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ROBERT J. FOGELIN
1
2009
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Preface Z
A few words about the provenance of this work may help explain
the form it takes. It concerns the same material that I examined
in the rst eight chapters of Humes Skepticism in the Treatise of
Human Nature, published in 1985. The primary intention of that
work was to counter the tendency, common at the time, to play
down or simply ignore the skeptical themes in Humes Treatise in
favor of a thoroughgoing naturalistic reading in the style of Norman
Kemp Smith. Since the skeptical themes were being played down,
to provide a suitable counterweight, I played them up. This work
is intended to offer a more balanced account of the relationship
between Humes naturalism and his skepticism.
In 1990 I was given the opportunity to develop the central ideas of
that book as a lecturer in a National Endowment for the Humanities
seminar directed by David Fate Norton and Wade Robison. It consisted of ve lectures on book 1, part 4 of the Treatise, the locus
of Humes deepest skeptical reections. I wrote careful notes and
corrected them in the light of the energetic discussions that greeted
these lectures. My intention at the time was to use these notes as
the basis for a second edition of Humes Skepticism in the Treatise.
I then became involved in other projects and thought no more of
these notes until fteen years later, when I received an invitation
from Livia Guimaraes to give a series of lectures on Hume at the
Universidade Federal de Minas Geraise in Brazil. I dug out the
Preface
Preface
xi
Contents Z
xvii
xiv
Contents
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Contents
xv
78
101
xvi
Contents
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139
Notes
159
165
xvii
How does Humes naturalismhis attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjectssquare with
what seem to be his strong skeptical commitments? On the face of
it, these two aspects of his philosophy appear to be at odds with one
another. For example, in a number of places Hume holds that there
are no rational grounds for believing that the regularities that have
held in the past will continue to hold in the future; that in turn
seems to show that the inductive inferences he employs in pursuit
of his science of human nature are themselves baseless. This conict
is so obvious that even philosophically unsophisticated readers often
recognize it. Hume, however, does not seem particularly concerned
about this apparent conict between his inductive skepticism and his
commitment to a science of human nature. In the Treatise of Human
Nature, a skeptical argument is used to reject reason (in a wide sense)
as the source of causal inferences, so that he can replace it with the
associative operations of the imagination. In the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, Hume celebrates this relocation, telling us
that it is . . . conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure
so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency (EHU, 45/55). As we shall see, skeptical doubts are the source
of deep disquietudes that emerge in the concluding section of the
rst book of the Treatise, but his inductive skepticismthough it
has troubled many othersseems not to have troubled Hume.
3
Introduction
A dramatic way of presenting the tension between Humes naturalism and his skepticism is to compare two passages: one from the
introduction to the Treatise, the other from the closing section of
book 1. Hume launches the Treatise with swagger:
Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or
less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them
may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and
Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men,
and are judgd of by their powers and faculties.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope
for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious
lingring method, which we have hitherto followd, and instead
of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to
march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences,
to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may
every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we
may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more
intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed
at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects
of pure curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose
decision is not comprizd in the science of man; and there is
none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we
become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect
propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they
can stand with any security. (4/xv)
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Z
A Quick Tour of Part 3, Book 1
Section 1. Of knowledge
At the opening of this section, Hume repeats his list of what he calls
philosophical relations that he had originally presented and briey
discussed in part 1, section 5. They are
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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He then lays down eight rules that will serve as guides to empirical
inquiry, telling his reader that they are of much more use than the
elaborate systems put forward by our scholastic head-pieces and
logicians [who] show no such superiority above the mere vulgar in
their reason and ability (117/175). It is hard to see, as naturalistic
interpreters point out, why Hume would nd it useful to present
such a system of rules for empirical inquiry if he harbored serious
doubts about the very possibility of such inquiry.
Section 16. Of the reason of animals
Hume holds that higher animals are capable of reasoning of the
same kind employed by human beings. The dog that avoids re
and precipices, that shuns strangers, and caresses his master, he
tells us, proceeds from a reasoning, that is not in itself different, nor
founded on different principles, from that which appears in human
nature (119/177). He thus claims that his theory can account for
both human and animal reasoning and challenges those who reject
it to attempt to do likewise:
Let any philosopher make a trial, and endeavour to explain that
act of the mind, which we call belief, and give an account of the
principles, from which it is derivd, independent of the inuence of custom on the imagination, and let his hypothesis be
equally applicable to beasts as to the human species; and after
he has done this, I promise to embrace his opinion. (119/178)
Passages like this, and many others of the same kind, seem to
settle the interpretive dispute in favor of naturalismunless, that
is, we turn pages and enter the skeptical realm of part 4. In fact, as
briey noted, the skepticism that emerges in part 4 is anticipated in
part 3 itself, in section 13, under the heading Of unphilosophical
probability. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Z
Unphilosophical as Opposed to Philosophical
Probabilities
In sections 11 and 12 of part 3, Hume examines what he calls the
probability of chances and the probability of causes. At the start of
section 13, he tells us that both are receivd by philosophers, and
allowd to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion. He then
continues: But there are [other kinds of probability], that are derivd
from the same principles, tho they have not had the good fortune to
obtain the same sanction (97/143). Hume dubs these other kinds of
probabilitythose not sanctioned by philosophersunphilosophical
probabilities. In sections 11 and 12, Hume argues that philosophical
probabilities are grounded in the operations of the imagination. In
section 13, he makes the same claim with respect to unphilosophical
probabilities. The upshot is that both philosophical and unphilosophical probabilities spring from the same principles: the operations of the imagination. Furthermore, philosophical probabilities
and unphilosophical probabilities can come into conict with one
another, and that, on Humes theory, amounts to saying that the
imagination can come into conict with itself. As we shall see, exposing conicts within the imagination is a central theme of part 4, and
their discovery is the primary source of Humes skeptical jitters.
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Z
Sources of Unphilosophical Probabilities
Hume examines four sources, or kinds, of unphilosophical probability: the effect of the remoteness of an event, the effect of the
remoteness of an observation, reiterative diminution, and prejudice
based on general rules.
The effect of the remoteness of the event
Humes discussion of this kind of unphilosophical probability provides his rst example of how a clash can arise between the deliverances of philosophical and unphilosophical probabilities.
The argument, which we found on any matter of fact we
remember, is more or less convincing, according as the fact is
recent or remote; and tho the difference in these degrees of
evidence be not receivd by philosophy as solid and legitimate;
because in that case an argument must have a different force today, from what it shall have a month hence; yet notwithstanding the opposition of philosophy, tis certain, this circumstance
has a considerable inuence on the understanding, and secretly
changes the authority of the same argument, according to the
different times, in which it is proposd to us. (9798/143)
Here Hume speaks of an argument that appeals to events remote in
time and claims that, as a matter of fact, the more remote an event
is, the less authority it will carry. This psychological fact cannot be
explained by appealing to principles of received philosophy, since it
runs counter to them. It can, Hume thinks, be explained by the
fact that, in general, events remote in time have less impact on the
imagination than those that have occurred more recently.
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32
33
34
35
It seems, then, that beliefs in remote past events are preserved only
because we become fuddled when we think of how they have been
handed down to us. This idea that a limitation or weakness in the
human intellect can protect us from an unanswerable skeptical challenge will reappear in part 4, section 1.
Prejudice based on general rules
Hume calls his fourth species of unphilosophical probability
prejudice:
A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that derivd
from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and
which are the source of what we properly call prejudice.
An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have
solidity; for which reason, tho the conversation of the former
in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very
judicious, we have entertaind such a prejudice against them,
that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason.
Human nature is very subject to errors of this kind; and perhaps this nation as much as any other. (99100/14647)
With respect to prejudice, the general rules that govern our judgment
are rashly formed and stand in contrast to those that proceed from
more general and authentic operations of the understanding.
Following the pattern found in his discussion of the rst three
forms of unphilosophical probability, Hume proceeds to offer an
account of why human beings reason in this unreasonable way:
Shoud it be demanded why men form general rules, and
allow them to inuence their judgment, even contrary to
present observation and experience, I shoud reply, that in my
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Frenchmans actions as foppish when they are not. All in all, not a
bad start for an account of the nature of prejudice.
Z
Conicts within the Imagination
and Skepticism
It is easy to read this examination of the nature and sources of prejudice as no more than a cautionary tale concerning the dangers of
rash generalizations as opposed to the security provided by generalizations that are broader and more authentic. That, however, is not
how Hume proceeds. Instead, he treats the conict between general
rules that are grounded in philosophical probabilities and those that
are grounded in unphilosophical probabilities as a challenge to his
theory:
According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the
effects of custom; and custom has no inuence, but by enlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of
any object. It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner,
as to render it opposite to the former. (101/149)
The fact is, however, that general rules derived from unphilosophical probabilities sometimes do clash with those having a philosophically more proper heritage.
Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to
each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause
in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally
carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho the
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Z
The Turn to Skepticism
Part 4 of book 1 of the Treatise represents the outer limit of Humes
critical reections on the philosophical enterprise. To borrow a
phrase from Immanuel Kant, it represents Humes attempt to delineate the fate of reason when its demands are pursued in an unrestricted manner. The result, as both Hume and Kant portray it, is
intellectual disaster. There is, however, an important difference in
the scope of their critiques. Kants primary target is the attempt
to produce substantive (synthetic) a priori knowledge that reaches
beyond the phenomenal world. Roughly speaking, his critique concerns metaphysics as traditionally pursued. Humes critique is more
radical and more far-reaching, for it calls into question both the
understanding and the senses in their modest and natural employments, not just their misemployment in a priori metaphysics. The
opening sections (1 and 2) of part 4 taken together yield the sweeping negative conclusion that
[t]is impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we
endeavour to justify them in that manner. As the sceptical
doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reection
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Z
The Basic Argument
This much is clear from the text: Section 1, part 4, book 1 of the
Treatise opens with a skeptical examination of the demonstrative
sciences (Humes words), that is, of beliefs based on demonstration
and intuition. Given his own nomenclature, both intuitive and
demonstrative truths are in the domain of knowledge as opposed
to the domain of probability. It is also clear that Humes skepticism is not limited to the domain of knowledge, but includes
the domain of probability as well. The moral that Hume draws
from his skeptical reections is that our intellectual faculties, when
allowed to follow their own principles without restraint, are wholly
destructive of beliefs based on reasoning. So the scope of Humes
argument is unrestricted: It is not limited to those beliefs that are
the product of demonstrative and intuitive reasoning, though it
includes them.
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all knowledge degenerates into probability; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to
the simplicity or intricacy of the question. (121/180)
Before getting into details of the skeptical argument concerning
reason, we should note that Hume presents his argument using the
metaphor of testimony. Our reason, he tells us, provides us with
testimony that is sometimes just and true; at other times it deceives
us. In order to assess the reliability of this testimony, we should
shift our attention away from the immediate object of our judgment
and examine the reliability of our faculties in dealing with the matter at hand. We should consider the ratio of the testimony that has
deceived us relative to the testimony that is just and true. Ideally, the
veracity should fully outweigh the deceitfulness, leaving us fully (or
at least highly) condent. If not, our level of condence should be
adjusted accordingly. This sounds quite sensible and in line with the
discussion in section 12, Of the probability of causes.1
Hume may be wrong in saying knowledge degenerates into
probabilitywe will look at his arguments for this shortlybut at
least he is saying this: Establishing a claim to demonstrative knowledge always involves establishing a prior claim of probability. That
is an arresting idea in itself, and not altogether implausible.2
Hume adds another reason for holding that the evaluation of
demonstrative reasoning reduces to or is at least dependent on probabilistic reasoning.
There is no algebraist nor mathematician so expert in his
science, as to place entire condence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing but
a mere probability. Every time he runs over his proofs, his
condence increases; but still more by the approbation of his
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Here we are not concerned with nding further conrming evidence, but, instead, we step up a level and reect on our ability to
carry out conformational procedures correctly. As Hume points out,
this principle applies not only to the assessment of demonstrative
arguments, but also to the assessment of probabilities themselves:
As demonstration is subject to the controul of probability,
so is probability liable to a new correction by a reex act of
the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and
our reasoning from the rst probability become our objects.
(122/182)
This claim has two important implications. The rst is that an argument that began with demonstrative reasoning as its target is now,
as Hume explicitly states, made equally applicable to probabilistic
reasoning. Secondand this is crucial to Humes argumentthe
reex act of judging our own capacities will, of itself, add a new
uncertainty into our considerations.
Having thus found in every probability, beside the original
uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty derivd
from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having
adjusted these two together, we are obligd by our reason to
add a new doubt derivd from the possibility of error in the
estimation we make of the truth and delity of our faculties.
(122/182)
The principle of reiterative diminution
Humes regression argument yields the traditional skeptical trope
of innite regress, and that, it would seem, would be sufcient to
achieve Humes skeptical purposes. However, an innite-regress
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So I think that Hume is simply wrong in thinking that the application of the reex principle automatically introduces a diminution in assurance demanded by the laws of logic or rationality. We
might better consider the reex act of self-examination a useful aid
for epistemic (or doxastic) prudence. There are occasions where it
is prudent to take into consideration our mental abilities for dealing with a complex or unfamiliar matter. One way to do this is to
take the vertical approach and consider how well we have done in
the past in dealing with matters of the kind at hand. The reexive move has, however, a fundamental shortcoming: As we ascend
higher and higher in levels of probability assessments of probability assessments, we almost immediately run out of data concerning
how well we have performed tasks of this kind. We have no idea, for
example, how well we do in making fourth-level assessments since,
in all likelihood, we have never attempted to perform one. Isnt this
lack of adequate data enough to yield Humes skeptical conclusion?
No. What it shows is that the vertical method has a use, but a very
limited use, in evaluating ones own cognitive capacities. This result
would carry skeptical consequences only if there were no alternative
way of guarding against cognitive errors.
What I have called the horizontal method provides an alternative to the vertical method. To repeat an example, if the result that
I get in adding up a column of gures coincides with the results
that others get, that increases my condence that my result is correct. Beyond thisand this is importantit also increases my condence that I am reliable in performing tasks of this particular kind.
Doesnt this ignore the possibility that something everyone agrees
on might be wrong? It does ignore this possibility. Relying on this
point would, however, subvert Humes attempt to show that canons of rationality, pursued without constraint, ultimately destroy
all beliefs. Transforming Humes skeptical argument into a general
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worry about human fallibility misses the specic point Hume is trying to establish.
If I am right, Humes skepticism with regard to reason suffers
from two serious shortcomings. The rst is that he has not shown
that making the reexive move will, in virtue of principles of logic
or rationality, diminish levels of assurance. The second is that he
has not shown that the vertical approach is the sole and demanded
method for establishing the reliability of ones cognitive faculties. In
sum, neither epistemic nor doxastic prudence forces us to adopt the
vertical approach, and even if we do, principles of logic or rationality do not, of themselves, yield diminution of assurance.4
Z
Humes Response to His Skeptical Argument
It seems, then, that Humes skeptical argument with regard to reason
does not work. Hume, however, thought it did, and his response to
this skeptical argument is worth examining. The skeptical argument
has three central components:
1. The Reexive Principle
2. An Innite Regress
3. The Principle of Reiterative Diminution
All three principles are, for him, demands of rationality. Intellectually,
he embraces them without reservation. Hume also holds that, taken
together, these demands of reason lead to the annihilation of both
knowledge and probability. Given this, is Hume a skeptic or not?
Hume poses this question himself:
Shoud it here be askd me, whether I sincerely assent to this
argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and
whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all
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is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possessed of any measures of truth and falsehood; I shoud reply,
that this question is entirely superuous, and that neither I,
nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that
opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity, has determind us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.
(123/183)
Hume asks two questions, not one: Do I assent to the argument?
and Am I one of those skeptics who holds that all is uncertain?
He does not answer the rst question directly, but instead calls it
superuous. Why is it superuous? Because he, like everyone else in
the world, is incapablepsychologically incapableof total skepticism or total suspension of belief. But still, does he accept the argument or not? The answer to this question is yes, he does accept it,
for he thinks that he has presented an argument that is theoretically
irrefutable. What may seem odd is that he accepts an argument that
establishes the groundlessness of our believing, yet he cannot cease
believing. In Fogelin (1985) I tried to capture these dual aspects of
Humes position by drawing a distinction between theoretical skepticism and belief or doxastic skepticism. A theoretical skeptic puts
forward arguments intended to show that beliefs of a certain kind
(perhaps all beliefs) lack adequate warrant. Hume, as I read him, is
a radical, if not quite unmitigated, theoretical skeptic.5 The notion
of a doxastic skeptic comes closer to the common understanding of
a skeptic: The doxastic skeptic suspends judgments concerning various kinds of beliefs or perhaps all beliefs. She may do so on the basis
of theoretical skepticism, or she may not. Using this terminology,
Hume is a mitigated doxastic skeptic, though, as we shall see, the
degree of mitigation varies with context. The upshot of this discussion is that Hume actually has two reasons for thinking that attacks
on his skeptical argument will fail: From a theoretical perspective,
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Z
Peritrope
It is important to keep in mind that, for Humes purposes, it is
essential that the skeptical argument he has propounded be theoretically irrefutable. For this reason he is called upon to defend it. A
standard ploy, dating back to antiquity, is to argue that skepticism
can be shown to be self-refuting by turning skeptical arguments
back upon themselves (peritrope). How, it is asked, can rational
arguments be used to undercut rationality itself without thereby
undercutting themselves? Hume offers the following response to
this challenge.
