WARREN - Citizen Participation and Democractic Deficits. Considerations From The Perspective of Democratic Theory PDF

PROOF
Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Appendices
List of Abbreviations
Notes on the Contributors
Acknowledgments
vii
ix
x
xi
xii
xvii
Introduction
Joan DeBardeleben and Jon H. Pammett
Part I
1
Defining the Participation Gap
15
Citizen Participation and Democratic Deficits:

Considerations from the Perspective of Democratic Theory
Mark E. Warren
17
The Decline of Political Participation: An Empirical Overview

of Voter Turnout and Party Membership
Alan Siaroff
41
Part II
Voter Turnout: Understanding the Decline
61
Turnout in Electoral Democracies Revisited

Andr Blais and Agnieszka Dobrzynska
63
Where Turnout Holds Firm: The Scandinavian Exceptions

Jrgen Elklit and Lise Togeby
83
New Members, Old Issues: The Problem of Voter Turnout in

European Parliament Elections
Joan DeBardeleben and Lawrence LeDuc
Part III
6
Parties as Vehicles of Participation
Party Membership and Activism in Comparative Perspective

Paul Whiteley
106
129
131
PROOF
vi
Contents
Models of Party Organization and Europarties

Luciano Bardi and Enrico Calossi
Grassroots Participation and Party Leadership Selection:

Examining the British and Canadian Cases
William Cross and John Crysler
Part IV Beyond Elections and Parties: Innovations

in Activating Citizens
9
151
173
195
Participation and the Good Citizen

Jon H. Pammett
197
10
Institutionalizing Participation through Citizens Assemblies

Jonathan Rose
214
11
Citizen Involvement in Constitutional Politics:

European and Canadian Experiences
Lawrence LeDuc
233
Youth Engagement, Civic Education, and New Vehicles

of Political Participation
Eileen Saunders
257
12
Bibliography
Index
276
297
PROOF
Part I
Defining the Participation Gap
PROOF
1
Citizen Participation and
Democratic Deficits:
Considerations from the
Perspective of Democratic Theory
Mark E. Warren
Are there political problems faced by the developed democracies to which

more citizen participation is the answer?1 From the perspective of democratic theory, the answer is clear and long-standing. Governments should
be responsive to citizens as a consequence of their participation, through
elections, pressure, public deliberation, petitioning, or other conduits.
For these forms of participation to function democratically, all potentially
affected by the decisions of a government should have the opportunity
to influence those decisions, in proportion to their stake in the outcome. From a normative perspective, governments are in democratic
deficit when political arrangements fail the expectation that participation should elicit government responsiveness. From an empirical
perspective, governments are in democratic deficit when their citizens
come to believe that they cannot use their participatory opportunities
and resources to achieve responsiveness. From a functional perspective,
governments are in democratic deficit when they are unable to generate
the legitimacy from democratic sources they need to govern.
My aim in this chapter is to clarify the question of democratic deficits
as they relate to the participatory elements of democracy. What would it
mean to understand the participatory features of the developed democracies as in deficit? To address this question, I distinguish two kinds of
participatory issues within the broader problem of democratic deficits.
The first, deficits in formal institutions of electoral democracy, is well theorized and well researched. The second is more recent and distinctive:
deficits have appeared in the many new forms of citizen engagement,
which have developed in response to deficits in electoral democracy.
Following this distinction, I suggest that each kind of deficit requires
distinct, though complementary, approaches. The first kind of deficit
17
PROOF
18 Activating the Citizen
calls for institutional reforms, such as the redesign of electoral systems, parliamentary institutions, and basic constitutional changes, so
that they are more responsive and have greater capacities for information gathering, deliberation, and policy formation. The second kind of
deficit calls for what I shall call the retrofitting of existing institutions:
designing new forms of democracy that supplement and complement
the formal institutions of electoral democracy, primarily in those functional policy areas where electoral institutions now have weak capacities
to generate democratic legitimacy.
The concept of a democratic deficit

The term democratic deficit originated in discussions about the political integration of the European Union (EU) (Bellamy and Castiglione,
2000). As a problem frame, the EU debate does not directly generalize to the developed democracies, as the EU is not a state but rather a
federation that emerged as a consequence of market integration under
the direction of the European Commission. The claim that the EU was
in democratic deficit reflected not a democratic past that was eroding,
but rather the growing democratic expectations that came with political
integration, combined with institutions the European Parliament in
particular that can and should be measured according to democratic
norms. Measured in these terms, the EU was (and is) found wanting,
with expectations evolving more quickly than the institutions. In the
early 1990s, permissive consensus, which enabled the elite-brokered
rule that underpinned the EU, was thrown into question by the Danish
and French referendums on the Maastricht Treaty (Norris, 1997). It is
unclear whether representative institutions can generate the legitimacy
needed to replace the permissive consensus. Turnout for European Parliament elections is low, and parties focused on Europe-wide issues have yet
to form, leaving candidates to focus on national issues. Much policy continues to be formed by relatively independent regulatory commissions.
There is little worry that the EU might become an illegitimate tyranny:
Its structure is relatively safe in that it is well checked by national governments, judicial review, and elections (Moravcsik, 2002). But it is not
clear whether the EU can find the democratic legitimacy to push forward
with a deeper integration since it lacks the responsive flexibility that a
confident and connected people will give its government (Follesdal and
Hix, 2006; Pammett, this volume).
Although the institutional differences between the EU and the established democracies do not allow direct comparison, at a broader level
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
19
the EU serves as a limiting metaphor for a more general condition. It is

in this sense that the democratic deficit metaphor is apt, as it suggests
a set of problems that are well short of crisis. Neither the EU nor the
established democracies the vast number of which are EU members
are failing. Over the last several decades, there has been little to bear
out the 1975 predictions of the Trilateral Commissions Crisis of Democracy, which expressed the fear that an excess of political demand would
cause democratic institutions to revert to authoritarianism. The problems of the developed democracies today are less dramatic, consisting of
a widespread citizen malaise with respect to the formal institutions and a
common view held by citizens that political institutions underperform.
The deficit concept suggests that we think about democratic malaise
structurally, as a misalignment between citizen capacities and demands,
and in terms of the capacities of political institutions to aggregate citizen
demands and integrate them into legitimate and effective governance.
From this perspective, the EU challenges look much like those common to the developed democracies. The list is well known. As it must
protect national identities and interests as well as minorities, the EU
cannot function in a majoritarian manner and thus lacks the capacity
for decisiveness. It handles some protections through federal structures,
others though subsidiarity, and still others through independent judicial review. Most developed democracies are evolving along similar
trajectories. In addition, the EU functions to regulate trade and market integration, responding less to citizens than to market forces, which
in itself requires regulatory processes that are relatively insulated from
politics including democratic politics. It is likewise for the developed
democracies. Finally, over the last half century or so, governing has
become increasingly technical and complex: No citizen can hope to
know more than a tiny fraction of the business of government. The
result, of course, is that government is very much a matter for experts,
who at best attempt to uphold the public trust and at worst govern as
disconnected technocrats.
Our received models of electoral democracy have had the advantage
of clear lines of direction from, and accountability to, majorities or
majority coalitions. Outside of questions about whether majoritarianism should be equated with democracy (it should not), the electoral
machinery of democracies is an increasingly poor fit with the complex,
pluralistic, multi-level business that governing has become. Societies
now seem to be developing more rapidly than their institutions of government in terms of citizen expectations and values, complexity and
demands for sophisticated performances, pluralism, and levels and scales
PROOF
of organization. Under these circumstances, the most common and least

costly form of citizen participation voting for representatives has less
functional value.
Yet these developments do not make citizen participation less important for governing. It is because democracies build in responsiveness
and accountability to the people that they have reflexive capacities
to form collective wills. Democracies enable their societies to benefit
from evolving consensus where possible. Where consensus remains elusive, democracies transform conflict into public discourse and argument,
where it can serve a creative rather than destructive role. At the limit,
democratic deficits undermine the capacities of democratic political systems to evolve and reform into ever more effective and legitimate agents
of citizens. The notion of a democratic deficit calibrates the problem: The
misalignment in the established democracies is not a crisis. Rather, there
are long-term problems, which, if left unattended, are likely to gradually
undermine the legitimacy and capacities of governments.
What should we expect? Participation and trust

To what extent can democratic deficits be narrowed through more citizen
participation? This dimension of the question also requires perspective,
since the same trends that open deficits may also limit participatory
responses. Those who first emphasized the complexity of governing
and its strategic consequences Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter
concluded that effective citizen participation was limited to choosing an
elite in competitive elections. In the face of governing structures that
depend upon professionals and favour concentrated power, citizens can
at best play a passive and mostly retrospective role in checking elites who
abuse their offices. These expectations have empirical relevance even
today. In a study of citizen views of participation in the United States,
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that citizens do not like politics and prefer that politicians do their jobs while citizens get on with
their lives. On average, citizens are averse to conflict. They are interested neither in the constant engagement necessary to communicate
their preferences (when they have them), nor in disciplining politicians
to attend to them. Rather, they want to trust politicians to look after the
public good though, of course, their trust is often disappointed, which
in turn reinforces disaffection. Those who believe more participation is
the answer to democratic deficits, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, are
waging an uphill battle.
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
21
Although Hibbing and Theiss-Morse overstate their case (Dalton,

