1

Tamta Gegechkori
SOC 325 Reimagining Protest
Peter Klein
Final Paper

Otpor!, A New Precedent of Its Time

Introduction
Last decade of the 20th century proved to be tense for Balkan and post-Soviet states
as they attempted to move into a period of democratization after the dissolution of the
USSR. The transition took longer than desired by many, and by the end of the century
militant pseudo-democratic government structures, which sprung up as a result of rapid
and extreme nationalization of said states, became a normal occurrence. Yet new times
also introduced people to new forms of social and political opposition. In this paper, I
will look at the Otpor movement that took place in Serbia from 1998 to 2004 as a social
movement that was the first of its kind in the area, and will examine what specific
factors led to Otpor becoming a precedent which some of the surrounding Balkan and
Post-Soviet states could also successfully implement.

Background
Otpor encompasses several major stages of a civic movement that transitions over
the course of some years. It started out as a street protest that later grew in scale and
turned into a full movement, and then went on to become a sort of a non-governmental
organization intent on monitoring the progress of democratic vote in their country until
it ultimately failed as an actual political party. It remains as a vivid example of

2
successful long-term non-violent campaign protest movements that swept Eastern
Europe in early 2000s.
The beginning stages of the movement are consistent with the situation in most
of Central Europe in the early to mid 90s. The Balkan states were not faring well after
the economic collapse that followed the dissolution of Soviet Union, and the surge of
nationalism that swept the countries could probably be characterized as a defense
mechanism against the identity struggle (between Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Albanians)
that only seemed to be escalating. The economic crisis and different nationalistic
agendas resulted in republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia
gaining independence from the former Yugoslav federation, effectively reducing it to
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro (Montenegro
would later declare independence in 2006).
Like in many other states at the time, a political group headed by Slobodan Milosevic
was able to monopolize the control over the region by playing up the nationalistic
agenda. Milosevics party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, while officially designated as
democratic socialist1, was made up of former apparatchiks, a term used in Soviet and
Easter Bloc countries that refers to anyone that held a bureaucratic or political positions
in the government apparatus. So, while the facade changed, the people running the
country were the same as a decade before. A heavy use of secret police followed, partially
aimed at eliminating ethnic struggles that were becoming prominent between Kosovo
and former members of Yugoslavia. The Kosovo conflict was the source of majority of
nationalistic ideology that enabled Milosevic to control and maintain power after the

1 Alan John Day, Roger East, Richard Thomas. A political and economic dictionary of Eastern
Europe. First Edition. Cambridge International Reference on Current Affairs, Ltd, 2002, p. 544

3
communist era, as it gave him the chance to go on a crusade to defend the borders and
state sovereignty of Yugoslavia, a sentiment that a lot of people supported.
One can trace the first seeds of Otpor movement to the Serbian public office elections
of 1996, which were annulled by Milosevic after the announcement that his opposing
Zajedno coalition won in 32 municipalities, plus the capital. The irregularities and
inconsistencies of election results were cited as a reason for cancellation, but that did
not stop thousands of Serbs to come out to the streets in protest to annulment of the
results. What followed was the 12-week period of daily demonstrations. Belgrade
University students organized marches that were taken up in different cities across
Serbia and garnered some amounts of international attention, to the point where
Milosevic conceded to the initial election results and allowed the winners to take office.
But Zajedno coalition was not able to stay together, and despite their initial success, in
1997 Milosevic was able to run for and get elected as a president of Yugoslavia, which
consisted of both Serbia and Montenegro at the time. Soon afterwards, he started
implementing restrictions for media and freedom of speech to reaffirm his power. Part
of his campaign was the University Law, which abolished the autonomy of the
universities by giving the government the right to appoint a university president.
Appalled by this, in 1998 Belgrade university students, many of whom had previous
experience with activism, formed a movement and named it Otpor, or Resistance.
The largest fallout from Kosovo conflict that contributed to Otpors formation and, to
some degree, success was the desire of North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to
remove Milosevic from power. Their main target of support was Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) who led an insurgency campaign against Yugoslav police. The Yugoslav
governments response was not particularly restrictive, and led to massacres of not only

4
KLA forces, but also the civilian population. The human rights and international law
violations in Kosovo by Yugoslav militia attracted a considerable international attention
and when negotiations failed, NATO began the bombing of Yugoslavia. While the
Yugoslav forces withdrew from Kosovo as a result of those bombings, the attack failed to
actually undermine Milosevics position within the government despite Serbian
populations increasing displeasure for him.

