MILITARY HIGH TECH VS.

LOW TECH

"If you load a mudfoot down with a lot of gadgets he has to watch somebody a lot more
simply equipped - say with a stone axe - will sneak up and bash his head in while he is
trying to read a Vernier." - Robert Heinlein

Resistance is futile!

The government and media have long since convinced us all of the omnipotence of
technology. Why they can read your underwear label from space via satellite, and one
single quick glance at a mountain range with a helicopter FLIR will located each and
every warm body present, from field mice on up, and separate them by genus and species.
Light infantry, freedom fighters, militia, guerrillas or whatever are all totally helpless
before such technological wonders, and will be immediately and mercilessly crushed like
bugs.

Electronic intelligence and the high-tech sub systems which gather that information are
indeed impressive and something to be treated with the greatest degree of respect. But no
man-made system is perfect. Even the most gee of the gee-whiz government toys have
their weaknesses.

Don’t believe it? Let’s examine a few instances where the omnipotent Eye-in-the Sky
failed miserably.

In 2002 in Afghanistan, U.S. forces were focused on the Shahi Kot Valley in the
mountains of Paktia Province because human intelligence on the ground between Special
Forces and local Afghanis indicated a gathering of Taliban and Al-Qaeda there.

“At night, when these groups [Taliban] heard a Predator or AC-130 coming, they
pulled a blanket over themselves to disappear from the night-vision screen. They used
low tech to defeat high tech.”
The full might of America’s high-tech electronic intelligence gathering assets swung into
action and was directed for several weeks on a 10 kilometer by 10 kilometer square box
of the objective area. Spy satellites directed their attention with Multi-Spectral Scanners,
radar, GIS, and whatever the hell other secret acronym intensive systems they possess
onto the area from space. Signals intelligence intercepted, triangulated, and monitored
every word the Taliban and Al-Qaeda spoke on their radios or cell phones. Predator
drones combed the area night and day with Multi-spectral Targeting Systems that
included color nose cameras, a variable aperture day-TV camera, and a variable aperture
infrared (FLIR) camera. AC-130 Spectre gunships prowled by night, using 360-degree
All-Light Level TV, Infrared Detection systems, lasers, radar, and crewmen with image
intensification NVD (Night Vision Devices).

One of many sensor banks inside an AC-130 being monitored by one of its 13-
member crew.

Combining all these high-tech sources, the chairborne intelligence wonks confidently
prophesied that the enemy consisted of only 150, no more than 200, fighters. They
possessed no heavy weapons, only small arms and, at best, heavy machine guns. The
handful of Taliban, the Whiz Kids said, were mostly located on the valley floor in the
small villages; only a single anti-aircraft position with a 12.7mm DShK machine gun had
been located in the mountains above the towns by the electronic toys.

Conditions turned out to be quite different when American troops air assaulted into the
midst of the area and Afghan troops mounted a ground offensive. It turned out the enemy
had at least a thousand fighters. The civilians had already pretty much left the villages,
and the Taliban forces were located mostly in the mountains instead. “No heavy
weapons” turned out to include numerous vehicles, mortars up to 120-mm, various
recoilless rifles, and several 122 mm D-30 howitzers and a larger 152 mm piece. The air
assaults received a blistering welcome from small arms, RPG’s and heavy mortar fire.
“No heavy weapons.” Unless you picky bastards consider a Soviet-built D-20 152mm
howitzer capable of firing a 96-pound projectile to a range of 17,400 meters
"heavy".

Approaching stealthily by night to be in position for a dawn overland attack, part of the
friendly Afghan ground forces, accompanied by Special Forces operators, were
accidentally attacked and blasted by an American AC-130 gunship despite radio calls and
infrared recognition devices. The remnants of this Afghani force were met by intense fire
of all kinds from the Taliban when they attacked in the morning, suffered numerous
casualties, and eventually withdrew.

One Special Forces team infiltrating through the mountains on foot gathered more real-
time intelligence on enemy numbers and positions with the Mark I Human Eyeball than
all the eyes-in-the-sky technology combined had. They almost immediately found
another DShK anti-aircraft position that electronic intelligence had missed. It was hardly
hidden, with a tent heated by a woodstove right beside it and a bright blue vinyl tarp
protecting the machine gun itself. The position directly overlooked one of the air assault
landing zones and would have brutally chewed up the flaring, landing choppers. Air
Force fighter-bombers could not hit the position; the SF Team had to stalk and take out
the heavy machine gun and its crew and guards by themselves on foot (in between
clearing jams on their M4’s, of course).

When a team of Navy SEALs in an MH-47 Chinook helicopter attempted to land on

Takur Ghar ridge, on which the all-seeing, all-knowing electronic eyes-in-the-sky had
just detected nothing, they instead found numerous Taliban fighters with another DShK .
51-caliber heavy machine gun, RPG’s, small arms, and a prepared bunker and slit
trenches, all of whom engaged them at point-blank range. They landed almost literally
right on top of them. Later, an Army Ranger reaction force that came in as
reinforcements was never informed of the situation, landed in the middle of the hot LZ,
and was also taken under heavy fire. The majority of American casualties and helicopter
shoot-downs came from this one isolated corner of the battle.

