LEGAL PROFESSION
JARDELEZA
CAYETANO V MONSOD
PARAS; September 3, 1991
NATURE
Petition to review decision of Commission on Appointments
FACTS
- April 25, 1991 – Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed by Pres.
Aquino as Chairman of COMELEC
- Rene Cayetano opposed such appointment as citizen and
taxpayer because Monsod allegedly does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years
- June 18, 1991 – Monsod took his oath of office
- Monsod’s credentials
> member of Philippine Bar since 1960
> after bar, worked in law office of his father
> 1963-1970 – in World Bank Group as operations officer in
Costa Rica and Panama involves getting acquainted with laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic and project work
> 1970 – in Meralco Group as CEO of investment bank
> since 1986 – rendered service to various companiesas legal
and economic consultant or CEO
> 1986-1987 – secretary-general and national chairman of
NAMFREL (election law)
> co-chairman of Bishop’s Businessmen’s Conference for Human
Development
> 1990 - Davide Commission – quasi-judicial body
> 1986-1987 – member of Constitutional Commission as
Chairman on Accountability of Public Officers
- AIX-C Sec1(1) - … Commission on Elections chairman shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years
- no jurisprudence on what constitutes the practice of law
ISSUE
WON Monsod is qualified as Chairman of COMELEC in fulfilling
the requirement engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years
HELD
YES. Practice of Law means any activity, in or out of court
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Monsod as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-
negotiator, and lawyer-negotiator is proof he is engaged in
practice of law for more than 1- years
- Black’s Law Dictionary
> Rendition of service requiring the knowledge and application
of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent
> not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and giving all legal advice to clients
- Land Title Abstract and Trust Co v Dworken
> one who in representative capacity engages in business of
advising clients as to their rights under law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court
- UP Law Center
> advocacy, counseling, public service
- Alexander SyCip
> appearance of lawyer in litigation is most publicly familiar role
of lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer
> more legal work is transacted in law offices that in the
courtrooms
> business counseling than trying cases; as planner,
diagnostician, trial lawyer, surgeon
- article on Business Star
> emerging trends in corporate law
SEPARATE OPINION
A2010 PROF.
NARVASA [concur]
- concur only in the result
PADILLA [dissent]
- Practice refers to actual performance of application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge;
it connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action TF
lawyer employed as business executive or corporate manager,
other than head of Legal Department cannot be said to be in the
practice of law
- People v Villanueva
> Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind
- Commission on Appointments memorandum
> practice of law requires habituality, compensation, application
of law, legal principle, practice or procedure, and attorney-client
relationship
CRUZ [dissent]
- sweeping definition of practice of law as to render the
qualification practically toothless
- there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know about and
observe
- “performance of any acts… in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law” which tells us absolutely
nothing
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
- practice is envisioned as active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal or
extemporaneous
- nothing in the bio-data even remotely indicates Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation
- difficult if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law
- Monsod was asked if he ever prepared contracts for parties in
real-estate transaction; he answered very seldom
- Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not
fall under the denominations of practice of law
SANTUYO V HIDALGO
CORONA; January 17, 2005
NATURE
Administrative case in SC for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty
FACTS
- Petitioners Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused
respondent Atty. Edwin Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyer’s oath and notarial law
- In Dec 1991, couple purchased parcel of land covered by deed
of sale
- It was allegedly notarized by Hidalgo and entered in his notarial
register
- Six years later, couple had dispute with Danilo German over
ownership of said land; German presented an affidavit executed
by Hidalgo denying authenticity of his signature on deed of sale
Petitioners' Claim
- Hidalgo overlooked the fact that deed of sale contained ALL the
legal formalities of a duly notarized document (including
impression of his notarial dry seal)
- Santuyos could not have forged the signature, not being
learned in technicalities surrounding notarial act
- They had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register,
and they could not have made any imprint of his seal or
signature.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Respondents' Comments
- He denied having notarized any deed of sale for disputed
property.
- He once worked as junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob
Law Office; and admitted that he notarized several documents in
that office.
- As a matter of procedure, documents were scrutinized by
senior lawyers, and only with their approval could notarization
be done.
- In some occasions, secretaries (by themselves) would affix dry
seal of junior associates on documents relating to cases handled
by the law firm.
- He normally required parties to exhibit community tax
certificates and to personally acknowledge documents before
him as notary public.
- He knew Editha, but only met Benjamin in Nov 1997 (Meeting
was arranged by Editha so as to personally acknowledge another
document)
- His alleged signature on deed of sale was forged (strokes of a
lady)
- At time it was supposedly notarized, he was on vacation.
ISSUES
1. WON the signature of respondent on the deed of sale was
forged
2. WON respondent is guilty of negligence
HELD
1. Yes.
Ratio The alleged forged signature was different from Hidalgo’s
signatures in other documents submitted during the
investigation.
Reasoning Santuyos did not state that they personally
appeared before respondent. They were also not sure if he
signed the document; only that his signature appeared on it.
They had no personal knowledge as to who actually affixed the
signature.
2. Yes.
Ratio He was negligent for having wholly entrusted the
preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the office secretaries, including safekeeping of
dry seal and making entries in notarial register.
Reasoning Responsibility attached to a notary public is
sensitive, and respondent should have been more discreet and
cautious.
Disposition Atty. Hidalgo is suspended from his commission as
notary public for two (2) years for negligence in the performance
of duties as notary public.
SICAT V ARIOLA, JR.
PER CURIAM; April 15, 2005
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility
FACTS
- In an affidavit-complaint, complainat Arturo Sicat, a Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged
respondent Atty. Gregorio Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of
Cainta, Rizal with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his
dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of
Attorney(SPA) purportedly executed by one Juanito C. Benitez
According to complainant, respondent made it appear that
Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in
fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
- He alleged that prior to notarization, the Municipality of Cainta
had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and
Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the
construction of low-cost houses(project worth=11M). For the
services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a
check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of 3.7M, payable to
J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Goco. The check was received and cashed by the the latter by
virtue of the SPA notarized by Ariola.
Respondents' Comments
- Respondent explained that as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez
had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to
inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to
notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4,
2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a
similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May
12, 2000. Therefore, the SPA was cancelled the same day he
notarized it.
- Moreover, the suit should be dismissed for forum shopping
since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Which complaints were dismissed because the assailed act
referred to violation of the IRR of the Commission on Audit.
- The Court, in its resolution dated March 12, 2003, referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP
recommended that respondent's notarial commission be revoked
and that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUES
WON acts of respondent amounted to a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD
Ratio The act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation
imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibits engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct..
Reasoning The undisputed facts show that Benitez died on
October 25, 2000. The notarial acknowledgment of respondent
declared that Benitez “appeared before him and acknowledged
that the instrument was his clear and voluntary act.” Clearly
respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful
statement.
- Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was
superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate
him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public
document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the
legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act.
Disposition WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola,
Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the
records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention
of the Ombudsman.
UI V BONIFACIO
DE LEON; June 8, 2000
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
Mrs. Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly
carrying on an illicit relationship with her husband Mr. Ui. In the
proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Bonifacio attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that
said that she and Mr. Ui got married in 1985, but according to
the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State
Department of Health, they were married in 1987. She claims
that she entered the relationship with Mr. Ui in good faith and
that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or
shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love
with Mr. Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her
discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law
LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD
- No. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not
have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply
by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. One of the
conditions prior to the admission to the bar is that an applicant
must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice.
Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.
- A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, which
has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community.
Lawyers, as keepers of the public faith, are burdened with a
higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
affairs with great caution. Atty. Bonifacio was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Mr. Ui, clothed as it was with what she
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral.
Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is,
it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
- A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also
behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Atty.
Bonifacio’s act of immediately distancing herself from Mr. Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged
moral indifference and proves that she fad no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. On the matter of the falsified certificate of marriage,
it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that
she did not know the year of her marriage or that she failed to
check that the information in the document which she attached
to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the bar, free from misdeeds and acts
of malpractice.
FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR.
ROMERO; July 31, 1997
FACTS
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco, Jr.
be denied admission to the legal profession. Barranco passed
the 1970 bar exams on the fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been sweethearts,
that a child was born to them out of wedlock and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
- Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo and
were steadies since 1953. Figueroa first acceded to sexual
congress in 1960. A son, Rafael Barranco, was born on Dec 11,
1964. Barranco promised to marry Figueroa after he passes the
bar exams. Their relationship continued, with more than 20 or 30
promises of marriage. Barranco gave only P10 for the child on
Rafael’s birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married
another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988, several motions to dismiss and comments
were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint
for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to
take the lawyer’s oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroa’s opposition,
resolved to cancel Barranco’s scheduled oath-taking.
- June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP. On May
17, 1997, IBP recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of Barranco from the legal profession
HELD
No. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless acts which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.
- Barranco’s engaging in premarital sexual relations with
Figueroa and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral
character on his part but it does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct.
- Barranco and Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual
relations were evidently consensual.
- Respondent, at the time of this decision, is already 62.
Disposition Petition is dismissed. Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
allowed to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of proper
fees.
BARRIOS V MARTINEZ
PER CURIAM; November 12, 2004
FACTS
- Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22
- Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13, 1996, and
the Entry of judgment dated March 20, 1996 in an action for
disbarment against Martinez
- July 3, 1996 – the Court required respondent to comment on
said petition within 10 days from notice
- February 17, 1997 – a second resolution was issued requiring
respondent to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for failure to comply with the earlier Resolution
and to submit Comment
- July 7, 1997 – the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for
respondent’s failure to comply with previous resolution within 10
days
- April 27, 1998 – the Court fined the respondent an additional
P2000 and required him to comply with the resolution under pain
of imprisonment and arrest for a period of 5 days or until his
compliance
- February 3, 1999 – the Court declared respondent Martinez
guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied
with the aforesaid resolution
- April 5, 1999 – NBI reported that respondent was arrested in
Tacloban City on March 26, 1999 but was subsequently released
after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of
February 17, 1997 and April 27, 1998 by remitting the amount of
P2000 and submitting his overdue Comment:
1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated
February 17, 1997 as he was at that time undergoing
medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo,
Leyte
2. Complainant passed away sometime in June 1997
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a
civil case which was decided in respondent’s favor.
Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the
execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the
family of complainant, the latter filed the present
administrative case
- September 11, 1997 – Robert Visbal of the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First
Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also
stood charged in another estafa case before the RTC of Tacloban
City, as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Dona Paz
tragedy in 1987 for which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a
decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed
by the CA.
- June 16, 1999 – the Court referred the present case to the IBP
for investigation, report, and recommendation
LEGAL PROFESSION
- The report of IBP stated:
1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the complainant died and that
dismissal is warranted because the case filed by him does
not survive due to his demise as a matter of fact, it is
extinguished upon his death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant
to Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the
SC or the IBP may initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when
their attention is called by any one and a probable cause
exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which
requires disciplinary sanctions.
2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as shown
by respondent, is an utter lack of good moral character
3. Respondent’s conviction of a crime of moral
turpitude clearly shows his unfitness to protect the
administration of justice and therefore justifies the
imposition of sanctions against him
4. It is recommended that respondent be disbarred
and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately
- September 27, 2003 – the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner
- December 3, 2003 – Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation
- January 14, 2004 – the Court required the complainant to file a
comment within 10 days
- February 16, 2004 – complainant’s daughter sent a
Manifestation and Motion alleging they have not been furnished
with a copy of respondent’s Motion
ISSUE
WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one involving
moral turpitude
HELD
Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
- The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law is also untenable. The practice of law is a privilege. The
purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
- Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of
persons unfit to practice them.
- The court is also disinclined to take respondent’s old age and
the fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his
favor. If at all, the respondent was held to a higher standard for
it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence, and his conduct should be above
reproach.
- The Court based the determination of the penalty from
previously decided cases, holding that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
of moral turpitude.
Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
PIMENTEL, HR V LLORENTE
MENDOZA; August 29, 2000
(edel cruz)
NATURE
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Administrative Matter. Disbarment
FACTS
- Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed this disbarment case against
Attys. Antonio Llorente (election officer of COMELEC and
chairman of the Board) and Ligaya Salayon (ex officio vice-
chairman) for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust
and violation of the lawyer’s oath in connection with the
discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of
Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections.
- Pimentel alleges that respondents:
• Respondents tampered with the votes he
received
• Statement of votes show that other candidates
were credited with votes which were above the number of
votes they actually received and his votes were reduced
(dagdag-bawas =p)
• In 101 precints, Enrile’s votes were in excess
of the total number of voters who actually voted therein
• The votes from 22 precints were twice
recorded in 18 statements of votes.
- PIMENTEL: The respondents committed a serious breach of
public trust and of their lawyers’ oath by signing the statements
of votes (SoVs) despite their knowledge that some of the entries
were false.
- RESPONDENTS: The errors pointed out by complainant could be
attributed to honest mistake, oversight and /or fatigue.
- IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit.
- Pimentel also filed criminal charges against the two before the
COMELEC which dismissed said charges for insufficiency of
evidence.
- The SC, upon Pimentel’s petition for certiorari, directed the
COMELEC to file appropriate charges against respondents.
ISSUE
1. WON a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
under Rule 139 –B, section 12 C (within 15 day period) since the
petition was filed late
2. WON the respondents are guilty of misconduct
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- In Halimao v. Villanueva: Although Rule 139-B, sec 12(c)
makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its
text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited.
- It appears that the petition was filed on time because a copy of
the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the SC was received. It is the burden of the
respondent to show that the complainant filed the petition was
filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.
- Even if Pimentel received the IBP resolution in question was
filed 2 days late, the delay may be overlooked.
- Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public
welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or
not.
- The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
Court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and generally has no interest, in the outcome except as all
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. For this
reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy or prescription or with
procedure like verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions
have no application to disbarment proceedings.
2. YES
Reasoning
- In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only
clearly preponderance of evidence is required to establish
liability.
- SC: What is involved here is not just a case of mathematical
error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the
election returns and the subsequent entry of erroneous figures in
or two statements of votes but a systematic scheme to pad
LEGAL PROFESSION
the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense
of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation
in the election returns.
- Despite the fact that these discrepancies were apparent on the
face of these documents and that the variation involves
substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified
the SoVs as true and correct. This constitutes misconduct.
- Only the respondents had access to the SoVs and the CoC and
thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the
discrepancies therein so it is irrelevant that the canvassing was
open to the public and observed by numerous individuals.
- A lawyer who holds a government position may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharged of his duties as a government official. However, if the
misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined
as a member of the bar for such misconduct.
- By certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, the
respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code, which
stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” By lawyers express provision of
Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government
service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as
to “do no falsehood.”
- As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under
greater obligation to observe the basic tenet of the profession
(to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor) because a public office is a public trust.
Disposition Respondents’ participation in the irregularities
reflects on the legal profession. This merits a suspension but
since this is their first transgression, a fine is sufficient.
Fine of 10,000 Php for each for misconduct.
CORDOVA V CORDOVA
PER CURIAM; November 29, 1989
(giulia pineda)
NATURE
Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the
Bar
FACTS
- Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to
then CJ Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence
Cordova with immorality and acts unbecoming of a member of
the Bar. The complaint was forwarded to the IBP, Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and investigation.
- The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified
complain to which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988
a revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint
against her husband.
- On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission
her evidence ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling
several times. The hearings never took place as she failed to
appear.
- The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices were sent to him.
- In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant
informed the commission that she and her husband have already
reconciled.
- In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the
parties to appear before it for the confirmation and explanation
of the telegraphic message and to file formal motion to dismiss
the complaint. Neither responded and nothing was heard from
either party since then.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors:
- Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June
1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born.
- In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as
Branch Clerk of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went
to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband
and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and
Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife,
with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his
wife, using the name Fely Cordova.
- Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to
establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while
failing to support his legitimate family.
- On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife
had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he
would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate
family to Bislig
- Respondent would, however, frequently come home from
beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the
support of his legitimate family.
- In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a
trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was no longer living with
her children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova
was living with another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had
taken his younger daughter along with him
- Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the
complainants, compelling complainant to go to court and to take
back her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC of Bislig, gave her
custody of their children.
- Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued
to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to
fail to give support to his legitimate family.
ISSUE
WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of
the complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case.
HELD
The most recent reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and
wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent earn carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself.
Ratio
- An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required
to show that he possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar.
- The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is
not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until further
orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory
to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has
given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
SORIANO V DIZON
PER CURIAM; January 25, 2006
(romy ramirez)
NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment
FACTS
- Respondent, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was convicted by final
judgment by the RTC of Baguio City for frustrated murder. He
applied and was granted probation by the said court based on
several conditions which included among others the satisfaction
of the civil liabilities imposed in favor of the offended party,
Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver who was rendered paralyzed on
the left side of the body as a result of his being shot by the
defendant.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- The defendant despite the condition that he pay the civil
liabilities imposed on him as a condition for the probation,
appealed said civil liability to the Court of Appeals.
- From the records of the trial court, it appears that defendant
was drunk at the time of the incident and that the case arose out
of the apparent resentment of the defendant from having been
overtaken by the victim who was then driving a taxi. From the
testimony of a witness, it further appears that the taxi driver was
merely defending himself and that defendant was the aggressor
during said incident.
- Upon the complaint for the disbarment filed by Soriano against
Dizon, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines rendered its report and recommendation which
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. The
Commssion recommended the disbarment of the defendant for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and
for exhibiting an obvious lack of good moral character.
ISSUES
1. WON Dizon’s crime of frustrated murder involves moral
turpitude and that his guilt warrants disbarment
HELD
Ratio
- The totality of the facts of the case unmistakably bears the
earmarks of moral turpitude. Given that membership in the legal
profession demands a high degree of good moral character not
only as a condition to admission but also a continuing
requirement for the practice of law, the defendant has shown in
all his actuations that he lacks the fitness to remain in the law
profession.
Reasoning
- Not all cases involving homicide involves moral turpitude. The
question as to what may be a crime involving moral turpitude
would depend on the individual facts surrounding the case and
the surrounding circumstances.
- In the case at bar, it was shown that Dizon was the aggressor
as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The actuations of the victim in this case can be
considered as reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
attack of Dizon.
- The defendant’s use of an unlicensed firearm and his refusal to
satisfy his civil liability to the victim is a serious transgression of
Canon 1 of the code of Professional Responsibility.
- Defendant has continuously display his dishonest and
duplicitous behavior by first seeking to arrive at an out of court
settlement with the family and when the same failed, making it
appear that it was the family would sought a conference with
him. He also lied to the court by claiming that he incident was
the result of the mauling he got at the hands of the victim and
two other persons. This story was belied by the physical
evidence as testified to by no less than three doctors.
Disposition Manuel Dizon is disbarred and his name is stricken
from the roll of attorneys.
CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES V VILLALUZ
REGALADO; June 19, 1997
(cha mendoza)
NATURE
Petition for the disbarment on the grounds of grossly immoral
and grave misconduct
FACTS
-Complainant is the presiding judge of Branch 108 of the RTC of
Pasay City while respondent is a consultant at the Presidential
Anti Crime Commission, and a retired justice of the Court of
Appeals
-Complainant was widowed by the presumption of death of her
1st husband, upon a decree of presumption of death after 16-
year absence
-Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1977when
respondent was the presiding judge of the Criminal Circuit Court
in Pasig for the murder case involving the death of the
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complainant’s son. Since then, the respondent became a close
family friend.
-On January 7, 1994, the complainant and the respondent got
married in a civil wedding, with all the essential and formal
requisites present.
-On the afternoon of their wedding day, the respondent fetched
the complainant from her house in QC to stay in the
respondent’s condo unit. There was a phone call and when the
complainant answered, a woman was on the other end of the
line offending the complainant with insulting remarks. The
complainant confronted the respondent about the caller and the
confrontation ended up in a heated exchange of words, to the
point where the respondent said to the complainant, “Ayaw ko
nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, 'yong sumusunod sa
bawa't gusto ko'. Get that marriage contract and have it
burned." With that, the complainant left the respondent and
after that, they never contacted each other again.
-Several months after, in a bible study session, the complainant
learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of
the bible group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the
marriage between the respondent and a certain Lydia Geraldez.
After hearing that, on June 6, 1995 the complainant filed the
instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
-On August 7, 1995, when complainant discovered that the
respondent falsified his marriage contract (Exh C.) dated May 10,
1994 by stating that he is “single”, the complainant executed
against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for
Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1"). The complainant also
presented the Marriage Contract between her and respondent
(Exh. "B"), the Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo
Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge
Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her
(complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").
Respondent’s claim The respondent claimed that he only
voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract bet. Him and the
complainant in an effort to help the complainant in the
administrative case for immorality filed against her by her legal
researcher in 1993 and that their marriage was just a “sham
marriage”
-Also, he claims that when he got married to the complainant,
his first marriage with Librada Peña was still subsisting because
the decision declaring its annulment had not yet become final
and executory (required publication not yet done), as certified by
Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").
ISSUE
WON the respondent is guilty of gross immorality and grave
misconduct?
HELD
YES, respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
Ratio The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that
he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law
Reasoning The respondent made a mockery of marriage which
is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. A former
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, and, thereafter, a Justice of
the Court of Appeals is surely conversant with the legal maxim
that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong, if granted that
he was just helping the complainant in the administrative case
filed against her.
-The respondent gave his voluntary consent to the marriage, and
with all the legal requisites for the marriage present, he should
have known that his marriage with the complainant was valid.
-the respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada
Peña had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he
(respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage,
and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from
claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by
LEGAL PROFESSION
second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña was
subsisting and unannulled.
Disposition WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former
Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a
more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the
same or a similar offense hereafter.
SO ORDERED.
ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; November 25, 2003
(boots tirol)
NATURE
RESOLUTION of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
FACTS
-Joseph Estrada, through Atty Alan Paguia, filed a Petition for
Certiorari under the Rules of Court against Sandiganbayan,
which prayed – “1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the
members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from
hearing and deciding the petition; 2. That the assailed
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
3.That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
-Atty Paguia, speaking for Estrada, asserted that the inhibition of
the members of the SC from hearing the petition is called for
under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting
justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have
violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the
assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the
Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contended that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that
would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo.
The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo is,
according to petitioner, a patent mockery of justice and due
process.
-The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion) and the SC warned Atty
Paguia of his conduct -- his attacks on the Court and making
public statements on the case (violating Rule 13.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility). He was given 10 days SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming
a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
- On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance
with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty.
Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier
claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court
(for discussion on political partisanship please see original case),
and continued to make public statements about Estrada’s case.
ISSUES
WON Atty Paguia should be suspended from the practice of law
HELD
YES.
-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on
similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not
denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-
founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the
Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of the people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by
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those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
-The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the
mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public
statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for
or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition. The Court has
already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as
an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all
take heed.
Disposition Atty Paguia indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law
ZALDIVAR V GONZALES
PER CURIAM; October 7, 1988
(joey capones)
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS
Enrique A. Zaldivar had a pending case for graft and corruption
in the Sandiganbayan initiated by Tanodbayan Gonzalez.
Zaldivar filed a petition in the SC alleging that Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
was no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and
corruption against public officials and employees, and hence the
information filed in his criminal cases were all null and void. The
SC issued a temporary restraining order. Petitioner later filed
another petition because Gonzalez filed additional criminal
charges against petitioner and five other individuals. Gonzalez
instituted another criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. Four days
later, the SC issued another TRO. Zaldivar then filed a petition to
cite in contempt Special Prosecutor Gonzalez for filing new
information before the Sandiganbayan and for making
contemptuous statements to the media. In a news art in the Phil
Daily Globe, Gonzalez made the ff. statements: (1) while the rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the SC, it’s
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course, (2) while Pres. Aquino had been prodding him to
prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty,
the SC had been restraining him, (3) while he doesn’t wish to
discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the SC, He was
disturbed that the order can aggravate the thinking of some
people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial.
The SC ordered the nullification of the criminal cases and for
Gonzalez to cease and desist from further acting on Zaldivar’s
case In the motion for reconsideration, Gonzales claimed that 3
handwritten notes, sent by some members of the SC interceding
for cases pending before his office, were in his possession. He
said that he doubts whether the judges will remain impartial to
him, there being at least 4 members who definitely won’t, and
prayed that these 4 inhibit themselves in the deliberation. When
this was denied, he filed a motion to transfer administrative
proceedings to the IBP. He also released statements to the
press saying, in effect, that the SC deliberately rendered an
erroneous decision, that members of the SC have improperly
pressured him to render decisions favorable to their friends and
colleagues, and that the Sc dismisses judges without rhyme or
reason and disbars lawyers without due process. Gonzalez didn’t
deny he said/wrote those statements. His defense is that he was
just exercising his freedom of speech.
ISSUES
1. WON the SC should punish Gonzalez for contempt of court and
give administrative sanctions
2. WON Gonzales is not liable because he was just using his
constitutional right of freedom of speech.
HELD
1. YES
LEGAL PROFESSION
Ratio Statements which constitute gross disrespect of the Court,
and degrade the SC and the entire system of justice are clearly
contemptuous. The SC should exercise its disciplinary authority
over the source.
Reasoning The SC cited several cases wherein the Court held
that the statements were contemptuous and warranting the
exercise of the court’s authority. These are:
(1). Monteciollo v. Gica – Atty del Mar moved to reconsider a
decision of the CA with a veiled threat that he should interpose
his next appeal to the President. He said the court knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment thru negotiations. He was
convicted of contempt of court.
(2) Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel – counsel asked
CJ Concepcion and J Castro to inhibit themselves from judging
the case since the brother of Castro was the VP of favored party
and CJ’s son was the Secretary of the Board of Investments. He
even threatened that if he didn’t get a favorable decision, he’d
bring the case to the World Court and invoke the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid to the Philippines.
3. In re Almacen – the SC committed a great unjust to his client;
justice administered by the SC wasn’t only blind, but also deaf
and dumb; he’ll argue the cause of his client in the people’s
forum (published in Manilla Times). Almacen was suspended
from the practice of law because he exceeded the boundaries of
fair criticism.
4. Paragas v. Cruz – counsel alleged that the SC violated the
Constitution, which was a ground for impeachment; hoped that
an incident wherein 2 SC employees were killed wouldn’t happen
again (covert threat upon the members of the Court)
5. In re Sotto – a newspaper reporter refused to divulge his
source and was sent to jail. Atty. Sotto published in a newspaper
that the SC erroneously interpreted the law, they’re narrow-
minded, and that the members of the SC should be changed. He
was held in contempt of Court.
6. Salcedo v. Hernandez – Atty Francisco: the Court’s resolution
is erroneous and is a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls.
2. NO
Ratio A lawyer’s right of free expression may have to be more
limited than that of a layman.
Reasoning The freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that the freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests. One
of the fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
[Discussion on the SC’s power to discipline its lawyers]
The SC, as the regulator and guardian of the legal profession,
has plenary disciplinary auth over attorneys. This stems from
the Court’s Constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the
practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the
practice itself. This is an inherent power incidental to the proper
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. It also has inherent power to punish for
contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of
ministerial officers of the court including lawyers and all other
persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court.
This is necessary for its own protection against improper
interference with the due administration of justice and not
dependent upon the complaint of the litigant. There are two
related powers here: (1) Court’s inherent power to discipline
attorneys – broader than contempt power; lawyer doesn’t need
to be in contempt of court to be punished under this; (2)
contempt power - may be committed by both lawyers and non-
lawyers, in and out of court; if this is done by a lawyer, it’s
usually accompanied with professional misconduct.
A lawyer is not just a professional but also an officer of the court
and as such, is called upon to share in the task and responsibility
of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
which tends to obstruct the administration of justice constitutes
both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
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disciplinary action against him and conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
Disposition Atty. Raul M. Gonzales was found guilty of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. He was suspended
from the practice of law indefinitely.
CASTANEDA V AGO
CASTRO; July 30, 1975
(glaisa po)
NATURE
- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago
in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.
-1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of
execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house
and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the
auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions
were denied
- 1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and
Henson; Ago failed to redeem
- 1964 – sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of
possession to the properties
- 1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered
against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal
obligation and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could
not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of
preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of
Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the
battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order
continued
- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it;
Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the
petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
WON the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid
controversy
HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for
the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin
suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by
their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and
prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
- A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and
honesty his client’s cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s
position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or
lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless,
then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
LEGAL PROFESSION
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s
propensity to litigate.
LEDESMA V CLIMACO
FERNANDO; June 28, 1974
(mini bernardo)
NATURE
Original action in the SC, Certiorari
FACTS
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an
accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge.
On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar
for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced
discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him
and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec
requires full time service which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma
instituted this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE
WON a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio
due to appointment as Election Registrar
HELD
No.
1. The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been
postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was
no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the
accused, and his task as an election registrar.
2. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an an act showing his lack of
fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to
have known that membership in the bar is burdened with
conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of
service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act
as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are
rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
3. The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel. "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the
indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that
it is not enough for the Court to apprise the accused of his right
to an atty, but is essential that the court assign on de oficio for
him if he desires/ is poor.
Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal,
if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of
the profession in good standing.
Disposition Petition for certiorari dismissed.
IN RE: TAGORDA
MALCOLM; March 23, 1929
(boots tirol)
FACTS
Luis Tagorda, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Provincial
Board of Isabela admits that the previous election he used a card
which states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and a
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notary public (he can execute deed of sales, etc). He also admits
that he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio asking him to
inform the people in any town meetings that despite his election
as member of the Board, he will still exercise his profession as a
lawyer and notary public, even adding that he will only charge
three pesos for registration of their land titles.
ISSUES
1. WON Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting
employment
2. WON Tagorda should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES.
Sec 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act 2828)
states that "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons 27 and 28 of the Code
of Ethics provide:
27- The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional... Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28 -It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring
a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship
or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation
is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It
is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of
action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit,
or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for
personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients… A duty to the public and to the
profession devolves upon every member of the bar having
knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may
be disbarred.
- The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to
do so would be unprofessional.
- With the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of
having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
2. NO. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply
justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are: first,
his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.
ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC
REGALADO; June 17, 1993
(dahls salamat)
FACTS
- Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing
ads similar to annexes A and B and to prohibit them from making
ads pertaining to the exercise of the law professions other than
those allowed by law
- Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560 for a valid marriage
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041
8:30am-6pm
7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla
- Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
LEGAL PROFESSION
DON PARKINSON
An Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BKS on Guam Divorce thru the
Leg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during office hours
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visa
ext. Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retiree’s Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Sp/Shil. Call Marivic
THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc
Petitioner’s Claim:
-Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar.
-As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the ads
Respondent’s Comment:
-They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering
of leg support services thru paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines
- Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should
be allowed under Bates v. State bar of Arizona
ISSUES
1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes
practice of law?
