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147
Introduction
Belgium has been described as the only state in the world where different
oppressed majorities coexist, each with a claim of superiority over the other
but all suffering from a sense of inferiority (Wigny 1969:178). While successive reconfigurations in the state system have made them all eligible, in various degrees, to claim autochthony, only the radical right Flemish-nationalist party Vlaams Blok, recently renamed Vlaams Belang (see Erk 2005) and
subsequently called VB, has managed to dominate politics by virtue of its
autochthony rhetoric. In this article, I try to examine why this is so.
Like South Africa, Belgium is a policultural state (Comaroff &
Comaroff 2003) in which autochthonous movements make claims on the
state in order to gain control over economic resources. Western European
and sub-Saharan African autochthony are equally concerned with the
exclusion within national polities of supposed strangers, including fellow
citizens, by rendering citizenship conditional (Comaroff 2005:131). Generally speaking, sub-Saharan African autochthony expresses a fear of being
outvoted by strangers under new democratic rules, while Western European autochthony expresses an attempt to reserve the benefits of the welfare state for those who are said to really belong (Ceuppens & Geschiere
2005). In Flanders, however, the effect of the federalization of the Belgian
state has had a similar effect as that of democratization in sub-Saharan
Africa: it has eroded the concept of rights-bearing individuals by foregrounding the rights of cultural subjects as identity-bearing subjects
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2003:455). I treat the appeal of autochthony in
Flanders here as an example of European autochthony in general. If, as
Jean Comaroff suggests, postcolonies are speeded-up, hyperextended
transformations of the modernist nation-states on which they model themselves, sedimentations, if you will, of the history of Euro-politics slightly
ahead of itself (2005:130), students of European autochthony would do
well to study its sub-Saharan counterpart.
European Autochthony
The modernist nation-state was erected on a fantasy of cultural homogeneity and horizontal fraternity (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003:454) which
ignored the degree to which state power both destroys and generates cultural differentiation (Sider 1987:3; see also Reed-Danahay 1996; Sahlins
1996).1 The renewed appeal of ethnicity since the 1960s has been
explained by the fact that members of minority groups find the notion of
cultures more attractive than a hierarchy of races or classes (Roosens
1989), although the subsequent rise of the radical right in Europe, which
has come to replace the idea of a racial supremacy with one of cultural
hierarchy, seems to challenge this assumption. However, the popular
appeal of radical right parties like VB derives not least from the fact that
they invoke autochthonous claims rather than ethnic ones.2
As described here, European autochthony cannot be reduced to ethnicity, nationalism, or right-wing racism. If one defines separatist nationalism as the efforts of an ethnic group that is not identified with the state to
reshape state structures (Coakley 1992:1), autochthony is different insofar
as it is about the efforts of any group that identifies with a locality within the
state. The association with a locality rather than an ethnic group is a key element in distinguishing autochthony from ethnicity; as such, it harkens back
to notions of belonging that precede the development of the nation-state.
The meaning of tranger (from which stranger is derived), in the
sense of a non-national, is historically secondary to the meaning conveyed
by estraigne in early French, before the development of the nation-state, as
someone from outside a defined locality (Grillo 1985:71). The predominantly Western European anthropology of locality (Cohen 1982a:7)
focuses upon belonging and localism. Associated with the notion of a particular bounded space with its set of close-knit social relationships based
upon strong kinship ties and length of residence (Featherstone 1996:47),
it shows the difficulties in establishing who the real locals and, by implication, the real aliens are (Strathern 1982). Localism can attribute
alien status to owners of a second home and to tourists (see, e.g., Ethnologie Franaise 32/3, 2002), individuals with a deviant lifestyle (Bagley
1973:17778; Bowie 1993:17273; Macdonald 1997:140), or state officials
and their agents (Berdahl 1999:69; Cohen 1982:305; Reed-Danahay
1996:60, Rogers 1991:21; Wylie 1957:chap.10). As such, we should be wary
of the suggestion that local identities bear any direct relationship to ethnic
identity (Edwards 1998:161).
