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Dynamic resource allocation in Cognitive Radio


environments - simulation and testbed evaluation
Andrei TOMA, Ligia CREMENE
Abstract
Over the past few years, wireless communication and network systems have witnessed
an unprecedent growth. The large number of co-located networks operating in the ISM
bands share the common radio spectrum, leading to external interference and resulting in
a volatile communication and a decrease in channel capacity for the heavily-used channels. In this paper we evaluate the performance of an existing game theory based power
allocation mechanism and propose a methodology for the experimental evaluation on a
real-world outdoor testbed. We study the ProActive Power Update algorithm for a topology in which users do and do not respect the convergence criteria and the effects of the
empirical parameter estimation on the best response and users strategies which represent the Nash Equilibria. Simulated results show that even if the convergence criteria is
not followed, system performs better when using PAPU while in the testbed evaluation,
for a certain cost range, the system converges and reaches Nash Equilibria.

Introduction

With the appearance of new wireless systems, there is an increase in the need for radio
spectrum. The large number of wireless devices, operating in the unlicensed ISM bands,
lead to a growth in the perceived level of interference by other equipments. This interference
causes unstable communication, low link quality and an inefficient use of energy. The solution for the lack of interference coordination is given by two concepts: Cognitive Radio (CR)
technology and Game Theory (GT).
A cognitive radio is defined as a radio that can change its transmitter parameters base
on interaction with the environment in which it operates [1]. By making use of CR technology, given the continuous growth of spectrum crowding and congestion, it is possible to
achieve more efficient utilization of the available spectrum. In a wireless network, the nodes
can be configured to have cognitive abilities and they can be dynamically programmed to
select the best spectrum and operating parameters. In this way, CR devices can observe the
environment, become aware of their situation and make decisions based on their observations, anticipations and experiences, followed by an intelligent adaptation to maximize their
preferences.
Future wireless networks are characterized by a distributed, dynamic and self-organizing
architecture [2]. These wireless networks are briefly grouped depending on their specific
characteristics in wireless Ad-Hoc/Mesh networks, that do not rely on a pre-existent infrastructure, wireless Sensor networks (WSN), made of autonomous distributed sensors and Cognitive Radio networks (CRN), composed by different cognitive devices. These wireless networks form the structure of numerous applications, and may cause different design problems

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that need a solution. Every node operating in a wireless network is capable of changing its
operation individually or in a small group of nodes, depending on the current network dynamics. Because of this, at a certain moment in time, every node in the wireless network will
find itself in a conflicting situation with other nodes, making the analysis and performance
evaluation of these networks a challenge. In order to cater for this, and to face the selfish
nature of network entities, Game Theory approach provides a feasible solution. Power control is a basic mechanism of resource management to mitigate the interference and improve
system performance. For voice and many delay-constrained applications, power control can
be viewed as a method to compensate the variations of the wireless channels [3] and [4]. This
type of compensation is not valid for data applications that are elastic, meaning that they
can tolerate a larger delay. It is possible in this case to adapt the transmission parameters,
such as transmission power to maximize the throughput [5]. Other game theory based algorithms that tackle the problem of self-interested rational users, by motivating the users to
adopt a social behaviour and share resources efficiently to improve the overall system performance were studied in papers such as [6] [7] [8]. In this paper we further evaluate the
performance of the power control mechanism and ProActive Power Update (PAPU) algorithm proposed in [9] and we adapt this framework to suite empirical evaluations while also
defining a power control protocol. The algorithm is simulated using Python programming
language, implemented and evaluated on the LOG-a-TEC [10] experimental testbed.

2
2.1

Problem formulation, GT solution and methodology


Problem statement

Figure 1: (a) example of a computer generated wireless network with 20 users, red triangles
and blue circles denotes the transmitter and receiver of user i. (b) 2 users forming the topology
in LOG-a-TEC testbed.

