COMMENTARIES

Press.
Rothenberg, A. (1983a). Creativity, articulation, and psychotherapy.
Journal of theAaulemy ofPsychoanalysis, 11, 55-85.
Rothenberg, A. (1983b). Psychopathology and creative cognition: A
comparison of hospitalized patients, Nobel laureates, and controls. Archives ofGeneral Psychiatry, 40, 937-942.
Rothenberg, A. (1986). Artistic creation as stimulated by superimposed versus combined-composite visual images. Jourtu~l of
Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 370-381.
Rothenberg, A. (1988a). The creativeprocess ofpsychotherapy. New
York: Norton.
Rothenberg, A. (1988b). Creativity and the homospatial process:
Experimental studies. Psychiatric Clinics ofNorthAmerica, 11,
443-459.

Rothenberg, A. (1990a). Creativity and madness: New findings and

old stereotypes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rothenberg, A. (1990b). Creativity in adolescence. Psychiatric Clinics ofNorth America, 13,415-434.
Rothenberg, A., & Sobel, R. S. (1980). Creation ofliterary metaphors
as stimulated by superimposed versus separated visual images.
Journal ofMental Imagery, 4, 77-91.
Rothenberg, A., & Sobel, R. S. (1981 ). Effects of shortened exposure
time on the creation of literary metaphors as stimulated by
superimposed versus separated visual images. Perceptual and
Motor Skills, 53, 1007-1009.
Sobel, R. S., & Rothenberg, A. (1980). Artistic creation as stimulated
by superimposed versus separated visual images. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 953-961.

Creativity, Causality, and the Separation of Personality and Cognition

Mark A. Runco
California State University, Fullerton

Eysenck's argument hinges on the distinction "between (a) creativity, or originality, as a dispositional
trait or cognitive style, measurable by means of psychometric tests, normally distributed in the population, and
general in its application and (b) creativity defined by
exceptional achievement." Clearly, this distinction is
very important for those studying creativity, and, although potential and actual performance have been
conceptually extricated before (e.g., MacKinnon,
1965; Maslow, 1971), Eysenck has done a remarkable
job of it. I am especially taken by his integration of such
varied lines of research and am particularly grateful that
be has brought biological and genetic research into his
theory. Clearly, the field of creativity research is in need
of such integrative efforts.
Difficulties naturally arise when integrations are attempted, and several are apparent in Eysenck's work.
In this commentary, I focus on Eysenck's assumptions-at least those I noted and question-and some
research findings he overlooked. I do not itemize the
stronger points ofEysenck's argument. He presents his
argument quite well, and there is of course no need for
me to reiterate. The most troubling assumptions concern causality, the separation of personality and cognition, and the role of problem solving in creativity. I also
mention his less significant assumptions about divergent thinking, verbal processes, and the distribution of
creative potential.

Causality
One of the most critical of Eysenck's assumptions
concerns the direction of effect. Consider Eysenck's
suggestion that "what may be happening is that high P

[psychoticism] is necessary for high creativity." Later

be writes that "it appears to be psychoticism in the
absence of psychosis that is the vital element in translating the trait of creativity (originality) from potential
into actual achievement," and later still he explicitly
refers to creativity as an "outcome." The notion about
"affinities" with schizophrenia and psychotic disorders
may help explain the oft-cited association between
creativity and psychopathology (e.g., Becker, 1978;
Richards, 1981), but the emphasis on one direction of
effect is disturbing because there are other possibilities
(Richards, 1990). Put very simply, creativity might lead
or contribute to what appears to be a disorder (most
likely a bipolar affective disorder), or the disorder
might somehow allow creative insights. A third possibility is that creativity and disorder are associated only
because they both share some underlying tendency.
(This third variable may very well be what Eysenck
refers to as overinclusive thinking.) I am not suggesting
that Eysenck is wrong about psychoticism but rather
that his theory might not help us understand the other
important possibilities, such as when creativity leads to
anxiety, alcoholism, and depression (Richards, 1990;
Rothenberg, 1990).
Eysenck does recognize that there is an optimal level
ofpsychoticism (or, more accurately, that psychoticism
is by definition moderate), beyond which psychopathology and creativity are independent. This is entirely
consistent with work by Bowden (in press) and Richards (1990) in that it is Bipolar II and III (not the
schizoaffective Bipolar I) that seem to be associated
with creativity. According to Bowden and Richards,
creativity may be associated with mood swings, but the
disorders are of subclinical levels. In fact, there are
some creative individuals who want to avoid clinical

221

COMMENTARIES

treatment precisely because it may interfere with their

productive periods (Bowden, in press; Rothenberg,
1990).