A recent study of locals and newcomers in an English urban setting
argues that although locals usually report a sense of familiarity, this does
not convey a sense that they belong, while newcomers employ a discourse of elective belonging . . . in which those who have an account of
why they live in a place, and can relate their residence to their choices and
circumstances, are the most at home (Savage et al. 2005:523, 45). Whatever the relative merit of localism or elective belonging to describe local
identities in Western Europe, the rise of autochthony highlights the enduring appeal of belonging and localism in the conflictual relations between
local neighborhoods and states (Appadurai 1991).
Leopold III, who had tried to strike a deal with Hitler, should be allowed to
reassume the throne. The electorate voted for the kings return with a narrow margin: by and large, Flanders voted yes, while Wallonia voted no.
Many Walloons interpreted the yes-vote as an indication that an antidemocratic, conservative Flanders was trying to impose its rule upon a democratic, progressive Wallonia. The consultation brought the country to the
brink of civil war, and Leopold III was forced to abdicate in favor of his
eldest son, Baudouin I.
Federalization
From the 1960s onward, as the economic center of gravity shifted from the
south to the north, many Walloons accused the state of refusing to invest
in their regions dying industry and started making regionalist claims
against Ltat Belgo-Flamand (the Belgian-Flemish state). Since 1970 the
national government has had to contain an equal number of Dutchophone
and Francophone ministers, apart from the prime minister. The alarm
bell procedure, introduced the same year, prevents one linguistic community from pushing through a law unilaterally by assuring that all future
changes to the Belgian institutional framework require not only a twothirds majority but also a 50 percent majority in each group. While this has
led radical Flemish nationalists to conclude that Belgium is a country in
which a majority is dominated by a minority, many Francophones continue
thinking that they are the victims of the imperialism of a Flemish majority.
Federalization grew out of Flemings and Walloons demands for more
autonomy from the central state. Introduced in 1980, it has mapped onto
the four linguistic regions three communities (Flemish, French, German)
for cultural matters and three regions (Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia) for
economic and regional matters, each with their own separate legislative
bodies and executives. For the Francophone majority, region and community do not coincide. In Wallonia, economic decline and federalization
have hampered the development of a shared Francophone identity with
Francophones in Brussels (some regionalist Walloons are hostile to what
they call Ltat Belgo-Bruxellois) and at the same time have strengthened
the power of the Parti Socialiste (PS). In Flanders, where region and community coincide, economic prosperity and federalization have fragmented
the internal political landscape and chrystalized cultural differences
between Flemings and Francophones inside and outside the region, on the
one hand, and between Flemings and the Dutch on the other. Traditionally, Flanders cultural elite thought usage of standard Dutch would challenge Frenchs universalistic claims; now, an increasing number of Flemings identify with an autochthonized form of Dutch, against Dutchophones
in the Netherlands, whom they accuse of linguistic imperialism.
& Caestecker 2001). If one agrees that the West eliminates its Others by
annihilating or assimilating them (Bauman 1993), this interpretation holds
up only if one accepts the idea that Wallonias assimilationist policies
toward foreigners are less racist than Flanders willingness to accommodate and subsidize ethnic civic associations. In addition, the rhetoric of the
Walloon Movement draws upon its own notions of ethnic citizenship. It
contains many references to specific ethnic qualities of Walloons such as
language, culture, and moral values. It shows a preoccupation with the Walloon soil as a value in itself whose (French) monolingualism must be maintained at all costs. It also argues that individuals belong to the Walloon
nation by virtue of their blood, their race, descent, or historical destiny
(Vanginderachter 2004).
Quantitative research confirms that Flemings with a Flemish and Walloons with a Belgian identification tend to have a negative attitude toward
Muslim labor immigrants and their descendants, while Flemings with a Belgian and Walloons with a Walloon identification view them more positively
(Maddens et al. 2000). However, in 1989, 67 percent of Walloon adults,
compared to 57 percent of Flemish adults, thought that immigrants abuse
Belgiums social security system, and 60 percent of Walloons, as opposed to
40 percent of Flemings, accused them of jeopardizing Belgians employment (Swyngedouw 1998b:124). In addition, research based upon a number of attitudesincluding negative feelings toward foreigners, authoritarianism, distrust of state institutions, political dissatisfaction, and so on
suggests that Walloons would be more receptive than Flemings to a radical
right rhetoric (Coff 2005). Nevertheless, there is no Francophone
autochthony movement comparable to VB. In the aftermath of the fixing
of the linguistic border, two localist parties with a translocal appeal developed in Francophone Belgium, both of which greatly influenced
national/federal politics. Yet unlike VB, neither managed to become large
enough to pose a genuine threat to mainstream parties.