We consider a system with N users (players) consisting of one transmitter and one receiver each, such as the one depicted in Fig. 1. The receivers are assumed to receive not only
the signal from the desired transmitter, but also form at least one other transmitter, thus being
subject to interference. The objective is to find stable operation points of power allocation
for each player such that the players global utility is maximum while the cumulated power
levels are kept to a minimum. More formally, given a set of N players, N = {1, 2, ..., N }

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and their corresponding power allocation profile P = {p1 , p2 , ..., pN }, the utility function,
characterizing each players quality of service, is given by:
ui = log(1 + SIN Ri ) = log(1 +

n0 +

1
B

hii pi
P

j6=i

hji pj

(1)

where pi ,pj are the transmit powers of players i and j, hii is the direct gain, hji is the channel
gain between transmitter j and receiver i, B Hz is the total bandwidth where user i transmits
a single channel (SC) spread signal and n0 is the noise power. The payoff function is given
by:
hii pi
P
(pi , pi ) = log(1 +
) ci pi
(2)
1
n0 + B j6=i hji pj
where the pricing function, ci pi is imposed to limit the interference, and hence, improve the
system performance. It can also be interpreted as a cost on the battery usage. For simplicity,
we consider B = 1.
P
The objective is to maximize P
the global utility function, max i ui , while minimizing
the globally allocated power, min i pi , where each user is action is its transmission power
pi [0, Pimax ]. It is important to state that we consider the game for non-cooperative power
allocation games, meaning that the decisions are taken autonomously by the CR nodes. Also,
in a non-cooperative game, what the players know are the players, payoff function, available
strategies, but they do not know in advance what actions the other players will take.

2.2

Game theory based solution

Distributed implementation of resource allocation is appropriate for large-scale system.


Game Theory is an effective mathematical tool for distributive systems. In order to mediate
the players greediness and increase the system overall performance, authors in [9] construct a
power control game, the goal being to motivate individual players to adopt a social behaviour
and enhance the system performance by sharing the resources.
The best response concept leading to Nash Equilibrium (NE) is used. In the power allocation game, the best response of any of the players involved is given by:
P
1
I + n0
1
j6=i hji pj + n0

(3)
bi (pi ) =
ci
hii
ci
hii
where bi (pi ) represents the best response of player i given the current state of the game, pi
denotes the power profile for all other players, ci is player is energy cost, I represents the
interference at the receiver, hji ar the channel gains, pj is the transmitted power for all other
players and n0 is the noise. In the PAPU algorithm, player i updates its power according
to (3) each time other users update their power pj (t 1) 6= pj (t). Based on PAPU, the
following power control protocol is defined:
Step 1: Each player i initializes its power p0i , p0i
Step 2: At time t if player i updates its power, player i will alert the neighbors that a power
change has been made.
Step 3: If player i detects a change in other playerss power, it updates its power according
to (3) and alerts the neighbours about the change.
Step 4: Player i checks if the NE condition is satisfied.
Step 5: If the NE condition is satisfied, the game is stopped.

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2.3

Methodology

When evaluating a scenario in a simulation environment, the values for different parameters are chosen conveniently to provide proof of concept. Validation of theoretical models in
real-world setups poses several testbed specific constraints. For investigating the feasibility
of experimenting with interference mitigation based on the power allocation game, we employ the next methodology: (i) identify the experimental setup and the constraints, (ii) adapt
the simulated framework to be used in a testbed, (iv) empirically determine the values of
parameters and (iv) implement and experimentally evaluate the performance.
The LOG-a-TEC experimental testbed consists of 50 VESNA devices divided into two
clusters of 25 nodes, one located in the Logatec city center and the other one in the Logatec
industrial zone. The testbed consists of three types of nodes, i.e. UHF receivers operating
at 470-862 MHz and transceivers operating at 868 MHz and 2.4 GHz ISM bands. The constraints imposed by the testbed are topological, the nodes are mounted on public light poles,
limiting the choice for the location of the players, transmission capabilities, the testbed is able
to transmit on one channel at a time, limiting the type of supported games to SC ones, power
levels, testbeds nodes support only discrete power levels, which affects players strategies,
sensing, the nodes use energy detection for sensing, affecting the accuracy of the measurements, delay, setting a transmission or a sensing can take from 1 to 3 seconds, affecting
the speed of the game and the convergence time and calibration, the low cost nodes are not
calibrated, affecting the final strategies of the players.
As mentioned before, in a theoretical framework, the values for hji and pi are chosen
conveniently. A testbed allows the study of the game where these parameters are constrained
by the environment and acquired in a realistic environment. A a result, for testbed implementations, we adapted (3) to:
P
P rmsrd|pi =0
1
P rmsrd i Pusef ul
1
1
j6=i hji pj + n0
(4)