This argument is not just; because the sceptical reasonings . . . woud be successively both strong and weak, according
to the successive dispositions of the mind. . . . The sceptical
and dogmatical reasons are of the same kind, tho contrary
in their operation and tendency; so that where the latter
is strong, it has an enemy of equal force in the former to
encounter; and as their forces were at rst equal, they still
continue so, as long as either of them subsists; nor does one
of them lose any force in the contest, without taking as much
from its antagonist. Tis happy, therefore, that nature breaks
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will agree that the successive application of the reexive method will
lead to a total destruction of beliefand they will agree without so
much as making a serious try at applying this method. The ignorance and weakness of mind that protects the vulgar provides no
protection to the learned, including Hume himself.
In his section concerning skepticism with regard to reason,
Hume shows no signs of recognizing the precarious character of his
own position relative to his own skeptical argument. Hume seems
to see himself as standing above the fray while the skeptic and the
dogmatist engage in mortal combat that inevitably leads to their
mutual destruction. It doesnt seem to cross his mind that he himself could be swept up in the combat with a similar outcome. Later
he will confront this possibilitywith dramatic results.
Z
Humes Turnabout with Regard to the Senses
The transition from skepticism with regard to reason to skepticism
with regard to the senses is made in these words:
Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even
tho he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle
concerning the existence of body, tho he cannot pretend
by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity.
Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless,
esteemd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted
to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well
ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?
but tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is
a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. (124/187)
Thirty pages later, quite a different voice is heard:
Having thus given an account of all the systems both popular
and philosophical, with regard to external existences, I cannot
forbear giving vent to a certain sentiment, which arises upon
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The Organization of Section 2
The organization of section 2 may seem peculiar, for it takes some
time before we can see why Hume speaks of skepticism with regard to
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Z
The Causes of Our Belief in the Existence of Bodies
Hume tells us that the subject, then, of our present enquiry is
concerning . . . the causes which induce us to believe in the existence
of body (125/18788). This question is transposed into two
questions:
Why we attribute a continud existence to objects, even
when they are not present to the senses; and why we suppose
them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception? (12526/188)
Hume holds that continued and distinct existences are intimately
connected, indeed mutually imply each another. It does seem right
that something that continues to exist unobserved must have a distinct existence. But distinctness does not seem to imply continued
existence. Perhaps things distinct from the mind pop in and out of
existence on their own, but I will ignore this possibility.
Having presented these two (interrelated) questions, Hume goes
on to make a very strong claim concerning them:
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These are the only questions, that are intelligible on the present subject. For as to the notion of external existence, when
taken for something specically different from our perceptions, we have already shown its absurdity. (126/188)
In defense of this claim, Hume refers the reader to a passage earlier
in the Treatise:
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derivd from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that tis impossible for us
so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specically different from ideas and impressions. . . .
The furthest we can go towards a conception of external
objects, when supposd specically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking
we do not suppose them specically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations.
(49/6768)
Humes point, I take it, is this: To have merely a relative notion
perhaps relational notion would be betterof an external object
would be to understand it only as the cause of our perception without attributing any other properties to it. The entity would amount
to an x that is the cause of a perception, where this x is not characterized in any other way.
The senses not the source of this belief
Hume is now in a position to raise his basic question. It mimics
his previous treatment of causality. Which faculty, he asks, leads us
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Hume completes his rejection of the idea that reason can serve as
the basis of the vulgar belief in the continued and distinct existence
of perceptions by appealing to his analysis of causal relations:
To which we may add, that as long as we take our perceptions
and objects to be the same, we can never infer the existence of
the one from that of the other, nor form any argument from
the relation of cause and effect; which is the only one that
can assure us of matter of fact. Even after we distinguish our
perceptions from our objects, twill appear presently, that we
are still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one to
that of the other. (129/193)
It seems that if we take our perceptions and objects to be the
same, as the vulgar do, then there is no place for a causal relation
to apply, for no object can be the cause of itself. If we distinguish
the perceptions from the objects, as the double-existence theorists
do, we would then have two things that could enter into causal
relations, but, as we shall see, an unanswerable skeptical argument
then arises.
Z
The Operations of the Imagination in Forming
This Belief
With both sense and reason eliminated, we are left with the imagination as the source of the belief that the objects we are aware of can
enjoy a continued and distinct existence.
So that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever shoud, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continud and distinct existence of body. That
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advances towards me. This gives occasion to many new reections and reasonings. First, I never have observd, that this
noise coud proceed from any thing but the motion of a door;
and therefore conclude, that the present phaenomenon is a
contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I
remember on the other side of the chamber, be still in being.
(13031/196)
In this passage, Hume employs what has now come to be known as
an inference to the best explanation. The existence of a door (now
unperceived) is the most reasonable way of making sense of the
sound heard and of the porters appearance before him. Hume then
adds:
There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a
similar instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to
suppose the continud existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such
an union with each other, as I have found by experience to be
suitable to their particular natures and circumstances. Here
then I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real
and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is
no longer present to my perception. (131/197)
What are we to make of this passage? Is Hume actually presenting
a proof of the existence of the external world? That cannot be right,
so we have to assume that the passage is written from the vulgar perspective where we often make inferences to the existence of things
that we are not perceiving in order to make sense of things that we
are perceiving. Hume is suggesting that a parallel pattern of reasoning takes place when we infer continued existence from coherence.
He notes, however, an important difference between the two cases:
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But tis evident, that, whenever we infer the continud existence of the objects of sense from their coherence, and the
frequency of their union, tis in order to bestow on the objects
a greater regularity than what is observd in our mere perceptions. (131/197)
That is, taken at face value, our actual experience is interrupted
(fragmented, eeting, etc.), yet imagination somehow contrives to
disguise this gappiness.
Having shown how the maintenance of coherence can be a factor
supporting the vulgar view concerning the status of objects of perception, Hume largely sets it aside in favor of the inuence of constancy of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy
of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory
account of that opinion (132/19899).
Humes homey example of the inuence of constancy concerned,
as we saw, his looking at his desk, closing his eyes for a bit, and upon
opening them nding the objects on his desk arranged in the same
way as they were before he closed his eyes. The constancy in this
experience naturally leads him to believe that the objects he observes
after reopening his eyes are the selfsame things that he saw before he
closed them. Now speaking of the reappearance of the perception
of the sun or ocean, Hume provides a more elaborate sketch of the
mechanisms that bring about the belief that we are experiencing the
very same thing again, when, in fact, we are not.
When we have been accustomd to observe a constancy in certain impressions, and have found, that the perception of the
sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an absence
or annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as at its rst
appearance, we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, (which they really are) but on the contrary
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two, three, or any determinate number of objects, whose existences are entirely distinct and independent. (133/200)
Hence a dilemma:
Since then both number and unity are incompatible with the
relation of identity, it must lie in something that is neither
of them. But to tell the truth, at rst sight this seems utterly
impossible. (133/200)
Hume attempts to show how the imagination solvesor rather
submergesthis dilemma, using time as the vehicle. There is, however, a difculty with invoking time to deal with the problem of
identity. In part 2, section 3, Hume states that time cannot make
its appearance to the mind, either alone or attended with a steady
unchangeable object, but is always discovered by some perceivable
succession of changeable objects (28/35). If that is true, then an
attribution of duration to an unchanging object is a falsehooda
falsehood, Hume adds, that is the common opinion of philosophers as well of the vulgar (29/37).
In part 4, section 2, Hume repeats this account of the ctitious
temporality of unchanging objects. Specically citing part 2, section 5,
he tells us:
I have already observd, that time, in a strict sense, implies
succession, and that when we apply its idea to any unchangeable object, tis only by a ction of the imagination, by which
the unchangeable object is supposd to participate of the
changes of the co-existent objects, and in particular of that of
our perceptions. (133/200201)
Hume attempts to explain this ction of an unchanging object
existing in time by using one of his favorite devices: placing things
in different lights, or viewing them from different perspectives.
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light of the transition from J to O. Taken that way, the unchanging sequence seems to share the temporality exhibited in the rst
sequence. On the other hand, we can view the second sequence
stepwise in terms of single moments and in that way preserve the
unity of the unchanging sequence. The ction of identity over
time is the result of ip-opping back and forth between these two
perspectives.