the people of Voeren was not in doubt because they speak a Dutch
dialect, these people themselves tended to think of Flemings as
aliens. In s Gravenvoeren, one of the six communes, the opposition
between Dutchophones and Francophones, which initially referred to
political differences rather than actual language use, was built upon an
older opposition between two local factions. One described itself as Belgian
patriots and construed its opponents as Flemish nationalists, foreigners
(to both the village and the nation), Germans, or Nazis. The other accused
its opponents of being aliens who were not born and bred in the commune (Van Laar 1988:4142). The rhetoric of the Flemish Movement was
introduced into the region mainly by nonlocal priests, and the first locals
to acquire a Flemish identity were men who had left their communes to
pursue secondary education elsewhere and had gained in school a sense of
common identity with Dutchophone students from other localities, including Leuven (Van Laar 1988:1045). French drew its prestige from its association with the local politicoeconomic elite and from the Ligois economy, Dutch from its connection with the Catholic Church; many local
Flemings were Catholics first and Flemings only second (Debougnoux
1986:144).
The local Flemish elite supported the transfer for fear that the influence of the industrialized, predominantly Socialist province of Lige would
change the political affiliation of the largely Catholic population; they
attracted the support of Flemings outside the region. Throughout the six
villages, the local Francophone elite led the resistance against the transfer
to Limburg (Van Laar 1993:42), arguing that in redrawing the linguistic
frontier, Flemings had undertaken a second attempt (after World War I) to
create a territorial corridor between Flanders and Germany (Debougnoux
1986:19; Van Laar 1988:83; Verjans 1985:25).
The rural, unitarist RL, which vainly fought the transfer, found an
unlikely ally in the urban, industrial, Socialist, and regionalist Mouvement
Populaire Wallon. Both parties agreed that Flanders had occupied Wallonia and that for a second time, after the settling of the Royal Question, it
was tying to impose its will upon the population. Things came to a head
when RL won the local elections in 1982 and promoted the candidacy of
Jos Happart as burgomaster. A Walloon newcomer with a mastery of neither the local dialect nor standard Dutch, Happart refused to speak Dutch
to strengthen the case that Voeren should have remained part of Wallonia.
In the eyes of Flemings in and outside the region, his lack of Dutch identified Happart as a foreigner. For local Francophones, the fact that he was
an ideological ally outweighed his status as a non-Catholic newcomer who
did not speak the local dialect. Flemings in the region and beyond thought
that Happart violated the law; for Francophones throughout Belgium, he
expressed the grievance of a majority who were denied the right to choose
their own language (Hooghe 1991:18). Far from being a trivial dorpsruzie
(village quarrel) that got out of hand (Van Istendael 1993:11), the political
gans: Eigen volk eerst (Ones own people first), Baas in eigen land
(Boss in ones own country), and Thuis zijn (Being home), all of which
tap into the reflexive self-image of the underdog that Flemings have cultivated since the dawn of the Flemish Movement (Lorwin 1974:199;
Reynebeau 1995:24546). In reality, the category of ones own people is
not clearly defined. In its attempt to exclude foreigners from the benefits
of the welfare state, VB cleverly combines two discourses: a prenational,
localist rhetoric that (as the situation in Voeren shows), easily (re-)classifies
local political opponents as foreigners; and a Flemish nationalist
rhetoric, forged in the aftermath of Belgian state-building, that portrays
Francophones as Flemings major historical enemy. Scale-jumping between
local communities, Flanders, Belgium, and Europe allows VB to define and
redefine different categories of people as foreigners, from disenfranchised Muslim immigrants and asylum-seekers to Francophone Belgians.
