A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism

A Defense of Yogcra Buddhism
Author(s): Alex Wayman

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 447-476
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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A DEFENSE OF YOGACARA BUDDHISM

Introduction:Defense fromWhat?
There have been many discussions in India,where Yogacaraoriginated, and elsewhere. Inevitably it was misrepresentedand the misrepresentationrepeated and copied. Now, this situation is much more
complicated than would firstappear. In Indiathere was a practicestarting from the Veda of memorizingtexts by repetitionand transmitting
them orally. Much later in the A.D. period there was a writingdown of
such scriptures,and then a copying of them. The Buddhiststransmitted
their scripturesin a comparable manner, and the written-downcanon
was also copied. Such scriptures-whether Hindu or Buddhist-are regarded by the respectivegroups as conveying truth.Therefore,we cannot argue against copying itself. Clearly, it is what is copied that concerns us now, namely, whetheror not there are misrepresentations.
Then, as concerns 'misrepresentations',it could be asked: What is
wrong with them? Well, some are good-naturedand some are rather
venomous. In general there is a great range of such, extending from
speculationsand guesses to downrightlies, thatare repeatedand copied.
In the case of misrepresentationsof the Yogacara, I accept them as
usually of the good-naturedkind, whether it be a type of refutationin a
Hinducommentary,or by a Buddhistopponent of the Yogacara.An importantillustrationof the Hindutype of refutationcomes fromthe comwhere the author,say Sarkara,can write
mentarieson the Brahmasutras,
in termsof the system itself,settingforthits tenets, or attemptsto express
certain tenets, while distortingan opposing system.1These Hindu systems and their rival systems were established by geniuses or otherwise
brilliantpersons. It might have been thought betterthat these rival systems not be presentedcorrectly,or followers mightget confused, wondering if their own system was indeed better,or whether a certaintenet
being refutedwas not really identical with a tenet of their own system.
Therefore,when the Buddhistsystemsupposedlybeing refutedin such a
Hinducommentarycan reasonablybe identifiedwith a sortof Yogacara
position, it seems fairto conclude that it is a good-naturedtype of refutation-one necessaryfor a successful commentary.
Perhapsthe same judgment could be renderedfor the quarreling
between the Hindu logic school and the Buddhistlogicians, which at
least in moderntimes is acknowledgedto have sharpenedthe arguments
on both sides, so that when Buddhismleft IndiaaroundA.D. 1200, the
Hindu logic school began to stagnatefor lack of intelligentopposition.
I interpretalso the MadhyamikaBuddhist refutationof the Yogacara
philosophicalpositionto be a good-naturedtype-probably more an exercise in discourse,with the premisethat some tenets can be expounded
Alex Wayman
ProfessorEmeritusof
Sanskritat Columbia
University
PhilosophyEast& West
Volume46, Number4
October 1996
447-476
? 1996
by Universityof
Hawai'iPress
447
in themselves and certainothers can be clarifiedby the refutationof an

opposing position. The Madhyamika-typerefutationof the Yogacararegarded its 'mind-only'(cittamatra)teaching as a denial of the external
as an unworld, and furthertook its 'store-consciousness'(alayavijinana)
warrantedadditionto the traditionallist of vijnanas.
Granting,then, that these sorts of refutationsare not made out of
malice, one mustface the problemof what there is to defend againston
behalf of the Yogacara.I claim that this system itself is its best defense.
Afterall, Asarga, the founder, wrote the huge YogacarabhOmi
and the
while Vasubandhu,besides his commentaryon the
Mahayanasamgraha,
and on the Madhyantalatter, as well as on the Dasabhomika-sOtra
the
in
treatises.
abbreviated
Thereis no lack
vibhaga,popularized system
of texts explaining this system, whether in an argumentativeor in a
nonargumentativefashion. Therefore,the role of the present writerto
defend the system really amountsto exposing it, taking it as the important thing, with ancient and modern writersless importantin comparison. Accordingly,the defense of the system againstanyone is reallythe
system'sown response;and the role of the presentwriteris to find this
responseof the system itself.
To illustratewhat is meant by this kind of attitude, let us take the
case of a review article I wrote for PhilosophyEastand West on Ashok
KumarChatterjee'sbook expoundingthe Yogacara.I concluded:
If Chatterjee's"Yogacara"is indeed the Yogacaraperson that Vasubandhu
was, then Chatterjee'sbook is certainlya wonderfulexpositionof the Yogacara philosophy.But,if the Yogacarafundamentalsare what I have indicated
above, happening to be in rough agreement with [P. T.] Raju and with
[Surendranath]Dasgupta, the Chatterjeebook is still worth reading as a
philosophical exegesis of what was traditionallyheld, principallyby nonYogacarins,to be the Yogacaraposition.2
When I wrote this, it was already known to me-though not mentioned

in the review-that Chatterjee had adopted the very interpretation that
his teacher T.R.V. Murti had espoused in chapter 13 of his well-known
book on Madhyamika.3 As has already been acknowledged, there is
nothing wrong with this kind of copying of a teacher's position. But it
also shows that if what was copied was in fact incorrect, the copy is also
incorrect. Still, we do not know yet if Murtiwas incorrect in that chapter.
The present essay will deal with this matter later on.
Another example is the more recent work by Schmithausen on the
Yogacara's alayavijnana teaching, wherein Schmithausen disagreed with
a Japanese scholar, H. Hakamaya, who insisted that Asanga was the
compiler of the entire encyclopedic YogacarabhOmi.Here Schmithausen
thought to counter Hakamaya's position by noting the use of the scripture Samdhinirmocana in some parts of the larger work and not in other
448
parts. About that scripture,Schmithausenconcluded: "Therefore,the

at least the portions concerned with the new
Samdhinirmocana-sutra,
kind of vijnanadistinguishedfrom the ordinarysix, was most probably
but after the Basic Section
composed before the ViniscayasamgrahanT
of the Yogacarabhomi."4It happens that a Japanesestudent, H. S. Sakuma,completed a dissertationat Hamburg,approvedby Schmithausen,
wherein he presented (in German)this very position stated abovehence copied. In my review of this publishedwork I pointed out: "One
may referin my Analysisof the SravakabhumiManuscript,5110-11, to a
passage on the three doors of vipasyana.This passage is virtuallythe
ch. 8, sect. 10. This is a
same as is found in the Samdhinirmocanasctra,
proofthat the authorof the Sravakabhomi-agreed to be the oldest part
of what Sakumacalls MaulTBhCmi[the 'Basic Section']-had available
and used the Samrdhinirmocanasutra."6
This, then, is an example of
where the copying turnedout to be incorrect,and was defended against
by calling attentionto what the Yogacaraitselfsays about the matter.
These two examples should clarifywhat is meant by misrepresentations (or possible ones) that are defended against-not really by the
present writer as an independent thinker, but ratherby the Yogacara
system itself being broughtto bear upon the alleged misrepresentation.
This essay continues with two main sections below: (1) The Positionof
the Yogacarinsand (2) Clarificationof the Position.
The Positionof the Yogacarins
Here I presentfourtopics: (a)Vasubandhuand an early scripture;(b)
about cittamatra;(c) about alayavijfinna;and (d) about three laksana.
Vasubandhuand an EarlyScripture.Some authors treat the Yogacara
system as though it were an invention of the founders, notably the
brothersAsarga and Vasubandhu.To suggest otherwise, may we notice
that BhikkhuNananandahas put out a bookleton the Kalakarama
Sutta.7
This scriptureis in the Ahguttara-Nikaya,Book of Fours,where it was
translatedby Woodward,8who noticed certain textual difficulties.The
Bhikkhu used some other editions and studied Buddhaghosa'scommentaryon every word for his Englishrendition,wherein he obviously
uses Woodward's words whenever possible. In the following I have
substitutedmy rendition 'gods and humans' and subdivide the translation with brief,bracketedremarks.
The Kalakarama
Sutta.[TheSetting.]At one time the ExaltedOne was staying
in Saketain Ka!aka's
Therethe ExaltedOneaddressedthe monks,
monastery.
"Monks."
"Revered
Sir,"repliedthosemonksin assent.[Asa Vedic
saying:
or Greek god would talk, declaring omniscience,] the ExaltedOne said:

"Monks,whatsoeverin the world with its gods, Marasand Brahmas,among
the progeny consisting of recluses and brahmins,gods and humans-whatsoever is seen, heard,sensed (sensationsarisingfromtaste, touch and smell), Alex Wayman
449
cognized, attained,soughtafterand ponderedover by the mind-all thatdo I

know. Monks,whatsoeverin the world ... of gods and humans,-whatsoever
is seen,... by the mind,-that have I fully understood;all that is knownto the
Tathagata,but the Tathagatahas not taken his stand upon it. [Now he denies
alternativesto be construedas four in number,because the scriptureis in the
Book of Fours.]If I were to say: 'Monks,whatsoeverin the world ... of...
gods and humans-whatsoever is seen ... by the mind-all that I do not
know'-it would be a falsehood in me. If I were to say: 'I both know it and
know it not'-that too would be a falsehood in me. If I were to say: 'I neither
know it nor am ignorantof it'-it would be a fault in me. [The Buddhanow
declares how one uses the senses while avoiding the 'apprehender'and the
'apprehended'.]Thus,monks,a Tathagatadoes not conceive of a visiblething
as apartfromsight;he does not conceive of an 'unseen',he does not conceive
of a 'thing-worth-seeing',he does not conceive about a seer. He does not
conceive of an audible thing as apartfrom hearing;he does not conceive of
'an unheard',he does not conceive of a 'thing-worth-hearing',
he does not
conceive about a hearer. He does not conceive of a thing to be sensed as
he does
apartfromsensation;he does not conceive of a 'thing-worth-sensing',
not conceive about one who senses. He does not conceive of a cognizable
thing as apartfromcognition;he does not conceive of a 'thing-worth-cognizing', he does not conceive about one who cognizes. Thus, monks, the
Tathagata,being such-like in regardto all phenomena seen, heard, sensed,
and cognized, is 'Such'.Moreover,than he who is 'Such',there is none other
greateror more excellent, I declare." [Now verses on how ordinarypersons
use theirsenses, sometimescalled 'the fantasyof normalcy'.]
Whatever is seen, heard, sensed or clung to, is esteemed as truthby
otherfolk.
Midstthose who are entrenchedin theirown views, being 'Such'I hold
none as trueor false.
This barb I beheld, well in advance [i.e., at the foot of the Bodhitree],
whereon humansare hooked, impaled.
"I know, I see, 'tis verilyso"-no such clingingfor the Tathagatas.
This scripture clarifies the Buddhist prescription "to see things as they
really are," since it implies that one should simply see without adding
anything. Recall the ancient Hermes epigram found on a Grecian urn:
"Who shall say more, will lie."9 As to the 'barb' of the verse, the Pali is
sallar, equivalent to the Vedic word salya, which down the centuries
means an 'arrow', on which one is impaled (if such be the case). I have
cited this scripture in this essay because I do believe that Vasubandhu's
popularizing treatises have such a scriptural source in the background.
About Cittamatra. Past writings on this topic uniformly render the term
cittamatra as 'mind-only', and so do I also in my own former essays.
Notice that such renditions take the topic outside India by way of Asian
translations and essays in English and European languages. Inside India,
where the term originated, the words citta and matra appeared as such
450
with connotationsof Sanskritwords; outside, there was the connotation