2007), such studies are important for calibrating expectations for participation in a healthy democracy (Van Deth, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002).
No citizen can attend to, let alone master, every decision that affects
him or her. Nor, given the range of possible activities and satisfactions
in todays societies, should we expect citizens to choose attentiveness to
politics particularly conflict-oriented politics over competing forms
of engagement: family, friends, occupations, hobbies, recreation, and
entertainment. In the developed democracies, with their high degrees of
institutional and system differentiation, political organization does not
encompass these other domains and so citizens are faced with trade-offs.
From an economic perspective, the political resources any citizen is able
to marshal will be scarce.
A good democracy should enable citizens to optimize their political
resources. Ideally, citizens should be able to focus their lowest cost
resource voting on choosing representatives who will fight most of
their battles and protect most of their interests. They may join associations that fight other battles. In both cases, citizens judge whether their
interests align closely enough with their representatives whether formally elected or informally selected that they can trust them as political
proxies (Warren, 1996, 2000). To participate in these ways, citizens do
not need to participate directly in decision making, but they do need to
know something about their representatives trustworthiness, based on
judgements about alignments of interests and values. They need to participate to the extent that they can ensure that they are, in fact, being
represented. In many areas of government typically those overseen
by executive bureaucracies or quasi-judicial commissions citizens may
simply decide that public officials share their interests and will uphold
the trust placed in them by the public. They may decide that their
representative proxies will alert them when and if their trust appears
misplaced. Under these circumstances, citizens can allocate their highcost political resources to the few areas where political conflicts matter
to them where they have reason to mistrust government or their
representatives and where their investment of knowledge, time, and
attentiveness may make a difference. In this way, a healthy democracy
enables citizens to divide their relationships to government between
those of active participation and those of trust based on informed deference. In turn, this division of labour enables citizens to deploy their
political resources to those issues that are most contested and where trust
is least warranted. The political institutions of a democracy should strive
to underwrite these participatory expectations.
PROOF
Even measured against these more modest expectations, however,

political institutions in established democracies are in deficit. The easiest form of participation, voting, has been stagnant at best in established
democracies over the last several decades (Franklin et al., 2004) and in
EU elections has been at markedly lower levels than in national votes.
Citizens are now more likely to distrust their political institutions
particularly legislatures than a few decades ago. They are more likely
to judge that government performance has deteriorated. They are less
inclined to identify with political parties, which remain the key institutions for translating public opinion into government (Pharr and Putnam,
2000; Rosenblum, 2008). As in other advanced democracies, voting
turnout in Canada has declined in recent decades, reaching a record low
at the federal level of 59.1 per cent of registered voters in 2008 (Elections
Canada, 2008). And, in Canada as in the EU, elite-brokered constitutional referendums have failed to pass muster with the voters ( Johnston,
Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte, 1996; LeDuc, this volume).
Other developments also suggest that political institutions based on
electoral representation are failing to generate the legitimacy necessary for many government functions. Innovations driven by gridlocked
government and poorly performing programmes began a few decades
ago, as evidenced by the rapid proliferation of public engagement
devices, including, for example, citizen juries and panels, advisory
councils, stakeholder meetings, professional review boards with lay
members, representations at public hearings, public submissions, citizen surveys, deliberative polling, deliberative forums, focus groups,
and advocacy group representations (Gastil and Levine, 2005; Fung,
2006a; Smith, 2005, 2009). These developments are not in themselves
evidence of democratic deficits in electoral institutions, but they do
suggest that much necessary political work generated within complex,
pluralized democracies is not accomplished through formal electoral
democracy.
While the general patterns of disaffection are clear, the causes are
not. There is disagreement as to whether the political disengagement of
citizens should be attributed to the poor performance of political institutions (Pharr and Putnam, 2000, Dalton, 2004); the increasing capacities
of new generations of better educated, more informed, less deferential
citizens to be critical of those institutions (Nevitte, 1996; Inglehart, 1997;
Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004); a broader civic phenomenon of declining
participation in the social groups and networks that are vital to fostering
norms of trust and reciprocity (Putnam, 1995, 2000); or a fundamental popular distaste for the conflict-ridden messiness of politics and a
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
23
general disinterest in public policy debates (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse,

2001, 2002).
Electoral representation deficits

Not every actionable diagnosis requires that causes be pinpointed precisely. Deficits in electoral representation are a case in point: Because
electoral representation forms the most visible connective tissue between
the people and decision makers, issues here are likely to be interconnected with most of the possible causes of democratic deficits. While
I do not address causalities here, their relevance to normative democratic theory depends on how we cast the normative expectations. What
should electoral representation achieve, normatively speaking?
All forms of electoral representation share three formal features that
specify the extent to which they have democratic content. Through
elections, representatives are authorized to represent those who inhabit
geographical constituencies. Electoral representation is held to be egalitarian and inclusive owing to the universal franchise; every member of
an electoral unit, excluding those unfit or not yet fit to exercise the
responsibilities of citizenship, is entitled to one vote. Subsequent elections function to hold representatives accountable for their performance
while in office (Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge, 2003; Urbinati and Warren,
2008; Warren, 2008). These three features include normative criteria: Institutions that are inadequate or incomplete in one or more of
these dimensions are less than democratic they are in deficit from a
democratic perspective.
In practice, democratic deficits appear in each of these three dimensions of representation (see, for example, Fung, 2006a). With respect
to authorization, for example, citizens may have unstable preferences,
which are neither adequately formed by the electoral process nor communicated by the blunt instrument of the vote. Elected leaders often
claim mandates based on very thin evidence, since voting is information
poor. Single-member plurality (SMP) systems compound the information problem by limiting the choices of voters, usually to a maximum
of two viable parties. The stagnation of voting itself diminishes the
significance of electoral authorization. In the 2008 federal election in
Canada, for example, the Conservatives were able to form a government based on a 36.6 per cent share of the vote. But because turnout
was only 59.1 per cent, the government was authorized by a mere 22.2
per cent of eligible voters. The narrowness of the mandate is carried
over into the parliament by the mechanics of the Westminster system,
PROOF
which provides few incentives for parties to form majority coalitions.

The mandate problem is somewhat mitigated by European-style proportional representation systems, which do provide parties with coalition
incentives.
Another problem is that the roles of political parties in the democratic authorization process are increasingly ambiguous. In theory,
parties put forward platforms for which they seek authorization; in
doing so, they enable voters to authorize substantive policy preferences. Yet broad declines in party identification suggest that party elites
should be less confident that votes are signalling approval or disapproval of a partys proposed policies and positions a deficit that is
particularly pronounced in Canada, where voters are four to five times
more likely to declare an absence of partisan ties than Americans or
Britons (Clarke and Stewart, 1998; Cross and Crysler, this volume).
While levels of partisan identification vary across European countries,
at the EU level citizens find it hard to view parliamentary elections as
a contest between competing political parties, partly because of the
weakness of Europe-wide party groups and partly because these elections are often understood as second order politics, that is, commentaries on national politics rather than on EU-level issues (LeDuc, 2007,
pp. 1423).
Indeed, advocacy groups are increasingly displacing political parties
as key conduits of public opinion, though we have yet to understand
and assess their connections to electoral authorization (Dalton, Cain,
and Scarrow, 2003; Whiteley, this volume). As Justin Greenwood notes
(2007, pp. 1803), at the EU level the European Commission has actively
promoted the formation of a range of Europe-wide groups or associations,
in part to gain the benefit of expert input, but also to reinforce the EUs
input legitimacy by creating a systematic and transparent process of
interaction with a range of civil society interests. Because of the weakness of elections and political parties as authorizing vehicles in the EU,
however, interaction with advocacy groups may take on an even greater
role there than in most national states.
With respect to inclusion, citizens are formally equal by virtue of the
universal franchise. In practice, however, electoral systems add several
layers of exclusion. The first layer of exclusion resides in constituency
definition: Leaving aside problems of drawing boundaries, electoral institutions represent the people only insofar as they are residents of a
particular territory. Attributes not tied to geographical residence (for
example, sex, occupation, lifestyle, class, religion, etc.) are not formally
represented (Rehfeld, 2005). The second layer of exclusion is inherent in
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
25
the design of electoral systems, simply because they function to produce