Indeed, it would seem that behind the ever-changing array of various
allochthons lurks the Francophone co-citizen as the enduring and ultimate
Other who stands accused of trying to impose a Gallicized culture and/or
feeding off Flemish labor.
locals who have pride in their homes to Muslim labor immigrants living
on the streets (cf. Van San & Leerkes 2001:95), also taps into the fears of
rural, middle-class Flemings, who feel equally alienated from politicians. As
most mainstream parties have tried to fight VB by taking over some of its
themes about foreigners and law and order, the traditional left-right
opposition in Flanders has been redefined (Blommaert 2005).
Throughout Flanders, the amalgamation of municipalities has
increased the geographical and social distance between the centers of decision-making and residential areas (Ackaert & Dekien 1989:321; Delmartino
1982:584). Through the amalgamations, the national parties tried to
increase their grip on the local electorate at the cost of local parties,
though it remains to be seen to what extent local sections of national parties are local (Deschouwer 1994), regional, or federal (Dewachter 1982).
While the number of local lists has been greatly reduced, they have proved
most resilient in small rural communes (Ackaert 1992: 587). The impact of
regional, federal, and supranational politics, combined with professionalisation and gentrification (Reynaert 1997:52), has reduced political factionalism and the bifurcation in sociocultural life that once accompanied
it.
To paraphrase Anthony Cohen (2000:148), the peripherality that
many VB voters now experience is a geographical fact, but it also provides
some substance for a depiction of local communities as somehow remote
from the centers of power and decision-making. Equating geographical distance with neglect and political powerlessness, VB voters can contrast the
authentic values of their peripheral communities with the vacuity and
superficiality of local, regional, and/or federal governments. Many VB voters see themselves as the people rising up against forms of centralized
authority that pay no heed to grassroots sentiments, as when a center for
asylum-seekers was imposed on municipalities (cf. Pred 2000:18992).
They are attracted to a discourse that foregrounds various types of Others
as aliens in order to protest that their politicians are seemingly more
concerned with foreigners than with the electorate. Trying to reclaim the
local as an unpolluted and unmediated scale for political life (Agnew
1994), they express their mobilization against Others through a vote for
an other, that is, an antiestablishment party outside the pillarized system.
Welfare Chauvinism
Unlike many Francophones who have long identified with an international
culture they deem superior, many Flemings consider themselves hereditary
victims (Bauman 1998) of all sorts of haughty imperialists (French, Dutch,
Francophones, Anglophones) and indolent scroungers (Francophones,
allochthons, asylum-seekers) parasitizing on their labor or profits.
Flemish nationalists across the political spectrum are concerned that
the Anglophone culture of affluent expatriates poses a greater threat to the
Flemish language and culture than does the culture of poor Muslim labor
immigrants and their descendants. However, animosity against so-called
Eurocrats has not captured the popular imagination outside communes
affected by their presence.16 Like Antwerps visible Hassidic community,
many of whom are involved in its diamond industry, Eurocrats are economically autarkic and an important source of revenue for Flanders. This
goes some way to explain why VB openly courts the Jewish vote in Antwerp
(Haaretz, August 29, 2005).
Contrary to earlier predictions, depillarizationwhich, as we have
seen, is more pronounced in Flanders than in Walloniahas not made for
more tolerance. The term biefstuksocialisme (beefsteak socialism) refers to
the shift from a group-oriented and pillarized culture to an individualized
consumer culture. Far from closing the gap between the working and middle classes, this new consumer culture has exacerbated the differences
between those who want to extend the benefits of the welfare state to
aliens and those who want to guard these benefits for their own people.
Thus far, Social-Democratic voters have been most susceptible to VBs
racism and Christian-Democratic voters the least, but this has probably less
to do with Christian, as opposed to Socialist, values (Billiet et al. 1999) than
with the legacy of pillarization: Christian-Democrats can only defend the
rights of employers and employees alike by upholding an ideal of class
cooperation while many Socialist voters seem to have substituted the
socioeconomic class war between employees and employers with a culturalized opposition between hard-working Flemings and lazy foreigners.17
The continuity between an old hierarchical model based upon class and a
new one based upon culture linked to primordialism, which disrupts class
solidarity and collaboration, goes some way to explain why members of
trade unions have less positive perceptions of allochthons than members of
other civic organizations do (Hooghe 2003).18 Welfare chauvinism is therefore crucial for understanding the appeal of exclusionary populism in Flanders. According to Kitschelt (1995:26162):
As long as minimalist welfare states represent nothing but the equivalent
of a private market insurance system in which people receive benefits
strictly in proportion to their contributions based on calculations of their
actuarial risk to the insurer, the influx of new residents from a hitherto
nonexistent or very small ethnic grouping does not undermine the public
acceptance of social programs. Where a comprehensive welfare state goes
beyond the insurance principle, however, and redistributes funds from
contributors to beneficiaries, a changing ethnic balance does matter. . . .