It is worth noting that Hume qualies his account of the ction
of identity over time in an important way:
Here then is an idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and
number; or more properly speaking, is either of them, according
to the view, in which we take it: And this idea we call that of
identity. (134/201, emphasis added)
In this passage Hume says something quite remarkable: Speaking
properly he is not offering an account of how a ctitious idea of
identity emerges; instead, he is offering an account of how the ction that we have such an idea arises. To put the matter another way,
he has not offered an account of how a ctitious complex idealike
that of grifnis formed. Hume is saying something stronger and
more interesting: We think that we have an idea of identity, but are
wrong in this. We are conceptually addled.4
Gap lling
The second task that Hume sets for himself is to explain why the
resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us
to attribute an identity to them.
I now proceed to explain the second part of my system, and
show why the constancy of our perceptions makes us ascribe
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same disposition or in similar ones, are very apt to be confounded. The mind readily passes from one to the other, and
perceives not the change without a strict attention, of which,
generally speaking, tis wholly incapable. (135/2034)
Hume spends a number of pages elaborating and illustrating the
contents of this passage. I will not go into the details of this discussion except to note that Humes appeal to dispositions working (as it
were) behind the scenes does seem to compromise the assumption,
cited earlier, that all actions and sensations of the mind are known
to us by consciousness, [and] must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear (127/190). Mental
dispositions need not be transparent to us.
The idea of continued existence
In virtue of the association of dispositions, we have a strong tendency
to take gappy sequences as non-gappy. At times, however, interruptions are too long to make this possible; despite this, we continue
to attribute an identity over time to the entities in the interrupted
sequence. This brings Hume to his third task: to account for that
propensity, which this illusion [i.e., the illusion of identity] gives, to
unite these broken appearances by a continud existence (133/200).
His answer is this:
The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the
resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect
identity. The interrupted manner of their appearance makes
us consider them as so many resembling, but still distinct
beings, which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity
arising from this contradiction produces a propension to
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Hume concludes his examination of the vulgar view of perception with an elegant summary passage that he believes the intelligent reader will nd wholly convincing:
Tis indeed evident, that as the vulgar suppose their perceptions
to be their only objects, and at the same time believe the
continud existence of matter, we must account for the origin of
the belief upon that supposition. Now upon that supposition,
tis a false opinion that any of our objects, or perceptions, are
identically the same after an interruption; and consequently
the opinion of their identity can never arise from reason, but
must arise from the imagination. The imagination is seducd
into such an opinion only by means of the resemblance of
certain perceptions; since we nd they are only our resembling perceptions, which we have a propension to suppose the
same. This propension to bestow an identity on our resembling perceptions, produces the ction of a continud existence; since that ction, as well as the identity, is really false,
as is acknowledgd by all philosophers, and has no other effect
than to remedy the interruption of our perceptions, which is
the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity. In the
last place this propension causes belief by means of the present
impressions of the memory; since without the remembrance
of former sensations, tis plain we never shoud have any belief
of the continud existence of body. (139/20910)
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The Philosophers Double-Existence
Theory of Perception
Having completed his account of the origins of the vulgar view of
perception, Hume turns his attention to the views of philosophers
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on the topic. Philosophers have been led to reject the views of the
vulgar because they think there are convincing grounds for holding
that our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence.
Hume then thinks it proper to observe a few of those experiments,
which convince us, that our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence (140/210). As I noted at the start of this chapter, given the importance of these argumentsor experiments, as
Hume calls themit is surprising how brief and underdeveloped
they are. It never seems to cross his mind to view them critically,
not to say skeptically.
Humes leading idea is that adopting the way of ideas rst
drives philosophers out of the common standpoint, but, under
the inuence of everyday beliefs that they cannot fully shake, they
are naturally led to adopt what Hume calls a double-existence theory of perception. This theory, which has come to be known as
representational realism, can come in a variety of forms, but the
primitive idea is to draw a distinction between ideas (perceptions,
and the like) that are mind-dependent and material objects that
exist independently of minds. An idea is said to be true of a material object if it properly represents it. This is merely a prototheorya mere sketch that demands elaboration and defensebut
I will not develop it further because I think it is this prototheory,
not simply some specic realization of it, that Hume targets for
investigation.
Hume holds, in the rst place, that this theory seems to provide
a way of accommodating our previous natural (though false) belief
in the continued and distinct existence of what we perceive with a
philosophical commitment to the way of ideas. We might think of
it as a vector of these two inuences. But, according to Hume, far
from making things better, this new, double-existence theory makes
them worse. The theory is, he tells us, only a palliative remedy,
[that] contains all the difculties of the vulgar system, with some
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The Pyrrhonian Moment
This brings us to the second passage cited at the start of this chapter:
I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an
implicit faith in our senses, and that this woud be the conclusion, I shoud draw from the whole of my reasoning. But
to be ingenuous, I feel myself at present of a quite contrary
sentiment, and am more inclind to repose no faith at all in
my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an
implicit condence. I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can
ever lead to any solid and rational system. . . . What then can
we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? And how can we justify
to ourselves any belief we repose in them? (14344/21718)
Hume goes further, and retroactively includes the operations of reason in his gloomy assessment:
This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the
senses, is a malady which can never be radically curd, but
must return upon us every moment, however we may chase
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it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it. Tis
impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we
endeavour to justify them in that manner. As the sceptical
doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reection
on those subjects, it always encreases, the further we carry
our reections, whether in opposition or conformity to it.
(144/218)
It should be clear what is troubling Hume. He recognizes with full
force that his account of the operations of the human mind applies
to the operations of his own minda mind incapable of leading us
to any solid and rational system, including, it seems, the development of his own science of man. It doesnt help to suggest that
Humes science of man is not intended to be a rational system,
but an empirical system instead. Hume is not restricting his claims
to the systems of rationalist philosophers. The passage just cited
makes it clear that his skeptical worries are a consequence of his own
philosophizing and that his own philosophizing falls under their
scope. We will revisit this self-referential crisis as it appears in the
nal section of book 1.
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A Concluding Note
Humes readers may, perhaps should, nd the development of section 2 perplexing. Hume starts out expressing an implicit faith in
the senses. He then proceeds to give an account of how this faith
in the senses emerges. His tacit assumption seems to be that this
faith is built into us as a gift of a provident nature who doubtless esteemd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to
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Reasons for Examining the Ancient and Modern
Philosophical Systems
At the close of section 2, Hume tells his readers that he will examine some general systems both ancient and modern that have been
proposed concerning the external and internal worlds. This will
not, he tells us, in the end be found foreign to our present purpose (144/218). What we will get, in fact, is a further demonstration
of how Humes science of man can be used to give an account
of how philosophical systems arise naturally at various stages of
philosophical inquiry. We have already seen such an investigation
with respect to the double-existence theory of perception. We will
now see how Humes science of human nature can similarly be used
with respect to both ancient and modern (i.e., seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century) notions of substance.
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Of the Ancient Philosophy (Section 3)
Reecting the spirit of his times, Humes attitude toward the ancient
notion of substance and the concepts related to it is patronizing
throughout.
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II
ABCD
ABCD
ABCD
ABCD
ABCD
BCDE
CDEF
DEFG
EFGH
FGHI
Here each step in column II preserves three qualities, so, taken stepby-step, a strong degree of resemblance is preserved, and because
of this it maintains some degree of resemblance to the unchanging sequence in column I as well. Yet, if we shift our perspective
and compare the initial step in column II with its nal step, we
nd ourselves comparing BCDE with FGHI where no similarity
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remains. Admittedly this diagrammatic representation looks articial, even simpleminded, but it does, I think, capture the essence of
what Hume has in mind when he speaks of a contradiction arising
from competing perspectives.
The ction of underlying substance, or original
rst matter
The scholastic rule was: When one encounters a contradiction, draw
a distinction! The imagination, according to Hume, follows a different rule: When one encounters a contradiction, create a ction!
In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination
is apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it
supposes to continue the same under all these variations; and
this unintelligible something it calls a substance, or original
and rst matter. (146/220)
So, despite surface appearance, the imagination posits something
that remains constant in sequence II. It is not, however, some other
property that has hitherto gone unnoticed. It is something of a
wholly different orderas Hume tendentiously puts it, something
that is unknown, invisible, and unintelligible. Taken this way, the
imagination does not provide us with a ctitious idea of substance
or original rst matter but, instead, creates the ction that we have
such an idea. As with the notion of identity over time, it is a misunderstanding to think that Hume is speaking of a ction in the
sense that a centaur or a grifn is a ctitious being. The idea of
substance, unlike the idea of a grifn, is not an idea at all. It is,
we might say, an empty placeholder for a solution to a problem
masquerading as a solution. If that is right, then Humes treatment
of substance is of a piece with his previous treatment of the ction
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not the perspective from which the vulgar view the world. Indeed,
the two perspectives are radically opposed to one another. For the
most part, this is not the perspective of past philosophers either. For
Hume, however, any departure from this standpoint will generate
falsehoods, ctions, or plain nonsense.