collective governing capacity under conditions of conflict. But different
systems produce different degrees of exclusion. SMP systems in particular exclude minorities. In some cases (Canada at the federal level,
for example), SMP systems exclude majorities as well, concentrating
power in the hands of representatives of a plurality of voters. In contrast, consensus-based PR systems tend on average to be more inclusive
(Lijphart, 1999). But all electoral systems produce legislative bodies that
fail the tests of descriptive representation (and thus exclude the perspectives of those most disadvantaged within society), though some systems
(party-list PR) tend to do better than others on this measure. A third layer
of exclusion concerns the locus of decision making in complex societies.
Even without the first two layers of exclusion, collective decision making
has tended to slip into the hands of administrators over the last several
decades not owing to any conspiracy or consequence of bureaucratic
power, but simply owing to a lack of legislative capacity to set more than
broad goals for the more complex work of administration. As well, in
contemporary, differentiated, market-capitalist societies, governments
are responsive to markets, which tends to undermine popular control of
gevernment (Lindblom, 2002). As a strategic consequence, some government agencies are effectively insulated from democratic control (central
banks, for example), and some government policies are responsive not
to votes or other clearly democratic inputs, but rather to those who
control productive resources. The development of the EU in response
to economic integration is a case in point (Bellamy and Castiglione,
2000). More generally, the fact that powerful EU institutions, such as
the European Commission and the European Council, are only indirectly
responsible to the public at large raises the possibility that these institutions are more responsive to well-organized interests than to the public.
The problem is not limited to indirectly responsible institutions. Even
elected representative institutions respond better to intense and wellorganized special interests than to latent interests, unorganized interests,
and public goods. Because pressure groups tend to represent those with
the resources to organize and who care intensely about a single issue, constituency communication may systematically disadvantage public-will
formation around common goods. That said, the Commissions efforts
to increase transparency and establish criteria to help assure that groups
represent their claimed constituencies are reforms that support inclusion
(Greenwood, 2007).
With respect to accountability, the picture is also mixed. On the one
hand, the sheer amount of electing has increased steadily in the EU,
PROOF
Canada, and other OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development) countries over the last several decades so much so that
while voter turnout has been declining in most elections, the number
of times citizens vote (their number of trips to the polls) has actually
increased over the last several decades (Dalton and Gray, 2003). On
the other hand, while there are many ways and means of introducing
accountability, the vote is often a weak mechanism. Voters are often
inattentive, information is incomplete, and other forms of power permeate the system, including actors with capacities to provide or withhold
economic resources and administrative officials who have knowledge
that representatives cannot match. Citizens often demand contradictory
things from government, such as first-rate health care and schools combined with low taxes. And while elections may serve to aggregate preferences into competing packages, they are not very good instruments for
stimulating deliberative consideration of collective goals and trade-offs.
Still, there are important differences in the kinds of accountability
electoral systems can provide. Westminster systems, for example, specialize in strong retrospective accountability, owing to strong institutional
connections between electoral parties and the power of the majority
party in parliament to govern. But the costs to inclusion and other forms
of accountability are high. In Canada, it is unusual for a government
to represent a majority of voters, owing to a combination of regionally strong parties and SMP. Only three times in Canadas history have
governments based their power on a majority of voters. When this fact
is combined with the Westminster-style concentration of power in the
Office of the Prime Minister, the typical effect is to sever representative
linkages to the majority of citizens. The system fails in the deliberative dimension of accountability as well: Legislatures should have a
deliberative element, which serves a democratic function by displaying
before the public reasons for decisions and decision making (Urbinati,
2006). Because Westminster systems concentrate power in the Office of
the Prime Minister, decisions are announced and then defended. In a
pure Westminster model, parliament itself is a weak policy-making body,
empowered only to say yes or no and lacking the power or capacity to
formulate decisions in deliberation with the affected publics. Because
Westminster systems concentrate power, there are few incentives for
power holders to seek out information or deliberate policy options even
in the semi-public forums of parliamentary committees, let alone the
public forum of the legislature (Peters, 1997). Accountability to citizens
is after the fact; when governments miscalculate as they often do without inclusive linkages to citizens they find themselves left with angry
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
27
or disaffected publics. Of course, this is an all-other-things-being-equal

kind of diagnosis: These effects are mitigated, for example, by minority government, federalism, senate reform, and parliamentary reform
though many of these characteristics, adopted in the absence of other
reforms, are just as likely to produce stalemate as performance, further
eroding legitimacy.
Those EU countries that use PR systems present a different kind of
accountability problem. Styles of decision making tend to be more
consensual and deliberative, no doubt a structural consequence of
the coalition building required by PR systems as well as systems with
effective dual chambers (Lijphart, 1999; Steiner, Bachtiger, Sporndli, and
Steenbergen, 2004). For the same reasons, however, it is difficult for citizens to hold any particular party responsible for policies that are often
brokered not only among coalition partners, but also between chambers,
or (in some cases) between executives and legislatures. The trade-offs
between accountability and institutional complexity are characteristic
of the EU as well. As DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann point out, in a
complex system like that of the EU, it is difficult to hold any particular
institution or individual accountable since it is difficult to trace political
acts to identifiable agents. Referring to multi-level governance systems,
which include the EU and federal states like Canada, DeBardeleben and
Hurrelmann also note that blame shifting by authorities at various levels
in the system can be used as a political tool by political actors in the face
of unpopular policies or policy failure (2007, p. 7).
Finally, electoral representation in itself limits the deliberative dimensions of accountability (Mansbridge, 2004). Because elected representatives function within a context that combines public visibility and
adversarial relations, they must weigh the strategic and symbolic impact
of speech. Thus, representative institutions have limited capacities for
deliberation, which requires a suspension of the strategic impact of communication in favour of persuasion and argument. Because of electoral
cycles, representative institutions have limited capacities to develop and
improve public policies over a long period of time. And because representatives must attend to vested interests, representative institutions have
limited capacities for innovation and experimentation.
In short, there are good reasons to conclude that, however necessary,
the traditional and recognizable forms of democratic representation
elected officials convened in representative assemblies such as legislatures, parliaments, and councils are no longer sufficient to carry out
the normative purposes of democratic representation, at least not as
stand-alone institutions.
PROOF
Democratic deficits in the participatory response

Although these observations are not new, they do underscore the degree
to which politics and democratic demand has flowed into venues
outside of electoral representation. The developments are striking. As
Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow (2003) demonstrate, political changes that
open venues outside of electoral representation have developed rapidly
in all the OECD countries with long-standing democratic systems. On
the demand side, citizens increasingly expect to have a voice in matters
that affect them, with younger cohorts leading the way, even as they participate less in formal democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Dalton,
2007, Pammett, this volume; Saunders, this volume; cf. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse, 2002). On the supply side, decision makers have increasingly identified democratic deficits as an issue in all of the developed
democracies, in practice if not in name. Public sector decision makers
increasingly find the authority granted to them by election, appointment, or expertise insufficient for their decision making and governance
responsibilities. In most areas of public policy, decision makers have
found that standard administrative techniques based on legislative mandates are sub-optimal. They often generate unexpected opposition from
stakeholders; fail to maximize the effective and efficient use of public resources; lack the legitimacy necessary for public acceptance and
cooperation; fall short of substantive goals, such as health, public safety,
and individual development; or fail to achieve normative ideals, such as
distributive justice. Performances that publics judge to be clumsy, inefficient, wasteful, unjust, or unfair can undermine citizens confidence in
public sector organizations, and democracy is impoverished when the
citizenry lacks collective agents for public purposes.
Over the last few decades, we have seen an enormous inventiveness
in addressing these deficits through new institutions designed, in one
way or another, to involve citizens in decision making (Fung 2006b;
Parkinson, 2006; Gastil, 2008; Smith, 2009). The array of processes and
practitioners is now extensive, including, to name a few, referendums,
public hearings, public submission processes, client polling, deliberative polling, town hall meetings, citizen juries, citizen assemblies,
participatory budgeting, numerous techniques for dialogue, neighbourhood councils, and issues forums. Citizen participation and engagement
are typically understood by administrators as one among many strategies for gaining advice, co-opting pressures, and improving services, and
in this way they seek to increase the legitimacy of their policies (Brown,
2006). The frameworks of engagement usually have administrative rather
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
29
than political origins. And administrators are typically seeking citizen

input rather than citizen empowerment in decision making.
At the same time, the administrative contexts have perhaps masked
the essentially political nature of these developments. We have not
really grappled systematically with the question as to what more citizen engagement in this sense would mean for the democratic system as
a whole. But we must: these developments are likely to continue, and
insofar as democracy is deepening, much of the action is occurring here
rather than within formal representative institutions (Cain, Dalton, and
Scarrow, 2003; Warren, 2002, 2003; Fung, 2006b; Smith, 2009).
At the same time, these new arenas of democratization can cause
their own democratic deficits. Referendums, while inclusive of the entire
electorate, provide numerous opportunities for interest-group mischief
(Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Moreover, as the European constitutional referendums of 2005 demonstrated, they may produce outcomes that are
hard to interpret because they force voters into yes/no responses on issues
that are inherently complex and multi-dimensional. Many other kinds
of new opportunities for citizen participation are less inclusive because
they are based on self-selection and therefore tend to favour those who
are better educated and wealthier, generating the paradox that increasing
citizen opportunities for participation may increase political inequality
(Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow, 2003). The same dynamic of self-selection
allows the most intense interests and loudest voices to dominate, leading to the under-representation of those who are less organized, less
educated, and have fewer resources (Mansbridge, 1983). And for similar
reasons, participatory venues can increase the neglect of public goods
or increase the unjust distribution of their burdens by empowering local
resistance by well-organized groups. Forms of participation that simply
aggregate existing opinion (for example, public submissions and hearings) contribute little to the deliberative formation of preferences and
policy. And participation without power can lead to more disaffection,
as citizens go through the exercise of engaging, only to have decisions
taken elsewhere and for reasons unrelated to citizen input (Abelson and
Eyles, 2002; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). Under these circumstances,
more participation can actually decrease democratic legitimacy. Finally,
participatory venues are replete with representative claims by individuals and groups, on behalf of any number of interests, identities, and
ideals. We have little understanding of what these kinds of representative
claims add to (or subtract from) democracy, in spite of their growing presence and importance (Rubenstein, 2007; Urbinati and Warren,
2008).
PROOF
What should be done?

