Why America Is Burning

Why America Is Burning
Why
Ame rica
is Bu r n i n g
by: R. M. Patton
Fire Protection Engineer
WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

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T a bl e o f C o n t e n t s :
PART 1: AMERICA IS BURNING 3
PART 2: WHY AMERICA IS BURNING 3
PART 3: THE EASY SOLUTIONS TO STRUCTURE FIRES 3
PART 4: FIRE IS A PROFIT MAKING BUSINESS 4
PART 5: WHY IONIZATION “SMOKE” DETECTORS KILL 6
PART 6: THE KILLERS AND FACILITATORS 8
PART 8: THE INCREDIBLY CORRUPT INDIANA DUNES TESTS 10
PART 9: EVIDENCE A FIFTH GRADE STUDENT COULD UNDERSTAND 11
PART 10: ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS PROVE THE DEVICE IS DEADLY 12
PART 11: THE ‘FIERY DEBATE’ 13
PART 12: THE DEADLIEST BETRAYAL IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA 14
PART 13: DO AUTHORITIES KNOW IONIZATION ALARMS ARE DEFECTIVE? 15
PART 14: IT WOULD BE NICE IF SMOKE DETECTORS DETECTED SMOKE 17
PART 15: IS YOUR FIRE INSPECTOR A KILLER? 18
PART 16: WHEN RECOMMENDING SPRINKLERS COULD COST A JOB 19
PART 17: DO NOT PUT THAT FIRE OUT - THE FIRE PROFESSION 20
PART 18: THE CRIME OF SILENCE 21
PART 19: HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 21
PART 20: EMPOWERING THE FIRE INSPECTORS 24
PART 21: CIRCUMVENTING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 25
PART 22: ANY STUPID ANSWER WILL SUFFICE 26
PART 23: THE LEGACY OF CORRUPTED FIRE CODES 27
PART 24: DO NOT PUT THAT FIRE OUT - THE ECONOMY OF FIRE 28
PART 25: THE ALTERNATE TO SPRINKLER PROTECTION 29
PART 26: VOODOO ENGINEERING 29


Fire science as presently practiced is voodoo science. Fire protection engineering is a guarantee
that homes will burn. The fire inspector may be the most dangerous man you ever welcome
into your home. And I say that the corrupt fire codes produced by the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) have probably caused more than a million fire casualties.
If you find this hard to believe . . . Read on and - YOU WILL BELIEVE!
PART 1: AMERICA IS BURNING

NATIONAL FIRE LOSSES:
The federal government evaluated the fire problem in the United States as follows:
“The U.S. fire problem, on a per capita basis, is one of the worst in the industrial
world. To put this in context, the annual losses from floods, hurricanes,
tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural disasters combined in
the United States average just a fraction of those from fires.”
‘Fire in the United States’, 13th Edition, Federal Emergency Management Agency Page 1, Oct 2004
PART 2: WHY AMERICA IS BURNING

THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES:
Within this report I will provide the evidence to confirm that this devastation by fire is not due
to carelessness, conditions beyond control or, as the fire insurers put it, Acts of God. No, nearly all of
the devastations are caused by corrupt businesses and corrupt governments that have guaranteed . . .
yes, guaranteed, a horrendous level of fire losses within the United States. The facts are provided
below. Read and you will believe.
AMERICA’S DEADLIEST FRAUD:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a Summary Order dated March
25, 2008 (in the case of Hackert vs. First Alert, Inc. and BRK Brands Inc) confirmed that:
the ionization type so-called smoke detector was defectively designed and the “legal cause” of the
deaths of children. These “children killer” ionization type so-called “smoke” detectors have been sold
into at least 80 million U.S. homes. My calculation reveals that approximately 75,000 fire deaths have
occurred within homes so “protected”. The ionization smoke detector fraud is the deadliest fraud
perpetrated within the United States.
THE FIRE REGULATORY SYSTEM IS CORRUPT:
The corruption is not limited to the smoke detector. Within this report I will provide the
evidence that nearly all fire deaths in America are the end result of incredible corruption within the fire
regulatory field.
PART 3: THE EASY SOLUTIONS TO STRUCTURE FIRES

FIRES WITHIN BUILDINGS ARE EASY TO ELIMINATE:
Fire is like a tiger cub. When first born it is easy to kill. But, allow it to grow and soon it
becomes the killer. With fire, the growth time to killing time is frequently less than 5 minutes. Hence,
control a fire within a building within the first two or three minutes or, quite possible some will die.

FIRES NEMESIS:
The easy way to eliminate fire is with water spray. Fire can survive only within an environment
where the surrounding temperature is nearing a thousand degrees F. Reduce the temperature of the
fire’s environment and fire dies.
THE REQUIRED WATER:
When fire is first born one gallon of water, especially if delivered in a spray form, is sufficient
to kill. Water kills by cooling and it has an absolutely incredible ability to absorb heat when applied in
droplets. The surface area of the water is maximized when broken into fine spray and the greater the
surface in contact with the fire the greater the heat absorption. But five to ten minutes later, when the
firefighters presumably arrive, often a hundred thousand gallons is inadequate. If that one gallon of
water is delivered to the early fire there will be no need for the hundred thousand gallons ten minutes
later and there’s the rub.
TWO WAYS TO GUARANTEE EARLY FIRE CONTROL:
There are two solutions to the building fire problem, which is the great portion of the total fire
problem. One is to install reliable and honest fire detectors in homes. When an alarm sounds while the
fire is still small, and if an effective means to control the early fire is available, the still tiny and
harmless fire can be promptly and safely terminated. Thus, an honest and reliable fire detection
system could prevent fire deaths and serious damage to a home at least 90 percent of the time.
Better yet, there is statistical fire loss data to confirm that an automatic fire sprinkler system can
control the early fire and prevent fire deaths with 99.9 percent reliability.
THE FIRE CONTROL CAPABILITY OF FIRE SPRINKLERS:
I provide a quote from an article by Mr. T. Seddon Duke, within The Rostrum publication dated
September, 1959 “Sprinkler supervised by ADT Central Station Supervisory and Water Flow Alarm
Service have had (since 1925) a satisfactory performance record of 99.98 percent!” Mr. Duke was the
president of a fire sprinkler company. Therefore, as of 1959 (if not much earlier), loss data revealed that
an electrically monitored fire sprinkler system was approximately 99.9 percent reliable at controlling
the early fire. Other data indicated that fire deaths in sprinklered buildings were very close to zero.
PART 4: FIRE IS A PROFIT MAKING BUSINESS

THE PROBLEM WITH RELIABLE FIRE SOLUTIONS:
The reason why fires in homes grow large and kill and injure is because the occupants do not
become aware of the fire when it is still tiny and easy to kill or escape. Thus, it is a near certainty that a
reliable and honest fire detection system in a home will dramatically reduce fire deaths, injuries and
major property damage. A fire sprinkler system in any building will come extremely close to totally
eliminating fire deaths, injuries and serious property damage. Both systems will result in water spray
being applied to the early fire before it has a chance to grow. Therefore there are economical ways for
fire to be transformed from a national disaster to a near triviality. However, there is a serious problem
with both of these “within the building” fire control systems.
At present America’s fire code maker, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
estimates that fire in the United States costs this nation more than 300 billion dollars a year. Those 300
billion dollars are going to businesses and bureaucracies that profit from or otherwise benefit from fire.
Yet, these are the very organizations that provide the voluntary code writing members that produce the
fire codes of the NFPA. The NFPA codes have been structured to guarantee that fire losses in the
United States will remain high and profitable for those that benefit from fire.
HOW TO GUARANTEE THAT FIRE WILL GROW LARGE AND KILL:

If fire is your ally and a producer of profits and paychecks, there is an easy way to guarantee
that fires remain frequent and deadly. The easy solution is to guarantee that the great majority of the
building fires do not have water spray applied within the first five minutes. It’s that easy.
WHERE FIRES KILL:
The home is where approximately 95 percent of all fire deaths (due to building fires) occur.
Hence, if the fire deaths are to be the justification for additional government funding for the fire services,
the key is to prevent the means to apply water spay to the early fire from being installed in homes.
GUARANTEEING THE CONTINUITY OF HOME FIRES:
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) developed a dishonest fire sprinkler code.
This code made it virtually impossible to install affordable and practical sprinklers in homes. Also, the
NFPA fire detection code was revised to mandate defective (indeed phony) smoke detectors in homes.
These devices will warn of bread being toasted and the shower running but will sit silent as the children
burn. Proof of this is provided below and on the referenced web sites. With NFPA codes guaranteeing
that water spray would not be applied to the early fire until the remote firefighters arrived, the
American Holocaust grew horrendously over the decades. As the fire devastations grew the benefits
derived from fire multiplied.
THE FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TIMES ARE A SCAM:
THE FREE BURN TIME: Fire department officials try to maintain a “five minute response
time” as the goal for protecting human life in homes. But the “response time” is not a full measure of
the time between ignition (when the threat to life begins) and the time when firefighters actually enter
the home to look for trapped people (or bodies). The time that has meaning is the “FREE BURN” time.
This is the time from ignition until fire control is actually initiated. A FREE BURN time includes the
(frequently delayed) time of discovery by the occupants. It includes the possibly further delayed time
until a call is made to 911 plus the time until the information is relayed to the closest fire station. The
response time includes the driving time from the station to the fire scene. It includes the arrival times of
volunteers if a volunteer department provides the service. It includes the delays caused by fire fighters
asleep in bed getting fully dressed and travel delays by trains, traffic, snow and ice. The first arriving
pumper usually will first look for a hydrant to hook the pumper to so that there will be an adequate and
uninterrupted hose stream water. So there will be some delay as the hook-up to the hydrant is made, the
hose lines are laid out and the plan of attack is determined.
If the fire is an advanced stage, which is often, it will be unsafe for firefighters to actually enter the
building until the hose streams knock down the heat and to some degree clear the smoke. Firefighters
enter a burning building behind a high pressure fog which drops the heat and provides a barrier
between the flames and the firefighters. Although it is not unusual for the firefighters to enter in an
effort to save lives while conditions are still very dangerous, it is prudent to get the fire well under
control before entering. It is also sensible because when conditions are so bad that there is extreme
danger for those who enter, the odds are that anyone still within the home is no longer alive. Only then,
if by then, can a search for victims be safely initiated. That is the “FREE BURN” time and that is the
time that has significance as to whether those within the building will live or die. This is why I say the
following are extremely important:
1. Your home needs adequate photoelectric type (true) smoke detectors with separate or
built-in heat detectors. Smoke detectors detect low heat smoky fires and heat detectors

warn of the extremely dangerous fast growing flaming fires. Because the further the
detectors are from the early fire the greater the delay in the warning, best protection is to
have a detector in every room.
2. When the fire is of the smoldering type, if you have the correct type smoke detectors
(photoelectric) there should be adequate time to exit because deadly conditions develop
slowly. But when flames are present do not delay leaving for any reason. Flaming fires
will suddenly increase in intensity unexpectedly (it’s called room flashover). If flashover
occurs while you are still within the home it may be impossible to reach the exit door.
3. Equip your home with the correct type fire detectors and be outside on the front lawn
when the first fire engine arrives, otherwise you may be coming out horizontally.
PART 5: WHY IONIZATION “SMOKE” DETECTORS KILL