of the words 'mind' and 'only'. I propose to consider these words with
their connotationin the Sanskritlanguage.
In current lexical work I have learned various usages of the term
matra.10The lexicons of India recognize a neuter form matramand a
feminine form matra,so the adjectives can go with the neuter or the
feminine. Of the two definitionsfor the neuter form-'all, the entirety'
(kartsnya),and 'restrictionto the instance' (avadharana)-the adjective
'only' could agree with 'restrictionto the instance'.
The rendition'only' worksfor the other definition-the entirety.For
example, there is the compound sthanamatra,in the meaning'a place in
general', thus any and all places and excluding what is not a place.
When cittamatrais understood in this way, the citta is unmixed with
anythingthat is not citta. Accordingly,if we suppose in the compound
cittamatrathat matrameans 'only', then is only one of the two senses
intended,or can it be both?
It is well to point out that other adjectives are feasible from the
feminine matra.The definition'any measure' (mana)yields the entry in
Apte's Sanskrit-English
dictionaryparomatra('vast')for the spatial measure and, in the lexicons, tatkalamatra('at once') for the temporalmeasure-and also alpa ('a trifle')as well as aksibhaga('a mirror').As adjectives applied to cittamatra,we could say 'amountingto mind'-both
spatially and temporally. Or we could say 'just mind' and 'mirroring
mind', and, for the latter,perhapsalso 'being mirroredby mind'.
In a previouslypublished essay, I presentedAsariga'sstatementon
cittamatra,which I translatedin part.11It is clear that the Buddhistopponents did not criticize on the grounds that Asarga denied the existence of the externalworld (which,of course, he did not do). As the first
attack,the opponentstates:"Itis not valid thatthere is a mind-onlyin the
sense of a 'continuoussubstantiality'(dravyatas),because it contradicts
scripture."The opponent is asked: "How does it contradictscripture?"
That person responds:"He (the Buddha)said, 'If the citta consisted of
lust defilement (upaklesa)and consisted of hatredand delusion defilement, it could not become liberated.'"Asanfgareplies:"Butwhat is the
objection to that?"He seems to mean that we accept what the Buddha
taught,and so if the cittadoes not consist of these defilements(orcontain
them), it would be liberated;hence your scripturalappeal cannot deny to
mind-onlya 'continuoussubstantiality'.The opponent does not give up,
and retorts:"Mind-onlyby itself is invalid, because if there is not two
together, when one does not resortto representation(vijnapti)of lust,
etc., one would be free (of those defilements)[which we know is not the
case]."
The opponent is obviously a follower of the Buddhist Abhidharma,which teaches thatthere is no cittawithouta caitta(= caitasika- AlexWayman
451
dharma)-a 'mental'.12Thatwe cannot have a citta by itself is the second meaning I treatedabove, the 'totality'sense, all citta, unmixedwith
anything else. But Asanga appears to espouse this 'totality'sense. His
response startsby saying "There is no fault in a prior representation,"
and continues:
Thereis whatwas saidby the Bhagavat,
to wit,"concomitant
(sahaja)
feeling
(cetana),"and whatwas said
(vedana),idea (samjnj),and thinking-volition
are mingled,not unmingled,so
(by Him),to wit, "Thesenatures(dharma)
these naturesare not objectsindividually
separatedout;or when separated
To demonout (notobjects)for referenceas distinct,or clear,or different."
stratethe meaningof the minglinghe usedthe simileof the lightof a butter
if theywerenotconcomitant,
it wouldalso havebeen
lamp.13Accordingly,
to saytheyaremingled.
improper
Asanga has cited a scripture in Buddhist Sanskritequivalent to the
Mahavedalla-suttaof the Pali canon Majjhima-Nikaya.Apparentlyfor
Asanga, concomitance does not deny a pure citta any more than it denies a purefeeling, and so forth.Ordinarythinkingis not able to separate
out the individualfactors,because they are mingled.Presumably,it takes
a yogin to separatethe mental items.Thenthis yogin can arriveat a pure
seems to have a similaridea when it refers
citta.The Pataijali YogasCtra
to 'cessationof the modificationsof the citta' (cittavrrtti-nirodha).
Now I shall deal with three subtopics:(1) the phrasecittamatramyad
uta traidhatukam,(2) the Yogacaratheory of ekagracitta,and (3) the
theorythat Vasubandhudenies the externalworld.
The Phrase Cittamatramyad uta traidhatukam.There is a rather
famous passage in the Buddhist Dasabhumika-sutra,its Sixth Stage
(bhumi).This has been cited as cittamatramyad uta traidhatukam,and
the scripture'stranslationby Megumu Honda, as revised by Professor
JohannesRahder,understandsthis to mean "Thistriple world is mindonly."'4 Sylvain Levi, in a learned note at the beginning of his French
translationof Vasubandhu's Virnsatika(the Twenty Verses), presents
several versionsof this formula,in each case showing the form traidhais the
tukam,and he appearsto recognize that the DasabhOmika-sutra
source of such nonscripturalcitations of the entire formula.15This passage has seemed to supportthe claim that the Yogacaradenies the existence of the externalworld, as here, 'threeworlds'-of desire, form,and
the formlessworlds, accordingto the usual Buddhistdogmatics.
Now, one of the difficultiesof the usual translationand consequent
is not reallya
interpretationis thatthis scripture,the Dasabhumika-sQtra,
of
Yogacarascripture.Indeedit is a basic scripture MahayanaBuddhism
and is not devoted to the particularphilosophicalview of the Yogacara.
The particularphrasewas insertedby that scripturewithin a discussion
PhilosophyEast& West of Dependent Origination,which is importantto all Buddhistschools.
452
Vasubandhu,in his great commentaryon the Dasabhomika-sutra,

gives
two explanationsfor this phrase,neitherof which promotesany particular theories of the Yogacaraschool, even though the first explanation
uses the Yogacaratheory of multiple vijinas.16 This first explanation
goes into the Buddhisttheory of waywardness(viparyasa),and then announces that the 'mind-only'passage was promulgatedso that one may
and fromother
be liberatedfromthe 'storeconsciousness' (alayavijfiyna)
perceptions(vijfina). Here,the sense of matramseems to be 'amounting
to', that is, 'amountingto mind', where the 'mind' (citta)here standsfor
counted as seven or eight. These are the perceptions
all the vijynanas,
on
the five outer-directedsenses, the manovijnanabased
based
(vijafna)
on the mind (manas)as an innersense organ, and the 'storeconsciousness' (for7), or number7, the 'defiled mind' (klistamanas),plus the 'store
consciousness' for 8.
If someone of Madhyamakapersuasion had been commenting,
would be mentioned.Therefore,it is not
probablyonly the firstsix vijfnana
a particularYogacarateaching here that is meant, but simply that these
variousperceptionsarewhat lead to waywardness(viparyasa)and then to
rebirthaccordingto the preceptsof DependentOrigination.Vasubandhu
was entitledto interpretthe term cittamatraby the set of vijfianabecause
the Abhidharmagives the terminologicalset citta, manas, vijfnana,which
allows their mutual substitutionin certain contexts;17and CandrakTrti's
also changes the cittamatra
autocommentaryon his Madhyamakavatara
of the famous formula about the 'three worlds' to vijfnanamatra
in his
section attemptingto refutethe 'storeconsciousness' (alayavijinana).'8
The second explanation has to do with the formulaof Dependent
Origination,and herethe 'thought'is thatof the Buddha,who realizedthe
formulawith just one thought(ekacitta)and then taughtit in a twelvefold
way. Here, the meaning of matramis the temporalsense 'at once' or in
temporalsequence when the twelve membersare taught one afteranother, thus taking time, eventually to have the theory that the twelve
amountto three lives.
And this informationfrom Vasubandhu shows that the rendition
of traidhatukamas 'three worlds' is incorrect. The Sanskritterm is a
derivativenoun from 'three worlds' (tridhatu).The derivativenouns of
Sanskrithave to be interpretedby each such term. Forexample, Gautama is the derivativeof Gotama;this is a family-typeof derivativesuch
that Gautamais the descendent of Gotama.The derivativepaurusafrom
purusa (a human person or man) applies more to the present case, because as a masculine noun paurusacan mean 'humanaction' (karman)
and 'the weight that one man with both hands can raise upwards'
We can also interprettraidhatukam
(urdhvavistrta-dobhpaninrmana).19
in two ways. Both ways take the derivativehere to be the formulaof
twelvefold Dependent Origination,that is, that it is derived from, or Alex Wayman
453
faithfulto, the three worlds, so realized in one moment'sthoughtby the