These considerations should help disaggregate the question about
whether more citizen participation will reduce democratic deficits. There
are at least two general areas we need to think about, corresponding to
two distinct kinds of deficits. The first has to do with deficits in the
formal institutions of representative democracy. Democratic deficits in
electoral representation are likely to involve incremental reforms of existing institutions, in part because they are not functioning so poorly that
they are generating broad constituencies for wholesale changes, and
in part because democratizing strategies are subject to limits of scale,
complexity, and governability. Our expectations here should probably
focus on other goods necessary to a well-functioning democracy such as
more responsiveness, high capacities for inclusive deliberation of public
matters and decisions, and better performance.
The second area of deficit is in administration and governance, where
electorally based political institutions have inherent incapacities. The
potential for more citizen participation is greatest here, owing to the
close relationships between policies and interests enabled by their disaggregation and delivery (Warren, 2002). I shall thus distinguish the reform
of representative institutions from the retrofitting of these institutions
that is, upgrading their democratic capacities by supplementing them
with new democratic devices, primarily in the areas of administration
and governance. In both cases, we shall need to imagine institutional
changes that build on broader social changes including increasing
advocacy, changing norms of citizenship, and declining deference to
authority while also enhancing system performance.
Reforming institutions
It is easier to generalize about democratic deficits in the developed
democracies than about institutional reforms, since the institutional
causes of deficits vary with the kind of system. Some systems, Denmarks for example, exhibit few of the deficits evident in the other
consolidated democracies (Elklit and Togeby, this volume), probably
because of that countrys history of supplementing electoral democracy with policy-specific network governance (Srensen and Torfing,
2003). Others, such as Italys, suffer from gridlock induced by inclusion.
In the case of Canada, the institutions suffer from overly concentrated executive powers and parliaments with weak deliberative and
policy-making capacities, combined with gridlock in federalprovincial
relations. EU institutions are sui generis, although they share some of
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
31
these institutional problems of national multi-level systems such as

Canadas.
Reforms can be thought of as targeting three kinds of institutions:
electoral systems, parliamentary bodies, and constitutions.
Electoral reform
From the perspective of democratic deficits, reforms should function
to make parliaments more inclusive and deliberative, increase citizen
input into policy making, and improve and stabilize policy outcomes
(Steiner et al., 2004; Peters, 1997; Lijphart, 1999). In the Canadian
case, changing electoral systems from an SMP to a PR system such as
mixed-member proportional or single transferable vote should result in
reducing the capacities of prime ministers offices to make policy in the
absence of broad input and deliberation, since powers are more likely to
be shared among coalition partners. In addition, fixed election terms are
likely to reduce the strategic powers of executives. Both reforms should
increase the inclusiveness of electoral representation, which would in
turn stabilize and probably improve policy outputs.
Although these reforms might produce parliaments that are more
inclusive and deliberative, the impact of electoral reform on citizen participation is likely to be modest at best. In New Zealand, for example,
although voter efficacy and perceptions of government responsiveness
initially increased, they subsequently declined (Banducci, Donovan, and
Karp, 1999). Japanese voters have become disillusioned with their new
electoral systems dual candidacy rules, which allow candidates who have
narrowly missed out on election in a single-member district to return
to the Diet via the party list. The new rules function very much like
the old rules, in that they still protect incumbents, suppress turnover,
and encourage personalistic candidate behaviour (McKean and Schiner,
2000). The lesson may be that those changes that are politically achievable are those that are not likely to have a dramatic impact on political
elites and other vested interests.
But even well-designed electoral reforms are unlikely to close democratic deficits. Nor should we expect them to: Given the complexity and
scale of government within pluralized contexts populated by multiple
powers and actors, it seems unlikely that the standard model of representative democracy voters elect representatives who develop policy
guidelines and direct administrators to execute them can ever again be
adequate, if indeed it ever was. Nonetheless, even if electoral reforms are
not sufficient, they may be necessary particularly in SMP systems to
keep democratic deficits from growing.
PROOF
Parliamentary reforms
Once voters elect their representatives, the bodies within which they
serve should function to form their interests and values into public wills. The design of parliamentary bodies makes a difference. In
the Westminster cases (Canada and the United Kingdom), parliaments
should be strengthened as policy-making bodies in order to balance
the powers of prime ministers offices, increase effective representation,
and develop greater capacities for deliberation. These kinds of capacities can be increased through a number of reforms, including relaxing
party discipline and strengthening parliamentary committees (Special
Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, 1985; Martin, 2002;
Commission on Legislative Democracy 2004). In addition, stronger freedom of information and sunshine legislation would reduce the capacities
of executives to use information for strategic reasons, while increasing
the numbers of informed participants in political processes though
these are likely to be groups and parties rather than individual citizens
(Cain, Egan, and Fabbrini, 2003).
Efforts within the EU to strengthen the role of the European Parliament
would be another example of this type of reform. Since the parliament
was made a popularly elected body in 1979, its role has been gradually
extended. With the adoption of the Reform Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon), the
parliament will take on a further enhanced role in legislation alongside
the council, and the Commission would be made formally responsible
to it. In addition, the parliament would also elect the president of the
Commission based on a recommendation of the Council (Benz, 2008).
These treaty changes, akin to constitutional changes in a national polity,
are also efforts to address the EUs democratic deficit.
Constitutional reforms
From a democratic perspective, there may be new roles for checks and
balances, which can increase the inclusiveness and responsiveness of
political systems by multiplying veto players, as long as mediating institutions exist to avoid conflicting mandates and gridlock, as in the case of
Germany. In Canada and the United Kingdom, changing upper houses
into democratically elected or otherwise democratically legitimate bodies would introduce effective bicameralism, which should also increase
the inclusive and deliberative qualities of policy making (Department for
Constitutional Affairs, 2003; Gibson, 2004). As in the EU, judicial review
should continue to be strengthened and developed, in order to pluralize
and regularize points of access to the political system, while dispersing
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
33
powers of judgement (Cichowski and Stone Sweet, 2003). On average,

these reforms should increase the inclusiveness as well as the quality
of policy making. A stronger judiciary and rights-based regime should
increase the power and standing of citizens with respect to government,
which is in turn likely to show up as increased advocacy, particularly
within the arenas of administration and services.
Political party reforms

Finally, like other institutions within established political systems, political parties have real but constrained potentials for reform. Dramatic
changes in party organization of the kind that would respond to declining citizen identification are most likely to follow from changes in
electoral systems and parliamentary reforms changes that would alter
the environments and incentive structures to which parties respond. The
constraints differ by system, making it difficult to generalize about party
reform across democracies.
But even though institutional contexts vary by country, parties face
social and cultural developments across the developed democracies that
are much more comparable. Citizens are less deferential to political
elites, more plural in their identities, and more likely to attend to values
(Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004). They are increasingly postmodern in Ingleharts (1997) sense. From the citizens perspective, many representative
functions of parties are being displaced by public interest groups. At the
same time, the bases of political authority have been shifting. It is not
enough to win elections and assume power; it is not even enough to
be held to account by an opposition. Governments (and the oppositions
that hope to succeed them) must continuously explain themselves to the
public, with every piece of legislation and with every action and inaction.
From one perspective, governing appears to be a permanent campaign.
From another perspective, however, the bases of political authority have
become increasingly discursive and public in nature. Merely winning
elections no longer confers the authority necessary to govern.
For these reasons, all parties have struggled over the last few decades
to become more internally democratic as well as more attentive to
organized advocacy groups, social movements, and the media, while
retaining a cohesion sufficient to form platforms, field candidates, and
win elections (Kittilson and Scarrow, 2003). Ideally, parties would begin
to view themselves as elements of a deliberative political system that
generates public legitimacy for them and their candidates through public arguments a trend currently most advanced in American staging
PROOF
of numerous pre-election debates among candidates, organized and