THE COURT HAS CONFIRMED IT IS A “KILLER”:
The United States Court of Appeals for the second circuit in a Summary Order dated March 25, 2008,
regarding the case of Hackert vs. First Alert Inc. and Standard Brands, Inc. ruled that:
The ionization “smoke” detector was “defectively designed”, and it was the “legal cause” of deaths.
Thus we have a court of law confirming what I have been saying for more than three decades, the
device that is installed in at least 80 million U.S. homes is a “killer of children”.
A “SMOKE” DETECTOR THAT CANNOT DETECT SMOKE:

The combustion products created by a flaming fire, or a smoldering type fire, are dramatically
different. A large flaming fire creates enormous energy. This high energy results in the combustion
particles being extremely minute and far too small to be seen by the human eye. The smoldering type
fire, possibly caused by a lit cigarette left on a sofa or bedding, creates a thick visible particulate known
as “smoke”. It was well proven by the 1974 Dunes Tests, Phase 1, that the ionization type so-called
smoke detector will sound only when the particulate entering the device consists of many millions (or
billions) of particles per cubic inch. The particle size that best trips the device is “near atomic” size.
Thus what will cause the ionization type so-called smoke detector to sound is invisible particulate, with
the suspended particles too minute to be visible to the human eye. Visible combustion particles called
“smoke” are too large and too few to cause the ionization device to sound. Hence, “smoke” is not what
causes the phony (ionization type) device to warn.
A smoldering type fire creates (visible) smoke which will not cause the device to warn. But a
smoldering type fire can create toxic gases including, but by no means limited to, carbon monoxide.
Whereas the deaths are usually described as due to “smoke inhalation” the true cause is toxic
combustion gases, not smoke. And, although carbon monoxide is considered “the primary deadly” gas
produced by fires, actually it is the synergistic effects of the entire package of toxic combustion gases
that kills. Initially the phony smoke detector was named a “”Products of Combustion” (POC) detector
because the manufacturers knew it was not a “smoke” detector. However, after they realized they could
get away with it, they renamed it a “smoke” detector.
THE “POC” DETECTOR IS ALSO UNRELIABLE FOR FLAMING FIRES:
The flaming fire is capable of producing combustion particles (solid and liquid) that are of high
energy and sufficiently minute and numerous to operate the ionization device. However when the hot
combustion particulate created by the early small fire rises to the cool ceiling it spreads out in all
directions. It then becomes more dilute as it mixes with the cooler air. As the temperature drops on the
way to the so-called smoke detector, the minute combustion particles agglomerate (bind together) and
become larger and less numerous. This is similar to the way rain drops are created as moist ocean air
rises up a mountain range. So, when the combustion products from the early and small flaming fire
finally reach the so-called smoke detector the particulate is often too large to activate the alarm. When the
flaming fire becomes large enough to send a hot particulate promptly and directly to the installed device,
probably (but not with certainty) it will sound. However, by then the fire may already be at the killing
size. Both the flaming and smoldering fires will often reach a deadly stage prior to a warning sounding.
THE FLAWED TESTING AT UNDERWRITERS’ LABORATORIES:
Underwriters’ Laboratories (UL) conducts four flaming fire tests at its lab within a large room
where the detectors are installed approximately 17 feet from the fire. The highest smoke density
allowed for passing the tests is 37 percent light reduction per foot. This represents an extremely
dangerous, indeed fraudulent testing of the device. During the many years when the smoke detector
manufacturers were claiming their devices would warn when the smoke density was 4 percent
(sometimes 2 percent) UL never required the manufacturers to reveal the actual smoke density when
their devices operated. So, for many years (indeed it is still occurring) the manufacturers deliberately
lied about the ability of their devices to detect fires and UL failed to warn the public that the
performance claims were being disproved within the UL test facility. Thus, the manufacturers and
Underwriters’ Laboratories were in a criminal conspiracy to defraud the public. And this fraud was
killing thousands of children. Hence, the term “Children Killers” is very appropriate.
TESTING THE DETECTOR IN A “SMOKE BOX”:
Originally, smoke detectors were tested (relative the smoldering fire) only in a “smoke box”. The
detector, a burning wick and a blower were all enclosed within the compact box. The blower blew fresh
air across a burning wick and then directly into the smoke detector. The delivery of fresh air enhanced
the smoldering and produced a particulate type capable of operating the device. Then the combustion
products immediately entered the detector before the minute particles could agglomerate. This test was
perhaps an adequate test for a fire in a foot locker with the smoke detector also located within the foot
locker. But, it was in no way pertinent to the true behavior of the device in the real world. Thus UL
“certified” the device as being a reliable detector of both the flaming and the smoldering fire
whereas it was close to useless for both. In Australia the performance of this phony smoke detector
was tested without requiring it to detect smoke. Oh well, why should a smoke detector be required to
detect smoke? That would be picky, wouldn’t it?
THE CREATION OF A FRAUDULENT SMOKE DETECTOR TEST:
During the Dunes Tests, as previously stated, the average time for an ionization device to
respond to a smoldering fire (when it did respond) exceeded one hour. Then, it operated only because
the smoldering fire was near or at its ignition point for flaming. The Dunes Researchers avoided a
major scandal for the NFPA and UL by mixing up and hiding the computer generated data in the rear of
the report and by lying about the results up in the conclusions at the front of the report. They did this
knowing that very few people would read beyond the conclusions. But that still left UL without a valid
test for a smoldering fire and many fire chiefs were questioning the legitimacy of the product. So, UL
created a new (but phony) test to further deceive the fire chiefs. The new test involved placing
Ponderosa Pine sticks on a hot plate and heating the hot plate up to or near 700 degrees F. When the
Ponderosa Pine was near its auto-ignition temperature (for flaming) it produced a type of high energy
“smoke” (that contained the billions of the near atomic sized particles that were required to operate the

device). But, this is not the type of smoke that a real smoldering (low temperature but smoky) fire
creates. It short, the new test was one more deception.
PART 6: THE KILLERS AND FACILITATORS

WHO ARE THE CHILDREN KILLERS?:
The following makers and sellers of the ionization type so-called smoke detector marketed a
defective and often deadly device that was simply not capable of producing a warning reliably enough
and promptly enough to provide reasonable protection for the occupants of homes. However, they
compensated for the defects of their devices by claiming incredible performance capabilities. The
performance lies were believed largely because the NFPA and Underwriters’ Laboratories helped sell
the lies, promoted the devices and rigged and falsified tests to hide the endangerment.
The number of victims that were killed or horribly injured is estimated to be in excess of
400,000. Small children have especially been victims, hence I call the ionization smoke detector a
“children killing device”.
The following company names are those that appeared in the false ads that ran in the Fire Journal of
the NFPA between 1965 and 1980:
NFPA ‘Fire Journal’ Advertisers: 1965 - 1980
1. Kidde;
2. Bliss Gamewell;
3. The Autocall Company;
4. Unelco Limited;
5. Faraday;
6. Simplex;
7. BRK Electronics;
8. Honeywell;
9. Firemark, and;
10. PYR-A-LARM
THE CO-CONSPIRATORS/CO-KILLERS:
The following organizations aided and abetted the children killers. Indeed, it is the dishonesty
of these organizations, and their failures to warn the public that has been the root cause of the killings.
Therefore the following organizations also should be held fully liable for the deaths:
1. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA);
2. Underwriters Laboratories (UL);
3. The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC);
4. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE);
5. Factory Mutual Research (FM);
6. Factory Mutual Engineering (FM);
7. The Office of the State Fire Marshal of California, and;
8. Others (possibly to be named in legal actions)
PART 7: WHY IT WAS CRIMINAL AND DEADLY

IT WAS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY:
My accusations are pertinent to the following crimes and possibly others:

1. Manufacturing and selling a dangerous and frequently deadly device improperly named a
“smoke detector”. It is estimated that a defective and frequently deadly so-called smoke
detector was sold into at least 80 million U.S. homes and many tens of millions more overseas;
2. Advertising false performance claims for the device (an ionization type so-called smoke
detector) within the NFPA publication, the Fire Journal, between the years of 1965 through
1980, and in other publications that went to fire department officials;
3. Testing the device with inadequate and false performance tests in the laboratory and concealing
the conditions under which it would fail to perform;
4. Conducting a federally funded test where the tests were rigged to provide false conclusions.
Disseminating deliberate performance lies within a federal fire research report
i.e. The 1974~1976 Indiana Dunes Tests Report conducted by The National Institute of Standards &
Technology (NIST) - formerly the National Bureau of Standards (NBS);
5. Recommending, promoting, distributing (often for free) and installing devices known to be
defective and deadly into buildings. Deceiving occupants of its ability to perform;
6. Testing the installed devices with a “smoke detector tester” that provides a fallacious positive
test for a dangerously defective device. Assuring the occupants that the device will warn under
conditions where it will fail to warn;
7. When fire deaths occurred due to the inability of the device to detect real (visible) smoke,
providing official but false reports relative the true reasons for the deaths;
8. Continuing to cover-up the crimes for more than four decades during which an enormous
number of wrongful deaths and injuries occurred, and;
9. The crime of silence (see Part 18 below).
WHY IT’S MURDER:
All of the above activities were (and are) crimes that equated to felonies. When a felony results
in deaths the perpetrators can be charged with murder. My calculations, based on the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) fire loss data, indicate that probably more than 75,000 fire deaths have
occurred within “smoke detector protected” homes. Because the devices were confirmed as being
defective more than three decades ago, it required many people within the fire community to continue to
deceive the public relative the endangerment. As the deceptions continued, the number of victims
increased rapidly. This could not occur without the cooperation of many; therefore it was a conspiracy.
When one or more persons are involved in a deadly conspiracy, all can be charged with the crimes.
THE PERFORMANCE LIES:
The manufacturers claimed, within full page ads within the Fire Journal, a publication of the
NFPA that: their devices “would warn of potential fires before flames or smoke appeared”.
Apparently these false performance claims within the NFPA publication over a period of 15 years
convinced the fire chiefs to promote the devices and seek legislation to require installations of these
devices in homes. Some direct quotes from these ads are provided below:
1. September 1965 - PYR-A-LARM: “PYR-A-LARM FASTEST Fire & Smoke Detector
Available.” “The PYR-A-LARM reacts immediately to the invisible products of combustion
before there is visible smoke, heat or flame.”;
2. July 1966 - BRK Electronics, Inc.: “3 Minutes are worth half a dozen fire engines.” The BRK
Electronics Fire Detector gives an alarm MINUTES, HOURS; even DAYS earlier . . . Before
there is smoke, before there is fire . . . the BRK fire detector picks up the invisible gases of
combustion and triggers the alarm.” The BRK Electronic Fire Detector is listed by