Therefore, a viable option that remained

for US and European powers to remove Milosevic from power was to provide funds to a
group of promising activists. This is where majority of Otpors funding came from, and
what enabled them to expand their efforts outside of Belgrade. Channeling the money
through a local group also removed the colonizer-colonizer relationship, allowing
Western states to take a backseat and remove themselves from direct intervention while
waiting for Otpor movement to play out.

New Social Movement Theories in Context of Post-Communist Spaces

The structure of Otpor movement, while in line with the developing social
movements of the time, was the first of its kind in its region. In next section, Im going
to discuss why Otpor took the pioneering role of a revolutionary social mobilization and
what factors contributed the basis for its specificities that would become a template for
others to follow. In this section, Id like to talk about the general changing nature of the
social movements that scholars started identifying during the second part of the 20th
century, and see how Otpor fits into the larger, internationally acknowledged framework
of social action.

2 Tristan Landry. The Color Revolutions in the Rearview Mirror: Closer Than They appear.
Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol 53. No 1. 2011

5
New social movement theory emerged as the response to classical Marxist analysis of
collective action that failed to explain the changes in how and why people mobilized.
Classical Marxism approach was characterized by several inadequacies that prevented
this from happening. First was its emphasis on economic production and capital, which
it claimed was the root of all politically significant social action. Secondly, Marxist
approach to class structure and relationships, which was believed to be the main
unifying factor for social groups, neglected the importance of other social identities. The
resulting idea of a proletariat revolution marginalized all other forms of social or
political protest. Therefore, new social movement theory scholars aimed to identify and
explain other political, ideological, or cultural incentives for collective action and to
understand other sources of collective identity such as ethnicity, gender, etc. 3 Buechler
identifies various applications of new social movement theory, and as a result he claims
the new social movement theories is a better name for it. New social movement
theories are sets of ideas that unify the different approaches to social movements
because even though they might all oppose the traditional Marxist approach,
individually they may place emphasis on different defining factors.
Buechler maps out several overarching themes of new social movement theories.
First, its the importance of symbolic action in cultural sphere that mirrors the
instrumental action in the political sphere. Second, new social movement theorists, such
as Habermas and Rucht emphasize the importance of processes that cultivate autonomy
and self-determination instead of strategies of maximizing influence and power.
Similarly, others point out the goals consisting of post materialist values as opposed to

3 Steven M. Buechler. New Social Movement Theories. The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 36. No
3. 1995

6
material resources. Fourth, new social movements view the formation of a collective
group and collective identity for that group as more complicated than structurally
predetermined. Most importantly, new social movement theories recognize multitude of
temporary networks that are at work during a collective action, rather than view
centralized organization as the backbone of all successful mobilization. The vast array of
points of emphasis dictates the need for plural understanding of new social movement
theories, and its interesting to see how Otpor fits into this framework of symbols,
identity, and political timing.