moderated by citizen groups and the media (Rosenblum, 2008).
Still, because parties are creatures of the electoral system and constitutionally determined functions in government or opposition, there
are limits to their reform, particularly with regard to their functions
in connecting society and government. Parties can translate the voices
of organized interests and social movements into legislative bargaining
positions, particularly in strong party systems. They are not equipped,
however, to represent latent and disaffected interests, nor can they
engage publics directly affected by policies on an ongoing basis. Their
interests are, in the end, episodic (determined by electoral cycles) and
strategic (oriented towards winning elections). Parties succeed when they
put together winning coalitions, which means that their concerns and
platforms operate at a relatively high level of abstraction when compared to the highly differentiated responses to highly complex societies
that responsive governing requires, and of the kind provided, say, by
single-issue associations, interest groups, and social movements. Parties
are essential for democracy, but their current difficulties are unlikely to
be significantly mitigated by internal reforms.
Retrofitting institutions: supplementary democracy
Institutions can be designed to be more sensitive to information, more
deliberative, and more formally inclusive. But for these potentials to
be realized, there must be connective tissue between institutions and
society. The connective tissue needs to perform the political work of
defining and engaging the publics affected by policies. As suggested
above, over the last few decades all democratic systems have experimented with new, supplementary conduits for engaging citizens, gaining
information, and generating informed public opinion. What is distinctive about these experiments is that they have little to do with organized
party politics or formal political institutions. Most are functional and segmented by policy area (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar,
2003; Srensen and Torfing, 2003; Fung, 2006a, 2006b).
We might think about these new forms of citizen participation as
supplementary democracy consisting in devices and venues that, in
effect, retrofit formal political institutions with new capacities to gather
interests, organize latent public opinion, and, in particular, provide
governments with guidance that is not oriented towards strategic electioneering. As also suggested above, however, many of these new forms
suffer from their own democratic deficits. Each has strengths and weaknesses: They are more or less inclusive, more or less deliberative, and
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
35
more or less costly. Each form performs different kinds of political work,
from co-opting obstruction to bringing informed publics into existence
for future issues. They may generate information; they may produce
more just outcomes; they may produce legitimacy; they may institutionalize new forms of learning. Each kind of process has costs: time
and money. But many may also generate alienation, provide venues for
NIMBYism, and produce outcomes that are substantially more unjust
than professional public servants might produce if sheltered from public
pressure.
Compared to our extensive and increasingly sophisticated knowledge
of formal political institutions, understanding these new forms of citizen engagement is still in its infancy (cf. Fung, 2006b; Parkinson, 2006;
Gastil, 2008; Smith, 2009). We have more questions than answers: What
kinds of processes are appropriate for what kinds of issues? What kinds
of processes are likely to generate better rather than worse outcomes
more legitimacy, justice, or effectiveness, say given the characteristics
of the issues and the constraints of time and money?
We know pieces of the answers. For example, combining experts with
lay citizens over time within a deliberative context can overcome many
of the constraints of technical complexity. We know that processes that
depend on citizen self-selection will bias the process towards organized,
high-resource interests and that random selection can produce a closer
approximation of informed public opinion.
But we dont know how to begin with an issue and a set of goals and
then design a democratic process appropriate for these particular goals
and constraints. We do, however, have discrete pieces of knowledge and
beginnings of middle-level theories that we now need to develop into
broader theories and generalizations (Fung, 2006b; Parkinson, 2006;
Gastil, 2008; Smith, 2009).
That it is possible in principle to narrow democratic deficits through
the careful design of supplementary institutions is suggested by research
on the British Columbia Citizens Assembly, an institution created by the
British Columbia government in 2004 to produce a referendum question
on electoral reform (British Columbia Citizens Assembly, 2004; see also
Warren and Pearse, 2008; Rose, this volume). The citizens assembly
an experiment repeated in Ontario and the Netherlands included two
key innovations. The first, random selection, avoided interest-group
domination of the venue. The second, extensive learning and deliberation over a period of ten months, developed citizen expertise and a
near-consensus recommendation. A survey indicated that the citizens
of British Columbia placed an extraordinarily high level of trust in the
PROOF
assembly and its recommendation (Cutler and Johnston, 2007), a consequence of an institutional design that closely matched the purposes and
qualities of the issue.
The case of the British Columbia Citizens Assembly suggests that it
is possible in principle to design supplementary forms of democracy in
ways that directly address and affect democratic deficits. A more general understanding of supplementary democracy is, however, still in
its infancy. But we should get started, since it is likely that the longterm solutions to democratic deficits will not only reform our existing
institutions, but also retrofit them with new and innovative forms of
democracy.
Note
1. I am grateful to Joan DeBardeleben for providing many of the examples from
the European Union as well as paragraphs on pages 235, 27 and 32 and suggested wording elsewhere. I thank Hilary Pearse and Laura Montanaro for their
research assistance.
References
Abelson, J. and J. Eyles (2002) Public Participation and Citizen Governance in the
Canadian Health System, Discussion Paper 7 (Ottawa, ON: Commission on the
Future of Health Care in Canada).
Ansell, C. and J. Gingrich (2003) Reforming the Administrative State in B. E. Cain,
R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), pp. 16491.
Banducci, S. A., T. Donovan, and J. A. Karp (1999) Proportional Representation
and Attitudes about Politics: Results from New Zealand, Electoral Studies, 18(4),
53355.
Bellamy, R. and D. Castiglione (2000) The Uses of Democracy: Further Reflections
on the Democratic Deficit in Europe in E. O. Eriksen and J. E. Fossum (eds)
Integration through Deliberation? On the Prospects for European Democracy (London:
UCL Press), pp. 6584.
Benz, A. (2008) The Treaty of Lisbon A Step towards a More Effective and Democratic European Union, EUCE Canadian Network Newsletter, 2(1), 1, 3, http://
www.euce-network.carleton.ca/newsletter/V2(1)-EUCENewsletter.pdf
British Columbia Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform (2004) Making Every
Vote Count: The Case for Electoral Reform in British Columbia, http://
www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final_report.pdf
Brown, M. B. (2006) Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation, Journal
of Political Philosophy, 14, 20325.
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
37
Cain, B. E., R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) (2003) Democracy Transformed?:

Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Cain, B. E., P. Egan, and S. Fabbrini (2003) Toward More Open Democracy:
The Expansion of Freedom of Information Laws in B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton,
and S. E. Scarrow (eds) Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
pp. 11539.
Cichowski, R. A. and A. Stone Sweet (2003) Participation, Representative Democracy, and the Courts in B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) Democracy
Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 192220.
Clarke, H. D. and M. C. Stewart (1998) The Decline of Parties in the Minds of
Citizens, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 3578.
Commission on Legislative Democracy (2004) Final Report and Recommendations,
http://www.gnb.ca/0100/FinalReport-e.pdf
Cutler, F. and R. Johnston (2008), Deliberation, Information, and Trust: The BC
Citizens Assembly as Agenda-Setter in M. E. Warren and H. Pearse (eds) Designing Democratic Renewal: The British Columbia Citizens Assembly (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), pp. 16691.
Dalton, R. J. (2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in the Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Dalton, R. J. (2007) The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation Is Reshaping
American Politics (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press).
Dalton, R. J., B. E. Cain, and S. E. Scarrow (2003) Democratic Publics and Democratic Institutions in B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) Democracy
Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 25075.
Dalton, R. J. and M. Gray (2003) Expanding the Electoral Marketplace in
B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 2343.
DeBardeleben, J. and A. Hurrelmann (2007) Introduction in J. DeBardeleben and
A. Hurrelmann (eds) Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance: Legitimacy,
Representation and Accountability in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan), pp. 114.
Department for Constitutional Affairs (2003) Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for
the House of Lords, http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/holref/index.htm
Deth, van J. (2000) Interesting but Irrelevant: Social Capital and the Saliency of
Politics in Western Europe, European Journal of Social Research, 37, 11547.
Elections Canada (2008) Table 4: Voter Turnout for the 2008, 2006, 2004, and
2000 General Elections, Fortieth General Election 2008: Official Voting Result,
http://www.elections.ca/scripts/OVR2008/default.html
Follesdal, A. and S. Hix (2006) Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU:
A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44,
53362.
Franklin, M. N., C. van der Eijk, D. Evans, M. Fotos, W. Hirczy de Mino, M. Marsh,
and B. Wessels (2004) Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition
PROOF
in Established Democracies since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Fung, A. (2006a) Democratizing the Policy Process in R. Goodin, M. Moran, and
M. Rein (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), pp. 66985.
Fung, A. (2006b) Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance, Public
Administration Review, 66, 6675.
Gastil, J. (2008) Political Communication and Deliberation (Los Angeles: Sage).
Gastil, J. and P. Levine (eds) (2005) The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies
for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-first Century (San Francisco: JosseyBass).
Gibson, G. (2004) Challenges in Senate Reform: Conflicts of Interest, Unintended Consequences, New Possibilities, Public Policy Sources, 83, http://
www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/files/ChallengesInSenateReform.pdf
Greenwood, J. (2007) Organized Civil Society and Input Legitimacy in the EU
in J. DeBardeleben and A. Hurrelmann (eds) Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel
Goveranance: Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the European Union
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 17794.
Hajer, M. A. and H. Wagenaar (eds) (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Hibbing, J. R. and E. Theiss-Morse (2001) Process Space and American Politics,
American Political Science Review, 95, 14553.
Hibbing, J. and E. Theiss-Morse (2002) Stealth Democracy: Americans Beliefs about
How Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and
Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy:
The Human Developmental Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Irvin, R. and J. Stansbury (2004) Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It
Worth the Effort?, Public Administration Review, 64(1), 5565.
Johnston, R., A. Blais, E. Gidengil, and N. Nevitte (1996) The Challenge of
Direct Democracy: The 1992 Canadian Referendum (Montreal: McGill-Queens
University Press).
Kittilson, M. C. and S. Scarrow (2003) Political Parties and the Rhetoric and Realities of Democratization in B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds)
Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial
Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 5980.
LeDuc, L. (2007) European Elections and Democratic Accountability: The 2004
Elections to the European Parliament in J. DeBardeleben and A. Hurrelmann
(eds) Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Goveranance: Legitimacy, Representation
and Accountability in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan),
pp. 13957.
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-six Countries (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press).
Lindblom, C. E. (2002) The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What To
Make of It (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Mansbridge, J. (1983) Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press).
PROOF
Mark E. Warren
39
Mansbridge, J. (2003) Rethinking Representation, American Political Science