Underwriters’ Laboratory, the New York Board of Standards and Appeals, the California
State Fire Marshal and other fire control organizations throughout the world.”;
3. May 1972 - SmokeGuard: (Picture of a baby holding a security blanket) “COMFORTING but
hardly a life saver!” Statitrol has a brand new ‘security blanket’ that helps protect your home
and family against the dangers of fire.” ”Operating on the ionization principle, SmokeGuard
senses danger - sounds a warning - gives you time to react - before you can even see it or
smell it”, and;
4. July 1972 - Honeywell-The Automation Company: Honeywell helps detect fires before they
start.” “The new detectors see “unseen” particles of combustion . . . in fire’s incipient stage.
The stage where you can do something about it! . . . Before smoke, flames and heat buildup.
Before sprinklers are activated.”
PART 8: THE INCREDIBLY CORRUPT INDIANA DUNES TESTS

THE DUNES TESTS PROVED THE DEVICE TO BE A KILLER:
The marketing of the ionization devices, with false performance claims being advertised within the
NFPA Fire Journal, began during 1965. By the early 1970s the fire officials were deeply involved in
promoting and helping to sell the devices. However, by then a great number of failures resulted in
deaths and horrible injuries. The fire officials were concerned. As a consequence, during 1974 a fire
test program was initiated by the federal government (the National Bureau of Standards which was
later renamed the National Institute of Standards and Technology). The fire test program was
conducted in Indiana and was called the ‘Indiana Dunes Tests’.
The Phase 1 series of tests during 1974 consisted of 40 live fire tests in real homes with nine
ionization devices installed during testing. Test No. 2 involved a smoldering fire on a sectional sofa
ignited with a charcoal igniter. The times when the ionization devices operated were (in Minutes): 104,
103, 43, 106, 107, 103, 106 and 106. The average time of operation for the ionization devices was
approximately 1 hour and 38 minutes. Here are the data for the eighteen smoldering fire tests during
Phase 1 of the tests (with 162 chances for an ionization device to operate).
1. 0 detectors operated within 5 minutes;
2. 1 operated within 10 minutes;
3. 28 (out of 162) operated within 30 minutes, and;
4. The average time for the device to operate (when it did operate) was 66 minutes.
Now compare these times of operation with the above listed performance claims that
appeared within the NFPA publication for 15 years. Before Phase 1 of the test program was
completed it became obvious that the ionization device was “an instrument of death” because it lulled
the occupants into a false sense security, yet it frequently remained silent long enough for the fire to kill.
THE DUNES TEST ENGINEERS LIED ABOUT THE PERFORMANCES:
The engineer in charge of the Dunes Tests, Phase 1, was Mr Richard Bukowski, an employee of
Underwriters’ Laboratories. For nearly 10 years the manufacturers of the false smoke detector had been
selling their devices with the UL Logo displayed. If Mr Bukowski released the truth regarding the
failure of these ionization devices to provide early warning in smoldering fires, Underwriters’
Laboratories would probably have been sued for “certifying the reliability” of a device that had
already caused thousands of deaths and injuries.
Prior to the Dunes Tests, representatives of the NFPA met with Mr Richard Bright of the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS). They offered Mr Bright the chairmanship of the NFPA Code No 74,
the standard for fire detection in the home. That standard called for real (photoelectric) smoke detectors
in the home for smoldering fires and heat detectors for flaming fires. But first the NFPA reps indicated
that the code should be revised to eliminate reliance on heat detectors and that the smoke detector
(meaning the ionization device) could provide all the protection needed.
Before the Dunes Tests began, Mr. Bright largely completed the rewrite of the code as the
NFPA reps requested. Then he was appointed to be the Washington monitor of the Dunes Tests. If the
tests proved the changes already made in NFPA 74 were wrong both Mr Bright and the NFPA would
be in difficult positions. Accordingly, the computer generated data (obtained during each test) were
divided into sections and so arranged in the rear of the report. Before any analysis of value could be
made one would first have to extract the pertinent data for that specific test from the many sections
where it was located and put it all together again. I know this was not an easy thing to do because I did
it. When Fire Protection Engineers write reports usually (unfortunately) other engineers tend to accept
the analysis and not examine the raw data or question the conclusions. Up in the front of the report it
was stated: “In general, all smoke detectors responded well to all fires.” That proved to be one of the
deadliest lies ever told. To my knowledge, I am the only fire professional who went behind the (up
front) lies, re-organized the basic data and evaluated it. Then I wrote my 1976 “Smoke Detector
Fraud” report and distributed approximately 3,000 copies of it to fire chiefs and fire industry
professionals across America.
PART 9: EVIDENCE A FIFTH GRADE STUDENT COULD UNDERSTAND

THE TESTING CONFIRMED THE PERFORMANCE LIES:
I have included some of the performance lies advertised within the Fire Journal of the NFPA for
15 years (see part 7, ‘The Performance Lies’ above). Note that the manufacturers claimed the device
would detect any type of potential fire “before smoke or flames could be seen”. And I have provided
the actual times when the devices operated during the Dunes Tests. Here is the contrast:
1. The manufacturers claimed the device would respond to any potential fire
“before smoke or flames appeared, and;
2. The average time (smoldering fires) for the device to operate exceeded one hour.
I say a fifth grade student could figure out that “instantaneous” and “in excess of an hour” is
not the same. So, why couldn’t the fire chiefs within the International Association of Fire Chiefs
(IAFC) and the fire protection engineers within the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) figure
it out? They had a legal “DUTY OF CARE” to do so. Both were obligated by law to protect the public
from deadly frauds and deceptions. Nearly 1005 of the members of both organizations remained silent
on the issues as tens of thousands of deaths occurred due to this fraud.
SHOULD FACTORY MUTUAL CONSULT THE 5TH GRADERS?:
Factory Mutual (FM) is a “Highly Protected Risk” insurer that has a reputation of having some
of the best engineers and researchers on its staff. And it has fire testing facilities to rival Underwriters’
Laboratories. And, like UL, it “certifies” products and systems; although the testing laboratories do not
like to use the word “certify” perhaps because the tested systems and devices have been known to fail.
The questions that need answers from FM are many, but these three will do:
1. Fifth graders would be able to comprehend that an average time to operate of more than one
hour does not equal “before smoke or flames appear”. Why didn’t you guys figure it out and
warn the parents before thousands of innocent children burned?;

2. Have you conducted smoke detector tests similar to those carried out at at Texas A & M
University following several exposés such as WTHR Indiana’s ‘Deadly Delay’, CBS Atlanta’s
‘Deadly Smoke Detectors’, and News Channel 5 Tennessee’s ‘An Alarming Failure’?, and;
3. If not, why not? If yes, why haven’t you warned the American public?
Note: I do not question the intelligence of the FM engineers; I question their integrity.
PART 10: ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS PROVE THE DEVICE IS DEADLY

THE CAL-CHIEFS TESTS ARE COMPLETED, BUT THE REPORT IS “BURIED”:
The fire department officials did not acknowledge or reply to my 1976, “Smoke Detector
Fraud” report. But apparently they initially took it seriously. Within two years (1978) California fire
officials ran a major new fire test program (called the Cal-Chiefs Tests) to evaluate fire detectors.
The ionization device again proved to be so unreliable that, following the testing, Chief John Gerard of
the Los Angeles Fire Department warned other chiefs that the ionization device would have a 50 to 80
percent failure rate.
However, by then the chiefs had been helping to sell the device for more than ten years. By
1978 thousands of deaths had already occurred.
To release the results of the Cal-Chiefs tests could have resulted in a major
negative impact on the fire services. So the Cal-Chiefs report was “buried”.
THE IAFC’s SMOKE ALARM REPORT”:

Following the Cal-Chiefs/IAFC fire test program of 1978 (where the tests proved that the
device had a horrendously high failure rate), the IAFC published its 1980 report entitled,
“Residential Smoke Alarm Report”.
Page 5 contains this statement,
“So there are two standards - NFPA’s No. 74 requiring detectors to react
to 4 percent or less smoke obscuration, and a UL standard listing
detectors at 7 percent smoked obscuration”.
Page 6 contains this statement,
“Further, to be consistent with the NFPA Standard #74, the subcommittee feels
it is imperative to detect smoke as early as possible, and so concurs
with NFPA’s 4 percent or less smoke obscuration level”.
So as of 1980, the IAFC went on record as recommending smoke detectors must warn: when
the smoke reaches 4 percent or less. And these fire officials confirmed that they considered smoke
detectors that did not sound until the smoke reached 7 percent to be unsafe. So, that makes me wonder
what their reactions would have been if they knew the full truth, that UL was actually allowing the
smoke to go as high as 37 percent before activating the alarm and then (according to Richard Bright of
NBS) an entire batch would be approved if only half of them sounded. However, it is a moot point
because the information within that IAFC report of 1980 was never passed on to the public. It too was
“buried”.
Note: The IAFC report is available at: www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org/if

THE ENGINEERING REPORT BY WPI AND OTHERS:

On January 2, 1986 a fire occurred on the 14th floor of the 52 story Prudential Building in
Boston, Massachusetts. For two hours heavy smoke rose up the elevator shafts and directly exposed
the so-called smoke detectors in the elevator lobbies on floors 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52. None
of the ionization smoke detectors activated. After the fire was controlled the fire inspectors tested these
devices and all of them sounded when the usual field test was performed. The obvious conclusion was
that the test device usually used by fire inspectors provides the “right” particulate to cause the device to
sound, but smoke from a smoldering fire and “aged” smoke from a flaming fire do not. Following this
fire the Fire Protection Professor at Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), a Deputy Fire Marshal,|
a Fire Protection Engineer from the Boston Fire Department and a Fire Marshal from Yale University
investigated the fire and the failure of the ionization smoke detectors to activate.
They published an excellent report dated June 24, 1986 entitled “The Ionization Smoke
Detector and Smoke Aging”. This report provided scientific evidence of the detection deficiencies of
the so-called smoke detector. Thus, it can be said that following that 1986 report there was no valid
excuse for the named perpetrators to continue to fail to warn the public of the threat to life posed by a
defective warning device.
As far as I can determine, after releasing the report to those “within the fire regulatory system”
the engineers at WPI did little further to alert the general public to the endangerment.
I consider the silence of the members of the Society of Fire Protection
Engineers (SFPE) to have been a betrayal of the public and a
contributing factor in tens of thousands of fire deaths.
PART 11: THE ‘FIERY DEBATE’

UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES (UL) KNEW THE DEVICE WAS A KILLER:
On September 25, 1977, the ‘Business Week’ Magazine published an article titled, ‘The Fiery Debate
Over Smoke Alarm Efficiency’. This article provides further proof that the above named perpetrators
knew that the ionization device was defective more than three decades ago but deliberately withheld
the truth from the public while the children continued to burn. The article revealed the following:
1. Richard Bright, Fire Protection Engineer at the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) reported
that the testing at UL allowed the smoke density from a flaming fire to go as high as 27 percent
while the device could pass and be sold with the UL Logo on the device implying reliability
(actually, I believe the maximum was 37 percent at the time);
2. Mr. Bright claimed that, “UL will certify a given alarm even if half of the units fail the tests.”;
3. NBS considered 15 percent smoke obscuration too great for safe exiting;
4. Ulysses J. Brualdi, ADT’s product marketing manager, correctly stated that they (ionization
detectors) “respond to invisible particles of combustion, not visible smoke”;
5. Brualdi also said, “Thus an ionization detector that goes off at 4 percent smoke when it is 2 feet
from a fire might not blow the horn until 20 percent smoke when it is 10 feet away”;
6. Mr. George Saunders, UL’s Managing Engineer stated that, “some present models are not
capable of meeting the requirements” (so, why were they carrying the UL Label?);
7. Mr. Saunders confirmed that UL was considering a new and stricter test for flaming fires,
possibly with a maximum allowed smoke density of 7 percent (however, the last time I checked
the limit at UL was 37 percent for flaming fires, obviously deadly), and;

