit.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his
parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e.,
the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor
pertains to petitioners parents; he is occupying the ground
floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with
respondents full knowledge; his parents spent their own
resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey
house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an
awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a coowner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the
demand to vacate was respondents attempt to deprive
petitioners parents of their rights as co-owner of the said
house; that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as
criminal cases against them involving the subject house which
were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and prayed for damages and attorneys fees.
44
45
that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes
nor declared any portion of the house in their name.16
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute
at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property.17 The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned
by his late father had been consistently declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with
the other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to
the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house
subject matter of the litigation.
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive
ownership of the subject property, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to contravene respondents claim. The burden of
evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a coowner of the subject house.
We held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit:18
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the
burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a
civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of "preponderance
of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth.19
In this case, the records show that although petitioners
counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary
evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same.20 Thus,
the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented
by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. 21 It is a settled
rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified
and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.22
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were
not formally offered, the same were marked during the
presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be
taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.23
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence
on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the birth
certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not
formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the
birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail
to prove petitioners minority which was never challenged by
46
47
Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other
aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir Castor of their
aliquot shares in the lots covered by Tax Declarations No.
7143, No. 7421, and No. 7956; thus, making Castor the sole
owner of the said properties. Similarly, the Deed of Partition
acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs to Ulpiano Cavile
of their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration
No. 5729, thus, transferring to the latter absolute ownership of
said parcel of land.
Thereafter, on 5 August 1960, Castor and Susana executed a
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition,7 whereby Castor
recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax
Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 were the just and lawful
shares of Susana in the properties left by their deceased
parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that Susana was in
actual possession of the said properties. According to the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, the lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. 2039 was "bounded on the North by Simplicio
Cavile, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by Napasuan, and on the West by Napasu-an Creek and Julian Calibog;"
while the one covered by Tax Declaration No. 2040 was
"bounded on the North by Hilario Navvaro (sic), on the South
by Fortunato Cavile, on the East by Silverio Yunting, and on
the West by Maximino (sic) Balasabas."
The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No.
2039 and No. 2040 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition
were strikingly close to those of the lots covered by Tax
Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the Deed
of Partition.
Fourteen years after the execution of the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition in 1960, respondents filed on 23
December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery
of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta
Cavile, the daughter of Castor, Jose de la Cruz, the husband of
Perfecta (hereinafter petitioner spouses), and the Rural Bank
of Bayawan, Inc. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 6111.8
Respondents averred in the Complaint that respondents
Justina and Genoveva inherited two parcels of land, covered
by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 (subject lots), 9
from their mother Susana, who, in turn, inherited the same
from her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina. Respondents
invoked the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5
August 1960 wherein Castor purportedly recognized Susanas
ownership of the subject lots. Susana had enjoyed undisputed
ownership and possession of the subject lots, paying the realty
taxes due and introducing improvements thereon. Susana was
even able to obtain a loan from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete
City sometime in 1960, mortgaging the subject lots as security
for the same.
After Susanas death in 1965, the subject lots were inherited by
her daughters, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who then
assumed the mortgage thereon. However, respondents alleged
that Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon
and excluded respondents from the subject lots. When Castor
died in 1968, petitioner spouses continued their unlawful
occupancy of the subject lots, planting on the same and
48
49
50
51
52
case
are
accurately
53
54
Mathew
L.
Deputy Prov'l. & Mun. Assessor
TAN-1886-760-6
Provincial Assessor, Deputy Assessor,Mun. Treasurer, Mun.
Mayor,
Notary
Public
or
any
other
person
authorized
to administer oath.
TRANSFEROR'S AFFIDAVIT
Ticag
(signed)
Cecilio J. Ulep
(signed)
Bernardo J. Ulep
____________________
Signature of Trnasfer
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (illegible) day of Oct.,
1981.
Mathew
L.
Deputy Prov'l. & Mun. Assessor
TAN-1886-760-6
Provincial
Assessor,
Mun.
Treasurer,
Mun.
Public
or
any
other
to administer oath.
Ticag
Deputy
Mayor,
person
Assessor,
Notary
authorized
55
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you see Bernardo Ulep sign this?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you see Cecilio Ulep sign this?
A: Yes sir.24
Verily, therefore, respondents' Exhibit "15" or petitioners'
Exhibit "I-19" was formally offered as evidence by both parties
and properly admitted and considered by the lower courts.
Exhibit "15" is a very solid piece of evidence in favor of
respondents. It constitutes an admission against interest made
by Bernardo Ulep, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In
Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,25 the Court elucidated thus:
x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents
are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on
the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to
presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth,
and it is his fault if it does not.26
Bernardo Ulep's admission against his own interest is binding
on his heirs, herein petitioners. It is now beyond cavil that
56
BEN-HUR
NEPOMUCENO,
Petitioner,
vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother
ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by
her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and
support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been
begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli;
that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of
Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999,
petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial
support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of
each month beginning August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the
handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered
to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente
lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give
her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the
age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was
the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute
the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the
National Peoples Army.2
57
58
59
PEPITO
CAPILA
Y
YRUMA,
petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 18903, entitled "The People of the Philippines
v. Pepito Capila y Yruma."
On August 24, 1993, an Information for robbery was filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City, against
Pepito Capila y Yruma, herein petitioner, his brother Bonifacio
Capila y Yruma, Deogenio Caparoso y Porfero, and Dimas
dela Cruz y Lorena.
The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-7117, is
quoted as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of August 1993, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
60
After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused,
through counsel, filed a Demurrer to Evidence but it was
denied by the trial court.
When the case was called for the continuation of the hearing
on November 15, 1994, the accused waived their right to
present their evidence, opting to submit their respective
memoranda instead.
On January 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision
acquitting all the accused, except petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. And finding that the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of accused Bonifacio Capila, Deogenes
Caparoso, and Dimas dela Cruz beyond reasonable
doubt, they are hereby acquitted.
2. And finding Pepito Capila guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery defined under Article
293 and penalized under Article 294 par. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, with the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, use
of a firearm, and betrayal of trust, he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate prision term of from
EIGHT (8) years as minimum to TEN (10) years as
maximum.
Pepito Capila is also ordered to pay:
1. Lanting Security Agency the sum of
P18,000 for the value of the three firearms
not recovered and belonging to said agency;
2. The sum of P1,292,991.12 to Pilipinas
Bank, the amount taken and not recovered.
With costs against accused Pepito Capila.
SO ORDERED.
61
Petitioner contends that since Dimas dela Cruz did not take the
witness stand, he (petitioner) was deprived of his right to crossexamine him. Thus, the Court of Appeals should not have
considered Dimas' statement as part of the Res gestae. Our
ruling in Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals 6 is
relevant.
In this case, it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the
early morning of June 29, 1967, a strong typhoon (Gening)
occurred in Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding. While one Isabel Lao Juan was wading in waist-deep
flood along Guerrero Street, Laoag City, suddenly she
screamed, "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. Her two
companions, Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo, shouted for help.
Ernesto dela Cruz arrived and tried to approach Isabel who
was electrocuted. But at four meters away from her, Ernesto
turned back shouting, "the water is grounded." This Court ruled
that the Court of Appeals properly applied the principle of Res
gestae. The testimonies of Aida and Linda that Ernesto dela
Cruz tried to approach the victim, but he turned back and
shouted, "the water is grounded," are not hearsay although he
(Ernesto) was not presented as a witness. His declaration is
part of the Res gestae.