2. WON their services can be advertised?
HELD
1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and expertise
- To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession; to give advice or render any kind
of service that involves legal knowledge/skill
- Not limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal
advice and counsel and preparation of legal instruments and
contracts by which legal rights are secured regardless of WON
they’re pending in court
3 types of legal profession activity:
1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations
2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of
legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman
3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty and
property according to law, in order to assist in proper inter and
enforcement of law
Respondent’s description of its services shows it falls within the
practice of law:
Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of
comps and modern info tech
- computerized legal research, document search, evidence
gathering, locating parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding
investigations, assistance to laymen in need of services from
agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc.
*even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical
and technical know how like installing computer system for law
offices, this doesn’t make it an exception to the general rule
- gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and
non-diagnostic
ex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption – have to
explain to client the intricacies of the law and advise him on the
proper course of action
- what its ads represent and what it will be paid for
- It doesn’t matter that they don’t represent clients in court since
practice of law isn’t limited to ct appearances but also leg
research, leg advice and drafting contracts
Phil Star Art – Rx for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales:
- Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic sit
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- lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can
take care of it (taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor,
litigation, fam law)
- backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys
- caters to clients who can’t afford big firms
- can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also
those w/ more extensive treatment
-The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services
doesn’t matter; what’s important is that it’s engaged in the
practice of law ‘cause of the nature of the services it renders,
which brings it within the statutory prohibitions against ads
only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who’s
in good and regular standing is entitled to the practice of law
- public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character
to protect the public, court, client and bar from
incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and
not subject to the discipline of court
2.No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer, in making known his legal services, shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective info/statement of facts
- not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement re his
qualifications/legal services
- not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in
return for publicity to attract legal business
Canons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers
shouldn’t resort to indirect ads for professional employment like
furnishing newspaper comments, publishing his pictures with
causes the lawyer’s been engaged in, importance of his position
and other self-laudation
Stands of legal profession condemn lawyer’s advertisement of
his talents like a merchant does of his goods because of the fact
that law is a profession.
The canons of profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct
Good and efficient service to a client and the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention; this
shouldn’t be done thru propaganda
EXCEPTIONS:
1. expressly allowed – publication in reputable law lists of
informative data that’s not misleading and may include only:
name, professional assoc, adds, nos, branches of law practiced,
date and place of birth and admission to the bar, schools
attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices, posts of
honor, legal authorships, legal teaching positions, membership
and offices in bar association, legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities, listings in other reputable law lists, names and
adds of references with written consent and clients regularly
represented
- can’t be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical that’s published for other purposes
- never in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure
the public/the bar or lower the dignity/standing of the profession
- ordinary simple professional card allowed – name, law firm,
add, no and special branch of law practiced
- publication of simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or change in partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for
the convenience of the profession
- have name listed in phone directory but not under designation
of special branch of law
2. necessarily implied from the restrictions
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a
statement of leg fees for an initial consultation or give, upon
request, a written schedule of fees or estimate for spec servicess
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers
LEGAL PROFESSION
- none expressly/impliedly provided for in the Canons of
Professional Ethics or Code of Professional Responsibility
*survey conducted by the American Bar Assoc on the attitude of
the public about lawyers after viewing TC commercials – pub
opinion dropped significantly:
Trustworthy – 71-14%
Professional – 71-14%
Honest – 65-14%
Dignified – 45-14%
With the present situation of our legal and judicial system, to
allow the publication of like advertisements would aggravate
what’s already a deteriorating pub of the legal profession whose
integrity’s been under attack by media and the community in
general
- all efforts should be made to regain the high esteem formerly
accorded to the leg profession
Atty Nograles (prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of the Leg Clinic) is REPRIMANDED w/ a warning that a
repetition will be dealt w/ more severely for misbehavior in
advertising his servIces and aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law
KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003
(apple maramba)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
- Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5,
2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid
advertisement which read: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist
532-4333/521-2667.”
- A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court took notice and called the number posing as an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that her husband was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, and that the fee was
P48,000.
- Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Public Information Office revealed that similar ads were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star.
- Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
- The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.
- IBP found respondent guilty
- Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied
- Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE
WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court
HELD
Yes. Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one
year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money is the primary
consideration.
Reasoning
- Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
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- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without
authority to do so.
- The following elements distinguish legal profession from
business:
1. A duty of public service
2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.
- Respondent advertised himself as an “Annulment Specialist,”
and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage
—encouraging people who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
- Solicitation of legal business sis not altogether proscribed,
however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with
the dignity of the legal profession.
DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE
AQUINO; May 10, 1985
(ice baguilat)
NATURE
Administrative Case
FACTS
Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and 9 other lawyers from
practicing law under Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in
Illinois, USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on
a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of
Cathay Products Int’l. Inc. to HE Gabriel (a client). Dacanay
denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being
represented by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the
purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus
this Administrative Case.
ISSUE
WON the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under
Baker & McKenzie
HELD
Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law
firm and cannot practice law in the country. Using the name
constitutes representation of being associated with the firm
which is deemed to be unethical. Respondents are enjoined from
practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SAMONTE V GATDULA
GONZAGA-REYES; February 26, 1999
(athe odi)
NATURE
Administrative matter. Grave Misconduct.
FACTS
LEGAL PROFESSION
- The complainant, Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando
R. Gatdula with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged
engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with
his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
- The complainant represents her sister as plaintiff in a civil case
for ejectment. Contrary to their expectation that execution will
proceed, they instead received a temporary restraining order.
Santos contends that the order was hasty and irregular as she
was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction.
- Gatdula, when asked by the complainant of the reason of the
decision, blamed Santos’ lawyer for writing the address in the
complaint for ejectment and told her that if she wanted the
execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain
the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling
card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera.”
- The decision of the Court continued not to be favorable to
Samonte, which cause her to file administrative complaint
against Gatdula.
ISSUE
WON Gatdula is guilty of infraction
HELD
Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card
constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7, sub-
par. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees) which declares it unlawful for
a public official or employees to, among others:
“(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constituion or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with official functions.”
Disposition Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the
private practice of law. He is further ordered to cause the
exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in
the private practice of law.
CRUZ V SALVA
MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959
(chris capul)
NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.
FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found
Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of
murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial.
Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine
Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to
persons other than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation
on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the
Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation made
available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the
affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee for
reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was
implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits
and confessions. Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the
committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec
the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this
present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal
request to allow him to appear at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim
investigation.
ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the
investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before
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Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property
HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to
allow him to appear at the investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and
decided and appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have
terminated. However, Salva has justified his reinvestigation bec
in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de
Guzman) was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and
secure conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may
continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in
part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the
investigation but he need not be present. His presence is more
of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and
not publicly in the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where
microphones were installed and media people were present. He
should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC
was disturbed and annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.
COLLANTES V RENOMERON
PER CURIAM; August 16, 1991
(aida villanueva)
FACTS
- A complaint of disbarment is filed with a related administrative
case against Renomeron of the Registrar of Deeds in Tacloban.
- Collantes was the house counsel for V & G Better Homes
Subdivision and filed the case with regard to the application of V
& G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment of lots in its subdivision in Jan 1987.
- Feb 16, 1987 – no action was made by Renomeron despite
follow-ups made by Collantes. Renomeron requested Collantes
to submit additional requirements which Collantes complied
with.
- Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents
pending compliance of V&G with certain special agreement
between then that V&G would provide Renomeron with a weekly
Tacloban-Manil round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket money. He
said he would act favorably on their application if that
agreement would be fulfilled.
- Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through his
niece. But pocket money was not given.
- Renomeron then imposed additional requirements which
angered Collantes, leading the latter to challenge Renomeron to
act on the 163 pending applications by V&G within 24 hours.
- May 22, 1987 – Renomeron denied the application for
ambiguity of the subject matter.
- Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated the
matter to the Administrator of the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration.
- The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable.
- The NLTDRA recommended Renomeron’s case to the DOJ and
the Secretary of Justice found him guilty. The president then
dismissed Renomeron from public service.
- A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against
Renomeron.
ISSUE
LEGAL PROFESSION
WON the disbarment case against Renomeron would prosper
given the administrative case
HELD
- Yes, the administrative complaint has to do with his position in
public service. The disbarment case has to do with his status as
member of the Integrated Bar.
- Renomeron violated the lawyer’s oath.
- The Code of Professional Responsibility 1.01 forbids a lawyer
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
PEOPLE V PINEDA
SANCHEZ; July 21, 1967
(jojo mendoza)
FACTS
- On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the
spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in
Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle,
caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid
succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead.
Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house,
entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo
Mendoza, — all minor children of the couple — and wounding
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
- Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were
indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five
(5) separate cases for murder. The five informations were based
on facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
investigation.
- Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases (Tomas
Narbasa and Tambak Alindo) moved for a consolidation thereof
into one (1) criminal case. Their plea is that said cases arose out
of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The
respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the City
Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal
sought reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge denied the
motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts
complained of stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the
part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots,
moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one
crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim; and
that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to
obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one.
Hence, this appeal to the Court on certiorari with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
ISSUE
WON the City Fiscal shall file only one information
HELD
- YES, ruling Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where
a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other (delito complejo). It is to be borne in
mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, there
must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal
impulse is not written into the law.
The respondent Judge reasons out that consolidation of the five
cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the
necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time,
indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the
trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear
entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan
City correctly presented the five separate informations — four
for murder and one for frustrated murder. A rule of presumption
long familiar is that official duty has been regularly performed. A
prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is
not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments
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thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we
must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not
be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of
doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule
may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due
process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be transgressed.
So it is, that in People vs. Sope, the Court made the
pronouncement that "it is very logical that the prosecuting
attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of
offenses, should determine the information to be filed and
cannot be controlled by the off ended party."
- The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is
to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of
what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a
criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must
have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made
by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who
did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this
regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not
to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be
blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed
of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is
necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in
proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional
or was held invalid." Nothing in the record would as much as
intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just
recited.
Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted.
MISAMIN V SAN JUAN
FERNANDO; August 31, 1976
(bry san juan)
FACTS
- It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain. in the Metro
Manila Police force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel
A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of
certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese
descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee,
complainant Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges filed by
him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery,
for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial
on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change
of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the
explanation for the non-appearance of the lawyer employed by
him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor
General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught.
- Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to
be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement
that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case
for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the
complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then
where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent
cannot be found guilty of malpractice. Respondent, as noted in
the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as
counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the
NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan
Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him
from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that
his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position,
is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the
suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies
having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the
LEGAL PROFESSION
NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing
an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise,
the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of
the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila."
ISSUE
WON a lawyer-public officer may represent a private client
during his tenure
HELD
NO, but since evidence is lacking to discipline Atty. Miguel San
Juan, the case is dismissed. The Court noted that the Report of
the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's
practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police
official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the
suspension or removal of an attorney.
- The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the
complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law.
As far back as in re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative
doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The
serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow
only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against
the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent
of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an
officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko
doctrine has been subsequently adhered to.
- This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration
whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service
Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding
his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a
matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted
in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless,
while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be
inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all
appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion
could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a
public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much
of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence
that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not
only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be
justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what
the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not
pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a
member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to
such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the
position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He
is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who
does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied
VITRIOLO V DASIG
PER CURIAM; April 1, 2003
(lora alamin)
NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S.
Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
FACTS
- Almost all complainants are high-ranking officers of the CHED.
They allege that while respondent was OIC of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
- During her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to
extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her
favorable action on their pending applications or requests before
her office
- Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her
oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless,
groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently
dismissed.
- Complainants charge respondent of transgressing
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subparagraph b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807,
for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to “Borela Tire
Supply” and “Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch” as evidenced by the
dishonored checks she issued, the complaint sheet, and the
subpoena issued to respondent.
- Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the
commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged
and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this
incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent
and her son, was lodged
- Complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then
President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which
maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven
(11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of
preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of
securing an appointment for herself.
- The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education. It was
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three
(3) years with a further warning that similar action in the
future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
- The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-393, adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
Respondent was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years.
ISSUE
WON respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her
malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing
of the complaint, was “Chief Education Program Specialist,
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards, CHED.”
HELD
YES.
Ratio Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if said misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of
every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty
to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further
stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Reasoning Respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is
of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of
the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was
patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
- Respondent’s demands for sums of money to facilitate the
processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
- A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed
his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
- Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are violative of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
LEGAL PROFESSION
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in
any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers
in government service from promoting their private interests.
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything
of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from
one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is
expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing.
Disposition Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct
and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and was ordered
DISBARRED.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
PUNO; April 12, 2005
(marge alias)
NATURE
Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari and prohibition.
FACTS
-1976: General Bank and Trust Co. (Genbank) encountered
financial difficulties, prompting the Central Bank to extend to it
emergency loans reaching a total of P310 million. Despite this,
Genbank failed to recover and the following year Central Bank
had to issue a resolution declaring Genbank insolvent and
ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of Genbank’s assets was
held; Lucio Tan Group submitted the winning bid.
-Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza field a petition with
CFI praying for the court’s assistance and supervision in the
liquidation as mandated by RA 265, section 29.
-After EDSA I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, PCGG filed a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting, and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan Group and the Marcos family. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the 2nd division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB). In connection with this, PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on the properties of the Lucio Tan
Group.
-Lucio Tan Group questioned the writs through petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the SC. The latter
referred the cases to the SB for proper disposition. In these
cases docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 Lucio Tan Group
was represented by their counsel, former SolGen Estelito
Mendoza who has then resumed private practice.
-05 Feb 1991: PCGG, invoking Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), filed motions to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0005 &
0096-0099. The motions allege that Atty. Mendoza “intervened”
in the acquisition of Genbank by the Lucio Tan Group when, in
his capacity as then SolGen, he advised the Central Bank’s
officials on the procedure to bring about Genbank’s liquidation&
appeared as counsel for the central Bank in connection with its
petition for assistance in the liquidation.
-22 April 1991: SB denied the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
in Civil Case No. 0005 for PCGG’s failure to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between Mendoza’s former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group; it also ruled that Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited
period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. PCGG did not file
a MFR.
-When Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the SB’s
2nd Division to the 5th Division, the latter also denied the motion
to disqualify. PCGG’s MFR was denied. Hence this petition.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
KEY ISSUE
WON Rule 6.03 of the CPR applies to Atty. Mendoza.
Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
Obiter
The History of Rule 6.03
-17th and 18th centuries: ethical standards for lawyers were
pervasive in England and other parts of Europe; the principal
thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
-colonial and early post-revolutionary America: The forms of
lawyer regulation did not differ markedly from those in England.
Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly
characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation
fairness, competency and reasonable fees.
-19th century: the “dark ages” of legal ethics in the United
States.
-mid 19th century: American legal reformers were filling the void
in two ways: (1) David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York “Field Code,” introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers; (2) legal educators,
such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other
lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's
duties.
-As in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive
statement of a lawyer's duties.
-end of 19th century, a new form of ethical standards began to
guide lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of
legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards
formulated by lawyers for lawyers. 2 primary sources of ethical
guidance: academic discourses & the bar association codes
-1887: Alabama - the 1st state with a comprehensive bar
association code of ethics. 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the
model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the
American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.
-1917: Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1
to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
-1924: some ABA members start to question the form and
function of the canons. Among their concerns was the “revolving
door” or “the process by which lawyers and others temporarily
enter government service from private life and then leave it for
large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service.”
(a) Adverse-interest conflicts - exist where the matter in which
the former government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the
interests of the current and former are adverse.
(b) Congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to
government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.
-ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. To
deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers,
Canon 36 was minted to disqualify such lawyers both for
“adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest
representation conflicts.”
Canon 36. Retirement from judicial position or public
employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any
matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a
judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
LEGAL PROFESSION
employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
-1946: the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own
Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
-mid 20th century: growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. 1964: ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the
“adequacy and effectiveness” of the ABA Canons. The unfairness
of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it with Canon 9 in the
1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9
states: “A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety.”
-The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility which was approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in August 1969. Canon 9 was
supplemented by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(b): “A lawyer shall not
accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
-Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained
unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards.
-August 1983: ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, doing away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless
dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective
views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature.
-1980: Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed
Code of Professional Responsibility which it submitted to SC for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs,
traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new
realities.
-21 June 1988: SC promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. CPR Rule 6.03 which deals particularly with
former government lawyers retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but
replaced the expansive phrase “investigated and passed upon”
with the word “intervened.” It is, therefore, properly applicable
to both “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest
conflicts.”
SUB-ISSUES
1. WON this case involves the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule
6.03
2. WON there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing the Lucio Tan
Group.
2a. WON Atty. Mendoza’s act of advising the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate Genbank is included within the
concept of “matter” under Rule 6.03
2b. WON the intervention of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of
Genbank is significant and substantial
HELD
2a. NO. Ratio American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342’s
definition of “matter” : any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation
and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Reasoning Based on PCGG’s case for disqualification, the
“matter” or the act of Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved here is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed
with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila.”
-The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in
Republic Act No. 265, sec. 29. Said legal provision provides for
the role of the SolGen in proceedings upon insolvency.
-Also, CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while a SolGen in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 (liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096
(sequestration of the stocks in Allied Bank, the successor of
Genbank, on the ground that they are ill-gotten).
2b. NO. Ratio in light of the history of CPR Rule 6.03, the 2nd
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
“intervention.” The intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant.
Reasoning 2 interpretations of the “intervene” (basis:
Webster):
(a) “intervene” includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.
(b) “intervene” only includes an act of a person who has the
power to influence the subject proceedings.
-The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading,
hence, it has to be signed by Atty. Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. The record is arid as to the actual participation
of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings.
-The principal role of the court in this proceeding for dissolution
is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors
against the Genbank. The role of the court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of
the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Obiter
Balancing Policy Considerations
-CPR Rule 6.03 represents a commendable effort on the part of
the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government
service. It should not be interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent.
-At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that
government will be able to reverse that situation. It is true that
the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is
have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in
private practice. “To make government service more difficult to
exit can only make it less appealing to enter.”
-In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its
use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger
that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is
not a mere guesswork.
-Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting
a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the
law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence.
-The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a
truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service.
-No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the
former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.
-As well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is
a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward
results. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
-Also the “switching sides” concern does not cast a shadow in
the case at bar. The danger that confidential official information
might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. There are no
inconsistent “sides” to be bothered about in the case at bar. In
lawyering for the Lucio Tan Group, Atty. Mendoza is indirectly
defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating
Genbank and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests
coincide instead of colliding.
Disposition Petition denied. No costs.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN [dismiss]
-The petition should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) res
judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of judgment; and (2)
prescription.
LEGAL PROFESSION
-The material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty.
Mendoza may still be barred from representing these
respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving
the very same ground for disqualification involving the same
parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2)
the passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he
ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed
disqualification (for violation of the CPR) was raised.
-There is no need to delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03
has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of
the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty.
Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same court
resolving the very same issue on the “disqualification” of Atty.
Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the same
subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can
no longer be altered or changed.
-CPR Rule 6.03 does not expressly specify the period of its
applicability or enforceability. But it cannot be inferred that the
prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent. All civil actions
have a prescriptive period. Unless a law makes an action
imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the action is
subject to a bar by prescription five years after the right of
action accrued. (Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code; Tolentino v CA)
SANDOVAL-GUTTIERREZ [dismiss]
-In evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not
bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the
combined effect of a party’s right to counsel of his own choice,
an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the financial
burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and any
tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding.
-An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and,
therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza
should be disqualified from representing Tan et al. is separable
from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil
Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is separable from the
merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari is dismissible.
-The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005
constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
under the doctrine of res judicata. The PCGG may not relitigate
such issue of disqualification as it was actually litigated and
finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.
-Atty. Mendoza’s participation in the liquidation of GENBANK
does not constitute intervention. CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to
Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an intervention in
a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.
CARPIO-MORALES [grant]
-The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since
in the case at bar, the question of whether the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a
legal question. Also, this is the first time that the issue to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before the SC.
-We cannot characterize the denial of PCGG’s motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a final order. It is only interlocutory
since it does not finally dispose of the case.
-the prohibition in Rule 6.03 is perpetual. It does not prescribe in
5 yrs.
-Atty. Mendoza’s lack of participation in the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is immaterial. What is
material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK
through his legal expertise. In advising the Central Bank, Atty.
Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of
Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known
for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts,
which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law with a
view to successfully liquidate the bank.
-While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into
government service, this does not justify the disturbance of our
mores. The canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility must be strictly construed.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
-While financial considerations are important, they are not the
sole factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government
sector. I would like to think that serving in government is its own
reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court
to know that money is not everything. All of us have, at one
point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of
financial success that private practice usually brings. But in the
end, we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in
government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone
of us has made a difference. There is more to this mortal coil
than the pursuit of material wealth.
CALLEJO, SR. [partially grant]
-The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for
Holmes’ proverbial “bad man” who wants to know just how
many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play,
without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for
the “good man” as a beacon to assist him in navigating an
ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of
professional conduct. (General Motors Corp. v City of New York)
-CPR establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in
the legal profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to
ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions. The Court must
not tolerate any departure from the “straight and narrow” path
demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.
-The Resolution denying PCGG’s similar motion to disqualify
Mendoza was an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or
finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or
collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to
bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in
the other cases.
-Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for Lucio Tan
Group in Civil Case No. 0096 violates the ethical precept
embodied in Rule 6.03.
-The subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with or
related to a “matter,” i.e. the liquidation of Genbank, in which
Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General
-Rule 6.03 applies even if Atty. Mendoza did not “switch sides” or
did not take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if no
conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s former
government client (Central Bank) and his present private
practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
-Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit temporal
limitation since cases have to be resolved based on their
peculiar circumstances. The peculiar circumstances of this case
justify the strict application of said rule.
TINGA [partially grant]
-Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to
Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be violative of his right to due
process. Whether it be at the time then Solicitor General
Mendoza participated in the process of the dissolution of General
Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed to
represent the respondents, the Code of Professional
Responsibility had not yet been promulgated.
-The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the
Supreme Court on 21 June 1988. Prior to its official adoption,
there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted
by the Supreme Court other than the provisions on Legal Ethics
in the Rules of Court.
-Atty. Mendoza may have violated Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, which some authorities deemed as a source
of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
But the prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this
Court or by statute as a norm until the enactment of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when
Atty. Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was
no definitive binding rule proscribing him from such engagement
or penalizing him for such representation.
LIM-SANTIAGO V SAGUCIO
CARPIO; March 31, 2006
(maia reiza)
LEGAL PROFESSION
NATURE
Disbarment case
FACTS
- Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter and administratrix of the
property of Alfonso Lim, the former president of Taggat
Industries. After his death, Lim-Santiago took over the
management of the company. Respondent Carlos Sagucio was
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, until he was appointed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.
- Some employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint against
Lim-Santiago for withholding payment of their salaries and
wages without valid cause for 1 year and 3 months (1 April 1996
to 15 July 1997). Sagucio, as the asst. Prov. Prosecutor, was
assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He
recommended the filing of 651 Informations for violation of
Art288 of the labor code of the Philippines.
- Lim-Santiago alleges that Sagucio is guilty of representing
conflicting interests, a violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), and of engaging in the private
practice of law while working as a government prosecutor, which
is expressly prohibited in RA6713.
Sagucio defends himself by saying that he accepted payment
from Taggat even after his appointment as government
prosecutor but said that such payments were not for
representation but for consultancy services. Also, he contends
that 5 years have passed since he was connected with the
company, thus there was no conflict of interest.
ISSUES
1. WON there are conflicting interests in this case
2. WON the “private practice of law” includes consultancy
services
3. WON disbarment is the appropriate penalty
HELD
- There are no conflicting interests. Sagucio is not guilty of
representing conflicting interests as prohibited in Rule 15.03 of
CPR. He left Taggat in 1992, and the non-payment of wages
occurred in 1996-1997, years after the relation to Taggat has
been terminated. In a charge for representing conflicting
interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent
used against the former client any CONFIDENTIAL information
acquired through his previous employment. Although a lawyer
owes a former client to maintain inviolate of the client’s
confidence, this responsibility does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. That
he was a former personnel manager and the case is labor-
related is not sufficient basis to charge Sagucio of representing
conflicting interests.
- The payment for consultancy services conducted by Sagucio
falls under the “private practice of law” which is specifically
prohibited by RA6713 (the court applies the liberal definition of
the practice of law as given in Cayetano v Monson). However,
Sagucio cannot be punished for this violation under the CPR, for
such violations are not subject to disciplinary action under the
CPR. On the other hand, this violation is also a violation of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 (a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful …
conduct), thus he can be punished for violating canon 1.
The penalty is a suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year
(basis is the Civil Service Law and Rules).
RE: 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES
PER CURIAM; October 6, 1989
(anton arcilla)
NATURE
An inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the integrated bar of the
Philippines. The Supreme Court, en banc, exercising its power of
supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolvd to suspend the oath-
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
taking of the IBP officers=elect and to inquire into the veracity of
the reports.
FACTS
- June 3, 1989, the election of the national officers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) was held at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC).The newly elected
officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989,
before the Supreme Court. However, because of widespread
reports about the intensive electioneering and overspending by
the candidates, the Supreme Court resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect to investigate.
- the elections were led by the main candidates for the office of
IBP President, namely Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon.
- Among the allegations were the use of government planes, and
the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence
the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws.
(“poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120
IBP delegates.”)
- Emil Jurado (Manila Standard) reported that there was rampant
vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity
as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA, and that government
positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor
Secretary.
- There was also the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush
hotels where they were reportedly “wined and dined
continuously, womened, and subjected to endless haggling over
the price of their votes xxx which ranged from P15K to P20K, and
on election day, to as much as P50K.
- In a resolution calling for investigations, the Court “called to
mind that a basic postulate of the IBP xxx is that the IBP shall be
non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor
campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of
Governors and of the House of Delegates and of the IBP officers.
- Article I, Section 4 of IBP By-Laws emphasizes the “strictly non-
political” character of the IBP:
SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. – the IBP is strictly non-political,
and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly
prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding
an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
government xxx shall be eligible for election or appointment to
any position in the IBP or any chapter thereof.
- Section 14 of By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts
relative to IBP elections:
o Distribution of election campaign material;
o Distribution of campaign material other that a
statement of the biodata of candidate not more than
one page of legal paper;
o Campaigning for or against any candidate, whle
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutory
office in Gov’t;
o Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations
of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
o For purpose of influencing a member, by payment
of dues or other indebtedness of the member; giving of
food, drink, entertainment, transpo, any article of value;
making a promise or causing an expenditure to be
made.
- Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes the sanctions:
o “Violation of the by-laws of the IBP shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his
removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the
imposition of sanctions upon any erring member xxx”
- Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250K during his
three weeks of campaigning; Atty. Nisce’s hotel bills at the Hyatt
amounted to P216K ++, not including previous expenses for his
campaign; Atty . Drilon’s campaign rang up over P600K in hotel
bills (Westin).
ISSUE
WON the candidates are guilty of massive electioneering,
inappropriate use of government resources, and vote-buying
during the IBP national elections.
LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD
Ratio
- IBP elections should be as they are annulled.
- The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for direct election by the
House Delegates of officers, IBP President, and exec. VP be
repealed.
- Former sstem of IBP President and Exec. VP elected by Board of
Governors from among themselves should be restored.
- At the end of President’s 2-year term, the EVP shall
automatically succeed to the office of the president. The
incoming board of governors shall elect an EVP from among
themselves.
Reasoning
- It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates
for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections violated Sec. 14 of the IBP
By-laws and made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly non-
political” IBP shrined in Sec. 4.
- The candidates and many of the participants in that election
not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the
legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of
their obligation to:
- Obey and uphold the constitutionand the laws;
- Duty to promote respect for law and legal processes;
- Abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
- It is speculated that the IBP ticket to the Judicial and Bar
Council as provided in Art. VIII Sec. 8 may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among
the lawyers.
- The decision is meant to impress upon participant the
seriousness of their misconduct, and to restore the non-political
character of the IBP.
SANTOS V LLAMAS
MENDOZA; January 20, 2000
(dahls salamat)
FACTS
Petitioner’s Claim:
-Llamas has not indicated proper PTR and IBP OR No and data in
his pleadings, he merely indicates IBP Rizal 259060 as his PTS
and IBP OR No for 3 years as shown in various court pleadings.
-Llamas’ last payment of IBP dues, as certified by IBP pres, was
in 1991
--in the context of Rule 138 section 1 that only a duly admitted
member of the bar “who is in good and regular stnding is
entitled to practice law” and Rule 139-A,Section 10 which
provides that “default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
integrated bar,and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys
-respondent’s track record shows that he was once dismissed as
Pasay City Judge, and was convicted of estafa.
Respondent’s Comment:
-SC has already dismissed the case for his dismissal as well as
the criminal case, and he was in fact promoted as RTC Judge,
-Respondent is engaged only in a limited practice of law,his
principal occupation being a farmer
-Being a senior citizen he is exempt from payment of taxes,and
he honestly believes that his dues with the IBP is covered by
such exemption
-in fact he does not exercise his rights to vote as an IBP member
-he is willing to pay his dues should he be in fact not exempt
from payment thereof
ISSUES
1.WON RA 7432 (Senior Citizen) exempts respondent from
payment of his dues with the IBP
2.WON respondent is guilty of misleading the court of his
standing with the IBP for using the same IBP OR number for at
least six years
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
HELD
1.RA 7432 exempts him only from payment of taxes but not
from payment of his association dues such as IBP dues. Since he
openly admitted that he was still engaged in the practice of law
eventhough his practice is already limited he is still subject to
the payment of IBP dues and failure to do so would warrant his
suspension under Sec 10 of Rule 139-A. He can only engage in
the practice of law by paying his dues and it doesn’t matter if his
practice is limited.
2.By Indicationg IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings, he is guilty of
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he has paid his
dues to IBP Rizal Chapter and of violating Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01-A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful,dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession,and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
CANON 10 – A Lawyer owes candor,fairness nd goodfaith to the
court.
Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,nor consent to
the doing of an court;nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.
Disposition Because of his old age, respondent was only
suspended from practice of law for one year or until he pays his
dues.
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
PER CURIAM; February 4, 2004
(chris lao)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bar Scandal.
FACTS
- On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination
in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003
Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored
leakage in the examination on the subject. He then reported to
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other members of the
Court, recommending that the examination on the subject be
nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith.
- On September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of
Justice Vitug and resolved to nullify the examination in
Mercantile Law and to hold another exam on the said subject
against which petitions were filed. The petitions voiced out the
support to nullifying the exam on the said subject and not to
take another exam due to the emotional, physical and financial
burdens it will cause the barristers. Alternative proposals were
submitted to the Court. The Court moved to nullify and to spread
out the weight of the Mercantile Law among the remaining seven
bar subjects.