Buddhaand then taughtin twelve terms.Thisone-moment'sthoughtis a
varietyof cittamatra.The other interpretationof the twelvefold formula
is that it is the way of rebirththroughwaywardnessdue to the set of
vijnana, and this is a differentinterpretationof cittamatra.But rebirth
requires-that is, is relatedto-the threeworlds.Neitherof Vasubandhu's
explanationsin this commentaryjustifiesthe interpretationthat the passage, so misrendered-to wit, "This triple world is mind-only"-has
anythingto do with denying the existence of the externalworld.
The naturalquestion, then, is how should that Sanskritphrase be
rendered?I would offer:the derivativeof the three worlds is only mind.
Thatis to say, whatevermay be the 'threeworlds' in a minimalsensewhateverelse is attributedto them, an elaborationof them, a productof
them-has been added by the mind. In one case it was added by the
mind of the Buddha-the twelvefoldformulaof DependentOrigination.
In the other case it was added by the mind of other sentient beings.
Hence, such an observationagrees with the scripturetranslatedabove,
the Ka!akarama
Sutta,which gave the message that to see things as they
must
not add anything.Apparentlythe six senses (when
one
really are,
as
normal)see things they really are, and it is the perceptions (vijnana)
based thereon that do the adding. But this is the interpretationof cittamatra when it is tantamountto the set of vijinana.This shows that it was
properfor me to cite that scriptureas a backgroundof Vasubandhu's
position.
and
Besides, the large chapter3 of Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakoga
his own commentaryis devoted to the worlds, which, when in two sets,
are the world of sentience (sattva-loka)and the supportworld (bhajanaloka).20He was thereforevery familiarwith the respectiveattributionsof
these two kindsof worlds. He would undoubtedlyknow of the scripture
in the DTgha-nikaya,III,called Aggannia-sutta(though in the Buddhist
SanskritAgamaversion)-a scriptureon the Buddhisttheory of genesis.
One may readthe account in the translationof the Paliversionthat, after
a long period,this world passes away. This is the Indiantheoryof cycles,
with the passingaway and emergence of the 'supportworld'. The scripture mentions that with the passing away the sentient beings had retreatedto a 'higher' realm-that of Form (ropa-dhatu)-and while the
world was plunged in waterydarkness,they were 'made of mind',fed on
joy, and were self-luminous.The earth reappearedlike a scum on the
cooling water and became endowed with color, odor, and taste. The
sentientbeings tastedthis and found it very sweet. As they ate more and
more, they graduallylost their self-luminance,while the moon and sun
became manifest. The beings had evidently fallen into the realm of
desire.21 In such an account we see the prior disappearanceand rePhilosophyEast& West appearanceof the supportworld, and thatthe sentientworldfollows suit.
454
Accordingly,the way of translatingthat phraseabout cittamatraand the

traidhatukathat I have had to discard, namely that the three worlds are
dependent upon citta,would have been in directviolationof the Genesis
story.I don't believe thatVasubandhuwould have taken a position in his
briefpopularizingworks in directoppositionto the Buddhistscriptures.
Itwas pointedout above thatthe
TheYogacaraTheoryof Ekagracitta.
Buddha was credited with realizing the entire formula of Dependent
Originationwith "one-moment'sthought." In that place, the term was
ekacitta. The theory of Buddhist meditation sets forth a goal called
samadhi,which is defined as ekagracitta.This term has frequentlybeen
rendered"one-pointedthought (or mind)."Then what is meant by the
Sanskritword agra?Since this is an importantterm in the Sanskritlanguage, the Indian lexicographershave had to make it a defined word.
Over four of their lexicons include for it the definitionalambana.22Literally, this means a 'support'.Many years ago I learnedthat this is the
basic term in Buddhismfor the 'reflectedimage' in the mind,23which is
what one should meditate upon, given that it is an appropriateobject
for such meditative purposes. It follows that such a definition permits
a translationfor the entire compound ekagracitta,namely "mind on a
single meditativetopic." Also, see Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakosa,
chapter 1, for a similar distinction between the outer sense object (visaya)
and the mental reflection(alambana).24
Besides, three of these four lexicons also defined the expression
ekagra,namely as "a single continuity"(ekatana)and as "being without
discord" (anakula).So the expression ekagracittacan be furtherexplainedfor the practiceof a yogin, to wit, "the mind or consciousness as
a single continuity and as without discord."25The two definitionsgo
together, because the continuity would be broken if the mind were
subjected to discord. And in such a case there would not be a "single
meditative object." This is an implication of the definition I found,
namely ekatana, because this contrasts with a well-known Buddhist
term, samtana,which is usually understoodas a "streamof consciousness," but which the foregoing informationsuggests should be better
renderedas a "mingledstreamof consciousness." I should call attention
to the fact that the prefixsam- in Sanskritis cognate with an Indo-European prefixthat is present in Englishas con- in the sense of "together,"
that is, that in the ordinarycase of a samtana,the continuity (tana)is
composite.
Therefore,when a modern Tibetan author, Lozang Tsewang, in a
published seminar paper, writes, "LordBuddhasays in the sOtras:'The
consciousness of a sentient being is of a single stream'"26(butdoes not
identifythe sctra so saying),the cited passage might mean what I called
attentionto above, that althoughthe mentalfactorsare mingled,a yogin Alex Wayman
455
-if successful-may separate out the citta and find it consisting of a

single stream.But it is importantto notice that the yogin does this with
his own mind, and because he is engrossed in a samadhi. He does not
do this separatingout in the mindsof other sentientbeings, who cannot
verifythatthe consciousness is of a single stream,forthe reasonsthatthe
mentalfactorsare mingledand thatthey have not learnedhow to go into
the appropriatesamadhi. This Tibetan author attemptedto apply that
cited passage in a philosophicaltreatmentof the Yogacaraposition. But
it is not valid to arguethatsomethingis the case with all minds(andtheir
presumedobjects)when it was only the case of a certainyogin and his
personalattainment.
The Theory that Vasubandhu Denies the External World. Certainlysome readersdecided thatVasubandhu'stwenty-versetreatise(the
involves a denial of the externalworld. And such personsare
Vimgsatika)
entitled to say: suppose we grant your previous argumentabout cittamatraand the traidhatuka.Evenso there are verses in that Vasubandhu
treatisethat appearto deny the externalworld. Beforegoing into those
particularverses, it is well to notice the situationin his Abhidharmakosa.
AbhidharmaBuddhismrecognizes six senses and theirobjects, fromthe
sense of eye with its object of formations(in shape or color)to the sense
of mind (manas)with its object of natures (dharma).But this does not
mean that one necessarily perceives such sense objects. So Buddhism
taughtthatthere is a 'perception'(vijfina) based on the eye, and so with
the other senses as bases (ayatana).Because the senses had the power
to apprehendthose variousobjects, they were given the Sanskritname
indriya,a word which means 'a power'. Itfollows immediatelythat 'perception' is powerless;that is, it is unable to contact the object directly,
but mustdepend on whateverthe sense organ comes up with.
Bareaupresentsthe mannerin which Vasubandhutreatedthis matter
in his Abhidharmakosa:27
ropam paincendriyanyarthahpanfcavijnaptir
is
ca
eva
(I, 9) ("Formation five sense organs, five objects, and nonrepresentation");caksuh pasyati ropani sabhagam na tadasritamvijnanam drsgyaterQpamna kilantaritamyatah (1, 42) (Bareau'stranslation:
"When it is in condition to work, the eye sees formations;the consciousness which is leaningon it does not (see formations),because formation,then being concealed, is not seen"). If we grantthat perception
fails to reach the object that was apprehendedby a sense organ, we begin to notice how perception,perhapsautomatically,adds to the sensory
evidence, as was discussedabove. And this may help to explainwhy the
same artobject is viewed differentlyby differentpersons-presumably it
was about the same as a sense object, but the subjective perceptions
evaluate it quite divergently.
West
East
&
Now to the twenty-versetreatise.The translationfrom the Chinese
Philosophy
456
by Hamilton28was reprintedin A Source Book by Radhakrishnanand

Moore.29We learnthere that these twenty verses are on vijnfaptimatrata,
there rendered'Representation-Only'.
It is somewhatembarrassingto me
to point out what the editors have added in their footnote on page 328,
because I have always had great admirationfor both Radhakrishnan
and Moore. They say: "A bettertranslationof vijfiaptimatrata
would be
exsince
rather
than
denies
'ideation-only,'
'representation'suggests
ternal reality."Well, no fair mistranslatinga Sanskritterm just to make
one's theory come out right!Thatremarkwas made because of thinking
that Vasubandhu'streatisedenies externalreality.
SylvainLevi'sedition30of the Sanskritfor the twentyverses numbers
them as twenty-two. His verse 1 can be taken as introductory,and his
verse 22 as concluding. The translationfrom the Chinese, as presented
by Hamilton,startswith Sanskritnumber2 as the firstverse. This is Levi's
introductoryverse with my translation:
evaitadasadarthavabhasanat
/
vijfiaptimatram
//
yathataimirikasyasatkesacandradidarsanam
Thisjustamountsto representation,
as the sightof unrealhair,moon,etc. of
one with an eye-caul-because beingthe (subsequent)
manifestation
of an
unrealartha(external
thing).
This introductorystatementdoes not deny an externalobject. Instead
there is a mental representationthat amounts to tinsel, 'fool's gold', a
false wealth. Vasubandhuappears to mean that the mind imagines an
externalarthain front,butthe mind has only a reportor representationof
what the sense organ had sensed.
This is Levi'sverse, and what for both the Chinese and the Tibetanis
verse 1, with my rendition(Levihad to reconstructthe Sanskrit):
anarthaniyamodesakalayoh
/
yadivijfnaptir
ca yuktakrtyakriya
na ca //
samtanasyaniyamas
Ifrepresentation
lacksanexternalobject(artha),
thereis no certainty
(aniyama)
of spaceandtime;thereis no certainty
of thecompositestream(ofconsciousness)andagencyis notvalid.
We notice again thatVasubandhudoes not here deny an externalobject,
because the sentence makes a supposition,"If...." The verses go on to
make a distinctionbetween the beings of differentdestinies, gods, humans, hungryghosts, and so forth,in how they view externals.Thusthe
gods see the riversparklingwith gems, humanssee it as good to drink,
and the hungryghosts (preta)find the riverfull of unclean things rendering it unfitto drink.We notice this differencein termsof destiny classes
that it involves the use of externalthings. Again, it is not a denial of external objects, but a claim that differentdestinies have a differentaddition (philosophicallyfalse) to what was sensed.
AlexWayman
457
Then there is what is numberedverse 16 in Hamilton'stranslation,