The situation now becomes dialectically complex. The previous
clashes between viewpoints took place within our commonas
opposed to philosophicalunderstanding. To repeat a previous
example, our belief in the identity of an object changing over time
arises when the changes preserve a suitable level of resemblance and
are viewed sequentially. We are jolted out of this belief when we
note the lack of resemblance between an object as it appears to us
now and how it appeared to us in the distant past. Two common
ways of viewing matters come into conict: how they seemed living through them, and how they seem looking back. The present
case is quite different: Here we have a global clash between frameworks for viewing the world. From the philosophical standpoint,
the common standpoint is challenged in toto. This is precisely how
Hume proceeds in pursuing his philosophical program. Adopting
the standpoint of those he calls the most judicious philosophers, he
dismisses as errors the beliefs of the vulgar. He then attempts to provide a naturalistic account of how these errors arise. He next offers
an account of how those who operate from within the philosophical
standpoint go on to introduce a philosophical ctionsomething
plain folks know nothing ofin an effort to provide a surrogate
for the common beliefs they have demolished, yet still hanker after.
For Hume, piling a philosophical ction on the prior ctions of the
vulgar only makes matters worse.
Where is Hume himself in all this? He is a member of the philosophical party in rejecting the beliefs of the vulgar. He never, so far as
I know, rejects the standpoint of the most judicious philosophers,
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even if he does reject the palliatives they offer under the lingering
inuence of their vulgar upbringing.
The ction of a unifying substance
Returning to Humes treatment of simplicity, having invoked the
philosophical perspective to reject the standpoint of the vulgar,
Hume nishes off the philosophical position in the same way he
dealt with the philosophical account of the identity of an object
changing over time. Here, in full, is the passage interrupted above:
Whenever [the mind] views the object in another light, it
nds that all these qualities are different, and distinguishable,
and separable from each other; which view of things being
destructive of its primary and more natural notions, obliges
the imagination to feign an unknown something, or original substance and matter, as a principle of union or cohesion
among these qualities, and as what may give the compound
object a title to be calld one thing, notwithstanding its diversity and composition. (146/221)
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more than the rest of the creation; but has reservd them a consolation amidst all their disappointments and afictions. This
consolation principally consists in their invention of the words
faculty and occult quality. For it being usual, after the frequent
use of terms, which are really signicant and intelligible, to
omit the idea, which we woud express by them, and to preserve
only the custom, by which we recal the idea at pleasure; so it
naturally happens, that after the frequent use of terms, which
are wholly insignicant and unintelligible, we fancy them to be
on the same footing with the precedent, and to have a secret
meaning, which we might discover by reection. (14748/224)
Words such as incomprehensible, insignicant, and unintelligible have both a broad and a narrow use. Used broadly, they
indicate foolishness or unsupportability. We say, for example, that
it is incomprehensible that some people still object to uoridating
drinking water. Taking incomprehensibility this way, Humes passage amounts to a broad, abusive condemnation of the peripatetic
position. Taken more narrowly, it can indicate that the peripatetic
vocabulary lacks meaning or semantic content. Hume, I think,
would have no reservations about using this expression in both
ways, but I am inclined to take his criticism in the second way, for
that squares with the notion I have pressed that the ctions Hume
attributes to philosophers are not ideas with a ctitious content but,
instead, the ction that a term is being used with a content.
Skeptical implications
Before closing the discussion of this section, I wish to return to the
question raised above, What is Humes standpoint in this discus-
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Of the Modern Philosophy (Section 4)
Before examining the modern notion of material substance, Hume
makes some prefatory remarks that are worth close attention.
He opens section 4 with a response to someone who might object
to his selectively rough treatment of the ancient philosophers.
But here it may be objected, that the imagination, according
to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems
of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers, for making use of that faculty, and allowing themselves
to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the
principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal;
such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and
from effects to causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular; such as those I have just now taken
notice of. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts
and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must
immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither
unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful
in the conduct of life; but on the contrary, are observd only
to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other
principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted
by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason, the former
are receivd by philosophy, and the latter rejected. (148/225)
It is essential to take this paragraph in the specic context in which it
appears. Obviously, it is aimed at what Hume takes to be the extravagances of the ancient philosophersextravagances that would not
have occurred if the philosophers had constrained their thought by
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Of the Immateriality of the Soul (Section 5)
This is the second-longest section of part 4 of the Treatise. Only
Humes Of skepticism with regard to the senses is longer. It is
irreligious, in places ironic and smart-alecky, sometimes obscure. It
also contains material that is, I believe, important for understanding Humes problematic and difcult discussion of personal identity
that follows it.
Setting the dialectical stage
Hume begins by telling us that the examination of our internal perceptions will be free of the sorts of contradictions that arose when
dealing with external objects.
The intellectual world, tho involvd in innite obscurities, is
not perplexd with any such contradictions, as those we have
discoverd in the natural. What is known concerning it, agrees
with itself; and what is unknown, we must be contented to
leave so. (152/232)
Hume lays full blame for the contradictions that do emerge in the
examination of the intellectual world at the feet of philosophers.
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That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now
the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. . . . And to cut
short all disputes, the very idea of extension is copyd from
nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly
agree to it. To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is
to say it is extended. (157/23940)
Does this mean that our idea of a table has a certain lengthsay,
ve feet? I do not think so, but I must confess that I nd this discussion bafing. In any case, for Hume the local conjunction of
the extended with the nonextended now raises the problem of local
conjunction for the immaterialist as well.
The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn; and having
found there are impressions and ideas really extended, may
ask his antagonists, how they can incorporate a simple and
indivisible subject with an extended perception? (157/240)
Thus, with respect to the problem of local conjunction, we wind up
precisely where Hume wants us to wind up: with a standoff of an
absurdity facing an equal (but opposite) absurdity.
So far, Hume has been evenhanded in his treatment of materialist and immaterialist conceptions of the soul, but now, showing
where his true animus lies, he singles out the immaterialist for an
extraordinary ad hominem attack.
I assert, that the doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and
indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism, and
will serve to justify all those sentiments, for which Spinoza is
so universally infamous. (157/240)
Hume claims to see a clear analogy between the doctrine of the
immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance
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Of Personal Identity (Section 6)
Though the topic is different, to a large extent Humes examination of personal identity is a replay of arguments that he previously employed in his treatment of the immateriality of the soul.
He begins by giving a vigorous statement of the position he will
attack:
There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every
moment intimately conscious of what we call our self;
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Basic criticisms
It takes Hume only a few pages to dispose of this position. His rst
response goes by so quickly that it may be easy to miss.
From what impression coud this idea be derivd? This question tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction
and absurdity; and yet tis a question, which must necessarily
be answerd, if we woud have the idea of self pass for clear and
intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise
to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are
supposd to have a reference. (164/251)
It is not entirely clear what Hume has in mind in saying that the
self is not any one impression to which our several impressions
are supposed to have a reference, but the claim seems similar to the
denitional move Hume made near the start of his discussion of the
immateriality of the soul, where he asked:
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being. They fall into two categories: those that concern substance
and those that concern necessary connections.
Hume quickly summarizes his reasons for rejecting the idea that
personal identity can be explained by treating the mind as a mental
substance. The simplest involves a direct appeal to introspection:
When I turn my reection on myself, I never can perceive this
self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever
perceive any thing but the perceptions. Tis the composition
of these, therefore, which forms the self. (399/634)
Another argument turns on the intelligibility of something existing
without inhering in a substance.
But tis intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist
distinct and independent, without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can
never be absurd with regard to perceptions. (399/634)
Then, in a remarkable passage, Hume goes beyond the suggestion
that an individual perception satises the denition of an individual
substance to claim that an individual perception can, by itself, constitute an individual mind:
We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or
few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reducd even below
the life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception,
as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you
conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you any
notion of self or substance? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion. (399/634)
Turning next to necessary connections, if perceptions are not unied at a given time and do not preserve identity over time through
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inference rather than as a connecting link that validates the inference. As he puts it: We only feel a connexion or a determination to
pass from one object to another (400/635). That feeling, like any
perception, is simply another member of the heap of perceptions.
Here, then, is the picture of the mind that has emerged. The mind
is a bundle of perceptions with no contents other than perceptions.
These perceptions are not related to one another by inhering in a common substance. In fact, strictly speaking, each perception is itself an
individual substance. In this respect, the mind is a bundle of substances.
Beyond this, each perception may be viewed as an individual mind, so
the mind is not simply a bundle of perceptions, it is a bundle of minds.