Why Now and Why Here

The process of democratic transition in Serbia is interesting because of the specific
political and social background that connects it to other countries in the region. The fact
that, in years following the collapse of Milosevics rule, similar types of non-violent
revolutions also occurred in other states in the region illustrates that there was
something specific in Otpors formula that was fine-tuned to work with post-communist
state issues. In this section, I will explore how or why Serbias role as a hybrid regime
contributed to the specificities of Otpor; and how that characterization was the trait that
connected Serbia to other countries that followed suit in non-violent resistance.
Otpors successful campaign to remove Milosevic from power was not solely the
result of their continuous efforts - it also owed a huge credit to the timing of these
events. The last decade of the 20th century, leading up to Otpors initial protests, was
instrumental in setting up the necessary basis for a change in political regime. The

7
alternatives of the regime - opposing parties and the existing civil society - contributed
both to the extent of the regime, and later to its decline in power. 4
Serbia during the Milosevic era can only be described as a hybrid regime, a term that
is often used by scholars to refer to the particularly peculiar political situation of the
early 1990s5 6. Essentially, the term tries to explain that while maintaining a democratic
facade, the state is in fact quite authoritarian. Political opposition did exist, and the
parties could participate in elections, yet the governmental control reached media,
public administration and economic resource management. The conventional
categorization of left-right ideological framework is insufficient to grasp the
complexities of the situation in early 1990s. The largest points of importance in partys
ideology was their position towards nationalism, conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, and the
support for reform.7 Therefore, the delay of democratization cannot be solely blamed on
fully autocratic regime. Rather, the very dysfunctional nature of the opposition was one
of the reasons that Milosevic was able to maintain the control of the majority of
government for so long.
Even though, like a true hybrid regime, Serbia held fourteen parliamentary and
presidential elections between 1990 and 2000, the citizens did not see any of the
members of the opposition gain any sort of tangible political power. While many
expected a unified anti-communist opposition to take over during the first free elections,
in actuality the parties failed to reconcile differences of extreme nationalistic and liberal
4 Florian Bieber. The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in
Serbia. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol 16. No 1. 2003.
5 Bieber, 2003.
6 Olena Nikolayenko. The Revolt of the Post- Soviet Generation: Youth Movements in Serbia,
Georgia, and Ukraine. Comparative Politics, Vol 39. No 2. 2007.
7 Bieber, 2003.

8
ideologies and as such could not present a unified front to counter Milosevics Socialist
Party, which went on to solidify its dominance.
According to Florian Bieber, the opposition in mid-1990s could be grouped into
three distinct categories: the extreme-nationalist, democratic national, and reformoriented. The erratic leadership and their varied position regarding the ongoing conflicts
often resulted in changes from one category to the other. For parties in the extremenationalist category, the solution for the national question held priority over the
democratization of the state. This neglect of the democracy, writes Bieber, only left
such groupings the options of joining the regime (implicitly or explicitly) or being
marginalized.
The democratic national group combined arguably the most important political
actors such as Democratic Party of Serbia, Democratic Center, and Serbian Renewal
Movement (which would be categorized as radical nationalist if it hadnt renounced its
extreme nationalist tendencies after the effects of war in Bosnia started emerging).
While the national question often emerged as an issue, these parties were more
interested in internal democratization of Serbia.
The reform-oriented group, which included parties such as Civic Alliance of Serbia,
supported the pro-Yugoslav agenda.
The continuing disassociation between the opposition parties led to the restructuralization of the make-up of the opposition to the point where their position in
regards to the main power became the identifier of their type. The breakup of the 1997
Zajedno coalition mentioned above resulted in the formation of the radical opposition,
whose member parties rejected any cooperation with the regime, and whose only viable
solution for the existing power struggle was a fundamental change in internal policies