- The Court resolved also to create a Committee composed of
three retired members of the Court that would conduct a
thorough investigation of the incident subject of the September
23, 2003 resolution. The Investigating Committee found that the
leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions
which the examinee, Atty. Balgos had prepared and submitted to
Justice Jose Vitug. His questions constituted 82% of the questions
asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of
September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes
which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as Atty.
Balgos, 71 years old, proposed.
- The circumstances that the leaked test questions consisted
entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos proves
conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from
the Office of Justice Vitug. Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked
test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without
any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty.
Balgos’ computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them
from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and
consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos’
legal assistant, Atty. Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily
LEGAL PROFESSION
confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman
revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his
secretary Villasis to his frat brods in Beta Sigma Lambda
Fraternity, namely, Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan. In turn,
Garvida faxed the test questions to Iñigo and Bugain. Iñigo
passed a copy or copies to other Betan Guiapal who gave a copy
to the MLQU-Beta Sigma’s Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald
Collado who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to
the MLQU’s 30 bar candidates.
- Atty De Guzman’s act of downloading Balgos’ test questions in
mercantile law from the latter’s computer, without his
knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was
theft of intellectual property.
- Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful
infraction of Balgos’ right to privacy of communication and to
security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search
and seizure—rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution. He transgressed the very first canon of the
lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that
a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
- De Guzman also violated rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7—A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
- He is guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar. Also, the Investigating committee does not believe that he
acted alone. Palma, secretary of Atty. Balgos and Atienza knew
of the password. Certain brods should also be investigated. The
committee does not believe De Guzman did this out of love for
the fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material
consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of
secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations.
- Atty. Balgos is also negligent.He could have just used the
typewriter considering his lack of adeptness with the computer.
ISSUE
WON Danilo De Guzman should be disbarred
HELD
YES. He should be disbarred plus he ought to make a public
apology and pay damages to the Supreme Court
- Atty. Balgos should be reprimanded by the Court and make a
written apology as a result of his negligence. He is not entitled to
receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.
- Further examination of the others should be held to show
accountability and also to find out how De Guzman was able to
secure a copy of the Supreme Court’s CALR database without
the court’s permission.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
IBP DUES
CHICO-NAZARIO; May 9, 2005
(keefe dela cruz)
NATURE
Bar Matter in the Supreme Court. Request for Exemption from
Payment of IBP Dues.
FACTS
- Petitioner, Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., is being assessed
P12,035 in IBP dues for the years 1977-2005
- After admittance to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part
of the Phil Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the US from 1986 to his retirement in 2003.
ISSUES
WON Petitioner’s inactivity in the practice of law that is, when he
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
was in the Civil Service and when working abroad, entitles him to
exemption from payment of IBP dues.
HELD
Ratio No.
Reasoning
- The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire law population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name
in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC. This is toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
themselves belong.
- Membership in the bar is a privilege (as opposed to a property
right) burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the
loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants.
Disposition Wherefore, petitioner’s request for exemption from
payment of IBP dues for the years 1977-2005 is Denied within 10
days from receipt of this decision, failure to do so will merit
suspension from the practice of law.
ZAGUIRRE V CASTILLO
PER CURIAM; MARCH 6, 2003
(sarah Cabrera)
NATURE
Petition for Disbarment on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct
(Adulterous Relationship).
FACTS
- Complainant and respondent met while working in the NBI.
Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her
while representing himself to be single. Soon they had an
intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted
until 1997. During their affair, respondent was preparing
for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10,
1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar.
- It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant
first learned that respondent was already married when his wife
went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with
respondent.
- On September 10, 1997, executed an affidavit, admitting his
relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn
child she was carrying as his.
- On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl,
Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to
refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support.
- Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant;
what transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and
desire; he never represented himself as single since it was
known in the NBI that he was already married and with children.;
complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew
beforehand that he is already married; the child borne by
complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing
other men at the time they were having an affair. He admits that
he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains
that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment.
Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was seeing
other men.
- The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo
guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be
meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct
2. WON it is relevant to this case if the complainant knew he was
married
3. WON the respondent should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES
- The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
LEGAL PROFESSION
IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility:
“Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
“CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.”
“Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.”
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
“xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community.
Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.”
*Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a
conduct way below the standards of morality required of
every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege
on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to
support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain
unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable,
unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification.
- This Court has repeatedly held: “as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
*Complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing
out that “men by nature are polygamous, and that what
happened between them was “nothing but mutual lust and
desire.” The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the
reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
2. NO
*That complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing
full well his marital status does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is
respondent’s fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It
is not dependent whether or not the other party
knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
In Mortel vs. Aspiras: “In a disbarment proceeding, it is
immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto
because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts.”
*The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while
respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations.
Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an
applicant for admission to membership in the bar must
show that he is possessed of good moral character, a
requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain one’s good standing in the profession.
3. NO
Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.
*As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be
meted out if a lesser punishment could be given. Records
show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has
severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this
fact as an indication of respondent’s effort to mend his ways or
that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble
profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more
appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite
suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to
show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in
himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and
uprightness required of every member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Disposition Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral
Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the
practice of law.
TAN V SABANDAL
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 24, 1992
(jat tabamo)
FACTS
- Nov. 29, 1983 - Court sustained charge of unauthorized
practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and denied the
latter’s petition to be allowed to take oath as member of the Phil.
Bar and to sign the roll of attorneys.
- From 1984-1988 - Sabandal filed motions for reconsideration all
of which either denied or noted without action.
- Feb. 10, 1989 – Court finally allowed Sabandal to take the
lawyer’s oath after consideration of his plea for mercy and
forgiveness, willingness to reform and several testimonies
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness.
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal’s oath taking,
complainants Dagpin, Tan and Boquia each filed motions for
reconsideration of the Resolution of Feb, 10, 1989.
- Complainant Tan contests the testimonial of IBP Zamboanga
Del Norte Chapter (ZDN) certifying that respondent was acting
with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the
community. Tan claims that said testimonial was signed only by
the then President of that IBP chapter, without authorization
from its Board of Officers. Attached to her motion was a
certification signed by the current IBP ZDN Chapter President
Atty. Nuevas, stating that the present Board of Officers had not
issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and
civic consciousness of Sabandal. Tan later on desisted and
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal “has
already been restored,” as he had asked her forgiveness and
that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him,
even recommending his admission to the legal profession.
- Complainants Boquia and Dagpin submitted their own
comments vehemently contesting the Court’s Resolution setting
the date for respondent’s oath-taking and filed a separate
comment as regards complainant Tan’s personal disposition,
questioning whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to
exculpate and obliterate their cases
- The Executive Judge of ZBN RTC, Judge Pelagio Lachica, in a
separate comment stated that he is not well acquainted
personally with the respondent and unaware of any acts
committed by him so as to disqualify him from admission to the
Bar. Said Judge also mentioned that there is a Civil Case, Rep. of
the Phil. v. Sabandal which was pending in the Supreme Court.
The IBP ZBN chapter also submitted a certification that Sabandal
has not been convicted of any crime and that there is no
pending criminal case against him, therefore finding no reason
to disqualify him from admission to the Bar.
- The Court then deferred setting the date of the oath-taking of
respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform the
Court of the outcome of the case Republic v. Sabandal. Judge
Pacifico Garcia, who succeeded Judge Lachica, informed the
Court on Dec. 12, 1990, that Sabandal’s case was already
considered closed and terminated, and that the principal parties
have reached an amicable settlement approved by the trial
court. Judge Garcia’s letter was noted in the Resolution of Jan.
LEGAL PROFESSION
29, 1991, where complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were
required to comment on said Judge’s letter.
- On Dec. 20, 1990, a certification was sent by Exec. Judge Jesus
Angeles of RTC of ZDN upon request of Sabandal, certifying that
he has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause
to object to his admission to the Bar.
- Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath in a motion dated June 8, 1991. The Court
again deferred action on the motion pending the complainants’
compliance with the Jan. 29, 1991 resolution.
- Only complainant Tan complied, and stated in a comment
dated Aug. 29, 1991, that the termination of Sabandal’s civil
case is proof of his sincere reformation, and repentance.
- Finally, in a Manifestation, dated Dec. 6, 1991, Sabandal
reiterated his plea to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
ISSUE
WON Respondent Sabandal should be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath
HELD
Ratio The practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. Although the term “good moral character” admits of
broad dimensions, it has been defined as “including at least
common honesty.” It has also been held that no moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.
No. The Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989, allowing Sabandal to take
the oath 10 years after passing the Bar, was prior to the Court
receiving the objections by complainants, and before it had
become aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
- As it turned out, the case of Republic v. Sabandal was brought
about when Sabandal, by way of his employment as Land
Investigator at the Bureau of Lands procured a certificate of free
patent over a parcel of land belonging to public domain (which
he could not but have known to be public land), which he used
as security for mortgage in order to obtain a loan. The Case was
eventually settled when respondent surrendered the bogus
certificate of title to the government and paid-off the mortgagor.
The Solicitor General did not object to the approval of the
settlement and even stated that, “the amicable settlement may
amount to a confession by the defendant.” The Court found it
manipulative on his part to take advantage of his employment to
facilitate such an act and a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in the public service, which cannot be cannot be erased by
termination of his case where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been compromised.
- The Court also noted that at the time the case was instituted,
Sabandal had already been filing motions for reconsideration
alleging his good moral character without mentioning the
pendency of the civil case against him. His failure to reveal to
this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed
against him during the period that he was submitting several
motions for reconsideration reveals his lack of candor and
truthfulness.
- As to the testimonials attesting to his good moral character,
they were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any
criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case
instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials
can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty
and lack of good moral character.
- That complainants, namely, Boquia and Dagpin have not
submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no
moment. They have already expressed their objections in their
earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her
objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his
favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another
subject matter.
Disposition Respondent Sabandal found to be unfit to become
a member of the BAR, Court’s Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989 is
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
recalled and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath is
denied.
TAPUCAR V TAPUCAR
PER CURIAM; July 30, 1998
(terry ridon)
FACTS
- Complainant Remedios Tapucar seeks the disbarment of
husband, Atty. Lauro Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with Elena Pena under
scandalous circumstances.
- Prior to complaint, he has already been charged four times for
conduct unbecoming of an officer, and has already been
suspended, and dismissed from being a CFI judge
- The suspension and dismissal on immorality did not stop him
from continue living with Elena and leaving Remedios and her 11
children. He and Elena even moved back to Antipolo from
GenSan, where they got married despite the subsistence of a
previous marriage
- His lawyer-daughter filed the disbarment proceedings,
represented her mother, from which the IBP recommended his
disbarment
ISSUE
WON the recommendation for disbarment is justified
HELD
- The recommendation by the IBP is sufficient to justify his
disbarment as a good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession but must remain
intact in order to maintain good standing in the profession. It is
essential that we have a high-toned sense of morality
- CPR Rule 7.03 is clear – that a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public of private life behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession
- Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, especially Tapucar as he was once a member of the
bench who must be free from impropriety; like judges, lawyers
are invested with public trust, that faith and confidence by the
public to the law is ensured
- As such, the court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct whether in his professional or personal capacity, but
this is only exercised if there is a clear case of misconduct
- In case at bar, despite the previous sanctions, he still persisted
in his illicit relations and arrogant even, in the face of charges
against him. All of these are violative of the lawyer’s oath and in
great disregard of the law
BUGARING V ESPANOL
DE LEON; January 19, 2001
(ricky cantre)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6,
1998 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring
petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.
FACTS
- The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing
held on December 5, 1996 of Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs.
Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment
of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge
Dolores S. Español of the RTC of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal
Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February
27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a
notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant
Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis
pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed
counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the
motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to
cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder
to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.
- During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on
December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired (pls see
case for full stenographic record of incident):
[discussing Deputy Reg of Deed’s manifestation that the
receiving clerk did not inform him of the court order]
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but
we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case
against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your
Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the
Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of
the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties
concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow
who is taking the video recording at this proceedings. There
is no permission from this Court that such proceedings
should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him
to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and
you should secure the permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some
video tape.
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give
him the go signal that shots should be done.
ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your
Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and
I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove
your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other
matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he
took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology
of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings
but the necessary authority or permission should be
secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video
tape.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my
personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that
guy your Honor please if this representation is being ….
COURT: That is very shallow, don’t give that alibi.
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going
to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for
contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this
matter?
ATTY. CONCEPCION (Deputy Reg of Deeds): Well as I have said
before, I have not received any motion regarding this
contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage,
it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings,
contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the
assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a
Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.
....................
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here,
Atty. Barzaga if he is willing
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ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet
present my witness but I will just mark our documentary
exhibits which are part of the record of the case and
thereafter your Honor please….
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a
preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the
respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately
hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of
this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to
go over the record of this case so that we can call the other
case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
------------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor,
after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I
noticed… [quite a long manifestation followed but
irrelevant to this case]
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your
Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want
to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he
has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is
finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to
do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear
to be a little bit complicated… [continued manifestation…
Judge Español making intermittent comments]
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this
representation your Honor please, that we will be marking
first our documentary evidence because this is set for
hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not
have their comment yet what are we going to receive as
evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please…
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you
have to do after the submission of the comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the
record will show that the motion for contempt was copy
furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado
Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the
Court would want to do. This should be an orderly
proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record
the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can
submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to
be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear
the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the
respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt
proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have
filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because
it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence
and present to this Court, your Honor.
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen!
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your
Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor,
please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure,
your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the
procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel
the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation
ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record
that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice
in town.
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we
LEGAL PROFESSION
are deprive to present our witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse
witness that was presented.
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the
respondent to file his comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I
don’t want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to
inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your
Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the
rules.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that’s why you are putting the
cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I’ve been challenged by this
Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic)
aside your Honor please, I’ve been winning in many
certiorari cases, your Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for
contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police
and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the
Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of
my client your Honor please.
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been
abusing the discretion of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the
appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting
my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an
abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff)
“Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail.”
- Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day
sentence and paid the fine of P3,000. The CA found that it was
obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times
impertinent too argumentative to the extent of being
disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court. It
affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the
fine of P3,000 exceeded the limit of P2,000 prescribed by the
ROC and ordered the excess of P1,000 returned to petitioner.
ISSUE
WON the contempt order by Judge Español had factual basis
HELD
Yes
Ratio The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge and can be punished
summarily without hearing.
Reasoning Petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in
the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order
inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity
to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The
records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even
filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the
same day. Petitioner’s alleged deference to the trial court in
consistently addressing the respondent judge as “your Honor
please” throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior
therein:
1. The veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the
trial court is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that “a lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts”.
2. The hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge
was partial in favor of the other party is against Rule 11.04,
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Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge “motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case”.
3. Behaving without due regard to the trial court’s order to
maintain order in the proceedings is in utter disregard to Canon
1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer’s
duty to “maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude” in
order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice,
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to “observe and maintain the respect due to
the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others”.
4. Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow
counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf
of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and
was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise is violative of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to
be heard is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on
the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an
adverse witness “with fairness and due consideration,” and
Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on
a lawyer to “exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.”
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the
petitioner’s use of the phrase “your honor please.” For, after
using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in
his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer
of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper
decorum is to be observed and maintained during court
proceedings.
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s
cause. He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to
Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility. He should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice per Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyer’s duty.
Disposition Decision of the CA affirmed. RTC ordered to
return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of
P1,000 out of the original fine of P3,000.
CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN
VITUG; March 22, 2000
(kiyo miura)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the
Code of Professional Ethics
FACTS
- 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all
members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly published
certain objectionable features
- the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the
students were expelled
- the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC
President giving rise to a civil case calling for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their
counsel and Pangulayan and associates representing the
defendant, AMACC
LEGAL PROFESSION
- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-
admission agreements were separately executed by and/or in
behalf of the students by their parents
- following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation
stating, among other things, that 4 of the students had
acknowledged their guilt and agreed to terminate all
proceedings
- apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission
agreements through negotiations with said students and their
parents without communicating with Camacho
ISSUE
WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics
HELD
YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Ethics which states:
“A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject
of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend
to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to law.”
- respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty
owing to his colleague
- the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution
suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case
against the other respondents since they took no part in it
- the court concurred with IBP’s findings but reduced the
suspension to 3 months
SUAREZ V SALAZAR
RESOLUTION; September 29, 1999
(rean balisi)
NATURE
Motion to Expunge All Pleading Filed by Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court or to
Dismiss Petion
FACTS
At the hearing on the same date, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan
admitted that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the
Philippines. He is also the same “Filemon A. Manangan” who was
found by the Court in Filemon Manangan v. CFI Nueva Vizcaya,
Br.28, decided on August 30, 1999, to be in reality Andres
Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE
WON Filemon Manangan / Andres Culanag should be held in
indirect contempt of the Court
HELD
Yes. Despite the facts as found by the Court, he has continued to
misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared
as counsel for petitioners in this case. Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared
in indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby
sentenced to 3 months imprisonment to be served at the
Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Ave.,
Manila, until further orders of this Court.
AGUIRRE V RANA
CARPIO; June 10, 2003
(monch bacani)
NATURE
Administrative matter on unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation
FACTS
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- On May 21, 2001, one day before respondent Edwin Rana
participated the oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
member of the Philippine bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar on the ground of unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
- The Court allowed respondent to take the oath, but did not
allow him to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
- The complainant charges him with unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct since she claims that he already appeared
as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate of
Mandaon, Masbate, George Bunan before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. She also claims that he signed the pleading dated
19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor as counsel for the said candidate.
- On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that the
respondent is a municipal government employee and as such, he
is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
- On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel George
Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
- Respondent claims though George Bunan sought his specific
assistance, “he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law.” He also admitted
signing the pleading, but not as a lawyer.
- In reply to the charge of violation of law, he claims that he
already resigned from the said government post May 11, 2001.
He further claims that the complaint is politically charged since
the complainant is the daughter of the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
- In the complainant’s reply to the respondent’s comments, she
further alleges that on May 19, Emily Estipona-Hao filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor
wherein the respondent signed as counsel for her.
- On July 17, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confident (OBC). The OBC found that the respondent indeed
appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan, as seen in the
minutes of the MBEC proceedings. The OBC also believes that
respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny
his admission to the practice of law.
ISSUE
WON the respondent should be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar
HELD
Yes. Records show that he indeed appeared as lawyer for Bunan.
He also signed the pleading as his lawyer. In the first paragraph
of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the
“(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN.” Bunan himself
also wrote to the MBEC that he had “authorized Atty. Edwin L.
Rana as his counsel to represent him” before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
- Emily Estipona-Hao also wrote to the MBEC that the respondent
will be the legal counsel for her party. The respondent also
signed the pleading as their lawyer.
- All these happened before he took his lawyer’s oath. It is clear
that he engaged in the practice of law.
- It is also irrelevant the respondent has already passed the bar
and taken his oath, for it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys
which makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
- As for the charge of violation of law, it is clear that the
respondent has already resigned from the said position before
appearing as counsel.
- On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
LEGAL PROFESSION
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
Disposition Respondent is denied admission to the Philippine
Bar
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V
LADAGA
KAPUNAN; January 26, 2001
(jonas azura)
NATURE
This is an administrative matter in the Supreme Court.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the practice of their
profession.
FACTS
Respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Makati, represented his cousin Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga as
pro bono counsel in a criminal case for falsification of public
document. The Court denied respondent’s request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directed the Office of the
Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for
appearing in court without the required authorization. In his
Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are
“close blood cousins” who belong to a “powerless family” from
an impoverished town in Surigao del Norte. Ms. Ladaga had
supported and guided respondent from childhood until he
finished his law degree. Because of their close relationship, Ms.
Ladaga sought respondent’s help and advice when she was
charged in a criminal case by Lisa Payoyo Andres. Respondent
claims that Ms. Andres’ only purpose in filing the case was to
“seek vengeance” on Ms. Ladaga. He explains that the discord
between his cousin and Ms. Andres started when the latter’s
husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit
with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4
Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot 3 children. The birth certificate of
their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against
Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that he felt it was his duty to
accept Ms. Ladaga’s plea to be her counsel as she could not pay
for the services of a lawyer and he was the only lawyer in the
family. Respondent also pointed out that in 7 years of
government service he had performed his duties with honesty
and integrity and it was only in this particular case that he had
been administratively charged for helping a close relative by
giving free legal assistance for a “humanitarian purpose”. He
never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court
since the questioned appearances were made in the MTC of
Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office.
Respondent also stressed that during his court appearances, he
was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees by appearing as
counsel
2. WON respondent obtained written permission from the head
of the department as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules
HELD
1. No. “Private practice” of a profession, specifically the law
profession, does not refer to an isolated court appearance. It
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. The
isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel for his cousin does not constitute the “private practice”
of the law profession as contemplated by law.
2. No. It is true that respondent filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court, which were
approved. However, the presiding judge of the court to which
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respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
Disposition Respondent is REPRIMANDED with a stern warning
that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.
HALILI V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
MAKASIAR; April 30, 1985
(eva sison)
FACTS
- initial cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of
more than 500 bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit;
litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for
the overtime with the defunct CIR on August 1958; disputes
were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
agreement on Dec. 1974
- under the agreement: the Administratrix would transfer to the
employees title to the tract of land containing an area of 33,952
sq.m. in San Bartolome, Caloocan and pay in addition the cash
amount of P25,000 in full and final satisfaction of all the claims
and causes of action of all of the employees against the estate of
Fortunato Halili; the union shall withdraw and dismiss the case;
the transfer of title and the cash release and quitclaim Halili
Enterprises, Halili Transit, Fortunato Halili, his estate, his heirs
and successors
- a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property was executed
- on Aug. 1982, the Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent
motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment requesting for
authority to sell and dispose of the property—motion was
granted
- prospective buyer, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, however,
had apprehensions regarding the authority of the Union to sell.
So, Atty. Pineda filed a motion with the SC on Dec. 1982
- but, in an order dated Feb. 1983 Labor Arbiter Raymundo
Valenzuela granted the motion; so the sale was consummated
on June 1983 and the purchase price was deposited with the
Manila Bank-Cubao
- When Atty. Jose Espinas, the principal counsel, learned of the
sale and apportionment of the proceeds, he requested Labor
Arbiter Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records. He was
told, however, that the records were missing; it was located for
him by Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC
- Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a
temporary mandatory restraining order on August 1983—
questions the legality of the orders dated Sept. 1982 and Feb.
1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela which authorized the
sale of the awarded property and the distribution of the
proceeds
- Movants Union and Espinas prayed for the court to: require
Atty. Pineda to deposit with NLRC the amount paid to him
representing 35% attorney’s fees; require the Halili Drivers and
Conductors Union through Domingo Cabading or any of his reps
to deposit with the NLRC the 6% union expenses paid to them;
implead the Manila Bank-Cubao to require it to prevent further
withdrawals of amount deposited in the name of Pineda and the
Union; that the order of Valenzuela be nullified insofar as it
allows Pineda 35% attorney’s fees; NLRC to equitably dispose
20% as fees to all lawyers who participated and any excess
amounts to be distributed to the workers
- Aug. 1983 Espinas filed a supplement to urgent motion praying
for the nullification of Valenzuela’s order
- the court issued a temporary mandatory restraining order:
enjoined Pineda to deposit with NLRC the amount representing
35% attorney’s fees (P712,992); directed the Union to deposit
with the NLRC 6% union expenses; ordered NLRC and Manila
Bank not to allow withdrawals
-Union, through Pineda said that the subject matter sought to be
enjoined or mandated by the restraining order is moot and
academic
- Espinas filed a manifestation and motion to require Atty. Pineda
and the union to comply with the temporary mandatory
restraining order
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Solicitor General filed his comment with the recommendations
that the orders of Valenzuela be nullified, that the case must be
remanded to the NLRC, and that the TRO issued by the court on
Sept.1983 be maintained pending final resolution by NLRC
- on the mandatory restraining order, Pineda claims that as of
Oct. 1983 he had a balance of P2,000 in his account with Manila
Bank
- resolution of court dated Oct. 1983, the court set aside as null
and void the orders of Valenzuela, directed the Manila Bank,
Pineda and the Union to comply with the temporary mandatory
restraining order issued on Sept. 1983, and remanded cases to
NLRC
- Oct. 1983 motion was filed to cite Pineda, Union and Bank in
contempt
- Dec. 1983- rejoinder reiterating plea to declare Pineda and
Capuno of the union in contempt of court and to mere out the
proper penalty
- crucial facts which have surfaced:
> then Union President Amado Lopez informed JC Espinas and
Associates that the general membership of the said Union had
authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm
> Espinas, the original counsel, established the award of 897
workers’ claim—notice of judgment in 1968 was served on JC
Espinas & Associates; and a notice of judgment in 1970 was sent
to Atty. BC Pineda and Associates under the same address as the
Espinas firm
> when Pineda appeared for the Union, still an associate of the
law firm, his appearance carried the firm name “BC Pineda and
Associates”, giving the impression that he was the principal
lawyer in the cases
> Pineda did not reveal to his partners that he had a retainer’s
contract entered into on Jan. 1967; he did not divulge, only the
Union officers knew of the contract
> the retainer’s contract between Pineda and the Union appears
anomalous and even illegal: only 14% of the total membership
was represented which is a violation of Art.242 of the Labor
Code; contingent fees worked to the prejudice of those who were
no longer working (Pineda knew that all the workers would be
out of work because Halili Transit had already stopped
operations in Metro Manila); contract was not notarized
> the decision of Manila Memorial Park cemetery to stop
questioning the Union’s authority to sell and the expeditious
manner by which Valenzuela granted motion for such authority
make the entire transaction dubious and irregular
ISSUE
WON Atty. Benjamin Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank-
Cubao should be cited in contempt for the alleged failure to
comply with the temporary mandatory order and the resolution
issued by the SC
HELD
Ratio
a. Atty. Pineda: Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect
contempt. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a
court, any abuse of or any interference with the proceedings of a
court, and any improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice shall be punished as
indirect contempts in order to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to enforce judgments, orders and mandates of
the court.
Atty. Pineda should likewise be subject to disbarment
proceedings. The Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose
acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
b. Manila Banking Corporation: Manila Banking Corporation is not
liable for contempt. When there is a sufficient compliance with
the court’s order, a party can no longer be liable for contempt of
court.
c. The Union and its officers are dropped from the within
contempt charge.
Reasoning
a. –the court already nullified the orders of the labor arbiter as
violative of the due process clause
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- the act of Pineda of filing a motion in the SC for authority to sell
property in question was by itself an admission on his part that
he did not possess the authority to sell the property and that the
SC was the proper body which had the power to grant such
authority
- he did not wait for such valid authority but instead previously
obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not
empowered to so authorize
- the 45% attorney’s lien on award of those union members who
were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of
those who were still working as provided for in the retainer’s
contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable (under sec.11
rule VIII of Book III, attorney’s fees should not exceed 10% of the
amount awarded)
- the pleadings show a deceitful pattern on the part of Pineda
- contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and admin of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation
- the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
- exercise of this power has a twofold aspect: the proper
punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or
its order, and to compel his performance of some act or duty
required of him by the court which he refuses to perform---> due
to this twofold aspect, contempts are classified as civil or
criminal
- civil: failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a
judge for the benefit of the opposing party
-criminal: conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a
court or of a judge, as in lawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority or dignity of a court or of a judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act
- where the punishment imposed is wholly or primarily to protect
or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine or
by imprisonment or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal
case
- if made before final decree, contempt judgment will be treated
as in the nature of an interlocutory order; if made after the final
decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on
appeal from the final decree
- whether civil or criminal does not affect the power of a court to
punish it
- On Disbarment
sec.27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court: attorneys may
be removed or suspended for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, for any violation of the lawyer’s
oath, for a willful disobedience of a lawful order of a superior
court...
- a lawyer may be criminally liable for breach of professional
duty, and under the Anti-Graft Act for knowingly inducing a
public official to commit an offense
b. – the bank had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance
which was a sufficient compliance
c. Mr. Capuno clarified that with regard to attorney’s fees, Pineda
made the Union officers believe that he would be the one to pay
the fees of Espinas and Lopez for which reason the 35%
increased fees was approved by the Union’s board in good faith
- Union was aware that Espinas was the principal counsel
- they knew of the original contract for 20% attorney’s fees
Disposition Atty. Pineda is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT
of court. He is sentenced to imprisonment until the orders of the
court are complied with. He is also directed to show cause why
he should not be disbarred.
TING-DUMALI V TORRES
PER CURIAM; April 14, 2004
(eva sison)
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Presentation of
false testimony, participation in, consent to, and failure to
adduce against, the forgery of complainant’s signature, and
gross misrepresentation.
LEGAL PROFESSION
FACTS
- complainant-affidavit filed on Oct. 22, 1999 where complainant
Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando Torres with
presentation of false testimony, participation in, consent to, and
failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature
in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from it,
thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal
and judicial ethics.
- complainant is one of six children of late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting.
- siblings involved are Miriam Saria, Marcelina Rivera and
Felicisima Torres who is married to respondent
- parents died intestate, leaving 3 parcels of land
Complainant’s Claim
- respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was
lawfully due them
- Felicisima and Miriam executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate where they made it appear that they were
the sole heirs; respondent participated in, consented to and
failed to advise against this act; he presented said document to
the Register of Deeds for the transfer of the title in the names of
his wife and Miriam (involving lot 1586)
- complainant’s signature was forged in another Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement involving a different lot to enable
Felicisima and Miriam to transfer the title in their names, thus
enabling them to sell the land (which they did, to Antel Holdings,
Inc); respondent, again, consented to and participated in this act
(involving lot 1603)
- respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false
testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only
children and legal heirs of deceased spouses in the petition for
Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy of a title covering the
last parcel of land (lot 1605)
- made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of
profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer of the last
parcel of land to release the full payment under the pretense
that the order of reconstitution would be released within a
month when he knew that it would be impossible because he
presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on August
1997 (he said this to buyer on Nov. 1996)
Respondent’s Comment
- denies the allegations
- lot 1586: his wife and Miriam were not motivated by any desire
to solely profit the sale; he had no part in the execution of the
document; he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had
already agreed on how to dispose of the lot; if ever
complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was
done in good faith
- admits he was counsel in the reconstitution case; the false
testimony of Marcelina could not be faulted on him because it
was a clear oversight
- regarding gross and false misrepresentation that the
reconstitution order would be released within a month,
assurance was made by the Clerk of Court
-believes the complainant intends to harass him
Complainant’s Reply
-denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her
mother because her mom met a sudden death, when she died
four siblings were still minors, and on Feb 2000 Eliseo wrote his
siblings, denying the existence of a toka
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
- on june 2000, SC referred the case to IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation or decision
- on Jan 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan of
the Commission on Bar Discipline found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and
Rule 10.1 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
- recommended the disbarment of respondent
- in its resolution, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved
and adopted San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to a 6-
year suspension
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
ISSUES
1. WON respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is
morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession
2. WON disbarment is the imposable disciplinary sanction
HELD
1. Yes, respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is
morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession. A lawyer is a servant
of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice. Thus, he should make himself more an exemplar for
others to emulate and he should not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Reasoning
– the lawyers’ oath is a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold
and keep inviolable at all times
- the oath is reflected in CPR (Canon 1, 7, 10); they underscore
the role of a lawyer as a vanguard of our legal system—in this
covenant, respondent miserably failed
- respondent knew of his wife’s siblings, yet he presented the
document stating that his wife and Miriam are the only children
to the Register of Deeds
- the falsification of complainant’s signature in the document
which contains a waiver by the complainant of her right over the
property, a matter consulted to respondent, is tantamount to
falsification of a public document; he presented such document,
therefore, he himself may also be held liable for knowingly using
a falsified document to the damage of the complainant
- respondent did not advise his wife from doing acts which are
contrary to law; he must have kept in mind that it is his duty to
uphold the Consti and obey the laws of the land
- regarding respondent’s argument that the non-declaration of
other siblings was an oversight does not deserve credence
because the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina
as the petitioners and because during the hearing when
respondent asked Marcelina WON she has bros and sis, latter
said none
- he allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false
testimony in court and he himself may be punished as guilty of
false testimony
- under canon 10, lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court; this was openly violated by respondent
- respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and
doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession
2. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar.