Finally, there can be no real connections among individual perceptions,
so no perception can apprehend other perceptions. In Humes audience-free theater, nothing exists that can apprehend the bundle, so the
bundle of perceptions exhibits no mechanism for bundling. For that
matter, it does not seem to contain any mechanism that accounts for
the feeling of connectedness of perceptions within the bundle. If this is
what Humes theory of the human mind comes to, it is not altogether
remarkable that he came to have misgivings concerning it.
Humes declaration of failure
Most philosophers seem inclind to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing
but a reected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. All my hopes
vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our
successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this
head. (400/63536)
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A Gloomy Summation of Skeptical Results
At the start of the seventh, and concluding, section of part 4, Hume
pauses to take stock of where his reections have led him.
Before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before me, I nd myself inclind to stop a
moment in my present station, and to ponder that voyage,
which I have undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires
the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. . . . My memory of past errors and perplexities,
makes me difdent for the future. The wretched condition,
weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in
my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces
me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on
the barren rock, on which I am at present. (17172/26364,
emphasis added)
I take this passage to be an unfeigned expression of the melancholy
generated by a series of disasters unanticipated in the brave opening pages of the Treatise. Others have found it overdone, John
Passmore, for example:
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when absent from the senses. But tho these two operations
be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in
some circumstances they are directly contrary [here Hume
refers the reader to section 4 of part 4], nor is it possible for
us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and
at the same time believe the continud existence of matter.
(173/26566)
The specic circumstance that Hume refers to in this passage concerns the skeptical consequences that follow from his critique of the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is worth
repeating.
There is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and
our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that perswade us
of the continud and independent existence of body. When we
reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour,
sound, taste, nor smell have a continud and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains
nothing in the universe, which has such an existence. (152/231)
Humes rst cause for concern, then, is that an implicit reliance on the imagination can yield irreconcilable conicts generated
within the imagination itself. His second concernand this seems
to affect him at least as deeplyis that enquiring into the operations of this faculty has brought to light its arbitrary, weak, and
capricious character.
When we trace up the human understanding to its rst principles, we nd it to lead us into such sentiments, as seem
to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry, and to
discourage us from future enquiries. (173/266)2
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What Is to Be Done?
Hume needs a way of exiting from his dismal situation, but for him
there is no way of thinking his way out of his crisis. Reason, he
tells us, is incapable of dispelling these clouds (175/269). One has
to abandon the study and reenter the affairs of daily life. In doing
so, he tells us,
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myself concerning the reasonableness of so painful an application. . . . No: If I must be a fool, as all those who reason
or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall at least be
natural and agreeable. (175/26970)
Z
Being a Philosopher on Skeptical Principles
Hume nds, however, that he is not fully content with this way out
of his difculties. Despite the trouble it has brought him, Hume
nds that he has not completely lost his desire to lead the life of the
mind. His ingenious answer is that we should pursue philosophy in
the same skeptical manner that, in daily life, we accept the deliverances of understanding, namely, blindly.
If we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical
principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the
employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively,
and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented
to. (176/270)
These two sentences, I take it, specify the skeptical principles Hume
thinks we should abide by in philosophizing. Skeptics, in this sense,
restrict their reections to matters that naturally attract their attention, and assent to things that they nd naturally compelling.
Skeptics, in this sense, live in accordance with how things strike
them in the situation they are inand nothing more.
With respect to our motive for pursuing philosophy, on this
approach, it is the same as our motive for playing backgammon or
conversing with merry friends: In appropriate circumstances and
carried out in the appropriate way, it can be fun. In Humes more
dignied language:
133
134
135
136
137
is not clear how (or if ) it can bear this burden. It is also unclear
how human faculties can be disciplined to stay within the modest
bounds that Hume, in his calmer moments, prescribes. Given the
seriousness of the skeptical challenges Hume has raised against his
own system, his responses to them seem, to borrow one of his own
phrases, little more than palliative remedies.
All the same, when we turn the page to the beginning of book 2,
Of the Passions, we nd Hume in ne fettle. As one of the readers
for the Press puts it, we nd Hume presenting a long and steady
and boring account of the passions, resuming the science of man as
though there was never a crisis about it. I agree that the transition
from part 4 of book 1 to the opening part of book 2 is at least as
surprising as the transition from part 3 to part 4 in book 1. The sudden appearance of radical skepticism and its sudden disappearance
are equally perplexing.
What are we to make of this? Perhaps when Hume reined in his
ambitions, his good spirits returned and he found that he could
again conduct his philosophical studies in a careless (i.e., carefree)
manner with the reasonable hope that he could at least contribute
a little to the advancement of knowledge. The closing remarks of
book 1, part 4, section 7 of the Treatise are not, however, Humes
nal words on the relationship between skepticism and the legitimacy of his philosophical enterprise. Hume addresses the problem anew in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and
attempts to resolve it in an interestingly different manner. We can
look at this next.
Z
The Treatise and the Enquiry on Skepticism
Hume placed the following advertisement in the front matter of
his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this
volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called
A Treatise of Human Nature: A work which the Author had
projected before he left College, and which he wrote and
published not long after. But not nding it successful, he was
sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he
cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression,
are, he hopes, corrected. . . . Henceforth, the Author desires,
that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing
his philosophical sentiments and principles. (EHU 1/2)
In this work I have willfully disregarded Humes injunction by
making only passing references to the Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding and concentrating almost exclusively on Humes
Treatise. Nor do I propose to examine the Enquiry in detail here.
I will, however, spend some time comparing the opening and closing parts of book 1 of the Treatise with the opening and closing
139
140
Z
The Opening of the Treatise
As we have seen, in the introduction to the Treatise Hume presents a
prospectus extolling the new science of man that he is about to pursue.
His claims in its behalf are hardly modest. His ambition is to produce
an account of human nature with the scope and power achieved by
Newton and others with respect to the physical world. In fact, he claims
to outdo Newton by proposing a complete system of the sciences.
There is no question of importance, whose decision is not
comprisd in the science of man; and there is none, which can
be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted
with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the
principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat
system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely
new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security. (4/xvi)
At the end of book 1, Hume came to the disappointing conclusion that he had not fullled this systematic project and seemed to
despair of the possibility of doing so.
Z
The Opening of the Enquiry
The rst section of the Enquiry is titled Of the different species of
philosophy. Hume begins by distinguishing two perspectives that
141
we can adopt with respect to the study of human nature. One, the
popular or easy approach, considers man chiey as born for action;
and as inuenced in his measures by taste and sentiment (EHU 5/5).
The other, abstruse, approach considers man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavours to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners (EHU 5/6). The popular
approach to human nature, which both entertains and elevates its
readers, needs no apology, but why, Hume asks, should anyone
engage in abstruse philosophy? This question is motivated, in part at
least, by the poor reception the Treatise received. That, however, is
not the whole storyand, to my mind, not the most important part
of the story. The developments in the Treatisea work in abstruse
philosophyseem to undercut the possibility of abstruse philosophy, so if Hume is going to salvage any of the principles and reasonings of that work, a defense, if only limited defense, of abstruse
reasoning is in order. What we get at the start of the Enquiry is a
popular essay in defense of engaging in abstruse philosophy.
Hume begins by presenting what amounts to a balance sheet of
reasons for and against engaging in abstruse philosophy. He rst
presents the reasons against doing so:
1. Abstruse philosophy seems to have little inuence on daily
life.
Abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which
cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can
its principles easily retain any inuence over our conduct and
behaviour. (EHU 6/7)
2. The enterprise is inherently prone to error.
It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in
his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent
142
143
144
Z
The Response to Skepticism in the Enquiry
Turning to the concluding section of the Enquiry, we can compare
the way Hume attempts to meet the challenge of skepticism there
with his response in the closing section of book 1 of the Treatise. In
the Enquiry Hume understands skepticism in much the same way
that he understood it in the Treatise:
The Sceptic . . . provokes the indignation of all divines and
graver philosophers; though it is certain, that no man ever met
with any such absurd creature, or conversed with a man, who
had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either
of action or speculation. This begets a very natural question;
What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to
push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?
(EHU 112/149)
To understand this passage and others like it, it is important to
keep in mind the distinction drawn earlier between two senses of
skepticism. In one sense, a person is skeptical concerning a particular matter if he doubts its truth or suspends judgment concerning it. I have labeled this form of skepticism doxastic skepticism.
We can also speak of arguments as being skeptical. An argument is
skeptical if it calls into question the justication or basis of beliefs
145
146
Though Hume does not explicitly say so, this is the kind of skepticism that emerges in part 4 of book 1 of the Treatise.