Review, 97, 51528.
Mansbridge, J. (2004) Representation Revisited: Introduction to the Case against
Electoral Accountability, Democracy and Society, 2(1), 1213.
Martin, P. (2002) The Democratic Deficit, Policy Options, 24(1), 1012.
McKean, M. and E. Schiner (2000) Japans New Electoral System: La Plus a
Change . . ., Electoral Studies, 19, 44777.
Moravcsik, A. (2002) In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing
Legitimacy in the European Union, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40,
60324.
Nevitte, N. (1996) The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National
Perspective (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press).
Norris, P. (1997) Representation and the Democratic Deficit, European Journal of
Political Research, 32, 27382.
Norris, P. (ed.) (1999) Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Parkinson, J. (2006) Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in
Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Peters, B. G. (1997) The Separation of Powers in Parliamentary Systems in K. von
Mettenheim (ed.) Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing
Regional and National Context (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press), pp. 7683.
Pharr, S. J. and R. D. Putnam (2000) Disaffected Democracies: Whats Troubling the
Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Pitkin, H. (1967) The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California
Press).
Putnam, R. D. (1995) Bowling Alone: Americas Declining Social Capital, Journal
of Democracy, 6(1), 6578.
Putnam, R. D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (New York: Simon & Schuster).
Rehfeld, A. (2005) The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Rosenblum, N. (2008) On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and
Partisanship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Rubenstein, J. (2007) Accountability in an Unequal World, Journal of Politics, 69,
61632.
Smith, G. (2005) Beyond the Ballot: 57 Democratic Innovations from around the World
(London: The Power Inquiry).
Smith, G. (2009) Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Srensen, E. and J. Torfing (2003) Network Politics, Political Capital, and
Democracy, International Journal of Public Administration, 26, 60934.
Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (1985) Report of the
Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (Ottawa, ON: Government
of Canada).
Steiner, J., A. Bachtiger, M. Sporndli, and M. R. Steenbergen (2004) Deliberative Politics in Action: Analysing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
PROOF
Trilateral Commission (1975) The Crisis of Democracy, Task Force Report #8
(New York: New York University Press).
Urbinati, N. (2006) Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press).
Urbinati, N. and M. E. Warren (2008) The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 387412.
Warren, M. E. (1996) Deliberative Democracy and Authority, American Political
Science Review, 90, 4660.
Warren, M. E. (2000) Democratic Theory and Trust in M. E. Warren (ed.)
Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 21034.
Warren, M. E. (2002) What Can Democratic Participation Mean Today?, Political
Theory, 30(5), 678702.
Warren, M. E. (2003) A Second Transformation of Democracy? in B. E. Cain,
R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), pp. 22349.
Warren, M. E. (2008) Citizen Representatives in M. Warren and H. Pearse
(eds) Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens Assembly
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 5069.
Warren, M. E. and H. Pearse (eds) (2008) Designing Deliberative Democracy: The
British Columbia Citizens Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
PROOF
Index
advocacy groups, see pressure groups
Africa, 65
Amsterdam Treaty, see Treaty of
Amsterdam
assemblies, citizens
consultation of public, 2258
definition, 215
and democracy, 356, 230
education of members, 21925
qualities, 21617
resources, critical, 22830
see also Canada; the Netherlands
Australia, 174, 233, 245
voter turnout, see voter turnout
Austria
citizenship, extra-national, 20910
demographics, 46
parties, political: competitiveness,
47; membership levels, 53;
Socialist Party, 55
socioeconomic factors, 46
Bulgaria, 46, 47
Bush, George, 271
Canada
assemblies, citizens, 356, 215,
21730
citizenship, concepts and duties
of, 1989, 2013, 204, 20810,
211
demographics, 46
education, civic, 259, 262, 264, 265
electoral system, 234, 256, 31, 48,
163
media, 163, 266, 268, 270
parties, political: activity, 163,
1656, 168; Bloc Qubcois, 165,
176, 248; Canadian Alliance, 177,
183; competitiveness, 47;
Conservative Party, 23, 1756,
177, 1823; identification with,
24; leadership power, 1734;
leadership selection, 168, 1748,
185, 1878, 1912; Liberal Party
(federal), 1756, 1778, 1813,
184, 185; Liberal Party (Quebec),
243, 248; and media, 163;
member activity, 168;
membership levels, 133, 145;
New Democratic Party (NDP),
177, 182, 1834; Parti Qubcois,
236, 242, 243; Progressive
Conservative Party, 168, 176, 177,
1857, 188; Reform Party, 165,
243
party system, 3, 5, 234, 42, 47,
151, 163, 1656, 173, 174
political system, 23, 4, 57, 267,
30, 32, 49, 1656, 168, 192, 234,
253
pressure groups, 163, 166
referendums, 22, 233: on the
citizens assemblies
Belgium
education, civic, 262
electoral system, 48, 51, 107
parties, political: leadership
selection, 174; and media, 162;
membership levels, 53
party system, 46
political system, 49
union density, 54
Bennett, R.B., 175
Blair, Tony, 55, 180, 183, 234
Bloc Qubcois (Canada), see Canada:
parties, political
Bouchard, Lucien, 248
Bourassa, Robert, 243, 244
Brazil, 226
Britain, see United Kingdom
Brown, Gordon, 183
297
PROOF
298 Index
Canada continued
recommendations, 215; on the
Charlottetown Accord in 1992,
2346, 2425, 250, 251, 252; on
Quebec sovereignty in 1980, 248;
on Quebec sovereignty in 1995,
236, 246, 2489
youth, 7, 262, 266, 268, 270
Canadian Alliance, see Canada:
parties, political
Charlottetown Accord, 2345, 2425
Chirac, Jacques, 234, 23940
citizens
behaviours and characteristics of, 7,
202, 26, 33, 56, 133, 13240,
1456, 167, 2047, 221, 2367,
249
generations of, 7, 45, 66, 73, 8990,
114, 124, 207
and trust, 12, 203, 19, 28, 33,
356, 50, 56, 57, 88, 956, 1001,
11516, 120, 124, 143, 145, 163,
198
citizenship
and duty, 1367, 13940, 146, 197,
199204, 21011, 21920, 230,
2578, 2601, 2634
education, see education, civic
extra-national, 1979, 204, 20911,
260, 265
models of, 25961
and participation, 17, 20, 131,
13940, 146, 173, 197, 2047,
21011, 21416, 230, 233, 2513,
2578, 259, 261, 2646
see also participation deficit
Clark, Joe, 188
Clarke, Kenneth, 181
cognitive engagement model, 142, 145
Communist Party (France), see France:
parties, political
compulsory voting, see electoral
system
Conservative Party (Canada), see
Canada: parties, political
Conservative Party (United Kingdom),

see United Kingdom: parties,
political
The Council of the European Union,
154, 166; see also EU Council of
Ministers
Cyprus, 46, 48, 53
Czech Republic
citizens and trust, 96
demographics, 46
and the referendums on European
Union constitutional change in
2005, 234
Danish Peoples Party, see Denmark:
parties, political
Day, Stockwell, 192
democracy
citizen views of, 56, 88
concepts, 17, 1920, 21, 31, 61,
137, 197, 208, 21416, 230, 265
history of: in the European Union,
50, 51; in Greece, 50; and party
membership, 53; in Portugal, 50;
in post-communist countries, 50,
51, 72, 1223; in Spain, 50; in
Switzerland, 50
importance of elections to, 21, 23,
27, 1512
importance of parties to, 24, 334,
131, 138, 1456, 156, 173,
18891; see also parties, political
and functions
supplementary, 346: see also
assemblies, citizens; participation
deficits and measures to address;
parties, political and leadership
selection; referendums
see also democratic deficits;
participation deficits
democratic deficits, 1, 3, 1729, 306,
42, 1979, 233
see also democracy; participation
deficits
PROOF
Index
Democratic Party (Italy), see Italy:
parties, political
Denmark
citizens: and civic duty, 95, 99100;
and political interest, 93; and
refugee and immigration issue,
94; and trust, 956, 99100
citizenship, extra-national,
20910
demographics, 46
electoral system, 87, 91
media, 162
parties, political: Danish Peoples
Party, 945; and media, 162;
membership levels, 923;
polarization of, 55, 934
party system, 46, 165
political system, 30, 49, 91
referendums, 233: on the euro in
2000, 236, 2468, 250; on
European Union constitutional
change in 2005, 234, 241; on the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 18,
238, 245
union density, 54
disproportionality, see electoral
systems
Douglas-Home, Alec, 179
Duncan Smith, Iain, 181
Eastern Europe, 72
education, civic
goals of, 25961
and media, 26673
and schools, 2616, 272
elections
civic duty and, 95, 115,
competitiveness, 545, 101, 120,
124
decisiveness of, 4950, 63, 689,
701, 72, 112
to European Parliament, 45, 9,
1512, 163; campaigning in,
478; and citizenship,
extra-national, 21011; timing of,
111; voting procedures, 967,
299
111; see also Europarties; voter