Applying the above ruling on the instant case, we cannot
consider the testimony of SPO4 Maximo as hearsay since the
statement of Dimas that petitioner is one of the robbers is part
of the Res gestae.
Moreover, despite the damaging testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution, petitioner did not testify to rebut them.
Such posture is admission in silence.
Section 32, Rule 130 of the New Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration
made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when
the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and
possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence
against him.
Another factor that militates against petitioner's innocence is
his flight to Samar after the commission of the crime.
Obviously, such flight is an indication of guilt.
Verily, we hold that the prosecution, by its evidence, has
established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18903 finding
petitioner PEPITO CAPILA y YRUMA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery is AFFIRMED.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
62
INTERNAL
HEMORRHAGE
secondary
Craniocerebral Injury secondary to Trauma
to
plaintiff-appellee,
DECISION
with
63
Hence, the elevation of the case to this Court for final review.
WHEREFORE,
in
view
of
the
foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the accused Pablo
Cudal Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide for the killing of his father Crispin Cudal, on
the early morning of New Year, January 1, 1998 with
the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, and
accordingly the Court sentences the said accused to
reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs
of the accused the sum of P30,000.00 representing
funeral expenses, plus indemnity of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is
credited with his detention to its full extent.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction before this Court, assailing
the trial court for "accept[ing] the prosecutions account as
gospel truth despite the fact that its witnesses were not actually
64
Q Whose house?
Q Why were you there at the house of your mother-inlaw, Marissa Dancel?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell the Honorable Court whose voice is
that?
A Pablo Cudal and Crispin Cudal, sir.
Q Now, what did you [do] if any when you heard this
quarreling voices of accused Pablo Cudal?
65
66
SO ORDERED.
Golden Delta alleged that its stocks coming from Luzon and
Cebu were delivered directly to the PSI compound and stored
there. Golden Delta also placed there trucks, forklifts and other
equipment necessary for loading and unloading the materials.
It likewise assigned there its own personnel to manage and
attend to the receipts and withdrawal of materials by its buyers.
Golden Delta claimed that the procedure in the withdrawal of
materials by its customers in the PSI compound was to first
purchase the materials from its main office in Iloilo City; the
customer would then be issued a withdrawal slip describing the
materials and their quantities; the withdrawal slip would then be
presented to Golden Deltas personnel stationed at the PSI
compound and the latter would record it and release the
materials to the customer. Golden Delta claimed that the
arrangement went smoothly from March 2000 to December
2001.8
Before December 5, 2001, the lessee of Golden Deltas
warehouse in Dungon A, Jaro, Iloilo City, terminated its lease
agreement with Golden Delta. Hence, Golden Delta decided to
resume its operations at its own warehouse. Thereafter,
Golden Delta started to retrieve and transfer its alleged stocks
from the PSI compound to its own warehouse in Dungon A.
Golden Deltas employees were able to load three out of four
trucks with assorted construction materials, but were only able
to bring out two loaded trucks from the PSI compound to its
warehouse in Dungon A. When Golden Deltas people returned
to retrieve the remaining materials, they were prevented from
doing so by the guards of PSI, allegedly upon the instructions
of Jardiolin. Despite numerous telephone calls by Golden Delta
67
1.
Five
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P500,000.00) as Attorneys Fees and one
[sic]
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P100,000.00) as Acceptance Fee;
2. Moral Damages in the amount of Three
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,500,000.00);
3. Exemplary Damages in the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00);
B. To defendant Zeon Setias;
1. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for
Attorneys Fees;
2. Moral Damages in the amount of Three
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,500,000.00);
3. Exemplary Damages in the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00);
SO ORDERED.21
68
V
IN GIVING ABSOLUTE CREDENCE, AND SWALLOWING
HOOK, LINE, AND SINKER THE TESTIMONY OF A
MORALLY DEPRAVED AND ADULTEROUS WOMAN, IMEE
VILCHES; AND
VI
IN
AWARDING
ATROCIOUS,
SCANDALOUSLY
EXHORBITANT AND GARGANTUAN AMOUNTS OF
DAMAGES WHICH ARE TOTALLY UNPROVED.26
On July 22, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision27 affirming with
modification the decision of the RTC. In its decision, the CA
found that Cembrano had the personality to appear and
represent Golden Delta. It, however, agreed with the RTC that
Golden Delta was not able to prove by a scintilla of evidence
that it is the owner of the subject materials and that it is entitled
to their possession. Further, the appellate court reduced the
monetary awards granted to Jardiolin and Setias. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision
under review dated March 17, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
6th Judicial Region, Branch 32, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 0227020, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
A. To defendant Jerry Jardiolin:
1. The award of Attorneys Fees and
Acceptance Fee is reduced from
P600,000.00 [sic] to P100,000.00;
2. The award of moral damages is
reduced from P3,500,000.00 to
P200,000.00; and
3. The award of exemplary
damages
is
reduced
from
P1,000,000.00 to P100,000.00;
B. To defendant Zeon Setias:
1. The award of Attorneys Fees and
Acceptance Fee is reduced from
P1,000,000.00 to P100,000.00;
III
IV
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
SUBJECT OF THIS CASE, ARE NOT PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED AND ARE INCORPOREAL PERSONAL
PROPERTIES, HENCE, NOT SUBJECT OF REPLEVIN.
69
SO ORDERED.28
Thereafter, Golden Delta filed a motion for reconsideration,
insisting that it is the owner of the construction materials
purportedly delivered to the PSI compound for storage. Golden
Delta also asserted that there was no evidence or legal basis
for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees in favor of Jardiolin and Setias.29 On February
20, 2007, the CA rendered an Amended Decision30 partially
granting Golden Deltas motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, after due consideration, the instant motion is
GRANTED in PART. This courts decision promulgated on July
22, 2005, is AFFIRMED as to the dismissal of plaintiffappellants complaint. However, the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees to defendants Jerry
Jardiolin and Zeon Setias is hereby DELETED and SET
ASIDE and the counterclaim of appellees is likewise
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.31
The CA concluded that after a reevaluation and thorough
perusal of the evidence presented by both parties, it likewise
found that Golden Delta failed to present convincing and
concrete evidence to support its claim of ownership and rightful
possession of the subject construction materials. However, the
CA found the award for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees to Jardiolin and Setias to be without sufficient
basis.32
Not contented with the amended decision, Golden Delta filed
the petition here, assigning as errors the action of the appellate
court:
I
IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT PETITIONER
EVER DELIVERED CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS SUBJECT
OF THE CONTROVERSY, INTO PSIs COMPOUND.
II
IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT JERRY H. JARDIOLIN, NOT
PETITIONER, IS THE PRESUMED OWNER OF THE
CONTESTED CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.
III
IN CONVENIENTLY PASSING SUB-SILENCIO THE VERY
CRUCIAL ISSUE, WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
(RTC, BR. 32, ILOILO) PRESIDING JUDGE, HON. LOLITA
CONTRERAS-BESANA, WHO HERSELF CONFESSED HER
PROXIMATE CONSANGUINITAL RELATION WITH ATTY.