8. Donald F. Steel, president of Electro Signal, a maker of photoelectric type smoke detectors,
reported that he had conducted actual fire tests with persons present in the room with the smoke
and that when the smoke reached 4 percent “everyone was choking and running for the door”.
The Business Week report was published in 1977, over three decades and tens of thousands of needless
deaths and injuries ago. This report establishes the fact that the inherent problems with the ionization
type so-called smoke detector had been well documented and known by the fire industry in 1977.
However, UL did not and still have not (as at the time of writing this article - May 2010), made the
discussed corrections in their smoke alarm standards testing (UL217). The NFPA never made the needed
corrections in their codes. Both the fire engineers and the fire service officials helped cover-up the fraud
for more than three decades after the scope of the dishonesty became known, despite thousands of
needless fire deaths and injuries every year.
Note: - The Business Week article will be e-mailed upon request: rmpatton@surewest.net
- More information about UL’s fraudulent testing of smoke alarms, their claims to correct their flawed smoke
alarm standard (UL217), and their failure to do so, is at: www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org/ul
- Standards Australia has acknowledged that the Australian Standard for smoke alarms (AS3786) is
flawed and has corrected/rewritten the flawed standard: www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org/sa
PART 12: THE DEADLIEST BETRAYAL IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA

FIRE OFFICIALS BETRAY THE PEOPLE:
Even before the 1974-1976 Indiana Dunes Tests research program was conducted, most fire
chiefs in America knew the ionization device was defective. There cannot be thousands upon thousands
of failures of a theoretical life saving device with officials remaining oblivious to the problem. After
the Dunes Tests were completed, it’s true the engineers lied about the results. But many chiefs actually
witnessed the testing and the failures were plain to see. In America, bad information circulates through
the fire department network with hurricane speed. Then I published my 1976 “Smoke Detector Fraud”
report and distributed 3,000 copies to fire officials and fire engineers.
Next, the fire chiefs ran their own tests during 1978. That’s when the person in charge of the
testing, John Gerard, the Fire Chief of Los Angeles began giving talks warning other fire chiefs that the
device would have a 50 to 80 percent failure rate in the field. Chief Gerard worked with the fire chief
of Salt Lake City to create a video to warn fire officials and the public of the problems with ionization
smoke detectors. Also, an IAFC committee had been appointed to study the problem. This committee’s
findings resulted in the IAFC’s 1980, “Residential Smoke Alarm Report” which warned of the defective
nature of the device. Keep in mind that all this is but a partial listing of the evidence that was available
confirming that a phony smoke detector was resulting in tens of thousands of fire deaths and injuries.
THE PRUDENTIAL BUILDING FIRE:
In addition, following the Prudential Building fire of 1986, (where ionization detectors on eight
floors were subjected to thick smoke for over two hours without operating) the engineers at Worcester
Polytechnic Institute (and others) created a comprehensive explanation of the technical reasons why the
device cannot safely warn of smoldering fires. What more was needed for someone to take that report
into every fire station in America and hit the chief over the head with it? Perhaps the mistake was that
the causes of the failures should have been explained to a fifth grade science class student and then that
student could have explained it to the chiefs.
There is no way that the fire chiefs and fire protection engineers could have remained ignorant of
the fraudulent nature of ionization smoke detector sales and resulting deaths.So why did they hide the

problem from the public? Was it because fire officials and the FPEs were so deeply involved they feared
the consequences of telling the public the truth? Was it to protect their jobs? There has been a concern
among the fire services that if the means to control the early fire was allowed into homes most fires would
be extinguished without need of the remote firefighters. And, the fire engineers were “engineering” in
accordance with the dictates of the NFPA codes. The codes were their “expertise” and when engineering
logic disagreed with the corrupted code, it was expedient to go with the code. Those fire engineers who
worked most closely with the fire insurance industry and the NFPA, and who fronted for those
organizations as “independents” and were referred to as “hired guns” were very successful.
PART 13: DO AUTHORITIES KNOW IONIZATION ALARMS ARE DEFECTIVE?

Quotes from authorities confirming awareness of the deadly defects of ionization smoke alarms:
“John C. Gerard, Fire Chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department cited national
statistics showing battery powered devices have a 50 to 80 percent failure rate.”
Source: Fire Chief Magazine, January, 1980.
“Smoke detectors were an unknown term to 99 percent of the population 10

years ago. Today, millions of single family dwellings have them, yet there is
no reduction in loss of life from fire. This paradox has not been explained.”
Source: Fire Chief Magazine, January, 1980.
“We put 50 million smoke detectors in buildings in America in a two year period and our
fire loss and death rate goes up. We’re having a little trouble explaining these things.”
Source: Gordon Vickery, former head of the U.S. Fire Admin, Fire Engineering Magazine, September, 1980.
“Promotion and advertising (of ionization smoke alarms) is misleading

the Fire Chief and the public . . . lives may be in danger.”
Source: IAFC ‘Residential Smoke Alarm Report’ September 1980, page 2.
“Residential fire death rate increases nearly 20 percent over 1984 residential death
rate with over 100 million smoke detectors installed in American homes.”
Source: NFPA Fire Journal, November 1986, page 44.
The following quotes expose the truth about ionization smoke alarms:
“I have often been cautioned that I should be quiet, “because we do not want the public
to lose faith in smoke detectors.” This statement implies that lives will be lost if we
we tell the American public the truth. I think the exact opposite is true . . . How
many lives have been lost because the American public was not told the truth?”
Source: Deputy Chief, Jay Fleming, Boston Fire Department, in an extract from a letter to
the US Fire Administration, October, 2006. From ‘The CAN Report’ February, 2007, page 6.
“The average person buys a smoke alarm, in the genuine belief that, before their house fills
with smoke from a smoldering fire, they will be given sufficient warning to safely escape;
regrettably this is absolutely NOT what will happen if they rely on an ionization smoke alarm.”
Source: David Isaac, Standards Australia Committee FP002 from the report,
‘New Zealand Fire Service - Saving Face or Saving Lives?’ May, 2006. page 4.
“That all residential accommodation be fitted with photoelectric smoke

alarms . . . Ionization smoke alarms may not operate in time to alert
occupants early enough to escape from smoldering fires.”
Source: Australasian Fire & Emergency Services Authority Council’s
‘Position on Smoke Alarms in Residential Accommodation’, 01 July, 2006, page 3.
“A smoke detector that sounds approximately 19 minutes after smoke reached its sensing
chamber is like an airbag that does not deploy until 19 minutes after a car accident.”
Source: The Hon David Schoenthaler, Mercer vs BRK, (04/98), from ‘TheMore quotes on
Can Report’, next
Feb, page
2007, . . 9.
page .

“We have five million smoke detectors in this state that are
ionization smoke detectors, that may fail in the time of need.”
Source: Indiana State Fire Marshal, Roger Johnson, September, 2007.
“Nationally the percentage of people dying when the

smoke detector works, but works too late is 40 percent.”
Source: Deputy Chief Jay Fleming, Boston Fire Department, Massachusetts, December, 2007.
“We’ve got outdated (ionization) technology that does not work.”

Source: Mike Turner, State Representative, Tennessee, March, 2008.
“Americans are using unsafe and inadequate smoke detectors.”

Source: Senator John Kerry, Massachusetts, USA, from his letter to the CPSC, June, 2008.
“Early warning is the key to surviving smoldering fires - the deadliest kind of home
fire. ‘Ionization-only’ smoke detectors ... are slow to warn if they warn at all
of smoldering fires, which typically occur while occupants are sleeping.”
Source: Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Massachusetts, USA, from the class action law suit
document, ‘Class Action Complaint And Jury Demand’ - Introduction, June, 2008 page 1, para 2.
“It is truly alarming . . . it is so stunning and so horrifying and it is so

hard to believe that it’s something the people just don’t know.”
Source: Courtney Stewart, Senior Editor, ‘The Hook’, Charlottesville, VA, July, 2008.
“The New Zealand Safety Council’s position is that ionization

smoke alarms be banned from sale in New Zealand.”
Source: David Calvert, Executive Director NZSC, from the NZSC’s ‘Smoke Alarm Report, July, 2008.
“Using better (photoelectric) smoke alarms will drastically

reduce the loss of life among citizens and firefighters.”
Source: Harold Schaitberger, President the International Association of Fire Fighters, October, 2008.
“It’s time to warn the public that almost everyone’s smoke alarms are dangerously defective.”
Source: Adrian Butler, Chairman, The World Fire Safety Foundation
from, ‘The Volunteer Fire Fighter’ Magazine, October, 2009, page 34.
“We are asking everyone to consider replacing their current Ionization Smoke Detector(s)
with Photoelectric Detector(s). Studies have shown that Ionization Smoke Detectors
have a failure rate over 55 percent of the time in smoldering fires.”
Source: Captain Mark Walsh, Colerain Fire Department, Ohio, in an, ‘Urgent Message
From Your Fire Department’, sent to Condo & Apartment Associations, 04 December, 2009.
“If you think the smoke detector you have in your home will save your life if there’s a
fire, you could be deadly wrong. Firefighters say almost one out of every two people
who die in a house fire die when there’s a working smoke detector in the home.”
Source: Jennifer Mayerle, CBS Atlanta’s, Emmy Award Winning Journalist. From the
‘Deadly Smoke Detectors’ Exposé, Atlanta, Georgia, October, 2009 ~ February, 2010, page 7.
“Here is what is ironic. We are the greatest technological nation on Earth. We can have troops
on the other side of the globe and a soldier can be pinned down under enemy fire and radio
for help. We have the capacity to surgically send a missile to take out the threat against the
against the soldier. However, we knowingly let people go to sleep at night with a product we
call a smoke alarm that has trouble detecting smoke. What is shameful is that good people
have been alerting us to this problem for decades and it has been intentionally ignored.”
Source: Dean Dennis, Co-Founder, ‘Father’s for Fire Safety’ from an email sent to
CBS Atlanta about their ‘Deadly Smoke Detectors’ exposé, 11 March, 2010.