=
bi (pi ) =
ci
hii
ci
h0ii
ci
h0ii
where h0ii stands for the measurement based estimation of the direct gain, P rmsrd i stands for
the received power measured by player i when player i is also transmitting, Pusef ul is the
estimated useful power received by Rxi when T xi is transmitting, and P rmsrd|pi =0 stands
for the received power measured by player i when player is transmitter is silent. In the
simulated scenario, considering (3) and equilibrium is reached when pi (t 1) = pi (t) for
all players at once. However, in practice, it is unlikely to have two best responses equal to
each other. Therefore, we modified the equilibrium criterion to be: |bik (pi ) bi (pi )| <
Pthr , where k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and Pthr is the threshold power used to compensate for the
environment dynamics. After the NE is reached, nodes have no incentive to deviate from the
stable operating points, since they represent a desired outcome of the game.
In in a simulated scenario (Fig.1a), the values for hji are usually calculated using a propagation model, ITU outdoor propagation model P.1411-7 for UHF in the case of this paper,
but for the topology presented in Fig.1b, the channel estimation was performed using empirical data. Since for practical implementation of (4) user i has to know the values for h0ii ,
long term gain measurements were taken for the duration of one month, and three strategies
were studied for computing h0ii : average gain, instantaneous gain and estimated gain using
Kalman filter. Since the gain is highly dynamic, using the average as means of approximation
does not reflect the actual state of the channel. Using instantaneous channel gain as an input
in best response, is not a viable option since the instantaneous gain measurements are prone

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to measurement errors. The third approach is using a simple channel estimation technique,
such as the Kalman filter, which consists in two steps: the first step is estimating the next
measured gain, using a queue of 9 most recent measurements, and the second step represents
the correction of the estimated gain by performing a new gain measurement. This method is
more suitable for the game because it compensates for the measurement errors to which the
instantaneous gain is prone, it relies on a history of measurements and the Kalman filter based
gains are more accurate than the average. Besides the direct channel gain, the value for ci ,
whose role is to penalize the players for transmitting with high power, had to be determined
taking into account testbed conditions. In the case of LOG-a-TEC, the best response had to
respect the lower boundary of -55dBm and the upper boundary of 0dBm. In the worst case
scenario, when players received the highest level of interference, the feasible values for ci
belonged in the [1000; 4000] interval.

3
3.1

Experimental results
Simulation results

Simulation of the power allocation game was conducted using the PAPU algorithm in
a Python software programme. PAPU algorithm assumes that the cross channel gains are
significantly smaller that the direct channel gains. This is stated by the convergence criteria
|h |
< N1 .
defined by: |hji
ii |

Figure 2: (a) 8 players respecting the convergence criteria, (b) 8 players not respecting the
convergence criteria
We evaluated this condition for a topology of 8 players, whose transmitters were distributed randomly in a 500x500m square and whose receivers were place within a 60x60m
square around the transmitters. The maximum power was set to be equal to 20 dBm corresponding to the upper power boundary of WiFi transmissions. The noise power was set
at n0 = 1012 , ci = 8 for all users and hji were calculated using ITU P.1411-7 outdoor
propagation model. It can be seen in Fig.2a, that if the players form a topology that complies
to the convergence criteria, after a number of iterations, all players will converge to a stable
state, represented by the NE. In the other case (Fig.2b), where players are not placed in a
topology that respects the convergence condition, convergence to a stable point is not always
guaranteed. It can be seen that, player 2 and 4 do not find a stable point. This is due to high
levels of interference for these players.