Reasoning
- In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction
against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary
purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
- given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case,
it is found that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the
severance of his privilege to practice law for life
Disposition We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the
CPR, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership
in the legal profession. He is ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
MASINSIN V ALBANO
VITUG; May 31, 1994
(javi bautista)
LEGAL PROFESSION
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition.
FACTS
This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente
Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a result of the
case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises
and to remove their house/apartment an surrender possession of
the subject land; to pay the sum of P100 a month from January
1987 as compensation for the use of the premises until the land
is actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the
judgment became final and executory. On August 22 1985, the
Masinsins filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila
seeking the annulment of the decision of the ejectment case and
to set aside the order of its execution. Petition was dismissed.
On October 7 1985, petitioners filed a complaint for “Annulment
of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages” was filed by the
Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the
ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed due to res
judicata. Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court. When petitioners refused to remove
their house, a demolition order was issued. But before the
completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by
the RTC following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary
injunction and for declaratory relief. Petition again was denied.
Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of
the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed on August 23
1990.
In this present petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of
Manila has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the
ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed an
area for priority development by the National Housing Authority
on December 1 1987 by authority of PD 2016.
ISSUE
WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in
the ejectment suit due to PD 2016
HELD
No. according to a report by manager of the Metro Manila Project
Department of the National Housing Authority, pursuant to PD
No. 1967 (which after amendments became PD No. 2016), the
disputed lot is not for acquisition by the NHA. It is located
outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement
Project. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and
therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus the MTC of Manila has
jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment case.
- What immediately catches one’s attention to this case is the
evident predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to
file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court
has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complainants and
petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to
prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has
long become final and executory. The petitioners through
different counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before
different branches of the court. The lawyer’s oath is a sacred
trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. The pertinent part
of the lawyer’s oath involved in this case:
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
not delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an
officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert,
impede and degrade the administration of justice is
contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action
and warranting application of the contempt power.
Disposition Petition is dismissed. Petitioner’s counsel of record
is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of
the lawyer’s oath in the future will be dealt with mot severely.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
YOUNG V BATUEGAS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; May 9, 2003
(owen ricalde)
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
- On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young, private
prosecutor in “People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana,
Jr.”, pending in RTC Manila, filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint
for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino for allegedly committing deliberate
falsehood in court and violating the lawyer’s oath.
- On December 13, 2000, Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for
accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that
the “accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority. As such, he is now under detention.” Upon personal
verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where
accused Arana allegedly surrendered, Young learned that he
surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the
Certificate of Detention
- Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, calendared
the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing
irregularity and other formal defects, namely
> lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant
> violation of the three-day notice rule
> failure to attach the Certificate of Detention
- According to respondents on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client,
they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him
to the NBI to voluntarily surrender but due to heavy traffic, they
arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the
certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered
on December 14, 2000 TF there was neither unethical conduct
nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has
voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI.
- WRT the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that Young was
not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the
State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of
hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter
notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.
- In August 13, 2001, referred to IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
- On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala submitted a report and recommended Atty.
Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be
suspended from the practice of their profession as a
lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months
ISSUE
WON Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood
HELD
YES.
Ratio To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the
pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn.
They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Reasoning
- Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the
court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that
accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and
was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate
ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice.
- A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will “do no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.”
- a lawyer should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and
the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion
LEGAL PROFESSION
- courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them
- while a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights
and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his
client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth.
- Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
- In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to
the police authorities on the same date “tentatively” scheduled
for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such
supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not
absolve respondent judge from administrative liability
considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the
application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point,
were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief
from the court.
- In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of
hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled
date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice,
respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-
observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they
are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
Disposition Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood.
Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU V THE
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
CASTRO; January 30, 1971
(rach mayuga)
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari to review a decision and resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the Unions’ complaint
FACTS
- The following UNIONS (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd,
Employees Ass’n-NATU; FGU Insurance Group Workers and
Employees Ass’n-NATU; Insular Life Bldg Employees Ass’n-NATU)
while still members of the Federation of Free Workers, entered
into separate collective bargaining agreements with these
COMPANIES (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd; FGU Insurance
Group)
- Lawyers of the Unions include Enaje and Garcia (Sec-treasurer
of FFW). When they left FFW, the Companies then hired them
and Garcia became Asst. Corporate Sec and Legal Asst in the
Legal Dept, and Enaje became personnel manager of the
Companies. He was also made chairman of the negotiating panel
for the Co. in the CBA with the Unions.
- Sept 16, 1957 – Unions jointly submitted proposals for a
modified renewal of their respective CBA contracts w/c were due
to expire on 9/30
- Sept/Oct 1957 - negotiations were conducted but snagged by
deadlock on issue of union shop; Unions then filed on 01/27/1958
notice of strike for ”deadlock on collective bargaining”
- April 15, 1958 – Unions dropped their demands regarding
security but the Companies still refused to negotiate
- Apr 25 to May 6 – They tried negotiating but with no
satisfactory results
- May 15, 1958 – Unions voted to declare a strike in protest
against what they considered as unfair labor practices
- May 20, 1958 – Unions went on strike and picketed the offices
of Insular Life Bldg
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- May 21, 1958 – Companies through the Acting Manager Olbes
sent to each of the strikers a letter specifying incentives should
they decide to go back to work
- Garcia and Abella (Chief of Personnel Records Section) tried to
penetrate the picket lines. When Garcia approached the picket
line, he engaged into a fight with one of the strikers and both of
them suffered injuries.
- Companies organized 3 bus-loads of employees, including a
photographer who succeeded in penetrating the picket lines
causing injuries to picketers.
- Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies
filed criminal charges against strikers and they also filed a
petition for injunction.
- May 31, 1958 – CFI Mla granted injunction. Companies sent
individually to the strikers another letter which states “If you are
still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group
Companies, and if there are no criminal charges against you, we
are giving you until June 2 to report for work at the home office.
Otherwise, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.”
- All of the more than 120 crim charges, except for 3, were
dismissed. But employees decided to call of the strike and to
report back to work on June 2.
- Before readmitting, Companies required them to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office and to be screened by a
management committee
- July 29, 1958 – CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice
- Aug 17, 1965 – CIR dismissed the complaint
Relevant to the assigned topic (read pages 277-280!)
- Martinez, the Presiding Judge of the CIR, misquoted a SC
decision in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication
Employees Ass’n:
(1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT
appear in the original;
(2) Martinez used “For it is settled that...”; the original reads,
“For it must be remembered...”
(3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of Martinez is actually
part of the immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC
decision.
- In the respondents’ brief, counsels for respondents quoted the
CIR’s decision
ISSUES
1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice -
a) In sending out letters individually directed to the
strikers
b) For discriminating against the striking members of the
Unions in the matter of readmitting employees after the
strike
c) For dismissing officials and members of the Unions
without giving them the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side
2. WON the officials and members of the Unions are to be
reinstated with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to date of
actual reinstatement
3. WON Presiding Judge Martinez and counsels of respondents
are to be cited for contempt for misquoting a Supreme Court
decision
HELD
1.a) YES.
Ratio It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating
under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate with his
employees individually, in connection with the changes in the
agreement. Although the union is on strike, the employer is still
under the obligation to bargain with the union as the employees’
bargaining representative.
Reasoning It is an act of interference for the employer to send
a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a
specific time, otherwise new employees would be engaged to
perform their jobs. The first letter contains promises of benefits
to employees; the second letter contains threats to obtain
replacements. Free speech protection under the Constitution is
LEGAL PROFESSION
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or
his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats or reprisal.
- The circumstance that strikers later decided to return to work
on account of injunction cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the
letters which tended to interfere with the employees’ right to
engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of strike.
- Totality of Conduct Doctrine: Expressions of opinion by an
employer, though innocent in themselves, were held to be
culpable because of the circumstances under which they were
uttered. (1) Before Unions’ submission of proposals for renewal
of CBAs, respondents hired former legal counsels of petitioners;
(2) After notice to strike was served on the Companies, they
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors, compelling them to
resign from unions; (3) During negotiations in Dept of Labor,
they refused to answer the Unions’ demands en toto; (4) Strikers
were individually sent letters inducing them to return to work
with promises of special privileges; (5) Three truckloads of non-
strikers crashed through the picket line, which resulted in
injuries on the part of picketers; (6) Criminal charges were
brought upon picketers; (7) An injunction was obtained from CFI;
(8) Another letter was sent individually and by registered special
delivery mail threatening them with dismissal if they didn’t
report for work on June 2; (9) When they did report for work, a
screening committee refused to admit 63 members of the
Unions on ground of pending criminal charges; (10) When almost
all were cleared by fiscal’s office, they were still refused
admission; but all non-strikers were readmitted immediately. It is
clear that the main reason for the strike was “when it became
clear that management will not negotiate in good faith.”
1.b) YES.
Ratio The companies are guilty of discrimination in their process
of rehiring. They refused to readmit strikers with pending
criminal charges, even after these employees have secured the
required clearances. At the same time, the Companies readily
readmitted non-strikers who also had criminal charges, without
requiring clearances. They even separated active from the less
active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on
the picket lines.
Reasoning There are 3 conditions for readmission of the
strikers: (1) he must be interested in continuing his work with
the companies; (2) no criminal charges against him; (3) report
for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. All
employees are considered to have complied with first and third
condition.
- In an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges
of discrimination in rehiring, they even delegated the power to
readmit to a committee composed of Abella and Garcia. Both
were involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during
the strike, and the mere act of placing the power of
reinstatement in their hands is a form of discrimination.
1.c) YES.
Ratio The Companies refused to take the employees back on
account of their “acts of misconduct” even if all, except three,
were able to secure the required clearances. Record shows that
not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to
defend himself against the supposed charges.
2. YES.
Ratio The members and officials of the Unions went on strike
because of the unfair labor practices committed by the
Companies. They are now entitled to reinstatement with back
pay because when they reported back for work, upon the
invitation of their employers, they were discriminatorily
dismissed.
3. NO.
Ratio The misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude
than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to
mislead. Counsels of respondents have the prima facie right to
rely on the quotation as it appears in the Judge’s decision, to
copy it verbatim and to incorporate it in their brief. Import of
sentences in the quotation is substantially the same as the cited
decision.
Impt: In citing SC’s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty
of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
is because “only the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.” (Miiranda v.
Imperial)
- Ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly
quoted, the decisions and rulings of SC may lose their proper
and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers
and the public who may thereby be misled. Also, appellate
courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, and be
saved precious time in finding out whether citations are correct.
Disposition Decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside.
Respondents are ordered to reinstate the dismissed members of
the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar
positions with back wages.
IN RE SOTTO
FERIA; January 21, 1949
(bri bauza)
NATURE
Original action in Supreme Court. Contempt
FACTS
- On December 7, 1948, Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was
required by this Court to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court for having issued a written
statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re
Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as
published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the
locality, reads as follows:
“As author of the Press Freedom Law (RA 53), interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a
local daily, who has now to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his
refusal to divulge the souce of a news published in his paper, I
regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence
the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the
only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that
one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted,
the Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to
liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court of today is a
far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory
of the Philippine Judiciary.”
- Respondent does not deny having published the above quoted
threat and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges
against this Supreme Court. But he contends that under section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, “this Court has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the
Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by
virtue of a law, and a law has to be promulgated by Congress
with the approval of the Chief Executive.”
- He also alleges in his answer that “in the exercise of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the
respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost
good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority
of the members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked,
nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of anyone.”
ISSUES
WON the Supreme Court may hold respondent guilty for
contempt of court.
LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD
Ratio Any publication; pending a suit, reflecting upon the court,
the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with
reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The summary
power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as
essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In
re Kelly)
Reasoning In re Kelly lays down the doctrine of the power of
courts to hold contempt proceedings.
- Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well founded it may enlighten the court. But in his above-quoted
statement, he not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with a presentation of a bill in the next congressional
session, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow-minded,
in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court,
and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But
the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into the disrepute and degrading the administration of
justice.
- The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law in their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos may be the result.
- As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.
- As Justice Holmes very appropriately said in U.S. v Sullens:
“The administration of justice and freedom of the press, though
separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be
violated by the other. The press and courts have correlative
rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
constitution and laws, form which the former receives its
prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction… This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital
to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.”
Disposition In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent
Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of
the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to
pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of
this judgment, a fine P1000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the
same period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be
disbarred from practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the
courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following
statements made by him during the pendency of the case
against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
The respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the
charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause
for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in
defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he
is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final
disposition of said case through intimidation and false
accusations against this Supreme Court.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
GUERRERO V VILLAMOR
FERNAN; NOVEMBER 13, 1989
(jaja estoy)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, Br. 16.
FACTS
- Consequent to the dismissal of five criminal cases for qualified
theft against Naval by respondent Judge Villamor, the offended
party, petitioner Carlos, through his lawyer and co-petitioner
Guerrero filed before the RTC Br. 21 of Cebu City an action for
damages against respondent Judge for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases.
Consequently, respondent Judge issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-
0989-0993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against
petitioners, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
direct contempt and sentencing them both to imprisonment of
five days and a fine of P500 for degrading the respect and
dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and
contemptuous language before the court.
- The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by
respondent judge are the allegations in the complaint in Civil
Case No. CEB-6478 reading:
"12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990,
0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly
without circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case
of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was
tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is
now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability-all because
the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with
his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances
which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion
free from bias x x x;"
"xxx xxx xxx
"14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the
conduct of defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking, but
appalling-in giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is
at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and
moral damages therefore would warrant on this kind of
reprehensible behaviour x x x
"15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations,
defendant judge should also visit upon him x x x for reducing
plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the
former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also
humiliated and spitefully scorned.”
- Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been
committed against respondent Judge in the complaint for
damages in Civil Case No. 6478 because whatever was
mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent Judge
while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any
matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court
while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that the words used in the subject complaint were
ISSUE
WON petitioners committed direct contempt of court through the
use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court
justifying the award of damages being sought
HELD
1. No. Direct contempt could not have been committed against
respondent Judge in the complaint for damages because
whatever was mentioned therein was not made before
respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial
proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial
function of the court while it is at work on a case before it.
Furthermore, the words they used In the subject complaint were
merely words descriptive of the plaintiff’s cause of action based
on his reaction and remorse and the willful infliction of injury on
him and that the same are all privileged communications made
in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant
LEGAL PROFESSION
to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. Strong
words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral
anguish suffered by petitioner as a result of the dismissal of the
subject criminal merely words descriptive of plaintiffs cause of
action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction
of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged
communications made in the course of judicial proceedings
because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be
contemptuous.
- In his Comment, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners
harp too much on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed
cases and therefore the language or words employed to
describe, opine, criticize or condemn the dismissal of said
criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb the
dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent
judge, as said court was no longer functioning as such in the
dispensation of justice. This, according to respondent Judge, is a
very dangerous perception for then the court becomes
vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the
foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability,
so that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a
shield to sully the court's prestige.
- The Court sustains petitioner’s contention that the alleged
derogatory language employed in the complaint in the civil case
did not constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all,
constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that may be
raised by said petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must
be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not
submitted to respondent Judge nor in the criminal cases from
which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another
court presided by another judge and involving a separate action:
the civil case for damages against respondent Judge. Although
the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the
wisdom of respondent Judge’s act of dismissing the criminal
cases, such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer
in the process of performing judicial functions in connection with
the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms as
direct contempt of court.
- The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so
much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power
of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, the power being intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise. Any abuse of the contempt citation powers
will therefore be curtailed and corrected.
- Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in
mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers and x x x (to) insist
on similar conduct by others." This respectful attitude towards
the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous preference
for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
x x x."
IN RE ALMACEN
RUIZ CASTRO; Feb 18, 1970
(kooky talon)
NATURE
Proceedings For Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen
FACTS
- Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant in the civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero. The trial
court tendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966
Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision, and on July 5,
1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the
latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return
card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon
verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, on August 22,
1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal
bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
- CA, citing Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal, “for the reason that
the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
Inc. vs. Bain Construction At Co.), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal
was perfected out of time."
- Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he
filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, as the applicable case.
Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration.
- Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. SC refused
to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal.
Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as
well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was
made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered
expunged from the records.
- Atty. Almacen then filed his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks, against the Court as well
as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented
as it is unprofessional. The petition was filed on September 25,
1967, in protest against what he asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts
the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "people by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violation of
the Constitution with impunity." His client, he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the' altar of
hypocrisy.'' In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of the Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members, of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He
then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that ". . . . a resolution issue
ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with
reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to
assume the practice of the noblest profession."
- Sept 28, 1967, SC resolved to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. When
nothing came from him, Atty. Almacen was reminded to turn
over his certificate so that the Court could act on his petition.
- To said reminder Atty. Almacen manifested "that he has no
pending petition in connection with Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said
case is now final and executory"; that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to 'pursue the negative act’."
- Nov 17, 1967 SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in the Nov 17 resolution, Atty.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Almacen asked for permission to give reasons and cause in an
open and public hearing. The Court required Atty. Almacen to
state his reasons for such request, to which he manifested that
since the Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in
an open and public hearing" so that the Court could observe his
sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no, time to hear him in
person." He was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.
- Atty. Almacen’s written answer offered no apology. Far from
being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeated his
jeremiad of lamentations, abundant with sarcasm and innuendo1.
ISSUE
WON the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions
HELD
- Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible
bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby
tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence
in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited
with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
- CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of Atty.
Almacen’s appeal in light of the law and applicable decisions of
the SC. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far
back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew - or ought to have known -
that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the
motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the
adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly
he did not). Atty. Almacen’s own negligence caused the
forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a
matter of right. There is no justification for his scurrilous and
scandalous outbursts.
- Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the
fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
then the court's actuations are thrown open to public
consumption.
- As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges.
It is his right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
- By constitutional mandate, it is the SC’s solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to
discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have
proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar.
- A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more
than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
petition, answer and oral argumentation far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
1 frequent customer of the restaurant of the spouses
Refer to the case for Atty. Almacen’s written answer. The way he addressed the
Court and how he laid down his points should be a matter of interest. As the court
said, this is a matter “unprecedented and unprofessional”. One paragraph reads: “Now
that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court
in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said in good faith.”
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- NOTE: disciplinary proceedings like the present are Sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not -
and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by the Court
motu proptio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Disposition Accordingly, it is the sense of the Court that Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
SORIANO V COURT OF APPEALS
PARDO; August 28, 2001
(yella bautista)
FACTS
- Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes pleaded that they were
employed by Socorro as manager and administrative
assistant of her property and real estate in 1968.
- As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro gave
them one apartment unit to use as their dwelling for the
duration of their lifetime and a token monthly rental on
P150 was imposed.
- In the same building, another unit was occupied by the
spouses which was improved and converted by them
into a pub and restaurant. For the use of the premises,
the token amount of P1500 monthly was imposed.
- On October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and
Rosalina notice to vacate the said two units
- Deogracias and Rosalina owned two commercial lots
with improvements. On May 28, 1968, they became
indebted to Socorro in the amount of P638,635.36. The
parties agreed to pay for the debt by selling the two lots
for P2.5M. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and
Rosalina conveyed the property to Socorro by way of
first mortgage. A deed of absolute sale was executed in
place of a real estate mortgage.
- Action was initiated by the spouses but the court
released the two lots in favor of Socorro having
presented the deed of absolute sale in her name.
- On October 28, 1988, the spouses paid the filing fee
and legal research.
- On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on two grounds:
1. the first cause of action was barred by the
pendency of an ejectment case between the same
parties over the same parties
2. the second cause of action was premature
- On December 8, 1988, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf
of their benefactress filed with the trial court an urgent
ex-parte motion for restraining order. They talked to
respondent judge Naval in his chambers and requested
him to immediately act on Socorro’s urgent ex-parte
motion for a restraining order. On December 16, 1988,
the TC denied the motion.
- On January 16, 1989, Socorro through counsel Atty.
Padilla filed a motion to inhibit Judge Naval
1. while still a law practitioner and politician, he was a
and was a good friend of his
2. he was also a good friend of the attorney of the
spouses
- TC denied motion to inhibit
LEGAL PROFESSION
- On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed a
motion to admit attached supplemental complaint
which pleaded that they have already paid their debt to
Socorro but the latter refused to accept said payment
without just cause thus was a clear move on her part to
let the 3 year period provided in their MOA elapse
- TC admitted the supplemental complaint
- Socorro moved to dismiss supplemental complaint
- TC denied motion to dismiss supplemental complaint
- TC ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deficiency
in the docket fees
- Socorro moved for an extension to file a responsive
pleading to the supplemental complaint and to reset
pre-trial
- Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order and
paid additional filing fees
- TC granted Socorro’s motion for an extension
- Socorro again moved for another extension and
resetting of the pre-trial
- The TC granted the second motion
- Socorro again moved for another extension on which
the TC did not act upon
- Socorro’s counsel Atty. Padilla filed an omnibus motion
for reconsideration of various orders of the respondent
court
- Deogracias and Rosalina filed an opposition
- The TC denied Socorro’s motion
- The TC directed Atty. Padilla to show cause whey he
should not be cited for contempt of court. He
consequently failed to do so and the court declared
Socorro in default and Atty. Padilla was sentenced to 5
days imprisonment with a P100 fine for direct contempt
of court.
- Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining
order assailing the orders of Judge Naval.
ISSUES
1. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
restrain or to remedy the forcible seizure by the
plaintiffs of the property subject of the litigation
2. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
order the payment of the correct fling fee upon failure
to pay the same, to dismiss the case
3. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
inhibit
4. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in admitting
the supplemental complaint with a theory directly
contrary to the original complaint and in not dismissing
it upon motion of defendant.
5. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion and acted in
excess of jurisdiction in finding Atty. Padilla, Jr. guilty of
direct contempt
6. WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
sanctioning the orders of the TC except the Order
admitting the supplemental complaint
HELD
1. No. The issue has already become moot and academic
since the parties had already entered the premises in
question.
2. No. There was no intention on the part of Deogracias
and Rosalina to degraud the government. They were in
good faith and relied on the assessment of the Clerk of
Court.
3. No. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides only the following grounds for the
disqualification of judges- No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in his exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
4. Yes. The supplemental complaint contains matters
directly different from and even contrary to the cause of
action stated in the original complaint. The rule
allowing amendments to a pleading is subject to the
general limitation that the cause of action shall not be
substantially changed or that the theory of the case
shall not be altered.
5. The CA erred when it stated that a certiorari proceeding
assailing the judgment of direct contempt was not
proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed therefrom.
Rule 71, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: A person adjudged in direct contempt by any
court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself
of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The court
also erred when it affirmed the trial court’s finding of
direct contempt of court against Atty. Padilla (see
comments made by Atty. Padilla in the original text of
the case) Atty. Padilla’s innuendoes are not necessarily
disrespectful to the court. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.
MACEDA V VASQUEZ
NOCON; April 22, 1993
(edel cruz)
NATURE
Petition for Certiorari of the order of the ombudsman
FACTS
- This is a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order for the Office of the Ombudsman to stop it from
entertaining a criminal complaint regarding the alleged
falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the SC.
- Petitioner Judge Maceda was accused of falsification of
Certificate of Service, and now seeks to review orders of the
Ombudsman
- Napoleon Abiera of PAO alleged that the petitioner had falsified
his Certificate of Service by certifying that all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for decisions have been
determined and decided on or before Jan 31 1989 when in truth
15 cases were still to be determined. (Abiera alleges Maceda lied
that he finished the cases but he hasn’t yet.)
ISSUES
1. WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case despite the
Court’s ruling in Orap v. Sandiganbayan
2. WON the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision
over all the inferior courts
HELD
1. NO. There is nothing in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A
judge who falsifies his certificate of Service is administratively
liable to the SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency. And
criminally liable to the state under the RPC for his felonious act.
2. YES. In the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation of the Ombudsman encroaches into
the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- ART VIII, sec 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests on the SC
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on
the powers granted to it by the Constitution for such a
justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the SC.
- The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s
certificates of service to the SC for determination of whether
said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load. (SO admin case first before criminal.)
Disposition Petition granted. Ombudsman is directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by the public respondent.2
MALONSO V PRINCIPE
TINGA; December 16, 2004
(giulia pineda)
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
In the early part of 1997, Napocor instituted expropriation
proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the
complainant in this case.
- April 1, 1997, a “Contract of Legal Services” was entered into
between the law firm “Principe Villano and Clemente Law
Offices” and SANDAMA, Inc. represented by its President Danilo
V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by
the expropriation proceedings. Complainant is a member of this
organization.
- November 27, 1997, complainant executed a “Kasulatan ng
Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan” in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the
latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter of
negotiation with the NPC.
- December 21, 1999, NPC’s Board of Directors approved the
amicable settlement of the expropriation cases by paying all the
lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four
Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P103,413,200.00).
- More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were
instituted and while complainant was represented therein by
Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent
filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling
Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants.”
- About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate
legal fees, respondent filed his “Notice of Entry of Appearance”
(dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal
counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case.
- February 12, 2000, (69) lot owners including the complainant
wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never
authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of the
respondent’s law firm to represent them in the expropriation
cases.
- February 17, 2000, complainant filed an “Opposition” to
respondent’s entry of appearance and motion to separate legal
fees.
- March 7, 2000, respondent filed a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien”
claiming 40% of the selling price of the properties being
expropriated by NPC.
- April 10, 2000, respondent filed a “Notice of Adverse Claim”
before the Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the
rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being
expropriated including that of complainant.
- November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave
to Intervene in the expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner
of the property being expropriated.
2 i.)
NOTE: Lawyer has a duty to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless
personal attack, irrespective of whether he loses or wins a case in a judge’s sala. But a
lawyer can file admin complaints against erring judges.
SC- ADMIN CASES (THROUGH COURT ADMINISTRATOR)
OMBUDSMAN – CRIMINAL CASE
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the
Compromise Agreement submitted by the lot owners and NPC
for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution
of the decision approving the compromise agreement between
the lot owners and the NPC was delayed
- June 6, 2001 - a complaint for disbarment was filed before the
IBP. Julian Malonso claimed that Atty Principe, without authority
entered his appearance as Malonso’s counsel in the
expropriation proceedings initiated by Napocor. After illegally
representing him, Pincipe claimed 40% of the selling price of his
land by way of attorney’s fees and in a Motion to Intervene,
claimed to be a co-owner of Malonso’s property.
- In the respondet’s anawer, he claims that the services of his
law office was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR (SANDAMA) through its president,
Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of Legal Services
executed on April 1, 19973. Respondent claims that Malonso is a
member of SANDAMA and that the said member executed an
SPA in favor of Elfa which served as Elfa’s authority to act in
behalf of Malonso
- In Malonso’s reply, he claimed that he did not authorize Elfa as
the SPA was executed after the Contract of Legal Services. He
also claims that he also had his own lawyer, Atty. Benjamin
Mendoza.
- Principe counters this argument saying that the agreement is a
continuing one, hence Malonso was within the coverage of the
contract.
- According to the findings of the IBP investigator, the Contract of
Legal Services is between SANDAMA as a corporate being and
the respondent’s law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the
expropriation proceedings instituted by Napocor, neither does it
claim co-ownership of the properties being expropriated. It was
also found that the SPA was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa
after the Contract of Legal Services, and the right of co-
ownership cannot be derived from the said documents. A
contract of legal services between a lawyer and his client is
personal and cannot be performed through intermediaries. From
the evidence presented by both parties, the Investigating
Commissioner found Principe guilty of misrepresentation. He was
found to have violated Canon3, Rule 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule
12.04. the report recommended the penalty of a 2 year
suspension.
- October 25, 2003 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
suspended him for 1 year
- In his Appeal Memorandum, respondent claims that the
Resolution has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having
been motivated by pure selfishness and greed, and the
Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule
139-B of the RoC. According to the respondent, the Investigating
Commissioner continued to investigate the instant case despite
the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-
B, without any extension granted by the SC. Moreover, in the
subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no
actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and the required
number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured
3
The Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their
lawyer of the collection, claim, and/ or payment of just
compensation of its members with the NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on
the following conditions:
A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court
proceedings and other related activities;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees,
appearance and liaison fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between
NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members; this forty (40%)
[percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated
depending on the volume of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
Attorney’s Fees of FIRST PARTY;
ii.) His representation expenses and
commitment expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the
best price from NAPOCOR.
LEGAL PROFESSION
considering that there were only five (5) governors present.
Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed
at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for
IBP National President.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Principe’s suspension in the practice of law
properly arrived at
2. WON Principe illegally represented the petitioners
HELD
1. Ratio
Before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by
the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigator’s report;
(2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of
the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a decision
reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the
official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the
collective view of the individual members thereof. Without a vote
having been taken, the Resolution is void and has no effect.
- Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would
result in the remand of the case. However, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not
be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the parties. In view of
the delay in resolving the instant complaint against the
respondent, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the
records before it.
2. Ratio
- The duty of the courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a
proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that
lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.
- It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer
accounts for his behavior towards the court, his client, his peers
in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court
is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also
to protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much
more, those wrongfully found guilty.