where he rendersthe firstpartas follows: "As has been said, the apparent object is a representation.It is fromthat memoryarises"(the Sanskrit
for this: uktam yatha tadabhasavijnaptih;smaranam tatah). Hamilton
translatesthe commentaryon this:31"As we have said earlier,although
there is no externalobject, a sense representation,visual, etc., appearsas
an outer object. Fromthis comes the later state with its memory associate, the discriminatedmental representation,appearingas a seeming
formerobject. Then we speak of this as a memoryof what has been alreadyexperienced."Notice that Hamiltontranslatedthe firstsentence of
this commentaryas thoughthere is denial of the copula ("althoughthere
is no externalobject").Butwhen we consultthe Sanskritthat Leviedited,
we find the sentence worded differently:"Evenin the absence of an external object" (vinapyarthena).It is necessary to translatethis way to
make sense of the comment that Hamiltontranslatesfrom Chinese:32
"Thatis, he defends his positionby sayingthatthere musthave been this
object immediatelyreceived in the past by the five organsof sense, eye,
etc. [so that] in the presentthe intellectiveconsciousness is able to hold
it in memory."
We have probablyall had such an experience, when concentrating
on some problem or passage, if someone comes to the door and says,
"Dinner is ready"and, not immediatelyhearinga response of the type
"O.K.I'mcoming," continues, "I said: 'Dinneris ready'!"-whereupon
the concentratingperson responds, "I heard you the first time"-not
exactly as this person now says it, because if we mean by hearingthe
actual sounds as heardat the time the sounds are made, this is truejust
for the receptionby a sense organ (of hearing),and not true for auditory
perception.Accordingto Vasubandhu,as the Chinese commentaryhere
understoodhim, the person rememberedthe words "Dinneris ready."
Thus, "even in the absence of an external object," that is, even
though that sound is no longer sounding, a person may hear it as a
memory image. Due to the actual experiences of yogins, this situation
was takenfor granted.Thereis a celebratedcase associatedwith what in
Buddhisthistory is called the Second Council, to determine if certain
erringmonks should be ousted from the Samgha:all the senior monks
were called to assemble for the hearings,but one of these monkswas in
the deep concentrationcalled nirodha-samapatti.
Accordingto the story,
from
the
a
his
samadhi
divinitygave him the message,
upon
emerging
It
he
to
the
whereupon
sped
meeting.33 should be admitted that this
remembered
the
yogin
message, while the instigatingsound was no
longersounding.
Thus, when we examine the text more carefully,we find that Vasubandhudoes not deny the existence of externalobjects in this and in the
PhilosophyEast& West previouslycited materials,even thoughthe translator,just by his manner
458
of translating,made it appear so. Besides, two authorsof recent books

translatinga numberof the Vasubandhutreatisesagree thatVasubandhu
does not deny an externalobject (Kochumuttom34
and Anacker35).
As to Murti'schapter,previouslyalludedto, a few wordswill suffice.
A reader of that chapter, supposedly on the 'absolutism'of Vedanta,
Madhyamika,and Vijnanavada,will readilyfind out that the Yogacara
position(called here 'Vijinnavada')is set forth,not fromYogacarabooks,
but from their rival Vedanta and Madhyamikabooks. Having decided
that the opponents must be right,when he then cites a Yogacaratreatise
it must be made to agree with Murti'ssupposition.So, referringto the
Madhyantavibhaga,he says, "The constructed subject-objectworld is
unreal;but this does not make the abhutaparikalpaunreal;for, it is the
substratumfor the unrealsubject-objectduality.It is, however, non-conwhich means "the imaginationof what
ceptual."36So abhutaparikalpa,
did not (really)happen," is 'non-conceptual'!I conclude that Murtiin
this chapterdoes not advance the understandingof YogacaraBuddhism.
AboutAlayavijnana.When we turnto the Yogacaratheoriesthatdevolve
aboutthe term alayavijnana,we notice thatwhat must have been a hotly
contested point even in the time of the BuddhistmasterAsanga is still in
presenttimes disputed. I already mentioned that there is a two-volume
work on the topic by Schmithausen. Here, under a heading "Introduction and OriginalMeaningof Alayavijnffna,"he points to a passage
in the SamahitabhCmiportionof the YogacarabhOmi
about a person in
the deep concentrationcalled nirodha-samapatti,and that it is a continuance of the alayavijiianawith its seeds, which shows that even
thoughvariousother mentalfunctionshave ceased, vijinanaitselfhas not
ceased, and these seeds will bring forth the evolving types of vijfnna
when the person emerges from the samadhi.37Schmithausencalls this
the "InitialPassage"here and a numberof times lateron in his work. He
goes on to claim38that the passage, although not statingthis explicitly,
implies that the continued presence of the alayavijnanahas kept alive
that yogin who is in nirodha-samapatti.
And if that is so, then the alayavijnanamust also be associated with the moment of conception in the
womb,39 and so this is the vijfnanaon which Name-and-Formation
arises in dependence-in the usual sequence of the Bud(nama-rCpa)
dhist DependentOrigination.Accordingly,he insiststhatthe pratisamdhi
(or 'linking',the 'rebirth')kind of vijnafnais that initialalayavijnanathat
descends into the male-femaleelement union in the womb.40
In the course of his investigationhe was led to disagreewith various
Japanesescholars who understoodthese mattersdifferentlyfrom him. I
shall have to evaluate whether his conclusions are consistent with the
positionsof Asahga,the founderof the Yogacara,or of Vasubandhu,the
Alex Wayman
greatpopularizerthereof.
459
It happens that Asanga himself-obviously responding to a number

of challenges and condemnations of this alayavijinanaposition-gave his
answers in the opening section of his exegetical section called ViniscayasamgrahanT,which I employ in the Tibetan version in the Tanjur. There
we learn that the 'store consciousness' is the abode of seeds (alayavijfnanm bTjasrayah).41 Asanga claims that this is a secret teaching of the
Bhagavat, citing a well-known verse from the Samdhinirmocana-sOtra
about the adanavijfnana(the consciousness that 'takes' [seeds]).42 But the
reader of this section cannot avoid the conclusion that Asanga is convinced that of the many references to vijinanain the old Buddhist Sanskrit
canon (the four Agamas) that he employed, they cannot all be explained
as the standard six perceptions based on the six sense organs, but that
there are various contexts of this Sanskritexpression which justify it to be
understood differently.
Now, as Asanga continues in his defense of this type of vijfnana,he
sets forth three reasons that surprisingly were not referred to by Schmithausen. I shall cite the Tibetan along with my translation below each
passage, and then follow with a discussion-insofar as it is possible.
/ ci'i phyirkungzhi rnampar ses pa med na lus kyi tshorba mi rungzhe na /
'di Itartshulbzhin nas tshulbzhin ma yin pa sems par byed pa dang / rjessu
rtogpar byed pa'am / sems mnyampar bzhag pa'am / sems mnyampar ma
bzhag pa gcig cig lus la tshorba rnampa du ma rnampa mangpo sna tshogs
gang dag 'byungba'i rigsna snangste / de'i phyiryang kungzhi rnampar ses
pa yod do
/43
1. Why in the absence of alayavijfnana

is the body's feeling not feasible?It is
this way: when positingthat the mind attends in the rightmannerand then
imagines in the wrong manner;or that the mind is equipoised, then is not
equipoised, there appearprinciplesthat bringfortha multitudeof aspects of
varied kinds of feelings in a certain body. Therefore,there is the 'storeconsciousness'.
/ ci'i phyirkungzhi rnampar ses pa med na sems med pa'i snyomspar 'jugpa
mi srid ce na / 'di Itar'du ses med pa la snyomspar zhugs pa'am/ 'gog pa la
snyoms par zhugs pa'i rnampar ses pa lus dang bralba kho nar 'gyurzhing
ma bralbarmi 'gyurbas / de'i phyirsi ba kho nar 'gyurba zhig na bcom Idan
'das kyi de skad du / de'i mam par ses pa ni lus dang bralba ma yin no zhes
gsungs pa'i phyir ro /44
2. Why in the absence of alayavijfina would there be no possibilityof equiIt is this way: the vijnanathat is in
poise withoutthought(acittika-samapatti)?
or is in cessation equipoise
non-ideationalequipoise (asamjinika-samapatti)
fromthe body, and would
when
it
is
absent
occurs
only
(nirodha-samapatti)
not occur [thatway] when not absent (fromthe body). Forthat reason, it was
only for the case of death that the Bhagavatdeclared, "his vijnana is not
absentfromthe body."
460
/ ci'i phyirkungzhi rnampar ses pa med na 'chi 'pho mi rungzhe na / 'di Itar
'pho ba'i tshe'i mam par ses pas lus ro stod dam / ro smad du drod yal bar
byed cing spong la yid kyi rnampar ses pa ni nam yang mi 'byungba ma yin
bas / de'i phyir lus len par byed pa'i kun gzhi rnampar ses pa kho na dang
bralbas lus kyi drodyal ba dang / lus la tshorba med par snang barzad kyi/
yid kyi rnampar ses pa dang bral bas ni ma yin te / de'i phyiryang mi rung
ngo
/45
3. Why in the absence of alayavijiina is there no feasibilityof transmigration?It is this way: the vijnanaat the time of [dyingand] transmigrating
leaves
when the warmthof the upper and lower partsof the body fades away, and
the manovijnanacertainlydoes not occur and is not [at that time]. On that
account, only in the absence of the alayavijfianawhich takes a body does
feeling (vedana)get lost in the body, but this does not happen throughthe
absence of manovijnana.So there is no feasibility(in the absence of alayavijiana).
One of the first conclusions about these three passages is that
Schmithausen was wrong in concluding that alayavijnana was necessary
so that a meditator who is in the trance state nirodha-samapatti would
not die there. Certainly, if Asanga had thought so, this would be the
place for him to have said so. It is a case when vijnana departs from
the body, but the person does not die (on that account). But when a
person does die, vijnana does depart from the body. However, the three
passages certainly require further explanations. A certain amount of explication should come through considering certain Schmithausen claims
as were alluded to above.
As to his view that the alayavijnana is the kind of vijnana that descends into the male-female element union in the womb, supposedly
bringing life thereto, there is Asarga's own explanation in the early part
of the Yogacarabhomi:
[tatra]sarvabrjakamvipakasamgrhTtam
asrayopaadanad alayavijiina.msammurcchati /46
There,the 'store-consciousness'all-seededand restrainedby maturation,after

takinga body, faints(orfalls unconscious,or becomes inactive).
And:
yatra ca kalaladege tad vijninam sammurcchitamso 'sya bhavati tasmin
samaye hrdayadesah /47
Wherethat vijnanafaintsin a place of the kalala(initialformof the embryo),it