Net contributors to the welfare state . . . are most willing to accept redistribution to the less fortunate where they can envision that they themselves could, in theory, be in the same predicament that calls for social
benefits. By definition, immigrants are excluded from that comparison
when residents see them not as members of the club that redistributes
internal funds. In a similar vein, while members may accept welfare state
labor descendants and their offspring, associating them with street crime,
social security milking, Islamic fundamentalism, discrimination against
women, traffic in drugs, urban housing deterioration, cultural uprooting
and anomy, etc. (Roosens 1994:94). It opposes Turkeys membership in
the European Union on the grounds that its Muslim culture would be alien
to Europes Christian culture, despite the fact that many party leaders are
self-avowed pagans who consider Christianity a foreign import (De Zutter
2000). But in a recent attempt to protest against a new traffic plan in two
Brussels communes, its Francophone deputy, Johan Demol, distributed a
leaflet in Turkish to gain the support of Turkish inhabitants (Brussel Deze
Week, July 14, 2005). Simultaneously, it paints a gloomy picture of ones
own people being threatened by various types of foreigners: Anglophones, asylum-seekers, Eastern European thieves, Eurocrats, Francophones, Muslims, illegal immigrants, non-European labor immigrants, niggers, refugees, Walloons, and so on (Arnaut & Ceuppens 2004). It depicts
its Flemish distracters and the Flemish political establishment as enemies
of the people.
accept this ruling on the condition that the bilingual region of Brussels be
extended into some of the surrounding Flemish-speaking areas, creating a
territorial corridor to Wallonia. For Flemings, the fixation of the linguistic
border is nonnegotiable.
The program of the new Flemish government, inaugurated in 2004,
included an agreement on the part of all mainstream Flemish parties to
split up B-H-V into a bilingual Brussels and a unilingual Flemish constituency. These parties subsequently put the question on the federal
agenda, forcing the federal government to resolve it. As the crisis unfolded
during the spring of 2005, Flemish political commentators and Flemish
nationalists flexed their muscles in the media and Internet forums, describing Francophone demands as yet another kaakslag voor Vlaanderen (a
slap in the face for Flanders) and insisting that they would not concede
een morzel grond (a single scrap of land). Accusations of Francophone
imperialism flew thick and fast: Imagine an independent Flanders. It isnt
hard to do. No king to pay for, and no Walloons too (http://forum.politics.be). The radical Flemish nationalist Taalaktiekomit (Language action
commmittee) described Francophones as occupiers intent on annexing
the province of Flemish Brabant in which Brussels is situated (www.taalaktiekomite.org). Happart made Flemish headlines again, suggesting that in
exchange for the split, Voeren should receive a biregional status.
When the negotiations failed, the federal government refused to
resign, realizing that the population is largely indifferent to the matter.26
Flemish politicians from all mainstream parties were quick to blame Francophones for the debacle, apparently oblivious to the fact that they had
created the problem by agreeing among themselves to resolve an issue
beyond their jurisdiction. The Flemish Christian-Democratic prime minister, Yves Leterme, pledged to increase investments in the six communes
and drew an unfavorable comparison between their Francophone inhabitants who refuse to assimilate by speaking Dutch and the Moroccan-born
Dutchophone Nama Amzil. (In 2005 Amzil gained the spotlight after her
employer received eight anonymous letters from a previously unknown
organization, Nieuw Vrij Vlaanderen [New Free Flanders], threatening
death to him and his family if he refused to fire his Muslim employee who
wore a headscarf.)