The Creative Personality

In several places, Eysenck offers what strikes me as
an either/or description of personality and cognition.
For example, he writes how "Spearman (1923, 1927)
suggested that creativity might be a personality characteristic rather than a cognitive characteristic [and] H. J.
Eysenck (1983) gave some evidence to support this
notion." The problem is the implication that creativity
is either "a personality characteristic" or "a cognitive
characteristic." Surely it is both! What is really needed
to understand creativity is the recognition of an interplay between cognitive and extracognitive factors
(Runco, in press-a; Russ, 1993; Shaw & Runco, in
press). 1
As a matter of fact, the extracognitive and cognitive
factors might very well be inextricable. Lazarus (1991)
reviewed evidence for this, but I will give the example
wherein an individual cannot be interested in solving a
problem or working productively without recognizing
that there is a problem-that is, without a cognitive
appraisal of the situation as a problem and deserving of
his or her effort (Runco, in press-a). Simply put, the
cognitive appraisal is necessary for the affective interest. Granted, my example relies on what is usually
called intrinsic motivation, but that is often included in
descriptions of the creative personality (Barron & Harrington, 1981), and my point is that any either/or argument is unrealistic.
A similar oversimplification arises when Eysenck
discusses the importance of relevance. I think he is
correct in questioning the blind or stochastic aspects of
the creative process, and he argues convincingly that
cognitive searches are directed and selective. 2 Individuals usually consider only information they believe to
be in some way relevant or meaningful. My concern is
with the manner in which the concepts of "relevance"
and "horizons" are used to distinguish between creative

and uncreative persons. I suppose Eysenck's idea is

simply that there are individual differences, but at this
point, his discussion seems a bit like a rigid trait viewthat is, one downplaying the impact of situations and
intrapersonal variability.
Eysenck's trait view is even clearer when discussing
psychoticism, for there he is explicit that "it was not
psychosis (i.e., a psychopathological state) that was
related to creative genius, but psychoticism (i.e., a
dispositional trait ... )." Eysenck does define psychoticism in terms of susceptibility, but he could bring the
possible variations more clearly into his model. There
is an implied connection between "environmental variables" and "creative achievement," but what about
specific differences between situations and domains
(Csikszentrnihalyi, 1990; Gruber, 1988)? Presumably
an individual can have a wide horizon in one domain
(e.g., music) but a narrow one in another (e.g., chess).
The impact or relevance of specific problem types
might also be recognized, especially those found between verbal and nonverbal tasks. Empirical evidence
suggests that associative patterns differ when an individual reacts to nonverbal rather than verbal stimuli
(Guilford, 1968; Richardson, 1986; Runco, 1986).
Part of the problem may be Eysenck's reliance on
problem solving. A great deal of the work he cites-especially in his discussion of intelligence and again
when reviewing the research on overinclusive thinking-is specifically on problem solving. This may be
misleading; creativity should not be too closely tied to
problem solving. There are several reasons for this,
including (a) the difficulties involved in definingproblems such that artistic creativity or everyday creativity
can be explained (Dudek & Cote, in press) and (b) the
separation between problem finding and problem solving. The former is more closely tied to creativity than
the latter (Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, in
press; Okuda, Runco, & Berger, 1991; Wakefield, in
press).