[thatplace] becomes for it [theembryo]at thattime the place of the heart.
Notice that in this account, the initial form of the embryo after conception is already there when the 'store consciousness' enters. The term kalala is used in Indian medicine for the initial embryo. So it is a case like
Alex Wayman
461
the Genesis account already mentioned where the supportworld precedes the subjectiveelement. Thuswhile Schmithausenwas rightabout
the role of alayavijinnato representin some way the vijiana that is the
thirdmemberof DependentOrigination,and so to fall into the womb (in
the humancase), it is clear thatAsaiga does not, and would not, ascribe
to vijnafnathe role of conferringlife-as Schmithausenclaimed. These
remarkshelp to explain somewhat the thirdof Asahga'sdefenses of the
alayavijynana.
Then Schmithausenclaimed, and repeatedhis claim, that this alayavijinanathat falls into the womb is the pratisamdhi(rebirth)type of vijinana.Apparentlybecause some panditswere espousing such a theoryat
the time of Vasubandhu,he countered it in no uncertainterms in his
DependentOriginationcommentary:"Itis not rightthatthe pratisamdhivijfianais by way of samskara[the second memberof DependentOrigination]. It is true that vijinanaarises [as the third member];the Nameand-Formation(nama-rupa)[as the fourthmember]arisingon that basis
is the time of pratisamdhi-this is the faultless position."48Gunamati
claims that Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakogaidentifies the pratisamdhi
('linkage'= reincarnation)with the skandha kind of vijiana.49 He presumablymeans chapter3, the introductoryparagraphto k. 14, where the
firstline in the Sanskrittext has the expression"five upadana-skandha,"
and in the next line it says "Themomentof pratisamdhiis the birthin the
destinies (gati)"(upapattibhavogatisupratisamdhiksanah).50
Buddhaghosahelps to make sense of the foregoingwhen, in his famous work Visuddhimagga,he sets forth under the topic of the fourth
memberof DependentOriginationthatthe naman(of nama-rupa),when
initiallydeveloping in the womb, consistsof three aggregates.Thatis, he
defines it, vedanadayo tayo khandha, "the three personal aggregates,
feelings, etc.,"51thus leaving out vinnfifna(the Pali way of writing vijnana),while the standardAbhidharmalistingof the namanpartpresents
the four members, including vijinana.This forces the well-known canonical passage holding that nama-rupaarises in dependence on vij~nan
and that vijinanaarises in dependence on n,ama-rupato mean that vijnafnais added to the namanto make four.
In short, when the vijinanathat is number 3 in Dependent Origination falls into the womb, it is there the 'store consciousness' that is a
store of seeds. As to the word 'seed' (bTja),Asaiga gives a set of words
realm (dhatu), lineage
that are roughly definitions, the bTja-paryaya:
cause
the real set (satkaya),
basic
nature
basic
(hetu),
(prakrti),
(gotra),
elaboration (prapanca),store (alaya), the taking (upadana),suffering
na), and
(duhkha),foundation of reifying views (satkyadrtyadhisthad
foundation of 'I am' pride (asmimanadhisthana)-andany others belonging to the same set.52 Besides, Asahga gives a list of various out&
West
East
of these seeds: family (kula),strength(bala),bodily appearance
comes
Philosophy
462
(rOpa),length of life (ayus),enjoyments(bhoga),and so on; and of these

effects, principallygood (subha)and bad (asubha)karmais the cause.53
Later,Asangatold how this 'storeconsciousness' gets its seeds:
evam avyakrtadharma kusalakusalavyakrtan
dharmanavahanti/ tadyatha
kusalakusalavyakrtabTjakam
alayavijnanamavahanti/54
Thus, the indeterminatenatures (avyakrtadharma)
bring the virtuous,unvirand
indeterminate
as
follows:
tuous,
natures,
they bring (them)to the 'store
which
is
seeded
with
the
consciousness',
virtuous,unvirtuous,and indeterminate.
Previouslyit was mentionedthat the Yogacarafrequentlypresentsa

list of eight vijnana,of which number7 is the 'defiled manas'and number 8 is the alayavijnana.Now, in Buddhistcommentarialexegesis of the
scriptures,there was a problemwith the vijinna that is third in Dependent Origination,and was said to have a 'vision'of the birthplaceand so
to be attractedthereto. Now, even in the Yogacara,it would hardlybe
feasible to identifythis thirdmemberwith the alayavijnana,since a store
of seeds could hardlybe called visionary,except for the envisioning of
effects, as an acorn might be said (poeticallyor metaphorically)to foresee the oak tree. But however we might credit the acorn with such an
ability,we should all admit that the acorn cannot imagine where it will
grow. Vasubandhuwas well aware of the difficulty,so in his Mahayasamgrahacommentaryhe said:
Besides, when the manovijnanathat is defiled witnesses the birthplace,the
intermediatestate [between death and rebirth]comes to an end. That it
"faints" means that the manovijiana comes together with the male and
female generative elements, [and] experiences a single [moment of] bliss,
whereupon the manovijnanafaints [i.e., becomes unconscious or inactive],
and on the basis thereof,a differentsortof manovijnanaenters."55
Since Asarigahad already denied that the manovijiina (i.e., the one
based on the manas as the sixth sense) is operativeat the time of death,
Vasubandhumust mean the seventh vijnana,what in laterYogacarawas
referredto as the 'defiled mind' (klista-manas).Later,Vasubandhucomments:"Therefore,the manovijnanathatfaints is not [i.e., is no longer]a
[i.e., a resultativekind];and that is
manovijnana,but is a vipaka-vijinana
'all-seeded'."56 He therefore admits that it was the 'defiled mind' that
falls into the womb and, once there, is called alayavijnana.Thisseparate

category of a 'defiled mind' seems to have been adopted for the death
for the
vision, for the visions duringthe intermediatestate (antarabhava),
birthvision, and perhapsalso (just my own speculation)for hypnogogic
states duringa lifetime.
Now, as this 'store consciousness' is creditedwith having a store of
'all' dharmas,we should recall that in BuddhistAbhidharmait is the Alex Wayman
463
that has those dharmassupposedlyas object, while it is the

manovijfnana
sixthsense manasthat has those dharmasdirectlyas object. Inthe theory
of Dependent Originationalluded to above, for a vijnafnathat arises in
Gunamatiexplainsthatthe manodependence on Name-and-Formation,
is
the
main
one:
"Given
the
set of six vijnafna,only manovijvijnana
nana is the fastening(Tib.sbrel ba) of pratisamdhi(the reincarnation)."57
is necessaryfor
Thismeansthatthe fourthmemberName-and-Formation
the Abhidharmamanovijnanato operate; so the remaining vijfnanas,
based on the-five outer-directedsenses, must requirethe fifth member,
the Six SensoryBases (sadayatana),to operate.
All the foregoing should clarifythat the chief demand to have the
concept of alayavijfnanawas for Asahga's third reason-the theory of
rebirth.Schmithausen'stheory that the initial place is the context of a
special yoga state-that is, nirodha-samapatti-is hardlytenable. The
discussion at some length in the early part of the Yogacarabhomi
shows that it was the Buddhistargumentsover whether some persons
had or did not have the potentialityof Nirvana,58and the attemptto
justify events of the present day as the effect of previous lives, that
demanded a carrierof a seed-nature.This must be why Asahga allows
for the operationof alayavijinana
when the 'evolving perceptions'are in
abeyance.59
But then there are the first and second reasons that Asarfgamentioned. These are quite difficult because yoga states are implicated.
When Asahga mentioned, as cited above, that vijnanaentered the embryo at the place where the heartwould form, this makes it clear that
when he said in the second reasonthat in the case of those two kindsof
samapattithe vijnanais absent fromthe body, it means that vijfnna had
left its 'heart'location, and was somewhere else for the time being (-in
the head?).Thissuggeststhatthe yogin is in a sortof catalepticstate.And
this seems to be why, in the firstreason, Asaflgahad creditedthe 'store
consciousness' with enabling the feelings of the body. Thus, in certain
trance states there is a local or more general loss of feeling, and Asafga
claims that to understandwhat is going on in these specialized states,
one must posit a 'store consciousness'. This appears to be enough for
these three reasons,as far as this essay is concerned.
It would also take too much space to go into the matter of the
transmutationof the 'store consciousness' (alayavijfnana-pariv.rtti),
and
the matterof which advanced persons-a Buddha,an arhat,advanced
bodhisattvas,and so on-have transmutedthis 'storeconsciousness'and
so do not possess it.60 But this teaching shows that the alayavijnana
theorydoes not requireit forthe yoga experienceof ekagracitta,as it was
discussed above, which implies a special condition of the evolving perceptions, especially manovijfnana(the perception based on the mental
East
&
West
of mind, manas).
sense
Philosophy
464
About Three Laksanas. There is considerable treatment already in Western sources on the three laksanas of Yogacara theory that are also called
the three svabhava. Nagao has written a spirited essay on the topic, "The
Buddhist World View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and its
Similes."61 As Nagao describes the three, they are the imagined nature
(parikalpita-svabhava),the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava),
and the consummated nature (parinispanna-svabhava). And he explains:
"The 'imagined' nature, therefore, is characterized by 'unreality' and
'total nonexistence'." "In contrast to this, parinispanna or 'consummated'
means perfect, real, and existent and connotes 'reality,' 'truth,' 'real existence', or 'the absolute'." "Between them is the third nature, called
paratantra, the 'other dependent'. It exists, but only by depending on
some other entity."62 Nagao cites an important observation from Vasubandhu's Trirmsiki,k. 21 c-d: "When the other-dependent nature obtains
a state absolutely free of the imagined nature, it is then the consummated
nature."63
It is the conclusion of the present writer that this system of three
natures is very close to what is found in the writings of the earlier and
famous Nagarjuna, with the difference that the Yogacara thought it
was improving in describing what is going on. I allude to two verses in
the latter's Acintyastava, 44-45:64
hetupratyayasambhuta
paratantraca samvrtih/ paratantraiti proktahparamarthastv akrtrimah// 44
svabhavahprakrtistattvamdravyamvastusad ity api / nasti vai kalpitobhavo
paratantrastu vidyate// 45
arisesfroma cause and
Convention,with dependence on other(s)(paratantra),
fromconditions.Thisdependence on other(s)has been announced(by Thee).
The Absoluteis not fabricated.(44)
It (the Absolute)is termedself-existence (svabhava),primarynature(prakrti),
reality(tattva),substance (dravya),abidingessence (vastu),the reallyexistent
(sat).An entity (bhava)when imagined does not exist, but (exists)when its
dependence on other(s)is found. (45)
Notice the complete agreement with the Yogacara that an entity when
imagined does not exist, but does exist with its dependence on another;
and the same word for dependence on another (paratantra) is used.
Nagarjuna, like the Yogacarin espousers of the three svabhava theory, has
an absolute, defined by six terms. The only seeming difference is when
Vasubandhu holds that this absolute nature is the other-dependent nature when the latter is free of the imagined nature. This amounts to acthat there is both
cepting for Dependent Origination (pratTtyasamutpada)
a conventional and an absolute explanation. Even if Nagarjuna accepts
this, it would probably be difficult to draw it from his works.
This brief account of the three natures should suffice.
Alex Wayman
465
Clarification of the Position