The problem of B-H-V is as unsolvable as that of Voeren, but this time
the federal government seems unable to find a complex solution in the
best consociational tradition, because the lines are drawn along ethnolinguistic rather than ideological lines: even Flemings and Francophones who
share the same political ideology now confront one another as opposing
blocks. It looks indeed as if increasingly, Flemish antiforeign rhetoric targets Francophones (who do not all share a common identity) rather than
allochthons (Arnaut & Ceuppens 2004). If allochthons are routinely taken
to task for being culturally different from Flemings, many Flemings take
the cultural differences between Flemings and Francophones so much for
haps also because he is of foreign descent. Above all, however, they hold
the PS responsible for the industrial wasteland that is Wallonia and for
which Flanders, in their view, foots the bills. They also accuse him of having forced Flemings to accept the extension of suffrage in local elections to
non-EU citizens. The Flemish popular imagination portrays Di Rupo (routinely described in the Flemish media as Belgiums most powerful man) as
the prototype of the lazy, arrogant foreigner who is not only supported by
thrifty, good-natured Flemings, but whose despotism and patronizing arrogance they must tolerate in the bargain: the ultimate colonizing alien.
And in the meantime, some Flemings have their own reasons for worrying about the influx of Eastern European workers: they fear that in the
local elections of 2006, VB will increase its power base in Brussels with the
help of Polish immigrants whom they describe as conservative, Islamophobic Catholics (De Standaard, March, 13, 2004). The German community in
Wallonia wants more autonomy from the Walloon region (De Standaard,
September 28, 2002) or even a separate German region (De Standaard, February 19, 2001), and inhabitants of the Walloon province of Luxembourg
demand official recognition of their (German) dialect (De Standaard, April
16, 2002). Finally, some Moroccans in Brussels agree with VB that the country is full and cannot accommodate more foreigners and that it must be
cleansed (De Morgen, January 24, 2005).
Conclusion
The popular appeal of autochthony in Belgium does not reflect an increase
in cultural diversity. Historically, both ideological and linguistic differences
were regionally based, both between regions (Catholic Flanders versus anticlerical Wallonia) and within regions (anticlerical urban centers in Wallonia and Flanders versus the Catholic countryside in Flanders and Wallonia). However, unlike linguistic differences, ideological differences were
not seen as indicative of cultural diversity. The discourses of RL, FDF, and
VB all draw upon older forms of localism, factionalism, and municipalism,
all of which allowed for the (re)classification of political allies or opponents as locals or aliens, regardless of their actual provenance. They
meshed with a pillarized system that was always inherently conflictual even
as it was consociational: compromises were needed to accommodate the
conflicting interests of the various subcultural segments. In addition, these
localist and autochthony discourses draw upon the rhetoric of the Flemish
and Walloon Movements, which both made cultural claims related to language before making predominantly political (Flemish) and economic
(Walloon) demands (Hooghe 1991:1516).
The federalization of the country has gradually transformed the linguistic frontier into a national border, emphasizing differences between
regions and communities at the cost of differences within them. The eth-
nes claim individual rights in Brussels and the facility communes where
they constitute a majority, and recognition as a cultural minority in Flanders.
Flemings as a class remain assimilationist in their views on Flanders
Francophones, but mainstream Flemish nationalists are divided between
left-wingers, who uphold allochthons right to emancipate themselves as a
group, and right-wingers, who insist that they must integrate individually.
The idea that VBs main enemy is not the artificial Fleming Mustafa, but
the artificial Belgian state (Gijsels 1992:183), highlights both the
endurance of the image of Francophones as Flemings ultimate Other
and the logic that structures pre- and postradical right Flemish nationalist
views on Francophone and Muslim aliens alike (Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; Swyngedouw 1998b). French, the Belgian state, and Islam
would all be equally incompatible with Flanders. However, increasingly,
Flemish autochthony seems to sway between a tendency to target those who
supposedly impose themselves culturally and politically as colonizers or
occupiers from above (Francophones) and those who undermine Flanders economically as spongers from below (Francophones, labor immigrants, etc.).