- On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of
the standards of the law profession, the improvement of the
administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Despite its
duty to police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to
“promote respect for the law and legal processes” and “to
abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Respect for law is
gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to
be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules formulated for their
observance.
Reasoning
- There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first
is concerned with the determination by the courts of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. The second phase is concerned with
the determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken which relates to the valuation
thereof. But as it frequently happens, the public purpose
dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest
to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their
property, the owners seek inroads to the leverages of executive
power where compensation compromises are commenced and
given imprimatur. In this dimension, the services of lawyers
different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or
even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and reliant
on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and
resourcefulness of the negotiator.
- In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the
valuation of the properties subject of the expropriation, the
same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said
appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the delay in the
adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR
negotiated for a compromise agreement. To assist them, the
landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa,
engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It
is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation
phase of the case.
- As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and
separate from its individual stockholders or members and from
that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. The rule is
that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its
directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Thus,
property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to
satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having
only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the former.
Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator, respondent is the
lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of
the expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to
interfere in the court proceedings involving the members. But
things are not as simple as that.
- A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to
believe that he can intervene and claim from the individual
landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into
SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondent’s firm so as to
make negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more organized.
SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed
towards the promotion of the landowners’ common interest. It
presented a unified front which was far easier to manage and
represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent still
dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
- Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa,
former SANDAMA president and attorney-in-fact of the members,
with whom he entered into a contract for legal services.
Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to
contract his firm’s services. After all, Elfa was armed with a
Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly,
individual grants of authority from the SANDAMA members,
including Malonso.
- Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a
contingent fee of forty percent (40%) of the selling price of the
lands to be expropriated, the same amount which was reflected
in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of
SANDAMA. Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed
that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same
amount earmarked for its legal services as indicated in their
service contract. Being a non-stock, non-profit corporation,
where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal
fees due to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of
its members.
- Lastly, respondent’s legal services were disengaged by
SANDAMA’s new President Yolanda Bautista around the same
time when the SANDAMA members abandoned and
disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the
negotiations bore fruit. With all these circumstances,
respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about
to be deprived of his lawful compensation for the services he and
his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. With the
prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members,
respondent saw the immediate need to protect his interests in
the individual properties of the landowners.
- The Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct
or practice justifying the penalty recommended. While filing the
claim for attorney’s fees against the individual members may
not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that
he instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was the
best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured
his firm’s services and was led to believe that he would be paid
for the same. There is evidence which tend to show that
respondent and his firm rendered legal and even extra-legal
services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable
valuation of their properties. They facilitated the incorporation
of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the
owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the
LEGAL PROFESSION
assistance of several political personalities to get some leverage
in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after
concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the
presentation of the compromise agreement for the court’s
approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of respondent’s law
firm.
- With the validity of its contract for services and its authority
disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without
having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not
getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to
SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm
auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have
been mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was
made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a
business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services rendered. It is but natural
that he protects his interest, most especially when his fee is on a
contingent basis.
- Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise
agreement was entered into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR. Its
motions for separate legal fees as well as for intervention were
dismissed by the trial court. Presiding from the ultimate outcome
of an independent action to recover attorney’s fees, the Court
does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such action
against SANDAMA or any of its members.
- The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty
percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract illegal
or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by
law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the
reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the
circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when it is shown that a
contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or
imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the
Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party.
Disposition WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and
considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in
all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.
PNB V UY TENG PIAO
VICKERS; 1932
(romy ramirez)
NATURE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non
payment of obligations at the CFI of Manila and said court
rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the
sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum
from June 1, 1924. The court ordered the defendant appellant to
deposit the money due with the clerk of the court within three
months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the
mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance
with law and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the
judgment.
- The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the
properties were auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of
P1,300 with PNB as the buyer.
- On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of
the latter’s right to redeem one of the properties described as
TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano
Santos for P8,600.
- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the
proceeds was credited to the account of Uy. The total amount
generated with the resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the
recover of the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38
with interest at seven percent per annum.
- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his
right to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would
not collect from him the balance of the judgment.
- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the
bank through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.
- Hence this appeal
ISSUES
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the
same case
HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain
testimony of the defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to
the condonation. Even if the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree
to the condonation, there is not evidence presented that Mr.
Pecson was authorized by the bank through its board of directors
or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the
agreement.
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both
counsel and witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SC
however stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer in this
case can appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they
are to testify as required by the case, they should withdraw from
the active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon
19 of the Code of Legal Ethics.
Disposition The decision of the CFI is reversed and the
defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum of P11,574.38 with
interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per annum to be
reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. SANCHEZ
PER CURIAM; SEPTEMBER 30, 1987
(cha mendoza)
NATURE
Resolution
FACTS
- During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent
labor unions (Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia) intensified the intermittent pickets they had
been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura
gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court
building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the
Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.
They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up
a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in
utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved
their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns
haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers.
- These acts were done even after their leaders had been
received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as
Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees,
had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that
the demonstration must cease immediately for the same
constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would
not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were
maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a
resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring the leaders of the respondent union
leaders to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30
A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be
held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively
dealt with.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals
appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas,
apologizing for their actions described and assuring that the acts
would not be repeated. Atty. Espinas likewise manifested to the
Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions
were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer
such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He,
however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the
picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the
"Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five
(75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the
Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor
union.
- Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the
picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cam is usually
for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme
Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian
of the Constitution.
- To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt
fully understood the reason for the citation and that they win
abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated,
the Court required the respondents to submit a written
manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on
July 17, 1987
ISSUE
WON the respondents and Atty. Espinas should be held in direct
contempt of Court
HELD
NO. Contempt charges dismissed.
Ratio The respondents who are nonlawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective
laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech
and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of
either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the
ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any
such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes
contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them,
therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their
counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was
called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets
the untenability of their acts and posture. It is their duty as
officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters
of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to
labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational
program for their members.
Reasoning The Court will not hesitate in future similar
situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for
contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting
one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances,
if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e.,
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in
keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.
- courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that
the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein
respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or
pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into
acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in
the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE DE VERA
TINGA; December 11, 2003
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
(joey capones)
NATURE
Administrative case for disqualification
FACTS
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April
26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention
scheduled on May 22-24, 2003 in compliance with IBP by laws.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board reset the elections to May 31,
2003, or after the IBP National Convention. Respondent De Vera,
a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y.
Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a
letterrequesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution. Their
Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) IBP By Laws require
the holding of the election of Regional Governors at least one
month prior to the national convention of the IBP to prevent it
from being politicized since post-convention elections may
otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable
political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003
will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from
resolving protests in the election for governors not later than
May 31, 2003, as expressed in the IBP By Laws. Motion was
denied. After the IBP national convention had been adjourned,
Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony
Velez filed a Petition before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the
second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of
respondent De Vera “from being elected Regional Governor for
Eastern Mindanao Region.” IBP denied petition stating that there
was no compelling justification for the postponement of the
elections and that the petition for disqualification was
premature. Petitioners filed the present Petition before this
Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition
before the IBP. The SC issued a TRO, directing the IBP Board, its
agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and
stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for
the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.
Petitioner’s Claim
 De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to
Agusan del Sur Chapter because he coveted the IBP
presidency. [Following the rotation rule, whoever will be
elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in
the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically
become the EVP. The EVP will automatically succeed the
President in the next term]
 De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. He was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking
the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on
the aconstitutionality of the plunder law. He also could have
been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his
client’s funds had he not surrendered his California license
to practice law.
 De Vera actively campaigned for the position of Eastern
Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention, a
prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws
Respondent’s Comments
 Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy:
the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve
the organization, is purely an internal matter
 Petitioners have no legal standing because there is no
disqualification in the by laws. Only election protests are
provided for but only qualified nominees can file protest.
Petitioners are not among qualified nominees.
 An IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer
his chapter membership. It was upon the invitation of the
officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that
he transferred his IBP membership. It is unfair and unkind
for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was
LEGAL PROFESSION
done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify
him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship
 He denies exhibiting disrespect to the Court or to any
of its members during its deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law
 As for the administrative complaint filed against him by
one of his clients when he was practicing law in California,
which in turn compelled him to surrender his California
license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as
basis for determining his moral qualification to run for the
position as there is no final judgment finding him guilty of
the administrative charge
 On the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP
National Convention, he states that it is baseless to assume
that he was campaigning simply because he declared that
he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in
the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did
not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he
or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at
the Century Park Hotel
ISSUES
1. WON this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy
2. WON petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De
Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the resolution
of two sub-issues, namely:
a. WON the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the
proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws
b. WON the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this
suit;
3. WON the present Petition is premature
4. Assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the
present petition is not premature, WON respondent De Vera is
qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region
HELD
1. Ratio As there exists a clear constitutional grant of power to
the SC to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, the SC has
jurisdiction over the present controversy.
Reasoning Sec. 5, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution confers power
to SC to supervise all activities of the IBP. The IBP by-laws also
recognize the full range of the power of supervision of the SC
over the IBP.
2A. Ratio Since the IBP By-laws do not provide for
disqualification of candidates for IBP governor, petition to
disqualify is not the proper remedy.
Reasoning Petition has no firm ground to stand on. Changes
previously adopted by the Court simplified the election process
and made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification
were thus removed in the present by-laws.
2B. Ratio With the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-
Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper
parties to bring the suit.
Reasoning As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees
can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting
forth the grounds therefore. only IBP members from Agusan del
Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and
elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern
Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the
aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner
Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners,
Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be
nominated at the forthcoming election.
3. Ratio Petition to seek disqualification of a person is
premature when the person has not yet even been nominated.
Reasoning Before a member is elected governor, he has to be
nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera
has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of
candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of
Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming
that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to
decline the nomination.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
4. Ratio As long as an aspiring member meets the basic
requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.
Reasoning The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be
elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member
in good standing of the IBP, 2) he is included in the voter’s list of
his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by
the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the
Chapter to which he belongs, (3) he does not belong to a chapter
from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless
the election is the start of a new season or cycle, and (4) he is
not in the government service. With regards to his transfer of
membership the same is valid having been made 17 months
prior election, The only condition required under the rules is that
the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to
the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes
to transfer. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly
provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of
moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of
an offense which involves moral turpitude. The contempt ruling
cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral.
The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does
not involve moral turpitude (“an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.”)
On the administrative complaint in California, no final judgment
was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty
of the charge. On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his
handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in
the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy,
again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the
same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under
our Rules of Court
Disposition Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De
Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao
in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this
Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election
for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby
LIFTED.
PEREZ V ESTRADA
VITUG; June 29, 2001
(glaisa po)
FACTS
- KBP, an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country,
sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage
of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency
in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
- The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter
to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano
and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
- The Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally
filed the instant petition; public interest, the petition further
averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the
public to vital information affecting the nation.
- In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd
October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by
then President Corazon C. Aquino: “Accordingly, in order to
protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last
analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to
PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court
LEGAL PROFESSION
proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes
shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
ISSUE
WON live radio and television coverage of the trial of the plunder
and other criminal cases filed against Pres. Estrada should be
allowed
HELD
- NO. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition
involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the
one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the
other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
- Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted
above its individual settings nor made an object of public's
attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by
any outside force or influence10 but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm
ambiance is demanded.
- An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty
can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure
that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago.
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process.
- The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of
the press and the right to public information. It also approves of
media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the
public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in
action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.
- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16
Apri1 2001, expressed its own concern on the live television and
radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to
paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the
rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to
assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life
and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the
Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio
coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate
unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused,
such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if
popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will
not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the
desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
- Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other
federal courts do not allow live television and radio coverage of
their proceedings.
- The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are
of great dimensions so involving as they do a former President of
the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice
become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting
phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the
events has left a still divided nation.
- The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn
a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass
action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the
courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the
very least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained
in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be
propitious.
MAGLASANG V PEOPLE
PER CURIAM; November 4, 1990
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
(boots tirol)
NATURE
Resolution of the Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of
the San Carlos City Court
FACTS
- a petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs.
People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado
(San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by
registered mail with the SC. Due to noncompliance with the
requirements, specifically the nonpayment of the legal fees and
the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified
true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the
respondent judge, the SC dismissed the petition.
-On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as
counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing the petition. This time, the amount of
P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a
duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the
IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership
dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the
duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality.
- On January 22, 1990 the Court received from Atty. Castellano a
copy of a strongly-worded complaint filed with the Office of the
President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang,
through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all
the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases
and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust
judgments or resolution."
- Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for
improper conduct by reason of the strong and intemperate
language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office
of the President, which has no jurisdiction to discipline, much
more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court.
-On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed his "Opposition." In his
"Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a
constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned.
Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of
the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause
inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and
no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction
to give such order." Thus, according to him, "the most they
(Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic)
is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be
punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao."
ISSUE
WON Atty Castellano is guilty of improper conduct and be
punished for contempt
HELD
YES.
In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's
Second Division with the Office of the President, even the most
basic tenet of our government system-the separation of powers
between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative
branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. The Supreme Court
is supreme-the third great department of government entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'
Not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may
pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
-Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a
constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices" is but an
effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that
the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having
LEGAL PROFESSION
complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming
that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and
justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too
plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Atty.
Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity
of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an
impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
Disposition Atty. Castellano found guilty of improper conduct
and contempt of court and fined P1,000.00 and suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
HORNILLA V SALUNAT
SANTIAGO; July 1, 2003
(dahls salamat)
FACTS
-Complainant : Benedicto Hornilla, Atty. FedericoRicafort
(members of PPSTA)
-Respondent : Atty. Erneto Salunat (member of ASSA Law Firm->
Retained counsel of Philippine Public School Teachers
Association)
-Complainants filed an intracorpoate case against members of
the Board of Directors for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 for
unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real property of the
PPSTA.
-Respondent appeared as counsel for PPSTA Board Members in
the said case.
-Respondent in PPSTS v 1992-1995 Board of Directors of PPSTA,
appeared as counsel for respondent despite being part of ASSA
Law Firm the retained counsel of PPSTA
Petitioner’s Claim
-respondent is guilty of conflict of interest because he was
engaged by PPSTA and was being paid out of its corporate funds
to which they have contributed.
-respondent violated rule 15.06 of the code of professional
responsibility when he assured PPSTA Board Members in a
meeting that he will win the PPSTA case
Respondent’s Comment
-He entered his appearance as counsel or the PPSTA Board
members for and in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates.
-His relationship with Aurelio Salunat is immaterial
-He denies assuring victory of the PPSTA Board in the case but
merely assured them the truth will come out.
-Averred by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent
averred that Atty. Ricafort himself was guilty of gross violation of
his oath amounting to gross misconduct ,malpractice and
unethical conduct for filing trumped up charges against him, and
prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and
complainant be disciplined or disbarred.
IBP Commission on Bar and Discipline recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Board of Governors approved the report and
recommendation.
ISSUE
WON a lawyer engaged by a corporation can defend members of
the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit
HELD
No. A Lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot
represent members of the same corporation’s board of directors
in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be
tantamount to representing conflicting interests which is
prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
-Pertinent rule of the CPR: Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
-There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
-TESTS FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
1. WON in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for a issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it
for another client.
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
Derivative suit: Where corporate directors have committed a
breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute
suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of
himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the
corporation and indirectly to the stockholders.
-Respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests and was ADMONISHED to observe higher degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ILUSORIO V LOKIN,JR.
CARPIO MORALES; December 14, 2005
(apple maramba)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
FACTS
On July 15, 1991, Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the services of
the law office of Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to
represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, of
which Ilusorio was one of the defendants
-In that civil case, the Republic was claiming shareholdings in
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
99% of the shares of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Atty
Luis Lokin, Jr., together with Attorneys Demaree Raval and
Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for Ilusorio
-While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the
law firm of Raval and Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando
Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise Agreement with
the Republic, where it was settled that the Republic was to get
4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares.
-During the special stockholders’ meeting of PHILCOMSAT held
on August 27, 1998, which was supposed to be a mere informal
gathering to introduce the newly appointed government
nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders of
POTC, the gathering, through the “high-handed and deceitful
maneuvers” of respondent, was suddenly and without notice
transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which
directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected.
-Ilusorio then contested the validity of the meeting by filing
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
complaint, against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly
elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case
respondent Lokin, Jr. appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al.,
contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests.
-However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of
his children, namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and Erlinda
K. Ilusorio-Bildner (herein petitioner), to establish their
qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was dismissed
-Petitioner filed a new complaint against respondent
-After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner San
Juan found merit in petitioner’s complaint and recommended
that respondent be suspended for three months.
-The IBP Board of Governors set aside the recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the complaint
-No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner.
Petitioner, nonetheless, learned about the recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside thereof by the
Board of Governors
- On March 10, 2004 petitioner wrote a letter to the Board in her
own name requesting “that the Board take up the matter once
more” and asking for “the remanding of the case against Atty.
Luis Lokin to the Board of Governors.”
LEGAL PROFESSION
- By letter of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors said that it
“constrained to deny [petitioner’s] request for a remanding or a
reconsideration of the case” as there was no provision for a
reconsideration of any such case either in Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline.
-Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter
of July 19, 2004 to Atty. Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP
Board of Governors and concurrently National President of the
IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any
final action on her complaint
- Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004,
stated that the Board could no longer act on petitioner’s July 19,
2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the
letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for
by the rules of procedure for cases of the kind.
- Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petition was filed within the 15-day reglamentary
period
2. WON the case should be dismissed for being inappropriate
and improper, it being based not on a resolution of the IBP Board
3. WON personal knowledge of the petitioner of the facts alleged
in the complaint is required to pursue the complaint
Substantive
WON the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility
HELD
Procedural
Reasoning
1. Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period, as petitioner should be deemed to
have received notice of the challenged IBP resolution, not on
August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004
letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when
she wrote the Board admitting having acquired knowledge of
the reversal of Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation.
Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until March 25,
2004 to file a petition for review.
- Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the
disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue
a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction.
The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the
Supreme Court orders otherwise.
- The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers
not to an unofficial information that may be gathered by the
parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of
the Board, but to the official notice of resolution that is supposed
to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all parties
and transmitted to this Court.
- Respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to
petitioner
- Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time
this petition was filed, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP
Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution, the
present petition has been timely filed.
2. While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBP’s
dismissal of a disciplinary case should await the notice of
resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite
issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27,
2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner.
-The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the
nebulous explanation that records were still being completed.
-In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her
complaint was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP
Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court
notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
3. Section 1, Rule 139-B states:
SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by
such documents as may substantiate said facts.
-Personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment
complaint. Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the
complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are any.
Substantive
Reasoning
Respondent denies representing conflicting interests on the
ground that SB Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are
totally distinct from each other
-Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondent’s
Memorandum dated September 28, 1998 filed with the SEC
wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows:
“A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent
disposition of the instant Petition by this Honorable Commission
would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the
disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the
Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case.
This Petition is a premature action to enforce the
Compromise Agreement entered into by Mr. Ilusorio.
Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise
Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time.”
-Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC,
he was advocating an interest hostile to the implementation of
the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated
for Ilusorio
Disposition The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
dated February 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K.
Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
GONZALES V CABUCANA, JR.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; 2006
(ice baguilat)
NATURE
Administrative Case
FACTS
Gonzales being counseled by the law firm Cabucana, Cabucana,
De Guzman and Cabucana Law Office, filed a civil case that was
awarded to them in a judicial ruling and asked Gatcheco to
execute such however Gatcheco failed to do so and Gonzales
filed a complaint. Gatcheco harassed Gonzales and subsequently
Gonzales filed a criminal case. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,
represented Gatcheco. Gonzales filed an administrative case
saying that Cabucana violated the lawyer-client relationship due
to conflict of interest.
ISSUE
WON there is a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for conflict of interest
HELD
Yes, the rule is that the lawyer is barred from representing
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Even the fact of
appearing to be treacherous and double-dealing is discouraged
because people are expected to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers. Acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Although the firm was the one who represented the civil case the
person is still in representation of the firm. It at the least invite
suspicion of double-dealing.
It is however mitigated by the fact that the case was done in
good faith and with no malice as supported by the findings of IBP
Commissioner Reyes and Gonzales move of withdrawing the
case.
Disposition Respondent fined and given a stern warning
DE GUZMAN V DE DIOS
PARDO; January 26, 2001
(athe odi)
NATURE
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. De Dios on the ground of
violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
FACTS
- De Guzman sought the assistance of Atty De Dios in forming a
corporation engaged in hotel and restaurant business. They
were able to have Suzuki Beach Hotel Incorporated (SBHI)
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Atty.
De Dios was retained by De Guzman.
- De Guzman was the majority stockholder. She subscribed to
29,800 shares, she paid up P745,000.00 during the stage of
incorporation. However, the remaining 22,250 shares
amounting to P2,235,000.00 was left unpaid.
- The corporation, upon the advice of Atty. De Dios required De
Guzman to pay the unliquidated shares. Later, they were
auctioned and acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the
incorporators of SBHI. Because of this, De Guzman was ousted
from the corporation completely. While Atty. De Dios rose to be
the president of the corporation.
- In defense, Atty. De Dios argued that she represents the
corporation, not De Guzman in her personal capacity. Moreover,
what she did was for the best interest of the corporation, which
was on the verge of bankruptcy then.
ISSUE
WON Atty. De Dios is guilty of representing conflicting interest.
HELD
Yes.
Reasoning
1. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, De
Guzman still has original shares of P745,00.00, enough for her
not to be ousted from the corporation.
2. There was an atty-client relationship between De Dios and De
Guzman. The latter was the one who retained her as counsel
not the corporation.
3. There was evidence of collusion between the board of
directors and respondent. De Dios became the president – a
clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent.
Disposition Atty. De Dios was SUSPENDED for 6 months.
REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN
KAPUNAN; September 20, 1996
(chris capul)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- This is an offshoot of the complaint before the Sandiganbayan
through the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth including shares of stocks in certain
corporations.
- ACCRA Law Firm performs legal svcs incl. organization and
acquisition of business associations/orgs. Sometimes, members
of the firm act as incorporators or stockholders. They acquire
info relative to assets of clients and their personal/biz
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
circumstances. In this case, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of said corps involved in sequestration proceedings.
- PCGG filed Third Amended Complaint w/c excluded pvt
respondent Raul Roco bec he promised to reveal identity of
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder
- ACCRA lawyers said it was in furtherance of legit lawyering and
they became holders of shares of stock only as incorporating or
acquiring stockholders, and as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in said shares.
- Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who separated fr ACCRA, filed a
separate answer.
- ACCRA lawyers filed a counter-motion that PCGG also exclude
them as parties-defendant as it did to Roco. PCGG set
conditions for exclusion of the petitioners:
- disclosure of identity of clients
- submission of docs substantiating lawyer-client
relationship
- submission of deeds of assignments petitioners executed
in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
- PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by
Roco of the said conditions.
- Sandiganbayan denied exclusion of petitioners fr the PCGG
case. That denial is now being questioned.
ISSUES
1. WON lawyer-client confidentiality applies in this case
2. WON Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are similarly situated,
thus, making the denial of the ACCRA lawyers’ exclusion from
the PCGG case a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD
1. Yes
- PCGG is not really after the petitioners but the “bigger fish”.
This is clear fr the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal w/ petitioners
– the names of clients in exchange for exclusion fr complaint.
- Lawyer-client relationship is based on contract of lease of svcs
and contract of agency. But it is more than relationship of
principal-agent and lessor-lessee. An atty possesses special
powers of trust given by client. He also occupies quasi-judicial
ofc since he is an officer of the court.
- Old Code of Civil Procedure forbids counsel w/o authority of
client to reveal communication or advise given in course of
professional employment. This was passed on into the Rules of
Court.
- Canon 17 of Code of Professional Responsibility says that a
lawyer owes fidelity to cause of his client. Canon 15 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics also speaks of the devotion of a
lawyer to the interest of the client.
- The right to counsel of an accused is also involved in this
issue. If client were made to choose bet legal representation w/o
effective communication and disclosure and legal representation
w/ all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled to stay
away fr judicial system or lose right to counsel.
- GENERAL RULE:
- Court has right to know that client whose privileged info is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
- Privilege exists only after atty-client relationship has been
established. It does not attach until there is a client.
- Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of the
relationship.
- Due process requires that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary.
- EXCEPTIONS
- Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing client’s name would implicate that
client in the very activity for w/c he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
- It is also privileged where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability.
- It is also privileged when govt’s lawyers have no case
against an atty’s client unless, by revealing the client’s
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
LEGAL PROFESSION
be necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
- Apart fr the exceptions above, other situations could qualify as
exceptions. Info relating to the identity of client may fall w/in
privilege when client’s name itself has independent significance
such that disclosure would reveal client confidence.
- The instant case FALLS UNDER AT LEAST 2 EXCEPTIONS. First,
disclosure would lead to establish the client’s connection w/ the
very fact in issue. Also, the link bet the offense and the legal
advice/svc was duly established by no less than the PCGG itself.
Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients
would implicate them. Revelation of the name would provide
the link for prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists.
- It is diff when the client consults atty for illicit purposes,
seeking advice on how to around the law. In this case, a client
thinks he might have previously committed something illegal
and consults atty abt it.
- Court is trying to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution.
After all, there are alternative sources of info available to
prosecutor w/c does not depend on utilizing a defendant’s
counsel as convenient and readily available source of info.
- Lawyer-client confidentiality and loyalty exists not only during
relationship but even after termination of the relationship.
2. Yes
- Respondents failed to show that Roco actually revealed the
identity of his clients. PCGG shld show that Roco was treated as
a species apart fr the ACCRA lawyers on basis of classification
w/c made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No
such substantial distinctions exist.
RESOLUTIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG
- I find it unreasonable for Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners
to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly
disguised threat of incrimination.
DAVIDE [dissent]
- The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in
a civil case is initially vested in plaintiff (PCGG in this case).
There has been an agreement/compromise settlement bet PCGG
and Roco. If Roco’s revelation violated confidentiality of lawyer-
client, he would be solely answerable to his principals/clients and
probably to the Court.
- For ACCRA lawyers to be excluded, they must perform certain
obligations as Roco did.
- Confidentiality is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a
ground for disqualification of a witness and may be invoked at
an appropriate time. None of the lawyers in this case is being
required to testify.
- State has right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials/employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees.
- Rules of Court requires that complaint be against all persons
who appear to be responsible.
- Privilege does not extend to further criminal conduct.
- Disclosure of client’s identity is necessary proof of existence of
lawyer-client relationship and is not privileged info.
PUNO [dissent]
- Person claiming atty-client privilege must present underlying
facts. Without proofs, Court has no factual basis to determine
whether petitioners fall w/in exception to the general rule.
PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN
REGALADO; July 16, 1997
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
(aida villanueva)
NATURE
Special civil action in the SC
FACTS
- The annulment of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan is being
sought, with the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to utilize
Atty. Sansaet as state witness.
- Honrada was a clerk of court in a municipality in Agusan del
Sur. Paredes was the provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur who
later became governor and congressman.
- Sansaet was a lawyer who served as counsel for Parades in
several instances petinent to the criminal charges involved in
the present recourse.
- 1976 – Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of land.
His application was approved and a title was issued to him.
- 1985 – Director of Lands cancelled the patent of Paredes,
saying that the land had already been designated and reserved
as a school site.
- It was also discovered that Paredes got the lot through
fraudulent means.
- An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. Another
allegation was that he had used his position to get what he
wanted. Sansaet was still Paredes’ counsel.
- Gelacio, a taxpayer, wrote the Ombudsman and asked for the
investigation of Sansaet, Honrada and Paredes. According to
him, he conspired with the other two.
ISSUES
1. WON projected testimony of Sansaet is barred by the atty-
client relationship
2. WON Sansaet qualified as particeps criminis (accomplice to
the crime) for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to
testify for the State
HELD
1. NO
Ratio If a client seeks his lawyers’ advice with respect to a
crime he committed, it is given the virtual confessional seal.
This does not apply to a crime which a client intends to commit.
Reasoning A distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already crimes and
future crimes intended to be committed.
- The period is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney.
- Paredes was planning to commit the crime of falsification.
- But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however,
the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect
to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
- The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and
Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet
and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
respondent Sandiganbayan
- Sansaet himself was a conspirator and it is settled that for the
atty-client privilege to apply in communication, it must be for a
lawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents
the attachment of the privilege.
2. YES
Ratio Despite his involvement in the crime, Sansaet fulfills all
the requirements needed for his discharge as state witness.
Reasoning Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of
falsification and in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
One of the requirements for state witness is that he does not
appear to be the most guilty (not that he is the least guilty as to
what has been erroneously interpreted in some instances).
LEGAL PROFESSION
- It is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the
predominant consideration and warrants an imposition of the
same penalty.
- In the case of People v Ocemar: “And by ‘most guilty’ we mean
the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of
the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be
considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of
participation in the perpetration of the offense.
- The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as state
witness are present.
- Sansaet is the only cooperative witness to the actual
commission of the crime of falsification.
- There is absolute necessity for Sansaet’s testimony
because the prosecution has no direct evidence available.
- He does not appear to be the most guilty.
- His testimony can be corroborated by reputable witnesses.
- Sansaet has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude.
CASTILLO V SANDIGANBAYAN
BUENA; February 21, 2002
(jojo mendoza)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
FACTS
On July 23, 1987, the Republic of the Philipines Filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against several persons,
one of which is petitioner. The complaint alleges that- defendant
Gregorio Castilo acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of
defendants Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, et al in
establishing Hotel Properties, Inc. in order to acquire beneficial
interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis Hotel;
defendant Gregorio Castillo signed all pertinent documents as
attorney-in-fact of the defendants Enriquezes and Panlilio.
- On October 1992, petitioner died.
- On October 15, 1996, petitioner, represented by his heirs, filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint against
him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
must be dismissed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Regala v Sandiganbayan.
- On November 26, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
to dismiss. Respondent contends that the ruling in Regala does
not apply to the present case, because in said case, there was a
clear finding that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded by the
PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of
their clients as shown by PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal with
the ACCRA lawyers – the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint. In this case, the petitioner is being
sued as a principal defendant for being in conspiracy with other
defendants in the commission of the acts complained of and he
is not being required to name his clients.
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s inclusion in the complaint violates the lawyer-
client confidentiality privilege
HELD
YES. While it is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in not being
required to name his clients, the case of Regala is still applicable
in the present case because the two cases are the same in more
important aspects.