9
and members. In an 1999 interview with Vreme (Time), a representative of radical
opposition stated that the issue of Kosovo played only a marginal role on the political
agenda, while poverty, corruption, democratization, and human rights, as well as the
return of Serb refugees and the reintegration of Yugoslavia into international
organizations all were more significant. The moderate opposition takes several
different forms. On one hand, it comprises groups that had fundamental policy
differences from the main regime, but was ready for cooperation with the main power.
On the other hand, there were groups who were severely against cooperation, but held
views similar to Milosevics nationalistic positions. By the end of the decade, the
dysfunctional opposition and failed attempts at creating a strong and long-lasting
coalition against Milosevic nudged people to place their trust more into active civil
society. The fact that the Zajedno coalition, made up of different opposition parties, was
not able to maintain its momentum diverted public attention and hope from political
parties to civil society. Essentially, in the years leading up to the end of Milosevics rule,
the citizens started paying attention to civil society because they had no ties with the
political figures who exercised power over the whole discourse.
In a newspaper article by Gillian Sandford, Slobodan Homen, a young lawyer who
was one of the key figures in the Otpor movement, was quoted saying: People are
supporting us because we are not a political party. We do not fight for power. We do not
want to be MPs.8 Indeed, as Florian Bieber argues, rather than supporting political
parties citizens chose to be active in NGOs and other types of civil society movements
that guaranteed peaceful resolution. The political arena proved to recycle and rotate the
same political actors over and over, so the changes that were achieved through that
8 Gillian Sandford. Children of the Revolution. The World Today, Vol 56. No 8/9. 2000

10
route did not necessarily have any real effect on the citizens. Essentially, the civil sphere
in Serbia gained trust and became successful because people realized that political
actors were not worthy of their support. They needed someone outside of the system
whose main goal was to remove the decision-makers who constantly managed to stay
around.

New Methods
Otpors methods, which were non-threatening to the general population, were one of
the largest selling points for public support. The decision to achieve success through
peaceful means had different aspects to it. Firstly, it held value as a grand symbol of
Serbs ability to carry out civilized, successful protests that stood out against Milosevics
violent approach to freedom of political speech, therefore acquiring a certain
performative streak. Secondly, it also appeared to be the most pragmatic and sensible
approach, as Otpor did not possess the numbers or the force to stand up against the
forces they would have to engage with had they initiated any violence.
Moreover, the recent history of civil resistance was not very hope-inspiring for the
public. As Landry mentions, the 1989 Velvet Revolution in Prague 9 was still fresh in
peoples minds and deterred them from direct violent involvement with the regime. The
images of student demonstrations crushed by armed forces made it clear that attempts
at creating a full democracy would not go over lightly. Peaceful nature of Otpor
alleviated those concerns. The non-threatening tactics that they employed managed to
fly under the radar long enough to rally majority of the public, after which the
movement became too strong to shut down fast and without serious repercussions.
9 Landry, 2011.

11
Therefore, Otpors use of stickers, stencils, and street performances, saturated with
humor and satire, became the largest contributions to its popularity and trustworthiness. For example, in preparation for 2000 presidential elections, Otpor
members distributed more than two million stickers with a slogan Gotov Je, which
translates as He [Milosevic] is Finished.
Michael Mulkay

10

maps out a way through which we can rationalize humor and

apply it to the social world. Mulkay identifies a serious mode, in which people assume a
shared world with other peoples homogeneous perceptions of it. In it contradictions are
considered to be illogical, a result of the failure to communicate or a misunderstanding
of ones claims. They have to be treated so because otherwise it challenges the notion of
the same world that everyone experiences. Mulkays other mode is humorous mode,
which is based on the idea of contradictions as the main principle of humor. In this case,
the duality is what makes the thing amusing. As Majken Jul Sorensen points out in his
study of humor as a tool against oppression, even in its most aggressive manifestations,
humor signals innocence. Humor changes the situation because however serious the
message is, it has a hint of Dont take me seriously, and Im not Dangerous. 11 For
Otpor, this not only ensured the appeal of the general public as a non-threatening way of
operations, but also delegitimized any future attempts by the regime to label the
protesters as terrorists and anarchists. It prevented people from seriously listening to
Milosevics attempts to paint the Otpor protesters as a threat to their peace and security.
All Otpor seemed to be doing was rallying the public through their use of satire, and it
quickly became apparent that claiming those actions to be of the terrorist kind was
10 M. J. Mulkay. On Humor: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society. Polity Press, 1988.
11 Majken Jul Sorensen. Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression.
Peace & Change, Vol 33. No 2. 2008: p171