Initially, the Flemish Movement was progressive insofar as it wanted to
change the existing order, and the Walloon Movement was conservative in
that it wanted to hold on to the status quo. By contrast, the Francophone
localist and Flemish autochthony discourses described here are all conservative in that they are driven by a desire to retain ones own privileged position under changed socioeconomic and political circumstances. Nevertheless, while RL and FDF have had a disproportionate influence on
national/federal politics in relation to their size, they have never managed
to make the transition from a local to a regional party in the way that VB
has. All Walloon regionalist parties have imploded, and regionalism is now
confined to the fringe of the PS. At one stage, anti-Muslim rhetoric caught
on across political oppositions in Brussels, but this soon fizzled out. One
could argue that this was partly so because the nineteen villages that
make up the region of Brussels have not been amalgamated, meaning that
inhabitants feel less detached from local politicians while racist rhetoric
remains fragmented and local. However, in Antwerp, the rise of VB was not
so much the effect of a badly implemented amalgamation (Swyngedouw
1998a:302) than of the arrogance of Antwerps political class which ignored
the electorate and refused to take the party seriously.
Personal charisma alone cannot explain why Happart and Nols
became at one time the most popular politicians in Francophone Belgium.
Clearly their stance against Flemings tapped into widespread anti-Flemish
sentiments. Yet neither they nor other politicians could channel this resentment into a powerful political party. Nolss failure to capitalize upon his
popularity when joining a radical right party suggests that opposition to the
radical right remains stronger in Francophone Belgium than in Flanders.
people, however that is defined. The Old Rights ideology of racial purity
was connected to modernist prewelfare states. The New Rights discourse
of cultural incompatibility, by contrast, cannot be detached from the development of the welfare state in the face of new global migration flows. Drawing upon cultural boundaries that are constantly negotiated, rather than
on fixed racial boundaries, allows it to respond quickly to the effects of various migratory movements that affect postnational states.
Yasemin Nuhog
lu Soysal reminds us that the incorporation of labor
immigrants in the polity reverses the classical Marshallian sequence: their
social rights precede political rights (1994:131). The tendency to associate
social rights with passive citizenship, as opposed to political rights and their
association with active citizenship (Kastoryano 2002: 123), contributes to
the erroneous view that labor immigrants and their offspring sponge off
the welfare state. The classical welfare state is universal only within national
boundaries: expected to operate with the assumption of closure, it
excludes noncitizens (Soysal 1994:13839). Relegating immigrants to
denizenship status remains within the confines of the nation-state model:
it depicts changes in citizenship as an expansion of scope on a territorial
basis and fails to recognize the changes in the nature of postnational states
(Soysal 1994:139). Granting immigrants denizenship, as opposed to citizenship, status justifies autochthony claims; it construes social rights as conditional upon political rights while reducing the state to its welfare bureaucracy through an identification of citizenship with social rights. The fact
that access to social housing is now connected to knowledge of Dutch
amply illustrates the extent to which the Flemish administration reduces
civil-ization to social rights.
Once again, it is useful to compare Flanders with sub-Saharan postcolonies. VB made its electoral inroads in 1991, two years after the fall of
the Berlin Wall (see Bouveroux 1996). Since then, neoliberalism has not
merely transformed the moral and material sovereignty of nation-states
everywhere but has also compounded their social heterogeneity: the
transnational mass mediation of signs and styles, information and ideologies, therapies and theologies; the rise of an electric commons; the growing hegemony of the market and with it, the notion that personhood is
constructed through consumption, that culture and history are intellectual
property to be possessed, patented, and exchanged for profit. In this world,
goes the truism, freedom represents itself as a choice: most of all, as a
choice not merely of identities but of modes of producing them. In light of
this, it is one of the great existential ironies of our age that identity appears
to have become, simultaneously, a function of voluntary self-production
and a matter of ineluctable essence, even genetic inscription (Comaroff
2005:130).