Verbal Processes and Divergent

Thinking

Eysenck himself calls for work on the cognition-affect interactions. In particular, he notes the need for research on "creative
tension," and this assumes a cognitive appraisal (Runco, in press-a).
Moreover, both Eysenck and Runco cite Rutter's (1985) theory of
resilience--Eysenck asking for research on "protective factors,"
Runco using it to explain the steeling of creative individuals.
1'hls is entirely consistent with the appraisals already mentioned.
However, Eysenck does seem to follow the idea of relevance into one
dubious alley. I am referring here to his discussion of "delusional
beliefs, thought disorders, hallucinations, and the like ... [which] ...
might be considered 'creative.'" This seems at odds with his criticism
of blind factors, for it suggests that purpose is necessary, whereas
hallucinations and delusions surely lack creative intent. Granted,
there is some controversy in this regard, with Mednick (1962) recognizing serendipitous associations and others discounting any "creativity'' that lacks purpose (Gruber, 1988; Wolf & Larson, 1981 ).

222

One reason I appreciate Eysenck's argument about

relevance is that it highlights the importance of selective and evaluative processes. Just as originality does
not guarantee creative performance, so too is creativity
not solely a divergent, intuitive, generative process.
Selective, evaluative, and valuative processes are necessary. Here I am only disappointed that Eysenck limits
himself to what he calls linguistic evidence. There is
other evidence. The evaluative process of ideational
creativity has been studied in several recent investigations (Runco, 1991b; Runco & Chand, in press; Runco
& Smith, 1992), and although these are just initial and

COMMENTARIES

perhaps even crude attempts at isolating selective and

evaluative tendencies, at least they are not limited to
verbal stimuli or associations (see Runco & Vega,
1990). This inclusion of nonverbal material is a virtue,
given what was said earlier about associative tendencies differing when elicited by verbal or nonverbal
stimuli and when following familiar or unfamiliar stimuli (Guilford, 1968; Mednick, 1962; Richardson, 1986;
Runco, 1986; Runco & Albert, 1985). Admittedly, my
own work on evaluative processes bas its limitations,
but the focus on ideational data seems reasonable given
the evidence for the predictive validity of such measures (Milgram, 1990; Okuda et al., 1991) and because
there is an extremely large literature (reviewed by
Runco, 1991a, 1992) to assist with interpretations.
In rebuttal, Eysenck might criticize the use of divergent-thinking tasks, just as I have criticized his reliance
on verbal data. As a matter of fact, he specifically
dismisses divergent thinking in his article (or at least
alludes to "deep-seated misgivings"). Something
should be said about this because, although he is right
that many researchers have given up on the Guilford
(1968) and Torrance (1974) tests, a careful reading of
the literature suggests that the dismissal of divergent
thinking is premature (Milgram, 1990; Runco, 1991a,
1992). Most who dismiss divergent thinking have done
so because of dated research findings. Little if any
attention is given by the critics to research from the late
1980s or early 1990s. Divergent-thinking tests are now
administered, scored, and interpreted differently from
the way they used to be-or, at least they should be,
given recent research. Eysenck himself cites research
from before 1959 when discussing the intelligence
threshold necessary for creativity. Granted, he cites the
classic work of Cox and Terman, but more recent
research should also be considered (see Runco & Albert, 1986; Simonton, 1984). Eysenck'sclaim about the
distributions of creativity as "approximately normal"
might similarly be questioned (Runco & Albert, 1985),
as might his unqualified generalizations about the impact of political unrest (Simonton, 1990).
I am very interested in Eysenck's ideas about relevance but cannot help but wonder whether he will
encounter some of the same measurement difficulties I
did, if he conducts the actual empirical tests of his
predictions. I am referring here to the difficulties found
early in Runco and Charles's (in press) investigation of
the relation between originality and appropriatenessappropriateness paralleling Eysenck's relevance.
Runco and Charles designed a simple Q-sort study to
examine the accuracy of judgments of originality, appropriateness, and their interaction as predictors of
creativity. I naively suspected that the appropriateness
of ideas would be relatively easy to operationalize-at
least in the context of divergent thinking, where a