Notice that consequent skepticism, as I will awkwardly call it,
may yield two quite different results: It can reveal the absolute fallaciousness of our mental faculties, or it can show their untness for
curious subjects of speculation. These options determine Humes
strategy in the Enquiry for dealing with skepticism. The rst result,
a specter that haunts the Treatise, must be avoided because it
destroys all motives for pursuing philosophical enquiry. The second outcome will be embraced because it fences off just those areas
where skeptical disasters occuror so it is hoped.
Z
The Science of Human Nature in the Enquiry
In the opening sentence of the Enquiry, Hume speaks of the science of human nature. If the science of human nature is taken to
be the presentation of detailed associationalist accounts of mental
phenomena, then it is striking how little of this activity, central to
the Treatise, is found in the Enquiry. In the Treatise Hume has an
insatiable lust for producing elaborate associationalist accounts of
mental phenomena, often going off on digressions in order to pursue this passion. He almost seems to be saying: Throw any problem
concerning the operations of the human mind my way, and I will
take care of it. Not only is this aspect of the Treatise reduced in the
Enquiry, there is a wholesale deletionpurge might be a better
wordof the most elaborate and important applications of associationalist methods found in the Treatise. Consider section 2, part 4,
Of skepticism with regard to the senses. The primary task of this
section is to accomplish two things: rst, to offer an account of how
the vulgar come to accept the false belief that objects of perception
147
148
149
Z
The Role of Skeptical Arguments in the Enquiry
In the Enquiry Hume presents a series of skeptical arguments that
deal, in turn, with the senses, reason, and what he calls moral
reasoning.
Skepticism concerning the senses
Hume begins his skeptical arguments directed against the senses
by dismissing as trite some common reasons for impugning the
senses: perceptual variability, illusions (bent oars in water, double
images), and so on:
These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufcient to prove,
that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on;
but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by
considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the
distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in
order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria
of truth and falsehood. (EHU 113/151)
Hume actually underestimates the force of these supposedly trite arguments. Their point is this: The appearance of things varies with settings
and circumstances, and we have no reasoned grounds for favoring any
one of these perspectives over any other.
Having brushed aside supposedly trite arguments, Hume
replaces them with one he considers both profound and unanswerable. Though perceptual variability of itself does not yield skeptical consequences, its recognition does lead a thoughtful person to
adopt the way of ideas:
150
151
entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but
the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of
their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
(EHU 115/153)
On the basis of this argument, Hume draws a conclusion as robust
as any found in the Treatise: This is a topic, therefore, in which
the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into
all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry (EHU 115/153).
For good measure, Hume throws in an argument against the
modern notion of primary and secondary qualities along the lines
he employed in book 1, part 4, section 4 of the Treatise. I will not
repeat that argument here, but simply note the strong skeptical conclusion that he draws from it.
Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and
leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as
the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that
no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it.
(EHU 116/155)
In a footnote, Hume explicitly attributes this argument to Berkeley.
Skepticism concerning reason
Hume presents a vigorous restatement of skepticism with regard to
the senses. The same cannot be said for his presentation of skepticism with regard to reason. The argument in the Treatise is not
repeated. Perhaps Hume had second thoughts concerning it. He
152
may have found its results too much to contend with. In any case,
this argument that deeply troubled him in the Treatise is simply
gone. What we get instead is a curious discussion of the paradoxes
that seem to arise from the mathematical notion of innite divisibility. In order to present a skeptical challenge to reason, Hume would
have to produce an argument of the following form:
Reason commits one to the doctrine of innite divisibility.
The doctrine of innite divisibility leads to absurdities and
contradictions.
Therefore, reason commits one to absurdities and contradictions.
Hume accepts the second premise but in a footnote seems to reject
the rst premise:
It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and
contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such thing as
abstract or general ideas, properly speaking. (118n./158n.)
Hume goes on to sketch a Berkeleyan critique of innite divisibility.
But if Hume is right in saying that the doctrine of innite divisibility is avoidable, then the rst premise of the above argument is false
and no general skepticism with regard to reason is forthcoming.
Skepticism concerning moral reasoning
Hume turns next to moral reasoning, not in the sense of ethical reasoning, but rather nondemonstrative or probabilistic reasoning concerning
matters of fact.4 He tells us that the skeptical objections to reasoning
concerning matters of fact are either popular or philosophical. He dismisses the popular objections to moral reason in the same way that he
dismissed the popular skeptical arguments directed at the senses:
153
154
155
The claim that the skeptical argument shows the weakness of our,
and not just the skeptics, mental faculties is reminiscent of claims
made in the Treatise. But there is a puzzle here. Humes reference
to the weakness of our faculties suggests that stronger mental faculties might not face like difculties. Humes skeptical argument is,
however, intended to establish that no reasoning can show that
objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined,
will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner.
The weakness or strength of our faculties does not bear on this matter. Hume does not seem to be altogether clear about this.
To return to a point already made, there is a fundamental difference between the employment of skeptical arguments in the Treatise
and Enquiry. In the Treatise, having presented a skeptical argument,
Hume goes on to ask questions of the following kind: How it happens, that even after all we retain a degree of belief, which is sufcient
for our purpose, either in philosophy or common life (124/185). It is
the pursuit of such questions that leads Hume into a skeptical crisis. In the Enquiry he largely avoids questions of this kind and thus
avoids the consequent skepticism that attempts to answer them can
generate.
Z
Pyrrhonism and Mitigated Skepticism
Rightly or wronglyI think wronglyHume identies Pyrrhonism
with an extreme form of doxastic skepticism, and on this basis produces a number of standard arguments against it:
For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it;
while it remains in its full force and vigour. (EHU 119/159)
156
And this:
And though a pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into
a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound
reasonings; the rst and most trivial event in life will put to
ight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in
every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers
of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. (EHU 119/160)
This may be comforting, but it provides no answer to the question Hume raised in the opening section of the Enquiry: Given the
multitude of dangers involved and the small rewards to be expected,
why pursue philosophical inquiry at all? How, that is, can philosophy be pursued in a manner that minimizes its dangers and gives
at least some prospect of reasonable reward? Humes answer at the
close of book 1 of the Treatise is, as we have seen, that we keep
ourselves out of trouble by keeping our heads low and doing our
philosophizing within the boundaries of gentlemanly constraints.
In the Enquiry, Hume makes a more remarkable and systematically
more interesting suggestion: We should use Pyrrhonian doubt to
police our philosophical efforts. It is in this way that we arrive at
what Hume calls a mitigated skepticism.
The rst form of mitigated skepticism generates modesty and
reserve. Hume associates it with the probabilism of ancient academic skepticism. His exact wording is important:
There is, indeed, a more mitigated skepticism, or academical
philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which
may, in part, be the result of this pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure,
corrected by common sense and reection. (EHU 120/161)
157
158
Z Notes
Chapter 1
1. Im not thinking just of section 6 of part 4, Of personal identity.
The notion of identity also plays a central role in Humes discussion
of skepticism with regard to the senses and in his discussion of the
metaphysical notion of substance.
2. Hume is particularly proud of his treatment of probability in the Treatise.
He brags about it (in a feigned third person) in his anonymously published Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature (408/64647).
3. I rst encountered a defense of Hume against Reids criticism along
these lines in a work published by the late-eighteenth-century/earlynineteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Brown:
That darkness and light mutually produce each other, they [i.e.,
common people] do not believe: and if they did believe it, their
belief, instead of conrming the truth of Mr. Humes theory,
would prove it to be false; since it would prove the relation of
Cause and Effect to be supposed where there is no customary
connection. How often, during a long and sleepless night, does
the sensation of darkness exist, without being followed by the
sensation of light? (Brown 1822, 170ff.).
159
160
Chapter 2
1. Notice that Hume does not seem to be talking about the degradation
of the content of the information transmitted, but rather its vivacity.
Chapter 3
1. It also corresponds to Humes treatment of miracles in section 10 of
the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, where, in effect,
he uses causal principles to evaluate the trustworthiness of eyewitness
testimony. For more on this, see Fogelin (2003).
2. In an attempt to show that intuitive knowledge also degenerates into probability, Hume argues that some probability of error exists in the addition
of even very small numbers. Hume does not employ the reexive move
central to this treatment of demonstrative reasoning, but instead engages
in two slippery-slope arguments I have labeled [1] and [2].
[1] For tis easily possible, by gradually diminishing the numbers,
to reduce the longest series of addition to the most simple question, which can be formd, to an addition of two single numbers;
and upon this supposition we shall nd it impracticable to show
the precise limits of knowledge and of probability, or discover
that particular number, at which the one ends and the other
begins. But knowledge and probability are of such contrary
and disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensibly
into each other, and that because they will not divide, but must
be either entirely present, or entirely absent. [2] Besides, if any
single addition were certain, every one woud be so, and consequently the whole or total sum; unless the whole can be different
from all its parts. I had almost said, that this was certain; but
I reect, that it must reduce itself, as well as every other reasoning,
and from knowledge degenerate into probability. (12122/181)
3.