turnout and European
Parliament
first-order, 5, 6, 86, 96, 99,
245
importance of, 6, 86, 967, 98, 115,
120
interest in, 934,
mobilization and, 910, 67, 68, 84,
989, 101, 114, 1245
second-order, 4, 24, 86, 99, 11011,
115, 118, 122, 123,
160, 163, 238, 240, 241, 242,
245, 250
third-order, 978, 99
see also electoral systems; voter
turnout
electoral systems
compulsory voting, 89, 489, 51,
63, 68, 6970, 72, 85, 91, 107,
112, 113, 242
disproportionality, 48
mixed-member proportional, 31,
68, 223, 224, 225
nature of, 221, 2234
proportional representation (PR),
24, 25, 27, 31, 48, 63, 68, 70, 72,
856, 87, 91, 112, 113, 114, 165,
221, 224
reform of, 31
representation, 237, 221
single-member plurality (SMP), 23,
25, 26, 31, 48, 182, 221
single transferable vote, 31, 113,
224
voter registration, 3, 85, 91, 114,
132
voting age, 10, 63, 68, 70, 72, 90,
112, 113, 114
Estonia
citizen interest in the European
Union, 123
demographics, 46
referendum on accession in 2003,
120
Estrada, Joseph, 271
EU Council of Ministers, 154, 166
PROOF
300 Index
Europarties
detachment from citizens, 156,
15960
development, 1514
as a distinctive party model, 1556,
170
functions, 1634, 166, 1689,
1701
participation in, 1689
summary of, 16971
European Coal and Steel Community,
152
European Commission, 18, 24, 25, 32,
50, 97, 166, 170
European Community, 1512, 170
European Convention on the Future
of Europe, 235
European Council, 25, 32, 97, 153,
169, 197
European Economic Community, 6,
197
European Parliament (EP)
and citizenship, extra-national,
21011
democratic deficit, 18, 32
elections, to, see elections
Labour Party (United Kingdom)
leadership selection and members
of, 180
power of, 32, 50, 97, 115, 153, 159,
166
promotion of, 1634
trust in, 1001, 116
European Union (EU)
citizenship: extra-national, 1978,
21011; and duty, 2034, 21011
democratic deficit, 1820, 24, 25,
27, 32, 1524, 198
electoral system, 11314
member states, new, 1089, 11625,
152, 153, 201, 2034, 209, 211,
240; see also post-communist
countries
party system, 478, 51, 1524; see
also Europarties
permissive consensus, 18, 152
political system, 46, 27, 50
referendums: on accession in 2003,
1203; on European Union
constitutional change in 2005,

29, 2336, 23742, 245, 250, 251,
253
trust in, 116
and unionization, 54
see also under individual institutions
and treaties of the European Union
Europeanization, 1523
Flanders, 20910
Fiji, 65
Finland
20910
demographics, 46
parties, political: membership
levels, 53
party system, 46
socioeconomic factors, 46, 53
union density, 54
first-order elections, see elections
France
demographics, 46
education, civic, 263, 265
electoral system, 5, 48, 113
media, 271
parties, political: Communist Party,
168, 240; competitiveness, 47;
The Greens, 113; interest
articulation and aggregation, 165;
membership, 133, 168; National
Front, 113, 165, 240; reform, 168;
Socialist Party, 55, 168, 169, 240;
Union for a Popular Movement,
240
political system, 3
referendums, 233: on European
2005, 234, 235, 23941, 245, 250,
253; on the Maastricht Treaty in
1992, 18, 238,
240, 245
Free Democratic Party (Germany), see
Germany: parties, political
PROOF
Index
301
generations of citizens, see citizens

Germany
citizen trust, 96
demographics, 46
elections, 5
parties, political: Free Democratic
Party, 168; and media, 162;
member activity, 168;
membership levels, 133; Social
Democratic Party, 168
Weimar, 42
Giscard dEstaing, Valry, 238
Gladstone, William, 178
Greece
citizens and trust, 56, 116
demographics, 46
and European Parliament election
in 2004, 110
history, democratic, 50
levels, 53
party system, 47
The Greens (France), see France:
parties, political
International Social Survey

Programme (ISSP), 8, 131, 132,
142, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 207
Internet, see media and new
Ireland
and the European Parliament
election in 2004, 110
referendums, 233, 252: on
European Union constitutional
change, 234; on the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, 238; on the Treaty
of Lisbon in 2008, 251, 252, 253;
on the Treaty of Nice in 2001,
245, 250, 252; on the Treaty of
Nice in 2002, 250, 252
Israel, 174
Italy
demographics, 46
media, 268
parties, political: coalitions, 165;
Democratic Party, 167; member
activity, 167; membership levels,
53; movements of Second
Republic, 160; Unione, 167
Second Republic, 160
and youth, 268
Howard, Michael, 181

Hungary
levels, 133
121
Japan, 31
Junker, Jean-Claude, 242
Iceland
levels, 53
interest groups, see pressure groups
Kennedy, Charles, 192

King, Mackenzie, 175
labour activity, 51, 54, 901, 86, 94,
164, 165, 177, 180, 182, 1834,
191, 246
Labour Party (Norway), see Norway:
parties, political
Labour Party (United Kingdom), see
United Kingdom: parties, political
Laeken Declaration, 235
Latin America, 85
PROOF
302 Index
Latvia
20910
demographics, 46
levels, 133
Liberal Democrats (United Kingdom),
political
Liberal Party (Canada), see Canada:
parties, political
Liberal Party (United Kingdom),
political
Lithuania, 46, 47, 1201, 124
Luxembourg
citizens and trust, 96, 107
media, 162
referendum on European Union
234, 2412, 250
Maastricht Treaty, 18, 152, 163, 166,
238, 240, 245, 251
Mali, 65
Malta
levels, 53
political system, 49, 51
socioeconomic factors, 46, 51, 53
Manning, Preston, 243, 244
McDonnell, Michael, 183
Meciar, Vladimr, 121
media
mass, 87, 93, 99, 101
and mobilization, political, 10, 11,
93, 99, 101, 138, 142, 145
new, 10, 11, 140, 142, 162, 205,
207, 229, 26872
news, 87, 99, 101, 207, 2668
and participation, 205, 207, 229

and political parties, 140, 1623,
165
and youth, see youth
Meech Lake Accord, 2345, 242, 244
Mexico, 6
mobilization, 811, 91, 86, 1202,
166, 250, 2678, 271
see also elections; parties, political
Mulroney, Brian, 242, 244
National Front (France), see France:
parties, political
the Netherlands
assembly, citizens, 35, 215, 21922,
22430
media, 162
parties, political: leadership
selection, 174; and media, 162
party system, 46
234, 235, 241, 245, 250, 252, 253
New Democratic Party (NDP), see
Canada: parties, political
New Zealand, 31, 174
North America, 6, 66, 1989, 211,
263, 267
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 6, 198
Norway
citizens: and civic duty, 95; and
political interest, 93; and trust, 96
demographics, 46
media, 162
parties, political: Labour Party, 86;
and media, 162; membership
levels, 53, 923; and refugee and
immigration policy, 94
and youth, 89, 95
PROOF
Index
Oceania, 656
Orchard, David, 188
Parti Qubcois, see Canada: parties,
political
participation deficits
description of, 1
explanations for, 47, 78, 223, 45,
536, 1456, 167, 2513
impact of, 12, 78, 412, 146
measures to address, 3, 811, 22,
289, 346, 567, 18891, 211,
233, 258, 273
and youth, 257, 2667
see also parties, political and
membership, explanations
for; voter turnout and
explanations for
parties, political, 68
citizen views on, 12, 22, 33
and the European Union, see
Europarties
functions: policy influence,
138, 154; citizen integration, 154;
citizen participation, 68, 138, 140,
1456, 1679; citizen and political
elite linkage, 1378, 146; civil
society maintenance, 131; interest
articulation and aggregation,
34, 1646; organizational
survival, 1545; personnel
recruitment, 138, 146, 173;
vote structuring, 545, 99, 1604
leadership selection, 1678, 17392
membership: characteristics, 41,
13240, 1456, 188, 191;
definition, 132; explanations for,
1, 536, 1434, 1678, 173, 187,
21415; levels, 1, 24, 41, 53, 923,
131, 145, 146, 167
and mobilization, 49, 517, 68,
925, 99, 123, 167
models of, 15460: cartel party, 155,
156, 1589, 162, 165, 169, 170;
catch-all party, 155, 158, 1601,
165; mass party, 154, 1568, 1601
presidentialization of, 1734
reform of, 334, 57, 1312, 146,
1678, 1734, 1847
303
see also under individual countries