12
absurd. Otpors satirical tactics included caricatures of political figures; posters where
the organization was portrayed as an innocent child against the scary, dramatized
versions of Milosevic and his supporters; leaflets with humorous rhymes, etc.
Essentially, Otpors humorous tactics influenced the mobilization of public, and
strengthened the culture of resistance. In the waking fear of previously attempted
revolutions in Europe (example: Prague 1989), and recent NATO bombings due to the
Kosovo conflict, humor worked as a catalyst for a unified front. On the most basic level,
it provided for the public the satisfaction of jabbing fun at the political leaders who
seemed so untouchable. Sorensen collected personal interviews with Otpor members in
early 2006, and one of them describes the atmosphere created thanks to the humor in
their tactics: [there was] an atmosphere of absolute fear, and everything was destroyed
[in NATO bombing] and this is really where humor came into the picture: You couldnt
persuade anyone, in this kind of atmosphere in the country, you couldnt persuade
anybody that something could be changed, that something should be changed. With
using different symbols, different narratives, Otpor succeeded. And then there was the
energy it was somewhere there, you could feel it, it was just to trigger it [] People were
really very eager to change things, you just needed something to wake them up and
make them active again. 12
The image of political figures mostly inspired fear, and humor brought that image
down. Partly, it ridiculed the regime actors and unified people in laughing at them. As
one protester recalls, humor was something like the main thing that brought
[Milosevic] down, because people were afraid, there was fear everywhere around and if
we are going to change something, the main idea was to make fun of the things that
12 Sorenson, 2008: p179

13
make them afraid [] to make people less afraid by using humor 13. The tactics were not
necessarily funny, thought. Janjira Sombatpoonsiri describes one famous incident of
subtle irony in her book Humor and Nonviolent Struggle in Serbia. Mira Markovic, Milosevics wife and herself the leader of the Yugoslav Left Party - was quoted saying
that a lot of blood had been shed for the introduction of communism into Yugoslavia
and it [the Communist Party] would never go [away] without blood. 14 She was
threatening use of violent force against protesters. In response, Otpor members set up a
blood donation campaign, collecting real human blood that they mockingly presented to
Markovics headquarters, asking if the Communist Party could please go now that they
had their blood. Not only did this action facilitate involvement, it also twisted
Markovics own words against her, ridiculing her in publics eyes.
Another advantage of humor as a tool for resistance was the fact that due to its
nature, these tactics also limited the ways the government could justifiably react.
Basically, it did not leave many options of violent intervention for Milosevics regime, as
this would seem like the most extreme over-reaction to something as innocent as a
cartoon or caricature (although it has to be noted that in earlier years, most of the
protests were met with armed police resistance, and up to 2000 students were arrested).
In September of 2000, the secret police raided Otpors headquarters in Belgrade and
confiscated equipment such as printers, computers, posters and stickers ready for
distribution. The operation was dubbed Unload 2000 by its victims, and was
counteracted by Load 2000, where they intentionally leaked information about
incoming equipment and materials to replenish their central offices capabilities. As
13 Sorenson, 2008: p180
14 Janjira Sombatpoonsiri. Humor and Nonviolent Struggle in Serbia. Syracuse Studies on
Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2015.

14
predicted, police arrived to confiscate the incoming supply and surrounded Otpor
members who were carrying what appeared to be sets of heavy boxes into the building.
Much to their dislike, members of Otpor were forced to surrender their boxes. But when
policemen attempted to pick the heavy boxes up and move them, they found them to be
completely empty or filled with newspaper scraps. The policemen became the
laughingstock of the onlookers and, unable to respond in any other way, all they could
do was swear at each other and at the secret polices failure to provide reliable
information.15 16
Therefore, the main counter-attack for Milocevic was an attempt to delegitimize
Otpor and proclaim them as terrorists working against the state. However, this only
provided further material for street performances and satire. In one town, the activists
gathered in front of the police station after accusations of Otpor being a terrorist
organization were broadcasted. The gathered activists started pointing out to the public
one of their members who wore glasses and had a typically nerdy and intelligent look,
parading him as an example of an activist. Because of the police accusations of
terrorism, this action implied that literacy and intelligence was now synonymous to
terrorism in Serbia. A similar sentiment was used in several other cities: cardboard
bridges were constructed and pens and books were placed under them. As the onlookers
gathered, Otpor activists proclaimed that they planted the landmines under the bridge.
In yet another city, Otpor members who were dressed in military clothes and carrying
toy rifles, marched through the citys pedestrian street and claimed that they were
indeed terrorists because they ignored all the traffic signs as they marched. They
15 Sorenson, 2008
16 Sombatpoonsiri, 2015.