The battle officially lasted from March 1 to March 18, 2001. The PBI (Poor Bloody
Infantry) pulled the brass’ chestnuts out of the fire…again…through improvisations and
day-long firefights. Aggressive attack helicopter pilots helped save the day for the ground
pounders, but most of the Apaches were soon shot to pieces and had to withdraw from
the fight. The latest greatest jet bombers with precision-guided munitions could not make
up for the fact that military leaders had ordered the “low-tech” tube artillery that was
badly needed left behind in the states since it wasn’t gee-whiz and high-tech enough.

Despite all the high technology gear and CAS aircraft stacking up waiting to deliver
ordnance, there was considerable difficulty in actually taking out the Afghan fighters
during Operation Anaconda. This excerpt comes from an official Army report, which
makes it particularly damning considering how much they whitewash things:

“Moreover, enemy targets often were so well protected by the surrounding mountains
and ridges that hitting them with strikes was difficult. Exact hits were often necessary,
and even precision JDAMs sometimes were not able to achieve this accuracy. Even when
exact hits were achieved, only a single small target—perhaps two or three enemy fighters
manning a heavy machine gun—was normally destroyed. Hundreds of enemy fighters
were deployed in the mountains and ridges, thus creating a very large number of small
targets, each of which had to be attacked individually. A further complication was that
enemy fighters often would scramble for the protection of caves when they sensed an
impending air attack, only to re-emerge after the ordnance had been delivered. The
process of rooting them out by air strikes thus was slow, frustrating, and time-
consuming. Several days of intense air bombardment were needed before enemy fires
began abating noticeably [emphasis added].”

General Tommy Franks tried to direct the action via satellite link from Florida, and other
brass all up and down the convoluted “me too” chain of command also second-guessed
the men on the ground. When all was said and done, the generals declared a brilliant
victory and patted themselves on the back. They claimed an enemy body count of 500-
1000 (I thought there were only 150?), and that friendly troops had recovered weapon
caches and invaluable intelligence materials. Others, lower on the totem pole, who had
been directly involved, noted that the air assault forces had been engaged in heavy
combat from the moment they hit the ground and had never made it to their assigned
blocking positions. With these escape routes left wide open, it is certain many insurgents
egressed safely across the border to Pakistan.

Before Afghanistan, there was the completely unintelligible goal-less NATO air
campaign in Kosovo. The bombing campaign lasted for 78 days. Aircraft from a dozen
countries flew 11,000 strike missions and delivered 20,000 bombs and missiles. As
always, the brass hats made extravagant claims of the enemy targets destroyed and the
efficiency of air power and patted themselves on the back. Perhaps air force technology
had reached a point where antiseptic surgical strikes from the sky would negate the need
for ground troops altogether? Once NATO “peacekeepers” were on the ground and on
site bomb damage assessments (BDA’s) were done, a different picture emerged.

“According to a suppressed Air Force report obtained by Newsweek, the number of

targets verifiably destroyed was a tiny fraction of those claimed: 14 tanks, not 120; 18
armored personnel carriers, not 220; 20 artillery pieces, not 450. Out of 744
“confirmed” strikes by NATO pilots during the war, the Air Force investigators, who
spent weeks combing Kosovo by helicopter and by foot, found evidence of just 58.”

How could this be possible against the might of several air forces and all the electronic
intelligence available? Here are but a few of the techniques the Yugoslavs used to counter
high tech with low tech.

*Yugoslav air defenses tracked U.S. stealth aircraft by using old Russian radars operating
on long wavelengths. This, combined with the loss of stealth characteristics when the jets
got wet or opened their bomb bays, made them shine on radar screens.

*Radars confused precision-guided HARM and ALARM missiles by reflecting their

electromagnetic beams off heavy farm machinery, such as plows or old tractors placed
around the sites. This cluttered the U.S. missiles' guidance systems, which were unable to
pinpoint the emitters.

*Scout helicopters would land on flatbed trucks and rev their engines before being towed
to camouflaged sites several hundred meters away. Heat-seeking missiles from NATO
jets would then locate and go after the residual heat on the trucks.

*Yugoslav troops used cheap heat-emitting decoys such as small gas furnaces to simulate
nonexistent positions on Kosovo mountainsides. B-52 bombers, employing advanced
infrared sensors, repeatedly blasted the empty hills. The army drew up plans for covert
placement of heat and microwave emitters on territory that NATO troops were expected
to occupy in a ground war. This was intended to trick the B-52s into carpet-bombing their
own forces. Dozens of dummy objectives, including fake bridges and airfields were
constructed. Many of the decoy planes were so good that NATO claimed that the
Yugoslav air force had been decimated. After the war, it turned out most of its planes had
survived unscathed. Fake tanks were built using plastic sheeting, old tires, and logs. Of
particular use were European milk cartons, which are metal-lined. These were flattened
and used to build 2/3 scale model military vehicles. To mimic heat emissions, cans were
filled with sand and fuel and set alight. Hundreds of these makeshift decoys were
bombed, leading to wildly inflated destruction claims.
 I wonder how many times this wood-and-canvas MiG-29 was bombed and
destroyed?