LEONARDO JIZ, COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS IN THE
TRIAL COURT, SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HERSELF FROM
HEARING THE CASE. THE VERY FACT SHE (BESANA)
PURSUED IN THE OTHER EARLIER CASES BEFORE HER
WHEREIN ATTY. JIZ WAS A PARTY, AND IN NOT
NULLYFYING OR AT THE VERY LEAST, REVERSING, THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON GROUNDS OF
CLEAR BIAS AND BEREFT OF EVIDENTIARY BASIS, AS
BORNE BY THE RECORDS.
IV
IN NOT RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO ADMIT THEIR VERY BELATEDLY FILED APPELLEES
BRIEF, WHICH IS ACTUALLY IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION
OVER
ITS
EARLIER
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE CASE SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION WITHOUT THE APPELLEES BRIEF, IN THE FACE
OF PETITIONERS VIGOROUS AND WELL FOUNDED
OPPOSITION, BEFORE RENDERING ITS DECISION,
THEREBY VIOLAT[ING] PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.33
Petitioner argues that the conclusions of the RTC and CA are
not only utterly baseless but, worse, contrary to the evidence
on record and the law. Respondents allegedly failed to produce
any evidence, in the form of purchase orders, delivery receipts,
proof of payment, and the like, that would prove that the
subject construction materials are owned by Jardiolin.34
Golden Delta insists that sufficient evidence was presented to
show that the construction materials subject of the controversy
were delivered and stored in PSIs compound, but the CA
refused to consider it and concluded instead that the ownership
and possession thereof were presumed to belong to Jardiolin.35
The above conclusion, says Golden Delta, which is evidently
based on a presumption, clearly showed that there was no
direct, clear, concrete and positive evidence of the fact of
ownership.36 Golden Delta likewise faults the appellate court for
keeping mum on the question it raised on the trial judges
partiality, considering her close blood relation with PSIs
counsel.37 Lastly, Golden Delta avers that the CA should have
first resolved whether or not to admit respondents brief before
deciding the case on the merits. Failure to do so, says Golden
Delta, amounts to a denial of due process.38
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only questions of
law may be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45; that both the CA and the RTC found that petitioner did
not store construction materials at the compound of PSI and
neither was its ownership established; that both the CA and the
RTC found that petitioner did not offer any written evidence
showing that the construction materials were received by
respondents personnel; that the alleged bias and partiality of
the trial judge were never raised as an issue before the CA,
hence, it cannot be raised for the first time in the instant
petition; that when the CA noted the entry of appearance of
Gellada Law Office in substitution of respondents former
counsel, Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz, it impliedly noted and admitted
its belated Appellees Brief; that the instant petition is
premature because the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of
the CAs Amended Decision it filed is still pending resolution.39
As a rule only questions of law are entertained in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. However,
the rule allows certain exceptions. Among the recognized
exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) when the finding of
facts is contradicted by the evidence on record; (8) when the
70
71
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
72
JUANITO
TALIDANO,
Respondents.
vs.
FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC., SPECIAL
73
that the Second Officer (complainant) did not carry out his duty
wathch. There was a confrontation between the Master and the
Complainant but the latter insisted that he was right. The
argument of the Complainant asserting that he was right
cannot be sustained by this Arbitration Branch. The fact that
there was an emergency call from the Japanese port authority
that M/V Phoenix Seven was invading other route simply
means that Complainant neglected his duty. The fax message
stating that Complainant was not at the bridge at the time of
the emergency call was likewise not denied nor refuted by the
Complainant. Under our jurisprudence, any material allegation
and/or document which is not denied specifically is deemed
admitted. If not of the timely call [sic] from the port authority
that M/V Phoenix Seven invaded other route, the safety of the
vessel, her crew and cargo may be endangered. She could
have collided with other vessels because of complainants
failure to render watch duty.11
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
and declared the dismissal as illegal. The dispositive portion of
the NLRCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered
declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal.
Respondents Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc. and
Hansu Corporation are hereby ordered to jointly and severally
pay complainant the amount equivalent to his three (3) months
salary as a result thereof.12
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged
misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no
probative value and are self-serving. It added that the ships
logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it is the
repository of all the activities on board the vessel, especially
those affecting the performance or attitude of the officers and
crew members, and, more importantly, the procedures
preparatory to the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC
also noted that private respondent failed to comply with due
process in terminating petitioners employment.13
Private respondent moved for reconsideration,14 claiming that
the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive
period. The NLRC, however, denied reconsideration in a
Resolution dated 30 August 2002.15 Rejecting the argument
that the complaint had already prescribed, it ruled:
Records show that respondent in this case had filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of prescription before the Labor
Arbiter a quo who denied the same in an Order dated August 1,
2000. Such an Order being unappealable, the said issue of
prescription cannot be raised anew specially in a motion for
reconsideration. (Citations omitted)16
74
Despite ruling that prescription had not set in, the appellate
court nonetheless declared petitioners dismissal from
employment as valid and reinstated the Labor Arbiters
decision.
The appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the
ship master shortly after petitioner had committed a serious
neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax messages
constitute the res gestae. In defending the non-presentation of
the logbook, it stated that three years had already passed
since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of
private respondent.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence he
filed this instant petition.
Citing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals, petitioner reiterates his argument that the appellate
court should not have accepted the second petition in view of
the fact that a corresponding entry of judgment already has
been issued. By filing the second petition, petitioner believes
that private respondent has engaged in forum shopping.26
Private respondent, for its part, defends the appellate court in
taking cognizance of the second petition by stressing that there
is no law, rule or decision that prohibits the filing of a new
petition for certiorari within the reglementary period after the
dismissal of the first petition due to technicality.27 It rebuts
petitioners charge of forum shopping by pointing out that the
dismissal of the first petition due to technicality has not ripened
into res judicata, which is an essential element of forum
shopping.28
In determining whether a party has violated the rule against
forum shopping, the test to be applied is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. 29 This issue has
been thoroughly and extensively discussed and correctly
resolved by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The respondents two arguments essay on certain
developments in the case after the NLRC rendered its
decision. He points out with alacrity that an entry of judgment
was issued twice first by the NLRC with respect to its
decision and then by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals
after it dismissed on technical grounds the first petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner. Neither event, for sure, militates
against the institution of a second petition for certiorari. A
decision of the NLRC is never final for as long as it is the
subject of a petition for certiorari that is pending with a superior
court. A contrary view only demeans our certiorari jurisdiction
and will never gain currency under our system of appellate
court review. It is more to the point to ask if a second petition
can stand after the first is dismissed, but under the particular
circumstances in which the second was brought, we hold that it
can. The theory of res judicata invoked by the respondent to
bar the filing of the second petition does not apply. The
judgment or final resolution in the first petition must be on the
merits for res judicata to inhere, and it will not be on the merits
if it is founded on a consideration of only technical or collateral
points. Yet this was exactly how the first petition was disposed
of. SP 73521 was dismissed as a result of the failure of the
petitioner to comply with the procedural requirements of a
petition for certiorari. The case never touched base. There was
no occasion for the determination of the substantive rights of
the parties and, in this sense, the merits of the case were not
75
MASTER N
DISCHARGE
76
77
SIMON
A.
FLORES,
Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the August 2 7,
2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division
(Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case No. 16946, finding
petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its November 29, 2007
Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an
Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the
Sandiganbayan which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in
the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the
Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in
the performance of his official functions and committing the
offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS
AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite Rifle, thereby inflicting upon
him several gunshot wounds in different parts of his body,
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS AVENIDO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded
"Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Paulito
Duran, one of the visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido (Gerry), son
of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the victim; and Dr.