- The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner
and defendants Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised
by petitioner as one of his affirmative defenses. In the same
vein, in Regala, the professional relationship was raised merely
as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proven
during the trial. This not withstanding, the court struck out the
complaint against the lawyers.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Similar to the petitioners in Regala, petitioner is not a mere
witness. He is a co-principal in the case for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth. He has made his position clear from the very beginning
that he is not willing to testify and he cannot be compelled to
testify in view of his constitutional right against self-incrimination
and of his fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
- Since the doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare
decisis is provided in Art. 8 of the Civil Code, Sandiganbayan is
ordered to exclude petitioner Gregorio Castillo as party
defendant in the case RP v Enriquez.
DALISAY V MAURICIO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006
(bry san juan)
NATURE
Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005
finding Atty. Melanio “Batas” Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of
malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.
FACTS
- On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant,
engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-
044, entitled “Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay
U. Valeriana, respondent,” pending before the Municipal Trial
Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt
of documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount of
P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal
services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client
relationship and demanded the return of her money and
documents, but respondent refused.
- On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, found that “for the amount of
P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been
taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent.” She
recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount
of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the
complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and
approving in toto Commissioner Navarro’s Report and
Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed
Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent
went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status
of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial court’s
Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that “the tax
declarations and title” submitted by complainant “are not official
records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed.”
Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against
complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172
and/or Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that
complainant offered tampered evidence.
- In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the
following arguments. First, complainant did not engage his
services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for
the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration
of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second,
Civil Case No. 00-044 was “considered submitted for decision”
as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to
October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence,
“he could not have done anything anymore” about it. Third,
complainant refused to provide him with documents related to
the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth,
complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-
004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
- In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that::
(1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between
a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against
her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3)
respondent should have verified the authenticity of her
LEGAL PROFESSION
documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified;
and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Court’s
directive constitutes contempt.
ISSUE
WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to
render services despite payment of his client
HELD
YES. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either
as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But
once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client
relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client’s cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s
cause with wholehearted devotion.
- Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the
amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle
Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in
the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier,
“there is nothing in the records to show that he
(respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of
record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.” Neither
is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that
he initiated new petitions.
- Undoubtedly, respondent’s present version is a flagrant
departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be
countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is
going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the
proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of
procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair
play, justice and due process. The present administrative case
was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondent’s previous
admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil
Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such
admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has
been achieved by respondent’s inconsistent assertions, it is his
dishonesty to this Court.
- At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed
engaged respondent’s services in filing the two (2) new
petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is
unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he
filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in
such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to
complainant. In Pariñas v. Paguinto,[10] we held that “a
lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for
failure to file the case must immediately be returned to
the client on demand.” Per records, complainant made
repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.
- Neither do we find merit in respondent’s second argument.
The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already “submitted for
decision” does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle
Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his
appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should
have returned complainant’s money. Surely, he cannot
expect to be paid for doing nothing.
- In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade
responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims
that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the
case. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the
requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.
As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the
certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law
Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of
complainant’s title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not
take any action on the case despite having been paid for his
services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a
lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the
accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent
accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil
Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against
her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to
complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be
sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First,
Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who
perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding.
Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02
of the same Canon specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received
information that his clients has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify
the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such
client in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
- As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead
of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her
to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses,
then he should terminate his relationship with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited
Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not
render legal service to complainant because she falsified the
documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us
to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth
argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged
falsification long after complainant had terminated their
attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search
for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044.
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins
with his or her retainer. It gives rise to a relationship between
an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a
very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a
high degree of fidelity and good faith. If much is demanded
from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
DEE V COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO; August 24, 1983
(lora alamin)
NATURE
Petition for a writ of certiorari to overturn Court of Appeals’
resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the decision of
May 9, 1986.
FACTS
- Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private
respondent, accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his
advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of
petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a well-
known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.
Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his
son, Dewey, having heard of a link between the mafia and
Caesar's Palace and the possibility that his son may be
harmed at the instance of the latter.
- Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he
would inquire into the matter, after which his services were
reportedly contracted for P100,000.00. From his residence,
private respondent called up Caesar's Palace and,
thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and two
trips to Las Vegas by him elicited the information that
Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around
$1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed
that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy,
with Dewey Dee merely signing for the chits.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the
president of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He
advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of
the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for
the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could
convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey
Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon
private respondent's return to Manila, he conferred with
Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the
indebtedness.
- In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's
Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking
for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was
cleared and the casino never bothered him.
- Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private
respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner
demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. Private respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner for the collection of
attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other
expenses.
- Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged
his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services
he rendered were professional services which a lawyer
renders to a client.
- Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional
relationship of attorney and client between him and private
respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private
respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's
gambling account. However, he insists that such visit was
merely an informal one and that private respondent had not
been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On the
contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his
services "as a friend of defendant's family" to see what he
could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00
inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims
that it was not in the nature of attorney's fees but merely
"pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las
Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already
sufficient remuneraion for his strictly voluntary services.
- After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00
with interest thereon.
- On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986.
- Petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
the Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive
factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was
ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father, he
was actually working "in the interest" and "to the
advantage" of Caesar's Palace of which he was an agent and
a consultant, hence the interests of the casino and private
respondent were united in their objective to collect from the
debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming
that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father
in view of the conflicting interests involved.
- In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court
reconsidered its decision and held that the sum of
P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private respondent
was commensurate to the services he rendered, considering
that at the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he
was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of,
and receiving compensation from, Caesar's Palace.
- However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by
private respondent, the present respondent Court of
Appeals issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987,
reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986.
ISSUE
WON there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner
and private respondent
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
HELD
YES. Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their
findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between
petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. The Court found no
reason to interfere with the factual finding. There may be
instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client
relationship has been created. The issue may be raised in the
trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have
found that there was such a relationship the Supreme Court
cannot disturb such finding of fact, absent cogent reasons
therefor.
Ratio The absence of a written contract will not preclude the
finding that there was a professional relationship which merits
attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary
formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part
of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request from the latter.
Reasoning There is no question that professional services were
actually rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his
family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner's brother,
Dewey Dee, with Caesars Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and
petitioner and his family were further freed from the
apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the
so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is
indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and
this right cannot be occluded by petitioner's pretension that at
the time private respondent rendered such services to petitioner
and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of
Caesar's Palace.
- On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the
services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for
the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial
payments totaling P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent
Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters sent by said private
respondent to petitioner, the receipt thereof being
acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz:
that petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc;
that there was a prior agreement as to the amount of attorney's
fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance due
and payable on said fees.
- On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not
completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by
petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace
were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a
creditor but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey
Dee, since the latter, as verifications revealed, was not the
debtor. Hence, private respondent's representations in behalf of
petitioner were not in resistance to the casino's claim but were
actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the
liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom payment was
ultimately and correctly exacted.
- Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained,
private respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally
indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from
representing parties with contending positions. However,
at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches
the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests
with the consent of the parties. A common
representation may work to the advantage of said parties
since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and
impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions,
may well be better situated to work out an acceptable
settlement of their differences, being free of partisan
inclinations and acting with the cooperation and
confidence of said parties.
- Even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent
was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace,
petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented
to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he
LEGAL PROFESSION
postulates. A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and
reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special
instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly
and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of
his client, the latter is bound to pay his just feeds.
Disposition The resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated February 12, 1987, reinstating its original decision of May
9, 1986 was AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
NAKPIL V VALDES
PUNO; March 4, 1998
(marge alias)
NATURE
-Administrative case in the SC. Misconduct.
-This case involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his
demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
FACTS
-1965: Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer
residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he
requested long time friend (family business consultant, lawyer
and accountant) Atty. Carlos J. Valdes to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that Atty. Valdes would keep the
property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back.
Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained 2 loans from a
bank amounting to P140k which he used to purchase and
renovate the property. Title was issued in Atty. Valdes’ name but
it was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house.
-When Jose Nakpil died, Atty. Valdes acted as the legal counsel
and accountant of his widow Imelda Nakpil whom the Court
appointed as the estate administratix. Respondent’s law firm,
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the
settlement of Jose’s estate.
-The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the
intestate proceedings when Atty. Valdes excluded the Moran
property from the inventory. He even transferred his title to the
Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
-March 29, 1979: Imelda sought to recover the Moran property
by filing with the Baguio City CFI an action for reconveyance with
damages against Atty. Valdes (&his corporation) who claimed
absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust
was created over it.
-During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, Imelda
filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent.
Petitioner’s Claim
Atty. Valdes violated professional ethics when he:
1. assigned to his family corporation the Moran property which
belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
2. excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate
properties he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time,
charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded
property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of
transferring the title to the said property to his family
corporation.
3. prepared & defended monetary claims against the estate that
retained him as its counsel and auditor.
Preliminaries
- CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. CA reversed.
- OSG relying on CA decision recommended dismissal of admin
charge.
- CA decision in reconveyance case has been reversed by SC.
Factual Issues (as settled in the reconveyance case)
1. Ownership of the Moran property: Atty. Valdes and the late
Jose Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran
property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the
trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over
the property and refused to sell the property to complainant
after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the
reach of Imelda and the intestate court, Atty. Valdes later
transferred it to his corporation.
2. Loan of P140k: Atty. Valdes, through his accounting firm,
charged the two loans as liability of the estate, after obtaining
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said loans for the purchase and renovation of the property he
claimed for himself. It is clear that the information available to
the accounting firm as to how these two loans should be treated
could have only come from Atty. Valdes himself as the said loans
were in his name.
3. Resignation from law firm not supported by any documentary
proof
4. Resignation from accounting firm in 1972 and 1974 is proven.
But when Atty. Valdes transferred the Moran property to his
corporation, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court.
He could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the
intestate case.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty, Valdes violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
2. WON Atty. Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests
3. WON Atty. Valdes can be administratively charged before SC
given that his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting
practice
HELD
1. YES. When he subordinated the interest of his client to his
own pecuniary gain, he clearly violated CPR Canon 17 which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and
enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him.
-A lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the
business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty
and good faith. No presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor. Atty. Valdes’
misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran
property is clearly unethical.
2. YES. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the
estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants
(Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc) who are creditors of the estate.
-The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
finds application where the conflicting interests arise with
respect to the same general matter and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be. Representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed only after full disclosure of
facts and informed consent of the clients. There is nothing in the
records to show that Atty. Valdes or his law firm explained the
legal situation and its consequences to Imelda.
-When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is
per se adverse to the estate. The relationship of the claimants to
the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest.
-The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in
the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
3. YES. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as
it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor.
-Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to
admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the
practice of law. Respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his
duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his
dealings/transactions with his clients.
Disposition Atty. Carlos J. Valdes found guilty of misconduct
and suspended from the practice of law for one year with a
warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely in the future.
QUIAMBAO V BAMBA
DAVIDE; August 25, 2005
(maia rieza)
NATURE
RESOLUTION on administrative case for disbarment
FACTS
LEGAL PROFESSION
Felicitas Quiambao used to be the president of Allied
Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned security and
investigation agency. She procured the services of respondent
Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB, but also used
his services for a personal case (an ejectment case wherein
respondent is the counsel of record). After, Quiambao resigned
as president. Six months later, AIB, through Bamba, filed a
complaint for replevin and damages against Quiambao to
recover a car assigned to Quiambao as a service vehicle by AIB.
Bamba filed this latter complaint without withdrawing as counsel
in the ejectment case, which was still pending. Quiambao then
filed for disbarment and charged Bamba with acts of disloyalty
and double-dealing.
Complainant’s arguments
-that she resigned as president because Bamba proposed that
she organize her own security agency, and that he will assist in
its organization.
-that such security agency was organized and Bamba was a
“silent partner”
-that while serving as a silent partner, Bamba convinced
Quiambao’s brother to organize another security agency (yes,
hobby nilang gumawa ng security agencies) where respondent
served as incorporator, stockholder, and president.
Respondent’s arguments
-although he admits representing Quiambao in the ejectment
case, he claims that he was made to believe that it was part of
his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the “personal
cases” of its officers
-that the ejectment case and replevin case were unrelated
cases, thus privileged information that may have been gathered
from one case would have no use in the other
-that he was never a silent partner in the security agency
organized by Quiambao
-that he serves AIB and the agency organized with Quiambao’s
brother in different capacities: in AIB, as legal counsel, while in
the latter, as president
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests (WON there was representation of
conflicting interests)
HELD
Yes, respondent is guilty
Ratio Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for
something which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
There are various tests in determining conflicting interests, few
of which are:
 whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim
in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client
 whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty
 whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment
- While the respondent may assert that the complainant
expressly consented to his continued representation in the
ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully
disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present
any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required
under Rule 15.03, Canon 15.
- That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith
and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not
make the prohibition inoperative. Moreover, lawyers are not
obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become their client. They have the right to
decline such employment.
- That he served in different capacities in two competing
agencies does not justify the involvement in conflicting interests.
In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of
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interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of
conflict. Loyalty to AIB becomes dubious with his interest as the
president in another security agency.
- The nature of a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It requires lawyers to remain
inviolate of the client’s confidence and to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing.
- Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.”
Disposition Guilty for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15.
Suspended for 1 year.
BERBANO V BARCELONA
PER CURIAM; September 23, 2003
(anton arcilla)
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court re: Disbarment.
FACTS
- A case was pending regarding a 244-hectare lot situated at
Alabang, Muntinlupa, owned by Rufino Estaban Hilapo. Petitioner
Felicitas Berbano is one of the heirs of REH, and the heirs chose
Atty. Porfiro Daen as their attorney-in-fact.
- January 26, 1999: Mr. Daen was arrested by Muntinlupa police,
and subsequently detained at Muntinlupa City Jail until his
release on February 18, 1999.
- Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his release. The
heirs (including petitioner) approached Atty. Wenceslao
Barcelona to assist them. Mr. Daen has engaged the services of
Atty. Barcelona to facilitate Daen’s release.
- Barcelona asked for P50K to cause the release of Daen from
prison the following day. Barcelona declared that he was going
to see a justice from the Supreme Court who could help the
release of Daen.
- At a meeting in Max’s restaurant, Barcelona reported that he
just came from the Supreme Court where he “fixed” the case of
Daen, but did not show any documents supporting the claim.
- Barcelona continued to asked for money on several occasions.
Petitioner gave him P10K and P15K on different times. Petitioner
also gave Barcelona P1000 for gasoline.
- February 18, 1999 petitioner and Barcelona met at Putatan,
Muntinlupa. There Barcelona promised that he will return entire
amount of P64 on February 18, 1999. Petitioner never saw
Barcelona since then.
- Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP required respondent to
submit his answer to the complaint, but despite due notice
respondent fail to file his answer. Upon a motion to declare
respondent in default, Investigating Commissioner again
required respondent to answer. Barcelona failed to appear
despite due receipt of notice.
- IBP Board of Governors found Barcelona guilty of malpractice
and serious breach of the Code of Professional responsibility, but
reduced the penalty to suspension from practice of law for 6
years.
ISSUE
WON Barcelona should be disbarred or merely suspended
HELD
Ratio Wenceslao C. Barcelona is barred from the practice of law
for gross misconduct.
Reasoning The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so
much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the court and the
LEGAL PROFESSION
public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to
remove from the profession persons unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them.
- Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are neither purely civil
nor purely criminal.
- Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of the following
Canons:
• CANON 1—a lawyer shall xxx promote respect for law
and for legal processes.
• CANON 7—a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
• CANON 11—a lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers xxx.
• CANON 16—a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that ma come into his
possession.
• Rule 16.01—a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received fro or from the client.
- Barcelona was previously charged with and found guilty of
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, when he misrepresented to the
complainant that eh could secure the restructuring of the
complainant’s loan with PNB through his connection with a
certain Mericullo (who did not really exist).
- In addition, the Judiciary has been besieged enough with
accusations of corruption and malpractice. A member of the
legal profession who invites mistrust on the judicial system with
irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated.
LICUANAN V MELO
PER CURIAM; February 9, 1989
(apple maramba)
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
Melo (respondent) was hired as counsel by Licuanan (petitioner)
in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, Aida Pineda
-On August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney,
obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Pineda whereby
the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay
Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and
succeeding months thereafter.
- When several months had elapsed without them hearing a
word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter
demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment
otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary legal
action against her to protect the interest of his client
- Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to
respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for rental payments
for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per
month.
-Pineda continued paying her obligations religiously to Melo,
covering the period between March 1980-January 1981.
-During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had
been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not
bother to inform or report to complainant about the said
payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money
-On April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent
had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an
administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of
the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral
turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her
apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to
pay her just obligation
-Pineda brought an action against Licuanan for damages before
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly
suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
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feelings and social humiliation arising from the unfounded
administrative case filed against her since as borne out by the
records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the
lawyer of Licuanan
- It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel
retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4,
1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant, that
he accounted for it
-Respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals
from complainant's tenant, but explained that he kept this
matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her
with his success in collecting the rentals
ISSUE
WON the respondent is guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics and breaching the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD
Reasoning
The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit
over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by
him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her
of its use, and withholding information on the same despite
inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath
to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of
the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly:
“11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client
Money the client or collected for the client of other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and
accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance
be commingled with his own or be used by him. “
- By his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the
trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for
the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-
client relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof
complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her
tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to
jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said
tenant against her by force of circumstances, complainant was
further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in
order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which
respondent withheld from her.
- The court is constrained to find him guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed
lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proven himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the
Court. He deserves the severest punishment.
Disposition Consistent with the crying need to maintain the
high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to
preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court
Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the
practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
(Paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics referred to is
reiterated in Rules 16.01. 16.02 and 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility promulgated by the Supreme Court
on 21 June 1988).
HERNANDEZ V GO
PER CURIAM; January 31, 2005
(chris lao)
NATURE
Resolution of the verified letter-complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S.
Hernandez (now deceased)
FACTS
- Both parties are from Zamboanga City.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainant’s husband abandoned her and
her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her
husband’s numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans.
Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her
properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for
sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal
services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
- Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness,
fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to
give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at
Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her
creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his
favor without any monetary or valuable consideration.
Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and
from the proceeds pay her creditors.
- Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise
located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her
creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed
the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale
involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became
the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant.
- Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent
did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her
creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in
his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions.
- In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was
required to file his comment on the complaint.
- Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature since
there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 for recovery of ownership
and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant
against him involving the subject lots.
- On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying
respondent’s motion and requiring him to submit his answer.
- In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the
allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in
good faith, complainant’s lots to various buyers, including
himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he
extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited
her to live with his family. His children used to call her “Lola”
due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
- On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
- It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and
26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to
the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainant’s
witnesses and the submission of its report and recommendation.
- On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to
the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.
- The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty.
Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, is quoted as follows:
“A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted
by the parties showed that all the properties of the complainant
are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several
deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the
respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D
situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent
to the complainant on September 5, 1974.
- It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who
notarized the documents involving the said properties redeemed
or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which
ended up in respondent’s name like in the deed of sale executed
by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots
1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio
Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed
of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan
properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the
mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over
the Tomas Claudio properties.
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- The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent
in addition to his having discussed, advised and gave solutions
to complainant’s legal problems and liabilities to her creditors
and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay
complainant’s accounts constitute practice of law as legal
counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in
other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations between
them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.
- It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a
detailed report to the complainant on how he paid complainant’s
creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to
buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then
later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of
complainant’s properties in utter disregard of their agreement
and no evidence was submitted by the respondent concerning
the value of the said sale of complainant’s properties.
- As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in
his obligation and duty as complainant’s legal adviser and
counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting
complainant’s properties in his name and possession in violation
of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered
member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation
hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the
Board of Governors.”
- On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of
Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.
ISSUE
WON the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility be
sustained
HELD
Yes. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty.
- Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction,
provides:
“A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.”
- Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for
himself complainant’s lots entrusted to him are, by any
standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong,
a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such
conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but
also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this
Court’s mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.
- Canon 17 of the same Code states:
“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.”
- The records show that complainant reposed such high degree
of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she
engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and
allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof
would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however,
abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to
pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP
Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to
render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he sold
the latter’s lots and the amounts paid to her creditors.
Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant
LEGAL PROFESSION
could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive
any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not
adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainant’s
counsel.
- Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for
any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.
- In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, we ordered the disbarment of
lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting
him with all her money and later refused to return the same
despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III, we disbarred a
member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the
P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In
Docena vs. Limson, we expelled from the brotherhood of
lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through
deceit and misrepresentation. In Busiños vs. Ricafort, an
attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for
misappropriating his client’s money.
- Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating
that a lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s financial plight
to acquire the latter’s properties for his own benefit is
destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation
of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and
consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the
Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
Disposition Respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His
name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY.
BUSINOS V RICAFORT
PER CURIAM; December 22, 1997
(keefe dela cruz)
NATURE
Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Francisco Ricafort
FACTS
- Respondent Atty. Ricafort was entrusted P30,000 by
complainant Businos to deposit in the bank account of
complainant’s husband, which amount respondent used for
himself and delayed in payment.
- Respondent required a bond of P2,000 from Businos
supposedly for one of her Civil Cases when no such bond was
required.
- Hence, Businos filed a complaint for disbarment against
Ricafort
- The court required respondent to comment on the complaint
time and again. But respondent failed to comply. As such, the
court considered his right waived, and referred the complaint to
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
- The Office ordered respondent suspended for 1 year.
ISSUE
WON the 1-year suspension is commensurate sanction for the
offenses committed by respondent Atty. Ricafort
HELD
NO.
Ratio
With dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior,
and palpable disregard of:
- Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - unlawful
retention of client’s funds
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- Code of Professional Responsibility
- Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
- Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession
- Canon 11 - Respect due to courts
respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath,
he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair an impartial administration
of justice — a vital function of democracy a failure of which is
disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a
lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession
shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority.
Reasoning Respondent's transgressions caused dishonor, not
merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he
belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.
Disposition Consistent with the urgent need to maintain the
esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession
and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the
Philippine Bar, the Court resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY.
FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name is
hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
QUILBAN V ROBINOL
PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989
(sarah cabrera)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
- The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father
Federico Escaler, sold a land to the Quezon City Government as
the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an
area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site.
Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. In
1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to
Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house
for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social
Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters,
Congressman Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of
donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters.
Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an
organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with
Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the
"Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin
as President.
- But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin
went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to
obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samaban members.
The land was ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 per
square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to P1
20 per square meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe
that Rivera represented the squatters on the property.
- In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the
case against Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case.
- To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the Samahan members
hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the
latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol
was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject
matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to
each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the
land sharing was confirmed in writing.
- On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI
Decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
- To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of
Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs
occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of
title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by
LEGAL PROFESSION
little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis
Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol.
- On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to
Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of
P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the
sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00.
- After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no
payment had been made to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol
replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and
that a Writ of Execution bad not yet been issued by the CFI of
Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for
intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty.
Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the
officers discovered to have no basis at all.
- On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first
consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of
the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. AnacIeto R.
Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was
shown the document containing the consensus of the Samahan
members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty.
Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter
informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services
and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him.
Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent
letter of the same tenor was similarly disregarded by Atty.
Robinol.
- On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his
appearance in a civil case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty.
Robinol, on the strength of the authority given him by plaintiffs
in said civil case through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor then
filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the
defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a
deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. At the hearing of
the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had
no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty.
Montemayor.
- Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first
consensus, another document labelled the a second consensus"
was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose
on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to
change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in their favor.
- Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the
Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this
Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal
to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its
power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to
practice law.
- Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a
complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case
without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and
knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the
plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
- Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who
recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended
for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs
in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty
will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and
that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, the sum of
P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not committed any
misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended
2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical
infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to
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continue in the practice of the profession. After the CA had
rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received
the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and
decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land
equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which
he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty.
Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients'
money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but
also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for
him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could
barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their
respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for
the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after
having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of
them.
- Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly
dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for
his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him
for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment
of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect.
Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any
legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific
purpose-the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the
money immediately to their rightful owners.
- The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants'
evidence on this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact,
received the total sum of P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is
the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to
continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his
oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also
brought the profession into disrepute with people who had
reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-
time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.
2. NO
Reasoning In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we
agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not
exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in
the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as
counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are free to
change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26,
Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer
who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in
the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol,
for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their
prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by
Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore,
the same is absolutely without merit.
Disposition
- Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having
violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the
fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself
unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his
unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his
rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of
P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs.
- Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
BARNACHEA V QUIOCHO
CALLEJO; March 11, 2003
(jat tabamo)
NATURE
Administrative matter. Breach of Lawyer-Client Relations
FACTS
- Complainant Ruby Barnachea sought the services of
respondent Atty. Edwin Quiocho, a lawyer who has stopped
practicing for some time and was only in the second month of
resuming practice, to cause the transfer under her name the
title over a property previously owned by her sister. She paid P
LEGAL PROFESSION
41, 280 for the expenses for said transfer and for respondent’s
legal services.
- Respondent failed to cause the transfer and consequently,
complainant demanded that she be refunded and that the
documents she entrusted to respondent to cause the transfer be
returned to her. Respondent failed to comply with the demands.
- On Nov. 1, 2001, Respondent wrote complainant a letter saying
he failed and that he would return the documents and the title
entrusted to him as well as refund the P 41, 280 through a
personal check. He however failed to fund the check despite the
demands of complainant.
- In his answer to the complaint, respondent:
1. Denied that complainant contracted his legal services.
Received the P 41, 280 payment but claimed they were for
actual and incidental expenses and not for legal services
2. Asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by the fact that
he returned the documents with an explanatory letter and
refunded complainant by issuing a personal check.
3. Alleged that his failure was caused by his difficulty in making
good the claimed amount, along with the fact that he was
afflicted with diabetes and loss of sight of his right eye.
4. Claimed that he only agreed to help complainant with the
condition that his task was merely to go through the regular
process of presenting available documents, paying taxes and
fees, and following up on the transfer, a task that a non-lawyer
familiar with the procedure can perform. 5. Claimed to have
discovered that the original copy of the transfer certificate of
title had been burned and that complainant’s copy therefore
needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled and
transferred. During this time, communication between both
parties broke down, as respondent’s mobile phone was stolen,
he has no home phone and that phone calls between him and
complainant at his work place had been cute due to souring
relationship with his co-workers.
- A formal investigation was conducted by IBP thereafter and it
found that the complainant engaged the legal services of the
respondent as admitted by respondent himself in his letter to
the complainant; that respondent was not able to meet his
financial obligations due to financial difficulties and that he was
in good faith in his failure. The IBP Investigation Commissioner
also recommended that he be ordered to repay his client within
90 days from receipt of notice and warned that a repetition
would be dealt with more severely.
- The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendations with an
additional sanction of reprimand.
ISSUE
WON the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors
corresponds to the gravity of the wrong committed by
respondent
HELD
No. The Court finds that the penalty recommended by the Board
of Governors is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong
committed by respondent.
Ratio 1: Respondent’s claim that complainant did not retain his
legal services flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even
if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed
between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed
or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties
Reasoning In this case, respondent failed to comply with his
undertaking for almost two months. Worse, despite demands of
complainant, he failed to refund the amount of P 41, 280 and to
return to complainant the deed of absolute sale and title over
the property. Respondent’s claim that complainant could not
contact him because he did not have any landline at his
residence and that his mobile phone was stolen in October 2001,
is hard to believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to
prove that his telephone at the business center was cut or that
his mobile phone had been stolen. Even then, respondent could
have easily contacted the complainant at her residence or could
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have written her a letter informing her that the original copy of
TCT No. 324411 in the custody of the Register of Deeds was
burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire and that
there was a need for the reconstitution of said title. Neither did
respondent adduce evidence that he had been sick with diabetes
and had lost his sight in his right eye. Respondent simply
refused to adduce evidence to prove his allegations in his
Answer to the complaint.
Ratio 2: A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property
of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to
said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as
for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for
expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property
under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned
immediately to his client upon demand therefor.
Reasoning The lawyer’s failure to return the money of his client
upon demand gives rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on
him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his
client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.
Ratio 3: The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in
nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential
character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute
abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client.
Reasoning In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure
up to the exacting standard expected of him. Although the Court
is led to believe that respondent’s failure to cause the transfer of
the title of the property under the name of complainant was due
to a financial problem that beset him shortly after he received
the checks from complainant. It can easily be inferred from
respondent’s letter that he used complainant’s money to
alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What compounded
respondent’s unethical conduct was his drawing of a personal
check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient
funds in his bank account to cover the check. Even as he
promised to fund his account with the drawee bank, respondent
failed to do so when the check became due. In this case,
respondent intransigently refused to return to the complainant
the amount of P 41,280 which he received for the expenses for
the transfer to her of the title of the property and for his
professional fees. His dishonest conduct was compounded by
his interjection of flimsy excuses for his obstinate refusal to
refund the amount to complainant
Disposition Respondent Atty. Quiocho is found guilty of
violating Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for 1
year with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely. He is also directed to restitute the
complainant the full amount of 41,280 within 10 days from
notice.
- If respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the
aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of 3
months for every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall
have paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of
suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be
necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his
one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty.
RUBIAS V BATILLER
TEEHANKEE; May 29, 1973
FACTS
- On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed
a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain
portions of lot located in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought
from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its
present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered
said portions of the lot on two occasions — in 1945 and in 1959.
LEGAL PROFESSION
In his answer with counter-claim defendant claims that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open
and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of
ownership of the portions of the lot in question. Unfortunately,
his title
- Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land
located in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of Barotac
Viejo province of Iloilo, which he caused to be surveyed on July
18-31, 1934
- Before WWII, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of
the land but was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director
of Forestry and other oppositors. During WWII, the record of the
case was lost. After the war, Francisco Militante petitioned this
court to reconstitute the record of the case but in the end, the
registration was denied.
- He appealed but pending the decision (which was denied in the
end), Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias
the land, and was registered in the Registry of Deeds
- Soon after, both Rubias and Militante were declaring the land
for taxation purposes
- On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer
case against Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Barotac Viejo Province of Iloilo
- During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove
by competent evidence the following:
> That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante
under Exh. "A" was formerly owned and possessed by
Liberato Demontaño but that on September 6, 1919 the land
was sold at public auction by virtue of a judgment in a Civil
Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato
Demontaño Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo,
defendants", of which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh.
"1-3"). The sale was registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4, 1920, under Primary Entry
No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite Deed of Sale was executed
by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan.
19, 1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having
been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo on February 10, 1934 (Exh. "1-1").
> On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to
Francisco Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J")
which was registered in the Registry of Deeds on May 13,
1940 (Exh. "J-1").
- Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent
evidence during the trial of this case the following facts:
> That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally
owned and possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the
defendant Basilio Batiller, on the death of the former in
1920, as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller succeeded his father ,
Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and possession of the land
in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land
remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession
being actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous in the
concept of an owner, exclusive of any other rights and
adverse to all other claimants.