*Bridges and other strategic targets were defended from missiles with laser-guidance
systems by bonfires made of old tires and wet hay, which emit dense smoke filled with
laser-reflecting particles.

*U.S. bombs equipped with GPS guidance proved vulnerable to old electronic jammers
that blocked their links with satellites.

* Serb forces were able to deceive NATO's heat-seeking radars and missiles by placing
large drums of liquid in the sunlight. After dark, as the liquid gave off its stored heat, it
would divert missiles and radar away from nearby Serb troops and equipment.

* One such method was to build crude silhouettes of military vehicles, bridges, and even
roads, which look like the real thing in satellite photos and radar images. The Serbs
protected one bridge by building, 300 yards upstream, a fake bridge consisting of a basic
frame of ropes and cables with polyethylene sheeting stretched over it. NATO pilots
repeatedly bombed these decoys, believing each time that they had destroyed a military
target.

* Another tactic used by the Serbs was to place damaged vehicles or equipment out in the
open. Bombing the same pieces of equipment over and over again accounts for part of
NATO's inaccurate estimates of Serb losses.

* NATO's early estimate of Serb casualties was also grossly inflated. Rather than five or
ten thousand, NATO peacekeepers now estimate that less than 1,000 Serbs were killed in
combat. It is widely believed that the figure would have been even lower had NATO not
coordinated its attacks in the final weeks of the campaign with the Kosovo Liberation
Army or KLA.
*Weapons that performed well in Afghanistan — Predator drones, Apache attack
choppers and C-130 Hercules gunships — proved ineffective in Kosovo. Drones were
easy targets for 1940s-era Hispano-Suisa anti-aircraft cannons, and C-130s and Apaches
were considered too vulnerable to be deployed.

Out of the mountains and in the wide open desert during the first Gulf War, high-tech
worked quite a bit better. But they only showed the very best smart bomb’s “War’s
Funniest Home Videos” on TV. They never showed the misses.

For instance, on the opening day of Operation Desert Storm, the 101st Airmobile was to
air assault the dug-in Iraqi 1st Battalion, 841st Infantry Brigade to seize a location for
forward area refueling of the Army’s relatively short-legged helicopter fleet. The eye-in-
the-sky technologies had failed to even find the Iraqi unit and its bunkers. When they
were found, for six straight hours Apache and Cobra attack helicopters pounded them
with dozens of Hellfire and TOW missiles, hundreds of 2.75-inch unguided rockets, and
thousands of 20 and 30-mm cannon shells. Air Force A-10 Warthog ground attack planes
added more 30-mm fire and dropped dumb and guided bombs.

When the smoke cleared and the 101st infantrymen arrived, almost all the Iraqis
surrendered but, to the amazement of the Americans, when the Iraqis crawled out of their
bunkers and dugouts, not a single Iraqi soldier had been killed by the hours aerial
firepower.

Before that, it had been the Soviets’ turn in Afghanistan, where they made all the same
mistakes American commanders too arrogant to learn from “inferior armies” had to make
all over again for themselves.

Russian expert Lester W. Grau noted this aspect to just one of the Soviet-Afghan battles
for the Caves of Zhawar:

"(September 4, 1985) The Mujahideen from Lezhi retreated south while a 20-man
Mujahideen force blocked the Manay Kandow pass. The pass is dominated by a high
peak which is capped with a thick rock slab. Under the slab was a natural cave which the
Mujahideen improved. The cave could accommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery
and air strikes. The Mujahideen also dug communications trenches so that they could
quickly reoccupy their fighting positions once the firing stopped. The firing positions
dominated the Tani plain and were well positioned to stop any infantry attack.

The DRA repeatedly attacked the pass but could make no headway. The infantry would
attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire and stop. Then massed air and artillery would
pound the area. The infantry would again try to attack, but would again be stopped
immediately. The procedure would then repeat itself, but the DRA made no headway
during its ten-day attack. After ten days, the DRA called in heavy Soviet airstrikes which
continuously hit the mountain top. The thick rock slab began to sway and rock. The
Mujahideen were afraid that the rock slab might shift and crush their cave, so they
finally withdrew. It was 14 September 1985."
Before that was Vietnam, but I think you have the picture by now.

To quote Grau one last time, from his article Bashing the Laser Rangefinder With a
Rock:

Combat in rugged terrain. The advantages of technology are limited in combat in heavy
forests, jungles, mountains and swamps. Conventional weapons, field gear,
communications equipment and transporters will often work less effectively or fail
completely in rugged terrain. US experience in Vietnam and Burma demonstrated
technology's limitations and showed that dismounted infantry, whether conventional or
guerrilla, are the most effective combatants in difficult terrain.

Low tech light infantry can still survive on the battlefield.