15
trivialized the

accusations of terrorism

through

humorous,

over-exaggerated

performances that illustrated how incompatible these accusations were with reality.
This is the kind of terrorists we are, was proclaimed by the groups coordinator
Vladimir Marovic after the march through the streets17.
These examples illustrate another very important aspect of Otpor that definitely
made it hard to build a resistance to the movement - its decentralization throughout
Serbia. All these different stories come from various towns and cities across the country.
These networks of Otpor hubs across small towns of Serbia gave Otpor credibility with
the local population, as they oftentimes personally knew people involved with the
movement. Such nature of small town communities ensured that government
accusations of Otpor members being state traitors and terrorists would not have much
ground. If you are from a small town people know you. Some members have parents
who work in the police. Some work for the army. And if you know someone from
primary school, its very difficult to believe claims that he is a terrorist - or to claim that
yourself, said Slobodan Homen, a young Otpor activist, in an interview with Gillian
Sandford.18
The decentralization was partially a result of a conscious decision to abstain from
having an official leader to the movement - a trait that has become common in modern
activist groups. As Otpor members themselves explained in interviews presented in a
book People Power19, de-centralized leadership for the movement had a practical reason
behind it. It was an answer to a realistic threat of removal and/or imprisonment of a
17 Sombatpoonsiri, 2015.
18 Sandford, 2000.
19 Howard Clark, People Power. Chapter 8 Serbia - Nonviolent Struggle for Democracy: The
Role of Otpor by D. Nenadi, N. Believi. Pluto Press, 2009.

16
possible Otpor leader, which would not be unheard of inside the militant regime they
were opposing. Activists claimed Otpor was based on an invisible structure, which
would undergo occasional changes in order to avoid infiltration. However, as Nenadi
and Believi argue, it was specifically its decentralized nature that managed to mask
Otpors internal workings so well. Branches throughout Serbian towns were
autonomous, and had power to plan and carry out their own acts of resistance designed
specifically to fit local circumstances. While they held the same values and stance,
different towns exhibited different types of satiric performances as described above.
With this came division of labor within the movement, as each hub of Otpor members
had their own sectors for finance, management, logistics and PR.

Generational Advantage and Transnationality

Otpor, as a new type of social movement, moved away from the accepted notion that
main source of opposition comes from the working class and was more in line with the
student-run protests that took place across the world in 1960s (France, US, Japan). As
such, it was fundamentally different from the working class-led movements of the
industrial era20. When people thought of the movement, a typical image of an activist
was that of a young, University-educated man or woman in their 20s. Serbian students
were the initial drive behind Otpor, and those students were primary representatives of
the post-Soviet generation.
Otpors activities, especially after the initial couple of years of its existence, bridge
the gap between a local social movement and a transnational network. After Milosevics
resignation in 2000 and his following arrest in 2001, Otpor took on a much larger role
20 Mark E. Warren, Democracy and Association.. Princeton University Press, 2001.