Here I present three clarifications: (a) in terms of subject and object,
in
(b) terms of Buddhist logic, and (c) in terms of Western discourse.
Clarification in Terms of Subject and Object. Previously I discussed the
position in Vasubandhu's treatise of twenty verses and rejected the claim
that he denied external existence. But more needs to be said about this.
Vasubandhu in this brief work of his used the term artha for the presumed external object. Thereby he could only implicate the five outerdirected sense bases that have these arthas as objects. The word artha in
its general Indian usage stands for property and goods, and of course
these stay behind when a person passes to the other world. This usage of
the term seems to be involved in its etymology.65 The sixth sense, manas,
has the set of dharmas as object; and by the Indian theory of transmigration, some of these may well be held to transmigrate.
Let us now consider the treatment in Matilal's book Perception. In an
"Analysis of Perceptual Illusion" he has a subsection on two Buddhist
analyses of illusion, admitting that he follows Vacaspati Misra for these
materials; and this is quite proper, because he aims just not to misrepresent the Hindu author. Matilal summarizes the Yogacara position in
seemingly well-stated sentences, which I shall number: (1) "The objectform is an integral part of the awareness itself, each awareness being
different from another by virtue of this unique object-form which appears
in it." (2) "The object-form does not come from outside." (3) "In fact
when the object-form is projected outside or externalized, we are said
to have an awareness of the external object."66 In all three statements,
Matilal attributes to the Yogacara that there is an 'object-form' in the
mind. But when we refer to what Vasubandhu said (in his Virnatika), we
find him explaining the 'representation-only' not as an artha, the external
object, but as an 'unreal object form' (asadartha)-a poor copy of the
external object. Such a term affirms, ratherthan denies, what is connoted
by the term artha, when it is employed by itself. Vasubandhu apparently
used the term artha instead of the standard Buddhist visaya to fend off
misattributions of the position he followed. Still, he was misunderstood,
and these misunderstandings were copied over and over.
Then there is the essay in Philosophy East and West by Prasad, who,
like Matilal, is a good writer on these topics.67 He cites Vasubandhu's
treatise on the three natures, the Trisvabhavanirdega,as follows:
What is the conception of that which is nonexistent?[Theanswer is] 'mind'
[mentalprojection]/ Forby it, the nonexistentsare imagined;and inasmuch
as the mind imaginesobjects, they do not exist at all.
What is that which is presentedin cognition?The nonexistentwhich is projected [or imagined]. How is that presented in cognition?In the form of a
twofold appearance[of the apprehenderand the apprehended]/ What is it in
466
cognition that does not exist? That by which the twofold appearance is
affected.
I accept
Using the Sanskritfor the verses as is found in Kochumuttom,68
Prasad'stranslationas on the whole correct.Inthe case of the second of
his cited verses, his renditionmay possibly mislead the reader,as suggesting that a nonexistentexternal has appeared in the mind. I believe
that here we should adhere more literallyto the Sanskrit:tatrakim khyati
asatkalpahkathamkhyatidvayatmana("Whatappearsthere?The imaginationof an unreal.How does it appear?As the subject-objectduality").
This subject-objectduality is found discussed in Buddhistliteraturegenerally by the terms grahaka (the apprehender)and grahya (the apprehended).The avoidance of the two is the topic of the scripturepresented
Sutta.Thus,when Vasubandhuwritessuch verses,
above, the Kalakarama
he evidentlybelieves thatthey are consistentwiththe Buddha'steachings.
Clarificationin Termsof BuddhistLogic.Stcherbatskyand othersclaimed
thatthere is a pronouncedinfluenceof Yogacaraphilosophyon Buddhist
lineage.69If one is to credit the Yogalogic of the Dignaga-DharmakTrti
cara with such influence, one should state the influence ratherspecifically. I have previouslypublishedthree essays on this matter,"Yogacara
and the Buddhist Logicians,"70"A Reconsiderationof Dharmakirti's
and "DharmakTrti
and
'Deviation'from Dignaga on Pratyaksabhasa,"71
In the firstof these essays I translated
the YogacaraTheory of BTja."72
which deals with the
Dignaga's brief treatise, the AlambanaparTksa,
theoryof 'atoms',which Vasubandhualso dealt with in his twenty-verse
treatise. I also cited the commentatorDharmottara'spassage explaining
the so-called atoms as constitutingcolor (varna),while the shape (samsthana)was added, presumablyin Representation-Only.The article "A
Reconsideration ..." defended DharmakTrti'sposition that there are four
and that this was

kinds of falsificationof perception (pratyaksabhasa)
and bTjashowed that
also Dignaga's position. The one on DharmakTrti
Dharmakirtiwas amenable to this 'seed' way of talking.
Among the many authorswho claim this Yogacarainfluence is C. L.
Tripathi,who wrote a book titled The Problemsof Knowledgein Yogacara Buddhismthat included a treatmentof Buddhistlogic. He is among
the many who thinkthat YogacaraBuddhismdenies externalexistence,
saying: "Vasubandhu ... categorically denies the existence of the ex-
ternal world."73Yet this same author has a chapter "Object of Perception" presentingthe position of Buddhist logic that the object called
svalaksanais the only real.74He calls it a 'particular',using the Western
terminologyof 'universal'and 'particular'.This authorseems not to realize that if the Yogacaradoes indeed deny externalobjects, it opposes
Buddhistlogic-and so why treat Buddhistlogic in a book with such a
Alex Wayman
title?
467
Now I shall continue the discussionwith the 'falsificationof perception', because this apparentlyagrees with the Yogacara'representationits chapter2,
only'. Vasubandhu'scommentaryon the Mahayasamgraha,
speaks of 'representations'(vijnapti)belonging to the body, the bodypossessor, and the eater. Here 'body' means the five realms (dhatu)of
(sense organs),eye, and so forth.'Body-possessor'is the 'defiled mind'.
The 'eater' (or enjoyer) is the realm of mind (manodhatu),that is, mind
(manas),the sixth sense.75Anotherrelevantpassage is in Vasubandhu's
(I translatefrom the Tibetan):"There are two
Karmasiddhiprakarana
kindsof citta:(1) what collects its seeds (= alayavijnana);(2-a) what has
it (i.e., the alayavijfnana)
as a mental support (alambana),namely the
'defiled mind' (klistamanas);
(2-b) what has images (akara)of it (i.e., the
the
[and] (2-c) what have differing
alayavijnana),namely
manovijfnana;
the
five
outer-directed
distinctions,namely
perceptions(vijnana)."76So
the 'defiled mind' knows the (subconscious)alayavijnanaseeds, while
the manovijfnana
distinguishesthe (conscious)imagesthatthe seeds have
Then
into.
we notice that the traditionalset of six vijfnana
sprouted
amounts to 'representations'because this system uses the convertible
Five of the six
terminologycittamatra,vijnanamatra,and vijfnaptimatra.
are representationsof the five sense organs(called the 'body'),while the
sixth one is a representationof the sixth sense, manas.
Now we can comparewith the four kindsof errorof Buddhistlogic.
Dharmottara'scommentary on DharmakTrti's
NyJyabindu, following
DharmakTrti's
Pramana-viniscaya,listed four causes of error.They are:
(1) cause of errorfound in the object, for example the whirlingfirebrand
taken as a wheel; (2) cause of errorfound in a place, for example embarkingin a boat, where the trees on the shore are moving;(3) cause of
errorfound within, for example being troubledby hatred;and (4) cause
of errorfound in a sense organ, such as the 'caul', causing the conch
shell to appear yellow.77 It is reasonable to compare with these four
causes of error-even thoughtwo are placed externally-since we have
shown above thatVasubandhudoes not deny externalsas being existent,
providedthey arise in dependence on another.
Number 1, cause of errorfound in the object, amounts to representationsbased on the sixth sense organ, manas. Number2, cause of
errorfound in a place, also amountsto representationsbased on the sixth
sense organ, manas. Thus,for numbers1 and 2, the representationsare
called manovijnafna.Skippingto number4, cause of errorfound in a
sense organ, the representationsare the five outer-directedperceptions.
Notice thatthis illustrationof a caul on the eyes is preciselythe example
used by Vasubandhuin the introductoryverse to his treatisewith twenty
verses (above, subsection "The Theory that Vasubandhu Denies the
ExternalWorld").
West
East
&
Now, going to number3, the cause of errorfound within, with the
Philosophy
468
example of hatred,this clearly goes with representationsof the 'defiled

mind'. About the 'defiled mind', Asarga's Paramartha-gatha,
39-41,
contains these points: "The defiled mind (klistammanas)always arises
and ceases togetherwith defilements(klesa)"; "On anotheroccasion it is
born pure"; and "Thatwhich was defiled, here in the end is purified,
with its intrinsiclight (prakrtibhJsvara)."78
This shows that the 'defiled
mind' requiresdefilements,which are dharmas.
Hence, the four causes of error found in those texts of Buddhist
logic are reasonably based on the Yogacaratheory of 'representationonly', and this is certainly a better solution than my old attempt in
the Bhandarkarjournal to associate these four causes of error with
the four pratyaksaof the Buddhistlogic system.79Accordingly,these
causes of errorare not a theory that the world is an illusion, since the
causes of errorcan be 'seen through',appreciatedfor what they are, in
particular.
Clarificationin Termsof WesternDiscourse. Modern Western philosophers have concerned themselveswith gettingproperdescriptivestatements regardingperceptionand its associate functions.Since such topics
can generate much writing, I shall restrictmy comparisons to issues
raisedin an articleby BijoyH. Boruah,"Seeing in the Mind'sEye."80He
concerned himself with theories of the authorGilbert Ryle and others.
He was clearly impressedwith the phraseologyby ElizabethAnscombe,
'intentionalseeing' and 'materialseeing'. The example was: suppose we
look at a paintingof Gandhi (the 'materialseeing'), and then go away
and ask ourselves, "What did I see?" Then these authorsare forced to
use the same expression, namely the translationinto Englishof vijnabut say 'representationalseeing', which
ptimatraas 'representation-only',
is 'intentionalseeing', while Wittgensteinused words like 'seeing as'. But
then Boruahhas to decide that 'seeing in the mind's eye' is not representational seeing, and this conclusion forces him to reject various
theories by Ryle and others.Thus,to see in the mind'seye is to have an
image that involves both "doing and achieving" and so is distinguished
from "abstractor purelyconceptual contemplation."But Boruahrecognized (speaking 'metaphorically')that this image "emerges only when
the fingerof thoughttouches the rightcord of sentience." He thus admits
that a sentience precedes this image.
Asaiga-or it mighthave been the opponent-was cited above for a
consistentremark,which I would now render:"Besides,there is no particularfault in understandingthat there is a priorrepresentation."81
This
apparentlymeans, "At least there is one thing we can agree on-there
was some kind of prior representation."Therefore,for the Yogacara
theory of the 'store consciousness', the seeds stored here cannot sprout
unless there is a prior'representation-only'
triggeredby sensory inputor Alex Wayman
469
by the 'defiledmind'.And the sproutingseeds would providethe images