Ruben Escueta, the physician who performed the autopsy on
the cadaver of the victim, Jesus Avenido (Jesus).
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused
Flores himself; his companion-members of the Civilian Action
Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H.
Manalo; and Dr. Rene Bagamasbad, resident physician of San
Pablo City District Hospital.
The Version of the Prosecution
On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San
Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors, Ronnie de Mesa,
Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the
terrace of the house of Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30
78
Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met
Flores who was heading towards the terrace. After glancing at
the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace,
Duran focused his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he
heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under the table.
Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the
bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores
was no longer in sight.5
Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep
to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter, Duran, Ronnie de Mesa
and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to the
hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not, at any time
during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with him.6
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house
before the shooting incident took place, anxiously waiting for
the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents
were then attending to his problem regarding a vehicular
accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short conversation
with his father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace.7
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the
street in the company of some members of the CAFGU. He
was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his
father talking to each other from a distance of about six (6)
meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the right
shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was
already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt hurt
to have lost his father.8
Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve
"pulutan" to their visitors when she saw Flores, from their
window, approaching the terrace. By the time she reached the
terrace, her husband was already lying on the ground and still
being shot by Flores. After the latter had left, she and her
children rushed him to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.9
As a consequence of her husbands untimely demise, she
suffered emotionally. She testified that Jesus had an average
monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
before he died at the age of forty-one (41). He left four (4)
children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for actual
damages consisting of lawyers fees in the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P6,500.00) for the funeral expenses.10
Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17,
1989, he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Jesus,
whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before
his body was brought to him.11
Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim
suffered four gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body,
specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between
the clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region
79
ISSUES
(I)
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll
the reglementary period of appeal.
Section 4, Rule 121 states:
80
81
82
defend himself to
this regard that the
on the body of the
eloquently refutes
EMMANUEL
B.
AZNAR,
Petitioner,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
62554 dated January 30, 2004 which set aside the November
25, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 10,
Cebu City and reinstated the Decision of RTC Branch 20 of
Cebu City dated May 29, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-16474;
and the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
83
84
85
ATTY. NAVARRO:
A. Denied.
Q. And after you were told that your card was denied you
presumed that it was blacklisted?
A. Definitely.
xxxx
Q. So your statement that your card was allegedly
blacklisted is only your presumption drawn from the fact,
from your allegations, that it was denied at the
merchandise store?
A. Yes, sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The dishonor of Aznars Mastercard is not sufficient to support
a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank,
especially in view of Aznars own admission that in other
merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his
Mastercard was accepted and honored.43
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION
FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer printout handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to
prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted.
On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT"
opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such
exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and
due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC
Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It
provides that whenever any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Q Mr. Aznar, where did you secure this Computer Print Out
marked as Exhibit "G"?
A This is provided by that Agency, your honor. They were
the ones who provided me with this. So what the lady did,
she gave me the Statement and I requested her to sign to
show proof that my Preferred Master Card has been
rejected.44 (Emphasis supplied).
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G"
would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person
seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the
manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private
electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the
person purported to have signed the same;
86
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it
constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and reliability
of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not
convinced. Aznars testimony that the person from Ingtan
Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be
considered as sufficient to show said print-outs integrity and
reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May
29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it
was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in
passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the
agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business
address of the source of the computer print-out because while
the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its
business address was not reflected in the print-out.45
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information
reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said
information could be relied upon as true. In fact, Aznar to
repeat, testified as follows:
ATTY. NERI
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the
"hot" list was confirmed to be authentic"
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred
Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at
the Merchants store, I do not know, they called up somebody
for verification then later they told me that "your card is being
denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not
know whom they called up; where they verified. So, when
it is denied thats presumed to be blacklisted.46 (Emphasis
supplied)
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which pertains to entries in the course of business, to
support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at,
or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or
unable to testify;
87
in a hot list or the same was blacklisted, let alone the fact that
all the credit cards which had been cancelled by the defendant
bank were all contained, reported and listed in said Warning
Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and released on a
regular basis.
ATTY. NERI:
xxx
88
SO ORDERED.
BERNARDO
B.
JOSE,
JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC. and MICHAELMAR SHIPPING
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 11 May
2005 Decision2 and 5 August 2005 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83272. The Court of Appeals
set aside the 19 January4 and 22 March5 2004 Resolutions
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC NCR CA No. 036666-03 and reinstated the 18 June
2003 Decision6 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR OFW
Case No. (M)02-12-3137-00.
The Facts
Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of
Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an undertaking 7
dated 2 July 2002 and an employment contract 8 dated 4 July
2002, MSSI through MPI engaged the services of Bernardo B.
Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T Limar. The employment
contract stated:
89
of
Position
Basic
Salary
Monthly
Jose, Jr. received a 96% total rating and was described as very
hardworking, trustworthy, and reliable.
On 29 December 2002, M/T Limar reached the next port after
the random drug test and Jose, Jr. was repatriated to the
Philippines. When Jose, Jr. arrived in the Philippines, he asked
MPI that a drug test be conducted on him. MPI ignored his
request. On his own, Jose, Jr. procured drug tests from Manila
Doctors Hospital,12 S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic, Inc.,13 and
Maritime Clinic for International Services, Inc. 14 He was found
negative for marijuana.
Hours of Work
48 HOURS/WEEK
Overtime
Point of Hire
MANILA, PHILIPPINES9
Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and
MSSI for illegal dismissal with claim for his salaries for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract.
90
We can not also say that respondents were motivated by ill will
against the complainant considering that he was appraised to
be a good worker. For this reason that respondents would not
terminate [sic] the services of complainant were it not for the
fact that he violated the drug and alcohol policy of the
company. [T]hus, we find that just cause exist [sic] to justify the
termination of complainant.15
Jose, Jr. appealed the Labor Arbiters 18 June 2003 Decision
to the NLRC. Jose, Jr. claimed that the Labor Arbiter committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that he was dismissed for
just cause.
The NLRCs Ruling
In its 19 January 2004 Resolution, the NLRC set aside the
Labor Arbiters 18 June 2003 Decision. The NLRC held that
Jose, Jr.s dismissal was illegal and ordered MPI and MSSI
to pay Jose, Jr. his salaries for the unexpired portion of
the employment contract. The NLRC held that:
Here, a copy of the purported drug test result for
Complainant indicates, among others, the following
typewritten words "Hoofd: Drs. R.R.L. Petronia Apotheker"
and
"THC-COOH
POS.";
the
handwritten
word
"Marihuana"; and the stamped words "Dr. A.R.A. Heath,
MD", "SHIPS DOCTOR" and "29 OKT. 2002." However,
said test result does not contain any signature, much less
the signature of any of the doctors whose names were
printed therein (Page 45, Records). Verily, the veracity of
this purported drug test result is questionable, hence, it
cannot be deemed as substantial proof that Complainant
violated his employers "no alcohol, no drug" policy. In
fact, in his November 14, 2002 message to Stelmar Tanker
Group, the Master of the vessel where Complainant
worked, suggested that another drug test for complainant
should be taken when the vessel arrived [sic] in Curacao
next call for final findings (Page 33, Records), which is an
indication that the Master, himself, was in doubt with the
purported drug test result. Indeed there is reason for the
Master of the vessel to doubt that Complainant was taking
in the prohibited drug "marihuana." The Sea Going Staff
Appraisal Report signed by Appraiser David A. Amaro, Jr.
and reviewed by the Master of the vessel himself on
complainants work performance as Wiper from August 1,
2002 to November 28, 2002 which included a two-month
period after the purported drug test, indicates that out of a
total score of 100% on Safety Consciousness (30%),
Ability (30%), Reliability (20%) and Behavior & Attitude
(20%), Complainant was assessed a score of 96% (Pages
30-31, Records). Truly, a worker who had been taking in
prohibited drug could not have given such an excellent job
performance. Significantly, under the category "Behavior
& Attitude (20%)," referring to his personal relationship
and his interactions with the rest of the ships staff and his
attitude towards his job and how the rest of the crew
regard him, Complainant was assessed the full score of
20% (Page 31, Records), which belies Respondents
insinuation that his alleged offense directly affected the
safety of the vessel, its officers and crew members.