“Given the weight of evidence surrounding the efficiency of different smoke alarm types,
it is not enough that standards, regulatory, and fire safety organisations recommend
photoelectric smoke alarms - they have a duty of care to warn the public of
the known, life-threatening limitations of ionization smoke alarms.”
Source: Karl Westwell, Co-Founder, CEO, The World Fire Safety Foundation
October, 2008. From ‘The Key Report’, 12 April, 2010, page 15.
PART 14: IT WOULD BE NICE IF SMOKE DETECTORS DETECTED SMOKE

A FIRE MARSHAL TESTS THE SMOKE DETECTOR:
Las Vegas fire inspectors were at a local grade school preparing to examine the smoke detector
system for the heating/cooling system. The heating/cooling system was of serious concern if a fire
occurred. If for example, a fire started in the library, smoke from that localized fire would be pulled
back through the return air duct to the furnace and the smoke would be redistributed throughout the
school via the supply ducts. All of a sudden smoke would be pouring out of the air vents in all the
classrooms and the corridors, which would panic the children. However, the problem could be solved
with a smoke detector in the return air duct. When the smoke reached the smoke detector it would
activate, the blower would stop and an evacuation alarm would sound. The corridors would remain
clear and the children could all leave safely.
Dan Quinan, the Nevada State Fire Marshal was present at the school along with the local fire
inspectors. He was not welcome because the Las Vegas fire inspectors believed they did not need ‘big
brother’ down from Carson City. And what really annoyed them was the “crazy” way he wanted to test
the smoke detector. Dan had two big metal garbage cans placed inside the school and put some paper
and combustibles inside. He lit the fires allowing real smoke to be pulled into the return air duct.
Testing smoke detectors with real fires inside the building producing real smoke; my God what a crazy
idea that was. The Las Vegas inspectors never heard of such a stupid way to test a smoke detector.
So the fires were lit. The blower sucked the smoke back past the smoke detector and the blower
just kept on running. Soon smoke was pouring out all the ducts throughout the school. Dan Quinan was
not pleased with the performance of that smoke detector inside the duct. But no one else was happy
either. The inspectors were furious that this guy, originally out of Pasadena, California no less, came
down to their big city with his cockamamie testing methods. He was making the Vegas fire inspectors
look bad in front of all the teachers. The contractor was screaming foul, “this is not the way to test a
smoke detector”. The installer wanted his money and now here was this guy with garbage cans and
fires inside the school. Dumb. Dumb. Dumb. The principal was complaining that the smoke was
fouling up the school. How do we get rid of the smell? The teachers were upset; the children should be
inside studying, not outside running around. Only the children thought that things were cool.
“This is nonsense”. said the contractor. “Here watch this”. He pulled out his trusty spray can.
He pointed the nozzle at the smoke detector, pushed the plunger down and in less than a second later
the smoke detector activated. The blower shut down. That little spray can had the look of a bug spray.
But right there on the label in big letters it said, “SMOKE DETECTOR TESTER”. If it says, “SMOKE
DETECTOR TESTER”, that ought to be the way to test a smoke detector, right? Everyone should
know that, right? And right there, right on the can was the UL (Underwriters’ Laboratory) logo. And
the smoke detector itself also came with the UL label. And the contractor had installed the system in
full accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code. What more could any
reasonable man want? (So, when the fire inspector goes into a home today and sprays that phony

detector on the ceiling with the “smoke detector tester” it will operate. Then he assures the lady of the
house that all is well and your children will be safe).
Well, for a while it was a nasty situation. Dan Quinan, the State Fire Marshal, insisted that a
smoke detector should be able to detect ‘real’ smoke. But that is not what the codes said. The code
required an installation as per the fire code and when the official smoke detector tester caused the
ionization device to operate, then everything was fine. Why couldn’t that guy from Carson City follow
the rules? Eventually, the Las Vegas fire officials and the casino bosses prevailed. Dan, the State Fire
Marshal, was told to stay out of Las Vegas. They did not need his advice. But Dan was a man who
believed that code compliance was not enough. He truly believed that a smoke detector should be
able to detect real (visible) smoke. That was a novel concept within the fire regulatory field. One day
his honesty and concerns would cost him his job.
PART 15: IS YOUR FIRE INSPECTOR A KILLER?

THEY ROUTINELY CERTIFY A KILLING DEVICE AS “SAFE”:
Many fire departments distribute ionization smoke detectors for “free” to low income
neighborhoods. This distribution of the “killing” device represents an endorsement of the device and
cooperation with those who manufacture them. That there is a relationship between the manufacturers
and the fire officials is obvious, but one never knows just what it entails. By distributing the devices the
government fire officials actually are “certifying” that the device will warn in time of danger. But the
manufacturers deliberately advertised false performance claims for their devices. To do so was a crime,
a felony. By cooperating with those who were defrauding the public, fire officials became partners with
the criminals.
BEWARE THE FIRE INSPECTOR:
It is not unusual for fire inspectors to visit apartment houses and mobile home parks (and
sometimes single family homes) to test smoke detectors. The inspector will use that “smoke detector
tester” described above and give the ionization device a shot of vaporizing spray. It is the “perfect”
vapor to cause the device to sound. “Your smoke detector is just fine.” He will assure the lady of the
house, “your children will be safe”. However, because the phony smoke detector sounds only when the
“right” stuff enters it does not mean that it will sound when the “wrong” stuff enters. The “wrong” stuff
is real (visible) smoke from a real fire.
THE COVER-UP:
When fires occur at night and occupants are sleeping, the smoke and toxic gases build up
slowly. The smoke may be localized but the deadly gases spread throughout the home in accordance
with the gas laws. That means that the occupants will soon be breathing invisible, deadly combustion
gases. The ionization device cannot detect visible smoke or invisible gases and so the device fails to
warn. The parents may survive but the children, who are more susceptible to the toxic gases are often
killed or maimed.
Of course, the reporters want to know why. So the fire department PR person frequently states
that the smoke alarm batteries were dead or missing. The fire official is the expert, so the reporters do
not check with the survivors. After all, who will be believed, the expert or the befuddled occupants?
Since 1970 I would estimate that there have been millions of failures of the ionization device to warn of
smoke. As far as I am aware, for over three decades, a fire department PR person has never yet reported
that the ionization device “failed to warn because it cannot detect smoke”.

Note: In the late 1990’s, Adrian Butler (Australia) and Karl Westwell (New Zealand), discovered
the problem with ionization smoke detectors. They also discovered that the Australian Standard
for smoke detectors was dangerously flawed. After they took their concerns to the appropriate
authorities and were ignored, they created The World Fire Safety Foundation to bring awareness
and change to the flawed Standards testing of ionization smoke detectors globally.

In 2006 they developed a simple but incredibly powerful demonstration to show how
ionization smoke detectors would not safely activate in real-world, smoldering fires. After the
Foundation’s ‘Aquarium Test’ resulted in live fire testing of ionization detectors in Australia, New
Zealand and across America, the truth about their deadly defects began to be exposed around the
world. The Aquarium Test, conducted by one of America’s leading investigative journalists, is on
the Foundation’s home page at: www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org

Thanks to the work of the Foundation, the Australian Smoke Alarm Standard has been
corrected/rewritten and is pending adoption into Australian law and Fire Services in Australia and
New Zealand have joined the push to mandate photoelectric smoke detectors. I am increasingly
hopeful that the ionization smoke detector fraud will be fully exposed and the Foundation’s
mission will soon be realized, to ‘Stop The Children Burning’.
THE DOUBLE DOSE OF REMORSE:

When parents lose children to fire it is an incredibly devastating blow. Added to the loss is self
blame. The parents torture themselves by trying to determine what they could have done that they
failed to do. Then when the fire department PR person (to protect the local fire department) claims the
batteries were dead (or missing), the assumption is that the carelessness of the parents was a
contributing cause of the deaths. This routine shifting of the cause from “defective detector” to “dead
or missing batteries” can destroy a marriage, it can destroy a parent, and it is a terrible extra burden on
those who suffer.
PART 16: WHEN RECOMMENDING SPRINKLERS COULD COST A JOB
RECOMMENDING SPRINKLERS FOR A HOTEL:
That not-very-friendly relationship between Dan Quinan, the Nevada State Fire Marshal, and
the fire officials of Las Vegas continued for a few years and then Dan did what his enemies were
waiting for. He really went out on a limb in a big way. The MGM Grand Hotel was under construction.
It would be the largest hotel in the world, or so they said. And it would be by code a “FIREPROOF
HOTEL”. Wow, how wonderful! The walls and floors were to be made from steel, concrete and
gypsum, all “fireproofing” materials. Obviously a “fireproof” hotel could not burn.
And here comes Fire Marshal Dan Quinan with another one of his cockamamie ideas. He said
that a fire sprinkler system should be installed throughout that hotel. He wanted a fire sprinkler system
in a fireproof hotel! What was wrong with that guy? Everyone knew that fireproof buildings do not
burn. After all, isn’t that what fireproof means?
So, finally Dan went beyond the pale. Now they had him. The last legislative session of the
term was winding down about 3:00am. All the reporters were sound asleep. They voted him out of
office. Dan Quinan, the thorn in the side of the fire “experts” in Las Vegas, would never bother them
again. Install a sprinkler system throughout that fireproof MGM Grand Hotel, my God what a crazy
idea that was!
But 85 innocent civilians died when the MGM Grand Hotel burned. Perhaps of even more
significance, about 5,000 occupants were trapped above the fire for the duration of the fire. If the fire
fighters had been unable to finally control that enormous fire, over 5,000 could have easily died. The
“exits” for a high rise would be classed as a joke, except it is no joke when thousands are at risk due to
fire regulatory corruption. The codes of the NFPA were also a factor in the deaths of those who died

within the World Trade Center disaster. But of course no “fire expert” will ever admit it - and if they
do, who will believe them?
PART 17: DO NOT PUT THAT FIRE OUT - THE FIRE PROFESSION
MAKING SURE ONLY FIREFIGHTERS CONTROL FIRES:
Controlling the fire is the job of the paid firefighters. They do not appreciate others who
infringe on their profession duties. So the fire officials make it clear that when there is a fire, do not
put it out; call us - we put the fires out.
The NFPA code prohibitions against sprinklers were one manifestation of this policy. Falsifying
fire tests to justify substituting phony (ionization) smoke detectors for honest (photoelectric and heat)
fire detectors was another. If the occupant does not get an early warning of fire the chance they will be
able to put it out without help from the fire department is slim.
Another way to prevent the control of the early fire by the occupants is to give them inadequate
fire control equipment. A fog nozzle on a small diameter hose installed in the home would be a
magical suppressor of the early fire if the home, assuming the home also contained a real fire detection
system. The firefighters are equipped with fog nozzles that are Underwriters’ Laboratory approved for
use on transformer banks and electrical stations with hundreds of thousands of volts. High voltage
current will not flow back along the fog because there are air gaps between the drops. But a fog nozzle
has never been made available for a small hose for the amateur firefighter for in home use.
THE “BEWARE OF ELECTRICITY” CON JOB:
The fire “experts” claim that using water spray in the home would endanger the user because of
possible electric shock (110 volts, not the 100,000 volts where the firefighter may direct their fog). But,
it was OK to sell a small fire extinguisher that emitted a pencil thin straight stream of water for 50
seconds because almost no one ever extinguished a firewith that thing, (incidentally, that straight
stream would be more likely to conduct a very high voltage fed current). However, even that small
straight steam would not present a shock problem in the home. When inspectors examine the ruins of a
building where many lives were lost, almost invariably they find several spent fire extinguishers that
failed to put the fire out. If a fog from a small, easy to handle hose, had been directed at the early small
fire it would have been a near certainty that the fire would have been killed quickly with no lives lost.
The propaganda against using water on electrical equipment is so effective that when two actual
firefighters had a hose (from a nearby building hose station) ready to apply water to the early fire in the
MGM hotel, although they were trained to handle that sized hose, they decided not to use it. Even the
trained firefighters incorrectly feared an electrical shock.
BEWARE THOSE EXPENSIVE HOSE STATIONS:
The hose stations in high rise buildings, office buildings, schools, apartment houses and similar
buildings are essentially useless to the non professional fire fighter. They hose is 1-1/2 inch size and it
requires two or more professional firefighters to handle it. When pressurized it is extremely difficult to
handle and to move about. It has to be pulled completely off the rack before the water is turned on,
otherwise the water will not flow. Then, with one man at the business end and one at the valve, when
the valve is opened the high pressure water will rush through the hose to the inexperienced man with
the nozzle in his hands.
As the water flows the hose stiffens possibly unbalancing the man. Then, when the high pressure
water hits the nozzle the reaction can tear the nozzle right out of the amateur’s hands. Fortunately, the
average person must sense that the hose is for profits and show only, so it is rarely used and almost never

effective in the hands of the untrained. The firefighters will not use that hose because it may be old, rotted
and unsafe. The firefighters bring their own hose. So why are these stations mandated by NFPA code?
Because they are profitable to sell and install and near certain to not put the fire out.
PART 18: THE CRIME OF SILENCE