> That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff
have never been in the actual possession of the land and
that they never had any title thereto.
> That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent
application of the defendant has been approved.
- On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open
court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed
he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he
did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of action against
him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly
bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject
matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was
brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No.
13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on
record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante.
- Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads:
> Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning: (7) Those expressly prohibited by law.
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> ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any
purchase, even at a public auction, either in person of
through the mediation of another: .
+ (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights of in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring an assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
- Defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any
interest in the property in dispute as the contract he (plaintiff)
had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and void. (See pp.
22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's
motion to dismiss claiming that defendant can not invoke
Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as Article 1422 of the
same Code provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is
not available to third persons whose interests are not directly
affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on Appeal).
- On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order
disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In
the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court practically
agreed with defendant's contention that the contract (Exh. A)
between plaintiff and Francism Militante was null and void.
ISSUES
WON the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-
law, the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan
Psu-99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was
counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving
the property in dispute
HELD
YES.
- The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his
client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491 paragraph (5) of
the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced supra; 6 and that
consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation
from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since
as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was
defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal
effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code
which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared
void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot
be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived."
- In a case, the Court ordered the issuance of a writ of
possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the
adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by him
and other expenses, and ruled that counsel is a lawyer and is
presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from the
beginning, have been well aware of the defect in his title and is,
consequently, a possessor in bad faith."
- Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish
Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by
reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the
property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control
either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial
auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3)
administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial
officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and
(6) others especially disqualified by law.
- New Civil Code recognizes absolute nullity of contracts "whose
cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly
prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts
"inexistent and void from the beginning."
- nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent
and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and
public policy remain paramount and do not permit of
compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent
LEGAL PROFESSION
disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers
grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of
guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code),
as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be
"ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in
which cases its validity shall be determined only by the
circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract.
The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair
the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was
illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become
lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the
service which was impossible may have become possible; or the
intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified
by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be
valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the
date of the first contract."
- As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly
acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the
ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since
its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded
thereon were being asserted against defendant-appellant.
CANTILLER V POTENCIANO
PER CURIAM; December 18, 1989
(ricky cantre)
NATURE
Administrative complaint versus Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano.
FACTS
- Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V.
Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine
Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and
misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice
and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court.
- Complainant is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an
action for "ejectment" before the MTC of Manila, Branch 57, San
Juan, Metro Manila. Another action, likewise involving Peregrina
but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the RTC,
Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila for "reconveyance with
damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented
by Cantiller and her sister. When the two cases were concluded,
Peregrina came out the losing party. The civil case for
reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the RTC on June 9,
1987 while the civil case for ejectment was decided by the MTC
against her.
- On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in
the civil case for ejectment, Cantiller and Peregrina were served
a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days from
receipt of notice. Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they
consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan on the matter. Pagalunan,
in turn, introduced them to Potenciano. After such introduction,
the parties "impliedly agreed" that Potenciano would handle
their case.
- A petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale
and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by Potenciano to forestall
the execution of the order to vacate. In the afternoon of October
9, 1987, Cantiller was made to sign by Potenciano what she
described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and
haphazardly composed" petition for annulment of judgment.
Cantiller alleges that Potenciano promised her that the
necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the
judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close
friend). Potenciano demanded from Cantiller P1,000 as
attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon.
However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153,
the presiding judge asked Potenciano to withdraw as counsel in
the case on the ground of their friendship.
- On October 11, 1987, Potenciano went to the house of Cantiller
and asked her to be ready with P2,000 to be given to another
judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment case.
Cantiller and her sister were only able to raise the amount of
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
P1,000 which they immediately gave to Potenciano. Later
Potenciano informed Cantiller and her sister that he could not
locate the judge who would issue the restraining order. The
parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where
Potenciano ordered some food-including two plastic bags of food
allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the
restraining order. At this juncture, Potenciano asked for the
remaining balance of the P2,000 which he earlier demanded.
Cantiller gave her last money-a ten dollar ($10.00) bill.
- Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, Potenciano
informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to
file another case with the RTC to enable them to retain
possession of the apartment. For this purpose, Potenciano told
complainant to prepare the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to
be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase
price of the apartment and another P1,000 to cover the
expenses of the suit. Potenciano stressed to the complainant the
need and urgency of filing the new complaint. Complainant and
Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some
friends and relatives. On October 26, 1987, the money was
handed over to the respondent.
- At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No.
55118 on October 30, 1987, Potenciano, contrary to his promise
that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his
appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not
able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining
order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence,
the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.
- Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that
there was really no need to make a deposit of P10,000 relative
to Civil Case No. 55210. After another inquiry, she found out that
in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,
1987, complainant sent a demand letter to Potenciano asking for
the return of the total amount of P11,000 which the former
earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never
answered and the money was never returned. Hence,
complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein
respondent.
- Potenciano in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases
Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the
allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge
against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only
intended to harrass him.
ISSUE
WON Potenciano is guilty if the charges against him
HELD
Yes.
Ratio When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby
covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its
final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of
the trust which the client had reposed on him. Reasoning The
acts of Potenciano in this case violate the most elementary
principles of professional ethics. Public interest requires that an
attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance
explains the public concern for the maintenance of an
untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his
client. The Court finds that Potenciano failed to exercise due
diligence in protecting his client's interests. Potenciano had
knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding
judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as
counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior
knowledge, Potenciano took no steps to find a replacement nor
did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that
Potenciano had no previous knowledge that he would be asked
LEGAL PROFESSION
to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to
the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118
Potenciano already filed a motion therein withdrawing as
complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefore his
frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void,
Potenciano failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask
complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. This Court
agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210
appear to be poorly prepared and written. Having represented
himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost
cause of complainant Potenciano should have carefully prepared
the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his
representation. The little time involved is no excuse.
Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file
the best pleading within his capability. Apparently Potenciano
was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant
who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness
to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to
"buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got
P10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited.
Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the
complainant dry is obvious. The allegation of Potenciano that the
P10,000 was given to him as fee for his services, is simply
incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with
the service he actually rendered. And his failure to return even a
portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more
bolsters the protestation of complainant that Potenciano does
not deserve to remain as an officer of the court.
Disposition Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano be guilty
of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to
resume the practice of law. Respondent is ordered to return to
complainant herein the sum of P11,000 with legal interest from
the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.
ALISBO V JALINDOON
GRINO-AQUINO; July 18, 1991
(kiyo miura)
FACTS
- 3/16/70: Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as
his counsel in an action to recover his share of the estate of the
deceased sps Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been
adjudicated to him under the judgment of CC No. 4963 because
Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of judgment in his
favor w/in the reglementary 5-year period. The salient provisions
of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between
Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following:
1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for
the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share
2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and
3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value
of the property recovered.
- 4/18/70: respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo,
and Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and Carlito Sales as defendant
signed by him alone (CC No. 9559); on the same day, he
withdrew it and replaced it with a complaint w/ Ramon as sole
plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as defendants w/c
respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel
- 12/8/71: an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his judicial
guardian Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty.
Pablo alone (10 years after final judgment)
- 8/21/73: defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the action had prescribed
- 10/3/73: the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the case on
the ground of prescription
(though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year prescriptive
period, it was null and void since Ramon was insane and hence
w/o capacity to sue)
- 1/2/74: complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately
caused the dismissal of CC No. 9559 and concealing the fact that
he had been the former legal counsel of Sales
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Jalandoon claims he only discovered his previous professional
relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972
ISSUE
WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or
conflicting interest
HELD
- YES because:
1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon
and Norberto re: CC No. 4963
2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963
3. For CC No. 9559, he had to inform himself of the personal
circumstances of defendant Sales
-w/ this knowledge, he should have declined employment by
Alisbo due to conflict of interest
- The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1
and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide:
6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the
client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and
any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might
influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.)
-Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking
the court to resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963. The
first complaint w/ Ramon and his brothers was only partially
defective due to Ramon’s insanity; by making Ramon the sole
plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly
defective and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period
- Jalandoon alleges to have only found out about Ramon’s
incapacity on July 17, 1971, he only amended the complaint
impleading his guardian as plaintiff 5 months . later when it had
prescribed
Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court
found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity and
was suspended for a period of 2 years.
NGAYAN V TUGADE
PER CURIAM; February 7, 1991
(rean balisi)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of
subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court
FACTS
- Respondent, Atty. Faustino Tugade, had been complainants’
(Fulgencio, Tomasa and Bella Aurora Ngayan) counsel for a
number of cases prior to this complaint. Complainants asked
Atty. Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a
complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert
Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into
complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the same,
Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she was
rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a
paragraph which did not mention Leonido was with Soriano when
both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan
allegedly told respondent about his omission and in front of her,
Atty Tugade crossed out the paragraph she complained about
and promised to make another affidavit. Respondent was
subsequently discharged by complainants as counsel. After
discharging respondent they found out that the name of Robert
Leonido was not included in the charge. This omission was
however remedied by their new counsel. When the adverse
LEGAL PROFESSION
parties Soriano and Leonido filed a motion for reinvestigation of
their case against herein complainants, Soriano and Leonido
presented Ngayans’ first affidavit which contained herein
respondent’s omission. This was allegedly made by Atty. Apolo
P. Gaminda, a former classmate of respondent. It appears then
that Atty. Tugade submitted an affidavit to the Court favorable
to the cause of Soriano and Leonido. Further, it was found out
that herein respondent attorney was also a lawyer of the brother
of Robert Leonido in an insurance company.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Tugade violation of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.4 Simply put, whether
he failed to uphold the trust and confidence conferred to him by
his clients
HELD
YES. [a] Respondent's act of executing and submitting an
affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano
advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients
demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against
complainants, violative of the first part of paragraph (f), Section
20, Rate 138, Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's act of
joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the
dismissal of the case against them shows not only his bias
against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on
the part of a lawyer. It was meant only to titillate the anger of
complainants.
[b] Respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him
and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his
flouting resistance to lawful order, of the court and illustrate his
despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule
138, Rules of Court.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW
TINGA; July 30, 2004
(monch bacani)
FACTS
- On August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain
Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case.
Maquera served as Castro’s counsel in said case. Castro’s
property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a
public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente.
Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the
property for one year. The right of redemption could be
exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the
aforesaid period.
- At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro’s property for
$500.00, the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.
- On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera’s
legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into
an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of
redemption in favor of the latter.
- On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro’s right of
redemption by paying Benavente $525.00 in satisfaction of the
judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the
property transferred in his name.
- On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S.
Chang and C.C. Chang for $320,000.00
4 appears that she left for the States and her apartment was used
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "(e) To maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or
with his knowledge and approval;
"(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged"
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- The Superior Court of Guam suspended Atty. Mosquera from
the practice of law for 2 years as he acquired his client’s
property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a
consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his
client’s case. It was in violation of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in Guam.
- The IBP on the other hand, concluded that although the said
court found Maquera liable for misconduct, “there is no evidence
to establish that he committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines.” However, they suspended him indefinitely for
failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP.
ISSUE
WON Maquera’s acts in Guam constitute as grounds for
suspension in the Philippines
HELD
Yes.
- Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
“The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
for disbarment or suspension”
- The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his
client’s property by exercising the right of redemption previously
assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services.
Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer’s acquisition by
assignment of the client’s property which is the subject of the
litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the
prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
- The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and
Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his
office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the
expense of his client.
- Mosquera’s acts are violative of a lawyer’s sworn duty to act
with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 and
Rule 1.01.
Disposition Atty. Mosquera is required to show cause within 15
days why he should not be suspended or disbarred. For the
meantime, he is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year or
until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes
later.
SOLATAN V INOCENTES
TINGA; August 9, 2005
(jonas azura)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court
FACTS
- Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar
Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was
retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex
when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration
by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the
PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against
non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.
- Complainant’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. It
by members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-
payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was
rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the
premises.
- Complainant was occupying said apartment when he learned of
the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to
LEGAL PROFESSION
arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which
he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes
referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of
ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement
was made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire
judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees
and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of
Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees.
- Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in
coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution
and levied the properties found in the subject apartment.
Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release
the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the
apartment. Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant
presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released
the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the
complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the
Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
- complainant filed the instant administrative case for
disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP
Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the
practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for
exercising command responsibility.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
2. WON Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal
representative for a person without being retained. No
employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.
Reasoning Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and
dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving
legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his
client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice given
by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the
rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in
consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not
be construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses
Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The act of
informing complainant that his properties would be returned
upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his
clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.
2. YES
Ratio His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over
matters under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy
shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty.
Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Reasoning Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty.
Camano on the latter’s dealings with complainant. This is the
linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and
liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold
supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary
diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of
the cases handled by persons over which they are exercising
supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to
foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
persons under their charge.
Disposition Petition granted. Sanction on Atty. Camano is
affirmed. Atty. Inocentes is admonished with the warning that
repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more
severely.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
LEGARDA V COURT OF APPEALS
PER CURIAM; June 10, 1992
(ajang pineda)
FACTS
- Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for a
specific performance with damages filed by private
respondent New Cathay House Inc (NCHI). The
complaint is aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to
sign a lease contract involving her house and lot which
Cathay House Inc. intended to use in operating a
restaurant. As prayed for in the complaint, the lower
court issued a TRO enjoining Victoria Legarda and her
agents from stopping the renovation of the property.
- Thereafter, Antonio Coronel of the Coronel Law office
entered his appearance as counsel for Legarda.
- He filed an urgent motion for extension of 10 days
which was granted by the court. However, Legarda was
not able to file her answer within the 10 days given so
she was declared in default, thereby paving way for the
presentation of evidence ex parte
- The lower court then rendered a decision by default
leaving Legarda on the losing end. Upon appeal, the CA
found the petition unmeritorious and dismissed it. It
said, “It is our belief that this case is one of pure and
simple negligence on the part of the defendant’s
counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of
the defendant.”
- But inspite of the CA’s tirade on his professional
competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a
motion for reconsideration, neither did he initiate
moves towards an appeal on the decision which was
adverse and prejudicial to his client. Thus the CA
decision became final.
- Victoria Legarda then got a new lawyer and won the
case.
- The court then required Atty. Coronel to show cause
w/in 10 days from notice why he should not be held
administratively liable for his acts and omissions w/c
resulted in grave injustice to petitioner.
- He filed for another 30-day extension. Then another
30-day extension. Not filed in time, the 2nd motion was
denied
ISSUE
WON Atty. Colorado was negligent thus violating Canon 18 of the
Professional Code of Responsibility
HELD
Yes.
- Atty. Colorado violated Canon 18 which states that “A
lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and
diligence” specifically Canon 18.03, “a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.”
- This is not the only case wherein in dealing w/ the
court’s orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a
pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as
counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In Imelda
Marcos vs PCGG, the court imposed a fine on him after
he was found guilty of negligence
Ratio
- Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when
strong disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal
profession, strict compliance w/ one’s oath of office and
the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.
- Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above
suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing w/ their
clients. The profession is not synonymous w. an
ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public
interest.
LEGAL PROFESSION
ENDAYA V OCA
TINGA; September 3, 2003
(ajang pineda)
NATURE
A complaint filed by Artemio Andaya against Atty. Wilfredo Oca
for violation of the lawer’s oath and for professional delinquency
or infidelity
FACTS
- Nov. 7, 1991 - a complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed against Endaya and his spouse, Patrosenia Endaya.
The complaint was filed by Apolonia Hornilla, Pedro
Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez
- Dec. 13, 1991 – the Endaya couple filed their answer
which was prepared by a certain Isaias Ramirez. A
preliminary conference was conducted w/c the couple
attended w/o counsel. During the conference,
complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were
the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land
involved in the case
- Thereafter, the complainant couple sought services of
the public attorney’s office in Batangas City wherein the
respondent attorney was assigned to handle the case
- At the continuation of the preliminary conference,
respondent appeared as counsel; he also moved for the
amendment of the answer previously filed by the
couple, but his motion was denied
- the court thereafter ordered the parties to submit their
affidavits and position papers w/in 10 days from receipt
of order – but the respondent failed to do so.
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiffs were not the real parties in
interest
- The plaintiffs appealed the decision. The RTC directed
the parties to file their memoranda. Once again, the
respondent failed to do so. The courts original decision
was reversed and set aside.
Petitioners' Claim
- Having lost the case, the complainant filed this
administrative issue for professional delinquency
consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings.
The complainants contend that due to respondent’s
inaction, he lost the opportunity to present his cause
and ultimately, the case itself
Respondents' Comments
- respondent denies this and stresses that he was not the
original counsel of the couple
- he avers that when he agreed to represent complainant
at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the
main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of
court to file an amended answer bec, he was made to
believe that it was made by a non-lawyer. When found
out that it was actually made by lawyer, he asked the
court to relieve him as the couple’s counsel, but he was
denied.
- He also asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder
believing in good faith that it wasn’t anymore necessary
ISSUE
WON Atty. Oca (respondent) violated the lawyer’s oath through
his professional deliquency
HELD
Yes.
- His failure to file the affidavits did not prejudice his
clients for the court nevertheless rendered a decision
favorable to them. But failure to do so per se is a
violation of Rule 18.03
- The respondent did not submit the affidavits and
position paper when required by the MCTC. With his
resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in
mockery of the authority of the court
- Respondent’s stubborn and uncaring demeanor
surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to
complainant’s reply
Ratio
- The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles
that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it
springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any
infringement thereof can cause his disbarment,
suspension or other preliminary action
- Canon 18: A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence
and diligence
- Much is demanded from those who engage in the
practice of law because they have a duty not only to
their clients but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public. The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his
work and profession not only promote the interest of his
client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by
contributing to the proper and speedy administration of
cases, maintain respect to the legal profession.
- The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably
show respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a
lawyer
BLANZA V ARCANGEL
BENGZON; September 5, 1967
(javi bautista)
NATURE
Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action.
FACTS
- On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their
respective pension claims in connection with the death of their
husbands, both P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers.
After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no
progress was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent
to return the said documents but the latter refused. Upon
questioning by Fiscal Rana to whom the case was referred by the
Solicitor General respondent admitted having received the
documents but explained that it was for photostating purposes
only. His failure to immediately return them was due to
complainants’ refusal to hand him money to pay for the
photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing the
documents. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses
himself and turned over the documents to the fiscal.
- Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and
recommended the respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen
feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand
considering 1) his failure to attend to complainants pension
claims for 6 years; 2) his failure to immediately return the
documents despite repeated demands upon him, and 3) his
failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her
documents.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance
HELD
No. Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the claims in
returning the documents has not been controverted by
complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent
asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did
not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly to
blame. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were
actually returned by respondent during the fiscal’s investigation
with him paying for the photostating costs himself. As for the
alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to
complainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs.
Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant
Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her
charges in a hearing but she let it go. Neither she nor her
counsel of record appeared. Thus, the Curt refused to take
disciplinary action against respondent due to lack of clear
preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations
against him.
- Nevertheless the Court also stated that “we cannot but counsel
against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a
more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely
complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a
man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community looked
up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his
professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that
ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait
and hope, for 6 long years in their pension claims. Upon their
refusal to co-operate, he should have terminated their
professional relationship rather than keep them hanging. And
although we voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense,
let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high
standards of his chosen profession require of him.”
ABAY V MONTESINO
PANGANIBAN; December 4, 2003
NATURE
Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action.
FACTS
- June 21, 2002 - Eduardo T. Abay charges Atty. Raul T.
Montesino with gross negligence, gross incompetence and
evident bad faith, in violation of his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar
- Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which Abay is a
stockholder, hired Montesino as counsel in an action for
“Cancellation of Title of Ownership, Recovery of Ownership and
Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction” against
the estate of Vicente T. Galo
- April 27, 1995 - RTC dismissed the civil case.
- November 3, 1995 - Motion for Reconsideration of the
judgment of dismissal was denied by the trial court
- Although Montesino filed a Notice of Appeal with CA, he failed
to submit an appellant’s brief and in March 19, 1999, CA
dismissed the appeal with the following admonition:
“We made a warning in our Resolution dated as early as
October 20, 1998 that no further extension will be
entertained. Precisely because of non-submission of the
Brief, we directed, on January 8, 1998, the dismissal of the
appeal. This is not to mention the fact that a total of 120
days extension, over and above the 45-day reglementary
period, had already been granted …We cannot see any
reason why the court’s admonishing for a limited time to do
compliance does not apply to this case now before Us.”
- Abay attributes the failure of Montesino to submit the brief to
the latter’s gross negligence and evident bad faith
- Montesino allegedly abandoned the appeal without the
knowledge and consent of the NIT and supposedly never told NIT
that its appeal had already been dismissed thus the complaint
- Montesino answered (October 29, 2002) that
1. pending appeal, he discovered that the property that it
was seeking to recover had been the subject of another
case which was a result of the overlapping transfers of
rights effected by the heirs of Vicente Galo
2. he felt that to pursue the appeal would be “dilatory,
expensive, frivolous and taxing to the precious time of the
CA and it was wise to advise the stockholders of the NIT to
abandon the appeal and instead file appropriate Complaints
against Grandea, et al to recover NIT’s claimed properties
3. complainant was unjustly adamant in his demand to
continue with the appeal despite legal advice and since he
sincerely felt that the best way to protect the rights of NIT
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was to file appropriate complaints, he allowed the period to
submit NIT’s Appellant’s Brief to lapse
4. although NIT did not pay his legal fees or reimburse him
for his expenses, he still faithfully performed his duty during
the entire time he served as its counsel
- April 24, 2003 – IBP Report by San Juan found respondent guilty
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility because:
1. not able to justify his failure to file the brief.
> if respondent actually believed it was futile to pursue the
appeal, why did he request from CA numerous extensions of
time to file
2. Montesino admits that after he advised NIT and herein
complainant on the futility of pursuing the appeal, the latter
expressed the wish to continue the appeal
> should have given due importance to the decision of his
client to avail of a legal remedy available to it under the
legal system
3. recommended suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six months, with a warning that a harsher penalty
would be meted out for a similar infraction in the future
ISSUE
WON pursuing methods not according to the client’s wish and
consent deserves sanction
HELD
YES and SC agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP.
Reasoning
- The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to
render public service and secure justice for those who seek its
aid. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting
in these considerations, whether in their professional or private
capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action.
Failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a clear
violation of his professional duty to his client
- The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to
serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rules 18.03
and 18.04 specifically provide:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.
- Client and lawyer disagreed on the legal course to be taken
regarding the appealed case. The lawyer advised the client to
abandon the appeal and to consider the other available
remedies but the client wanted to pursue it. Feeling that he was
“unjustly adamant” in wanting to do so, the lawyer contrary to
the desire of the client deemed it wise to abandon the appeal
without informing his client and not filing an appellant’s brief is
prejudicial because such failure could result in the dismissal of
the appeal.
- The conduct of shows that he failed to exercise due diligence,
and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his
client. The abandonment by the former of the latter’s cause
made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him.
Even if respondent was “honestly and sincerely” protecting the
interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive
the appeal without the latter’s knowledge and consent.
- If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his
retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance
and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.
- Moreover, the appellate court noted that respondent failed to
file the appellant’s brief despite being granted several
extensions of time to file it. He therefore violated Rule 12.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that
lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
LEGAL PROFESSION
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so
- We emphasize that all lawyers owe fidelity to their client’s
cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present
every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in
support of that cause.
Disposition Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of
negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
QUIRANTE V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
REGALADO; January 31, 1989
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari to review the judgment of the IAC
FACTS
- Atty. John QUIRANTE is the counsel of Dr. Indalecio CASASOLA
in a case involving a contract with a building contractor named
Norman GUERRERO, who failed to perform his part of the
contract within the period specified. Dr. Casasola also sued
PHILAMGEN, (The Philippine American General Insurance Co.
Inc.) which acted as bondsman for Guerrero.
- Oct 16, 1981 – RTC Manila ruled in favor of CASASOLA by
rescinding the contract. It ordered Guerrero and Philamgen to
pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
liquidated damages, amount of surety bond, and attorney’s fees
(P30T). It also denied MFR filed by Philamgen on Nov 4, 1982.
(During this period, Dr. CASASOLA died, leaving his widow and
several children as survivors.)
- Philamgen brought the case to the appellate court, and the IAC,
on May 4, 1983, dismissed petition for quashal of the writ of
execution. The case was then elevated to SC and is now still
pending.
- June 18, 1983 – QUIRANTE filed a motion for the confirmation
of his attorney’s fees, which was granted by the RTC. RTC also
denied MFR filed by the opposing party. But the IAC reversed the
decision of RTC (IAC granted petition for certiorari filed
CASASOLA heirs.) Hence, QUIRANTE filed this appeal by
certiorari in the SC.
Petitioners’ Claims
- There was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr.
Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement
was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda.
de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, Mely
Garcia and Virginia Nazareno.
- The attorney's fees would then be computed as follows:
(A). In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the
attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall
be P30,000.00.
(B). In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of
the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the
Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
IAC’s ruling
- “Firstly, there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition
which may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the
Casasola family of the total amount of damages given by RTC.
Hence the award of damages may be premature. Secondly,
assuming that the grant of damages to the family is eventually
ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and
should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.”
ISSUES
1. WON confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature
2. WON IAC correctly ruled that the alleged confirmation of
attorney's fees would not be binding on all heirs
HELD
1. YES
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Ratio An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the
main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is
at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only
arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is
to be paid.
Reasoning Since the main case from which the petitioner's
claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the
determination of the propriety and amount of attorney’s fees
should be held in abeyance. This is especially true given the
subsequent developments in the civil case against Guerrero and
PHILAMGEN: On May 21, 1987, the SC rendered judgment
setting aside the May 1983 decision of IAC.
- Also, the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis
for their fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed
is subject to certain contingencies.
Obiter Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted
either in the very action in which the services in question have
been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is
chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount
were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to
recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which
the services of counsel have been rendered. Also, there is the
assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree
already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's
services.
- However, what is being claimed here as attorney's fees by
petitioners is different from attorney's fees as an item of
damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his
counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment
creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged
contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and
the private respondents as the debtors.
- In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees,
petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This
is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence.
2. NO
Reasoning This decision is also pre-emptive of factual and
evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by
the trial court. “The orderly administration of justice dictates that
such issue be likewise determined by the trial court inasmuch as
it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in
determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery
of attorney's fees.”
Disposition Decision of IAC is affirmed except for the portion
which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees
should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.
TANHUECO V DE DUMO
PER CURIAM; April 25, 1989
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
- On February 24, 1975, complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed
before the Court a petition for Disbarment against respondent
Justininao G. de Dumo for having violated the Canons of
Professional Ethics by his a0 refusal to remit her money
collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and b) refusal
to return documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant
in certain collection cases.
SOLICITOR-GENERAL’S REPORT:
Evidence for Complainant
- Complainant secured the legal services of respondent to collect
indebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to
execute a document evidencing their lawyer-client relationship,
respondent told her that it was not necessary. She nonetheless
offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to collect from
the debtors.
- Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her
P2,000.00, P1,300.00 and P3,000.00 on three separate
LEGAL PROFESSION
occasions, but she could not remember when she gave those
amounts. Respondent did not pay those loans.
- Respondent filed cases against her debtors and that one of
them, Constancia Manosca, paid P12,500.00 to respondent.
Informed of such payment by Manosca herself, complainant
confronted respondent but the latter denied having received
payment from any of her debtors. Complainant then brought the
matter to the attention of Malacanang which referred her to
Camp Crame. Notwithstanding subsequent demands of
complainant for the money, respondent had refused to give her
the amount.
Evidence for Respondent
- Complainant indeed secured services of respondent to collect
from her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what
he may be able to collect. He thus filed cases against Tipace,
Manosca, Morena, Jr., and others, and was able to obtain
favorable judgment in the cases against Manosca, Tipace and
Leonila Mendoza. The initial payments made by these judgment-
debtors were all given to complainant. With respect to Manosca,
respondent obtained a judgment for P19,000.00 although the
debt was only P12,000.00.
- Respondent also declared that complainant was influenced by
her debtors, who were also her friends, into distrusting him.
Ultimately, because comlainant filed a complaint against him, he
terminated his relationship with complainant and demanded his
attorney’s fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected.
Complainant refused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over
to her the P12,000.00 initial payment of Manosca, which he
considered, or applied, as part payment of his attorney’s fee.
Respondent estimated his attorney’s fee due from complainant
in the amount of P17,000.00
- Respondent denied having borrowed the amounts of P2,000.00,
P1,300.00, P3,000.00 and P1,000.00, pointing out that
complainant did not even have money to pay him so that he
handled the cases for her on contingent basis. He also denied
having received documentary evidence from the complainant.
What evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative.
Findings and Recommendation
- Both respondent and complainant admit of an attorney-client
relationship between them.
- Respondent also admitted having received P12,000.00 from
judgment-debtor Constancia Manosca, without turning over the
amount to his client, complainant herein, and applying it instead
as part of his attorney’s fees.
- Undoubtedly, respondent’s failure to account for the
P12,000.00, representing payment of the judgment-debt of
Manosca constitutes unprofessional conduct and subjects him to
disciplinary action.
- As regards the charges that respondent received documents
evidencing the debts to complainant and had refused to return
them to the latter, and that respondent also borrowed some
amounts from her, there is no competent, conclusive evidence to
support them. Perforce, such allegations have no factual basis.
- It is recommended that respondent be severely reprimanded
and admonished that repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely. (To this recommendation, the
Court does not agree)
ISSUES
1. WON respondent violated Canon 11 (now Canon 16) regarding
trust of client’s moneys
2. WON respondent violated Canon 13 (now Canon 20) regarding
attorney’s fees.
HELD
1) Ratio Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment
rendered in favor of his client, constitute trust funds and must be
immediately paid over to the client.
Reasoning When respondent withheld and refused to deliver
the money received by him for his client, the deceased
complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, he breached the trust reposed
upon him. The fact that a lawyer ahs a lien for fees on moneys in
his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his
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duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to
do so constitutes professional misconduct.
In the present case, what respondent could have properly done
was to make an accounting with his client, the complainant,
deduct his attorney’s fees due in respect of the amount actually
collected by him, and turn over the remaining balance to the
complainant.
2) Ratio Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. But
when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was
obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his
client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is
clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved
party.
Reasoning Respondent claimed that he charged complainant,
his client, a contingent fee of 1) 50% of the sum of principal and
interest collected from different debtors; and 2) attorney’s fees
charged to the defendant and “not to be included in the
computation.”
Under this scheme, respondent was actually collecting as
attorney’s fees more than half of the total amount due from
defendant debtors. The contingent fee here is grossly excessive.