Indeed, if Complainant had been a threat to the safety of
the vessel, officers and crew members, he would not be
been [sic] allowed to continue working almost three (3)
months after his alleged offense until his repatriation on
December 29, 2002. Clearly, Respondents failed to present
91
xxxx
Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or
papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence
known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be
invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from
him because of necessity and under circumstances that
safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of
evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of
business, which are transactions made by persons in the
regular course of their duty or business. We agree with the
labor arbiter that the drug test result constitutes entries made in
the ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of
the vessel. The tests administered to the crew were routine
measures of the vessel conducted to enforce its stated policy,
and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued
and released by the medical officer. The ships physician at
Curacao under whom the tests were conducted was admittedly
Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his handwritten
comments that the report on the respondent came out, and
there is no basis to suspect that these results were issued
other than in the ordinary course of his duty. As the labor
arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and
does not require additional supporting evidence except if it
appears that the drug test was conducted not in accordance
with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has
even been suggested in this particular case.
The regularity of the procedure observed in the administration
and reporting of the tests is the very assurance of the reports
admissibility and credibility under the laws of the evidence. We
see no reason why it cannot be considered substantial
evidence, which, parenthetically, is the lowest rung in the
ladder of evidence. It is from the fact that a report or entry is a
part of the regular routine work of a business or profession that
it derives its value as legal evidence.
Then the respondent was notified of the results and allowed to
explain himself. He could not show any history of medication
that could account for the traces of drugs in his system.
Despite his lack of plausible excuses, the ship captain came
out in support of him and asked his superiors to give him
92
In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of
Appeals ruling is violative of any law or jurisprudence. Section
43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
93
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code states that the employer may
terminate an employment for serious misconduct. Drug use in
the premises of the employer constitutes serious misconduct.
In Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation,30 the
Court held that:
The charge of drug use inside the companys premises and
during working hours against petitioner constitutes serious
misconduct, which is one of the just causes for termination.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment.
The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Act
must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however
serious, must nevertheless, in connection with the work of the
employee, constitute just cause for his separation. This Court
took judicial notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can
damage the mental faculties of the user. It is beyond question
therefore that any employee under the influence of drugs
cannot possibly continue doing his duties without posing a
serious threat to the lives and property of his co-workers and
even his employer. (Emphasis supplied)
Jose, Jr. claims that he was not afforded due process. The
Court agrees. There are two requisites for a valid dismissal: (1)
there must be just cause, and (2) the employee must be
afforded due process.31 To meet the requirements of due
process, the employer must furnish the employee with two
written notices a notice apprising the employee of the
particular act or omission for which the dismissal is sought and
another notice informing the employee of the employers
decision to dismiss. In Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied
Services, Inc.,32 the Court held that:
[R]espondent failed to comply with the procedural due process
required for terminating the employment of the employee. Such
requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with
at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it
constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to
mans innate sense of justice. The Labor Code does not, of
course, require a formal or trial type proceeding before an
erring employee may be dismissed. This is especially true in
the case of a vessel on the ocean or in a foreign port. The
minimum requirement of due process termination proceedings,
which must be complied with even with respect to seamen on
board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to
be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to
present their own side of the alleged offense or misconduct,
which led to the managements decision to terminate. To meet
the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish
the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e.,
(1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, Jose, Jr. was not given any written notice
about his dismissal. However, the propriety of Jose, Jr.s
dismissal is not affected by the lack of written notices. When
the dismissal is for just cause, the lack of due process does not
render the dismissal ineffectual but merely gives rise to the
payment of P30,000 in nominal damages.33
94
95
96
The plaintiff submits that the ledger cards constituted the best
evidence of the transactions made by the defendant with the
bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section 43 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. There is no question
that the entries in the ledgers were made by one whose duty it
was to record transactions in the ordinary or regular course of
the business. But for the entries to be prima facie evidence of
the facts recorded, the Rule interpose[s] a very important
condition, one which we think is truly indispensable to the
probative worth of the entries as an exception to the hearsay
rule, and that is that the entrant must be "in a position to know
the facts therein stated." Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a
position to know the facts of the check deposits and
withdrawals. But the transfers of funds through the debit
memos in question?
97
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 157064 August 7, 2006
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. (now known as
UBP
Securities,
Inc.)
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
DECISION
98
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60209 dated 11 July 2002, 1
ordering the petitioner to pay the Government the amount of
P826,698.31 as deficiency income tax for the year 1987 plus
25% surcharge and 20% interest per annum. The Court of
Appeals, in its assailed Decision, reversed the Decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) dated 17 May 2000 2 in C.T.A.
Case No. 5662.
Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP
Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of
securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual Income
Tax Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment for deficiency income tax in the amount of
P826,698.31 arising from the disallowance of the item on
salaries, bonuses and allowances in the amount of
P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible business expense
since petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and
allowances to withholding taxes. This assessment was covered
by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 dated
1 February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to
petitioner through registered mail on 6 February 1991.
However, petitioner denies receiving the formal assessment
notice. 3
On 17 March 1992, petitioner was served with a Warrant of
Distraint and/or Levy to enforce collection of the deficiency
income tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed a formal protest,
dated 25 March 1992, against the Warrant of Distraint and/or
Levy, requesting for its cancellation. On 3 July 1998, petitioner
received a letter dated 30 April 1998 from the respondent
denying the protest with finality. 4
On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for review with the
CTA. After due notice and hearing, the CTA rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner on 17 May 2000. The CTA ruled
on the primary issue of prescription and found it unnecessary
to decide the issues on the validity and propriety of the
assessment. It maintained that while a mailed letter is deemed
received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely
a disputable presumption. It reasoned that the direct denial of
the petitioner shifts the burden of proof to the respondent that
the mailed letter was actually received by the petitioner. The
CTA found the BIR records submitted by the respondent
immaterial, self-serving, and therefore insufficient to prove that
the assessment notice was mailed and duly received by the
petitioner. 5 The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 1988 deficiency
tax assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED TO DESIST from collecting
said deficiency tax. No pronouncement as to costs. 6
On 6 June 2000, respondent moved for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision but was denied by the CTA in a Resolution
dated 25 July 2000. Thereafter, respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals on 31 August 2001. In reversing the CTA
decision, the Court of Appeals found the evidence presented
by the respondent to be sufficient proof that the tax
assessment notice was mailed to the petitioner, therefore the
99
100
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or
by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it
was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties,
or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official
information x x x.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based
on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that
she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice.
Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes 26 how
and from whom she obtained the pertinent information.
Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the
reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same.
Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present
case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not
qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry
receipt of the assessment notice, or a certification from the
Bureau of Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet
respondent failed to present such evidence.
G.R. No. 162243
December 3, 2009
101
the
Petition
for
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171875
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G.
Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP),
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its
Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the
government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by
then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Since the
remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, and since the 1969 Document itself has a
proviso requiring compliance with the laws and the
Constitution, the issues in this Motion for Reconsideration are
the following: (1) firstly, is the 1969 Document a contract
enforceable under the Non-Impairment Clause of the
Constitution, so as to make the signing of the IFMA a
ministerial duty? (2) secondly, did PICOP comply with all the
legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of an
IFMA?
To recall, PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have its Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In
the middle of the processing of PICOPs application, however,
PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR.
Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for
Mandamus1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T.
Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of
mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute
and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to
[I]ssue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the
area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended;
b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and
harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to
meet the raw material requirements of petitioners pulp and
102
II.
103
104
105
JUSTICE TINGA:
ATTY. AGABIN:
106
And therefore any ruling on the part of the Court on that issue
could not be an obiter dictum.
ATTY. AGABIN:
ATTY. AGABIN:
JUSTICE TINGA:
JUSTICE TINGA:
ATTY. AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor. Except that
JUSTICE TINGA:
So, how can you say now that the Court merely uttered,
declared, laid down an obiter dictum in saying that the
Presidential Warranty is not a contract, and it is not being a
contract, it is not prohibited by the non-impairment clause.
ATTY. AGABIN:
To the decision of the Court.
JUSTICE TINGA:
It was.
ATTY. AGABIN:
It was not necessary.
JUSTICE TINGA:
ATTY. AGABIN:
It was.
This Honorable Court could have just ruled, held that the
mining law allows mining activities under a forest reserve
without deciding on that issue that was raised by PICOP, your
Honor, and therefore we believe.
ATTY. AGABIN:
Yes.
JUSTICE TINGA:
JUSTICE TINGA:
It could have been better if PICOP has not raised that issue
and had not claimed that the Presidential Warranty is not a
contract.
ATTY. AGABIN:
ATTY. AGABIN:
Well, that is correct, your Honor except that the Court could
have just avoided that question. Because
JUSTICE TINGA:
Why[?]
ATTY. AGABIN:
It already settled the issue, the basic issue.
JUSTICE TINGA:
the
Philippines
and
Natural
Resources
THE
SECRETARY
107
D-53,
Licenses
Bislig
Bay
(Bislig, Surigao)
(T.L.A.
Lumber
No.
Co.,
43)
Inc.
(Sgd.)
FERNANDO
Secretary
of
and Natural Resources
LOPEZ
Agriculture
Encl.:
Lumber
word]
Co.,
Inc.
RECOMMENDED BY:
Bldg.
(Sgd.)
JOSE
Acting Director of Forestry
VIADO
S i r s:
APPROVED:
This has reference to the request of the Board of Investments
through its Chairman in a letter dated July 16, 1969 for a
warranty on the boundaries of your concession area under
Timber License Agreement No. 43, as amended.
We are made to understand that your company is committed to
support the first large scale integrated wood processing
complex hereinafter called: "The Project") and that such
support will be provided not only in the form of the supply of
pulpwood and other wood materials from your concession but
also by making available funds generated out of your own
operations, to supplement PICOPs operational sources of
funds and other financial arrangements made by him. In order
that your company may provide such support effectively, it is
understood that you will call upon your stockholders to take
such steps as may be necessary to effect a unification of
managerial, technical, economic and manpower resources
between your company and PICOP.
It is in the public interest to promote industries that will
enhance the proper conservation of our forest resources as
well as insure the maximum utilization thereof to the benefit of
the national economy. The administration feels that the PICOP
project is one such industry which should enjoy priority over the
usual logging operations hitherto practiced by ordinary timber
licensees: For this reason, we are pleased to consider
favorably the request.
We confirm that your Timber License Agreement No. 43, as
amended (copy of which is attached as Annex "A" hereof which
shall form part and parcel of this warranty) definitely
establishes the boundary lines of your concession area which
consists of permanent forest lands with an aggregate area of
121,587 hectares and alienable or disposable lands with an
aggregate area of approximately 21,580 hectares.
We further confirm that your tenure over the area and exclusive
right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood shall
be for the period ending on April 26, 1977; said period to be
renewable for other 25 years subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with
existing policy on timber concessions.
The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by you of your area as
described and specified in your aforesaid amended Timber
License Agreement No. 43 is hereby warranted provided that
pertinent laws, regulations and the terms and conditions of
your license agreement are observed.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
FERDINAND
President of the Philippines
E.
MARCOS
ACCEPTED:
BISLIG BAY LBR. CO., INC.
By:
(Sgd.)
President
JOSE
E.
SORIANO
108
ATTY. AGABIN:
We further confirm that your tenure over the area and exclusive
right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood shall
be for the period ending on April 26, 1977; said period to be
renewable for other 25 years subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with
existing policy on timber concessions.1avvphi1
JUSTICE CARPIO:
109
ATTY. AGABIN:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Your Honor, except that we are invoking the warranty, the
terms of the warranty.
So, they file the petition for conversion before the end of the
50th year for IFMA.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
ATTY. AGABIN:
Can the warranty prevail over the Constitution?
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. AGABIN:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Well, it is a vested right, your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, but whatever it is, can it prevail over the Constitution?
ATTY. AGABIN:
The Constitution itself provides that vested rights should be .
JUSTICE CARPIO:
If it is not in violation of specific provision of the Constitution.
The Constitution says, 25 years plus another 25 years, thats
the end of it. You mean to say that a President of the
Philippines can give somebody 1,000 years license?
Well, that is not our position, Your Honor. Because our position
is that .
JUSTICE CARPIO:
ATTY. AGABIN:
ATTY. AGABIN:
It can be done.
ATTY. AGABIN:
ATTY. AGABIN:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
PICOP is, in effect, arguing that the DENR issued DAO No. 9953 in order to provide a way to circumvent the provisions of the
Constitution limiting agreements for the utilization of natural
resources to a maximum period of fifty years. Official duties
are, however, disputably considered to be regularly
performed,35 and good faith is always presumed.
DAO No. 99-53 was issued to change the means by which the
government enters into an agreement with private entities for
the utilization of forest products. DAO No. 99-53 is a late
response to the change in the constitutional provisions on
natural resources from the 1973 Constitution, which allowed
110
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
Dont you think that will, in effect, be invidious discrimination
with respect to other applicants if you are granted a fresh
period of twenty-five years extendible to another twenty-five
years?
DEAN AGABIN:
I dont think it would be, Your Honor, considering that the IFMA
is different regime from the TLA. And not only that, there are
considerations of public health and ecology which should come
into play in this case, and which we had explained in our
opening statement and, therefore the provision of the
Constitution on the twenty-five limits for renewal of coproduction, joint venture and production sharing agreements,
should be balanced with other values stated in the Constitution,
like the value of balanced ecology, which should be in harmony
with the rhythm of nature, or the policy of forest preservation in
Article XII, Section 14 of the Constitution. These are all
important policy considerations which should be balanced
against the term limits in Article II of the Constitution.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
The provision of this Administrative Order regarding automatic
conversion may be reasonable, if, I want to know if you agree
with me, if we limit this automatic conversion to the remaining
period of the TLA, because in that case there will be a valid
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, Your Honor, we beg to disagree, because as I said TLAs
are completely different from IFMA. The TLA has no production
sharing or co-production agreement or condition. All that the
licensee has to do is, to pay forest charges, taxes and other
impositions from the local and national government. On the
other hand, the IFMAs contained terms and conditions which
are completely different, and that they either impose coproduction, production sharing or joint venture terms. So its a
completely different regime, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DE CASTRO:
DEAN AGABIN:
111
or
repugnant
to
the
We further confirm that your tenure over the area and exclusive
right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber and pulpwood shall
be for the period ending on April 26, 1977; said period to be
renewable for other 25 years subject to compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with
existing policy on timber concessions.