THE FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBING AND THE CRIME OF SILENCE:
On 19 April, 1995 Timothy McVeigh set off a truck bomb that destroyed the Oklahoma Federal
Building in Oklahoma City. A friend of Mr. Nichol, Michael Fortier, knew that the bombing was
planned but he played no role in the bombing. However, Mr. Fortier was tried and convicted for
“failing to warn” of the planned bombing. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison. The bombing of this
building resulted in 168 deaths.
Note: Read my report, ‘Hide a Crime - Commit a Crime’, at: www.FireCrusade.com/documents.htm
DID FIRE ENGINEERS HELP KILL CHILDREN?:

Everything the fire chiefs knew about this incredibly deadly fraud was also know to the
engineering members of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE). In fact, as engineers they
were the best educated members of the fire community in fire technology. If there were any who should
have been able to comprehend the technical facts even better than the fifth graders I mention above, it
was the fire engineers. And they did not even have to analyze the fire test data and technicalities of the
fraud. I put it all down on paper and gave it to them on that proverbial silver platter.
Clearly, it was impossible for the engineers to not realize the device was a scam after I
published and distributed 3,000 copies of my “Smoke Detector Fraud” report during 1976. And if that
was not enough to penetrate their brain cells, the WPI report following the Prudential Building Fire
tens years later in 1986 should have done the trick.
As professional and state government certified engineers they had a legal DUTY OF CARE
responsibility to protect the public. Think of this scenario, here are corrupt manufacturers of phony
smoke detectors defrauding the public and as a result, tens of thousands of small children are killed or
horribly mutilated by fire. And what do the engineers who have the responsibility to protect the
children do? They help the corrupt businesses that are selling the phony device cover-up the crimes. I
denounce the fire engineers even more forcefully because they are the technical experts of the fire
business. Years ago, I was a charter member of the SFPE. But I dropped out disgusted with the SFPE
policy of expediency rather than honesty.
Michael Fortier failed to tell the authorities that Timothy McVeigh was planning to bomb the
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The bomb killed 168 people. So, for failing to report a potential
crime Mr. Fortier was sentenced to 12 years in prison. The engineers within the SFPE, with very few
exceptions helped cover-up the smoke detector crimes. This went well beyond “failing to report a
crime”. The engineers were recommending the devices, ignoring the deaths and holding out that the
inherently flawed ionization device would protect the people under conditions where they would not. I
say the FPEs were co-conspirators of the fraud. By my count the fraud has killed 75,000 people and
injured about five times that many.
PART 19: HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

EXPLOITING FIRE DISASTERS:
A number of years ago I attended a meeting in Reno, Nevada. An NFPA representative was
giving a critique on a hotel fire where a large number of people died. Long before that fire occurred, the
NFPA had been promoting the idea that any person trapped in a fire should crawl out below the smoke
to safety. Following the hotel fire it was discovered that a young lady did indeed crawl along the
corridor to exit the building. The NFPA saw this survivor as a confirmation of the wisdom of their
“crawl out” promotions. So, the representative told her story stressing that she was a bright young and
athletic gal with the implication that she lived because she followed the advice of the NFPA. Of
course, it was anyone’s guess as to whether she would have escaped just as well, perhaps even more
safely, if she ran out fast instead of crawling out slow. One thing for sure, if you are still within the
building when flashover occurs and black smoke at a thousand degrees F. comes down the corridor
toward you, you better be moving fast.
But, what concerned me more was the clear implication that if those who had died followed this
NFPA strategy for survival, probably they too might have lived. This was typical NFPA, using a deadly
fire to promote the NFPA. And the implication was dead wrong. Those who died in that hotel were
trapped within a meeting room when a flash fire from a non-sprinklered basement raced up an open
stairway and down the non-sprinkler protected corridor, completely blocking exits from the meeting
room before most could react. Those trapped made every possible effort to escape including throwing
chairs at the large windows to be able to leap to safety. But the speed of the flashover fire killed many
before they could escape.
It was the anti sprinkler policies and corrupted sprinkler design codes of the NFPA that resulted
in near 100 percent of the “Life at Risk” type properties (including hotels) being devoid of sprinklers. If
the building had been sprinklered the victims would have lived. Even though sprinklers were not
installed in that hotel, if the building at least had been equipped with a reliable fire detection system,
the victims probably would have had a warning in time to escape prior to being trapped by a major
flashover fire.
A LADY WHO CRAWLED:
The fire problem with apartments is that often the window is too high above ground to exit and
the path from the bedroom to the exit door is via the living room adjoining the kitchen. Thus the exit
path is through the area most likely to become deadly very quickly in a fire. Then add in the fact that
the NFPA gave the American public a phony (ionization) smoke detector to warn the sleeping occupant
of the fire. I received a report on a fire one time where the lady, trapped in an apartment bedroom,
crawled through the fire area to the door and escaped. The lady next door who answered the victim’s
desperate screams and banging said that the victims back was actually on fire when she opened the
door (radiant heat from the super-hot ceiling). And, as she crawled her hands were sinking into a carpet
than was so hot that it was becoming plastic and sticking to her hands.
The lady had a job that required typing and her fingers were burned to the bone. She never
regained full use of them again. Her job skills were taken away from her. So, would this victim had
been better off to grab a blanket from her bed, drape it over her head, take a deep breath and then hold
her breath as she bent low and moved fast through the fire area to the door? Probably the exposed time
would have been less than ten seconds. Of course second guessing has no real value relative a panic
situation where calm analysis is unlikely. But I can say this with certainty; because the NFPA helped
put phony smoke detectors into 80 million homes an enormous number of victims have paid for this
fraud with their lives, or in the case of the lady above, maimed for life.
THE NFPA CORRUPTION CAUSES REPETITIVE FIRES:

The problem with the NFPA strategy of using disasters to promote the NFPA is that the true
causes of the disasters must be concealed so that the phony solutions can be exploited. The end result is
that over many decades the same fires repeat. For example, here are a few of the disasters of like kind
resulting from similar defective NFPA fire code policies:
1903 - 602 dead. Iroquois Theatre Fire - Chicago;
1908 - 170 dead. Rhodes Opera House Fire - Pennsylvania;
1908 - 175 dead. Lakeview Grammar School Fire - Ohio;
1911 - 145 dead. Triangle Shirtwaist Fire - New York;
1940 - 207 dead. Rhythm Club Fire - Mississippi;
1940 - 119 dead. Winecoff Hotel Fire - Atlanta;
1942 - 492 dead. Cocoanut Grove Fire - Boston;
1958 - 95 dead. Lady of Angels School Fire - Chicago;
1963 - 63 dead. Golden Age Nursing Home Fire - Missouri;
1977 - 165 dead. Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire - Kentucky, and;
2003 -100 dead. Station Nightclub Fire - Rhode Island.
Note that all of these fires happened within a “place of assembly” and for decades the NFPA not
only did not require sprinklers in places of assembly, but the codes were structured to make it
extremely and unnecessarily costly to protect these buildings. It is beyond reasonable doubt that every
one of these fires could have been controlled promptly with virtually no casualties if the NFPA had not
created codes that effectively prevented proper fire protection from being installed in these buildings.
TWO REASONS FOR RIGGING TESTS TO DISCREDIT HEAT DETECTORS:
During the Indiana Dunes Tests the engineers deliberately rigged the tests to justify removing
heat detectors from the NFPA code so that phony smoke detector could under-protect homes. But there
was a second objective to the rigging of the tests to discredit heat detectors. The fire sprinkler system is
a near 100 percent guarantee that the building will not burn and the occupants will not die. But the
NFPA for decades had been able to prevent fire sprinkler systems from being installed into close to 100
percent of all buildings constructed.
Only the high valued, high hazard, buildings that the insurance industry wanted to be protected
were sprinklered. Therefore, the manufacturers of the ionization device saw another market (besides
homes) to be exploited. Full page ads were placed in the NFPA Fire Journal promoting smoke
detectors as an alternate to sprinkler for those properties not normally sprinkler protected. The false
concept that heat detectors (sprinkler heads) would not operate to apply water until after fire deaths
(due to the smoke) would have already occurred was a central theme.
HEAT DETECTORS ARE THE BEST DETECTORS FOR THE MOST DEADLY FIRE:
The heat detector is best for detecting the fast growing fire that produces temperatures well
above a thousand degrees F. Actual fire tests in real homes have proven that the ignition of one
upholstered chair or sofa can proceed to a room flashover condition in as little as three or four minutes.
Once flashover has occurred, conditions throughout a home turn deadly so rapidly that escape is often
impossible. The manufacturers of the ionization device, in an effort to diminish the importance of the
heat detector and exaggerate the value of the ionization device, promoted the idea that 75 percent of all
fires develop as smoldering fires and that the smoldering fire (best detected by a smoke detector) was
responsible for nearly all fire deaths.
These were just some more lies by businesses that depended on lies to sell their products. The
truth is nearly all fire deaths are the result of flaming fires and the heat detector is without peer when it
comes to reliably warning of the fast and deadly flaming fire. A complete fire detection system
consisting of heat detectors throughout a home and smoke detectors in rooms where there is a serious
potential for a smoldering fire (bedrooms and living rooms at least) will likely reduce fire deaths by an
excess of 90 percent, possibly 95 percent.
TESTING HEAT DETECTORS WITHOUT HEAT DETECTORS:

The heat detector as the trigger for the fire sprinkler system had a near perfect record of
preventing loss of life for nearly a hundred years. Therefore, there was no way that an honest test
program could prove that heat detectors should be removed from the NFPA code because they were
“unreliable”. And it is the fast and extremely deadly fire where the heat detector is most needed. So, the
challenge for the corrupt engineers who ran the Dunes Tests was to “prove” that heat detectors would
routinely fail to warn of the dangerous hot and fast fire. Here are the ways that the Dunes Tests were
falsified to “prove” heat detectors would fail to warn of the fast growing flaming fire. Many of the fires
employed smoldering type fires that produced no significant heat. Then there were some flaming fires
that grew so slow and produced so little heat that the ceiling temperatures did not rise to the operating
temperature of the heat detector (135 degrees F.).
A true smoke detector would provide adequate warning for these extremely slow flaming fires.
But, eventually independent observers would be reading the test report so some faster growing and
more typical fast growing house fires had to be run. The challenge then was to not allow the heat
detector to operate when those true flaming fires (hot and fast growing) were conducted. This would
not be easy. But the researchers were resourceful. They figured out that if they did not install any heat
detectors (when the fires were allowed to burn hot and fast) no heat detector would sound. Nothing was
wrong with that logic; if no heat detector was present none would sound. So the majority of the fires
were run without the heat detector. Amazingly the corrupt engineers running the tests stated, up front
in the published report, that the heat detector failed to respond to most fires. The falsification of the
Indiana Dunes Tests report has played a key role in the needless deaths and maiming of tens of
thousands of children.
PART 20: EMPOWERING THE FIRE INSPECTORS

THE CODE IS THEIR EXPERTISE:
When a fire department plan reviewer, who may have only a high school education, enters a
building construction meeting for a hospital, high rise or airport terminal, he will have to bend
architects, engineers and building construction managers to his will. He may be the least
knowledgeable person in the room relative the technical issues at hand. But he will have two extremely
powerful allies entering with him. One will be a complete set of NFPA codes, more than a thousand
dollars worth of them. His second ally will be the law. It is a tough combination to beat. He can make a
quick decision that adds several hundred thousand dollars to the project and sets the project back a
month. Those involved in construction know that far too often the demands of the fire official may be
bordering on the idiotic and the useless. But those who object will have an almost impossible task to
undo an inspector’s decision. It may take months, even years of court battles to reverse a fire
inspector’s folly.