And there is reason to believe that fraud was committed –
complainant was an old and sickly woman and, in respondent’s
words, “penniless.” She was already 76 yrs. old when she filed
the complaint. In her circumstance, and given her desire to
realize debts owed to her before death took over, she would
easily succumb to the demands of respondent attorney
regarding his attorney’s fees.
In Mambulao Lumber Company v PNB, it was explained that the
principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney’s fees
whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that
the same is unreasonable is deeply rooted in this jurisdiction.
A lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of
assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the
parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that:
1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys’
oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months and
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will
be more severely dealt with;
2. the attorney’s fees that respondent is entitled to in
respect of collection cases here involved shall be an amount
equivalent to fifteen percent of the total amount collected
by respondent from the debtors in those cases;
3. respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of
complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, the P12,000.00 respondent
received on behalf of his client less attorney’s fees due to
him in respect of that amount (P12,000.00 less fifteen
percent thereof) or a net amount of P10,200.00; and
4. respondent shall return to the estate of
complainant Hilaria Tanhueco any documents and papers
received by him from the deceased complainant in
connection with the collection cases for which he was
retained. If he has in fact made any other collections from
deceased complainant’s debtors, he shall promptly account
therefore to complainant’s estate and shall be entitled to
receive in respect thereof the fifteen percent attorney’s fees
provided for herein.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished each to the Bar
Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent
attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
ALBANO V COLOMA
FERNANDO; OCTOBER 11, 1967
NATURE
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
Coloma was the counsel of Albano and his mother during the
Japanese occupation. Albano alleged that after liberation and
long after the courts had been reorganized Coloma failed to
expedite the hearing and termination of their civil case, as a
LEGAL PROFESSION
result of which they had themselves represented by another
lawyer. He also claimed that Coloma intervened in the case to
collect her attorney’s fees. Coloma denied that she did nothing
to expedite the hearing and termination of the civil case as the
record would show that she filed “more than 20 papers and
pleadings; went to trial for several days and, with the assistance
of her sister who was also a lawyer, obtained a favorable
judgment in the Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his
co-plaintiffs; and filed with the Court of Appeals a 35-page brief,
finished after careful, conscientious, and exhaustive study and
preparation.” She likewise denied that she could have been
removed for her failure to comply with the obligations as counsel
as she served “faithfully, efficiently, continuously, and to the
best of her knowledge and capacity.” Her dismissal then,
according to her, was made without just cause and without her
consent and only when she had already won the case for them in
the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
WON Coloma may recover attorney’s fees
HELD
Yes. Any counsel who is worthy of his hire is entitled to be fully
recompensated for his services. With his capital consisting solely
of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any
attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It
is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to
secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not
get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to
avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those
benefited by counsel’s services to deprive him of his hard-
earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
METROBANK V CA
REGALADO; January 23, 1990
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari impugning the decision of CA
affirming order of RTC, fixing attorney’s fees and directing
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) to
pay its attorneys, private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Associates, the amount of P936,000 as attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit5 basis.
FACTS
- Private respondent handled civil cases for the declaration of
nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages, in behalf of
Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983.
- Celedenio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio
Alejandro, et al. These were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank
to secure a loan obligation of Felix Angelo Bautista and/or
International Hotel Corporation. Obligors defaulted and
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgages.
- Alejandro brought suit against Javier and included Metrobank
as defendant, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation
committed against him by Javier.
- it was during the pendency of these suits that the lands were
sold by Metrobank to its sister corporation, Service Leasing
Corporation, for P600,000. On same day, properties were resold
to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for P2.5M.
Herby then mortgaged the same properties to Banco de Oro for
P9.2M. Private respondent did not have knowledge of such
transactions.
- Aug 16, 1983 private respondent then filed a motion to enter
the charging lien6 in the records of the civil cases, pursuant to
51
quantum meruit - (lit. “so much as he deserved”) cause of action for reasonable
value of services rendered, or occasionally of goods or materials provided, under
circumstances in which there was no enforceable contract to pay for them but it would
be unfair to leave plaintiff uncompensated.
6
Charging lien or attorney’s lien – a lien on money, papers, and property of a client in
the hands of an attorney, or a lien that an attorney may request from a court on a
fund or judgment obtained for the client by the attorney’s efforts, to secure payment
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Sec 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to 25% of the
actual and current market values of the litigated properties, as
attorney’s fees.
- Alejandro et al filed a motion to dismiss their complaints, which
lower court granted.
- May 28, 1984, private respondent filed motion to fix its
attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit. Metrobank
manifested it had fully paid private respondent. Private
respondent, however, countered that the P50,000 given by
petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a
cash advance, including P14000 paid on Dec 15, 1980. It also
appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a
compromise with Metrobank in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000 but negotiations were
unsuccessful.
- Oct 15, 1984, RTC issued an order granting payment of
attorney’s fees, P936,000, to private respondent. Respondent CA
affirmed trial court’s order.
ISSUES
1. WON private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its
charging lien for payment of its attorney’s fees.
2. WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of
such lien
3. WON private respondent is entitled to 25% of the actual and
current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruit basis.
HELD
1. NO. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the
payment of attorney’s fees requires as a condition sine qua non
a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of
his client.
- in this case, the dismissal order neither provided for any money
judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much
less in favor of petitioner. Private respondent’s supposed
charging lien is thus without legal basis.
- an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon
money due his client form the adverse party in nay action or
proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does
not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation.
An attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as e
defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in
litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an
attorney defending the client’s title to property already in the
client’s possession.
2. NO. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the
necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his
services were rendered when something is due his client in the
action from which the fee is to be paid.
- an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the
jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction
subsists until the lien is settled. This, however, applies only
where the charging lien is valid and enforceable.
3. The Court refrained from resolving the third issue so as not to
preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility
of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a
proper proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.
NOTE: in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of
the subject matter in controversy (2) extent of services rendered
(3) professional standing of lawyer .
Disposition Petition for review is granted, decision of CA is
reversed and set aside, without prejudice to appropriate
proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to
establish its right to attorney’s fees and the amount thereof.
ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
of attorney’s fees.
LEGAL PROFESSION
CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006
FACTS
- 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation
proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis for parcels of land
belonging to them situated in Antipolo, Rizal with a total land
area of 1, 790, 570.36
- The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo
G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor
- They executed a Letter-Agreement dated April 22, 1983 which
indicated that the contingent fees that the lawyers will receive at
P11 or more per square meter is thirty percent of the just
compensation
- The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and on October
29, 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just
compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square
meter
- The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the lowering of
the amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable
laws
- Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint
special power of attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in
favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor
- On December 10, 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by
and between the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor
which fixed the just compensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17,
and anything in excess of that shall be the contingent fees of
Attys. Roxas and Pastor for their legal services
- Resolution No. 1174 dated December 16, 1985, issued by the
NHA, stated that the property would be acquired at a cost of
P19.50 per square meter and that it will be paid in NHA Bonds
which the yield would be based on the Central Bank rate at the
time of the payment
- As a result of the NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement
was executed and it was approved by the Court in a Decision
dated December 20, 1985.
- Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34, 916, 122.
The total amount released by the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The
difference of P19, 583, 878 is, undoubtedly, the yield of the
bonds.
- The amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas
amounted to P30, 520, 000 in NHA bonds
- On August 25, 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new
counsel to Attys. Roxas and Pastor demanding that the latter
deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds
paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under
pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action
- Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered stating that the amount that
they go seems huge from the surface but it just actually passed
their hands.
- On September 29, 1987, a letter was again sent to Attys. Roxas
and Pastor formally terminating their services
- The Zuzuarreguis then filed a civil action for Sum of Money and
Damages, they demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be
turned over to them
- The RTC dismissed the complaint
- The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal
- The Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and Pastor to return
to the plaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting
the reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,4 76,426.275
- Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a MFR
- The Zuzuarreguis also filed a MFR
- The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a MFR
- All MFRs were denied for lack of merit
- Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a petition for certiorari
ISSUES
1. WON the letter-agreement executed by the parties should
stand as law between them
2. WON the contingent fees were reasonable
HELD
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to
give something or to render some service. The Zuzuarreguis, in
entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent
thereto. In fact, it was them who sent the said letter to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all matters
which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no
evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the
Letter-Agreement. It is basic that a contract is the law between
the parties.
2. No. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor
are to receive contingent fees for their professional services.
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states: a
contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject t o the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness
Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states the guidelines by which a lawyer
should determine his fees (see original)
- Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only
reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount
of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable
(Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Attorney’s fees are
unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determine the
reasonableness of attorney’s fees stipulated by the parties is a
matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
- In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an
amount which is equal to 44% of the just compensation paid by
the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis. Considering that there was no full
blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a
Compromise Agreement, the 44% is undeniably excessive. In
the opinion of the Court, 87.17% of the yields of the bond should
go to the Zuzuarreguis computing from the amounts stipulated
in the Letter-Agreement. The remaining amount is what is due to
Attys. Roxas and Pastor. The SC affirms the decision of CA with
modification in the computation of the attorneys’ contingent
fees.
URBAN BANK, INC. V ATTY. MAGDALENO M.
PEÑA
PUNO; September 7, 2001
NATURE
Administrative Matter. Disbarment
FACTS
- Complainant charges that respondent is guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule
138, of the Revised Rules of Court.
- 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land located
along Roxas Boulevard from the Isabela Sugar Company (“ISC”
for brevity).
- One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the
eviction of all the occupants found in said property. This
condition was incorporated in the Contract to Sell and adopted in
the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between
ISC and Complainant.
- ISC hired Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña. He proceeded to take the
necessary steps to evict the occupants of the property subject of
the sale.
- During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC
and Peña about the necessity of a letter of authority in favor of
the latter, granting him the authority to represent the bank in
maintaining possession of the aforesaid property and to
represent the bank in any court action that may be instituted in
connection with the exercise of said duty.
- Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-
authority dated 15 December 1994, but only after making it very
clear to Peña. that it was ISC which contracted his services and
not Complainant.
- Peña then requested for a modification of said letter of
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
authority by furnishing Complainant with a draft containing the - Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter, could have
desired wordings (including the date, i.e., 19 December 1994) instituted a suit against the complainant. There is no gainsaying
and asking Complainant to modify the previous letter by issuing that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-
a new one similarly worded as his draft. client relationship.
- If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly - Respondent can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit,
obliged and re-issued a new letter of authority to Respondent, malpractice and gross misconduct for invoking the aid of the
this time incorporating some of Peña’ s suggestions. court in recovering recompense for legal services which he
- Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter
question was successfully carried out. does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did was
- After the lapse of more than thirteen (13) months, Peña filed a a lawful exercise of a right.
collection suit against herein Complainant and its senior officers Disposition The disbarment complaint against respondent Atty.
“for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
and attorney’s fees” on the basis of the letter given to him for
the purposes of evicting the occupants. CORPUZ V CA
- According to Complainant: Peña, knowing fully well the
DAVIDE; January 26, 1998
circumstances surrounding the issuance of said letter of
authority, constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
NATURE
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
Petition to set aside the decision of CA which reversed the
provision enumerates the grounds for the suspension and
resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the latter
disbarment of lawyers, namely:
declaring that petitioner’s separation from the service as Atty V
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
in the MTRCB was not in order and directed that he be
Court, on what grounds, - A member of the bar may be
automatically restored to his position.
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
FACTS
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or
- Atty Corpuz was appointed MTRCB’s legal counsel – Prosecutor
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
and Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer). The
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of which he
appointment was approved by the Asst Regional Director of the
is required to take before admission to practice, or for willful
CSC-NCR. Subsequently, he was designated Attorney V under
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or
the Salary Standardization Law.
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
- August 1991, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91
to a case without any authority to do so. The practice
5 entitled "An Act To Declare The Appointments Of The
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
Administrative And Subordinate Employees Of This Board As Null
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
And Void." This undated resolution noted that the past and
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)”
present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for
- Peña denied all the allegations and moved to dismiss the
approval the appointments of administrative and subordinate
complaint.
employees to the MTRCB before forwarding them to the CSC, in
- He added that there was no reason for him to deceive
violation of Section 5 of P.D. No. 876-A, and later, P.D. No. 1986.
complainant into writing a letter of authority because he knew
- CORPUZ was unaware of the promulgation of Resolution No. 8-
very well that the verbal agreement was sufficient to constitute
1-91 as he was then on leave. The Resolution was likewise kept
an attorney-client relationship.
secret and it was only on 12 March 1993 that an announcement
- We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
8 of its contents was posted by an Ad Hoc Committee on the
(IBP) for investigation.
MTRCB bulletin board. This announcement invited the
- The IBP decided in favor of Peña and recommended that the
submission of any information concerning the appointments
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
involved therein to the Committee. It appears, however, that
nothing was immediately done to implement Resolution No. 8-1-
ISSUE
91.
WON Peña should be disbarred on the ground of deceit,
- At the MTRCB meeting of 19 January 1993, MTRCB Chair
malpractice and gross misconduct
Mendez was informed about Resolution No. 8-1-91. An Ad Hoc
Committee composed of MTRCB members was then constituted
HELD
to look into the appointments extended by former Chairman
NO.
Morato, as well as the qualifications of the appointees.
Reasoning
- The Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the
***Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest,
approval of the appointments, except that of Corpuz and seven
undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of preserving
others
courts of justice from the official ministration of the persons
- On 27 July 1993, Corpuz and one Larry Rigor filed a complaint
unfit to practice them.
with the CSC requesting a formal investigation and hearing. In
- Complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that
her comment to the complaint, Mendez stated that she
respondent really induced it, through machination or other
discovered that the appointments extended by Morato were not
deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter of authority
submitted to the MTRCB for approval pursuant to Section 5(c) of
ostensibly for the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then
P.D. No. 1986; hence to cure the defect, she submitted the
using the very same letter for demanding agent’s
appointments to the MTRCB.
compensation.
- On 31 August 1993, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 93-
- No evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or
3509 granting the MTRCB authority to fill up positions vacated in
gross misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is one
the agency due to appointments, which were not submitted to
thing to allege deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct, and
the MTRCB for approval. In the Resolution of the CSC dated
another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts
December 23, 1993, they ruled that: The appointment of Atty.
constituting the same.
Corpuz, if defective, could have been the subject of a direct
- The letter, from respondent’s own admission, just served to
action for revocation or recall which may be brought to the
officially confirm a done deal. It was, hence, utilized solely as
Commission within a reasonable period of time after its approval.
documentary evidence to buttress respondent’s assertion
. . Since no such action was filed with the Commission, we can
regarding the existence of the agency agreement. (Respondent
safely state that Corpuz had already acquired security of tenure
here is not suing by virtue of the letter of authority as what the
in the said position. Hence, the Commission can not allow the
Complainant is saying, but grounded on the oral contract of
current Board's disapproval of the said appointment to produce
agency the two purportedly entered into.
any effect. Atty. Corpuz can no longer be separated from the
LEGAL PROFESSION
service except for cause and after observing the requirements of
due process.
- The MTRCB filed with us a special civil action for certiorari,
which we referred to the CA in view of Republic Act No. 7902. In
its decision, the CA declared null and void Resolution No. 93-
5964 of the CSC, ruling that since the appointment of Corpuz
was not approved by the MTRCB, the appointment was invalid
and he could not invoke security of tenure. The record shows
that the appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the Board,
as mandated by PD 1986 Sec16. As such, he cannot invoke the
security of tenure, even if he has rendered service for a number
of years.
- Corpuz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He
then filed an instant petition under Rule 45 RoC and asked the
Court to reverse the decision of CA on the ground that: “THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT
OF PETITIONER ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ DID NOT HAVE THE
APPROVAL OF THE MTRCB BOARD WHICH IF NOT CORRECTED, IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO SECURITY OF TENURE”
- In his memorandum, he declared that he is no longer seeking
reinstatement but for the continuity of his government service
from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time he was
permanently employed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE
WON Corpuz can invoke security of tenure
HELD
Ratio
No, he cannot invoke security of tenure.
Reasoning
- There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB
personnel, other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation
by the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing of the
appointment paper, which is among his powers under Section
5(d); and (b) approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the
appointment.
- It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that
where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee
has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the
commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or
confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the
commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only
when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the
appointment becomes complete when the last act required of
the appointing power is performed. Until the process is
completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the office
nor invoke security of tenure.
- A public official or employee who assumed office under an
incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the
duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he
assumed office under color of a known appointment which is
void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise.
Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto
officer.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and
the assailed decision of 13 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP-No. 37694 is AFFIRMED.
HILADO V DAVID
TUASON;1949
NATURE
Original action. Certiorari
FACTS
- Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action Against Selim Jacob
Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed by
her now deceased husband during the Japanese occupation.
- In the course of the case, Hilado consulted respondent Vicente
J. Francisco with regard the case filed against Assad despite the
fact that she had previously retained a different set of lawyers to
act on her behalf. Francisco claims that at the time, he already
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
advised her that her case cannot prosper on the basis of what
was told him by her.
- In any case, Hilado brought to his office documents related to
the case. Francisco claims that these documents were received
by his assistant. Atty Agrava. When advised of the same, he
instructed Atty. Agrava to return the documents as the firm will
not handle her case against Assad.
- Atty Agrava thought that in returning the documents a proper
explanation be made as to why the firm is not taking her case.
Atty. Francisco signed the letter to Hilado without reading the
same.
- On January 28, 1946, Atty Francisco entered his appearance as
attorney of record for Assad in the case instituted by Hilado.
- On May 29, 1946, the lawyers of Hilado wrote Francisco urging
him to discontinue representing Assad on the grounds that he
was consulted by Hilado with regard to her case. and that during
the consultation, certain documents were turned over to him.
- When Francisco did not reply, Hilado’s lawyers, on her behalf,
filed this original action.
ISSUE
WON Francisco should be disqualified from representing his
clients against Hilado
HELD
Ratio
- Yes. Based on the facts, a relationship of attorney and client
between Francisco and Hilado ensued when he issued the
written opinion to Hilado. The letter binds and estops him in
acting for others against Hilado.
Reasoning
- The SC noted that it is in the interest in the administration of
justice that lawyers are viewed without reproach in their
actuations. Hence, even if it were true that what was given to
Francisco were facts that were already public knowledge, there
is no way of knowing if this was in fact the case.
- In citing jurisprudence on the matter, the court held that a
lawyer is engaged professionally when he is just in fact listening
to a client’s preliminary statement of his case or when he is
giving advice thereon. That formality is not the essence of
employment.
- The fact that the action against Francisco was brought four
months after he filed in appearing in the case does not operate
as a waiver of Hilado’s right to ask for his disqualification. The
confidence once reposed cannot be divested by expiration of
professional employment. The Court also stated that in matters
of the practice of law the jurisdiction of the court is pervasive.
This flows from the fact that lawyers are officers of the court
where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law
for the administration of justice and as such are subject to the
disciplinary authority of the court.
- The Court then expounded on the nature of the “retaining fee”
as a means of compensating the lawyer who was asked to give
professional advise to the detriment of the lawyer not being able
to act as counsel for the other side, even if he has declined to
perform the services required by the original client. The fee is
separate from the fee that a client is obligated to pay the lawyer
for the services which he was retained to perform.
GENATO V SILAPAN
PUNO, July 14, 2003
NATURE
Complaint for disbarment
FACTS
Complainant’s Side
- July 1992, respondent allegedly asked the complainant if he
could rent a small office space in complainant’s building in
Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and
introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant’s
retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building
and made him handle some of complainant’s cases.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as
down payment for the purchase of a new car. In return,
respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the
amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest
on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house
and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that
it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the
Quezon City Register of Deeds.
- The respondent bought the car but the document of sale was
issued in the complainant’s name and financed through City
Trust Company.
- January 1993: respondent introduced to complainant a certain
Emmanuel Romero who wanted to borrow money from
complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from
this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount
of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay
respondent’s arrears with the car financing firm.
- Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the
car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant.
Complainant tried to encash respondent’s postdated check with
the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent’s account
therein was already closed.
- Respondent failed to heed complainant’s repeated demands for
payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against
respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil
case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
- In the foreclosure case, the respondent alleged that the
complainant is engaged in buy and sell of deficiency taxed
imported cars, shark loans and shady deals, and has many cases
pending in court, which the complainant denied, adding that the
allegations were libelous and were irrelevant to the foreclosure
case. A particular allegation states that in one case, the
complainant would only give the respondent the document of
sale of the car if the latter would bribe the review committee of
the DOJ for a case of the complainant. According to the
complainant, the allegation was, aside from being false,
immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to
defame him, the respondent was also guilty of breaking their
confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held
administratively liable.
- the complainant then filed this complaint for disbarment,
praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against
respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check
Respondent’s Side
- It was complainant who offered him an office space in his
building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed
with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case filed against
complainant.
- There was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest
business practices to complainant and his revelation of
complainant’s desire to bribe government officials in relation to
his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these
statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his
case and discredit complainant’s credibility by establishing his
criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws.
He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential
lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the
disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
- Respondent asserted that he executed the real estate
mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration and only
as a “formal requirement” so he could obtain the P200,000.00
loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the
mortgaged property to complainant.
- Respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not
for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as “some kind of
acknowledgment” that he already received in advance a portion
of his attorney’s fees from the complainant for the legal services
he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not
abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.
- Respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission
from Romero’s loan which he allegedly helped facilitate, alleging
that the amount paid to him was for attorney’s fees. He used this
amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the
car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring
ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted
that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the
termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling
as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped
paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that
he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a
complaint for libel against him.
- October 27, 1993: the Court referred the administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
- August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the
report of the investigating commissioner finding the respondent
guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUES
1. WON the court has the jurisdiction to sanction respondent for
his issuance of the bouncing check
2. WON the respondent committed a breach of trust and
confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and
disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case, and thus would be
sanctioned
HELD
1. NO, it is not for the Court to sanction respondent for his
issuance of a bouncing check, which would be determined by the
trial court.
Ratio We shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal
and civil cases pending between the parties. It is for the trial
courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of
the allegations made therein.
2. YES, respondent’s allegations and disclosures in the
foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.
Ratio A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Reasoning Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The
long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to
disclose communications made to him in his professional
character by a client, unless the latter consents.
-The obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a
client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection
given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client.
-However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to
those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a
fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the
complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in
relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the
privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to
advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is
not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strict
sense.
-The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as
they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper
for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation
therein and respondent’s professional competence and legal
advice were not being attacked in said case.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L.
Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court
Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO V AQUINO
TEEHANKEE; April 29, 1971
NATURE
An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of the
Court of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly
entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS
Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were
appointed co-special administrators of the estate of Luis
Domingo, Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a money claim on the estate. CFI
approved the money claim of Aquino. Both parties appealed to
the CA. CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in favor of
Aquino (allowed compounded interest). The estate's counsel in
the CA, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy
of the judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's
attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower
court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally
informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment. Consuelo
Domingo de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA an
"Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with
a copy of the Judgment," stating that Asuncion Domingo Sta.
Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with the
permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr.
(who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed
from his trust by the intestate court, for having squandered cash
funds of the estate, that, as a consequence, she was appointed
judicial administratrix and has since been administering the
estate alone; that as judicial administratrix, she wished to file a
motion for reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed
to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty.
Unson and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be
substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her
counsel be served with copy of the CA’s decision. CA denied
motion for reconsideration. After almost 5 mos. and after
respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for
execution of the judgment, petitioner filed this petition alleging
that CA decision was entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion. This was opposed by Aquino on the
ground of finality.
ISSUE
WON CA’s decision has become final
HELD
YES
Ratio CA decision has become final and executory in
accordance with the Rules of Court and since no appeal was
filed.
Reasoning Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and
delay was without legal basis. Petitioner’s motion for substitution
filed with the appellate court after its decision recognized the
fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its
adverse decision and petitioner merely expressed her wish to
belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the
petitioner estate. She was apparently resigned to the futility of
filing any such motion, in view of the finality of the appellate
court's decision — for such motion was never filed. She cannot
use as an excuse the substitution of administrators/counsels.
The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the
counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court
and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. He was
representing the estate and not the administrator, Luis Domingo,
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Jr., so that even after latter’s removal, the former remains to be
counsel of estate. No withdrawal as counsel or petition for
change of counsel was filed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Notice and copy of the CA's decision were duly served by
registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address
of record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of
Court. And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered
mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's
counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the
addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the
first notice of the postmaster. The present administratrix gives
no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself
vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal or to then
engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court.
Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioner’s counsel shall pay
treble costs for falsely representing to the SC that the CA had
granted “new and further relief” to Aquino when, in fact, he had
duly prayed for the relief awarded and for filing unmeritorious
cases that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction
issued on Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved.
MONTANO V IBP
KAPUNAN, May 21, 2001
FACTS
- Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his
counsel in collaboration with Atty. Gerona in a case pending
before the Court of Appeals wherein the complainant was the
plaintiff-appellant.
- The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount
of P15,000, 50% of which was payable upon acceptance of the
case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the
case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount
of P7,500
- Even before Atty. Dealca had prepared the appellant’s
brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining
balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty.
Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant.
- Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.
- Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, Atty. Dealca
again demand payment of the remaining balance of 3,500.
- When complainant was unable to do so, lawyer
withdrew his appearance as complainant’s counsel without his
prior knowledge and/or conformity.
- Montano claimed that such conduct exceeded the
ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the
latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later
on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum
penalty of disbarment.
- IBP conducted investigation, report and
recommendation. It found respondent counsel guilty of
unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be
“severely reprimanded.”
- IBP Board of Governors resolved that the penalty be
amended to 3 months suspension from the practice of law.
- Atty. Dealca sought reconsideration saying:
> Complainant went to him just to prepare and submit
complainant’s appellant’s brief on time at the agreed
fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its
completion
> He was able to finish the appellant’s brief ahead of its
deadline, so he advised the complainant about its
completion with the request that the remaining balance
of P7,500.00 be paid.
> Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay
the P3,500.00 “tomorrow” or on “later particular date.”
This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly
until the last day of the filing of the brief.
> Even without being paid completely, he, of his own
free will and accord, filed complainant’s brief on time;
Such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now
ISSUE
LEGAL PROFESSION
WON Atty. Dealca’s conduct just and proper
HELD
No. We find Atty. Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of
the legal profession.
- Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
- Although he may withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the
circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal
was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay
him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest
efforts to fulfill his obligation.
- Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.
- Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a
penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty,
such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired. Reprimand is deemed sufficient.
OBANDO V FIGUERAS
NARVASA; 1990
NATURE
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, seeking to annul a
Decision of the CA which affirmed dismissal, without prejudice,
of Petitioner Felizardo Obando’s action for annulment of contract
and reconveyance earlier ordered by the RTC of QC.
FACTS
- 1964: Alegria Figueras and her stepsons Eduardo and Francisco
filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her
deceased husband Jose Figueras.
- pending settlement of the estate, Alegria died. Eduardo
assumed administration of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria.
- Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to
be Alegria’s Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo Obando,
Alegria’s nephew (herein petitioner)
- the alleged Will bequeathed to Obando properties left by the
Figueras couple, including 2 parcels of land in Quezon City.
- Probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings,
and Obando was appointed as Eduardo’s co-administrator of the
joint estates.
- upon investigation, the NBI found the Will was a forgery, which
led to the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of
a public document
- 1990: probate court denied Eduardo’s Motion for authority to
sell the parcels of land. Despite denial, he sold the lots to Amigo
Realty Corporation, on the strength of an Order issued by the
probate court in 1991. New titles were issued in the name of
Amigo Realty.
- 1992: Petitioner Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir
of Alegria, filed Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty
(respondents), for the nullification of the sale.
- 1997: the probate court removed Obando from his office as co-
administrator.
- Consequently, respondents filed Motion to Dismiss, based on
Obando’s loss of his legal standing to pursue the case.
- 1993: Trial Court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil
case
- Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied.
- CA dismissed Obando’s Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
- rejected Obando’s contention: that he did not lose his legal
personality to prosecute the civil case, since there was no
categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery,
and its probate was still pending
- affirmed the dismissal of the action because the probate
court’s Order alluded to the fact that the Will was a forgery.
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- that the probate of the Will had not been decided on
the merits did not change the fact that the probate
court had removed Petitioner Obando as co-
administrator.
Petitioners' Claim
-Assignment of Errors:
Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners:
(1) whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer
who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record; (2)
whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings
were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the
conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification
and the revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of
which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the
civil case; and (4) whether there was a conflict between the
Order dismissing the civil case and the previous actions of the
trial court.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer
who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record
2. WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings
were already made can still be granted
3. WON that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the
civil case because Obando's conviction for estafa through
falsification was still on appeal
4. WON trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its
previous rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993,
it granted Eduardo's later Motion to Dismiss
HELD
1. the lawyer was still Eduardo’s counsel of record.
Ratio Representation continues until the court dispenses with
the services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138
of RoC. Counsel may be substituted only with the ff requisites:
(1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2)
the client’s written consent is obtained; (3) the written consent
of the lawyer to be substituted is secured
Reasoning Eduardo did not dismiss his Atty (Yuseco). The
Motion to Dismiss was beneficial to respondent Eduardo, he had
no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an atty.
who has been dismissed by a client is allowed to intervene in a
case in order to protect the client’s rights. In this case, any
irregularity should have been raised by respondent Eduardo, and
not the petitioners.
2. YES
Ratio if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the
pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the
defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even
after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading.
Reasoning The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon
the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be
filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading.
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has
allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction,22 (2) litis pendentia,23 (3) lack of
cause of action,24 and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that
would constitute a ground for dismissal.25 Except for lack of
cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section
1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal
is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the
reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.26
- the respondents did not waive their right to move for the
dismissal of the civil case based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal
capacity. It was only after he had been convicted of estafa
through falsification that the probate court divested him of his
representation of the Figueras estates. It was only then that this
ground became available to the respondents. Hence, it could not
be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss
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filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff
loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in
the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file
a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary
period for filing a responsive pleading.
3. NO.
Ratio When an appointment as co-administrator of an estate is
revoked by a probate court, a final conviction in a criminal case
has nothing to do with such revocation.
Reasoning This argument has no bearing at all on the
dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner Obando derived his power
to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his
appointment as co-administrator.27 When the probate court
removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked
the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he
could not continue prosecuting the civil case.28 Thus the trial
court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.29
Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a
proper issue in this Petition. He should raise the matter in his
appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the
Figueras estates.
4. NO. There is no conflict between these court rulings.
Reasoning they were based on different grounds. The first
Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time, Petitioner
Obando still had legal capacity to sue as co-administrator of the
Figueras estates. The second Motion was granted because the
probate court had already removed him from his office as co-
administrator. The change in his legal capacity accounts for the
difference in the adjudication of the trial court.
Disposition the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.