alluded to in Boruah'sessay.
To illustratethe independenceof the image fromsentience as well as
from abstractthought-which Buddhismcalls 'discursivethought' (vikalpa,etc.), one could take the example of the composer Beethoven.He
firsttook classes in music, heard Bach, and so forth,and this was represented in his mind, 'heardas'. Later,he composed greatworksof music,
but this did not involve hearingwith his ear-because he was becoming
stone deaf. Therefore,his auditoryimageryof music became independent of sentience, that is, in terms of hearingexternalsounds, and was
also independentof discursivethought. He did have discursivethought
to change his score-"l should change it thus"-or to fume againstother
persons,and so forth,which is outside his composing music. Of course,
even in his deafness he still had visual inputfrommusicalscores.
The example of Beethoven also illustratesthe description of the
image-here auditoryimagery(heardby the sixth sense, manas)-as a
sort of doing and achieving. The Yogacaraissuance fromthe 'storeconamountsto
sciousness' that is expressed in the languageof 'seeds' (bTja)
a compatibleway of talkingbecause the seed can do something,achieve
a result,say, a shoot. Since this issuance from the 'store consciousness'
can be of the indeterminateas well as of the virtuousand the unvirtuous,
there are a vast numberof images possible. Since these images can also
be called representations,this shows the active natureof these representations.
It is hoped that this essay, including the preceding three clarifications, may help to elucidate YogacaraBuddhism.
FinalDeclaration
I hope that the Yogacarasystem has been somewhat clarified on
behalf of anyone who wants it clarified.The misrepresentationsof this
system that have appeared in older as well as in recently published
works are not more correct simply by being copied over and over. Of
course, the Yogacaraput itstrustin the subjectivesearchfortruthby way
of a samadhi. This renderedthe external world not less real, but less
valuable as the way of findingtruth.
The tide of misinformationon this, or on any other topic of Indian
lore comes about because authorsfrequentlyread just a few verses or
paragraphsof a text, then go to secondary sources, or to treatises by
rivals, and presume to speak authoritatively.Only after doing genuine
researchon such a topic can one begin to answer the question: why
were those texts and why do the modernswritethe way they do?
Decades ago I knew that the Yogacaraposition was misrepresented
in many works, ancient and modern. Only recently was the means
East&West to defend YogacaraBuddhismput in my hands, as has been detailed
Philosophy
470
above. I do not care whether or not others are convinced by the arguments presentedhere.
NOTES
1 - Cf. GregoryJ. Darling,An Evaluationof the VedanticCritiqueof

Buddhism(Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass,1987), p. 371, taking notice
of an incorrectportrayalof Buddhismin Vedanticcriticism.
2 - A. Wayman, "The YogacaraIdealism,"PhilosophyEastand West
15 (1) (1965): 65-73.
3 - T.R.V.Murti,TheCentralPhilosophyof Buddhism(London:George
Allen and Unwin Ltd.,1955), chap. 13, "The Madhyamika,Vijnanavadaand VedantaAbsolutism,"pp. 311-328.
4 - LambertSchmithausen,Alayavijfnana:
On the Originand the Early
of
a
Central
of
Concept YogacaraPhilosophy,pt. 1,
Development
Text;pt. 2, Notes, Bibliographyand Indices (Tokyo:The International Institutefor BuddhistStudies,1987), here, pt. 1, pp. 13-14.
5 - Alex Wayman, Analysis of the SravakabhumiManuscript,University of CaliforniaPublications in Classical Philology, vol. 17
(Berkeley,California,1961).
6 - Alex Wayman, review of HidenoriS. Sakuma,Die Asrayaparivrttitheorie in der Yogacarabhomi..., 2 vols. (Stuttgart:FranzSteiner
Verlag, 1990), in Journalof the AmericanOrientalSociety 113 (1)
(1993): 144.
7 - BhikkhuNan.ananda,TheMagic of the Mind:An Expositionof the
KalakaramaSutta(Kandy,Sri Lanka:BuddhistPublicationSociety,
1974), pp. 1-92.
8 - F. L.Woodward, TheBook of the GradualSayings,vol. 2 (London:
PaliText Society, 1952), pp. 26-28.
9 - WilliamG. Doty, "Hermes'HeteronymousAppellations,"in James
Hillman,ed., Facingthe Gods (Dallas, Texas: SpringPublications,
1984), p. 131.
10 - See LozangJamspal,ed., Abhidhanavisvalocanamof SrTdharasena
(Narita:NaritasanShinshoji,1992); and see Alex Wayman, trans.,
Abhidhanavisvalocanamof SrTdharasena
(Narita:NaritasanShinshoji, 1994).
11- Alex Wayman, "Doctrinal Affiliation of the Buddhist Master
Asahga,"in N. H. Samtani,ed., Amala Prajina:
Aspects of Buddhist AlexWayman
471
12 -
13 -
14 -
Studies (Delhi: Sri SatguruPublications,1989), p. 214 and n. 74,

furnishingthe Tibetanin transcriptionfor the passage.
See, e.g., Th. Stcherbatsky,The CentralConception of Buddhism
and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"(Calcutta:Susil Gupta,
1961), p. 7: "Consciousness,it is stated, never arisesalone, since it
is pure sensation,withoutany content."
Forthis simile, see I. B. Horner,trans.,TheCollectionof the Middle
LengthSayings (London:Luzac, 1967), vol. 1, Mahavedalla-sutta,
p. 355, where, in the case of a burning oil lamp, "the light is
seen because of the flame and the flame is seen because of
the light."
This translationis in the Sata-Pitakaseries, Indo-AsianLiteratures,
vol. 74, publishedby the InternationalAcademy of IndianCulture,
New Delhi, 1968; and the passage is at p. 189, where the translator
also offers: "What belongs to the triple world, that is (of) mere
mind."
15 - Sylvain Levi, Mat6riauxpour I'Etudedu systeme Vijfaptimatra

(Paris:LibrairieAncienne HonoreChampion,1932), p. 13.
16 - When the Japanesescholar, ProfessorRyOshinOhminami,was at
ColumbiaUniversitysome yearsago studyingthis scripturewith the
Vasubandhucommentaryfor a work in Japanese, he kindly gave
me both the Peking Tibetan Tanjuredition (PTT)and the Derge
Tibetan edition for Vasubandhu'scommentary. I have read the
beginning of the Peking edition, but for the present topic have
used justthe Derge edition (publishedby Delhi KarmapaeChodhey
and printedat Mujeeb Press, 1976), the part I discuss at pp. 200
and 202.
17 - As for the terminologicalset of three, as in Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakosa,chap. 2, k. 34a-b, cf. Louis de La Vallee Poussin
(Paris,1923), p. 177, where the autocommentaryexplains, "Cittais
so named because it accumulates(cinoti);named manasbecause it
knows (manute);named vijnanabecause it distinguishesits object
(alambanamvijanati).
18 - Cf. the Peking Tibetan canon (Japanesephoto edition, PTT),vol.
98, p. 127.5-1, citing, "khamsgsum po 'di ni ram par ses pa tsam
and is asmo"-where rnampar ses pa tsam mo = vij~nanamatra,
sertedto be these three worlds.
19 - Wayman,Abhidhanavisvalocanam
of SrTdharasena,
p. 192.
de Vasubandhu:
20 - Cf. Louisde LaVallee Poussin,L'Abhidharmakosa
East
&
West
Paul
Troisieme
1926).
(Paris:
Geuthner,
Philosophy
Chapitre
472
21 - Cf. T. W. and C.A.F.Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha,pt. 3

(London:Luzac, 1957), pp. 77-94.
22 - For three lexicons which include the definition alambana,Anundoram Borooah, Nanarthasamgraha(Gauhati:Publication Board,
Assam, 1969), text, p. 3, under "Agra,"cites the MedinTkosa,the
and the one by Hemacandra.Forthe fourthone, see
Vigvapraka'a,
Jamspal,Abhidhanavisvalocana,p. 278, no. 1625A. Besides, alambana is a definitionfor agra in these two lexicons of the Deccan
College, Poona, series: NanarthamafnjarT,
by Raghava,ed. K.R.V.
Sharma(1954), and Dharanikogaby Dharanidasa,ed. E.D. Kulkarni
(1968). The translationby A. Wayman, Ethicsof Tibet:Bodhisattva
section of Tsong-kha-pa'sLam rim chen mo (Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1991), adopted the rendering'area' for
the term agra,as though an area in the mind for meditation.
23 - That is, while preparingmy Analysis of the SravakabhumiManuscript(cited note 5 above).
24 - de LaVallee Poussin,trans.of the Abhidharmakoga,
chap. 1, p. 52.
25 - See Borooah, Nanarthasarmgraha;
definitionsfrom Medinikogaand
from Visvaprakasa.The same in Jamspal,Abhidhanavisvalocana,
p. 297, no. 1742.
26 - Tsewang, "The Mentalism of Dignaga and DharmakTrti,"in
Doboom Tulku, ed., Mind Only School and Buddhist Logic: A
Collection of SeminarPapers(New Delhi: Tibet House and Aditya
Prakashan,1990), p. 15.
27 - See AndreBareau,"Abhidharmakosakarika
of Vasubandhu:Index,"
VAK
from
Deccan
(Poona:
reprinted
College), no. 3:45-83.
28 - ClarenceH. Hamilton,trans., Wei Shih ErShih Lun,or The Treatise
in TwentyStanzason Representation-Only
(New Haven:American
OrientalSociety, 1938).
29 - SarvepalliRadhakrishnan
and CharlesA. Moore, A Source Book in
IndianPhilosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1957), pp.
328-333.
30 - Sylvain Levi, Vijnaptimatratasiddhi
(Paris,1925; reprintShanghai,
1940).
31 - Hamilton,Wei Shih ErShih Lun,p. 61.
32 - Ibid., n. 114.
33 - The storyis cited in F. D. Lessingand A. Wayman,trans.,Introduction to the Buddhist TantricSystems (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1978), p. 65.
Alex Wayman
473
34 - Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience

(Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass,1982), p. 1, contendsthatthe Yogacara
is reallya "realisticpluralism"ratherthan, as it is usuallydescribed,
an "absoluteidealism,"and so on.
35 - Stefan Anacker, Seven Worksof Vasubandhu(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1984), p. 159, rejectsthe theory-claimed by some persons to be the purportof Vasubandhu'sTwentyVerses-that consciousness unilaterallycreatesall formsin the universe.
36 - T.R.V.Murti,TheCentralPhilosophyof Buddhism,p. 319.
37 - Schmithausen,Alayavijnana,pt. 1, pp. 18 ff.
38- Ibid.,p. 31.
39 - Ibid., pp. 36-39.
40- Ibid.,pp. 5 ff.

41 - Asarga, in his Viniscaya-samgrahan,PTT,vol. 110, p. 235.1.
42 - Ibid., p. 235.2.
43 - Ibid., p. 235.4-6.
44 - Ibid., p. 235.4-8.
45 - Ibid., p. 235.5-2.
46 - The Yogacarabhomiof AcaryaAsahga, ed. VidhushekharaBhattacharya(Calcutta:Universityof Calcutta,1957), p. 24.4-5.

47 - Ibid., p. 24.18-19.
48 - Vasubandhu,PratTtyasamutpadadi-vibhanganirdeSa,
PTT,vol. 104,
p. 287.3-3, 4: / de bas na 'du byed kyi rkyengyis zhing mtshams
sbyorba'i mam par ses pa yin par rigspa ma yin gyi / ... rnampar
ses pa ni 'du byed kyi rkyengyis yin no / de'i rkyengyis nying
mtshamssbyorba'i tshe ming dang gzugs yin no zhes bya ba de Ita
bu'i lugs 'di ni skyon med pa,yin no /
49 - Gunamati, PratTtyasamutpadadi-vibhahganirdega-tTka,
PTT, vol.
mtshams
las
mdzod
/
104, p. 335-4-2: / chos mngon
sbyorphung
po'i rnampar ses zhes smraspa.
of Vasubandhu(Patna:
50 - P. Pradhan,ed., AbhidharmakoSabhasyam
K. P. JayaswalResearchInstitute,1975), p. 124.
51 - Visuddhimaggaof Buddhaghosacariya,ed. Henry ClarkeWarren,
revisedby DharmanandaKosambi(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1950), p. 477, par. 187.
of AcaryaAsahga,p. 26.18-19.
52 - Bhattacharya,The YogacarabhOmi
East&West 53 - Ibid.,p. 25.13-14.
Philosophy
474
54 - Ibid., p. 109.13-15.
55 - Vasubandhu, in Derge edition of Tibetan Tanjur, Sems tsam, vol.
Ri, f. 135a-5, 6: / de yang nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyi rnam par
ses pa skye ba'i srid pa la dmigs nas bar ma do'i srid pa 'gag par
'gyur ro / brgyal ba de la zhes bya ba ni yid kyi rnam par ses pa khu
ba dang khrag dang Ihan cig grub pa dang / bde ba gcig par 'gyur
ba ste / yid kyi rnam par ses brgyal par gyur pa de la brten nas yid
kyi rnam par ses pa gzhan nyid 'jug par 'gyur ro /
56 - Vasubandhu, Derge, Sems tsam, Ri, f. 69a-5,6: / de'i phyir rnam
par ses brgyal ba gang yin pa de ni yid kyi rnam par ses pa ma yin
gyi / de ni rnam par smin pa'i rnam par ses pa ste de sa bon thams
cad pa'o /
57 - Gunamati, PratTtyasamutpadadi-vibhahganirdesa-.tka, PTT, vol.
104, p. 337.3-3: / ram par ses pa'i tshogs drug go zhes gsungs
kyang yid kyi mam par ses pa kho nas nying mtshams sbrel ba yin
pa.
58 Asarga alludes to this in the Yogacarabhomi early section, in Bhattacharya, The Yogacarabhomi of Acarya Asarga, p. 25.1-2.
59 - Buddhist Insight: Essays by Alex Wayman, ed. George R. Elder
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 330.
60 - Ibid., p. 330.
61 - Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhyamika and Yogacara,trans. Leslie S. Kawamura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), chap. 6,
pp. 61-74.
62 - Ibid., p. 62.
63 - Ibid., p. 70.
64 - Among the editions, there is one in Chr. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), and another in Fernanda Tola
and Carmen Dragonetti, "Nagarjuna's Catustava," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 13 (1985).
65 - See the essay by M. A. Mehendale, "Etymology of the Word Artha-,"
in his Nirukta Notes, series 1 (Poona: Deccan College, 1965), pp.
42-46.
66 - Bimal KrishnaMatilal, Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986),
p. 189.
67 - Chakravarthi Ram Prasad, "Dreams and Reality: The Sarikarite
Critique of Vijnana-vada," Philosophy East and West 43 (3) (July
1993): 405-455.
68 - Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, p. 93.
Alex Wayman
475
69 - Cf. F. Th. Stcherbatsky,BuddhistLogic (reprint,New York:Dover

Publications),1 :29.
70 - Alex Wayman, in Journalof the InternationalAssociation of BuddhistStudies2 (1) (1979): 65-78.
71 - Alex Wayman, in Annals, BhandarkarOrientalResearchInstitute
(DiamondJubileeVolume),1977-1978, pp. 387-396.
72 - Alex Wayman, in ErnstSteinkellner,ed., Studies in the Buddhist
EpistemologicalTradition:Proceedingsof the Second International
DharmakTrti
Conference,Vienna,June 11-16, 1989 (Wien:Verlag
der OsterreichischenAkademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), pp.
419-430.
73 - Tripathi,The Problemof Knowledge.... (Varanasi:Bharat-Bharati,
1972), p. 333.
74 - Ibid.,pp. 150-151.
75 - Vasubandhu,Derge, Sems tsam, vol. Ri, f. 143b-4: / lus dang / lus
can dang / za ba po'i rnampar rigpa zhes bya ba de la / lus ni mig
la sogs pa'i khamsInga'o/ lus can ni nyon mongpa can gyi yid do /
za ba po ni yid kyi khamsso /
76 - Ibid.,vol. Si, f. 141b-3: / sems ni rnampa gnyis te / de la gcig ni
de'i sa bon rnamsbsag pa yin no / gnyis pa ni de'i dmigspa dang /
rnampadang / bye bragtha dad pa dag gis sna tshogspa yin no /
77 - Wayman, in Annals, BhandarkarOriental Research Institute,pp.
393-394.
78 - Alex Wayman, Analysis of the SravakabhOmi
Manuscript,p. 173;
in
Buddhist
340.
reprinted Elder,
Insight,p.
79 - Wayman,Annals, BhandarkarOrientalResearchInstitute.
80 - Boruah'sessay appeared in Journalof Indian Council of Philosophical Research6 (3) (May-August1989): 119-130.
81 - Since this remarkis important,I should cite the Tibetan(alludedto
in note 11 above): / rnampar rig pa sngon 'gro ba nyid du rtogs
pa'ang de Itana nyes pa khyadpar med pa kho nar 'gyurro /
East&West
Philosophy
476

A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism

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A Defense of Yogcra Buddhism

Author(s): Alex Wayman

A DEFENSE OF YOGACARA BUDDHISM

in themselves and certainothers can be clarifiedby the refutationof an

When I wrote this, it was already known to me-though not mentioned

parts. About that scripture,Schmithausenconcluded: "Therefore,the

or Greek god would talk, declaring omniscience,] the ExaltedOne said:

cognized, attained,soughtafterand ponderedover by the mind-all thatdo I

with connotationsof Sanskritwords; outside, there was the connotation

Vasubandhu,in his great commentaryon the Dasabhomika-sutra,

faithfulto, the three worlds, so realized in one moment'sthoughtby the

Accordingly,the way of translatingthat phraseabout cittamatraand the

-if successful-may separate out the citta and find it consisting of a

by Hamilton28was reprintedin A Source Book by Radhakrishnanand

Then there is what is numberedverse 16 in Hamilton'stranslation,

of translating,made it appear so. Besides, two authorsof recent books

It happens that Asanga himself-obviously responding to a number

1. Why in the absence of alayavijfnana

There,the 'store-consciousness'all-seededand restrainedby maturation,after

Wherethat vijnanafaintsin a place of the kalala(initialformof the embryo),it

(rOpa),length of life (ayus),enjoyments(bhoga),and so on; and of these

Previouslyit was mentionedthat the Yogacarafrequentlypresentsa

falls into the womb and, once there, is called alayavijnana.Thisseparate

that has those dharmassupposedlyas object, while it is the

Clarification of the Position

and that this was

example of hatred,this clearly goes with representationsof the 'defiled

by the 'defiledmind'.And the sproutingseeds would providethe images

1 - Cf. GregoryJ. Darling,An Evaluationof the VedanticCritiqueof

Studies (Delhi: Sri SatguruPublications,1989), p. 214 and n. 74,

15 - Sylvain Levi, Mat6riauxpour I'Etudedu systeme Vijfaptimatra

21 - Cf. T. W. and C.A.F.Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha,pt. 3

34 - Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience

40- Ibid.,pp. 5 ff.

46 - The Yogacarabhomiof AcaryaAsahga, ed. VidhushekharaBhattacharya(Calcutta:Universityof Calcutta,1957), p. 24.4-5.

69 - Cf. F. Th. Stcherbatsky,BuddhistLogic (reprint,New York:Dover

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