But, the entire project could be halted as the challenge is heard by a court of law. And in the
end, almost always the demand of the fire inspector is upheld. So, the inspector reigns supreme and his
weapon is a set of fire codes, mainly written by committee members who are far more interested in
gaining profits from fire, and much less interested in saving lives. And, let us not forget that by
denying affordable fire sprinklers systems and reliable fire detectors to the builders, the American burn
rate is maintained sky high which in turn justifies an abundance of fire stations, equipment, manpower
and political muscle.
PART 21: CIRCUMVENTING THE ANTITRUST LAWS

WHY BIG BUSINESS LOVES THE NFPA:
Probably the number one reason why big business will send a representative or five on a three
thousand mile plane trip and pay hotel costs in four or five star hotels; and operate a hospitality suite in
order to input an NFPA code, is because it is a magical way to defeat the antitrust laws. The fire
insurance industry was allowed under law to price fix (rating bureaus). So the insurers thought it would
be nice if their allies had the same rights. The fire insurers created the NFPA to produce fire codes that
(supposedly) save lives. So, top executives of an industry, such as the fire sprinkler industry could go to
the NFPA meetings and discuss the goal of making the world safe from fire. And if by chance they
created a code that made it near impossible for competitors to enter the market, well it was all for the
good of humanity.
Probably no business has worked the schemes for eliminating competition and controlling
prices (via the fire codes) better than sprinkler industry, (however, the smoke detector manufacturers
have manipulated the fire codes to their advantage pretty well too). From 1896 until into the 1960s
there was never any significant challenge to the incredibly corrupt sprinkler codes and the love feast
between the pipe fitters union and major sprinkler firms. The handful of sprinkler firms maintained an
iron hand on the marketplace nationwide. Because prices could be controlled for the most part, the pipe
fitters had special perks and high pay.
By mandating large size iron pipe systems, ungodly priced UL listed fire pumps, and water
supplies rivaling Lake Michigan, the few sprinkler companies effectively barred the plumbers and other
potential competitors from the marketplace. Only iron pipe (noted for being extremely subject to
internal corrosion) was permitted for the work. Plumbers mainly dealt with copper because it was
superior pipe. Plastic was not permitted even though it could be obtained with a higher temperature
rating then the iron pipe (neoprene gaskets in mechanical fittings were allowed).
If a pipe fitter became proficient, could he go into the sprinkler business? Hardly, a costly
fabrication shop was needed to cut and process 4, 6, 8, and 10 inch pipe. If a two inch copper pipe line
could be run from the street and if a five hundred dollar industrial centrifugal pump (that could operate
continuously for ten years without maintenance), and would provide more water than an honest
sprinkler system would need, could it be installed? No way! The $25,000 UL approved pump and
related controls were required, plus perhaps a $20,000 water connection with back-flow preventer.
The pump and related equipment might require so much space that a $50,000 pump house might also
be needed. Of course, if the street main could not supply the massive water demand one could always
install a hundred thousand gallon ground level reservoir or possibly get by with only a 50,000 gallon
elevated tank.
After hydraulic calculations were allowed, the NFPA code required a push button calculation
method that guaranteed the system would be pipe sized to produce, quite often, a too-low density over
the early fire. That would guarantee that the heat from the early fire would definitely open some extra

sprinklers flowing water where there was no fire - yet. By guaranteeing extra heads would open, the
pressure and density directly over the fire would be reduced. Of course, the greater the number of
sprinklers that opened where there was no fire, the greater the drop in pressure and density at the site of
the fire. Therefore, the fire would grow even larger, the heat at the ceiling would spread farther, more
sprinklers would open where there was no fire, and the fire would grow larger yet. Eventually,
hopefully, the firefighters would arrive and put water directly onto the fire and not elsewhere, assuming
they could still get close to the fire. Even though the system was designed either by graduate
engineering idiots or the sprinkler industry designers (who were without fault because they were taught
the NFPA code way) nearly always the sprinklers would hold the fire at least to the degree that the
firefighters could get it controlled.
The day after the fire was extinguished the insurance inspector would arrive and count how
many heads had opened. Then he would congratulate his engineers. You designed it for two acres of
open heads and that’s how many opened. How brilliant you are! If they designed it for adequate density
over the early fire, the open heads would have been four or less, probably requiring less than a hundred
gallons a minute for maybe ten minutes. But nobody wanted that.
The NFPA sprinkler and water supply codes accomplished three things that were much
appreciated: less than ten sprinkler companies controlled nearly all the work nationally, the fire
inspector became a mechanical and hydraulic engineer the moment he purchased the codes, and
roughly 99 percent of all buildings remained unprotected and fully burnable.
PART 22: ANY STUPID ANSWER WILL SUFFICE

ANY HONEST QUESTION IS USUALLY REJECTED:
Over the year I have prepared many serious and valid letters and reports to authorities such as
the NFPA, UL, the IAFC, local fire authorities and government officials. Most were not even answered.
But, when answered, the answers were often so stupid that I had to wonder, could they be that stupid or
are they just blowing smoke my way. Also, for many years I attended meetings including the NFPA
conventions and raised important issues. But any answer, making sense or not, that was an attempt to
rebut what I stated would suffice. The reality was that code dishonesty was common knowledge to
most of those in the fire field but they liked it that way. The codes created opportunities for all who
profited from or earned a paycheck from fire. I’ll give a couple of examples:
I wrote to the NFPA in 1992 to again protest the phony (indeed criminal) testing that resulted in
the wrong orientation of the NFPA fire detection code No. 74. I explained to the NFPA that during the
Dunes Tests the engineers failed to install heat detectors during the hot flaming fire tests and then
claimed the missing devices failed to perform. The research lies were then used as the “proof” that the
heat detectors could be removed from the NFPA code. The NFPA reply to my concerns came by way of
a copy of a memo from A. E. Cote, (Chief Engineer of NFPA) and John Hall (NFPA Assistant VP) to
A. R. O’Neil (NFPA Executive). That memo, in part, stated that, “For example, he (Patton)
characterizes a number of the early tests as having been conducted with no heat detectors present
when they were clearly labeled as using thermocouples (temperature recorders) as surrogates for
heat detectors”.
This was one of those typical stupid answers I usually received from the “experts” at the NFPA
and from the engineering “fire experts” as well. Logically, what can a temperature recorder tell you as
to whether a heat detector will or will not operate when there is a flaming fire? If the thermocouple
revealed that the maximum ceiling temperature recorded was below the operating temperature (135
degrees) of the heat detector, a failure to operate (if it had been present) would NOT have been a

“failure”. If the thermocouple revealed that the ceiling temperature rose to a thousand degrees, how
could that information prove the heat detector would have failed to operate if it had been installed?
Such inane logic from “engineers” was not the exception; it was the norm. The NFPA codes were
written by special interest committee members attempting to structure codes to help sell a product.
Logic and engineering principles meant nothing to the profit oriented committee members. Therefore,
finding sensible answers to deliberately corrupted fire codes was not easy.
Note: My 1992 letter to the NFPA is at: www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org/nfpa92
CAN YOU BURN THE BUILDING WITHOUT HARMING THOSE WITHIN?:

One of the worst examples of fractured logic always came from an insurance industry
representative. When I would articulate, at an NFPA Convention, the technical details of how and why
a fire sprinkler system could be engineered to cost a fraction of the cost of a NFPA code designed
system, and at the same time apply a greater density (superior control) directly over the early fire,
always at least one insurance “engineer” would get up to respond. He would tell the assemblage that
the advanced fire sprinkler system designs were OK for protecting life.
Then he would explain that the fire insurers did not insure life, but rather the building. Then he
would declare the modernized system was not satisfactory for protecting the building. I would always
reply thusly, the people are the most easily damaged contents of a building; how can you control the
early fire and save even the babies in their cribs while allowing the building to burn down? But
invariably it was no use; those at the meetings would not challenge an explanation for rejecting better
sprinkler systems if the insurance man said we must reject that system because my dog ate my
homework. Engineering fundamentals, logic, common sense, concern for the burning children; they all
went out the window when the status quo was threatened.
PART 23: THE LEGACY OF CORRUPTED FIRE CODES