Bearing this in mind, we can deduce why, for the time being,
autochthony has caught on more in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium. Flemings can afford to buy into the language of choice; by redefin-
ing the category of ones own people and by rejecting automatic, federal
solidarity, they restrict access to the benefits of the general welfare state to
their own. This choice is real insofar as it is more open to the affluent
than it is to the destitute. Indeed, welfare chauvinism is propelled by prosperity rather than poverty, attracting not primarily those who have lost the
most or have least to lose, but rather those who stand to lose the most. This
goes some way to explain why in Belgium, as in Italy and Germany, inhabitants of the most affluent regions seem more susceptible to claims of
autochthony against co-citizens than those of the poorest regions. The
poorer inhabitants of Western European welfare states, including Walloons, lack the freedom that would allow them to choose to reinvent themselves and to deny others the benefits of the welfare state upon which they
themselves rely heavily. Finally, inequality of choice could help explain why
Flemish and Walloon regionalists have not set up alliances against the Belgian state. As such, the breakup of the Belgian state, if it ever materializes,
may only result from a Flemish choice.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Peter Geschiere, Chantal Kesteloot, and Michael Meeuwis
for comments on earlier drafts of this text.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
John Knight (1994) takes Cohen to task for closing off localities from the wider
nation; but see Cohen (2000).
The radical right is a clearly demarcated political ideology while autochthony,
like populism, refers to an analytical description of a political phenomenon
that challenges conventional left-right oppositions (cf. Cuperus 2005; Hermet
2001).
A quick Internet search establishes five hits for colonisation flamande and twenty
for imprialisme flamand, seventy-one for franskiljons (gallicized Flemings) en
imperialisme and no fewer than 208 for franstalig (Francophone) imperialisme.
Both regions gained their name after independence.
Pillars are not a legal category, but political parties are connected to various
civic associations and auxiliary organizations, from schools to publishing
houses, from health insurance companies to banks. Thus traditionally, devout
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
tinues marking the villagers common allegiance to their shared locality (Vandermeeren & Wynants 1993:228), but it does not symbolize political neutrality:
Francophones dispute that it is Dutch (Van Laar 1994:62).
In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and other international events, the
identification of Islam with terrorism once again made itself first felt in Brussels, where a number of Francophone, Socialist, and Liberal burgomasters
declared 75 percent of Islam teachers dangerous fundamentalists (Boender
& Kanmaz 2002).
Eurocrats refers to individuals working for the European Unions institutions.
In 1995, when the Flemish Socialist party was dogged by scandals, it managed
to regain 3 percent of previously lost votes by building its electoral campaign
around President Louis Tobback, who was presented to the electorate as uw
sociale zekerheid (your social security).
However, their focus on maintaining the standard of living of those in full-time
employment rather than on securing jobs for all means that in practice, they
do not represent the great majority of Muslim labor immigrants and their
descendants who are now unemployed (Okkerse & Termote 2004).
It is not clear how Kitschelt squares the minimal welfare system of the United
States with the recurrence of cultural nativism against foreigners(Perea
1997).
The first member of a mainstream Flemish party to make the point was the
Socialist Robert Voorhamme, who has strong ties to the Socialist trade union
movement (De Standaard, September 2627, 2002). Recently, Bart Somers, the
leader of the Flemish Liberal party and a former member of VU, reiterated
that view (De Standaard June, 19, 2005).
In the wake of VBs condemnation of racism, Matthias Storme, one of Flanders leading conservative Flemish nationalist intellectuals, described discriminating against others as an elemental human right.
It now openly tries to win Francophone voters in Brussels by saying that they
would be better off in a prosperous Flanders than tied to an impoverished Wallonia. While little love is lost between Francophones in Brussels and Wallonia,
it remains to be seen whether the former are willing to put their vote where
their mouth is.
The Flemish student song Franse ratten rolt uw matten was written in 1814
in protest against the French occupation and later adapted to target Franskiljons. Seven hundred years after the Battle of the Golden Spurs on July 11,
1302, in which the infantry of the Count of Flanders defeated the French cavalry, many Flemish nationalists consider France, not Belgium, the major
enemy.
In reality, most Francophones in Flanders outside the facility communes make
cultural rather than political claims. They are ostracized, on the one hand, by
those who take umbrage at their public French language use, and on the other
by many on the left who do not want to extend their vision of a multicultural
society to what they consider a social elite. Like Muslims, they are required to
relegate the expression of their cultural identity to the privacy of their own
homes; most do so, so as not to court controversy (Laureys 2005).
Most estimates speculate that in addition to twenty thousand French citizens,
there are one hundred and twenty thousand Belgian Francophones in the