problem can be used as context. I soon discovered my

error and now feel that appropriateness and relevance
are even more subjective than originality. I was naive
to expect an easy operationalization of appropriateness
and have lately found several theories explaining its
subjectivity and elusive qualities (e.g., Gould, 1991;
Maslow, 1971). At least with originality, statistical
infrequency can be used (Hocevar, 1979; Runco &
Albert, 1985). Appropriateness and relevance may be
much more difficult measurement targets because of
their connection with values. Incidentally, Runco and
Charles (in press) found a strong relation between
originality and creativity and indications of an inverse
relation between appropriateness and creativity. The
expected Originality x Appropriateness interaction was
minuscule and statistically insignificant. This last finding is contrary to many, many theories that bring appropriateness, fit, usefulness, and relevance into the
definition of creativity (e.g., MacKinnon, 1965; Mumford et al., in press; O'Quin & Besemer, 1989;
Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976).3
Conclusion and Implications
Eysenck claims that he presents a model with testable predictions. I hope what I have written will help to
modify some of those predictions. Although I question
some of Eysenck's assumptions, I certainly have no
desire to dismiss his model. There is much to be gained
from it. Indeed, I wish I had more time to discuss the
strong points of Eysenck's theory. As I already mentioned, it is especially important that Eysenck has
looked to biological and genetic contributions.
It is also important that he mentions practical implications, such as when he describes the need for
"educating ... teachers in the appreciation of the value
of originality and creativity." Here I only suggest that
his claim be changed such that it too uses the concept
of "optima," as in "optimal appreciation." I say this
because originality is insufficient for creativity. This is
implied by Eysenck's discussion of the optimal levels
of psycboticism, for too much can lead to originality
that has no relevance and that is indubitably uncreative.
Teachers might therefore sacrifice some classroom
3

Another potential measurement problem reflects the fact that

something in addition to relevance might be needed. In particular,
where does the aesthetic component of creativity fit in? I hesitate
raising this issue because it in tum leads to the difficult question,
"Where do we stop?" Ifthe aesthetic component is included in models
of creativity, along with originality and relevance, the model becomes
more complicated. It may become more accurate with each additional
term or dimension, but it will probably also be accurate only in certain
domains. Complicated models often lose in generality what they gain
in accuracy (Wiggins, 1981).

223

COMMENTARIES

structure for divergent thinking and spontaneity; but,

given the critical roles of knowledge, information, and
selections or evaluations, they should only "give" some
of the time. I like the concept of optimal appreciation
because educators could jump on the creativity bandwagon and go to the extreme, allowing complete spontaneity and individuality. This kind of open education
does not benefit creativity (also see Cropley, 1992;
Runco & Okuda, in press). Educational flexibility
might allow divergent thinking and self-expression, but
judgments of relevance require some conventional
thinking and memorization-and thus a dose of structured education.
Looking back, much of what I have written here has
to do with how creativity is treated rather than with
what is included. Consider, for instance, my citing the
very recent research on the direction of effect between
creativity and psychopathology and my gripes about
the older citations for divergent thinking and the threshold theory. The integration of research is not easy-especially integrations in creativity research, where there
is such a high premium placed on originality (Runco,
in press-b). Overall, Eysenck does remarkably well. His
article is a model of what needs to be done to keep
creativity research moving forward--that is, to maintain its own creativity.
Notes
I completed this Commentary while holding a Visiting position at the Institute for Cognitive Psychology
of the University of Bergen. I thank the institute and, in
particular, Geir Kaufmann.
Mark A. Runco, Department of Psychology, EC 105,
California State University, Fullerton, CA 92634.
References
Barron, F., & Harrington, D. (1981). Creativity, intelligence, and
personality .Annual Review ofPsychology, 32, 439-476.
Becker, G. (1978). The mad genius controversy. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Bowden, C. (in press). The relationship of bipolar disorder to creativity. In M. Shaw & M. A Runco (Eds.), Creativity and affect.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Cropley, A J. (1992). More ways than one: Fostering creativity.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). The domain of creativity. In M. A
Runco & R. S. Albert (Eds.), Theories of creativity (pp. 190212). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Dudek, S. Z., & Cote, R. (in press). Problem finding revisited. In M.
A Runco (Ed.), Problem finding, problem solving, and creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Eysenck, H. J. (1983). The roots of creativity: Cognitive ability or
personality trait? Roeper Review, 5, 10-12.
Gould, S. J. (1991 ). Bully for Brontosaurus. New York: Norton.
Gruber, H. (1988). The evolving systems approach to creative work.