A NATION WITH RUBE GOLDBERG FIRE EMERGENCY SYSTEMS:
Today we have at least 80 million U.S. homes “protected” with phony ionization smoke
detectors that warn of bread being toasted and the shower running, but not when there is real (visible)
smoke. But that is only the tip of the iceberg. Many of the large buildings in America, such as high rise
office buildings, hospitals, hotels and other “Life at Risk” buildings, are “protected” with very costly
and extremely complex fire detection and evacuation systems. These systems are loaded with smoke
detectors in rooms, corridors, elevator lobbies, air ducts and anyplace else where they could be
installed. Supposedly they will detect smoke and close dampers and fire doors, alert the occupants, take
elevators out of service, force the people to use the stairways (that are almost certain to be filled with
smoke), notify the internal security forces, send a signal to the fire department, evacuate the smoke
from the building or at least shift it from here to there and whatever else could be dreamed up at
construction time to add to the price of the building. These systems often included voice
communication systems so that when they shift the smoke and the occupants.
Within hospitals the smoke detector gurus wanted a smoke detector and automatic damper in
every duct at every point where the duct (above the corridor ceiling) passed from the corridor to the air
supply vent within the patient room. Also, the detector below the ceiling in the corridor would
theoretically close the door to the patient room. Then the right dampers would be automatically closed
or opened to shift the smoke to outdoors or at least to an unoccupied area of the building. Much of this
is theory that has a slim chance of working well during a real disaster. But for years these elaborate fire
detection and smoke control systems (based on smoke detectors everywhere) were promoted as

alternate protection for sprinklers. The basic concept was, don’t put out the fire, it is much more fun to
shift the smoke and the people around.
The reality is that many of these elaborate systems that are installed in high rises, hospitals and
other major structures never pass the final testing. Sometimes there are tests and disputes and more
tests and more disputes until finally the systems are signed off. The owners get tired of trying to get
them to perform as expected. Assuming the system does finally perform to the specifications, and is
working perfectly when signed off; don’t assume it will stay that way. These systems are strongly
oriented towards smoke detectors. If a smoke detector within a duct works and the damper functions
during a fire, probably it is more luck than professional skill. As time passes the smoke detectors begin
to become loaded with dust and other foreign materials. False alarms become common. It is expensive
to be replacing them. Also, it is difficult to find well trained technicians for maintaining these systems
and expensive if you do. There is a common solution to the problem of maintaining them, however.
The solution is to disconnect the devices that are false alarming or to kill the worst performing circuits
or, perhaps take the entire system out of service.
If a well trained fire detection system technician (which eliminates fire department inspectors)
were to go to any large city in America and test fire detection and alarm systems in 100 large buildings,
I believe that 75 percent of them would not be in fully functional and some would be virtually useless.
Those that are central station monitored would do much better but I would still expect many of the
smoke detectors to be disconnected.
The smoke detector industry, with the help of UL, the NFPA, the SFPE
and the IAFC has put most Americans at risk, at work and at home
and is one of the primary reasons Why America is Burning.
PART 24: DO NOT PUT THAT FIRE OUT - THE ECONOMY OF FIRE
FIRE SPRINKLERS WERE THE ENEMY OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:
I realized early in my career that fire sprinkler systems represented a near 100 percent solution
to the fire problem in buildings. However, this was dangerous to my career. A fire engineer from a
major insurance broker told me that one time, when he was new to the field; he was inspecting a plant
with an enormously high insurance rate and suggested to the plant manager that if he installed
sprinklers his rate would drop so dramatically that he could pay off the system in just a few years. But
when he got back to the office, his manager ,who had been contacted by the plant manager about
sprinklers, was furious with him. He called him into his office and warned him if he ever told a plant
manager to install sprinklers again he would be fired. The economics is that insurance on a high valued
plant that is creating a two hundred thousand dollar per year commission for the broker might drop to,
say, thirty thousand if sprinkler protected. The NFPA was created by the fire insurance industry in 1896
to create a fire code that set the requirements for the sprinkler system so complex and so costly that it
would be installed only within the high risk industrial properties where the insurers needed protection
to make the property an acceptable insurance risk.
Sometime during the 20th Century the fire officials in America realized that the fire sprinkler
was so effective at controlling the early fire that the sprinkler system was the enemy of the fire services.
Therefore the fire chiefs, by and large, have cooperated in the code writing to severely limit the
sprinkler installations. However, within the fire services there has always been a minority that actively
promoted sprinklers because fire was so deadly. They are real humanitarians. The end result is that

sprinklers have finally been allowed to be installed in many building types where they were not
installed previously. But the NFPA regulations have been able to severely limit these installations.
There is only one logical solution to fire and I advocated it many years ago.
It is a simple and cost effective solution.
Put the Fire out Before it Grows Large and Deadly!
PART 25: THE ALTERNATE TO SPRINKLER PROTECTION

Beginning during the 19th century the accepted “solution” to the fire problem (except where the
potential for loss was so great that the insurance industry demanded protection) was the
“FIREPROOF” building. The insurers promoted the concept that the building itself was the fire
problem. Therefore, the “solution” to fire was to design an “inherently safe” building. This resulted in
the cost of gaining permits and constructing a building growing ever more expensive as the building
regulations proliferated. The building codes were constantly being revised in the search for that
“inherently safe” building. Of course, as the cost of constructing a building increased the premiums
paid to the insurance company also increased. It was a win-win deal for the insurers. But the fireproof
buildings kept burning and no one seemed to have a real solution to the problem . . . from the
perspective of the fire victims. Destruction by fire in America is horrendous.
Early in my career I realized why the NFPA/insurers fire “solution” was not working. It was not
the building itself that was the fire problem but rather the combustible contents within the building.
A fireproof building was no different than a furnace. A furnace is designed to withstand an internal fire.
So is the fireproof building. When the contents burned only a tiny fraction of the combustibles have to
be converted to smoke, to block exit paths, and to toxic gases and heat, to kill the occupants.
The home is sheathed on the interior with gypsum board, which represents a “fireproofing” of
the home (the intent was to confine the fire to one home until the fire department arrived. The insurers
were content with homes burning singly but not with conflagrations involving many homes). However,
note that this fireproofing of the building interior did not prevent the contents fire from killing the
occupants. Few know this but the Coconut Grove fire of 1942 in Boston (492 dead) occurred within a
fireproof building. The building survived and continued in use for many more years.
Within manufacturing facilities the production equipment was far more valuable than the
building. And the cost of lost production also could be much greater than the cost of the lost building.
Hence, because industrial losses could be excessive for the insurers, sprinkler protection was allowed.
Otherwise the codes effectively barred sprinklers from nearly all buildings because the profits from fire
would be reduced. The NFPA cooperated in creating codes that allowed industrial properties to be
protected but prevented the non-industrial properties from being protected. The Fireproof Building was
the substitute for the fire sprinkler system. There is no doubt that fireproofing is an essential component
to the fire protection arsenal. What it is not, however, is a satisfactory alternate to sprinkler protection.
PART 26: VOODOO ENGINEERING

The first course in Fire Protection Engineering initiated at Armour Institute of Technology in
1903. Later Armour became Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT). I received a Bachelor of Science
degree in Fire Protection Engineering from IIT in 1951. Later I passed the required testing in Ohio and
became a licensed professional engineer. The FPE course included many true engineering subjects.
But the “fire engineering” was largely oriented toward what we have accepted as “fire science”
according to the fire insurance industry and the NFPA codes. In short, the “fire science” component

was seriously corrupted by the NFPA code making system. Much to my regret, my fellow fire
engineers have chosen to key what is termed fire engineering to the NFPA codes. The result in my view
is ‘Voodoo Engineering’.
I have proven that the existing water line to the great majority of small and compartmented
buildings will suffice for sprinkler protection. The average number of sprinklers that operate due to a
fire in what the NFPA terms “light hazard” occupancy (I term it “life at risk property”) is less than two.
And, for this property type a 10 gallon per minute (gpm) flow per sprinkler (small orifice) will provide
excellent control of the early fire. The NFPA code has far too often prevented sprinklers from being
installed unless a 4 or 6 inch line is run from the street main to the building (at costs that can go as high
as $50,000). Often $40,000 is spent on UL listed fire pumps whereas an inline centrifugal (non-UL
listed) could be installed for $1,000.00.
The evidence that the ionization device is a phony smoke detector and a killer of children has been
common knowledge within the fire engineering community for more than three decades. How many of
the approximately 5,000 fire engineers have dared to warn the public relative this endangerment?
My guess is about three at most. Do they have a “duty of care” responsibility to warn/protect the public?
As indicated above, although the corruption relative sprinklers and fire detectors may head the list
of voodoo fire engineering, the corruption is endemic in the entire fire protection field. Reluctantly, I
have to admit that fire engineers in America has been “in bed” with the NFPA. And I consider the NFPA
to be America’s number one serial killer of children during the 20th century.
EVIL PERSISTS
WHEN GOOD PEOPLE
DO NOTHING
Richard M Patton
Fire Protection Engineer
President, The Crusade Against Fire Deaths
Author, ‘The American Home Is A Fire Trap’
R M Patton: Credentials
Email: rmpatton@surewest.net
www.FireCrusade.com
www.AmericasHolocaust.org
www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org


Why America Is Burning

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Why America Is Burning

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Why America Is Burning

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 2: WHY AMERICA IS BURNING 3

PART 3: THE EASY SOLUTIONS TO STRUCTURE FIRES 3

PART 4: FIRE IS A PROFIT MAKING BUSINESS 4

PART 5: WHY IONIZATION “SMOKE” DETECTORS KILL 6

PART 6: THE KILLERS AND FACILITATORS 8

PART 8: THE INCREDIBLY CORRUPT INDIANA DUNES TESTS 10

PART 9: EVIDENCE A FIFTH GRADE STUDENT COULD UNDERSTAND 11

PART 10: ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS PROVE THE DEVICE IS DEADLY 12

PART 11: THE ‘FIERY DEBATE’ 13

PART 12: THE DEADLIEST BETRAYAL IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA 14

PART 13: DO AUTHORITIES KNOW IONIZATION ALARMS ARE DEFECTIVE? 15

PART 14: IT WOULD BE NICE IF SMOKE DETECTORS DETECTED SMOKE 17

PART 15: IS YOUR FIRE INSPECTOR A KILLER? 18

PART 16: WHEN RECOMMENDING SPRINKLERS COULD COST A JOB 19

PART 18: THE CRIME OF SILENCE 21

PART 19: HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 21

PART 20: EMPOWERING THE FIRE INSPECTORS 24

PART 21: CIRCUMVENTING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 25

PART 22: ANY STUPID ANSWER WILL SUFFICE 26

PART 23: THE LEGACY OF CORRUPTED FIRE CODES 27

PART 25: THE ALTERNATE TO SPRINKLER PROTECTION 29

PART 26: VOODOO ENGINEERING 29

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

Why America Is Burning

PART 1: AMERICA IS BURNING

PART 2: WHY AMERICA IS BURNING

PART 3: THE EASY SOLUTIONS TO STRUCTURE FIRES

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 4: FIRE IS A PROFIT MAKING BUSINESS

HOW TO GUARANTEE THAT FIRE WILL GROW LARGE AND KILL:

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 5: WHY IONIZATION “SMOKE” DETECTORS KILL

A “SMOKE” DETECTOR THAT CANNOT DETECT SMOKE:

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 6: THE KILLERS AND FACILITATORS

PART 7: WHY IT WAS CRIMINAL AND DEADLY

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 8: THE INCREDIBLY CORRUPT INDIANA DUNES TESTS

PART 9: EVIDENCE A FIFTH GRADE STUDENT COULD UNDERSTAND

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 10: ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS PROVE THE DEVICE IS DEADLY

THE IAFC’s SMOKE ALARM REPORT”:

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

THE ENGINEERING REPORT BY WPI AND OTHERS:

PART 11: THE ‘FIERY DEBATE’

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 12: THE DEADLIEST BETRAYAL IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 13: DO AUTHORITIES KNOW IONIZATION ALARMS ARE DEFECTIVE?

“Smoke detectors were an unknown term to 99 percent of the population 10

“Promotion and advertising (of ionization smoke alarms) is misleading

“That all residential accommodation be fitted with photoelectric smoke

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

“Nationally the percentage of people dying when the

“We’ve got outdated (ionization) technology that does not work.”

“Americans are using unsafe and inadequate smoke detectors.”

“It is truly alarming . . . it is so stunning and so horrifying and it is so

“The New Zealand Safety Council’s position is that ionization

“Using better (photoelectric) smoke alarms will drastically

WhyAmericaIsBurning01August10.pdf | Published: 01 May, 2010 | Last Updated: 01 August, 2010

PART 14: IT WOULD BE NICE IF SMOKE DETECTORS DETECTED SMOKE