17
of monitoring the ongoing democratic processes in post-Milosevic Serbia. Their
reputation of non-violent resistance and civic engagement spread outside of the
boundaries of Serbia, and youth groups in countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia
and even Egypt were looking up to them as a symbol of successful non-violent
revolution. Youth in Ukraine and Georgia were inspired to form their respective
movements, Pora (Its Time) in Ukraine and Kmara (Enough) in Georgia. The fact that
the main driving force behind these movements were all children of same political
generation sheds light on many similarities between the movements, and can be used to
explain the scope of Otpors influence across the borders.
Nikolayenko defines a political generation as a group of individuals who have
undergone the same basic historical experiences during their formative years 21. In case
of Otpor, the formation of post-Soviet generation was directly affected by the collapse of
Communism and subsequent social transformations that gave context to their identity.
These events experienced during their formative years have a lasting impact on a
generation, and manifest themselves in its political aspirations. Within this framework,
it becomes easy to understand why Otpors success could inspire youth in Georgia and
Ukraine, whose formative years were based in very similar political and historical
context of final years of Soviet Union, to mobilize and resist as well. This is a case where
an initiator movement, in this case Otpor, sets precedent for the rise of successive
movements through cross-national diffusion of ideas. 22
Right after the Serbian revolution, members of Otpor founded the Centre for Nonviolent Resistance with a goal to bring together activists who took part in the movement.
21 Nikolayenko, 2007.
22 Nikolayenko, 2007.

18
These were young, technologically savvy, university-educated people with direct
experience of civil resistance. This formation facilitated a continuation of an effort by
Western states to remove former Soviet government officials from power in post
communist countries without direct involvement on the ground. Instead of that, it
allowed Ukrainian and Georgian movements to directly interact and learn from activists
who already had a success behind their back23. In following years, the Centre for Nonviolent Resistance transmitted its knowledge to Eastern European states. An experience
of successful revolution gave them credibility and respect, so Otpor took on a role of a
guardian, and provided trainings to different youth and student groups. As such, after
achieving its initial goals, Otpor transformed into what can be categorized as a truest
form of a translational social movement, and became an integral carrier of values in a
now overarching system of social activist groups. Keck and Sikkink define transnational
advocacy groups as those that build new links among actor in civil societies, states and
international organizations, thus multiplying the opportunities for dialogue and
exchange24. In a manner very much similar to this, Otpors actions lead to successful
connections between groups in several different states. The groups that they coached in
non-violent activism - such as Zubr in Belarus, Kmara is Georgia, Pora in Ukraine - later
became central actors in Easter Europes Color Revolutions. Even their names bear
Otpors influence - they all are different translations of words along the lines of
enough, or resist. They illustrate the boomerang effect of transnational activism - a
phenomenon where groups in their home states seek out Otpors support and advice
after their initial attempts to engage in discourse with their governments fail.
23 Landry, 2011
24 Margaret E. Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational and Advocacy Networks. 1999

19
As hybrid regimes, states of Ukraine and Georgia, much like Serbia, revolved around
certain democratic institutions while apparatchiks retained a hold on most of the
political procedures. Parliamentary and presidential elections, which were under their
control, provided an incentive to mobilize towards a specific cause - Gotov Je, leading
up to 2000 presidential elections in Serbia, was the last and most significant act of
mobilization, calling for participation in polls. Similarly, formation of Kmara in Georgia
coincides with 2003 parliamentary elections that people hoped would provide a
departure from autocratic regime. Ukrainian Pora formed a year before 2004
presidential elections, with enough time to mobilize and prevent the installment of a
successor president through fraudulent elections. In their words, the mission set for
them was to prove to the ruling political elite that the power it gets from people is not
giver forever and prove to the citizens that they have enough power in their hands in
order to channel the development of their country in the direction they need. 25
Another unifying factor was the failing educational sector in post-Soviet states. The
resistance to the University Law was the first major fuel for Otpor. Similarly, higher
education in Ukraine and Georgia was under the control of the government. Highly
centralized educational system allowed universities to come under pressure of existing
regimes, and increased student dissatisfaction with their respective governments.
Otpors use of irony in their tactics was mimicked by similar use of symbolisms in
Pora and Kmara. Pora integrated an image of an egg into their propaganda after an egg
thrown at president-to-be, Yanukovich, during his election tour resulted in his
hospitalization. Kmara followed the suit of Otpor and incorporated a symbol of raised
fist against black background. With media being under strong control of the
25 Nikolayenko, 2007.