That
There
Were
Mutual
Contract
112
113
114
While the first issue (on the nature of the 1969 Document) is
entirely legal, this second issue (on PICOPs compliance with
administrative and statutory requirements for the issuance of
an IFMA) has both legal and factual sub-issues. Legal subissues include whether PICOP is legally required to (1) consult
with and acquire an approval from the Sanggunian concerned
under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code; and
(2) acquire a Certification from the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) that the concession area does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. Factual sub-issues include
whether, at the time it filed its Petition for Mandamus, PICOP
had submitted the required Five-Year Forest Protection Plan
and Seven-Year Reforestation Plan and whether PICOP had
paid all forest charges.
For the factual sub-issues, PICOP invokes the doctrine that
factual findings of the trial court, especially when upheld by the
Court of Appeals, deserve great weight. However, deserving of
even greater weight are the factual findings of administrative
agencies that have the expertise in the area of concern. The
contentious facts in this case relate to the licensing, regulation
and management of forest resources, the determination of
which belongs exclusively to the DENR:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the countrys
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and
grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well
as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may
be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos.59
When parties file a Petition for Certiorari against judgments of
administrative agencies tasked with overseeing the
implementation of laws, the findings of such administrative
agencies are entitled to great weight. In the case at bar, PICOP
could not have filed a Petition for Certiorari, as the DENR
Secretary had not yet even determined whether PICOP should
be issued an IFMA. As previously mentioned, when PICOPs
application was brought to a standstill upon the evaluation that
PICOP had yet to comply with the requirements for the
issuance of an IFMA, PICOP refused to attend further
meetings with the DENR and instead filed a Petition for
Mandamus against the latter. By jumping the gun, PICOP did
not diminish the weight of the DENR Secretarys initial
determination.
Forest Protection and Reforestation Plans
The Performance Evaluation Team tasked to appraise PICOPs
performance on its TLA No. 43 found that PICOP had not
submitted its Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and its SevenYear Reforestation Plan.60
In its Motion for Reconsideration, PICOP asserts that, in its
Letter of Intent dated 28 August 2000 and marked as Exhibit L
in the trial court, there was a reference to a Ten-Year
Sustainable Forest Management Plan (SFMP), in which a FiveYear Forest Protection Plan and a Seven-Year Reforestation
Plan were allegedly incorporated. PICOP submitted a machine
copy of a certified photocopy of pages 50-67 and 104-110 of
this SFMP in its Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP claims that
115
116
e)
To
perform
other
duties
and
responsibilities as may be directed by
superiors.73
117
118
119
120
breadth not only of Surigao del Sur but also of Agusan del Sur,
Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental.92
On Motion for Reconsideration, PICOP now argues that the
requirement under Sections 26 and 27 does not apply to it:
97. PICOP is not a national agency. Neither is PICOP
government owned or controlled. Thus Section 26 does not
apply to PICOP.
98. It is very clear that Section 27 refers to projects or
programs to be implemented by government authorities or
government-owned and controlled corporations. PICOPs
project or the automatic conversion is a purely private
endevour. First the PICOP project has been implemented since
1969. Second, the project was being implemented by private
investors and financial institutions.
99. The primary government participation is to warrant and
ensure that the PICOP project shall have peaceful tenure in the
permanent forest allocated to provide raw materials for the
project. To rule now that a project whose foundations were
commenced as early as 1969 shall now be subjected to a 1991
law is to apply the law retrospectively in violation of Article 4 of
the Civil Code that laws shall not be applied retroactively.
100. In addition, under DAO 30, Series of 1992, TLA and IFMA
operations were not among those devolved function from the
National Government / DENR to the local government unit.
Under its Section 03, the devolved function cover only:
a) Community Based forestry projects.
b) Communal forests of less than 5000 hectares
c) Small watershed areas which are sources of local
water supply.93
We have to remind PICOP again of the contents of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
All projects relating to the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources are projects of the State. While
the State may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
121
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
vs.
ZENAIDA QUEBRAL y MATEO, FERNANDO LOPEZ y
AMBUS and MICHAEL SALVADOR y JORNACION,
Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the requirement of authentication of seized
prohibited drugs and the conduct of warrantless search of a
suspect by the roadside based on probable cause.
122
123
124
125
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
126
127
128
LEA
MER
INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,* Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
ommon carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in their vigilance over the goods entrusted to them, as required
by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy.
Consequently, the law presumes that common carriers are at
fault or negligent for any loss or damage to the goods that they
transport. In the present case, the evidence submitted by
petitioner to overcome this presumption was sorely insufficient.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the October 9, 2002 Decision2 and the
December 29, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 66028. The challenged Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The December 7,
1999 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42
in Civil Case No. 92-63159 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. [Petitioner] is ordered to pay the [herein respondent]
the value of the lost cargo in the amount of P565,000.00. Costs
against the [herein petitioner]."4
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea
Mer Industries, Inc., for the shipment of 900 metric tons of
silica sand valued at P565,000.5 Consigned to Vulcan Industrial
and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from
Palawan to Manila. On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was
placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer.6 During
the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.7
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value
of the lost cargo.8 To recover the amount paid and in the
exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan demanded
reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply.
Consequently, Malayan instituted a Complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on September 4, 1992,
for the collection of P565,000 representing the amount that
respondent had paid Vulcan.9
On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint,
upon finding that the cause of the loss was a fortuitous event.10
The RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of the bad
weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court
ruled that petitioner had no advance knowledge of the
incoming typhoon, and that the vessel had been cleared by the
Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
129
Reversing the trial court, the CA held that the vessel was not
seaworthy when it sailed for Manila. Thus, the loss of the cargo
was occasioned by petitioners fault, not by a fortuitous event.12
Hence, this recourse.13
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues in this wise:
"A. Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor,
Jesus Cortez, who had not been presented as a witness of the
said report during the trial of this case before the lower court
can be admitted in evidence to prove the alleged facts cited in
the said report.
"B. Whether or not the respondent, Court of Appeals, had
validly or legally reversed the finding of fact of the Regional
Trial Court which clearly and unequivocally held that the loss of
the cargo subject of this case was caused by fortuitous event
for which herein petitioner could not be held liable.
"C. Whether or not the respondent, Court of Appeals, had
committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the testimony of the witness from the MARINA,
Engr. Jacinto Lazo y Villegal, to the effect that the vessel Judy
VII was seaworthy at the time of incident and further in
disregarding the testimony of the PAG-ASA weather specialist,
Ms. Rosa Barba y Saliente, to the effect that typhoon Trining
did not hit Metro Manila or Palawan."14
First Issue:
Liability for Loss of Cargo
Question of Fact
The resolution of the present case hinges on whether the loss
of the cargo was due to a fortuitous event. This issue involves
primarily a question of fact, notwithstanding petitioners claim
that it pertains only to a question of law. As a general rule,
questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review.15
The present case serves as an exception to this rule, because
the factual findings of the appellate and the trial courts vary.16
This Court meticulously reviewed the records, but found no
reason to reverse the CA.