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The total channel and average link channel capacity was further evaluated for the topology depicted in Fig.1a, where the first 8 players (circled with blue) respect the convergence
criteria, while the next 12 players (circled with red) do not follow the convergence criteria.

Figure 3: (a) total system and (b) average link capacity as a function of total number of
players, (c) Nash equilibrium and (d) payoff evolution as a number of active players

Figure 3a,b clearly shows that with an increase in number of players in the band total system capacity increases, while average link capacity deteriorates. Applying the PAPU
algorithm and not permitting players to transmit with maximum power have positive consequences in both of the cases, PAPU being able to save power by sacrificing a little capacity.
This can be seen for the first 8 players, whose cost was set at 80. As a result they limit
their power from 20 dBm to an interval that lies in [8,11] dBm (Fig.3c), and compromise
some network utility. The cost value can be tweaked so that the capacity reaches a desired
value.Increasing the cost limits the power levels, but also affects the network utility, especially for a small number of players (see first 2,6 players). When the systems is not convergent, i.e. players 9 to 20 join the system, when transmitting with 20dBm total system capacity
is strongly affected. The same situation can be seen also for the average link capacity. Even
though the convergence criteria is not respected, the system does not crash, and using PAPU
algorithm can have positive effects in terms of network utility. On the other hand, some
players are affected by the the convergence criteria. As it can be seen in Fig.3c, with the
apparition of player 13 in the system, player 9 is forced to end its transmission. The same
situation happens for player 14 with the apparition of player 16. Limiting the power to a level
that cannot be sensed (-70 dBm) is mainly due to the strong level of interference these players
receive. However, with the apparition of player 19 in the system, player 13, strongly affecting
player 9, limits it power from 9 to 5 dBm and as a result, player 9 will transmit again. Both
NE and Payoff function experience a decrease with an increase in number of players, given
the increase in interference levels.

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3.2

Testbed experiments results

The simulated value of the NE for PAPU considering ci = 1000 and average value of the
gain is (-0.24,-1.25) dBm represented as green in Fig.4a. In this case the influence of the

Figure 4: (a) experimental NE compared to simulated one for two players and (b) players
best response as a function of players costs.

predicted gains to the players final strategies is evident. By running the same game on a
real testbed, NE are much more spread as shown with blue squares in Fig.4a., mostly due to
interference and noise. It can be seen that the variation of the best response is relatively small
with 0.3 dBm for Player 1 and 0.5 dBm for Player 2. In the first two cases where simulation
was used, the Nash equilibrium results in a (0, -2) value. For the case of LOG-a-TEC, in the
experimental setup, the multitude of Nash equilibria obtained in different runs, after being
rounded to the discrete values of the transmission power supported in LOG-a-TEC, are (0,0)
and (0,-2).
Fig.4b depicts player strategies for different cost schemes. It can be seen that with the
increase of the cost, there is a decrease of the allocated powers. All the experiments were
performed as following: the direct channel gains were computed at the beginning of each
experiment by predicting the gain, interference and noise power levels, were measured and
updated at each iteration, k = 0,4 and P th = 0.8dBm. For Fig.4b, all the experiments were
repeated 20 times and the NE are given as averaged values.

Conclusions

In this paper we evaluated the performances of an existing power update algorithm and
we proposed a methodology for experimental evaluation of it. We have shown that the convergence condition is a decisive factor when choosing the topology upon the game is implemented, simulated results show that using PAPU does make a difference in terms of network
utility, testbed implementation proved that it is possible to run a decentralized power allocation game on a low cost testbed and that for a specific cost range the system converges to
NE.

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References
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Biography
Andrei Toma is currently a B. Sc. student at Faculty of Electronics, Telecommunication and Technology of Information, University of Cluj-Napoca. His current interests are in
cognitive and wireless networks, internet protocols and programming.

Andrei TOMA, B. Sc. student


Technical University of Cluj Napoca
Faculty of Electronics, Telecommunications and Information Technology,
G. Baritiu Street, no. 26, Cluj Napoca 400027, Romania
E-mail: tomaandreiandrei@gmail.com

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