party system, 42, 468, 51, 63, 701,
72, 112, 115
permissive consensus, see European
Union
Philippines, 271
Poland
Kaczynski,
Lech, 116
levels, 133
1201
2005, 234
Portugal
party system, 47
2005, 234
post-communist countries, 44, 467,
50, 51, 109, 11623, 1245, 133,
152, 2034, 262
see also under individual countries; see
also European Union and member
states, new
pressure groups, 24, 25, 29, 33, 34,
155, 158, 162, 163, 1645, 173
Progressive Conservative Party
(Canada), see Canada: parties,
political
proportional representation, see
electoral systems
public interest groups, see pressure
groups
referendums, 1011, 29, 2338,
24953
see also under individual countries; see
also European Union
PROOF
304 Index
Reform Party (Canada), see Canada:
parties, political
Reform Treaty, see Treaty of Lisbon
representation, see electoral systems
Romania, 46, 123
Rosebery, Lord, 178
Russia, 133
Scandanavia
see Denmark; Norway; Sweden
Scotland, 246
second-order elections, see elections
Second Republic (Italy), see Italy
Single European Act, 152
single-member plurality (SMP), see
electoral systems
Slovakia
citizen interest in the European
Union, 123
demographics, 46
121
Slovenia
party system, 46
120
social capital model, 1423, 145, 197,
266
Social Democratic Party (Germany),
see Germany: parties, political
Social Democratic Party (United
Kingdom), see United Kingdom:
parties, political
Socialist Party (Austria), see Austria:
parties, political
Socialist Party (France), see France:
parties, political
socioeconomic factors, 456, 53, 63,
668, 70, 72, 901, 99, 101, 133,
135, 145, 204
South America, 66
Spain
demographics, 46

in 2004, 110
media, 267
levels, 53; regionalist, 165
party system, 47
234, 2389, 250
youth, 267
Steel, David, 179
Sweden
citizens: and civic duty, 95; and
political interest, 93; and trust, 96
demographics, 46
in 2004, 110
media, 162, 269
parties, political: and media, 162;
membership levels, 923, 133;
and refugee and immigration
policy, 94
referendum on the euro in 2003,
236, 246, 250
union density, 54
and youth, 89, 95, 269
Switzerland
demographics, 46
history, democratic, 50, 51
party system, 67
Thatcher, Margaret, 185
third-order elections, see elections
trade unions, see labour activity
Treaty of Amsterdam, 152
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe, 233, 235, 237, 251, 252
PROOF
Index
Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 153
Treaty of European Union, see
Maastricht Treaty
Treaty of Lisbon, 32, 166, 251, 252,
253
Treaty of Nice, 245, 250, 251, 252
Treaty of Rome, 151, 153
Trudeau, Pierre, 242, 244
trust, see citizens
Turkey, 240
Union for a Popular Movement
(France), see France: parties,
political
Unione (Italy), see Italy: parties,
political
unions, see labour activity
United Kingdom
citizens: and electoral reform, 165;
and trust, 56, 96, 165
demographics, 46
education, civic, 258, 259, 2634,
265
media, 162, 266, 267, 268, 270, 271
parties, political: Conservative
Party, 55, 1789, 1801, 183, 185;
identification with, 24; Labour
Party, 55, 165, 178, 180, 182,
1834, 185, 187; leadership
selection, 167, 1745, 17881,
1878, 1912; Liberal Democrats,
17980, 183, 185; Liberal Party,
179, 184; membership levels, 133;
polarization of, 545; Social
Democratic Party, 179
party system, 47, 545, 165
referendums, 233, 234, 241
youth, 7, 266
United States
citizens: characteristics, 20
citizenship, concepts of, 200
electoral system, 34, 334, 85, 132
305
media, 162, 266, 267, 271

parties, political: identification
with, 24; leadership selection,
191; and media, 162; member
definition, 132; membership
levels, 133
and the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 6
Rock the Vote, 268
youth, 266, 267
Victoria, Queen, 178
voter registration, see electoral systems
voter turnout
Australia, 49
Austria, 44, 46, 47, 107
Belgium, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 107
Bulgaria, 46, 47
Canada, 5, 67, 22, 23, 26, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 66, 73, 83, 85, 89,
248, 250
Cyprus, 44, 46, 48
Czech Republic, 46, 11618, 124
Denmark, 44, 46, 49, 83, 85, 87, 88,
8991, 92, 96101, 107, 112, 114,
115
and electoral outcomes, 412
Estonia, 46, 47, 11618, 120, 123,
124
Europe, 4, 56, 22, 26, 65, 67, 70,
71, 723
European Parliament, 4, 18, 22, 44,
478, 51, 95, 967, 10625,
1689, 198
explanations for, 47, 10, 4451,
536, 63, 6673, 85101, 11025,
138, 167, 1689, 200, 205,
21415, 252
Fiji, 65
Finland, 44, 45, 46, 83, 88, 89,
1078
France, 44, 46, 47, 48, 165, 240, 250
Germany, 44, 46, 49, 89, 96
Greece, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 107,
114, 116
Hungary, 44, 116, 120, 121
PROOF
306 Index
voter turnout continued
Iceland, 44, 46, 49
Ireland, 44, 250
Italy, 44, 46, 48, 114
Latvia, 44, 46, 47, 116, 120
Lithuania, 44, 46, 47, 116, 1201,
124
Luxembourg, 44, 46, 48, 107
Mali, 65
Malta, 44, 46, 47, 49, 51, 65
the Netherlands, 44, 114, 124, 241,
250
Norway, 44, 46, 49, 83, 86, 88, 89,
90, 91, 93, 94, 95
Poland, 44, 46, 47, 48, 11618,
1201, 124
Portugal, 44, 47, 50, 107
post-communist countries, 44,
467, 50, 51, 109, 11623, 1245
1203
239, 240, 241, 250
Romania, 46, 123
Slovakia, 46, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124

Slovenia, 46, 116, 120, 124
Spain, 44, 46, 47, 50, 107, 239, 250
Sweden, 44, 46, 83, 88, 89, 90,
9192, 93, 94, 95, 1078
Switzerland, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51,
65, 67
the United Kingdom, 44, 46, 47, 48,
49, 55, 83, 89, 107, 114
the United States, 85, 86, 90
worldwide, 1, 656, 67, 70, 71, 723
youth, 78, 68, 83, 85, 8990, 91,
9455, 101, 114
voting age, see electoral systems
youth
and citizenship, 78, 28, 204,
2578, 25961, 273
and education, civic, see education,
civic
and media, 26672
political party membership, 945,
133, 173

WARREN - Citizen Participation and Democractic Deficits. Considerations From The Perspective of Democratic Theory PDF

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Descrição original:

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

WARREN - Citizen Participation and Democractic Deficits. Considerations From The Perspective of Democratic Theory PDF

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

PROOF

Defining the Participation Gap

Citizen Participation and Democratic Deficits:

The Decline of Political Participation: An Empirical Overview

Voter Turnout: Understanding the Decline

Turnout in Electoral Democracies Revisited

Where Turnout Holds Firm: The Scandinavian Exceptions

New Members, Old Issues: The Problem of Voter Turnout in

Parties as Vehicles of Participation

Party Membership and Activism in Comparative Perspective

Models of Party Organization and Europarties

Grassroots Participation and Party Leadership Selection:

Part IV Beyond Elections and Parties: Innovations

Participation and the Good Citizen

Institutionalizing Participation through Citizens Assemblies

Citizen Involvement in Constitutional Politics:

Youth Engagement, Civic Education, and New Vehicles

Are there political problems faced by the developed democracies to which

The concept of a democratic deficit

the EU serves as a limiting metaphor for a more general condition. It is

of organization. Under these circumstances, the most common and least

What should we expect? Participation and trust

Although Hibbing and Theiss-Morse overstate their case (Dalton,

Even measured against these more modest expectations, however,

general disinterest in public policy debates (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse,

Electoral representation deficits

which provides few incentives for parties to form majority coalitions.

the design of electoral systems, simply because they function to produce

Canada, and other OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and

or disaffected publics. Of course, this is an all-other-things-being-equal

Democratic deficits in the participatory response

than political origins. And administrators are typically seeking citizen

What should be done?

these institutional problems of national multi-level systems such as

powers of judgement (Cichowski and Stone Sweet, 2003). On average,

Political party reforms

of numerous pre-election debates among candidates, organized and

Cain, B. E., R. J. Dalton, and S. E. Scarrow (eds) (2003) Democracy Transformed?:

Mansbridge, J. (2003) Rethinking Representation, American Political Science

Conservative Party (United Kingdom),

111; see also Europarties; voter

constitutional change in 2005,

generations of citizens, see citizens

International Social Survey

Howard, Michael, 181

Kennedy, Charles, 192

and participation, 205, 207, 229

see also under individual countries

and European Parliament election

media, 162, 266, 267, 271

Slovakia, 46, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124

Você também pode gostar