4.
5.
6.
161
out the possibility that some simple arithmetic sums fall paradigmatically into the category of intuitive truths. 1 + 1 = 2 can be counted as
an intuitive truth even if we cannot specify the precise place where
ones intuitive powers dim. Argument [2] is no better. We can make
errors in adding a long column of numbers without at some point
mistakenly believing that, say, 2 + 3 = 7. We know that 2 + 3 = 5
but, distracted, write down the wrong number, or read a number
incorrectly.
Here is a more exotic example. Suppose one of the subjects just happens to be omniscient, something, being omniscient, she, he, or it
would know. No diminution of assurance would take place in this
case. It is, however, not clear to me whether it makes sense to speak
of a being who (or that) just happens to be omniscient. Perhaps omniscient beings must be necessarily omniscient, but I dont see why.
Previously I have argued that Humes skeptical argument fails because
he has not ruled out the possibility that the series of diminutions may
approximate a limitperhaps a high limit (Fogelin 1985, note 4,
p. 174). That criticism, though fair enough, now strikes me as shallow
in conceding too much to Humes argument.
As already noted, Hume seems to exempt reports of subjective states
from his skepticism.
Hume used quite a different tactic in dealing with the threat of the
loss of all belief in the remote past through reiterative diminutions
in part 3, section 13. There he says that the imagination avoids this
result by forming a confused and general notion of each link that
disguises the multiplicity of transitions. In both cases, however,
the day is saved by what seems to be a defect in our intellectual
apparatus.
Chapter 4
1. There are objections aplenty that can be brought against it, but I will
not rehearse them here.
2. Incidentally, in the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley deals
with the phenomenon of outnessthe fact that we seem to perceive
162
163
the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without
a mind. (Principles, part 1, section 6)
164
This is too heady and swift. The distinction between relations of ideas
and matters of fact as drawn in section 4 of the Enquiry is too underdeveloped and too prone to objections to bear so heavy a burden. In
anticipating Ayers positivism, Hume also buys futures in many of its
problems. This is not the place to go into such matters in detail, but
it is worth inquiring into the status of Humes distinction itself. How
should we treat the following passage?
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be
divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of
Fact. (EHU 24/25)
166
Z Index
167
168
Index
causal relations
and idea of necessary
connection, 120121
necessary connection as attendant
product of, 1314
necessary connection as essential
component of, 2223
necessary connection as not an
essential element of, 2526
causation
as natural relation, 26
as philosophical relation, 12, 26
and philosophical relations of
contiguity and priority, 1314
vulgar perspective on, 115116
cause, denition of, 1617, 2527
cause, necessity of, 1415
circularity argument, 18
Cognition and Commitment in Humes
Philosophy (Garrett), 9
coherence, as basis of belief in external
existence, 6668
common sense and reection, as
curb to Pyrrhonisms destructive
tendencies, 157
conceivability argument, 1718
conjunction, constant, in denition of
cause, 1617
conjunction, local, and immateriality of
the soul, 104107
consequent skepticism, 145146
constancy, as basis of belief in external
existence, 66, 68
constant conjunction, in denition of
cause, 1617
contiguity, and transfer of beliefs, 20
continued and distinct existence
Index
shift in emphasis from the Treatise, 147
skeptical arguments: concerning
moral reasoning, 152155;
concerning reason, 151152;
concerning the senses, 149151;
in Treatise compared to, 154
on skepticism, 139140
Euthyphro choice, 23
existence. See continued and distinct
existence; double-existence
theory of perception;
external existence
experience, initial, in origins of causal
reasoning, 15
external existence, 5965, 6668
See also continued and distinct
existence
external objects, 57, 60
faculties
human, weakness of, 154155
free-thinkers. See materialists
gap lling, in operations of the
imagination, 7375
Garrett, Don, 9
governments, examination of origins
of, 163 n.2 (chap. 7)
horizontal method, in evaluating
soundness of proof, 43, 47
human mind. See mind, the
human nature, approaches to
study of, 140141
Hume
defense of, against Reids
criticism, 159 n.3
169
170
Index
ideas (continued)
and perceptions of constancy,
7374
principle of, in operations of the
imagination, 69, 7073
self-identity compared to, 70
See also personal identity
imagination
associative operations of, as source
of causal inferences, 3
capacity of, to vivify ideas based
on associationalist principles,
147148
difculties in implicit reliance on,
126129
and the ction of personal identity,
112113
mechanisms of, as source of Humes
skeptical crisis, 5657
as source of belief in continued
and distinct existence, 6566
treatment of, in the Enquiry compared
to in the Treatise, 148149
undiscriminating operations
of the associative principles
of, 38
immateriality of the soul, 101102,
104107
immortality, proofs of, 108109
impressions, 1516, 1618
incomprehensibility, broad and narrow
meanings of, 94
inductive skepticism, 3
innite divisibility, paradoxes arising
from notion of, 152
innite regress, 4445, 48
intuitive knowledge, 12, 160161 n.2
Kant, Immanuel, 39
knowledge
degeneration of, into probability, 4142
domain of, 1112
intuitive, 160161 n.2
reason, and annihilation of, 48
local conjunction, and immateriality
of the soul, 104107
materialists, and argument against
immaterialist, 105
material substance, modern
notion of, 9798
memory, and belief in personal
identity, 115
memory, impressions of, 1516
mind, the
as bundle of minds, 121
as bundle of perceptions, 121
Humes picture of, 118121
as mental substance, 119
perceptions, exclusive presence in, 60
reex acts of, 41, 44, 46, 4748
theater metaphor and, 111112
See also imagination
miracles, Humes treatment of, 160 n.1
mitigated skepticism, 6, 155158
moderate skepticism, 95
modern philosophy, 85, 9697, 9799,
99100
moral certainty, 164 n.4
moral reasoning, 152155
naturalism, tension between skepticism
and, 4
natural relation, and denition of cause, 25
Index
necessary connection
as attendant product of causal
relation, 1314
as essential component of causal
relation, 2223
feeling of, as product of causal
inference, 120121
as not an essential element of causal
relation, 2526
as product of inference from cause
to effect, 23
New Theory of Vision (Berkeley), 62
objects
changing, false belief in continued
identity of, 8789
external, 60
false belief in simplicity of, 86,
9093
imagination, role in formation of
beliefs concerning, 57
solidity as primary feature of, 98
occult qualities, 94, 95
operations of the imagination
gap lling, 7377
grounding of beliefs in,
as source of Humes
difculties, 126127
and identity, principle of, 7073
philosophical and unphilosophical
probability and, 29
skeptical consequences that emerge
from, 127128
as source of causal inferences, 3
See also continued and distinct
existence: belief in
original rst matter, 8990
171
172
Index
Index
regression argument, and skepticism
with regard to reason, 4344
Reid, Thomas, 2627, 159 n.3
reiterative diminution, principle
of, 3135, 4448
relations
causal, 1314, 2223, 2526, 108,
120121
natural, 25
philosophical, 1112, 1314, 25
remoteness of the event, effect
of, 3031
remoteness of the observation,
effect of, 31
representational realism, staying
power of, 81
representationalist account of perception,
7882, 147, 150151, 158
resemblance, 12, 20, 27
Scepticism with Regard to Reason
(Owen), 89
science of human nature
in the Enquiry, 146148
transformation of, into modest
activity, 134135
senses, the
faith in, 5557
Humes turnabout with regard
to, 5557
implicit faith in, 82
implicit faith shaken, 8384
as not the source of belief in
continued and distinct
existence, 6162
skeptical doubts about, 8283
of skepticism, distinctions between, 144
173
174
Index
skepticism
antecedent, 145
consequent, 145146
distinctions between senses of, 144
doxastic, 49, 144145
in the Enquiry, 139140, 144146
rst reference to, in the Treatise, 38
Humes turn to, 3940
inductive, 3
mitigated, 6, 155158
moderate, 95
radical, 67, 59, 137 (see also
Pyrrhonism)
results of, a gloomy summation, 125130
tension between naturalism and, 4
theoretical, 49, 145
and universal doubt, 151
solidity, as primary feature of material
objects, 98
soul, the
immateriality of, 101102, 104107
spiritual substance of, as basis for
immortality of the soul, 108109
as substance, 102104
soul-body interaction, 107108
standpoints of Hume regarding radical
skepticism, 67
Stroud, Barry, 8
substance, notion of, 8586, 8990,
102103, 103104