224

CreativityResearchJourna~ 1, 27-51.
Guilford, J.P. (1968). Creativity, intelligence, and their educational
implications. San Diego: EDITS.
Hocevar, D. (1979). Ideational fluency as a confounding factor in the
measurement of originality.JournalofEducationalPsychology,
71, 191-196.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991 ). Cognition and motivation in emotion. American Psychologist, 46,352-367.
MacKinnon, D. W. (1965). Personality and the realization of creative
potential. American Psychologist, 20, 273-281.
Maslow, A (1971). The creative attitude. In A Maslow (Ed.), The
farther reaches ofhuman nature (pp. 57-71). New York: Viking.
Meduick, S. A (1962). The associative basis of the creative process.
Psychological Review, 69,200-232.
Milgram, M. (1990). Creativity: An idea whose time has come and
gone? In M. A. Runco & R. S. Albert (Eds.), Theories of
creativity (pp. 215-233). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Mumford, M. D., Reiter-Palmon, R., & Redmond, M. (in press). In
M. A Runco (Ed.), Problem finding, problem solving, and
creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Okuda, S.M., Runco, M.A., & Berger, D. E. (1991). Creativity and
the finding and solving of real-world problems. Journal of
PsychoeducationalAssessment, 9, 45-53.
O'Quin, K., & Besemer, S. (1989). The development, reliability, and
validity of the Revised Creative Product Semantic Scale. Creativity Research Journal, 2, 267-278.
Richards, R. (1981). Relationships between creativity and psychopathology: An evaluation and interpretation of the evidence. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 103, 261-324.
Richards, R. (1990). Everyday creativity, eminent creativity, and
health: An afterview for CRJ special issues on creativity and
health. Creativity ResearchJourna~ 3, 300-326.
Richardson, A J. (1986). Two factors of creativity. Perceptual and
Motor Skills, 63, 379-384.
Rothenberg, A (1990). Creativity, mental health, and alcoholism.
Creativity Research J ourna~ 3, 179-201.
Rothenberg, A, & Hausman, C. (1976). The creativity question.
Durham, NC: Duke Uuiversity Press.
Runco, M. A (1986). Flexibility and originality in children's divergent thinking. Journal ofPsychology,.120, 345-352.
Runco, M. A (Ed.). (1991a). Divergent thinking. Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Runco, M. A. (1991b). The evaluative, valuative, and divergent
thinkingofchildren.JournalofCreativeBehavior, 25,311-319.
Runco, M.A. (1992). Children's divergent thinking and creative
ideation. Developmental R~Wiew, 12, 233-264.
Runco, M. A (in press-a). Creativity and its discontents. In M. Shaw
& M. A Runco (Eds.), Creativity and affect. Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Runco, M. A. (in press-b). Objectivity in creativity research. In A.
Montuori (Ed.), Unusual associates: Essays in honor of Frank
Barron. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
Runco, M. A, & Albert, R. S. (1985). The reliability and validity of
ideational originality in the divergent thinking of acaderuically
gifted and nongifted children. Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 45,483-501.
Runco, M. A, & Albert, R. S. (1986). The threshold hypothesis
regarding creativity and intelligence: An empirical test with
gifted and nongifted children. Creative Child and Adult Quarterly, 11, 212-218.
Runco, M. A., & Chand, I. (in press). Problem finding, evaluative
thinking, and creativity. In M. A Runco (Ed.), Problem finding,
problem solving, and creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Runco, M. A, & Charles, R. (in press). Judgments of originality and
appropriateness as predictors of creativity. Personality and Individual Differences.
Runco, M. A, & Okuda, S.M. (in press). Reaching creatively gifted
children through their learuing styles. In R. M. Milgram & R.
Dunn (Eds.), Teaching the gifted and talented through their

COMMENTARIES
learning styles. New York: Praeger.
Runco, M. A, & Smith, W. R. (1992). Interpersonal and intrapersonal
evaluations of creative ideas. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 295-302.
Runco, M. A, & Vega, L. (1990). Evaluating the creativity of
children's ideas. Journal ofSocial Behavior and Personality, 5,
439-452.
Russ, S. (1993). Creativity and affect: The role of affect and play in
the creative process. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Rutter, M. (1985). Resilience in the face of adversity: Protective
factors and resistance to psychiatric disorders. British Journal
ofPsychiatry, 147, 598-611.
Shaw, M. P., & Runco, M.A. (Eds.). (in press). Creativity and affect.
Norwood, NJ:Ablex.

Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, creativity, and leadership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Simonton, D. K. (1990). Political pathology and societal creativity.
CreativityResearchJourna~ 3, 85-99.
Spearman, C. (1923). The nature of "intelligence" and the principles
ofcognition. London: Macmillan.
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man. London: Macmillan.
Torrance, E. P. (1974). Torrance Tests ofCreative Thinking. Bensenville, IL: Scholastic Testing Services.
Wakefield, J. (in press). In M. A Runco (Ed.), Problem finding,
problem solving, and creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Wiggins, J. S. (1981). Clinical and statistical prediction: Where do
we go from here? Clinical Psychology Review, 1, 3-18.
Wolt; F. M., & Larson, G. L (1981). On why adolescent formal
operators may not be creative thinkers.Adolescence, 62, 345-348.

Blind Variations, Chance Configurations, and Creative Genius

Dean Keith Simonton
University of California, Davis
Eysenck's target article is an exciting read. As he
points out, for some time creativity studies had shown
signs of entering the stage of a degenerative research
program. Psychoanalytic accounts of the creative person and Gestalt accounts of the creative process now
seem passe. Psychometric approaches to the same phenomena, although once the rage, have sunk into despondency. And the current activity of cognitive
psychologists in this area, although often provocative,
fall short of a comprehensive theory. Their computer
simulations, for example, concentrate on certain specifics of the creative process while utterly ignoring personality and social context. What we lack are widely
accepted theoretical approaches that explain all important aspects of creativity. Eysenck's proposed theory
tries to fill this sad gap.
As we should expect of any sweeping theory,
Eysenck's model is rich in ideas. He has tried to integrate a vast range of research findings-work that
spans many decades. Therefore, I cannot possibly provide a critique of his entire scheme. Instead, I focus on
a single issue-the place of chance in creativity. Although Eysenck seems to downplay the role of chance
in the creative process, I interpret his arguments and
data quite differently.
Let me begin by clearing up a potential source of
confusion. Campbell (1960) termed his original model
of creativity the blind-variation and selective-retention
theory. My own elaboration of this theory I styled the
chance-configuration theory. The rationale for the
name change was a difference in emphasis and complexity between the two theories. For one thing, by
introducing the concept of "configuration," I hoped to
sprinkle a little Gestalt on the initial Darwinian frame-

work. The basic idea was that the mind can generate
innumerable combinations of concepts, but only a few
of these will coalesce into a structural whole-a configuration. To offer an everyday illustration, think what
happens when you write a sentence that you hope will
communicate a profound idea. You have at your disposal a host of words and their synonyms for each
subject, predicate, object, and other sentence component. You also have access to a variety of syntactical
constructions that can adjust the expression to the finest
shades of meaning. So, you search for that distinctive
pattern of lexical elements and syntactical structures
that convey precisely what you mean. That just-right
sentence seems to encapsulate better than its more
awkward rivals the meaning that before existed only in
imagery or intuition.
Another reason for the name change was my dissatisfaction with Campbell's choice of the adjective blind.
By claiming that the ideational variations were blind,
he meant that the combinatory process lacked reason or
foresight. The more novel a problem is, the more inadequate are the received collection of algorithms and
heuristics. Having nothing definite to guide the quest
for a solution, the creator must grope in the darkness.
The process is one of cognitive trial-and-error. It seems
perfectly reasonable to style this process blind.
Unfortunately, this word choice leads to some confusion. For those familiar with the problem-solving
literature, blind often implies the same thing as blind
search-which almost everybody recognizes as the
heuristic of last resort. As Eysenck notes, a genuine
blind search very quickly encounters a "combinatorial
explosion" that makes it most unlikely that the venture
will converge on a solution. Moreover, it is evident that

225

Copyright 2002 EBSCO Publishing