20
government, these movements relied on direct contact with people achieved through
rallies, street performances, and organized concerts. Training provided by Otpor
activists influenced both Kmara and Poras approach to civil resistance, and formed
specific tactics of activism for post-Soviet generation to employ.

Conclusion
The Gotov Je campaign was the last major push against Milosevics regime. Prior to
the presidential elections in September of 2000, eighteen opposition parties formed the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition, with Vojislav Kostunica as their candidate.
While the independent sources were reporting a majority win for the democratic
coalition, federal government stated that no party managed to win required majority.
The response was statewide, and marked the beginning of Bulldozer Revolution that
would later inspire Color Revolutions of Eastern Europe. The coalition called for a
general strike, which started with miners who produced most of electricity supply for
Serbia. Otpor supported the coalition by arranging roadblocks across major roads and
effectively bringing the country to a standstill. On October 5, 2000 hundred of
thousands of people marched onto the building of the parliament, and Milosevic was
forced to resign several days later. This marked the end of the first successful, nonviolent revolution in a post communist state - an event that set a precedent for countries
in similar political context, and inspired youth groups to engage in civil resistance.
Otpor played the most crucial role in removal of Milosevics regime - it united and
mobilized population that was pacified and scared of speaking out. It employed tactics
of humor and peaceful resistance in order to make itself more appealing to the public
eye, and distance itself from the political actors who were failing the trust of the

21
population. Due to it being first in line of Color Revolutions that followed, examination
of Otpors tactics and nature of other factors contributing to its success not only tells us
more about political and social situation in late 1990s Serbia, but also starts to explain
the transnational culture of non-violent resistance that it created in other Eastern
European countries.

References:

F. Bieber, The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in
Serbia. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol 16. No 1. 2003.

M. R. Beissinger, Structure and example in Modular Political Phenomena: The

Diffusion of Bulldozer/ Roze/ Orange/ Tulip Revolutions. American Political Science
Association, 2007.

S. M. Buechler. New Social Movement Theories. The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 36. No
3. 1995

J. Day, R. East, R. Thomas; A political and economic dictionary of Eastern Europe.

First Edition. Cambridge International Reference on Current Affairs, 2002. p. 544

P. Gahrton, Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game. Pluto Press, 2010.

M. E. Keck, K. Sikkink, Transnational and Advocacy Networks. 1999

T. Kuzio, Civil Society, youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions.

22
George Washington University, 2006.

T. Landry. The Color Revolutions in the Rearview Mirror: Closer Than They appear.
Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol 53. No 1. 2011

M. J. Mulkay. On Humor: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society. Polity Press,
1988.

M. McFaul, Transitions from Postcommunism. Journal of Democracy, July 2005.

D. Nenadi, N. Believi, Serbia Nonviolent Struggle for Democracy: The Role of

Otpor. Chapter from People Power by H. Clark. Pluto Press, 2009

O. Nikolayenko. The Revolt of the Post- Soviet Generation: Youth Movements in

Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Comparative Politics, Vol 39. No 2. 2007.

G. Sandford. Children of the Revolution. The World Today, Vol 56. No 8/9. 2000

J. Sombatpoonsiri, Nonviolent Action as the Interplay between Politican Context and

Insiders Knowledge: Otpor in Serbia. Chapter from Civil Resistance by Kurt Schock.
University of Minnesota Press, 2015.

J. Sombatpoonsiri. Humor and Nonviolent Struggle in Serbia. Syracuse Studies on

Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2015.

M. J. Sorensen. Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression.

Peace & Change, Vol 33. No 2. 2008: p171

M. Spoerri, Engineering Revolution: The Paradox of Democracy Promotion in Serbia.

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.

S. Vukovic, Serbia: Moderation as a Double- Edged Sword. Chapter in Arab Spring:
Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat by Willian Zartman. University of Georgia
Press, 2015.

23

M. E. Warren, Democracy and Association.. Princeton University Press, 2001.