Rule on Common Carriers
130
Other than be[a]ching the barge Judy VII, were there other
precautionary measure[s] exercised by you and the crew of
Judy VII so as to prevent the los[s] or sinking of barge Judy
VII?
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Baldovino, Jr.:
Your Honor, what I am asking [relates to the] action taken by
the officers and crew of tugboat Ayalit and barge Judy VII x x x
to prevent the sinking of barge Judy VII?
xxxxxxxxx
Court:
Mr. witness, did the captain of that tugboat give any instruction
on how to save the barge Judy VII?
Joey Draper:
I can no longer remember sir, because that happened [a] long
time ago."37
Second, the alleged fortuitous event was not the sole and
proximate cause of the loss. There is a preponderance of
evidence that the barge was not seaworthy when it sailed for
Manila.38 Respondent was able to prove that, in the hull of the
barge, there were holes that might have caused or aggravated
the sinking.39 Because the presumption of negligence or fault
applied to petitioner, it was incumbent upon it to show that
there were no holes; or, if there were, that they did not
aggravate the sinking.
Petitioner offered no evidence to rebut the existence of the
holes. Its witness, Domingo A. Luna, testified that the barge
was in "tip-top" or excellent condition, 40 but that he had not
personally inspected it when it left Palawan.41
The submission of the Philippine Coast Guards Certificate of
Inspection of Judy VII, dated July 31, 1991, did not
conclusively prove that the barge was seaworthy.42 The
regularity of the issuance of the Certificate is disputably
presumed.43 It could be contradicted by competent evidence,
which respondent offered. Moreover, this evidence did not
necessarily take into account the actual condition of
the vessel at the time of the commencement of the voyage.44
Second Issue:
Admissibility of the Survey Report
Petitioner claims that the Survey Report45 prepared by Jesus
Cortez, the cargo surveyor, should not have been admitted in
evidence. The Court partly agrees. Because he did not testify
during the trial,46 then the Report that he had prepared was
hearsay and therefore inadmissible for the purpose of proving
the truth of its contents.
The Survey Report Not the Sole Evidence
131
The facts reveal that Cortezs Survey Report was used in the
testimonies of respondents witnesses -- Charlie M. Soriano;
and Federico S. Manlapig, a cargo marine surveyor and the
vice-president of Toplis and Harding Company.47 Soriano
testified that the Survey Report had been used in preparing the
final Adjustment Report conducted by their company.48 The
final Report showed that the barge was not seaworthy because
of the existence of the holes. Manlapig testified that he had
prepared that Report after taking into account the findings of
the surveyor, as well as the pictures and the sketches of the
place where the sinking occurred.49 Evidently, the existence of
the holes was proved by the testimonies of the witnesses, not
merely by Cortez Survey Report.
Rule on Independently
Relevant Statement
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
132
133
134
FISCAL:
Q: When you saw your sister Michelle assisting your
father, what [sic] happened next?
A: And I immediately went near my father and asked
him who shot him and he answered it was Joemarie
Cerilla who shot him.
Q: Before you reached your father, did you observe
his physical appearance of what happened to him?
A: Yes, Maam, he was supporting with his arm and
when I asked him he still made a response.
Q: You said [that] before you approached your
father[,] you saw him supporting his body, what was
his position at that time?
A: He was in a position of lying with his hand on the
road and my sister was assisting him.
xxx
Q: Were you able to observe why your father was
sitting on the ground and supporting himself not to fall.
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Why, [sic] what did you observe?
A: My father was supporting himself in order that
blood will not [ooze] from his body and his body will
not fall down.46
SPO3 Dequito, who responded immediately to the
crime scene, corroborated the testimonies of the
Alexanders children, to wit:
Q: So, what did you do when you arrived at the crime
scene?
A: We advised the group to carry Mr. Parreo to the
ambulance because the ambulance was on the way
and after our mobile arrived, the ambulance arrived
also [sic] so we carried Mr. Parreo to be brought to
the hospital.
COURT:
Q: Meaning
ambulance?
A: Michelle.
COURT:
Proceed.
you
loaded
the
victim
into
the
135
demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to testify
had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a
criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
Other police officers were presented by the defense to refute
the dying declaration.1wphi1 PO1 Javelora alleged that he
happened to pass by the crime scene and saw a young girl
crying. The girl led him to her father who was sitting on the
roadside. He asked the victim who shot him but he did not get
any reply.50 PO3 Allona and Sarmiento arrived at the hospital
and questioned Alexander as to who shot him but the latter told
them, "I am not sure because it was dark."51 These statements
cannot be construed as a categorical statement of the victim
denying knowledge as to the identity of his assailant. It can be
recalled that at the time Alexander was being questioned, he
was already being readied for surgery. At that point, he was
understandably no longer fit to respond to questions. Between
these two seemingly conflicting testimonies, it is the positive
identification made by Alexander in his dying declaration which
must be sustained.
Appellant insists that there was an inherent impossibility in
identifying the assailant with clarity since there was a power
blackout at the time of the commission of the crime and was
then a moonless night.
The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does
not cast doubt on Alexanders and Michelles positive
identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was
dark, this did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from
identifying the assailant, especially since the shot was
delivered at close range.
In dismissing appellants contention, the trial court rationalized:
x x x This argument deserves scant consideration. In the case
of People v. Hillado, G.R. No. 122838[,] promulgated on May
24, 1999[,] citing the case of People v. Oliano, "visibility at
nighttime is possible not only at the exact minute and date
when the moon is full as indicated in the calendar. Thus, a
persons nocturnal eyesight, is not necessarily diminished just
because there is no illumination from the moon, because it is a
fact that our eyes can actually adjust to the darkness so that
we can still see objects clearly even without sufficient lighting.
In the case at bar, it would not be so hard for Michelle to
identify a persons fact especially if the latter as in the
present case was barely two (2) arms length away from them
which is confirmed by the presence of gunpowder nitrates on
the body of the victim. We stress, that the normal reaction of
the person is to direct his sight towards the source of a startling
[shot] or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, the most
natural reaction of the victims in criminal violence is to strive to
see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the
manner in which the crime is committed. Added to this is the
fact that the accused Joemarie Cerilla and the victim Alexander
Parreo have known each other quite well before the incident
so that they became familiar with each others face and
physical features. x x x 52
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were not shown to be
impelled by ill motive to testify falsely against appellant.
Besides, Susan, Michelle and Novie Mae, being immediate
relatives of the deceased, would naturally be interested in
having the real culprit punished.53
136
OF
July 2, 2010
THE
WORLWIDE
PHILIPPINES,
TRADING
Petitioner,
CORPORATION,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside
of the Decision1 dated May 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077, which affirmed the August 7,
1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, in LAND REG. CASE NO. N-281. Petitioner
also assails the CA Resolution2 dated March 30, 2006, denying
its Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
137
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land
registration court. After an applicant has filed his application,
the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial
hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document.
The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of
the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land
Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the
party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x
xxxx
138
Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the RTC
did not commit any error in giving due course to respondents
application for registration.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court agrees with petitioner
on the more important issue that respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that it or its predecessors-ininterest possessed and occupied the subject property for the
period required by law.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.7
is
based
on
139
140